

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



19960729 101 **THESIS**

**U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT:
A SOURCE OF INFLUENCE OR ILLUSION?**

by

Scott Charles Gover


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE March 1996	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT: A SOURCE OF INFLUENCE OR ILLUSION		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Scott Charles Gover				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines how the United States uses military assistance to influence the foreign and domestic policies of Egypt, one of the two leading recipients of U.S. security aid. While it is generally believed that arms transfers provide a patron state with influence over a client state's behavior, little evidence has been provided to support this proposition. This research examines influence theory and the difficulties associated with the study of influence. Then it examines how the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs serve as tools for the United States to exert influence. Finally, these programs are evaluated through an examination of Egyptian policy making during three historical periods which correspond to the presidencies of Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. The FMS program influences Egyptian behavior through the development of numerous U.S.-Egyptian personal relationships at all governmental levels and through Egyptian dependence on the United States for weapons, training, financing, and follow-on support. The IMET program influences the potential leaders of Egypt by providing students exposure to U.S. culture and values. U.S. influence efforts in the case of Egypt have been most successful in obtaining short-terms goals that were of mutual interest to both nations.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Security Assistance, Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training, Egypt, U.S. Influence			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 106	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATIONS UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of


MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


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


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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how the United States uses military assistance to influence the foreign and domestic policies of Egypt, one of the two leading recipients of U.S. security aid. While it is generally believed that arms transfers provide a patron state with influence over a client state's behavior, little evidence has been provided to support this proposition. This research examines influence theory and the difficulties associated with the study of influence. Then it examines how the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs serve as tools for the United States to exert influence. Finally, these programs are evaluated through an examination of Egyptian policy making during three historical periods which correspond to the presidencies of Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. The FMS program influences Egyptian behavior through the development of numerous U.S.-Egyptian personal relationships at all governmental levels and through Egyptian dependence on the United States for weapons, training, financing, and follow-on support. The IMET program influences the potential leaders of Egypt by providing students exposure to U.S. culture and values. U.S. influence efforts in the case of Egypt have been most successful in obtaining short-term goals that were of mutual interest to both nations.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security assistance provided to Egypt is heralded as a vital instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Egypt and Israel remain the two largest recipients of U.S. security assistance grants. Egyptian participation in the Camp David Accords in 1979, logistical support for the U.S. hostage rescue attempt that same year, and participation in the U.S.-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991 are recent examples of U.S. influence derived from security assistance. Although the utility of security assistance as a source of U.S. influence is widely accepted, little research has been done to examine how security assistance programs actually influence the behavior of arms recipients.

This research examines how the United States influences Egypt through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. These programs are evaluated in terms of their capacity to provide the United States with influence over Egyptian policy during the Cold War. Based on U.S. Cold War experiences, the utility of arms transfers in the Post-Cold War environment is evaluated.

The influence model utilized in this study identifies three types of influence; *bargaining*, *structural*, and *hegemonic* influence. Bargaining influence is the most direct type; it involves gaining leverage over specific issues of immediate concern to the patron. Structural influence differs from the influence derived from bargaining

in that it occurs at a prior level, and attempts to avoid patron-client conflict. Through the use of structural influence, patrons attempt to create structural limitations which alter the behavior of an arms recipient. The last type of influence is unlike the other two types of influence. Hegemonic influence is not rooted in the transfer of arms. The goal of hegemonic influence is to co-opt the decision-making elites of a client state. Even while working within a well define influence model, influence may still be difficult to identify.

Efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of attempts to influence client states are fraught with difficulties. Any attempt to exercise bargaining influence is heavily dependent on an actor's perception of other's intentions. The effectiveness of bargaining influence is also dependent on the credibility of the threats and promises of an arms patron. Furthermore, the publicly stated intentions of decision makers frequently do not represent their true intentions, and thus serve as an unreliable indication of influence.

The FMS process in and of itself is a source of influence . The complexity of the FMS process, and the financial, contracting and managerial skills required to complete a major weapons sale, make arms recipients dependent on U.S. assistance. This extensive government-to-government involvement provides the United States with access to the political and military elites of a client state, and is believed to incur an obligation on the part of an arms recipient to support U.S.

policy objectives. Furthermore, the sophistication of modern weapon systems and equipment makes many less-developed nations dependent on follow-on support from the United States.

The IMET program unlike the FMS program, is not a source of bargaining or structural influence, and does not involve the transfer of arms. The training and educational opportunities provided foreign officers and civilians holding government positions represent U.S. efforts at exerting hegemonic influence. The design of this program is based on the belief that exposing foreign students to democratic principles and the American way of life will influence the future decision-making process of a client state.

U.S.-Egyptian security assistance relations are discussed in three historical phases coinciding with the Egyptian presidencies of Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. These periods are chosen for analysis based on the dominant role Egyptian presidents have played in shaping Egyptian foreign and domestic policy. From this study the following conclusions and recommendations were derived with regard to U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian behavior through the FMS and IMET programs.

The four basic elements of the FMS program which serve to influence Egyptian behavior are:

- the development of personal relations at all government and military levels between the United States and Egypt,
- the development of Egyptian dependence on U.S. weapons,

- the manipulation of arms delivery schedules and financing terms, and
- Egyptian dependence on U.S. follow-on assistance.

Unlike the FMS program, the IMET program represents a U.S. investment which will serve as a source of further influence. The IMET program influences the potential future leaders of Egypt through providing students exposure to the American lifestyle, training which stresses U.S. values, and fostering the development of close personal relationships between Egyptian students and their U.S. counterparts.

In answering the research question – "How does the United States influence Egypt through the FMS and IMET programs? – " the efficacy of past efforts to influence Egypt are examined. This research identifies the following four elements which have effected the success of U.S. influence:

- the existence of mutual interests between the U.S. and a client state,
- lack of consideration on the part of a the United States for the negative impact compliance will have on a client state,
- limitations on the ability of the United States modify client behavior, and
- the ineffectiveness of security assistance at achieving long term goals or promoting the continuation of existing behavior.

The United States continues to view security assistance as a valuable means to achieve U.S. objectives. However, questions persist as to its utility. The influence derived through the transfer of military hardware and training is an issue that requires additional research to expand the available knowledge in the field.

Based on the belief that grant security assistance produces a greater level of influence than that derived from cash sales of arms, the case of Egypt should be an optimal case. Since 1988 annual security assistance grants to Egypt have averaged \$1.3 billion dollars. In light of the magnitude of these annual grants of aid to Egypt, additional research is warranted to study whether the United States, especially in time of slow economic growth.

Historically, the United States appears to have achieved a constant level of influence over Egyptian behavior. However, there is little evidence in general supporting U.S. influence of Egyptian behavior. Additionally, there appears to be no correlation between the amount of arms transferred to Egypt and the influence obtained. Steady increases in the dollar amount of arms transferred to Egypt have failed to produce any indications of increased U.S. influence.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Security assistance provided to U.S. Middle Eastern allies has been portrayed as a vital instrument of U.S. foreign policy. As part of a much broader security assistance network, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the International Military Educational and Training (IMET) programs are designed to meet the legitimate security needs of recipients, and to serve as a source of U.S. influence. Egypt has been one of the principal recipients of U.S. security assistance since the late 1970's. Egypt and Israel are unique in that they are the two remaining nations which annually receive over one billion dollars of U.S. security assistance grants. Egypt receives an average of \$ 1.3 billion of grant assistance each year.¹

Arms acquisition is driven by real or perceived national security requirements. In the anarchic self-help global political system, the capacity of a nation to defend itself is the *sine qua non* of any state's concerns.² National survival, sovereignty, and the perpetuation of the government in power is dependent on a nation's ability to defend itself from internal and external threats. Nations which do not possess the indigenous resources with which to satisfy

¹ Richard Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1984-1991," *DISAM Journal* 15, no. 1 (Fall 1992): 30.

² Statement by Molly K. Williamson, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asian Affairs, 103rd Cong., 3rd sess., 11 May 1995 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1995): 7.

internal and external security requirements are driven to meet these needs through trade with foreign powers. The willingness of Egypt to devote increasingly scarce resources to the procurement of arms and training underlines the importance this nation places on acquiring advanced military weaponry and technology, and thus provides the United States with the opportunity to exert influence. The goal of this study is to examine how the United States influences Egypt through the FMS and IMET programs.

The arms trade is not a new phenomenon, but U.S. use of arms transfers as an instrument for influencing the behavior of other nations began after the Second World War. Since the advent of modern weapon systems in the nineteenth century, less industrialized countries have acquired much of their military capability through trade.³ The international arms trade has evolved from what is referred to as the "merchants of death" era from 1930 to 1940 (a period characterized by a lack of government controls on private arms manufacturers) to the present system in which governments serve as primary actors.⁴ During the "merchants of death" era, few arms transfers were used for political or diplomatic purposes.⁵ It was not until the Post-World War II period that nations began to view the arms trade as a source of influence over the political and military behavior of recipient states. The advent

³ Edward Laurance, *The International Arms Trade* (New York: Lexington Books, 1992), 3.

⁴ Ibid., 59.

⁵ Ibid., 62.

of national controls effectively brought the laissez-faire international arms trade system to an end . Growing awareness of the intense political significance of the arms trade has led governments to become increasingly involved in its control and regulation. The United States has come to regard arms transfers as an integral element of U.S. foreign policy.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has utilized security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. The weapons and training provided to U.S. allies and friends in the early post war period, began in response to perceived threats to the United States and its Western European allies from communist expansion. Early security assistance was provided primarily to the U.S. war ravaged European allies from existing post-war stockpiles. By the 1950's, The U.S. security assistance program had expanded to encompass many of the newly emerging third world countries of the Middle East, in an effort to gain client states, and halt Soviet expansion.

Historically, U.S. military assistance has been used as both a carrot and a stick. Promises of continued military assistance encouraged Israel and Egypt to sign the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords. However, U.S. security assistance has also been utilized as a stick with which to punish countries whose policies run counter to U.S. interests. The U.S. resupply of Israeli forces during the three Arab-Israeli wars from 1967-1973, served not only to support a U.S. regional ally, but also provided a form of punishment for Egyptian alignment with the Soviet Union.

1. Research Objectives

Through an examination of the U.S. International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Sales programs, this thesis will answer the following questions: (1) How does the United States influence Egypt through the FMS and IMET programs? (2) How do these programs support our Cold War regional interests? (3) Do they offer the same utility with regards to supporting our Post-Cold War interests?

2. Case Selectivity and Methodology

This thesis addresses the research objectives through the analysis of U.S. arms transfers to Egypt. The security assistance relationship between the United States and Egypt is examined in three historical phases. These phases correspond with the terms of Egyptian Presidents Gamal Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-1994). For the purpose of this study, the concept of influence will be defined as the ability of one country to exercise a degree of control over the policy of another through the supply of arms and training, but also as the ability to affect the decision making process of security assistance recipients. Influence with regard to military assistance includes, but is not limited to, the explicit manipulation of the flow of arms to effect policy changes

on the part of the recipient. Influence can also be manifest in the form of governmental policy decisions which take into account the "anticipated reaction" of an arms supplier.⁶

The basic methodology utilized is content analysis. A survey of pertinent official documents, pronouncements and secondary sources was utilized as the basis for determining U.S. foreign policy and objectives as they pertain to the Middle East, along with those of Egypt. The level of U.S. influence over Egypt is measured in terms of their participation in the Middle East peace process, support of U.S. regional initiatives, and demonstrated respect for human rights as compared with the level and type of security assistance provided.

3. Organization of Study

The subsequent sections of this chapter lay the foundation upon which the remainder of the this thesis is constructed. Section B of this chapter discusses influence theory. This section outlines the ambiguity associated with many of the key terms encountered in the study of influence, and establishes working definitions. Additionally, the difficulties associated with evaluating the presence of influence or its effects are considered. Finally, the influence model which is utilized in this study to evaluate U.S. influence in the case of Egypt is defined. The rationale for the selection of this model is also discussed.

⁶ William Quandt, *Arms Transfers to the Third World* (Boulder: Westview, 1978), 122.

Chapter II outlines the evolution of U.S. Security Assistance programs, while highlighting the development of the FMS and IMET programs. The FMS process and the IMET program are discussed in terms of how they serve as instruments with which the U.S. exerts influence. Section B provides a historical overview of U.S.-Egyptian relations. The final section of this chapter presents an overview of U.S. security assistance provided to Egypt under the FMS and IMET Programs in terms of magnitude from 1952 to 1994.

