Task Force Smith: An Intelligence Failure?
Abstract
This monograph examines intelligence and how it was applied to Task Force Smith. Task Force Smith was a regimental combat from 1st Battalion 21st Infantry Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles 'Brad' Smith, the first American soldiers committed during the Korean War. The thesis analyzes what was known about the North Korean Peoples Army immediately before, during, and after the employment of American soldiers. There was adequate intelligence available in June 1950 that predicted war on the Korean peninsula, and there was also adequate intelligence that could have benefitted Lieutenant Colonel Smith and his soldiers. Unfortunately, an immature command and control system, an untried intelligence system, and a chaotic military situation prevented what was known about the enemy to get down to the tactical commander. Intelligence is of no value unless it gets into the hands of the commander. It must be pushed down to the decision maker, and if it is not, the commander must become actively involved in the intelligence process and focus the intelligence effort. Unless intelligence and operations is integrated into plans the risk remains for repeating Task Force Smith.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 14, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA309900
Entities
People
- Richard E. Matthews
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College