

THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MILITARY



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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport R.I.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
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by


James R. Callard

Lieutenant Colonel
United States Air Force Reserve


As an Advanced Research Project

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force.

Signature: 

14 June 1996



Faculty Advisor
Thomas B. Grassey, Ph.D.
Editor, Naval War College Press

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Paper directed by
John B. Hattendorf, D.Phil.
Director, Advanced Research Department

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper provides a philosophical and ethical framework with which to evaluate changes in democracy that affect the relationship between the public and the military profession. Changes in communication technology are changing the nature of both war and democracy. The media and public are developing a more influential role in the formation of national security strategy. Use of propaganda to market war in the past has been problematic and contrary to American democratic principles. Applying a strong professional military ethic grounded in institutional and constitutional values will insure that senior military leadership understand the ramifications of applying knowledge strategies in the future.

Chapter one introduces the subject, and chapter two examines a professional military ethic which establishes an analytical basis for evaluating military conduct. Chapter three focuses on the changing nature of democracy, examining the trend toward a greater supervisory role by the public in the formation and implementation of policy in recent years as affected by the increased transparency of government and other institutions caused by media coverage and developing communications technology. The fourth chapter examines historical methods of achieving support for military operations and the constitutional and ethical questions raised when the use of information warfare is not restricted to the battlefield. The final chapter discusses the need for a strong professional military ethic to

evaluate the use of military power and influence in a changing democracy. This paper recommends forming a task force to produce a study that examines where public information ends and unwarranted military influence begins. A second recommendation is made to add a course on ethics and civil-military relations to the joint professional military education requirements for senior military officers.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As America looks forward into the next millennium, military leaders must examine and understand the relationship between war and democracy, for the values of our democratic society dictate the limits of warfare as a tool of United States foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, Americans are once again defining who they are and what they hope to accomplish as a democratic nation and as a people.

Few words are more familiar than "war" or "democracy," yet the nature of each is transient and situational, making the words themselves difficult to define. Modern warfare has been and will continue to be affected by changes in communications technology and the corresponding growth in real-time uncensored news coverage. Information warfare postulates that winning the wars of the future requires information domination on the battlefield. Some have suggested that this will require the military to regulate, control and manipulate information. But can information warfare be contained and its impact limited to the battlefield? If not, how will information warfare affect the free exchange of ideas which is critical to the proper functioning of a democratic society and the preservation of the marketplace of ideas guaranteed by the Constitution?

American society also will be altered by changes in communications technology. There has been an historical trend toward increased opportunity for political participation in this country, coupled with an increased capacity to collect and disseminate information. This has resulted in a corresponding growth in the power of public opinion to influence economic, political and military policy decision making. The new level of transparency created by real-time news coverage may make it more difficult to implement policy or develop national security strategy without consideration of public opinion. Others argue that uncertainty is created by excess information and that the public becomes increasingly cynical and apathetic about governmental decisions. In either case there are consequences for the military profession as an institution.

This paper examines the way in which the military must deal with public opinion and the transparency of government institutions as caused by today's media coverage. Military and government leaders may be motivated to influence public opinion directly through public relations efforts, including the dissemination of information (accurate or inaccurate) and the use or manipulation of commercial media. The risk associated with such an effort may prove directly proportional to the ethical validity of the undertaking.

Historical efforts to market war or peacetime deployment of forces have received mixed reviews at best. Government and military leaders cannot allow euphoria over the prospect of

information domination on the battlefield to cloud their understanding of the ramifications of targeting American citizens and Congress with "knowledge strategies." Dissemination of false or misleading information and manipulation of the media in the past has been shown to undermine public respect for government and the very credibility of the profession of arms that is critical to our ability to defend this country with honor.

The first inquiry of this analysis examines the ideal military professional. The military officer's oath requires that an officer "support and defend the Constitution," a document which establishes our shared societal values and interests. Consideration of a professional military ethic provides an analytical basis for evaluating the relationship between the military and the public in our democratic society as we enter the information age.

The second focus of this paper is democracy. Information age technology will not only change war, but also alter democracy. It is necessary to begin by examining the historical debates over representative versus participatory democracy. Both concepts have influenced the form of democracy that exists and flourishes in the United States. Within that context this paper will examine the trend toward a greater supervisory role by the public in the formation and implementation of policy in recent years. That trend of course has been affected by the increasing transparency of government and other institutions caused by media coverage and developing communications technology.

After examining these changes in democracy, the growing importance of public opinion, and the media's influence in our democratic society, the discussion will shift to the third focus of this paper: methods of achieving support in the United States for military operations in both war and peacetime. Clausewitz suggests that the support of a complex and consequential public is necessary. The German propaganda model was effective, but it is incompatible with our Constitutional values. American efforts at applying similar models during World War I and II and the Cold War had mixed results and were at times inconsistent with core institutional and Constitutional values of the United States military profession. Failure to restrict information warfare to the battlefield, we will show, raises serious Constitutional and ethical questions.