The security assistance relationship between Egypt, and the United States, is divided into three distinct phases. Chapter III addresses the first phase, from 1952 to 1970. This chapter discusses the evolution of U.S. foreign policy objectives from the Truman to the Nixon administrations, Egyptian foreign policy under Nasser, and the level of U.S. security assistance provided during this period. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian foreign and domestic behavior.

Chapter IV discusses the second phase of U.S.- Egyptian relations, from 1970 to 1981. An analysis of this phase encompasses the study of the evolution of U.S. foreign policy objectives from the Nixon to the Reagan administrations, and Egyptian foreign policy under Sadat. The efficacy of U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian behavior will also be discussed.

Chapter V examines the final and current phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations. The evolution of U.S. foreign policy from the Reagan to the Clinton administration

is examined, along with Egyptian foreign policy decisions as shaped by Egyptian President Mubarak.

Chapter VI presents a summary of the findings of this thesis and proposes recommendations for future U.S. security assistance. One of the chief findings is that there is a general lack of evidence supporting U.S. influence of Egyptian behavior. One of the chief recommendations is that greater study is required of the relationship between arms transfers and U.S. influence.

The logical starting point for a thesis which evaluates how the United States influences Egypt is an examination of the concept of influence. A basic knowledge of influence theory, and the conceptual model utilized in this study is essential. There exists a multitude of conflicting theories and models which attempt to explain how one nation influences the behavior of another.

B. INFLUENCE THEORY

Any meaningful study which analyzes how the United States has attempted to influence Egypt through the FMS and IMET Programs must be conducted within the confines of a defined conceptual framework. Along with working within a well defined framework, any study must acknowledge many of the limitations which accompany the study of influence. Most seasoned diplomats would argue that the influence derived from arms transfers is apparent, and does have major benefits for the United States, the world's leading arms supplier.⁷ Furthermore, arms transfers

⁷ Keith Krause, "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 3

have been categorized as the single most weighty diplomatic instruments in the hands of major powers.⁸ Although these may be commonly held beliefs, they are based on a multitude of different understandings of how states attempt to exercise influence through the manipulation of security assistance in conjunction with other tools of foreign policy.

A key factor which adds to the complexity of the study of security assistance as a source of influence is the ambiguity associated with the fundamental terms identified with this study. The inability to clearly define terms such as influence, power and leverage adds to the existing conceptual chaos. For the purpose of this study influence is defined as the "ability of a patron state to affect the foreign and domestic behavior of a recipient country to further the interests of the patron."⁹ The term "power" is often used interchangeably with the term "influence". Power is most commonly defined as the capacity to influence the behavior of other states in accordance with one's own objectives.¹⁰ Implicit in this definition, is the understanding that without the exercise of power, other states will not accede to the demands made upon them. The last term, leverage, as it applies to security assistance, is defined as the ability to threaten the discontinuation of a security

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Gabriel Marcella, "Security Assistance Revisited: How to Win Friends and Not Lose influence," *Parameters* 12, no. 4 (December 1982): 21.

¹⁰ John Spanier, *Games Nations Play*, sixth ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1987), 164.

assistance relationship unless American interests are given preeminent weight.¹¹ Even if these definitions are universally accepted, additional analytical questions persist. These persisting analytical caveats introduce a degree of uncertainty into any apparent claims as to the efficacy of arms transfers as a source of influence. These important analytical caveats include the absence of definitive evidence, dependence of influence on the intentions of patrons and clients, and the realization that an actor's perceptions of others intentions are more critical than the intentions themselves.¹²

Realizing the conceptual and mythological pitfalls which exist, the analysis of U.S. derived influence through the provision of security assistance in the case of Egypt will be examined in terms of three distinct operational influence models. These models distinguish three dimensions of influence sought by patron states: *bargaining influence*, *structural influence*, and *hegemonic influence*. The influence model selected for this thesis is based on Keith Krause's discussion of how arms transfers are used as tools of statecraft.¹³ The Krause model was chosen for its clearly defined three part structure. Its structure incorporates, and facilitates the categorization of past U.S. efforts to influence Egypt. Use of this model not only

¹¹ Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 166.

¹² Krause, "Military Statecraft," 316.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 313-336.

highlights how the United States attempts to influence arms recipients, but also serves as a means with which to analyze the efficacy of U.S. arms transfers.

1. Bargaining Influence

Bargaining influence involves gaining leverage over specific issues of immediate concern to the patron. This is the most direct means of attempting to exercise influence. It follows the carrot and the stick approach in which clients are manipulated through either threats of punishment or promises of rewards in order to achieve the specific goals dictated by the arms supplier. The means that have been used have varied from actual or threatened arms embargoes, to precipitous decreases or increases in levels of military aid, to cancellations of contracts, to delays or accelerations of deliveries, or to the promises of future transfers.¹⁴ Bargaining influence has been utilized to affect the signing of peace treaties, cease-fires, troop withdrawals, and participation in coalitions and treaty organizations.

Although widely utilized by patron states, numerous major difficulties are associated with attempts to influence clients through bargaining. The effectiveness of bargaining influence is dependent on the credibility of threats and promises. If a client state views a patron's threats or promises as lacking credibility, the patron's ability to gain influence through bargaining is severely degraded. The second difficulty associated with bargaining influence is related to the nature of influence.

¹⁴ Ibid., 317.

The ability to exert influence may not lie solely in the hand of a patron state. Clients may retaliate by exercising reverse influence. Reverse influence may be the product of a client's lobbying efforts within a patron state, or may be manifest in the form of promises or threats. Rather than to repeatedly capitulate to an arms supplier, a client may attempt to insulate itself against future punishment by finding an alternate supplier. Any attempt to exercise bargaining influence is heavily dependent on an actor's perception of others' intentions. The inherent difficulty associated with evaluating an actor's true intentions compels actors to rely on their own perceptions of other's intentions. Additionally, even in light of the presence of existing threats of punishment, or promises of rewards, the significance of mutual interests cannot be discounted. A major difficulty encountered when one attempts to identify bargaining power is that the type of evidence necessary to prove the existence of a causal relationship in many cases does not exist. As has been previously alluded to in terms of the importance of perceptions, the publicly stated intentions of decision makers frequently do not represent their true intentions, and thus serve as an unreliable measure.

2. Structural Influence

Structural influence differs from the influence derived from bargaining in that it occurs at a prior level, and thus attempts to avoid a patron-client conflict over specific goals. Structural influence facilitates the achievement of both specific or general objectives by altering the policy choices of an arms recipient without the visible exercise of influence. Through the application of structural influence,

patrons attempt to create structural limitations which alter the behavior of an arms recipient. This goal can be achieved either by altering the threats a client faces, or through the expansion or contraction of the range of possible options open to a client in the face of a perceived threat. Arms transfers which alter the regional or local balance of power represent a method of altering the threat a client faces. In security assistance relationships, structural power can also be exercised by providing or withholding specific types of weapons and training that facilitate or inhibit certain military strategies. Two methods of detecting structural influence are counterfactual history and shifts in the arms acquisition patterns of client states.¹⁵

3. Hegemonic Influence

Hegemonic influence, unlike bargaining and structural influence, is not rooted in the transfer of arms. The goal of hegemonic influence is to co-opt the decision-making elites of a client state. Through the willing acceptance of the patron's views by the ruling elite of a client state, the perceived interests of clients and patrons converge.¹⁶ This form of influence is not associated with the achievement of specific or general goals, but rather is used in support of global interests. The United States attempts to exercise hegemonic influence through the IMET and E-IMET Programs. Through these programs the United States attempts to socialize the world view of participants, in the hope that participants of these

¹⁵ Ibid., 322.

¹⁶ Ibid., 325.

programs will rise to positions of prominence. Once in a position of national leadership, it is assumed that a participants Americanized views will direct the decision making process of a recipient nation so as to converge with that of the patron.

For the purpose of this study, U.S. efforts to influence the foreign and domestic behavior of Egypt will be evaluated in terms of the bargaining, structural, and hegemonic influence models. The following chapter examines the mechanisms with which influence is sought through the International Military Training (IMET) program and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. Facets of each of these programs will be identified in terms of what type of influence the United States attempts to wield. Subsequent chapters will examine the utility of U.S. influence efforts, in terms of the role both these programs play, while remaining cognizant of the intrinsic limitations which exist with regards to establishing casual relationships.

II. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PROGRAMS AND MOTIVATION

This chapter presents a brief discussion of the evolution of U.S. security assistance efforts, followed by a description of both the FMS and IMET programs. Through gaining an understanding of the complexity of the FMS process, the level of involvement on the part of both the United States and potential arms recipients, how the United States attempts to influence recipients can be identified. The discussion of the FMS program is completed with a brief review of the mechanisms incorporated within the FMS process which serves as an instrument for achieving influence and applying leverage. The second part of this section reviews the objectives of the IMET and E-IMET programs, along with how these programs are designed to provide foreign military officers with training which supports U.S. interests.

A. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

International military assistance has been an integral part of U.S. security policy for more than fifty years. Originating with special programs of military aid to the Philippines and Western Europe in 1946, Greece and Turkey in 1947, and Nationalist China in 1948, the multitude of military assistance efforts of the U.S. government were finally united in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. As outlined by this act, military assistance was viewed as "essential to enable the United States and other nations dedicated to the principles of the United Nations

to participate in arrangements for individual and collective security."¹⁷ Out of these altruistic goals emerged a more pragmatic rationale for providing U.S. security assistance. The United States provides security assistance to protect its vital interests and enhance its national security. During the Cold War U.S. vital interests centered around the containment of the Soviet Union. Aid provided to Greece and Turkey was initially designed to frustrate Soviet attempts to expand into the Mediterranean. Through a U.S. offer of military assistance, Truman hoped to entice Greece and Turkey into a pro-western security alliance. From its modest post WWII origin, U.S. security assistance efforts have continued to expand in both scope and in the objectives which they strive to achieve.

Military assistance has become a valuable instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy. It helps strengthen friends and allies so they can play a larger role in maintaining the status quo in their region, defend themselves against aggression, or participate in peace-keeping activities. The United States provides security assistance through a range of programs that allow friends and allies to acquire U.S. equipment, services, and training for legitimate self-defense and for participation in multinational security efforts, such as coalition warfare.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. security can no longer be viewed in terms of maintaining the upper hand in the East-West power struggle. The

¹⁷ William H. Lewis, "Political Influence: The Diminished Capacity," in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., *Arms Transfers in the Modern World* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 188.

increased interdependence of states, and the breaking down of national and international boundaries, has created an international system which is beyond the control of any one state. The emerging role of coalitions as primary actors in the international system underlines the importance of U.S. security assistance efforts which serve to strengthen U.S. friends and allies.

In the current international system, the line between U.S. foreign and domestic policy has effectively evaporated. The post-Cold War international environment highlights the importance of security assistance as a vital instrument with which to guarantee national security. U.S. national security can no longer be viewed solely in terms of defending our borders. National security includes protecting the American way of life. With the growing complexity of world politics and dwindling world resources, our ability to maintain the American way of life is dependent on the actions of other states. President Truman's observation that "our security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes," is as applicable today, as it was over forty years ago when he first pronounced it.

Along with understanding the evolution of U.S. security assistance efforts, it is important to be familiar with the U.S. security assistance programs which have been categorized as a vital instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

1. Foreign Military Sales Program

The Foreign Military Sales Program is one of the two key U.S. security assistance programs defined as a source of U.S. influence. Through a understanding of the program's origin, and the FMS process, the strength of this

program as an instrument for exerting U.S. influence can be evaluated. Although derived from the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which was developed after World War II, the accomplishments of the current FMS program must be viewed in term of its relatively brief existence.

a. *Origin*

The Humphrey Morgan Act - International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA), served as the legal foundation upon which the FMS Program was constructed. Under the provisions of the AECA, the United States is authorized to sell defense articles and services to allies and friendly foreign governments, in accordance with the restraints and controls specified by law, and in the furtherance of the security objectives of the United States.

b. *Process*

The sale of U.S. defense articles or defense services, though the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program is a lengthy process encompassing an elaborate system of U.S. government involvement. The extent of government involvement in the FMS process is demonstrated by the manpower devoted to it. As of 1994, 2,085 U.S. government civilian employees and 5,766 U.S. contract employees were involved in the planning and implementing of U.S. military sales in 105 countries.¹⁸ The complexity of the FMS process in conjunction with

¹⁸ William W. Keller, *Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 53.

numerous possible procedural variations at each step of the negotiating and implementing process makes each FMS case unique. Government-to-government Foreign Military Sales involves a relationship between the United States and a recipient government in which the United States acts as a contracting agent. The U.S. government purchases security assistance articles from suppliers and then provides them to foreign governments. The nature of a request and the military department which has cognizance over the defense articles or services will determine the exact procedures followed in each specific FMS case. However, all cases contain a number of basic elements.

