

**SUPPORT TO UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS:
IS THERE A ROLE FOR
UNITED STATES
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES?**

A Monograph
By
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Special Forces



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
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Acronyms

CA	Civil Affairs
CAS	Close Air Support
CMO	Civil Military Affairs
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CST	Coalition Support Team
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
DA	Direct Action
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLT	Faction Liaison Team
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HCA	Humanitarian Civic Action
HRO	Humanitarian Relief Organizations
ISB	Intermediate Staging Base
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	Joint Task Force
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MILGP	Military Group
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCC	Non-conventional Conflict
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy

PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Volunteer Organizations
SAF	Special Action Force (1963) or Security Assistance Force (1981)
SEAL	Sea Air Land
SF	Special Forces
SFGA	Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SO	Special Operations
SOC	Special Operations Command
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SR	Special Reconnaissance
UN	United Nations
USCINCSOC	United States Commander in Chief Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

I. Introduction

Arms alone are not enough to keep the peace. It must be kept by men.¹

John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Message, 11 January 1962.

The purpose of this monograph is to present a concept for the employment of United States Special Operations Forces (US SOF) in support of United Nations (UN) operations. This concept breaks tradition with the past and is intended to provide US and UN leadership with a new appreciation for the use of US SOF in light of post-Cold War developments around the world. In addition, it will provide SOF planners and operators a new framework with which to approach future UN missions, as well as a broad range of tasks essential to the successful execution of UN operations.

The fundamental assumption of this paper is that peace operations will continue for the foreseeable future and that the US, as a world leader, will participate in such missions by providing funding, technical and logistical support, or military force. The current national security strategy, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, clearly states that peace operations are a component of engagement and that it is the United States' specific intent to remain engaged throughout the world. The underlying rationale in this strategy is that in exercising strong leadership in the world "we can make America safer and more prosperous -- by deterring aggression, by fostering peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts."² The reality, however, of a declining military force poses resource limitations on the execution of this dynamic strategy. The imperative is thus that the US must explore economy of force options in accomplishing "engagement" objectives.

It is in this light that US SOF have a role to play in UN peace operations. As will be discussed, the environment in which the UN operates is highly complex, characterized by ambiguity, and encompasses a wide range of activities from humanitarian relief to

combat operations. Missions are often not only protracted, necessitating a long term commitment, but also have repeatedly proven to require experienced, mature, culturally aware, language proficient, and highly trained personnel for success. The complex and sensitive environments that typify UN operations are the very environments US SOF have operated in for the past forty years. The mind-set of the "indirect approach", as well as joint and combined skills, adaptability, and flexibility of US SOF as relied upon in the conduct of Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) have direct application in supporting UN missions. This paper thus attempts to examine the capabilities of US SOF in light of the specific needs of UN peace operations in environments long familiar to SOF.

It is not the intent to argue that SOF can replace conventional military units in conducting UN operations. SOF will almost never be the main effort in a UN operation but, if employed correctly, they have the potential to make a substantial contribution relative to the numbers employed. Circumstances may dictate that it is not in the interest of the US to make a large-scale or high visibility commitment of conventional forces. The drastic impact of supporting UN peace operations on US divisions' readiness and US politics in recent years is clear evidence that heavy reliance on conventional forces has its drawbacks. The US may rather desire to support UN operations with a low-profile force commitment that is capable of meeting critical needs of the UN force commander. It is in such cases that US SOF find their niche.

II. The Basis for SOF's Role in Peace Operations

The resistance to US military participation in UN operations by both the general public and within the Republican-controlled Congress³ in contrast to the National Security Strategy (NSS), which states that "multilateral peace operations are an important part of our strategy,"⁴ poses a dilemma for US realpolitik. This national security dilemma is further compounded as a result of increasing military operations and declining

military resources for the foreseeable future. Since 1990 the US military has downsized significantly, with a reduction in active and reserve personnel strength of 23 percent.⁵ Simultaneously, the number of contingency operations (both US unilateral and in conjunction with the UN) has risen so sharply that in 1994 three Army divisions' readiness rates dropped to C-3, which is the next to lowest combat readiness rating (C-1 being the highest and C-4, the lowest).⁶ When this is combined with the fact that the number of UN operations has doubled since 1988, and will likely continue to grow, the US is then logically driven to seek economy of force solutions to supporting select UN operations in the national interest.⁷

In light of this apparent conflict between the requirement to remain engaged and declining military resources, the question becomes: What economy of force options does the US have in circumstances where US force commitment is necessary? While this paper cannot completely answer this question, it does offer a plan for the limited use of one part of the military instrument of power to improve the efficiency of UN operations, allow the US to remain engaged in international affairs, and reduce some of the burden of US conventional forces' involvement in UN operations.

It answers four key questions:

1. What is the appropriate role of US SOF in support of UN operations?
2. What are the critical military weaknesses in UN operations?
3. What capabilities do US SOF possess that can overcome the critical military weaknesses in UN operations?
4. What is a possible concept of employment for US SOF in support of UN operations?

Aside from the coincidental similarity of UN and SOF operational environments and the US need for economy of force solutions to its support of UN operations, there are functional, historical, and doctrinal bases for SOF involvement in peace operations.

The following definitions of peace operations provide the doctrinal operational scope for judging the validity of SOF support to UN peace operations. As defined in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations and in FM 100-23, Peace Operations peace operations are:

All actions taken by the United Nations or regional organizations under the authority of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and those Chapter VII operations not involving the unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low intensity peace enforcement operations not involving the unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. (JP 3-0)⁸

An umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement). (FM 100-23)⁹

The functional basis for SOF support is provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), the Honorable H. Allen Holmes, in his charter to SOF in the post-Cold War era. He states that they must perform three strategic functions to continue to serve US interests in the post-Cold War world. To summarize, these strategic functions are:

1. Acting as a force-multiplier in support of conventional forces in general war or major regional contingencies (MRC).
2. Expanding the range of options available to decision-makers confronting crises or forms of political violence such as terrorism, insurgency, or drug trafficking.
3. Supporting noncombat missions such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.¹⁰

The last two capabilities clearly could be directly supportive of UN peace operations. SOF advisory and instructional skills could also plausibly have a force-multiplier effect in peace operations.

The suitability of SOF for peace operations is further documented by John M. Collins who conducted an assessment of SOF for the Congressional Research Service in

1993. Peacetime engagement defined, and the relationship between it and SOF, is best summed up by a quote from his report.

Peacetime engagement is a prescription for applying political, military, economic, and other instruments of national power to promote regional stability, diminish threats, facilitate combat operations if deterrence fails, foster post-crisis recovery, and otherwise enhance US national security. Peacetime engagement concepts employ military forces, but not military force. SOF are especially well suited, because they deter aggression primarily through good deeds, whereas conventional forces promise military retaliation. Low-key SOF maximize US influence in selected countries through military to military contacts, information programs, and civic actions; minimize prospects of unpleasant surprise by conducting special reconnaissance missions; and garner good will in the aftermath of catastrophes and conflicts by taking care of afflicted peoples.¹¹

Special Operations Forces in support of UN operations is neither a new nor novel idea; the historical precedence of SOF support for peace operations is a matter of record since the 1960s and is particularly conspicuous in the 1990s. They have participated in some form or another in most of the recent major UN operations in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and Haiti, however, in each instance they have been employed in different ways. In Iraq they initially were used to assess the operational area and prepare for follow-on forces and then operated as a subordinate joint task force with its own area of operations conducting civic action in much the same way as the conventional forces. In Somalia they provided security for the initial airlift of humanitarian aid, then provided liaison and interoperability support with Coalition Support Teams (CST) to UN forces, conducted civic action, and finally participated in combat operations. In Haiti they trained elements of the UN forces, provided CSTs, established information programs, and conducted unilateral civic action in remote areas.

It is US SOF's indirect method of operations that provides the basis for its potential support to UN peace operations. Though SOF are employed in two modes: direct and indirect, the direct mode consists of applications of military power designed to break an adversary's will and comprises reconnaissance, strikes, and maneuvers with

destructive end states in mind. SOF's indirect approach, however, describes constructive applications of military resources designed to train, advise, or assist interagency activities, nations important to US interests, and surrogate forces pursuing US interests. Indirect operations further encompass engagements and economies of force that deter an adversary's use of force or that promote peace.¹² US SOF support to UN operations is thus essentially just another example of operations in the indirect mode.

The contribution that SOF can make to UN operations, which are inherently difficult and inefficient, because they are by nature multinational events, is to function as a kind of "trim tab" that organization expert Peter M. Senge discusses in his book The Fifth Discipline. The trim tab is the "rudder on the ship's rudder" that produces the leverage required to efficiently direct a large ship's movement through the water. The leverage provided by SOF is their ability to aid the force commander by training, advising, and assisting his subordinate units to improve interoperability among the coalition forces, enhance training readiness, and increase organizational efficiency. SOF can be the leverage for the UN force to help it move efficiently and effectively toward the political goal, however, SOF cannot by itself accomplish the policy goals nor replace the "rudder" of the UN force; they can only assist in the "rudder's" efficient operation.¹³

This section's discussion has shown that UN operations are likely to continue and that the US has an interest in ensuring their successful accomplishment. On the other hand, in the current environment of constrained resources and increasing operations, it is difficult for the military to maintain both combat readiness and support for UN operations. The indirect application of US SOF, with the expertise and skills they use in accomplishing their principle missions, can serve as a strategic economy of force by allowing the US to remain engaged while protecting scarce resources. The remainder of this paper will show the inherent complexities and vulnerabilities in UN operations and

how US SOF can be employed to help overcome them and thereby contribute to the success of UN operations.