One foreseeable certainty is that the information age will change both warfare and democracy. Evaluation of, and response to, these changes should be based on a strong professional military ethic. Yet it should be understood that such a commitment may restrict our options. Consequently, it is both necessary and advisable to define very carefully the ethical parameters of military political influence in both wartime and peacetime. The difficulty in identifying these parameters is the basis for recommending that a substantial course on ethics and civil-military relations be added to the joint professional military education requirements. This recommendation and the ethical parameters, based on the requirements and limitations

which the Constitution places on the American military institution and on the individual officer, will be the fourth and final focus of the paper.

Clearly the context of professional military education at the war colleges is changing, and technical academic disciplines increasingly define the center of mass; but if the Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, is right in asserting that we need more "people who are comfortable in an uncertain world," senior professional military education must be grounded in common, foundational values which guide us in our functions and performance as professional military officers.¹ This paper aims to provide a useful synthesis of basic ideas which are fundamental to who we are, what we do, and how we do it as we transition into a new era.

NOTES

1. John M. Shalikashvili, presentation at the National Defense University, August 18, 1995, as cited by Ervin J. Rokke, "Military Education for the New Age," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1995): 21-22.

CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY PROFESSION IN AMERICA: FINDING THE TOUCHSTONE

A man's character is his fate.
Sophocles

The ideal military professional is ready and willing to wage war violently and efficiently, yet is well aware of Sun Tzu's dictum that those who excel in war must first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions.¹ The American military is clearly capable of waging war violently and efficiently. We have proven that we can fight to win now. We spend 90% of our training and professional military education improving that capability. The focus of this chapter, however, is on the second half of Sun Tzu's equation: the principles that provide guidance on how we fight, when we fight, and for what we fight.

Military ethics provides a basis for understanding what those principles are, the study of right and wrong, of duty and responsibility in human conduct, and of reasoning and choice about fundamental ethical principles.² Military ethics helps the officer decide what "ought" to be done. The environment in which the military professional operates can pose a severe threat to consistent and acceptable ethical behavior, and there are gray areas in times of both war and peace where consistent ethical

decision making is difficult at best. Many decisions have to be made in the context of institutional, economic, social and political pressures that make doing the right thing very difficult. The military officer must have a touchstone, a set of fundamental principles which provide grounding and guidance. A professional military ethic helps the military officer cultivate and maintain his or her humanity, institutions and laws.

Some would argue that personal moral values or obedience to laws and regulations suffice to tell us what we ought to do. Personal moral values certainly are important, but they may not be based on universal norms or directly connected to the essential function of military officers. Not all value systems are equally ethical. If they were, we could not distinguish between Hitler and Gandhi on an ethical basis.

Likewise, an ethic based only on the value of obedience to orders and the law also falls short. Clearly, obedience during the Vietnam War to what he understood to be the orders of a superior officer provided inadequate guidance to Army Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., who argued that he was merely following the orders of his chain of command in slaughtering the men, women, and children of a rural hamlet in Vietnam.³ While we need good laws, and obedience to orders is critical to the discipline of a military organization, as members of a profession of arms we deal in many gray areas and function in times of crisis when deeper guidance is necessary. Our profession requires firm moral grounding.

American ideology as set forth in the Constitution can provide the basis for a comprehensive and useful professional military ethic. The model presented in this paper weaves together three separate strands of ethical principles based on core values of American society to form a professional military ethic: the functional requirements of the profession of arms, the laws of war, and the values which have been crystallized in the American Constitution.⁴ There are other ethical values which are important to individual military officers on a personal level, but the three concepts discussed in this paper are the power fibers which will give substance and strength to the core fabric of a professional military ethic. That ethic will define who we are as military men and women.

The first power fiber in our ethic consists of the functional requirements of the military as a profession. These include the institutional ethical values that enable the military "to provide for the common defense." Joint doctrine succinctly lays out four core institutional ethical values: integrity, competence, moral and physical courage. JCS Pub 1 clearly and precisely states the importance of these institutional values in joint warfare: these are the "bedrock of combat success," and "the essence of our professionalism."⁵

The military creates and manages violence on a large scale to solve problems. As a consequence, the military must have unimpeachable standards and adhere to those standards rigorously in order to maintain the public trust which is the ultimate basis

of the existence of the military institution. "The nation expects more from the military officer: it expects a living portrayal of the highest standards of moral and ethical behavior. The expectation is neither fair nor unfair; it is a simple fact of the profession."⁶

The second fiber of the professional military ethic is embodied in the recognized laws of war. Joint doctrine tells us that we must have "the courage to wield military power in an unimpeachable moral fashion," and that we respect human rights and observe international law "not only as a matter of legality, but from conscience."⁷ Together, constitutional values, functional values, and the laws of war dictate how and when to fight, keeping the American military on the moral high ground.

The laws of war evolve over time but generally suggest that nations should only wage war when directed to do so by a legitimate authority for a proper cause. Nations should use force as a last resort and announce their intentions to do so. The use of force should be proportionate to the material and moral damage which the war may produce, and a nation's action's must be based on good intentions. A nation should not use force without a reasonable chance of success nor a reasonable expectation of achieving the objectives for which war is waged.⁸ Without these guiding principles soldiers become mercenaries, and war becomes an exercise in wanton destruction.