Forward Planning: The forward planning which may occur before a country submits a specific request, serves as the foundation upon which a supplier-recipient relationship is developed. The U.S. government, as the potential contracting agent, assists prospective recipients in determining their security assistance needs along with related U.S. budgetary and procurement issues. The assistance provided to a buying country at this preliminary stage is provided through three separate planning tracks. These tracks are delineated as the country track, budget track, and procurement track. The country track involves the regional departments of the State and Defense Departments, the operating branch of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), the Commanders of the Unified Commands of the Armed Forces responsible for the area involved, and the Security Assistance Office (SAO) in the interested country. The "budget track" involves DSAA's Plans Branch, the Office of Management and Budget, and at the State Department, the Under

Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (State/T), and Political-Military affairs (State/PM). The "procurement track," includes the State/PM, the individual services, DSAA Operations and Plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Disclosure Policy Committee.¹⁹

The actual planning is carried out by two types of groups: the "Country Team" or SAO of a particular country, and the "Washington Team", which may be a consultative or survey team dispatched for a particular reason, or associated with a Joint Military Commission.²⁰

A key planning tool is the Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA), prepared by the Country team. Additional planning documents include Consolidated Data Reports (CDRs). These reports contain abbreviated AIASA information for use in the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD), produced as part of the annual budget process. The CPD is an annual account of the security assistance requirements of selected countries.²¹

Eligibility: The first step in all FMS cases is a determination of eligibility. Any nation wishing to buy or lease defense articles or services, whether through FMS or commercial sales, must meet the requirements delineated in the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. The AECA stipulates that the United States

¹⁹ Michael Collins Dunn, "The Life History of a Foreign Military Sale," *Defense and Foreign Affairs* 14, no. 4 (April 1986): 7.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

may sell or lease defense items to friendly countries solely for four stated purposes : (1) internal security, (2) legitimate self-defense, (3) participation in regional or collective security arrangements, and (4) enabling foreign military forces to construct public works in support of economic and social development.²²

Additionally, the statute invests the Executive Branch with the responsibility of approving a nation's eligibility. In practice this is a function delegated to the State Department. In conjunction with the aforementioned eligibility requirements, recipient country or organization must agree not to transfer title to or possession of any defense related article, service or training to a third party without Presidential approval. Additionally, the country must provide the same degree of security protection to purchased defense articles as afforded such article in United States.²³

Types of Requests: Once a country's eligibility is established, an initial request will be made. Initial requests can be made to the State Department, or the Department of Defense from a foreign embassy, or in regular meetings between government officials. Initial requests, although often initially informal, are the basis for determining the precise channels through which the negotiations will proceed. Following an initial inquiry, a formal Letter of Request (LOR) is submitted. FMS requests, depending on the nature of the equipment requested, are either

²² Dunn, "The Life History of a Foreign Military Sale," 9.

²³ Ibid., 8.

categorized as "Requests for Significant Military Equipment (SME), or "Requests for all Other Foreign Military Sales."²⁴ SME refers to equipment listed in the United States Munitions List as requiring special export controls because of their substantial military utility or capability.²⁵ Requests for SME are sent to both the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). Although there is no required format for a LOR, in cases where SME is requested, the request must address a number of fundamental issues. These issues include: why the nation needs the equipment requested, how it will affect its force structure, the reaction of neighboring countries, the ability of the buyer to operate the equipment, the source of financing, "relevant human rights considerations," and whether the U.S. government should approve the transfer.²⁶ All other FMS requests, except SME will be routed to the cognizant DOD component.

P&R and P&A Data: Once the initial request is received through the appropriate channel, potential buyers may request either Planning and Review (P&R) data, or Price and Availability (P&A) data. P&R data is preliminary data, while P&A data is more detailed, and offers precise cost estimates and delivery timetables. DOD components are expected to provide P&R data within 45 days of receipt of the

²⁴ The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *The Management of Security Assistance*, 3rd ed. (Dayton: Wright-Patterson AFB., 1982), ch. 8, p. 1.

²⁵ Dunn, "The Life History of a Foreign Military Sale," 12.

²⁶ Ibid.

request, and P&A data should be provided within 60 days of receipt of the request. Unlike P&R data, and because of its precise nature P&A may be incorporated in a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA).

The LOA: The LOA is the document used as the actual sale transaction. This document lists the items or services, estimated costs and any conditions of the sale. In cases where requested items require a long lead time and require financing, a Letter of Intent (LOI) will be issued to cover the period between the issuance of the LOA and official acceptance. After the LOA is completed, the LOA will undergo an extensive review process by relevant agencies.

Final Review of LOA: Prior to finalization a completed LOA is reviewed by various appropriate agencies. In the Defense Department, the comptroller and the legal counsel of the relevant "component" are automatically involved. The DSAA Operations Directorate (DSAA/OPS) is the main coordinator for all FMS actions, and directs any DSAA action required prior to the point when the document is ready for "countersignature." The actual review process varies on a case-by-case basis. The nature of the defense items and services requested, the monetary value of the sales package, mode of payment and the source from which sales items are drawn, determine the review process.²⁷

Congressional Oversight: Until 1974, the power to negotiate and approve arms transfers resided almost exclusively with the President. In 1974, the legislative

²⁷ Ibid., 12.

branch took its first step towards establishing congressional oversight of the FMS process. With the adoption of the Nelson Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Congress received a limited veto power over major FMS transactions. While the Executive Branch has retained the responsibility of determining FMS recipient eligibility, the U.S. Congress maintains the power to block proposed FMS sales. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, with the incorporated Nelson Amendment, was the first comprehensive piece of legislation to establish formal policy guidelines for the FMS Program.²⁸ The AECA gave Congress the power to block arms sales, by passing a concurrent resolution of disapproval. Furthermore, the AECA requires the Executive Branch to formally notify Congress if a proposed FMS sale meets prescribed thresholds. Section 36 (B) of the AECA defines the thresholds above which Congress must be notified to include;

- any LOA which includes defense articles and services totaling \$ 50 million or more,
- requested design and construction services of \$ 20 million or more,
- or any "major defense equipment " for \$ 20 million or more.²⁹

In cases where prescribed thresholds are met or exceeded, the President must notify the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the

²⁸ Ibid., 41.

²⁹ Michael Collins Dunn, "Arms and the Congress," *Defense & Foreign Affairs* 14, no. 4 (April 1986): 14.

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by numbered certification. Once Congress has been formally notified of a pending transaction, the House and Senate have thirty days in which to debate the proposal. If, after thirty days, Congress adopts a concurrent resolution opposing the sale, the transaction is nullified and the State Department must negotiate a new agreement with the purchasing government.³⁰ If there is not concurrent resolution the transaction becomes legal and binding.

The expanded role of Congress in the security decision making process has increased the ability of Washington to influence client states. A potential arms recipient must not only convince the Executive branch of the benefits to the United States of a proposed arms sale, but also the Congress. The requirement for congressional approval of all major arms sales strengthens Washington's bargaining position. Additionally, foreign lobbying efforts which may accompany controversial arms sales serves to acquaint foreign governments with the U.S. political system, functioning as a source of hegemonic influence.

FMS Case Implementation: Once a foreign buyer finds the offer acceptable, the purchaser must complete and sign the LOA's acceptance portion, date it, and forward the copies to the military department, as well as an additional copy to the Security Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC). Upon receipt of the LOA, SAAC issues the obligation authority (OA) to the cognizant DOD component. The

³⁰ Michael T. Klare, *American Arms Supermarket* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 72.

procurement and logistical aspects of delivery are as complex as any other stage of the process and require significant further interaction between representatives of the buying country and their U.S. counterparts. A FMS case is not considered closed until all items and services listed in the LOA have been shipped and billed, when all bills containing these items and services have been paid, and when SAAC issues a "Final Statement" attached to the next quarterly bill officially closing the case.³¹

The FMS process from the time a LOR is submitted to the time a "Final Statement" is issued can take as long as two to three years, depending on the specifics of the case. During this time representatives of the client state work hand in hand with a large team of U.S. government representatives. These U.S. personnel guide the client nation in determining their security needs, and lead them step by step through the complex FMS process. Additionally, U.S. Government personnel provide the procurement and management skills, which in many cases the client nations is incapable of providing for itself. It is this dependency relationship that develops between the United States and a client state as a result of the complexity of the FMS process that is a significant source of influence. Beyond this source of implicit influence, other aspects of the FMS process provide the United States with additional sources of influence. The next section of this chapter discusses the influence derived from the FMS process in greater detail.

³¹ Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *The Management of Security Assistance*, 3rd ed., ch. 8, p.15.

c. *Sources of Leverage and Influence*

The transfer of major weapon systems and high-tech equipment through the FMS Program, offers the United States the opportunity to influence the political behavior of recipients. The capacity of the U.S. government to apply influence and leverage as a function of the FMS program is a product of the arms sale negotiation and contracting process, as well as the nature of the defense articles and services that are sold. Through the FMS program, the United States attempts to:

- gain access to the political and military elite of a client state,
- develop an obligation on the part of arms recipients to support U.S. policy objectives,
- establish military-to-military ties,
- and make arms recipients dependent on the United States.

The long and often complex negotiations, which are characteristic of the FMS process, provide U.S. officials with the opportunity to establish close working relationships with their foreign counterparts. Out of these close working relationships grow friendships and allegiances, which often yield significant future returns. In countries such as Egypt, where military elites wield considerable political power and influence, the development of enduring relationships are particularly important.

Through major arms sales the United States attempts to directly and indirectly influence arms recipients. The transfer of advanced munitions are

believed to create a bond between the parties involved, implying a commitment on the part of supplier to defend the recipient. In turn for this implied commitment to defend the recipient, the recipient incurs an obligation to support the policy objectives of the supplier.³²

The sophistication of modern weapons systems and equipment makes many less developed nations, dependent on follow-on support from the United States. The ties which are established when a nation purchases advanced weapons was adeptly stated by Lockheed Vice President William D. Perreault, when he said, "When you buy an airplane, you also buy a supplier and a supply line; in other words you buy a political partner."³³ The dependency which accompanies many weapons purchases can be the source of significant coercive potential. The ability of an arms supplier to influence a recipient's behavior is greatest during times of crisis and or war. This is especially true in instances when the rapid resupply of vital war materials means the difference between victory and defeat.

Arranging large-scale loans or grants is yet another service which is usually only available through a government-to-government sale. The current world recession has significantly reduced the funds available to many Third World nations for the acquisition of costly new munitions. Since the end of the Cold War, the

³² Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, 30.

³³ Ibid.

United States has come to dominate the Third World arms market. Many Third World countries cannot pay cash for weapons, but still have a military or political desire for acquiring advance weapon systems. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as one of the few remaining states capable of providing financing for major defense purchases. Financing has become an integral element of Foreign Military Sales, and a source of considerable leverage. The United States attempts to influence the behavior of arms purchasers by offering favorable credit terms at the time of sale. Unlike FMS financed through grants, FMS financed through a U.S. financed loan offers the United States the opportunity to influence recipients for years after the sale of a weapon system. Through refinancing and loan restructuring, the United States can alleviate the financial burden imposed by loan repayment to arms recipients faced with financial shortfalls.

Government-to-government weapons sales are not the only method by which the United States attempts to shape the behavior of security assistance recipients. The training of foreign military officers has been categorized as one of the most cost effective means with which to influence the foreign and domestic policies of client states. Section two of this chapter discusses both the IMET and E-IMET programs. These programs serve as the vehicles through which International military students, and more recently their governmental counterparts receive U.S. training.