III. Nature Of Post-Cold War UN Operations

War embraces much more than politics: it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.¹⁴

John Keegan in A History of Warfare

Since 1988 the UN has not only significantly increased the number of its peace operations, but it has also had to adjust to a new paradigm of confrontation taking place not just between states, but also within states as a result of the end of the Cold War. This new environment is typified by intra-state hostilities, widespread human suffering, and ambiguous, asymmetrical, and long-term conflicts that can best be characterized as *non-conventional conflicts*. It is in understanding the changes in this new environment that UN vulnerabilities become apparent, and it is these very vulnerabilities that provide US SOF their role in UN peace operations. The purpose of this section is to recognize the changing nature of UN operations and to examine the environment in which UN operations are being conducted, in order to provide the foundation for discussing the specific vulnerabilities of UN operations in the third section.

The United Nations was founded on the premise that as an international organization of states it could solve disputes and prevent conflict through negotiation without resorting to violence among the parties involved.¹⁵ During the Cold War the threat to world peace was kept in check by the balance of power between the two world superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Although many conflicts erupted, often with tragic results for the participants, the world was a comparatively stable environment. The United Nations did play a part in resolving disputes throughout the world, but it is fair to say that it was the balance of power between the US and the Soviet

Union that allowed it to function successfully. In fact, the UN did conduct thirteen peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1988. However, since 1988 the number has more than doubled.¹⁶ Not only has the number of operations grown, but also the types of operations conducted have changed.

Traditional UN peacekeeping operations consisted mainly of employing lightly armed troops, often from lesser-developed countries, to serve as observers, buffers, and referees between belligerents in implementing a peace treaty or armistice. Rarely did UN forces conduct combat operations. The only offensive action taken by forces directly under UN control occurred in the Congo in 1960-64, but harsh international criticism prevented a repetition of such an operation.¹⁷ Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the world has become more unstable and increasingly the UN is taking the lead in attempting to prevent or resolve conflicts. The result has been the expansion of UN-led peace operations. The nature of UN operations has evolved beyond traditional peacekeeping,¹⁸ as noted by the UN Secretary General, Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, in his An Agenda for Peace. Current conflicts have changed in a qualitative as well as a quantitative way, are more likely to be *intra-state* than inter-state, and are characterized by the disintegration of state infrastructure and institution. Moreover, "they are often guerrilla wars without clear front lines."¹⁹

What is clear is that the UN is now involved in not only the prevention and resolution of conventional conflicts, but also in *non-conventional* conflicts (a non-doctrinal term).²⁰ This is the milieu in which the UN increasingly operates and which makes peace operations so difficult, yet it is this very environment in which US SOF have traditionally worked. This environment forms the foundation for the UN vulnerabilities and needs to be explored and thoroughly understood in order to deduce solutions to those vulnerabilities. To explain this new environment, the common definition of conflict will be examined and compared to its non-conventional counterpart.

Conflict is defined as "an armed struggle or clash between organized political parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives."²¹ This definition, though somewhat more ambiguous than war, is still rather straightforward and simple to understand. However, non-conventional conflict is something even more ambiguous and difficult to understand. It extends the continuum of conflict. Conflict in the conventional sense begins when the armed struggle begins; however, non-conventional conflict encompasses all of the types of conflict listed above, starting with the *threat* or *possibility* of conflict and extending past conflict termination, because the conditions that gave rise to hostilities in the first place may still remain, though not visible or easily recognized. It also includes armed clashes by *unorganized* groups that are not seeking to achieve any political or military objectives. Non-conventional conflict encompasses the lawlessness of a society in which the governmental system has collapsed, but no organized group has risen to take its place. Violence and terrorist-like activity can occur out of frustration with no identifiable purpose. This type of conflict is non-conventional, because it is difficult to determine the objectives and methods of the actors, perhaps difficult to even determine the actors, and thus it is difficult to apply conventional elements of power. This is the sensitive and complex environment in which peace operations may increasingly take place. Although the situation may not be a traditional insurgency, there will likely be many of its characteristics present. In these types of non-conventional environments it is the issue of *perceived legitimacy* by the people and the political powers involved that places new stresses on UN forces whose legitimacy is no longer a matter of fact. This is perhaps the most significant change for UN forces given the evolution of *conflict*.

To expand the understanding of non-conventional conflict it is useful to turn to Sam Sarkesian, a professor of political science at Loyola University, who sets forth a set of characteristics that summarize the variety of future non-conventional conflicts in which

the US might become involved. He believes that it is in this environment that US SOF will be called upon to operate.

- Asymmetrical Conflicts. For the US these conflicts are limited and not considered a threat to its survival or a matter of vital national interests; however, for the indigenous adversaries they are a matter of survival.
- Protracted Conflicts. Require a long term commitment by the US, thus testing the national will, political resolve, and staying power of the US.
- Ambiguous and Ambivalent Conflicts. Difficult to identify the adversary, or assess the progress of the conflict; i.e., it is rarely obvious who is winning and losing.
- Conflicts with Political-Social Milieu Center of Gravity. The center of gravity will not be the armed forces of the adversaries as Clausewitz would argue, but more in the political and social realms as Sun Tzu espouses.²²

If the words "United Nations" are substituted for "United States", the above would describe some, if not all, of the conflicts in which the UN has been involved since 1988. In this light it seems that the US and the UN face similar situations driven by the changed environment in which peace operations must be conducted. The evolution of conflict in the post-Cold War era now presents UN peacekeepers not only with highly complex operating environments (witness Bosnia), but also with the challenge to continually justify UN force presence in the eyes of a diverse and potentially antagonistic cast of players. This sensitive environment confounds conventional logic, defies traditional solutions, and has driven the UN to a paradigm shift.

The UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services has noted the recent adjustments made by the UN in light of its changed operating environment. The types of activities that UN forces have been recently directed to conduct or support as part of peacekeeping missions do not reflect traditional peacekeeping in which the primary task is to separate two opposing armies and act as a buffer force to prevent the initiation or resumption of conventional combat operations. These activities include the creation and maintenance of secure areas to allow access to humanitarian aid, protecting human rights, establishing safe

areas, protecting non-combatants from attack, and using all necessary means to accomplish the objectives of the mandate.²³

As Boutros Boutros-Ghali recognized in his Agenda for Peace and as echoed by the UN Internal Office of Oversight Services, the changing nature of peace operations requires a shift in the traditional peacekeeping paradigm of the Cold War era. The Secretary General has coined a new term for these non-traditional peace missions, stating they are multi-functional operations requiring UN forces to execute a variety of tasks not previously associated with peacekeeping.²⁴ John MacKinlay, a senior research associate at Brown University, in an article in Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, provides an excellent model for the new peacekeeping which he terms "Second Generation Peacekeeping." He believes that the UN has already moved into the new generation and that the term "peacekeeping" is no longer adequate. The second generation differs from traditional peacekeeping in a number of ways: It includes a range of missions such as establishing a secure environment, conducting humanitarian relief, disarming hostile factions, and setting up monitors and buffer forces. Unlike traditional peacekeeping missions, it does not necessarily have the support of some or all of the local political factions, and thus may require a higher level of military force than traditional peacekeeping, yet still falls short of the level of force needed for peace enforcement. This new generation encompasses three levels: one, consisting of monitors and observers; two, requiring a reinforced military presence which may use a limited amount of force to achieve UN objectives; and three, characterized by military intervention by forces with a significant combat capability to "redress a major threat to international peace and security."²⁵ These levels are an expansion of the traditional peacekeeping operations conducted from 1948 to 1988. Levels two and three are significantly more complex and place a great burden on a UN force to operate efficiently

and effectively across of larger spectrum when the mere presence of a peacekeeping force no longer offers a deterrence to continued confrontation.

Whether peace operations are called multi-functional operations or second generation peacekeeping with its three levels, it is clear that the post-Cold War world has ushered in significant changes for the types of operations UN forces must conduct. To operate at these levels and in such a new environment, the UN requires a force that possesses a command and control structure, an intelligence apparatus, and organizational and operational efficiency which allows it to function as a potent combat force capable of acting faster, more efficiently and with greater combat power than potential threats. Non-conventional conflict requires new methods of operation to solve a myriad of problems ranging from humanitarian relief to the establishment of safe areas to combat operations as part of peace enforcement, while maintaining UN legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and international actors. However, it is this new environment and these new operational requirements that have increased the complexity of peace operations and thus caused critical vulnerabilities in UN forces. These vulnerabilities will be examined with a view to determining how they can be offset by committing US SOF to serve as a trim tab to support a peace operations force.

IV. UN Military Vulnerabilities

You cannot take a few people from one unit, throw them in with some from another, give them someone else's equipment, and hope to come up with a top-notch fighting outfit.²⁶

Colonel Charles Beckwith, 1980

This section examines military weaknesses inherent in UN operations and serves as the foundation for presentation of a US SOF concept of employment in support of UN operations in the next section. It is important to understand that the weaknesses in UN operations are not simply the result of poor military units or weak military leadership. On the contrary, there are many examples of superb leadership and

outstanding performance by UN forces. The fundamental problems lie not with the failings of leaders and units, but instead result from the inherent ad hoc nature of UN operations, the different and sometimes incompatible military capabilities of the units from the various contributing nations, and most significantly, the extremely complex and ambiguous environment as described in the previous section. Although Colonel Beckwith made the above comment in reference to Operation Eagle Claw, the hostage rescue attempt in Iran in 1980, a parallel between that event and peace operations is discernible. A peace operation is no less difficult than a hostage rescue attempt and often many more lives are at stake, at least over the long term. However, at the very outset, peace operations normally consist of taking a few units from more than one country, often giving them someone else's equipment, with the hope that this ad hoc organization can accomplish the objectives of the mandate. UN operations are by their very nature complex, often inefficient, and sometimes upon their establishment are presented with the conditions for failure rather than the conditions for success, as evidenced by operations in Somalia and Bosnia, and to some extent in Northern Iraq, Cambodia, Rwanda, and even Haiti. These conditions create vulnerabilities which must be examined in some detail.

