Russia's Military Doctrine and the Internal Use of Military Force.

Abstract

On 11 December 1994, President Boris Yeltsin gave the order for the Russian Federation Armed Forces invasion of the self-proclaimed independent state of Chechnya. The intent was to gain control of an internal conflict and ensure the integrity of the Federation with a quick, decisive victory. what was to be a short-term action to achieve this intention, however developed into a protracted conflict that continues to draw national and international criticism toward Russia. This paper will examine the conflict it Chechnya relevant to Russia's current military doctrine, use of force, and the Armed Forces capability to achieve success and provide implications resulting from the analysis. The intent of this paper is to provide an awareness of the problems Russia faces with balancing use of force with the capability of the force to achieve success. Some correlation will be drawn between Russia's use of forces to conduct operations internal to state borders and peacekeeping operations conducted within the region that includes former Soviet Union states.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1996
Accession Number
ADA310860

Entities

People

  • Dale E. Roth
  • Steven A. Raho Iii

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Cis
  • Combat Readiness
  • Doctrine
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • International Law
  • Law
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Budgets
  • Military Doctrine
  • Military Operations
  • National Governments
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Ussr
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • East Asian Political and Security Studies within the Soviet Union
  • International Relations and Conflict Resolution
  • Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Cyberspace Operations against Adversarial Threats.