2. International Military Education and Training Program

The United States has a long history of providing military training to its friends and allies. Since the earliest days of the MAP program, the provision of training has been seen as an essential element of the security assistance "total package approach." It was recognized early on, that the provision of military hardware alone does not guarantee the increased operational readiness of military aid recipients. As the training element of the MAP program developed, and later evolved into the IMET program, U.S. military training began to be seen as a valuable source of hegemonic influence.

a. Origin

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. The current IMET program evolved out of what was formerly the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The MAP provided both grant military equipment and training to U.S. allies and friends. The training element of MAP focused on providing technical training which was directly related to the support of grant MAP equipment. The demise of the MAP in 1976, represented a fundamental shift in U.S. international military training efforts, and subsequently led to the development of IMET. The IMET program took on an expanded thrust, concentrating on providing training for individual students, not especially coupled to military equipment deliveries. The IMET program was developed in response

to the requirements outlined in the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was subsequently amended in the Fiscal Year 1976 Congressional Presentation Document (CDP). Section 543 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, identifies three intended purposes of the IMET program:

- (1) to encourage effective mutual beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security;
- (2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and,
- (3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.³⁴

Additionally, the IMET program was established in response to a U.S. government initiative to standardize the training of international military students receiving training in the United States. The initial IMET program focused on providing professional leadership, and management training to a select group of junior, middle and senior grade foreign officers.³⁵ The overall goal of the IMET Program was to strike a balance between providing technical courses that a poorer country could not purchase, and professional "influence-building" training appropriate to the level of development of the country involved and the sophistication of the country's armed forces. Since 1950, the IMET

³⁴ Spiro C. Manolas, "The United States International Military Training (IMET) Program: A Report to Congress," *DISAM Journal* 12, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 24.

³⁵ Janet Seufert, "International Military Student Program", *DISAM Journal* 16, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 87.

program and its predecessor programs have furnished education and training for over 500,000 international military students from nearly 150 countries. The number of students trained under the IMET program alone, however, fails to illustrate the potential of this program, the selectivity of program participants serves to magnify the impact the program has on participating nations. U.S. professional military training , serves as an integral step in the career paths of many foreign officers and conversely a stumbling block for others. The successful completion of a U.S. military course enhances participants' potential for advancement. In a six-year period, FY 1984-FY 1989, over 1,000 former IMET students held such key positions as Heads of State, Cabinet Ministers, Ambassadors, Members of Parliament and Chief Executive Officers of leading business enterprises, as well as chiefs of their military services, military commanders, academy superintendents, foreign attaches, and senior NATO military officials.³⁶ The IMET Program appears to help the United States reach and influence thousands of individuals who ultimately rise to positions of prominence, either in the government, or in the private sectors of their nations. As with other security assistance programs, the IMET program has evolved and expanded.

3. Expanded IMET Program

The expanded IMET Program is part of the overall IMET Program, but is different from the traditional IMET Program which emphasizes military-to-military ties. Expanded IMET trains military and civilian officials, including civilian personnel from non-defense ministries, the country's legislative entities, and non-governmental agencies who are

³⁶ Manolas, "The United States International Military Education and Training Program,"4.

involved in military matters, in managing and administering military establishments and budgets, in promoting civilian control of the military, and creating and maintaining effective military justice systems and military codes of conduct in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.³⁷ The objectives of the Expanded IMET Program include:

- contributing to responsible defense resource management,
- fostering greater respect for and understanding of democracy and civilian rule of law, including the principle of civilian control of the military,
- improving military justice systems and promoting and awareness and understanding of internationally recognized human rights.³⁸

The training and education provided to foreign military officers and civilians under the IMET and the E-IMET programs represents a long term investment in a client state, which the United States hopes will yield future influence. These programs in their current form are based on the belief that exposing foreign students to democratic principles and the American way of life will influence the future decision making process of a client state.

The goals of the IMET and E-IMET programs have steadily grown since the United States first began providing foreign students training and educational opportunities. . Early training programs focused on instructing students in the operation of U.S. military equipment, however, have expanded to include educational courses ranging from financial management to civil-military relations. While the efficacy of these programs continues to be accepted, there has been little serious study of actual program effectiveness.

³⁷ U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Expanded IMET Handbook*.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Two significant considerations must be taken into account with regards to any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of these two programs. The first consideration is the time span required for U.S. influence efforts through the IMET Program to come to fruition. It may take a foreign officer trained under the IMET program, several years to reach a position of prominence. The second consideration that must be taken into account is that any U.S. attempt to track the professional progress of foreign officers trained in the United States could easily prove to be counterproductive. Even in semi-open societies, such as Egypt, any attempt to stay in contact with, or gather information on past students trained under the IMET program can easily be viewed as a threat to Egyptian sovereignty.

The IMET program while characterized as a cost effective source of U.S. influence, requires a longer period of observation. It has only been since 1980, that annual Egyptian participation in the IMET program has exceeded fifty students.³⁹ Furthermore, in view of the limitations associated with evaluating program effectiveness, further study is required. While the FMS and IMET programs serve as instruments of foreign policy, the success or failure of U.S. influence efforts can not be viewed solely as a result of these two programs.

The history of U.S. - Egyptian relations, discussed in the last section of this chapter, provides the final building block of the foundation upon which the Egyptian security

³⁹ Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts: As of September 30, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: FMS Control and Reports Division Comptroller, DSAA, 1992), 99.

assistance case is developed. The importance of gaining a fundamental understanding of the history of U.S.- Egyptian relations was clearly articulated by John C. Campbell in his discourse on the connection between history and a nations foreign policy:

We cannot decide upon objectives and policies in the abstract and then expect to apply them in some mechanical way. It is largely a question of direction, of day-to-day decisions made in accordance with a consistent general approach, in light of the region itself. Certain forces and trends should be apparent. It is our task to estimate them correctly, to guide and control them as we can; to march with them when they are favorable, and deflect them when they are not; to ride the tides of history and not be submerged by them.⁴⁰

The foreign and domestic policy decisions of a nation are not made in a vacuum. Egyptian foreign policy has been shaped by it leaders, along with economic, social, religious and cultural forces. Through the study of the history of U.S.- Egyptian relations these forces and trends can be identified.

B. U.S. - EGYPTIAN RELATIONS (1952-1994)

Any study of Egypt inevitably involves a study of geopolitics and regional conflicts. Egypt occupies a strategic position as a land bridge between two continents, and a link between two principle waterways, the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Egypt is a country of over sixty-four million, and contains over half of the world's Arabs. This fact has historically placed the leader of Egypt in contention for leader of the "Arab World." Egypt's geographical position in the world has repeatedly placed the nation between outside powers vying to influence Egyptian foreign policy.

⁴⁰ John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 6.

Soon after the conclusion of World War II, Egypt emerged as a sought after prize in the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. concerns over expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, led to the formulation of National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68). NSC-68 represented a radical shift in U.S. global defense doctrine and capabilities. In accordance with the goals outlined in NSC-68, the United States attempted to develop mutual security agreements in the Middle East in efforts to halt Soviet expansion. The Anglo-American concept of a Middle East Command (MEC), with Egypt as one of its principle members, was an early attempt at incorporating Egypt in an Anglo-American Middle East security strategy.

Modern Egyptian history and the evolution of U.S. - Egyptian relations are but a reflection of regional conflicts. Military failure has historically been the force which motivates change in Egypt. The formation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent war for Israeli independence, served as a catalyst of change in Egypt. The poor performance of the Egyptian Army against the fledgling State of Israel in the 1948 War, produced discontent in the Egyptian Army, and resulted in the formation of the Egyptian Free Officers movement. The Egyptian officer corp blamed the Army's poor performance on the faulty military equipment supplied by the corrupt government of King Farouk.⁴¹ There are some allegations not only of Washington's participation in the coup, but of attempts by the United States, without the knowledge of the British, to reorient

⁴¹ David R. Tarr and Bryan R. Daves, eds., *The Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1986), 141.

regional politics. Kermit Roosevelt, is said to have given Lieutenant Colonel Nasser, a prominent member of the Free Officers, three million dollars with which to implement the coup.⁴² After the successful coup, the members of the young Free Officers movement appointed General Muhammad Naguib as the leader of Egypt's ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). On September 3, 1952, President Truman, made a public statement which expressed broad support for the new Egyptian government, and hinted at American readiness to provide military aid to the Free Officers.⁴³ General Naguib indicated to the United States, that he was willing to except U.S. influence in exchange for weapons. On September 18, 1952, Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Amin, delivered a message from General Naguib, to the American ambassador in Cairo. The message stated that Egypt was completely on the side of the United States, and utterly apposed to communism. Furthermore, Naguib was willing to exchange Egyptian membership in the proposed Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), in exchange for military and financial assistance. In October, Nasser presented the Assistant Secretary of Defense, William Foster, with a \$100 million military shopping list. In response to the Egyptian request, the United States initially agreed to sell Egypt ten million dollars worth of equipment, however, the State Department withdrew the offer the next day. The U.S. offer was withdrawn because Amin refused to provide earlier agreed upon assurances. In 1954, Gamal Abdul

⁴² Steven Z. Freiburger, *Dawn Over Suez* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992), 26.

⁴³ William J. Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt; 1955-1981* (Albany: State University of New York, 1985), 13.

Nasser won his two year power struggle with General Naguib, and became the head of the RCC. ⁴⁴ Nasser's rise to power retarded U.S.-Egyptian relations, and effectively nullified all earlier agreements. Continued U.S. support of the Free Officers Movement was seen as means of reviving American influence in the Arab world. From 1945 to 1966 , Egypt went from being a monarchy, greatly influenced by its former protector, the United Kingdom, to becoming an independent nationalistic Arab state vying to regain its previous position as leader of the Muslim World. Under Nasser, Egypt pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment. Egypt attempted to exploit the superpower rivalry in the Middle East, by playing the interests of both superpowers against each other. One of Nasser's first objectives after taking power was the strengthening of the Egyptian military. However, limited Egyptian industrialization and severe financial constraints made any military modernization plans dependent on the procurement of foreign military aid. The revolutionary regimes quest for modern weaponry provided credibility to an active Egyptian foreign policy, served as a symbol of Egyptian independence and reinforced the authority and legitimacy of the regime. However, the Egyptian non-alignment policy proved to be incompatible with procurement of U.S. economic and military aid. Two conflicting attitudes developed in Washington and Cairo, with regards to foreign aid. Nasser perceived the existence of an obligation on the part of foreign donors, including the United States to provide Egypt with economic and military aid. Washington, however, believed that acceptance of U.S. aid also included acceptance of implied U.S. influence.

⁴⁴ Hellen Chapin Metz, ed., *Egypt: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1991), 58.

Israeli retaliatory raids into the Gaza Strip, in which Egyptian forces suffered a number of casualties, effectively substantiated Egyptian perceptions of the threat posed by Israel. Heightened Egyptian security concerns served to bring to the forefront the opposing attitudes of Egypt and the United States, with regards to the nature of security assistance. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, perceiving a legitimate security threat to Egypt, sought Western arms and training to restore the regional military balance.⁴⁵ However, under the 1954 Mutual Security Act, recipients of U.S. military aid were required to make binding commitments to the United States, guaranteeing that American weapons would be used for legitimate defense and internal security. Additionally, a congressional mandate required that U.S. arms transfers be accompanied by a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), tasked with supervising the transfer and accountability for the proper use of American weapons.⁴⁶ In September, 1955, Egyptian reluctance to accept U.S. arms transfer terms resulted in the withdrawal of Egypt's request for U.S. military aid. Nasser viewed the United States' military aid policy as symptomatic, and designed to isolate and weaken Egypt. Unfortunately, President Eisenhower failed to heed the warning of the British Foreign Minister Bevin at the London Conference five years earlier. Bevin stated that the Arabs must be allowed to purchase the arms necessary to meet their legitimate security needs, realizing that if Western powers refused to sell arms to the

⁴⁵ Tarr and Daves, *The Middle East*, 69.

⁴⁶ Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Towards Egypt, 1955-1981*, 16.