For the purposes of analysis, the vulnerabilities and weaknesses are primarily derived from official reports of the UN itself, the US General Accounting Office (GAO), Congressional Committees, and various after-action reviews. It should be noted that the UN itself has recognized these weaknesses after conducting a thorough analysis of its peace activities. For example, in March 1995 the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services prepared a report for the Committee for Programme Coordination entitled "In-depth Evaluation of Peace-keeping Operations," which is a wide ranging evaluation of all aspects of peace operations including "six substantive components: information, electoral, repatriation, human rights, civilian police, and military," as well as the "six support functions: planning, financing, staffing, logistics, procurement, and training."²⁷

An analysis of the UN's conduct of peace operations has resulted in the identification of four general categories of problems: **assessment, planning, training,** and **command and control**, and they will be addressed in terms of the specific weaknesses that affect the success or failure of a UN operation. Other weaknesses identified but not discussed in this monograph include information gathering operations, information dissemination operations, and humanitarian assistance. These three areas are important to multi-functional peace operations of the so-called second generation and will always be of concern to the UN force commander, however, it is the four vulnerabilities above that set the conditions for success or failure at the outset and must be addressed in every mission. In addition, it is important to note that while only four of the most significant vulnerabilities are discussed, there are difficulties encountered in every operation that may be unique to that situation. The list of potential vulnerabilities could be exhaustive depending on the specific combination of variables involved in the operation, from the make-up of the UN force itself, to the political and military situation in the area of responsibility, to even such things as the terrain and weather. Therefore, the following discussion will focus on the four most important vulnerabilities that commonly are present in all UN operations.

Assessment

The UN has had continual problems conducting an accurate assessment of the operational area, the parties in dispute, and its own military capabilities, a fact which has resulted in the Security Council establishing unattainable strategic mandates, as well as a failure on the part of the UN force to adequately develop a peace operations campaign plan to link tactical peace activities to the strategic aim. The reason for poor assessments stems from the inadequate number of qualified personnel, the dependence on member nations to provide information and their reluctance to do so, and the perception that conducting assessments is a form of "intelligence gathering" and thus something in which

the UN should not participate for fear of compromising impartiality.²⁸ These deficiencies provide the initial conditions for failure and will be amplified in detail following a discussion of what an assessment entails and why it is important.

An assessment is generally accepted as the foundation of military planning. In a conventional combat operation with a clearly defined enemy, assessing the threat is relatively simple compared to the ambiguous, insurgency-like struggles with multiple organized and unorganized belligerents and noncombatant civilians found in non-conventional conflict. In both situations an accurate estimate of the situation is critical to success of the operation, therefore, it must be undertaken with great care. Conducting an assessment assists in the development of the strategic estimate which in turn, can significantly influence the shape and tone of the mandate.

The purpose of conducting an assessment is twofold: first, to provide information to the strategic-level decision makers of the Security Council for use in determining the need for UN action and in formulating an attainable end for the mandate, and second, to assist the operational planners, the UN force commander and staff, in developing the peace operation campaign plan. An inadequate and inaccurate assessment can precipitate the formulation of unrealistic aims and insufficient operational planning.

Two additional areas of assessment are required. One is to assess the subordinate units of the UN force; the UN force commander requires thorough knowledge of his units in order to assign missions that are within a unit's capabilities. Second, an assessment cannot end with the completion of the campaign plan; it must be ongoing for the duration of the mission in order to identify changing conditions, identify new threats, and provide information on which to measure success.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali underscores the importance of the assessment in his An Agenda for Peace, stating: "preventative steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts."²⁹ While it appears that the UN has recognized the importance

of assessments, it still does not conduct them well.³⁰ There are two reasons for this; one is based on the perception of the fine line between intelligence and information and the second is based on non-availability of trained assessment forces.

Assessments are associated with gathering information, which connotes "intelligence." Many diplomats in the UN feel that any link with an intelligence function compromises its impartiality.³¹ Therefore, the UN has no permanent organization with which to conduct assessments, except for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations which consists of fourteen political officers, nine military planners, and fifteen general service workers to support the thirteen peace operations on going as of early 1995.³² The UN is dependent on member states to gather information, which has proved difficult since nations are reluctant to provide information for fear of compromising sources and methods. Another method to obtain information is to dispatch UN and member state officials to conduct surveys as was done for Cambodia in 1989 and 1990. According to sources at the UN and members of the UNTAC operation, these assessments were of "limited value in preparing detailed operational plans and the information was out of date, inaccurate, or incomplete."³³ In Rwanda, the problem was repeated. The personnel on the assessment team did not possess the necessary expertise; thus, political intelligence and knowledge of the local operational areas were insufficient, resulting in troops entering an unknown security situation, delays in providing humanitarian relief, and continued suffering by the local population.³⁴

Assessments lay the ground work for mission-success, but, as shown, the UN has not conducted them due to poor capabilities, inadequate number of personnel and an unwillingness to engage in actions perceived as "intelligence gathering." Yet it is necessary to conduct assessments for four purposes: first, to assist in determining a realistic, attainable mandate, second, to provide the foundation for operational planning, third, to accurately determine the capabilities of the subordinate elements of the UN

force, and fourth, to identify changing conditions in the operational area and facilitate contingency planning. The US Institute of Peace summed up the relationship between planning, assessment, and the mandate in its report on professionalizing peacekeeping by stating: "the point is to provide realistic military requirements and assessments and to design an appropriate peacekeeping and enforcement operation within an effective strategic plan."³⁵ To establish the conditions for success the UN requires a proficient, experienced element that can assess the operational area for military, political cultural, and humanitarian conditions, as well as analyze the friendly force capabilities in order to facilitate operational planning. Such a force is not in existence, nor is it likely that one will be established in the near future, a fact which will continue to hamper UN peace operations from their very beginning.

Planning

Because the UN has no permanent military forces, it typically has not been able to conduct adequate military planning until a UN force commander and staff are designated. This has occasionally resulted in the establishment of unattainable mandates and plans of execution that are not practical, are incomplete, or do not take into account the likely contingencies, such as occurred in Bosnia when the UN force was ordered to establish its headquarters in Sarajevo for operations to be conducted in Croatia.³⁶ In the following paragraphs the importance of planning, the problems caused by a lack of an adequate initial planning staff, and the failures to conduct continuous mission planning will be discussed.

The most critical factor in any mission, whether combat or peace operation, is the ability to develop a thorough, flexible, and executable plan that meets the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability.³⁷ The UN has determined that two elements are critical to military planning of UN peace operations: a realistic mandate and the designation of the force commander as soon as possible.³⁸

The critical issue here is that there is a lag time between the time a mission is authorized and the time when a force commander is designated for planning. The disconnect between the "strategic aim" of the mandate, the time-frame that the Security Council establishes and the translation of the mandate into military objectives by the designated force commander comprises the first step in setting the conditions for failure. The failure to have an operational commander *and* his staff identified and present during the initial formulation of the mandate can lead to the establishment of unattainable strategic aims. Strategic aims and military objectives cannot be devised separately. While the strategic aims have primacy, it is useless to establish aims if the capabilities to achieve them are not available. The strategic-level decision makers (UN Security Council) and the operational planners (UN force commander and staff) must conduct planning and coordination simultaneously and not sequentially. This would be a difficult situation even if the force commander was using troops solely from his own military, however, the planning problem is exacerbated by the fact that often the commander does not know from what countries his subordinate units will come, thus, he has no idea of their capabilities and weaknesses. The associated lack of means of support, such as supply and maintenance, deployment timelines, and facilities, also impact on the commander's ability to adequately plan and prepare for the mission.

The staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has also found fault with UN mission planning. It believes that it is not as much a problem with the actual planning process as it is a problem with the confusing structure and lines of authority and poor coordination.³⁹ Kenneth Allard states in his report on Somalia that the planning of the exit and entry strategies is critical as is determining (and measuring) the success criteria. He also reinforces the UN's own criticism by pointing out that a clear mandate is crucial to planning a mission, because it not only drives the political guidance for forces

provided by contributing nations (the means), but also it is what will shape the "what" (ends), and the "how" (ways), of accomplishing the mandate.⁴⁰

Perhaps most critical of UN planning is the US Government Accounting Office (GAO). When evaluating operations in Cambodia and Somalia, it stated that "the United Nations is ill-equipped to plan, logistically support, and deploy personnel to missions the size of UNTAC and UNOSOM II."⁴¹ It went on to say that "attention is often focused on peacekeeping *actions*, but the ability to act depends heavily on the UN Secretariat effectively planning missions."⁴²

Pre-mission planning is critical, however planning must continue throughout the operation in order to deal with changing conditions and threats. Again the GAO pointed out a significant weakness of UN forces when it showed that no contingency planning was conducted in Cambodia to deal with potential threats from either of the adversaries. Members of the UNTAC mission stated that had they conducted contingency planning they would have been better prepared to deal with the banditry encountered in various provinces. Rather than identifying potential problems and developing contingency plans to actively counter them, they were forced into a reactive mode, thus sacrificing initiative and prolonging instability in that country.⁴³ The same was true in Somalia.⁴⁴

In short, the UN ability to plan is weak both prior to deployment and during execution. The situation is made worse by rarely having the force commander, his staff, and subordinate forces present and identified in order to provide military advice when the mandate is being debated and developed. Because of this, a feasible, acceptable, and suitable campaign plan linking the UN force's actions with the strategic aim(s) of the mandate is difficult to formulate. Planning is likely to be a problem for UN operations as long as it does not maintain a standing military force. If a planning element were immediately available when debate is initiated in the Security Council then perhaps this

weakness could be countered. However, as long as military planning is sequential and not simultaneous and ongoing, UN operations will likely remain vulnerable.

Training

One of the most pressing problems with UN operations is the disparity among the units that make up an ad hoc UN force. Lack of standardized procedures, varying levels of proficiency and capabilities, at times even the use of unfamiliar equipment, and inadequate preparation of the force in terms of the local situation and culture cause UN missions to begin from a position of weakness. This section examines the problems of training in a coalition force and the resultant vulnerability caused by the same.

UN peace operations are invariably coalition operations usually made up of military forces with diverse capabilities, often including forces from developing countries that are sparsely equipped, use different methods of operation, and have various levels of ability. For the UN force to be effective and properly employed, all of the participating forces must operate using common procedures. The commander and staff must know the capabilities and weaknesses of all units so that the strengths of the force are maximized and the weaknesses are minimized. It is too late to discover these and to standardize forces during actual execution as retired Major General MacKenzie of the Canadian Armed Forces points out in his book on his peacekeeping experiences throughout the world and specifically in the Former Yugoslavia. He rarely had knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the forces provided to the peacekeeping mission, and the continuous result was the inability to rapidly begin large-scale peacekeeping operations until standard procedures could be established.⁴⁵ His experience, as well as that of other commanders in similar situations, demonstrates the imperative that pre-mission training must be conducted prior to deployment in peace operations.

The Secretary General has acknowledged this problem, stating that he is concerned that the equipment with which some units deploy is in poor condition and their level of

training is unsuitable for the mission.⁴⁶ According to the United States Institute of Peace, three types of training are necessary for peace operations: basic infantry training, interoperability training, and mission-specific training. Generally, units participating have adequate infantry and small unit skills, yet fall short in the mission-specific and interoperability categories.⁴⁷ In order to improve peace operations training, the Nordic countries and Canada have training centers devoted to peacekeeping and offer training to other military forces, while the US conducts peace operations training at its Joint Readiness Training Center. The UN, however, has no formal program, and because of this units continue to deploy on peace operations deficient in necessary capabilities. Training is and likely will continue to be a member state responsibility, yet, with no standardized predeployment training under the direction of a single authority, the UN force commander will have to delay the employment of forces in the operational area until he is sure that they are adequately prepared.⁴⁸

One of the continuing problems is that there is a lack of common doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, although various nations have produced some excellent manuals and guides for peacekeeping. Specifically, the Nordic countries, the Canadians, the British, the French, and the Australians have all published doctrine based on their extensive experience in UN operations, but this initiative is inadequate, because not all member nations use the doctrine to prepare their forces. The UN does make its own training guidelines and the Nordic manuals available to contributing nations, however, the mere availability of guidelines from various sources has not standardized operations, because units continue to deploy without a common understanding of standard operating procedures (SOP).⁴⁹

Regardless of the amount of doctrine available, the nature of multinational peace operations is such that coalition forces will often arrive in the operational area with different capabilities, various types of equipment, and procedures and techniques unique

to their military system, as well as with a lack of understanding of the nature of the culture in which they will operate. Thus, it is likely that under current conditions, a UN force can expect to have to work through a "learning curve" during the execution phase, thereby sacrificing initial operational capability until common methods and procedures are established and an understanding of all units' capabilities is acquired. The lack of standardized pre-mission training to ensure that interoperability is maximized and an adequate level of proficiency is attained prior to deployment into the operational area continues to sabotage the readiness of UN forces for the foreseeable future and causes operations to begin from a position of weakness.

Command and Control

Command and control has been an ongoing deficiency in UN peace operations, primarily because such operations are multi-national and ad hoc, which result in slow decision cycles and increased vulnerability caused by uncertainty and chance. Multinational operations have been and will continue to be among the most difficult of all military activities. Conflicting national ideals, cultural heritage, and religious beliefs, as well as differing languages, military doctrine, force capabilities, equipment, logistics procedures, levels of training, and, most significantly, the possibly divergent political goals and objectives of their respective national governments, all contribute to the inherent difficulty of conducting multinational missions under the auspices of the UN.⁵⁰ In the final analysis the weaknesses in UN force command and control stem essentially from two areas: dual lines of authority and lack of interoperability due to the language barrier and non-standardized methods of operation - deficiencies which are inevitably built in to every operation.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that a UN mission must have unity of command,⁵¹ however, this has often been difficult to attain due to the fact that national contingents generally operate with their own national interests first and the mission's second. The

result of this apparent conflict is that the UN force commander is faced with the constant possibility that his subordinate units may not carry out his orders and directives in a timely manner or perhaps may not even carry them out at all. An illustration of this problem occurred in Somalia when a commander ordered a subordinate unit to seize an area where snipers were conducting operations against UN forces. The subordinate commander initially delayed his response to contact his government for instructions on whether or not he should comply with the orders of the UN commander and risk casualties to his own troops. Of course, during the entire time the snipers continued to fire on UN personnel.⁵² This vulnerability will continue to be a fact of UN operations unless either a permanent UN force is established or contributing nations decide to allow the UN force commander complete operational control and take disciplinary action against their officers who fail to comply with the legal orders of the UN commander. Both options are unlikely to occur, thus leaving UN forces vulnerable to disunity of command.

A second cause for weak command and control, as is the case with the majority of the vulnerabilities of UN operations, comes from the ad hoc multi-national nature of a UN force. Although the common language for UN operations is English, not all members of the peacekeeping force speak it at a common level if at all. However, it is not simply the ability to communicate in English that is necessary, but rather it is a common understanding of military doctrine and its unique vocabulary that is required.⁵³ What may seem to most non-military personnel as common terms can easily be misinterpreted. For example, an interpretation of the term "protection" can lead to a wide variety of actions among multi-national contingents. Some military forces can take this to mean taking all means necessary to protect its personnel and equipment, including offensive, pre-emptive action, while others emphasize the passive, defensive requirements for protecting the force. Evidence of this has occurred time and again in recent peace

operations from Bosnia to Cambodia. As an example, a US member of the UN mission in Cambodia relates that peacekeepers from some countries from the Former Soviet Union believed that for the UN forces to maintain an appropriate level of protection from the Khmer Rouge some offensive action was necessary, while other members of the group felt that more passive measures would suffice and have the added potential of maintaining the legitimate appearance of impartiality.⁵⁴ Thus, there is not only a language barrier within the UN force, there are also doctrinal differences that can and do cause serious problems for the UN commander. As with the problem of dual lines of authority, one way for this problem to be overcome would be to have a standing UN force. As this is not likely, other means such as pre-mission training and competent language-qualified liaison are required to off-set this vulnerability, yet these capabilities do not presently exist in adequate measure.

The vulnerabilities described above have a generally consistent theme among them, that being that the weaknesses of UN military forces are caused in large part by the ad hoc and multi-national nature of peace operations. It is this condition that in turn causes the most significant vulnerabilities in UN operations and is not likely to be eliminated unless a standing UN force is established. These weaknesses will persist, but they can be reduced through the use of an integrated organization which is specifically organized and prepared to train, advise, assist, and liaise with multi-national forces. This organization is found in the US Special Operations Force and is the subject of the next section.

V. SOF Employment In Support Of UN Operations

The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, creative, and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict.⁵⁵

Boutros Boutros -Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 2d ed., 1995

Although the Secretary General was speaking to the world community, his statement has particular relevance to US SOF, because it embodies the UW and FID spirit characteristic of SOF since their inception. Boutros-Ghali's imperative to dynamically address the "causes of conflict" carries with it strong implications not only for "SOF-mindedness," but also for the SOF community itself. SOF already inherently possess the requisite skills and expertise to support peace operations, which simply require adaptation to the different UN political environment. The "mental model"⁵⁶ for describing the UN's operational environment thus logically falls into the realm of counterinsurgency or more appropriately *non-conventional conflict*, an environment in which US SOF is uniquely suited to operate. It is this "well-suitedness" for the *UN operational environment* that drives the question: How should SOF organize, interface, and operate in support of a UN mission? The following discussion will show that while FID is not only the type of mission to be conducted, it serves as the overarching framework within which SOF operations are planned and conducted. It will furthermore address a proposed organization, as well as specific tasks and activities that SOF might conduct to assist the UN force commander in accomplishing the mission of his mandate.

Foreign Internal Defense and Support to UN Forces

When faced with a new operational environment posed by the Cold War in the early 1960's then President John F. Kennedy recognized the applicability of FID and

turned to the US Army's Special Forces to call upon not only them but the entire military to adapt to the change and deal with the rise of insurgencies and guerrilla wars facing the free world and US allies. A parallel exists at present with the difference now that it is the UN that must struggle with the post-Cold War evolution and operate in the new environment of non-conventional conflict. It is thus that the counterinsurgency and FID doctrine developed since the 1960's may be a valuable model for assisting the UN in peace operations.

In order to explore the concept of SOF support, it is necessary to begin with the doctrinal foundation of FID, which is defined as:

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The primary mission is to *organize, train, advise, and assist* host nation military and paramilitary forces. [emphasis added] ⁵⁷

If the term "UN" is substituted for the words "another government" and "host nation," a case can be made that the use of US SOF in support of UN operations is similar to the FID missions SOF have conducted throughout the world. In a FID situation SOF focus on assisting a nation's military force in protecting its country from an insurgency. They assist in improving its capabilities to conduct effective operations against insurgents and by doing so they can also help the government in its fight for legitimacy. This same concept can be applied in a UN mission, since history has proven that a UN force must establish, perhaps fight for, and always maintain legitimacy if it is to be effective. What is key for the SOF planner and operator is that their efforts must be focused on making the UN force effective so that that force can directly participate in stabilizing the situation in the operational area. By using a fundamentally FID framework for mission analysis and conduct, US SOF can analyze a UN operation, develop a supporting campaign plan that addresses the vulnerabilities and then execute the plan with emphasis on making the UN force an effective peacekeeping organization. In this light the need for

direct application of the US military instrument of power is reduced by making the UN force effective. The employment of SOF in this manner is thus an example of both the indirect approach and a strategic economy of force which accomplishes US objectives through UN action.