Middle Eastern states, the Soviet Union would surely do so.⁴⁷ As had been predicted by Bevin, Nasser, in an effort to thwart the imposition of U.S. influence agreed to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union, through Czechoslovakia. This action served to trigger a sequence of events. Egyptian procurement of Soviet weapons was viewed by the United States as an Egyptian move towards alignment with the Soviet Union, and led to the withdrawal of a U.S. offer of financial support for the Aswan Dam project on July 19, 1956. A week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, presumably in effort to gain the revenue from the canal, to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam, subsequently triggering the Suez Crisis.⁴⁸ Israel responded to Egyptian provocation by attacking across the Sinai Peninsula on the evening of October 29, 1956. Israeli action was followed by preplanned British and French response aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal. Israeli actions in conjunction with British and French attacks on the canal, rapidly overwhelmed Egyptian forces. The Suez Crisis, although representing a major military loss, was viewed as a moral victory for Nasser. After the setbacks suffered by Egypt in the 1956 War, Nasser attempted to demonstrate Egypt's ability to implement an expanded foreign policy, through Egyptian involvement in the Yemen Civil War in 1962. Egyptian support of Yemeni rebels was in direct opposition to U.S. support of loyalist forces. From 1963, to 1965, Egyptian troop concentrations in Yemen increased to 80,000, however, inadequate training and equipment for Yemen's rugged mountain terrain was blamed for the failure of Egyptian

⁴⁷ Freiburger, *Dawn Over Suez*, 20.

⁴⁸ Tarr and Daves, *The Middle East*, 142.

forces. The psychological setback suffered by the Egyptian Army, threatened to produce the same discontent in the officer corp that had previously resulted in the formation of the Free Officers Movement. Perhaps the most damaging consequence of Egyptian involvement in the civil war in Yemen, was that it increased Egyptian dependence on Soviet military aid, and tied down Nasser's best troops far from home at the advent of the 1967 War with Israel. An Israeli surprise attack across the Sinai on June 5, 1967, and the subsequent fighting proved devastating to Egypt. Eleven years as a recipient of Soviet training and weapons proved to be of little value with regards to Egypt's ability to repel foreign aggression. The 1967 War, resulted in the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force, and the overwhelming of Egyptian ground forces in less than twelve hours of fighting. Morale in the Egyptian Army plunged to its lowest point since the 1952 military takeover. The 1967 War, served as a turning point in Egyptian-Soviet relations. After the August, 1967, summit of the Arab League in Khartoum, Egypt became the recipient of financial aid from the Arab oil producing states. Nasser began to distance himself from the Soviet Union, although, Egypt continued to remain almost completely dependent on Soviet sophisticated military hardware.

It was not until after the death of Nasser, and the advent of the 1973 Yom Kippur War that Egypt actively attempted to move towards aligning itself with the United States. In May of 1971, Anwar Sadat signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in order to guarantee continued Soviet support. However, by late 1972, he called for the removal of all 20,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians. Almost immediately after announcing his desire for the removal of Soviet personnel, Sadat secretly contacted the Nixon

Administration. On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched an ill-fated attempt to regain the Sinai. Sadat's attempt at regaining the Sinai, though unsuccessful, was not as costly as the 1967 War. Once again the failure was attributed to arms, the Soviet Union's failure to properly prepare the Egyptian military, and provide timely resupply shipments of advanced weapons, was delineated as the cause of Egypt's failure. The 1973 War, convinced President Sadat, that his greatest hope of regaining lost Egyptian territory lay with the United States at the bargaining table.

The current phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations originated in the early 1970's.⁴⁹ Although, Egypt turned to the United States with political and economic objectives in mind, the provision of security assistance quickly became an integral element of emerging U.S. - Egyptian relations. U.S. efforts to forge peace between Egypt and Israel, ultimately resulted in the United States arming both former belligerents. U.S. arms sales became a reward for the pursuance of an Egyptian foreign policy that supported the peace process. Progress in the Middle East peace process was reflected in the rapid expansion of FMS to Egypt. After the signing of the Camp David Accords, Egypt and Israel were rewarded with U.S. arms credits. By offering Egypt, U.S. weapons, along with a co-production agreement, the Carter Administration hoped to convince Sadat to sign an agreement granting the U.S. Air Force access to Egyptian airfields. Although, failing to grant U.S. forces official access to Egyptian bases, Sadat did however, promise to provide access on a case by case basis. Major General Click D. Smith, in a report to Congress stated that

⁴⁹ William B. Quandt, *The United States and Egypt* (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 13.

in late 1979, the United States was given secret access to a former British fighter base in the desert of southern Egypt. From this staging site, the April, 1980, attempt to rescue the Americans being held in Iran was launched. Additionally, the base has been used as a training site for U.S. electronic surveillance and air combat-control crews.⁵⁰ In 1981, Egypt officially agreed to allow the United States Rapid Deployment Force to use Egypt's base at Ras Banas, in the event that a friendly nation needed help to repelling an armed attack. The level of cooperation between Washington and Cairo at this time was further demonstrated in Egyptian logistical support for an American program which provided arms to the Afghan *mujahideen* during the war in Afghanistan.⁵¹ Throughout the 1980's, the United States attempted to influence the behavior of the Egyptian government through increased arms deliveries, and by providing Egypt with American MAAGs.

Two episodes in the 1980's, served to highlight the level of development of the relationship between Washington and Cairo. The first episode was the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, and the second episode was the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June of 1982, a watershed event in the Middle East, created strains in U.S.-Egyptian relations.⁵² Israeli implication in the massacre at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, led Egypt to recall its ambassador to Israel in protest. They however, did not break off diplomatic relations. Although faced with regular

⁵⁰ Richard Halloran, "U.S. Tells of Secret Air Operations in Egypt," *New York Times*, 24 June 1983, p. 9.

⁵¹ Quandt, *The United States and Egypt*, 33.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 20.

Congressional pressure, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, did not appoint a new ambassador until 1986.⁵³ The hijacking of an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro on October 7, 1985, off the coast of Egypt, served as another test of the depth of U.S.-Egyptian relations. An Egyptian attempt at transporting the hijackers to Tunis, to stand trial by the PLO was thwarted by the United States. U.S. action was taken after U.S. officials learned that Leo Klinghoffer, a wheelchair bound Jewish American, had been killed by the hijackers. American F-14 fighter aircraft intercepted an Egyptian commercial aircraft transporting the Achille Lauro hijackers over the Mediterranean. The Egyptian aircraft was forced to land in Sigonella, Italy, where Italian authorities took custody of the hijackers.⁵⁴ This episode served as a source of friction between both governments. However, both countries were able to continue a dialogue of friendship, although Egypt didn't like our actions and we were unhappy with some of their efforts.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 proved to be a significant test of U.S. interests in the Middle East, and of the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy. The Gulf crisis reaffirmed the utility of U.S. arms transfer policy with regards to Egypt. The cost of the Gulf War would have been much greater to the United States, if it had not been for active Arab participation. In support of the U.S. led coalition, Egypt sent 35,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. Egypt's troop commitment was only second to that of the United States. Egyptian participation in the anti-Iraq coalition was considered critical, in that it provided

⁵³ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁴ Quandt, *The United States and Egypt*, 22.

political cover for U.S. intervention. As a reward for Egyptian participation, the Bush administration canceled all outstanding Egyptian military loans held in the United States. In addition, to this significant financial windfall, Egypt was granted permission to purchase \$2 billion in new U.S. armaments on credit.⁵⁵

Through examining the history of relations between Egypt and the United States, past Egyptian efforts at balancing conflicting national interests become apparent. Egyptian dependence on foreign military assistance and apprehension of foreign influence have presented Egypt with a significant foreign policy challenge. By gaining an understanding of how Egypt has historically attempted to satisfy these conflicting requirements, U.S. efforts to influence Egypt through the FMS and IMET programs can be better evaluated. The last section of this chapter presents a brief overview of U.S. security assistance that has been provided to Egypt throughout the three phases of U.S.-Egyptian relations.

C. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO EGYPT (1952-1994)

1. FMS Program

Egypt first completed notable U.S. Foreign Military Sales agreements in 1954. Early sales agreements were more symbolic than substantial. They represented U.S. good will. Significant military sales to Egypt, in terms of magnitude, were not negotiated until after 1976. Total sales agreements from 1950 to 1975, only totaled approximately \$350,000. The level of U.S. security assistance provided to Egypt as a function of FMS agreements rose during the late 1970's. This marked increase in U.S. assistance, was paralleled by

⁵⁵ William D. Hartung, *And Weapons For All* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 14.

Egyptian progress in its peace talks with Israel. While the peace process was viewed as mutually beneficial to Egypt and Israel, U.S. influence derived from arms transfers accelerated the peace process by encouraging Egypt to sign a less than optimal agreement. The 1980's witnessed a general decrease in magnitude FMS agreements between the United States and Egypt. The decline in level of U.S.-Egyptian FMS agreements during the 1980's can be attributed to prevailing international economic conditions. U.S. military sales agreements experienced another period of growth from 1988 to the advent of the Gulf War. Following the Gulf war, there was a brief increase in the level of FMS agreements, followed by a period of decline, and the current period of leveling off. Figure 4-1 shows the corresponding fluctuations in U.S. FMS agreements with Egypt. An important aspect of FMS agreements that must be recognized, is that there is no direct correlation between the magnitude of the FMS agreements signed, and the actual delivery of material or services in a given year. Figure 4-2 depicts actual FMS delivers to Egypt from 1976 to 1994. The large disparity in these two sets of figures, raises the question, as to whether promises of assistance, or actual delivery of material provides the most influence. Fluctuation in both FMS agreements, and actual deliveries, can be viewed as a U.S. attempt to exercise bargaining and structural influence over Egypt.

The success or failure of U.S. influence efforts is not solely a function of the magnitude of FMS. It is for this reason that the utility of FMS as a source of influence is discussed in Chapters III, IV and V, after the development of U.S. and Egyptian foreign policy is discussed.

FMS Agreements

The Case of Egypt




Figure 4-1

Source: DSAA Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1994, p. 2.

FMS Deliveries

The Case of Egypt




Figure 4-2

Source: DSAA Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1994, p. 16.

2. IMET Program

Egypt has a long history of receiving professional military training from foreign sources. At the end of the American Civil War, Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt hired Thaddeous Mott, an ex-colonel in the Union cavalry, to recruit fellow veterans as advisors to the Egyptian Army. Mott brought an experienced cadre of military men to Egypt, including six ex-generals, for the purpose of providing training to Egyptian staff officers.⁵⁶ More recently, from 1955 to 1973, the Egyptian military was the recipient of Soviet training. President Hosni Mubarak, once a career Air Force pilot, received his military training in the Soviet Union.

Egyptian military officers started receiving U.S. training, under the IMET program in 1978. With the exception of two peak years in 1982, and 1983, in which the number of Egyptian students training exceed three hundred and thirty, the number of students receiving training has remained relatively constant. Figure 4-3 depicts the level of Egyptian student participation in the IMET program.

⁵⁶ Joseph P. Engelhardt, "Civil War Americans in Egypt," *DISAM Journal* 16, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 7.

Egyptian Students Trained

Under the IMET Program




Figure 4-3

Source: DSAA Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1994, p. 104.

III. PHASE I (1952-1970)

This chapter examines the first historical phase of U.S.-Egyptian security assistance relations. The motivating forces of both Egyptian and U.S. foreign policy are discussed, along with the level of U.S. security assistance. U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian foreign and domestic behavior through arms transfers are then evaluated.

A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO NIXON

The primary concern of the United States in the Middle East after 1947, was the potential Soviet threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its southern neighbors, and hence to Western interests in the region.⁵⁷ From 1952-1960, U.S. Middle East policy was developed in the context of the emerging Cold War. The American foreign policy objectives pursued during this period can be defined in terms of the presidential doctrines which were developed. These commitments to contain Soviet influences and various attempts to make them operational, in turn constituted the core of American policies toward the Middle East in the postwar era. The first of these doctrines was the Truman doctrine. The 1947 Truman Doctrine provided the foundation for what was later defined as the policy of containment. The focus of the Truman Doctrine was provision of military aid to Turkey and Greece in effort to hold Soviet expansion. During this period U.S. concerns centered around guaranteeing the territorial status quo in the Middle East, limiting the extension of Soviet influence and avoiding dislocations that would have adverse repercussions for the

⁵⁷ Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Retrospect and prospects: Forty Years of US Middle East Policy," *Middle East Journal* 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 9.

Western alliance. Additionally, President Truman, through sponsorship of the 1951 Middle East Command, or defense organization, attempted to establish a link between NATO and an alliance of Arab countries headed by Egypt. Although Truman's attempt to establish the MEC failed, attempts to extend the Western alliance into the Middle East continued under the Eisenhower presidency. Eisenhower, sensing a lack of commitment for containment in the Arab world, formulated a new region defense arrangement, the Baghdad Pact, among the Northern Tier states in effort to block Soviet expansion. However, events of the 1950's, allowed the Soviet Union to leap over the "Northern Tier" of Middle Eastern states, and establish close relations with Egypt. With the breach of the "Northern Tier" by the Soviet Union, came the Eisenhower doctrine. This doctrine represented a U.S. pledge to commit armed forces to protect the integrity of any Middle Eastern nation requesting assistance against an overt attack by any state controlled by international communism.⁵⁸ During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, U.S. Middle East strategy proved to be inconsistent, especially in the case of Egypt. Kennedy demonstrated a sincere desire to establish better relations with the Arab nationalists, such as Egypt, while by 1966, the Johnson Administration, followed a policy of non-cooperation with Egypt. This policy reflected Johnson's impatience with Nasser's involvement in the Yemen Civil War.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Although, this phase of Egyptian-U.S. relations, encompassed the strategies of five U.S. presidents, the foreign policy goals of each presidency were based on common objectives with regards to the Middle East. These commonly shared objectives were, the continued support for Israel, containment of the Soviet Union through the formation of regional military alliances, maintaining the status quo in Middle East, promoting Arab-Israeli peace, drawing Egypt out of the Soviet sphere of influence, and maintaining access to the regions natural resources.

Although, the Truman Administration attempted to utilize military aid as an instrument of foreign policy, establishing a precedent for its use by subsequent administrations, it was never viewed as a vital tool, or the only tool. Military and economic assistance offers were alternately made to Egypt, however, their use proved to be of insufficient magnitude to be an effective tools of foreign policy. The following section examines U.S. security assistance provided to Egypt under Nasser.

B. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER NASSER

As has been discussed earlier, the ability of the United States to influence an arms recipient's behavior is dependent on U.S. intentions and objectives, as well as those of the patron state. The origin and factors influencing Egyptian foreign policy decisions must not be viewed through a western prism. Egyptian foreign policy, like that of other actors in the international system is influenced by the country's geography, history and culture. However, unlike other nations, Egyptian leaders since independence, have played a dominant role in the foreign policy decision making process. Egyptian leaders have enjoyed exceptional latitude in the formation of foreign policy compared to the rulers of

developing countries generally, and other Arab countries in particular.⁶⁰ The ability of Egyptian leaders to exercise virtual absolute rule, is rooted in the administrations of the ancient pharaohs. This "Pharaonic Core," once necessitated by Egyptian geographic constraints, serves to legitimize modern Egyptian authoritarian rule. A major consequence of the foreign policy role played by Egypt's ruling personalities is that formal institutions like the parliament, political parties, and even the foreign affairs bureaucracy are relegated to playing an insignificant part. Although domestic, economic and political forces are important, they do not drive Egyptian foreign policy, in the same way they do in many developing countries. Since the rise to power of Abdel Gamal Nasser, some of the boldest diplomatic strokes have been made not because of political and economic pressure, but despite them.⁶¹ The evolution of Egyptian foreign policy is best analyzed in terms of the personal goals of its ruling personalities. It is for this reason that Egyptian foreign policy is discussed in relation to Egypt's presidents, Abdel Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.

Abdel Gamal Nasser personified Egypt. Through understanding Nasser, one gains a better understanding of the history, culture, and the way in which Egyptians wish to view themselves in the Arab world. The Egyptians are a proud, homogenous people, politically and culturally sophisticated, deeply conscious of their continuous existence as a nation,

⁶⁰ Joseph P. Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 21.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

dating back to earliest history.⁶² Nasser's vision of an Arab world under Egyptian leadership, was the product of seven thousand years of Egyptian history, and two thousand five hundred years of foreign occupation. Egypt's most recent experiences, while under seventy-four years of British domination caused Egypt to embark on a search for a national identity. An important result of Egyptian experiences while under foreign domination, is the intense fear Egyptians harbor of being tied to a colonial master. This opposition to extraterritorial rights is one of the most deep-seated strands of continuity in Egyptian policy, its roots are grounded in centuries of foreign rule dating back to the Ottomans and their more recent struggle with the British in the Suez Canal Zone. The 1948 Palestine War was the crucible in which Nasser's vision of Arab unity was formed. Beyond being the spark that ignited the fires of Arab unity, the war highlighted the critical importance of Egyptian security in the area of the Fertile Crescent, and led to Nasser believing that Egypt should play a more dominant role in the region. The Egyptian foreign policy which emerged after the 1948 war, focused on Egyptian influence in Syria and Palestine. Another major event which shaped Egyptian foreign policy was the withdrawal of British forces. Nasser's agreement with the British in 1954, on troop withdrawals served as a watershed event. It opened the door to a more assertive Egyptian regional posture by removing the constraints that had existed while Cairo was negotiating its independence.⁶³

⁶² Thomas W. Lippman, *Egypt After Nasser: Sadat, Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 5.

⁶³ Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs*, 26.

Four events led Nasser to move in 1955 and 1956, toward a foreign policy that found its main justification in the ideologies of Arab nationalism and nonalignment:

- the Baghdad Pact,
- Egyptian-Israeli military clashes in Gaza and the subsequent Czech arms deal,
- the nonaligned summit in Bandung,
- and the Suez Crisis.⁶⁴

To Nasser, the Baghdad Pact appeared to be little more than a British attempt at securing concessions from Iraq that they were unable to obtain from Egypt. When combined with the sense that Egypt had just freed themselves from their colonial master, this made Egypt vehemently opposed to the Pact. The border clashes between Egypt and Israel drew Egypt into what had been previously an unplanned direction. The loss of Egyptian forces, transformed Nasser's ambivalent attitude towards Israel, into one which supported a more aggressive foreign policy. At the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April, 1955, Nasser concluded that nonalignment made sense, and that pursuing such a policy would make him a key player among the leaders of the Third World. Nasser also theorized that pursuing a policy of nonalignment would gain Egypt widespread support from the large number of newly emerging African, and Asian, states that identified with nonalignment. The Suez Crisis in 1956, was significant in that it put Nasser at the center of the world stage, seizing the imagination of the Egyptian people and of Muslims everywhere. In fact, Nasser remarked that it was not until the Suez crisis that Egyptians

⁶⁴ Ibid., 27.

began to take Arabism seriously.⁶⁵ The emerging Egyptian self image, as the leader of the Arab world, became a dominant force driving Egyptian foreign policy . The advent of the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957, strengthened the conservative governments surrounding Syria, and motivated a Syrian call for Arab unity. This U.S. doctrine which pledged financial aid to any Middle Eastern government threatened by overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

Nasser was becoming a victim of his own rhetoric, any failure to answer the call for a Egyptian-Syrian union, would result in a loss of legitimacy. The ill-conceived union between Egypt and Syria which materialized in 1958, was short lived, and collapsed by 1961. In 1967, Nasser's desire to prove his Arab credentials, drew Egypt into conflict with Israel. Palestinian raids from Jordan resulted in Israeli reprisals against Jordan, and criticism for Egypt's lack of action. Anwar Sadat wrote in his memoirs, "Nasser gave orders for the Tiran Strait to be closed, and the United Nations Emergency Force to be withdrawn, knowing that war was a one hundred percent certainty."⁶⁶ Nasser's foreign policy was built on the two pillars of nonalignment and Nasser's desire to lead the Arab world. Although, pragmatic and willing to accept assistance where ever he could find it, with little concern for the ideology of would be patrons, Egypt's repeated military defeats thrust Egypt into a state of military and economic dependency.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 29.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 33.

Upon his death in 1970, although immortalized by the Egyptian people, Nasser left his successor a legacy of military and economic decay.

C. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT (1952-1970)

Between 1952, and 1970, the United States provided Egypt with a minimal level of security assistance. Between May 25, 1950, and December 31, 1955, the United States exported only \$ 1.2 million in arms and \$6.1 million in spare parts and aircraft to Egypt.⁶⁷ Offers of U.S. military aid coincided with the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Suez Canal zone and the Alpha Project, (a U.S. proposed Arab-Israeli peace settlement). In August of 1954, the United States offered Egypt \$20 million in military aid tied to progress toward an Egyptian-Israeli Peace accord. However, this offer never came to fruition, as a result of Nasser's acceptance of a Soviet arms offer known as the Czech Arms Deal in 1955. Once the Soviet Union became Egypt's principle supplier, military aid was discarded as a U.S. foreign policy tool with regards to Egypt. Egyptian allegiance with the Soviet Union effectively prevented any future U.S. military aid to Egypt until the 1970's.

D. EVALUATION OF U.S. INFLUENCE

The success or failure of U.S. security assistance as a source of influence is determined by the degree to which the behavior of a recipient conforms to that desired by the United States. However, when evaluating the degree to which military assistance has influenced Egypt, many factors must be taken into account. These factors include but are not limited to, the type of influence applied, existing Egyptian foreign policy, availability of

⁶⁷ Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt*, 33.

an alternate supplier, the cost of Egyptian compliance, and the history of U.S.-Egyptian relations.

Washington's efforts in the early 1950's, to exchange promises of arms to Egypt for U.S. influence, represented a U.S. attempt to probe the capabilities and limitations of arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy. The efforts of the Eisenhower Administration at utilizing arms transfer as a source of influence, although, achieving a some successes, were generally viewed as a failure. The experiences of the Eisenhower Administration in the early 1950's, did however, provide many important lessons. The first lesson was the importance of the credibility of U.S. military assistance. Egyptian skepticism as to the credibility of U.S. arms offers, led President Nasser to search out the Soviet Union as an alternate arms supplier. The failure of the Eisenhower Administration to recognize the possible consequence associated with denying Egypt arms, served as an object lesson for future administrations. Through the failures of the Eisenhower administration it became apparent that the projected magnitude of proposed military aid must be commensurate with the risks involved supporting U.S. objectives. Additionally, the delays , restrictions and uncertainties which are an unavoidable part of the military aid process must be taken into account. In an environment with other potential suppliers unburdened by legislative requirements and a complex aid machinery, recipients must be rewarded for their forbearance. The Eisenhower Administration tried, in Barry Rubin's words, "to convince

the Egyptians to do too much with too little benefit for the already suspicious Free Officers.”⁶⁸ Early U.S. efforts to influence Egypt through arms transfers proved ineffectual. They had limited success in facilitating U.S. goals.

The only notable attempt by the United States to exchange arms for influence was the agreement between Britain and Egypt in 1954, calling for the removal of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. While arms were provided to Egypt for their support of this agreement there is no definitive evidence that the provision of U.S. arms influenced Egypt's decision to sign the agreement. The success of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, may be attributed to the presence of mutual interests, rather than the result of U.S. influence. Nasser's desire for greater autonomy combined with British efforts to reduce Middle East military obligations ultimately led to the signing of the agreement.

During the period 1952 to 1970, arms transfers to Egypt failed to be a viable source of U.S. influence, or an effective tool with which to achieve foreign policy goals. The U.S. failure was attributed to dominant image of American policy making during this period. U.S. officials continually confused their own view of what Egyptian priorities should be with the real priorities of the Nasser regime.⁶⁹

The death of Gamal Nasser in 1970 ended the first phase of Egyptian foreign policy. The rise to power of Anwar Sadat marked the beginning of a new phase of U.S.-

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Towards Egypt*, 211.

Egyptian Relations. Chapter IV examines the second phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations from 1970 to 1981.

IV. PHASE II (1970-1981)

This chapter examines the second historical phase of U.S.-Egyptian security assistance relations. The motivating forces of both Egyptian and U.S. foreign policy are discussed, along with the level of U.S. security assistance. U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian foreign and domestic behavior through arms transfers are then evaluated.