SOF Organization for Peace Operations

Not only can US SOF look to its history for planning and supporting peace operations, it can also draw an organizational structure from its heritage that is uniquely suited to support peace operations. When President Kennedy called on the US military to adapt to the changing environment in the 1960s, US Army Special Forces built an organization that was uniquely qualified to conduct FID and counterinsurgency and a variation of it is being revitalized at Fort Bragg as part of the Force XXI experiments.⁵⁸ It first appeared in 1963 in US Army Field Manual 31-22 US Army Counterinsurgency Forces. Four Special Forces Groups were organized under this concept in the 1960s: the 1st in Okinawa, the 8th in Panama, and the 3d and 6th at Fort Bragg.⁵⁹ In 1981, FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) discussed it, though with a slightly different name. Special Forces (SF) doctrine kept the concept alive in 1990 in FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces. Lastly Major General (Retired) Sydney Shachnow, the former commander of the US Army Special Forces Command, proposes a similar, though more expanded, concept that he calls "Notional 'X' Command."⁶⁰ In the 1960s this organization was called the Special Action Force (SAF) and in the 1981 LIC and the 1990 SF doctrine it was called the Security Assistance Force (SAF). Regardless of the name, however, it is the concept of a specially task-organized special operations force robust enough to handle the diverse challenges of non-conventional conflict, that can serve US interests - be they FID or UN support. This organization has particular utility for such missions and provides the foundation for SOF support to peace operations, as well as other special operations.

According to FM 100-20 (1981), the SAF "normally consists of a Special Forces Group as the nucleus, augmented with CA, PSYOP, engineer, medical, and military police units. The mission of the SAF in FID is to assist the MAAGs [Military Assistance Advisory Group] by providing training, operational advice, and assistance to host nation forces."⁶¹ Major General Shachnow's organization, however, is more robust. He proposes a permanent structure with Special Forces, Rangers, aviation, CA, PSYOP, engineer, and support battalions, as well as military police, signal, and military intelligence companies.⁶² What these various organizations have in common is that they combine the key SOF and conventional force functional units for FID operations into a single organization so that it can be integrated systematically into a campaign plan to assist a host nation in securing itself.

Considering the above concepts, SOF should organize a new form of the Special Action Force (SAF) for UN operations with one crucial difference. It should be composed of joint forces and not be solely an army organization. Ideally, permanent organizations for each theater would be established so that all elements could train and prepare as a unit, not unlike a standing joint task force (JTF). It would be composed of elements from SF, CA, PSYOP, signal, military intelligence, aviation (army and air force), logistics support, and Navy SEALs, the task organization of which would be based on the estimate of the situation. It would be capable of being augmented with engineers, military police, medical, and if necessary, other combat arms and combat support. Rangers, because they are a limited national asset, would not be an inherent part of the organization, but could be added if the mission analysis identified a requirement for them. The purpose for establishing this organization, whether it be a standing force or ad hoc, is to provide the SOF commander all the tools with which to organize, train, advise, and assist the UN force and support its commander. Such an organization would be tailored

to provide the skills necessary to address both the specific vulnerabilities inherent in UN forces and the requirements of the operational environment.

SOF Missions and Activities

The following concept of SOF employment in support of a UN force is based on US joint doctrine for campaign planning, because, as Colonel Robert B. Killebrew states in a recent article in Armed Forces Journal International, a peace operation takes place at the operation level and that executing it is an example of executing operational art. Since a peace operation requires a campaign plan to link the tactical activities conducted by peacekeepers to the strategic objectives set by the Security Council,⁶³ US SOF's support such an operation will include a supporting campaign plan based on an estimate of the situation, which includes an analysis of the "friendly situation." In accordance with Annex B of Joint Pub 3-0, which calls for a "specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities,"⁶⁴ a SOF supporting campaign plan must similarly evaluate the UN's objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities, with particular emphasis on its vulnerabilities as was done in the previous section. The resulting four vulnerabilities of assessing, planning, training, and command and control are the fundamental objective points at which to apply leverage, thus allowing SOF to function as the "trim tab" or an operational enabler and force-multiplier. A SOF supporting plan thus focused should be designed to support the various phases of the overall campaign plan. In order to accomplish this, the SOF supporting plan is sub-phased or conducted in stages -- a concept adapted from the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) SOF campaign plan methodology which serves as the basis for the following discussion.⁶⁵

Stage One is *preparation of the operational area* and is perhaps the most critical to the UN force's short- and long-term success, because it specifically addresses the vulnerabilities of assessment and planning, while laying the ground work for training and

command and control assistance. On order of the National Command Authorities (NCA), the theater Special Operations Command activates the SAF, the condition that initiates this being debate in the Security Council and consideration of a potential mandate for establishing a UN operation. Four main tasks are completed in this stage: preparation of the operational area, establishment of an intermediate staging base, deployment of the SAF, and preparation for stage two.

In describing the following concept of preparation of a theater it is useful to draw from US joint doctrine, as this doctrinal concept is of exceptional value to the UN force. Preparation "involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area."⁶⁶ This knowledge will assist the UN Security Council in developing an attainable mandate and help the UN force commander prepare a feasible, acceptable, and suitable campaign plan. In this light the SAF can provide this necessary assistance to the UN by conducting special reconnaissance, specifically an area assessment of the operational area.⁶⁷ Borrowing from Unconventional Warfare (UW) doctrine, elements of the SAF, in the form of an assessment or pilot team,⁶⁸ will deploy to the operational area and begin providing real-time information on the situation through the SAF and ultimately to the Security Council and UN force commander. The pilot team would likely be a unilateral SAF team, because of its ability to rapidly deploy, however, it should ideally form the nucleus of a larger UN assessment team. The focus for the pilot team is to gather information to assist in preparation of the operational area by addressing the Security Council's and UN force commander's information requirements in order to facilitate development of the campaign plan and to identify the specific training and preparation requirements for the military force. This also includes assessing the logistics requirements for reception, initial staging, onward movement and integration of the main force, as well

as common and special equipment requirements for support of both the UN force and for humanitarian and civic action. Additionally, the pilot team will focus on gathering information for the SAF commander for the development of the SOF supporting campaign plan, which includes information dissemination operations and humanitarian and civic action (HCA). The imperative for the assessment is "to provide realistic military requirements and assessments" to assist in the "design [of] an appropriate peace operation within an effective strategic plan."⁶⁹ Finally, the pilot team will conduct one more important task, which will provide a foundation for the entire operation. It will initiate development of an information gathering network in the operational area to support force protection and enable a continuous assessment of the situation.

Concurrently with the above activities, the SAF will identify a location for an intermediate staging base (ISB) through which the UN force will pass. The ISB is a critical requirement for overcoming the training vulnerabilities of the UN force, as it will allow the UN force to be deployed to a single location prior to introduction into the operational area in order to conduct the specific training and preparation requirements for the mission. Based on the make-up of the UN force, the Coalition Support Teams (CST), which are area-oriented⁷⁰ SOF detachments, will be prepared at the ISB in order to train, advise, and assist the supported unit, to provide command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) connectivity between the unit and UN force headquarters, coordinate combat support such as close air support (CAS) and indirect fires as necessary, and function as the UN force commander's "directed telescope."⁷¹

Stage One ends with the deployment of the SAF to the ISB and it being prepared to receive the UN force. The activities conducted during this stage can provide the foundation for both the establishment of an attainable UN mandate and the development of a feasible, acceptable, and suitable peace operation campaign plan, thus leveraging SOF capabilities to conduct special reconnaissance and area assessments to overcome the

vulnerabilities of assessment and planning. Furthermore, the SAF has laid the ground work to attack the vulnerabilities found in training and command and control which will be addressed in subsequent stages.

Stage Two is the *establishment of conditions for UN peace operations*, the pre-condition of which is that the UN force has been identified and begins deployment to the ISB for organization, training, and equipping. During this stage the SAF priority of effort is to address the training vulnerability and enhance command and control for the UN commander, while continuing to provide updated assessments to facilitate final planning. The major activities of SOF include conducting mission-specific training, ensuring the UN force commander's standing operating procedures (SOP) are uniformly established throughout the force, attaching CSTs to subordinate units of the force, and deploying Faction Liaison Teams (FLT) to the parties in dispute. While Stage One activities have provided the foundation for success, it is Stage Two that will shape the outcome of the operation.

Deployment of the UN force to an ISB is a fundamental shift in peace operations practices, because, as previously stated, forces often deploy to the operational area without the necessary training and equipment.⁷² This practice changed during the recent intervention in Haiti when, prior to deployment for Operation Restore Democracy, multinational forces conducted pre-mission preparation with US SOF in Puerto Rico.⁷³ By deploying the UN force to an ISB in such a manner, three mission-critical objectives can be accomplished. First, the UN force commander can establish and ingrain critical SOPs. Second, mission specific training can be accomplished, as well as area and cultural orientations essential to harmonious interaction with key actors in the region. In support of this the SAF provides training teams to conduct situational training exercises, oversee the implementation of SOPs, and conduct briefings based on area studies and information received from the pilot teams. Third, upon arrival at the ISB the SAF will provide a CST

to each national contingent to establish direct linkage and ensure C3I connectivity between the UN force commander and his force. The CST's primary objective is to facilitate UN force interoperability and mission-specific training so that operations can commence immediately upon deployment to the operational area. The US military has employed CSTs in this capacity in multinational operations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, in Combined Forces Command in Korea, to a limited extent in Somalia, and in Restore Democracy in Haiti with good effect.⁷⁴ The use of CSTs can thus greatly assist the UN force commander in reducing the friction in command and control stemming from a multi-national ad hoc organization by acting as a directed telescope. With the assistance of the CSTs, equipment shortfalls can be identified and corrected, and perhaps most important at this stage, the CST can provide the UN force commander with an assessment of the capabilities of the units with which they are serving. This will allow the commander and his staff to assign the appropriate missions to the units with the correct capabilities, thus taking advantage of strengths and avoiding weaknesses.

Concurrent with on-going ISB operations the pilot teams continue to report to the SAF at the ISB providing updated information to facilitate final planning by the UN commander and his staff. Furthermore, they will be prepared to receive the advance parties from the UN force and guide them to their operational locations. They will begin to shift their priorities to information gathering in support of contingency planning. In addition, they will continue to develop assets and to maintain contact with the local population so as to facilitate force protection.