A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM NIXON TO REAGAN

The early 1970's witnessed two events which influenced U.S. foreign policy. These events were the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and the OPEC oil price rise of 1974.⁷⁰ In response to the experiences of Vietnam, President Nixon developed the Nixon doctrine. This doctrine represented an attempt to shift some of America's global defense responsibilities to "surrogate gendarmes" in the Third World.⁷¹ This, in conjunction with the dramatic rise in the price of oil in 1974, led to a major drive to increase U.S. exports to the oil-producing countries of the Middle East and reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. Although the Nixon doctrine represented a new strategy for supporting U.S. interests in the Middle East, it was essentially a continuation of the efforts of previous administrations, which was to focus on addressing Soviet expansionism in the region and promoting peace between Israel and the Arabs. Nixon's Middle East foreign policy was centered around three significant goals. His first goal was to minimize the prospects of

⁷⁰ Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, 40.

⁷¹ Ibid.

further major armed conflict between Arabs and Israelis. The second goal was to remove the Soviets from the region and deny them access to regional military base facilities. The final goal was to guarantee continued U.S. access to the oil it and its allies required by removing the cause for embargo and lessening Soviet means of interfering.⁷² Nixon professed, especially in the early stages of each of his two terms, to follow an "evenhanded, " or "balanced policy," toward Egypt.⁷³

With the resignation of President Nixon on August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford became President. During Ford's term as president, there were few changes to U.S. Middle East foreign policy. President Ford's commitment to continuity in foreign policy was evident in his retention of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. It was not until the Carter administration that U.S. Middle East foreign policy strategy shifted.

Like his predecessors, President Carter was aware of and strove to counteract the Soviet threat to the United States in the Middle East, but this goal was conceived by him in light of another priority: respect for human rights, on a global scale. President Carter engaged himself deeply in the problems of the Middle East. In dealing with the Middle East, Carter's foreign policy efforts center on answering three principle challenges: the Camp David negotiations, the Iranian revolution including the hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While faced with these three challenges, President Carter

⁷² Lewis Sorley, *Arms Transfers under Nixon: A Policy Analysis* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 42.

⁷³ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 140.

is most remembered on the positive side for his efforts to produce a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Unlike his predecessor, Carter enunciated a new principle to govern U.S. arms export decision making: rather than view military exports as a normal instrument of U.S. foreign policy, he viewed arms transfers as an exceptional foreign implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to U.S. national security interests.⁷⁴ However, despite President Carter's classification of security assistance as an exceptional foreign instrument, the provision of U.S. military aid was instrumental in gaining Egyptian acceptance of the Camp David Accords.

B. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SADAT

Anwar Sadat after taking office, was faced with an ambiguous Egyptian foreign policy, which he inherited from Nasser. For the first three years of his presidency, Sadat remained within the shadow of Nasser, and was heavily influenced by Nasser's policies and personality. Sadat, although benefiting from the consolidation of power within the office of the president during Nasser's reign, possessed a style of leadership that was distinctly different from that of Nasser. By 1974, Sadat had concluded, that the foreign policy failures of Nasser's last years stemmed in part from Nasser's close alignment with socialist states - states whose values were at odds with Egypt's conservative traditions. Sadat outlined what he was to call his "Corrective Revolution" in The October Working Paper of 1974. This declaration stated the philosophical basis for his revolution.

⁷⁴ Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, 43.

The real challenge confronting peoples with deep-rooted origins who are facing the problem of civilizational progress is precisely how to renovate their civilization. They should not reject the past in the name of the present and should not renounce the modern in the name of the past, but they should take of the new with out losing sight of their origins.⁷⁵

Sadat was categorized as a pragmatist, a realist with little attachment to grand theories and ideologies.⁷⁶ He was essentially anti-Communist, and anti-Soviet. However, insofar as their position toward the Middle East was concerned, he saw no difference between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unlike Nasser, who saw the Arab world as Egypt's natural sphere of influence, Sadat saw Egypt's leadership position as a structural property, and not a behavioral attribute. Furthermore, he believed this was a property that could not be challenged or taken away.⁷⁷ Egyptian general foreign policy objectives in the 1970's, as articulated, and acted upon by Sadat, were as follows:

- the restoration, preferably by negotiation, of Egyptian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (As a consequence, when Sadat's February 1971 peace plan failed, the only option left was war,),
- the termination of the war with Israel, as the economic costs had become bearable,
- the improvement of relations with Washington, as the United States was the only country that could influence Israel,

⁷⁵ Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs*, 115.

⁷⁶ Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 129.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 130.

- the rejuvenation and modernization of the economy through the importation of Western technology and private capital,
- the modification of Egypt's global and regional policies in order to better pursue these objectives.⁷⁸

Both Nasser, and Sadat, had foreign policy challenges. Nasser had brought about the evacuation of the British, while Sadat set in motion the process of recovering the Sinai after the 1973 War. Under Sadat the return of the occupied territory became the cornerstone of Egyptian foreign policy, and every other action was judged according to its impact on that goal. While heavily relying on outside assistance, Sadat followed his own instincts when the strategies or tactics of a patron differed from his own. The nature of his relationship with the United States was often deceptive. At times, Sadat in order to generate in U.S. leaders a sense of indebtedness and commitment to the peace process, deliberately magnified the extent of Egyptian dependence on the United States.⁷⁹ As early as 1973, in his first meeting with Henry Kissinger, as part of his famous "shuttle diplomacy", Sadat talked about a common strategy between Egypt and the United States to remove Soviet influence from the Middle East. Sadat's strategic vision was later expanded to encompass a local, triangular, hegemony in the Middle East. Sadat was essentially proposing that Egypt become a third regional pillar, essentially restructuring President Nixon's twin pillar policy.⁸⁰ However, even with Sadat's overtures to Washington, where sovereignty concerns were involved, Sadat drew a firm line. Finally,

⁷⁸ Ibid., 129.

⁷⁹ Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs*, 116.

⁸⁰ Korany and Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, 130.

Sadat's participation in the peace process, was more out of necessity, than any desire to appease the United States. Sadat's decision to go to Israel in November of 1977, was a political gamble, prompted by his frustration over Arab disunity, increasing economic problems at home (January food riots), and U.S. impatience with the push and pull of Arab politics.⁸¹ Sadat's peace overtures, although well received at home, resulted in suspension of Egypt's membership in the League of Arab States, after the Egyptian signed the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, although initially well received in Egypt, led to his assassination by right wing Egyptians in 1981.

C. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT (1970-1981)

It was during the second phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations that significant progress was made in aligning Egypt with the United States. Egyptian efforts to distance themselves from the Soviet Union, leading up to and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, opened the door for U.S. military aid. U.S. arms came slowly and gradually. In 1975, after the signature of the second disengagement agreement, Egypt bought six C-130 transport air planes. By the summer of 1977, fourteen additional C-130s, and twelve reconnaissance drones were provided to Egypt, at an estimated value of \$251 million. Military relations developed at an unprecedented rate after President Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. In February 1978, President Carter authorized the sale of fifty F-5Es to Egypt as part of an overall jet package to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.⁸²

⁸¹ Ibid., 142.

⁸² Klare, *American Arms Supermarket*, 45.

The value of U.S. arms sales to Egypt rose from \$68.4 million in 1976, to \$937.3 million by 1979.⁸³ After the collapse of the Arab Military Industrial Organization (AMIO) in October, 1979, Egypt and the United States agreed to cooperate in manufacturing and assembling of armored vehicles and electronic equipment.⁸⁴ Additionally, 1979, was significant in that it was the first year since 1955, that the Soviet bloc was not Egypt's primary supplier of military equipment.⁸⁵ In 1980, three U.S. training exercises were held on Egyptian soil. The first exercise held in January was a U.S. exercise aimed at practicing contingencies, reportedly in response to events in Iran and Afghanistan. The second operation, code named Proud Phantom, was a joint U.S.-Egyptian air combat exercise. In November, 1980, U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces, including approximately 1,400 troops and eight A-7 tactical ground-support planes, participated in a two week exercise in Egypt. This exercise, called Bright Star, was significant in that it was the first time the U.S. RDF operated in the Middle Eastern deserts, highlighting a number of U.S. operational and equipment problems.

It was during this period that the United States developed the IMET program. Although, in the previous period, 1952 to 1970, while the United States provided training to foreign military personnel under the MAP, no Egyptians received U.S. military training. It was not until 1978, that Egypt began receiving U.S. military training under the IMET

⁸³ Samuel F. Wells and Mark A. Bruzonsky, eds., *Security in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 79.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Edward P. Djerejian, "US Aid and Assistance to the Middle East", *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 19 (10 May 1993): 331.

program. From 1978, to 1981, two hundred and sixty Egyptians received training under the IMET program at a cost of \$ 2.1 million dollars.⁸⁶

D. EVALUATION OF INFLUENCE

The sale of U.S. transport aircraft to Egypt in 1975 and 1977, not only served to initiate an active U.S.-Egyptian military aid relationship, but can be viewed as a U.S. attempt to exercise structural influence. Congressional hearings held to discuss these aircraft sales outlined the rationale for the transfer of U.S. military equipment. Nicholas Veliotis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated that the proposed sale would not effect the regional balance of power. By improving Egyptian capability for collection of information, and for movement of troops and supplies, the items would enhance regional stability.⁸⁷ In conjunction with this statement, General Fish added that the aircraft provided to Egypt could not be used offensively without significant modifications, which in his opinion could only be made with further U.S. assistance.⁸⁸ The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty that was signed on March 26, 1979, was heralded as a spectacular U.S. diplomatic achievement, largely attributed to U.S. influence derived from

⁸⁶ Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts: As of September 30, 1992*, Washington, D.C.: FMS Control and Reports Division Comptroller, DSAA, 1992, p. 99.

⁸⁷ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, *Sale of C-130 Aircraft to Egypt*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., September 21, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1997),p. 43.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

arms transfer to both signatory nations. More than two weeks prior to the signing of the historic treaty on the White House lawn, U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown met with the Defense Ministers of both Egypt and Israel to negotiate the contents of the U.S. arms packages each of the treaty nation were to receive. Egypt received \$1.5 billion in arms credits, and on July 8, the Carter administration announced it had agreed to sell Egypt 35 F-4E Phantom fighter bombers, along with several hundred air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, for an estimated \$594 million.⁸⁹ The link between U.S. promises of security assistance and Egyptian acceptance of the peace treaty was articulated by American Ambassador to Egypt, Herman Eilts, shortly after the treaty was signed. Eilts stated, "that the American promise of increased military aid to Egypt was significant in persuading President Sadat to accept the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty even though he knew these documents were deficient in expressing Egyptian commitment to the overall Arab cause."⁹⁰

Secretary of State Alexander Haig's visit to Egypt in April, 1981, served as a further test of the United States' ability influence Egypt through increased arms transfers. Haig attempted to convince Sadat to sign an agreement making the Ras Banas base available to the U.S. Army. Sadat, although refusing to sign a formal agreement, pledged to make facilities available to the United States in response to a request by any member of the Arab

⁸⁹ Quandt, *The United States and Egypt*, 143.

⁹⁰ Adel Safty, *From Camp David To The Gulf* (New York: Black Rose Books, 1992), 105.

League.⁹¹ Although demonstrating a clear reluctance to yield on the issue of formal basing rights for U.S. troops, U.S. influence paved the way for joint training exercises in Egypt.

⁹¹ Wells and Bruzonsky, *Security in the Middle East*, 79.

V. PHASE III (1981-1994)

This chapter examines the last historical phase of U.S.-Egyptian security assistance relations. The motivating forces of both Egyptian and U.S. foreign policy are discussed, along with the level of U.S. security assistance. U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian foreign and domestic behavior through arms transfers are then evaluated.

A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON

U.S. foreign policy objectives from the Reagan administration to the Clinton administration have been profoundly effected by world events. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the success of the Gulf War, prompted a redirection of U.S. foreign policy, away from the previous policy of containment under Reagan to a policy centered around enlargement under Clinton.

U.S. foreign policy objectives under the Reagan and Bush administrations were essentially carried forward from the previous administrations, with the exception of Carter's emphasis on human rights. U.S. objectives in the Middle East continued to include; support for the Arab-Israeli peace process, the protection of U.S. access to regional resources, and containment of the Soviet Union. However, U.S. Middle East arms transfer policy, under Reagan, while appearing to represent a complete reversal of the arms transfer policy prescribed by the previous Carter administration, represented a continuation of the actual arms transfer practices endorsed by Carter. Arms transfers, while in practice were always viewed as a valuable instrument of foreign policy, once again were heralded publicly. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and subsequent

Gulf War was heralded as reaffirmation of the utility of an open arms transfer policy. The defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the election of a new U.S. president, served as the impetus for a new U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy shifted from a policy focusing on containment of the Soviet Union to a policy focusing on enlargement.