One other action may take place during this stage if the situation warrants. The SAF will prepare and deploy a CST-like element to the parties in dispute. The element, perhaps best termed Faction Liaison Team, (FLT),⁷⁵ will serve as a liaison between the faction or party in dispute and the UN force commander. There are two primary objectives for this. One is to provide a direct communications link between the UN force

and the parties to the conflict so that reliable information about the actions and intentions can be exchanged in order to reduce the chance of conflict. The second objective is to have an element on location so as to be able to interpret and explain the actions of the UN force so that they are not misunderstood. This will aid in force protection by reducing the likelihood of chance contacts. In addition, by having a direct representative of the UN force living and operating with the parties in dispute it is possible that this will facilitate negotiation by establishing trust and rapport. There are risks in such a procedure, however, it is a contingency for which SOF is uniquely suited and which may be critical to the overall peace operation.

In order to facilitate a continuous flow of trained forces, the ISB can remain operational for the duration of the peace operation to conduct training for rotating forces. As recent history shows, missions often last years and require replacement of units at various intervals. Because the contributing nations have different rotation policies, there may be a need to continue operations at the ISB to train newly arriving units to ensure that the UN force commander's requirements for mission-specific training and standing operating procedures are met.

Successful preparation during Stage Two operations can provide the UN commander with a force at a readiness level that allows for immediate operations upon deployment into the operational area. The ISB as utilized during Restore Democracy in Haiti can reduce the likelihood of unprepared forces deploying into the operational area by directly addressing the weaknesses in training; a concept which can serve as a model for future operations. Command and control weaknesses can be diminished through the use of CSTs, while the pilot teams can continue to assess the operational area to allow the commander and his staff to finalize the plan of execution. These activities, when conducted efficiently and completely can positively shape the conditions for successful peace operations.

Stage Three, the *execution* stage, commences with deployment of the main body of the UN force from the ISB to the operational area. During this stage the priority of the SAF's effort is to facilitate C3I connectivity for the UN force commander through the CSTs and to continue to conduct assessments to determine if the success criteria established by the campaign plan are being met. In addition, its staff will conduct contingency planning for unforeseen emergencies, such as the eruption of hostilities requiring fire support or emergency exfiltration. As in the previous stages the identified vulnerabilities of UN operations will be specifically addressed by the activities of the SAF. In addition, the SAF will also contribute to the campaign by employing two other critical SOF assets inherent in its organization: its Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) units.

To facilitate C3I connectivity the SAF headquarters will collocate with the UN force headquarters and provide an operations and communications center which serves as a fusion center for all SOF activities. This capability not only serves to inform the UN force commander of all developments in the operational area and advise and assist him and his staff, it also provides the capability to prepare contingency plans based on the assessments of its elements in the field and coordinate with supporting multinational contingents that may be on stand by for emergency support. In addition, it functions as a direct communications link with the parties in dispute via the FLT's, thus enabling the UN force commander to keep his finger on the pulse of the situation.

Because of the work conducted by the pilot teams in Stage One and Two, they will continue to operate in the UN area of responsibility building on the rapport established with the local population and exploiting their unique language skills and area orientation. Their primary focus is to update their assessments and gather information to enhance force protection. They will also concentrate on identifying changes in conditions, determining potential parties in dispute, and assessing the status of the entire operation

using the established success criteria, thus providing the UN force commander with a separate objective and unfiltered "information feed."

The CSTs will function as the directed telescope facilitating C3I connectivity which they began during Stage Two and provide the UN force commander with potentially the best capability for enhancing his command and control. Because of the relationship developed between the CST and the supported force, as well as the language and cultural skills inherent in SOF soldiers, the interpretation of orders which are often complex even among those who speak a common language, can be facilitated, thus reducing the confusion and friction of normal operations. In addition, they will assist in contingency planning by surveying emergency pick-up zones and coordinating procedures with the supported national contingent for emergency evacuation and emergency fires.

Although not addressed as a critical vulnerability, the ability to disseminate information to the population in the operational area, as well as to the international community is an important part of all peace operations, especially in a non-conventional conflict environment. Boutros Boutros-Ghali has recognized this as evidenced by his statement in An Agenda for Peace that "peacekeeping operations, especially those operating in difficult circumstances, need an effective information capacity. This is to enable them to explain their mandate to the population, and by providing a credible and impartial source of information, to counter misinformation disseminated about them."⁷⁶ The PSYOP unit of the SAF has the ability to provide this effective information dissemination capability to the UN force commander. This element can conduct information dissemination operations to enhance the legitimacy of the UN force in the operational area, as well as to provide practical information to inform the population of humanitarian assistance and civic actions in order to maximize their effects. It will work closely with the public affairs element of the UN force to assist in providing information about the activities of the UN force, but it should be remembered that PSYOP has

negative connotations. While psychological operations are planned activities to convey information to foreign audiences "to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals,"⁷⁷ however, the aim of PSYOP assets in a peace operation environment is positive and straight-forward: get the truth to the people. The criticality of getting truthful and practical information to the population about what is and is not happening in the area of operations compels the need to use PSYOP unit capabilities free from the negative pre-conceived notions about "psychological warfare" and propaganda. The fact remains that PSYOP units possess equipment that can disseminate information over a variety of media to facilitate humanitarian and civic action operations for the relief of suffering and keep the population informed, and as such, is an essential component of the SAF in its support to the UN force.

An additional capability found in the SAF is its Civil Affairs unit which can provide the UN force with the proficiency to deal in the civil arena within the area of responsibility. As noted by UN Office of Internal Oversight, Boutros-Ghali, and such eminent scholars as John MacKinlay, peace operations are now often conducted, not just for the purpose of ending combat operations, but to relieve human suffering by providing humanitarian assistance through a variety of aid organizations as well as the UN force.⁷⁸ As Kenneth Allard stated in his report on the UN operation in Somalia, "the real 'peacekeepers' in a peace operation are the humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) that provide both aid for the present and hope for the future."⁷⁹ UN military forces have historically demonstrated the need to develop the expertise to deal in the civilian and interagency field, because these ad hoc forces have not possessed this organic capability. The Civil Affairs unit of the SAF can provide such expertise and form the nucleus of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), which plan, coordinate, and assist in conducting humanitarian and civic action (HCA) throughout the operational area. This is

a concept which has been the most effective in coordinating civil activities as seen in its successful employment in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.⁸⁰

Stage Three is the heart of the peace operation and it is during this stage that the work of the SAF during Stage s One and Two bears fruit. Through its training efforts, by enhancing C3I connectivity, and by conducting thorough and continuous assessments, the SAF can provide the UN commander the ability to effectively employ his multi-national ad hoc contingent in accordance with a feasible, acceptable, and suitable campaign plan with the confidence that common procedures will be utilized throughout the organization, thus reducing the friction which has historically plagued UN forces.

Stage Four is the *redeployment and withdrawal* of the UN force brought on by either successfully achieving the desired end state as established by the UN mandate, expiration of the mandate, or the transition to another force. During this stage, the SAF has two primary tasks: first, to facilitate the redeployment of the UN force and second, to assist in the transition of the follow-on force, if necessary. As redeployment is taking place the SAF may assist in coordinating the redeployment of national contingents while continuing to operate the directed telescope and to gather information in the operational area. If there is a transition to a force from other than UN, the SAF can assist in the transition and then withdraw. Finally, should the United States decide to support a nation building mission in the operational area, the SAF will be in place and prepared for the arrival of additional US forces.

One additional point must be made concerning the employment of SOF and that is the controversial issue of SOF command and control. Two command relationships could be used depending on the situation. If there are US conventional forces as part of the UN force, the SAF could remain under the tactical control of the US commander and placed in direct support of the UN force headquarters. This would be similar to the relationship for SOF in a FID situation when tactical control is exercised through a MAAG or

MILGP⁸¹ and would allow the SAF to perform its primary FID function of organizing, training, advising, and assisting the "host nation military or paramilitary forces" or in the case the UN force. The second situation occurs when there is no participation by US forces other than SOF. In this case operational control would remain with the theater SOC and the relationship to the UN force would still be one of direct support. Specific details on support to be provided and the specific command relationship would have to be established through a memorandum of agreement or terms of reference.

The concept presented shows that the use of US SOF to support the UN force can assist in establishing the conditions for attaining the mandate. The four stages provide a framework for an integrated, systematic approach to supporting peace operations in which the four major areas of UN force vulnerability can be reduced. The SAF's execution of four SOF missions (FID, SR, CA, PSYOP) and two SOF collateral activities (Coalition Support and HA) constitutes a dynamic capability not doctrinally resident in any UN force at present. The SAF's unique task organization contributes to the overall UN operation by specifically focusing on the four critical vulnerabilities: assessment, planning, training, and command and control and then applying the expertise, resources, a strategy, and a command and control structure to ensure those weaknesses are mitigated or corrected. This concept, which incorporates information operations, humanitarian and civic action, and other situation-specific special operations enables US SOF to effectively function as the trim tab for a UN force and can be a US strategic economy of force indirectly assisting in accomplishing US national interests.

VI. Conclusion

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins - war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires - in those situations where we must encounter it - a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training.⁸²

President John F. Kennedy, 1961 West Point Graduation Speech

Although President Kennedy was talking about the rise of insurgency during the Cold War, the idea that the world is experiencing increased instability and hostilities that are new when compared with the Cold War, yet which have been experienced in many forms throughout history is particularly appropriate when addressing UN peace operations. As is demonstrated in this monograph the world has changed and both the UN and the US are in the process of adapting to it. One of the ways to assist the UN in adapting to this non-conventional conflict environment is for US SOF to provide support to its peace operations forces. This requires some change in old mental models by taking historical and existing capabilities and applying them in a new situation. SOF have the tools and the experience; all that is required is a commitment to conduct their established missions in support of a new force in a new situation. This can pay off for both the United Nations and the United States.