The Clinton enlargement policy focuses on four general objectives; (1) strengthening the community of major market democracies, (2) fostering new democracies and market economies, (3) countering "backlash" states, and (4) supporting the acceptance of international human rights.⁹²

B. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MUBARAK

After the assassination of President Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's vice president, assumed the leadership of Egypt after receiving overwhelming support in a national referendum on October 24, 1981.⁹³ Mubarak, with minimal experience in the struggle for power, and little taste for the world stage, adopted a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs that parted ways with both his predecessors. He currently represents the middle ground. He has allowed more overt political activity, (when compared to the oppressiveness of Sadat), and immediately upon taking office pledged to honor the peace treaty with Israel. Mubarak, like his predecessors, realizes the importance of improving the quality of Egyptian life and acquiring foreign aid. Unlike his predecessors, Mubarak seems eager

⁹² Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," *DISAM Journal* 12, no. 4 (Winter 1993/1994): 72-75.

⁹³ Metz, *Egypt: A Country Study*, 86.

to open up the Egyptian political system as a way of building his own legitimacy, and is far more responsive to Egyptian public opinion.⁹⁴ He is less inclined than Sadat to draw special attention to the special relationship with Washington. Mubarak, like the Egyptian leaders that came before him, continues to demonstrate Egyptian reluctance to alignment. With the independence and territorial integrity of Egypt secured by his predecessors, Mubarak faced the challenge of bringing normalcy to Arab reactions.

C. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT (1981-1994)

The decade of the 1980's saw an unprecedented flow of military resources from the United States to the Middle East. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the subsequent loss of the Iran as a regional surrogate, led the United States to seek out a new regional partner. Egypt as one of the region's moderate Arab states, with its important geographic location, found itself the focus of U.S. efforts to cultivate a new regional partner. From bases in Egypt the United State's hoped to continue to play an active role in the Middle East.

Egypt whose participation in the anti-Iraq coalition was considered critical, was rewarded by the Bush administration through the cancellation of \$ 7 billion dollars in Egyptian military debt to the United States. This sum represented all the outstanding U.S. loans Egypt had dating back to the early 1980's. Beyond this considerable financial windfall, Egypt was allowed to purchase over \$2 billion in new U.S. arms on credit from the

⁹⁴ Quandt, *The United States and Egypt* , 19.

fall of 1990 to through the summer of 1991.⁹⁵ In April of 1994 the Clinton Administration, reversing U.S. policy, permitted Mississippi's Ingalls Shipbuilding to begin talks on constructing diesel submarines, worth \$ 350 million each for Egypt.⁹⁶ Earlier this same year the United States gave Egypt free of charge , 700 M-60 tanks from the aging , but still lethal Cold War arsenal.⁹⁷

In 1991, arms agreements signed between Egypt and the United States totalled \$2.3 billion. Most of this total was due to an Egyptian purchase of forty-six F-16 C/D fighter aircraft.⁹⁸ In conjunction with the dramatic increase in FMS to Egypt during this period, a corresponding increase occurred in the number of Egyptian students trained under the IMET program. From 1981 to 1994, 2,247 Egyptian students were trained under the IMET program, at a cost of approximately \$ 21 million.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Hartung, *And Weapons for All*, 145.

⁹⁶ Mark Thompson, "Going Up, Up in Arms," *Time*, 12 December 1994, 47.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World," 27.

⁹⁹ Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts: As of September 30, 1992*, Washington D.C.: FMS Control and Reports Division Comptroller, DSAA, 1992, p. 76, and *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts: As of September 30, 1994*, Washington D.C.: FMS Control and Reports Division Comptroller, DSAA, 1994, p. 98.

D. EVALUATION OF INFLUENCE

The ability of the United States to influence Egyptian behavior through military aid during the current phase of U.S.-Egyptian relations has produced mixed results. These mixed results bring into question the viability of U.S. security assistance as a source of influence. Three major events which occurred during this period are discussed along with the role U.S. influence played. The utility of the FMS and IMET programs are also be discussed in terms of their ability to support current U.S. goals as outlined by President Clinton's policy of enlargement.

A key event in 1982 that demonstrated the inability of U.S. military aid to influence Egyptian foreign policy decisions, was the recall of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the apparent Israeli complicity in the massacres by Lebanese forces of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in September, President Hosni Mubarak withdrew Egypt's ambassador from Tel Aviv. Even in the face of constant U.S. congressional pressure, a new Egyptian ambassador was not sent to Israel until 1986.¹⁰⁰ During this same period, the United States signed FMS agreements with Egypt totaling over \$2.3 billion.¹⁰¹ In view of the fact, that this incident occurred only three years after Camp David, it appears that U.S. efforts to tie military aid to Egyptian acquiescence in Israeli actions was limited.

¹⁰⁰ Quandt, *The United States and Egypt*, 9.

¹⁰¹ Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts: As of September 30, 1992*, Washington D.C.: FMS Control and Reports Division Comptroller, DSAA, 1992, p. 98.

Another incident which highlighted the inability of U.S. security assistance to generate Egyptian support for U.S. interests was the October 7, 1985, Achille Lauro hijacking. Egyptian President Mubarak attempted to bar the United States from bringing the hijackers to trial, by secretly attempting to fly the accused hijackers to Tunis, even after learning of the killing of an American passenger.¹⁰² In this instance, Egypt was more concerned with being viewed as supporting the Palestinians in the eyes of the Arab world than supporting U.S. interests.

The third test of U.S. influence during this period was the 1991 Gulf War. Egyptian support of the U.S. led coalition was attributed to U.S. efforts to exert bargaining influence. In exchange for Egyptian participation, President Bush promised to cancel the \$ 7 billion Egypt owed the United States for past FMS purchases and authorize an additional \$ 2 billion of FMS credit. Although U.S. influence is claimed to have been the major reason for Egyptian support, Egyptian interests can not be neglected. Egyptian President Mubarak initially attempted to diffuse the Iraq-Kuwait situation by playing a mediating role. However, with the failure of his mediation efforts, he was left with little choice but to condemn Iraqi actions, in effort to save face in the Arab world.¹⁰³ Furthermore, Mubarak believed that by not condemning Iraqi actions, foreign intervention was guaranteed. Egyptian economic concerns were another driving force behind their decision to join the coalition forces. Remittances from the approximately two million

¹⁰² Quandt, *The United States and Egypt*, 22.

¹⁰³ Adel Safty, *From Camp David to the Gulf*, 203.

Egyptians working in the Gulf countries constitute the single largest source of Egyptian foreign currency earnings.¹⁰⁴

The final point that will be examined is the degree to which influence derived from security assistance efforts has supported the objectives outlined in President Clinton's enlargement policy. The two elements of the enlargement policy which will be addressed are the recognition of human rights and economic development.

The Egypt Constitution provides for various human rights, including a multiparty political system, regular elections, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, freedom of opinion, and the right to peaceful private assembly.¹⁰⁵ Many of these rights have been severely restricted since Emergency Law was implemented immediately after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981.¹⁰⁶ Billions of dollars worth of security assistance grants, and the education of hundreds of Egyptian officers since 1982, has failed to bring about the restoration of many basic human rights in Egypt. Egyptian efforts to combat Islamic fundamentalism have resulted in the detention of thousands of Egyptians without formal charges, the circumvention of the regular court system by trying civilians suspected of terrorism in military courts, and virtual government control of the press. In light of the active role the government plays in regulating the press, the Egyptian media continues to print anti-American statements. While, the provision of U.S. security assistance appears

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Egyptian Human Rights Practices, 1994* (February 1995), 1.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 7.

to have little effect on Egyptian recognition of human rights, significant progress has been made on the economic front.

The Egyptian Government is continuing its U.S. supported economic reform program. U.S.-Egyptian trade relations have remained strong. The United States continued to be Egypt's leading trading partner, providing twenty-seven percent of its imports and receiving six percent of its exports.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Tom Sams, "Government Slowly Pursues Economic Reform Program," *Business America* 114, no. 8 (19 April 1993): 41.

VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis was to examine how the United States influences Egyptian behavior through the FMS and IMET programs. An examination of the FMS program revealed the four basic elements of this program which serve to influence Egyptian behavior. The FMS process leads to the development of numerous personal relationships at all governmental levels between the United States and Egypt. Egyptian reliance on U.S. weapons and assistance in determining their security requirements has enabled the United States to guide the direction of Egyptian military development. Through manipulation of delivery schedules and financing terms, influence can be exerted. Finally, the FMS process does as any arms acquisition or sales project, makes Egypt dependent on further U.S. assistance or sales, and is thus a source of continuing U.S. influence.

The dependency relationship established as a result of the FMS program and the IMET program represents a U.S. investment which will serve as a source of future influence. The IMET program influences the potential future leaders of Egypt through providing officers exposure to the U.S. lifestyle, training which stresses U.S. values, and fostering the development of close personal relationships between Egyptian officers and their U.S. counterparts.

In answering the research question – “ How does the United States influence Egypt through the FMS and IMET programs? – ” the efficacy of past U.S. efforts to influence

Egypt were examined. This research identified four elements which have affected either the success or failure of U.S. influence.

U.S. attempts to influence Egypt were most successful when both the nations shared mutual interests. The 1979 Camp David Accords and Egyptian participation in the Gulf war serve to highlight this point. Although, the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty failed to meet all of President Sadat's political objectives, a U.S. offer of military aid proved instrumental in Sadat's acceptance of the peace treaty. The 1991 Gulf War served as another example supporting this point. U.S. and Egyptian mutual concerns over Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, in conjunction with the U.S. waving of \$ 7 billion of Egyptian FMS debt and approval of \$64 million of additional FMS, led to Egypt's support of U.S. led coalition forces.

Instances in which the United States has attempted to influence Egyptian behavior through the provision of security assistance without considering the possible negative cost of Egyptian compliance have ended in failure. U.S. attempts to gain permanent basing rights in Egypt have been repeatedly viewed as a threat to Egypt's sovereignty and have been opposed by the Egyptian population. As a result they have achieved mixed success. Egyptian concerns over the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt have dominated Egyptian domestic decision making, seriously undermining U.S. efforts to influence Egyptian human rights behavior.

The United States must recognize the limitations associated with the use of security assistance as a tool for modifying Egyptian foreign or domestic behavior. Egyptian behavior is the product of their geography, culture and thousands of years of history. U.S.

attempts to modify Egyptian human rights behavior through the FMS and IMET programs have proven to be largely unsuccessful. Egypt has remained under Emergency Law since 1981 and continues to deny its citizens many basic human rights.

The influence derived from the FMS and IMET programs, in the Egyptian case, is best suited for attaining short term goals, as opposed to long term goals or the continuation of existing behavior. FMS to Egypt have facilitated Egyptian support for U.S. contingency operations in the Middle East on a case by case basis. Egyptian logistical support for the 1979 U.S. hostage rescue attempt and U.S. efforts to aid the Afghan rebels during the war in Afghanistan, serve as examples.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States continues to view security assistance as a significant source of U.S. interest. However, questions continue to persist as to its utility. The influence derived through the transfer of military hardware and training is an area of study that requires additional research to expand the available knowledge in the field.

Based on the belief that grant security assistance produces a greater level of influence, than that derived from cash sales of arms. The case of Egypt should be the optimal case. Since 1988, annual security assistance grants to Egypt have averaged \$1.3 billion dollars. In light of the magnitude of these annual grants of aid to Egypt, additional research is warranted to study whether the United States would be better served to limit arm sales to Egypt to cash sales.

Historically, the United States appears to have achieved the same level of influence over Egyptian behavior, while providing grant assistance at levels which were less than

half of the current levels. There appears to be little correlation between the level of assistance and the degree of U.S. influence. The current level of military aid provided Egypt should be reviewed.

Furthermore, with regards to U.S. influence derived from the IMET program, a longer period of study is required to evaluate the results of this program. Additionally, greater emphasis must be placed on tracking the career paths of international military students trained in the United States.

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