The US Commander in Chief Special Operations Command has directed that any new SOF mission be examined critically before it is accepted and as such has established five criteria for analysis.⁸³ Each will be addressed in terms of the SOF role in support of UN operations.

The first question to ask is: *Is this an appropriate SOF mission?* As discussed, this mission is actually a synthesis of existing missions and capabilities. The personnel, skills, and equipment required for conducting SOF's principle missions and collateral

activities apply to support of UN operations. There is both a peacetime test and a wartime test for this criterion. In peacetime the test is simply to ask if the mission is part of the unit's mission essential task list (METL). All SOF units have some or all of the missions and activities required to support the UN operations as part of their METL. The wartime test is to determine if other forces train for the required missions and whether the unique skills of SOF are required. Since no other units train for the all missions and activities discussed, it therefore is apparent that support to peace operations would be an appropriate mission.

The next criterion is: *Does it support the CINC's campaign plan?* Depending on the situation, this can be answered in the affirmative. In that all regional CINCs have as an objective the promotion of regional stability it stands to reason that a successful UN operation can contribute to its accomplishment. Furthermore, the US SOF contribution serves the needs of the National Command Authorities as they serve as a strategic economy of force by reducing the requirement for conventional forces, thus allowing the US to remain engaged in UN operations, and to expand military to military contacts, while possibly reducing domestic political turmoil.

Is it operationally feasible? This question concerns preventing the waste of SOF resources when a mission is beyond their capabilities. In general terms support to a UN operation is not beyond SOF capabilities, since as already discussed, they possess a wide range of skills and capabilities. However, there is a caveat to this. With the increasing number of peace operations, it is possible that SOF could become overextended. This could have significant effects on readiness. Therefore, the selection of operations will be critical, because it is probable that US SOF will not be able to adequately support all operations.

The fourth question is: *Are the required resources available to execute?* This deals with both SOF assets, as well as conventional resources needed to support the

operation. This question is more concerned with wartime or a mission requiring support such as air cover, electronic support, deception, or other actions and assets that may be needed for other higher priority missions. The failure to properly resource and support Task Force Ranger recently in Somalia is an example of the tragic consequences of disregarding this question. The use of SOF in peace operations in the 21st Century can result in competition for scarce SOF resources. A long-term commitment to a UN force can tie up limited SOF assets that may be required for other operations. Careful analysis of US interests and minimum essential force and resource requirements (SOF and non-SOF) is required to support committed SOF properly.

The most important criterion is: *Does the expected outcome justify the risk?* If SOF support could only make a marginal contribution then it may not be worth using them. However, in this case, as already demonstrated, if escalation of conflict can be prevented, threats reduced or eliminated, and regional stability enhanced, then the gains may outweigh the risks. There are risks to individual operators especially for pilot teams and those liaising directly with the parties in dispute. Again, these risks may be outweighed if the UN operation is critical to the US, because it allows the US to achieve policy aims with a minimal commitment of US resources.

In conclusion, this monograph has shown that US SOF have a role in support of UN operations -- a role which has a historical, doctrinal, and functional basis. Their use can be of significant benefit to the US by serving as a strategic economy of force, to the UN force by functioning as the means to apply leverage that assists in efficient operations, and to SOF themselves by allowing them to conduct missions which enhance their current capabilities. US SOF are able to operate with UN forces, if the NCA determines it is in US interests, because the environment in which peace operations are conducted is increasingly similar to the environment in which SOF have traditionally functioned -- an environment characterized as one of *non-conventional conflict*.

In order to effectively contribute to UN operations, US SOF should revitalize an organization from its counterinsurgency roots of the 1960s: the Special Action Force. By establishing such an organization, with the principle SO mission FID as the overall framework in which to operate while drawing on their UW skills, US SOF can focus its efforts on assisting a UN force commander in assessing, planning, training, and executing a peace operation. By establishing a "directed telescope" with CSTs and FLTs, enhancing interoperability, providing accurate and timely assessments, conducting effective information gathering, disseminating factual and practical information, and conducting humanitarian and civic action, US SOF can be the oil that reduces the friction caused by operating with multi-national forces in a non-conventional conflict environment, as well as the glue for cohesive and effective UN operations. Thus, in supporting UN operations US SOF have found a new niche in which they are uniquely qualified to operate -- a capability which will expand the strategic reach of the United States in the 21st Century.

Glossary

Aggravated Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts. (JP 3-0)

Area Assessment. The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 1-02)

Area oriented. Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area. (JP 1-02)

Campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. (JP 1-02).

Capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (JP 1-02).

Civil Affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (JP 1-02)

Coalition Force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

Combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified; e.g., Combined Navies.). (JP 1-02)

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

Direct Action. Short duration and other small scale offensive actions by SOF to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target or to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Internal Defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The primary mission is to organize, train, advise, and assist host nation military and paramilitary forces. (JP 1-02)

Humanitarian Assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02)

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

Irregular Forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (JP 1-02)

National Objectives. Those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation--as opposed to the means for seeking these ends--toward which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. (JP 1-02)

National Policy. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

National Security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, b. favorable foreign relations position, or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

Operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

Paramilitary Forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

Peace-building. Action to identify and support structures which would strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-0)

Peace-enforcement. Armed intervention, involving the use of force or threat of the use of force, pursuant to authorization by the United Nations Security Council for the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression (JP 3-0)

Peace-making. Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essential through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement. (JP 3-0)

Peace Operations. All actions taken by the United Nations or regional organizations under the authority of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and those Chapter VII operations not involving the unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low intensity peace enforcement operations not involving the unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. (JP 3-0) Also: An umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predominantly military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement). (FM 100-23)

Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. Rangers can also execute direct action operations in support of conventional non-special operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. (JP 1-02)

Sea-Air-Land Team. A group of officers and individuals specially trained and equipped for conducting unconventional and paramilitary operations and to train personnel of allied nations in such operations including surveillance and reconnaissance in and from restricted waters, rivers, and coastal areas. Commonly referred to as SEAL team. (JP 1-02)

Security Assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

Special Forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF. (JP 1-02)

Special Forces Group. A combat arms organization capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. It consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and special forces battalions. The group can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, special forces group units are capable of task-organizing to meet specific requirements. Also called SFG. (JP 1-02)

Special Operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special-operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and

dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02) The modes of SO are:

Direct Operations or Strike: Consists of applications of military power designed to break an adversary's will and comprises reconnaissance, strikes, and maneuvers that cause the destruction, disruption, or denial of military capabilities. Includes four SOF core tasks: Counter-Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP-WMD); Combating Terrorism (CBT); Direct Action (DA); and Special Reconnaissance (SR). (USAJFKSWCS Briefing and draft JP 3-05)

Indirect Operations or Engagement: Applications of military resources designed to train, advise, or assist interagency activities, nations important to US interests, and surrogate forces pursuing US interests. Indirect operations encompass engagements and economies of force that deter an adversary's use of force or that promote peace. Includes four SOF core tasks: Unconventional Warfare (UW); Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Psychological Operations (PSYOPS); and Civil Affairs (CA). (USAJFKSWCS Briefing and draft JP 3-05)

Special Operations Command. A subordinate unified or other joint command composed of designated special operations forces that is established by a unified or other joint force commander to prepare for, plan, and execute, as directed, joint or single-Service special operations within the joint force commander's assigned area of operations, or as directed by the National Command Authorities. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

Special Operations Forces. Military units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force which are designated for special operations, as that term is defined, and are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

Special Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy. SOF may also use SR to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. (JP 1-02)

Strategic Estimate. The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (JP 1-02)

Strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other

instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

Support. 1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

Traditional Peacekeeping. Deployment of a United Nations, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations, regional organizations, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Non-combatant military operations (exclusive of self defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute (JP 3-0).

Unconventional Warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

END NOTES

¹Robert A. Fitton, ed. Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 219.

²William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 2 and 16.

³Republican Contract with America, item 6: The National Security Restoration Act, 28 Sep 94 from the Congressional Quarterly On-line Service. Although it has not passed into law, nor is it likely to, it does demonstrate the negative attitude toward U. S. Participation in U. N. controlled or sponsored operations.

⁴Clinton, 16-17.

⁵William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, DC: The US Government Printing Office, 1995), C-1.

⁶Ibid., 40.

⁷History of UN Operations from the UN web site.

⁸Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993), GI-13.

⁹Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 111. Additional definitions of key peace operations terminology are in the glossary.

¹⁰Glenn W Goodman, Jr., "Warrior-Diplomats - Not Political Warriors," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1995, 42. This article is a report on the speech given by Assistant Secretary Holmes on 14 December 1994 during the American Defense Preparedness Association's sixth annual Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium.

¹¹John M. Collins, CRS Report for Congress, Special Operations Forces: An Assessment, 1986-1993, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1993), 75.

¹²The following information is derived from briefing slides produced by the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) which are

intended to provide information on the current revision of JCS Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, that is currently in draft form.

¹³ Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), 64-65.

¹⁴ John Keegan, A History of Warfare, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 12.

¹⁵ A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91-92. Selected portions of the UN Charter are reproduced in this report with particular emphasis on chapters VI and VII. It is interesting to note that no where in these chapters nor in the entire charter is a concept of "peacekeeping" established. The word "peacekeeping" is not even mentioned.

¹⁶ "UN Peacekeeping Chronology," Soldiers for Peace: A Supplement to Military History Quarterly: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Vol. 5, Number 1, Autumn 1992, 5-8. This provides a useful summary of each of the operations conducted through 1992. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 2d ed., (New York: The United Nations, 1995), 8. As of December 1994 there were seventeen total UN operations under way; nine of the traditional type and eight of the new multifunctional type.

¹⁷ Jan Goldman, "A Changing World, A Changing UN," Military Review, September 1994, 13. Although the Korean War was conducted under the UN flag, it was not controlled by the UN Security Council or the Secretary General. It is interesting to note that the only reason that a UN Security Council Resolution passed in June 1950 was that the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN and was not present to use its veto. See also William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 315-352.

¹⁸ Traditional Peacekeeping is defined as deployment of a UN., regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN., regional organizations, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Noncombat military operations (exclusive of self defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. See Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington DC.: The Joint Staff, September, 1993), GL-15.

¹⁹ Boutros-Ghali, 8-9 He states: The new breed of intra-state conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. They are usually fought not

only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command. *They are often guerrilla wars without clear front lines.* Civilians are the main victims and often the targets. Humanitarian emergencies are commonplace and combatant authorities, in so far as they can be called authorities, lack the capacity to cope with them. [emphasis added].

²⁰The non-doctrinal term of *non-conventional* conflict is used to differentiate from the doctrinal term: unconventional warfare, which is "a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source, UW includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape." Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, March 1994).

²¹AFSC Pub 1, I-9.

²²Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 15.

²³United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, "Final Report on the In-depth Evaluation of Peacekeeping Operations," (New York: The United Nations Committee for Programme and Coordination, 17 March 1995), para. 35. Specifically, these activities are:

- Creation of a secure environment for the delivery and provision of humanitarian assistance.
- Maintenance of humanitarian access.
- Use of all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives of peace-keeping operations.
- Action in the face of documented, large-scale incidence of genocide, and prosecution of those committing acts of genocide.
- Monitoring of compliance with human rights norms and supervision of elections as part of internally negotiated political agreement to end internal civil and political strife.
- Establishment of safe areas and deterrence of attacks against them.

- Protection and promotion of human rights.

²⁴Boutros-Ghali, 8-11, 34.

²⁵John MacKinlay, "Defining a Role Beyond Peacekeeping," an article in Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, McNair Paper Number 17, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1993), 32-33. The three levels of peace operations are:

Level One: (Monitors and Supervision) Comprises defined tasks of observer mission and peacekeeping forces.

Level Two: (Reinforced Military Presence) Describes five categories of operation which usually occur in conflict between communities within a state, rather than between states. Although UN multinational forces will be stronger and more effective, they will continue to operate under strict limitations of using the minimum amount of force required to achieve their immediate objective. This is distinguished from Level One by the higher requirement for militarily effective contingents and the presence of heavier weapon systems within the UN force.

Level Three: (Military Intervention) These operations refer to enforcement operations where UN military forces with a substantial heavy weapons capability are used to redress a major threat to international peace and security. They are distinguished from Levels One and Two by the likelihood that incidents between UN forces and the sanctioned party are likely to occur at a very high level, typically between troop formations, combat aircraft, or warships and not between small groups on the ground. Level Three operations are continuing to develop in their characteristics and scope. This is certainly the most dynamic area of UN operational activity.

²⁶Colin L. Powell and Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey, (New York: Random House, 1995), 249. Colonel Beckwith was referring to the ad hoc organization established for the Iranian rescue operation, code named Eagle Claw, which resulted in the tragedy at Desert One.

²⁷UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, para.. 2.

²⁸Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: The Joint warfighting Center, 1995), 28.

²⁹Boutros-Ghali, 25.

³⁰UN Office of Internal Oversight, para.. 71. See also US GAO Report, 34.

³¹William J. Durch, The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century, (Carlisle Barracks PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), 7.

³²US GAO Report, 5.

³³Ibid., 34.

³⁴Major David M. Last and Mr. Don Vought, "Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations: A Conference Report," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 4.

³⁵United States Institute of Peace, The Professionalization of Peacekeeping: A Study Group Report, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), x.

³⁶Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993), 113.

³⁷Department of Defense, AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993, (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1993), 6-32, Fig 6-13. The "FAS" test is a method for evaluating course of action during the decision making process. It consists of five basic questions of which three are useful in evaluating any plan:

Suitability: Will the course of action [plan] actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives?

Acceptability: Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses? Losses in time, material, and position are weighed in addition to purely military losses, and military and political supportability are also considered.

Feasibility: Do we have the required resources, i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in time?

³⁸UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, para.. 49.

³⁹A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 11.

⁴⁰Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 22, 28.

⁴¹United States General Accounting Office, UN. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions, (Washington DC: The US General Accounting Office, December 1993), 5.

⁴²Ibid., 30.

⁴³Ibid., 35.

⁴⁴Allard, 41. Planning often focuses on the deployment and not on identifying the potential contingencies. In some instances it is the Time Phased Force Deployment List that is the center of planning as opposed to the identification of potential threats and the development of branches and sequels for response.

⁴⁵MacKenzie, 178.

⁴⁶Boutros-Ghali, 18.

⁴⁷United States Institute of Peace, 48.

⁴⁸Ibid., 34.

⁴⁹See US Army FM 100-23 Peace Operations, 1994, pages 119-120 for a listing of peace operations doctrine. Examples include: Nordic UN Tactical Manuals, vols. 1 and 2, 1992; Canadian Force Publication 301 (Interim), Land Force Peacekeeping Operations, 1993; NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Draft) 1994; United Kingdom Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping (Fourth Draft Revised), 1994; Draft Concept for the Employment of Army Units in Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Activities, 1992; Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Pamphlet No. 1, Peace Support Operations, 1993; and UN Training Guidelines, 1993.

⁵⁰DoD, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, 10-11.

⁵¹Boutros-Ghali, 17.

⁵²James H. Baker, "Central Control Essential in UN 'Peacefare,'" Army Times, 21 June 1993 reprinted in the DoD Joint Electronic Library (JEL), Peace Operations, May 1995, file number K224.

⁵³David S. Alberts, "Command and Control in Peace Operations," Institute for National Security Studies Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technologies, 1 September 1994, reprinted in the DoD Joint Electronic Library, Peace Operations, May 1995, file number K332.

⁵⁴Interview with a former US member of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, September 1995.

⁵⁵DoD, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, 37.

⁵⁶Senge, 8. He describes mental models as "deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action." For SOF the "mental model" the peace operation environment is viewed in traditional terms of usually two opposing forces in dispute over some political, economic, or territorial issue. This mental model should be shifted to view the conflict more from an insurgency point of view and the fight for legitimacy. In addition, the mental model for FID must be shifted. SOF should view the UN peace operations forces as the "government" it is assisting in its fight for legitimacy.

⁵⁷Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, March 1994).

⁵⁸Lieutenant General James T. Scott, "Special Operations Forces: Facing Change and Challenge," Army (April 1995), 21-26. In this article an army special operations force structure is described which integrates CA and PSYOP into a special forces group structure.

⁵⁹Charles M. Simpson, III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 69-70.

⁶⁰Major General Sydney Shachnow, "As I Remember It: Notional 'X' Command," Special Warfare, October 1995, 15-17.

⁶¹Department of the Army, FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1981), 128.

⁶²Shachnow, 15.

⁶³Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, "Combat Peacekeeping: Fashioning an American Approach to Intervention Operations," Armed Forces Journal International, October 1995, 34.

⁶⁴Department of Defense, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff 1993), III-24.

⁶⁵Commander, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) Memorandum, 8 April 1992, SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces Campaign Planning.

⁶⁶DoD, JP 3-0, VI-1.

⁶⁷DoD, JP 1-02: Special Reconnaissance consists of "reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy. SOF may also use SR to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance." Area assessment is "the commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment."

⁶⁸Department of the Army, FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), 7-9. See also obsolete publications for further discussions of pilot and assessment team operations. For example, ST 31-201, Special Forces Operations, (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, 1978), 5-3

⁶⁹United States Institute of Peace, x.

⁷⁰DoD, JP 1-02. Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area are area oriented.

⁷¹Lieutenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The US Army Command and General Staff College Combat Studies Institute, 1991), 1-2. The directed telescope has been employed throughout history to overcome the problems associated with the uncertainty of combat and the inherent weaknesses of organizations functioning in the chaos of combat situations. It generally consists of using "trusted agents," usually specially selected, highly trained, trusted, young staff officers to deploy to subordinate units and serve as the eyes and ears of the commander. Subordinate commanders are faced with two equally pressing problems. First is to direct his unit to successfully accomplish its mission. Second is to inform the higher commander of the situation. Obviously, the old adage of having to "shoot the closest enemy first" applies here. The commander must ensure the survival and success of his unit; therefore, it is natural that reporting the situation to a higher level will be a secondary priority. Of course, this is a paradox because if the higher commander understands the subordinate situation he may be able to employ resources at his disposal to assist the unit in combat. Thus, the directed telescope, in one form or another, has been used throughout history in an attempt to overcome this problem.

⁷²Boutros-Ghali, 18.

⁷³BG Potter briefing, 5 May 95.

⁷⁴Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), II-15 for comments on success of SOF CSTs in Desert Storm. Also author's personnel experience for success of CST operations in CFC in Korea. See Allard, page 77, and DoD, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations for evidence of CST success in Somalia.

⁷⁵The term Faction Liaison Team was coined by Major Tim Whalen and then Major Charlie King of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in 1993 in preparation for a potential UN peace operation.

⁷⁶Boutros-Ghali, 19.

⁷⁷Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994).

⁷⁸United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, para. 35, MacKinlay, 32-33, and Boutros-Ghali, 8.

⁷⁹Allard., 66.

⁸⁰Ibid., 69-70 (Somalia); DoD, The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, 23-24 (CMOC operations); Last, 10-11 (Rwanda); and Department of Evaluations and Standardization, USAJFKSWCS, 208 (Northern Iraq), and BG Potter briefing, 5 May 95.

⁸¹Department of Defense, JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), III-8, Figure III-4. The specific relationship is not direct support but support and/or coordination. However, the direct support relationship as defined in Joint 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations is more clear and fits the situation more precisely: "Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance." (II-10).

⁸²Simpson , x.

⁸³United States Special Operations Command, memorandum, "SOF Mission Criteria," 9 August 1993.

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