The laws of war and other agreed upon international rules of behavior are becoming more important in international relations

for a variety of reasons, but in part because of our worldwide success in promoting American ideas concerning the intrinsic value of freedom, democracy, equality, and individualism. As the leading democratic nation, proud of its political institutions and responsible for promoting its ideology, America has set visibly high standards. These come with the increased responsibility of maintaining them. We shall see later in this paper that the transparency created by advances in communication technology will both amplify mistakes and broadcast successes, making it even more important that rhetoric and actions are consistent.

The third fiber woven into the professional military ethic consists of the common and shared ethical values taken from the United States Constitution. Colonel Anthony Hartle suggests that the four core constitutional values are freedom, democracy, equality, and individualism. Freedom is not only the opportunity to pursue individual self interest but originally was a "civic" value, resting on active participation in political life.⁹ Democracy will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but briefly it implies a positive characterization of the nature of man (citizens can govern themselves) and a "belief in the possibility of progress."¹⁰ The American tradition of equality emphasizes basic social rights and the equality of opportunity. It is a "self-evident truth" that "all men are created equal."¹¹ Individualism reflects the strong belief in the worth and importance of the individual.

Freedom, equality, democracy and "the inalienable rights of men" are phrases that denote fundamental realities that the American military profession will always fight for rather than surrender. All four core ethical values are interrelated and have evolved and flourished as we promoted, debated, and fought for them. Sometimes forgotten, ignored or misrepresented, always interpreted and reinterpreted, but never discarded or replaced, these Constitutional values are American bedrock. They define America as a country, and more importantly, what we live and die for as a society and as military professionals.

Since the first Congress met in the summer of 1789 and established our oath as required by law, the military officer has sworn to "support and defend the Constitution." This was and still is unique.¹² No other military has sworn to support and defend a concept or form of government (as opposed to a sovereign or a liege lord). The United States military officer takes an oath to support and defend those ideas and values which are the basis of our institutions. Our Founding Fathers' goal was not to achieve utopia but national cohesion, political stability, economic growth and individual liberty. That agenda has been fulfilled for a great many Americans, and as a profession we have been intimately involved in this struggle.¹³ As a guardian of the nation and its institutions, every United States military officer must understand and revere the concepts embodied in the Constitution which he or she has sworn to uphold and defend.

The Constitution also mandates civilian control of the

military and creates a necessary balance of power between the branches of government and government institutions.¹⁴ The military is answerable to the President, to Congress, to the judiciary, and thereby ultimately to the people. As commander-in-chief, the President has constitutional authority to direct the armed forces in combat.¹⁵ Congress has the power to raise, support and maintain military forces; to declare war and to check Presidential power by denying funds needed to fight a war.¹⁶ As an institution ruled by laws and regulations, the American military is subject to judicial review.¹⁷

The American public, however, must not be forgotten. The American military was created as "a people's army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement."¹⁸ In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln stated it most eloquently:

...that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.¹⁹

That is the justice of laws that Sun Tzu admonishes us to understand and remember.

If the American public are the source of governmental power, civilian control of the military by elected representatives of the people is the source of an important corollary principle: "The professional soldier is 'above politics' in domestic affairs."²⁰ Functional influence as an expert advisor on defense matters is necessary and traditionally given. Overt

participation in the political process, however, is forbidden by custom and regulations, however. Moreover, individuals in the military have traditionally maintained political neutrality.²¹

The tradition of neutrality for individual military members is fairly clear; practice of political neutrality by the military institutionally is less clear and leads to one of those often nebulous areas where the military officer must make choices between competing goals. The parameters determining the limits of military influence with the public is one such area that is governed more by custom than regulation or law. We will discuss this subject in more detail in a later chapter.

Applying a professional military ethic involves an interweaving of the three power fibers: the functional requirements of military activity, the prescriptions of the laws of war, and the enduring Constitutional values of society. Implementing a professional military ethic thus involves three steps. The first is to identify what is functionally required to accomplish the mission. The second step is to recognize and adhere to the restrictions imposed by the laws of war. The third step is to evaluate particular situations in the context of basic constitutional values. This third step is essential to American military ethical decision making because our ultimate duty to our country "takes priority over duty to our profession, and in this nation we recognize the principle of civilian control of the military."²² Taken together these three steps filter out courses of action that are morally unacceptable.²³

The process sounds fairly straightforward, but the reality is far more complicated. For example, we should expect tension at times between functional and Constitutional values. Our Founding Fathers rejected the establishment of a standing army that responded only to the President because the abuses of King George and the presence of British troops were still very much a part of many Americans' personal experience.²⁴ Today an unavoidable problem of civil-military relations under our constitutional government is determining the appropriate role of the military in providing expertise and advice in the national policy making process.²⁵ A military that reflects only on its constitutional and social values might be incapable of performing its military function. Likewise, a military profession focusing only on its mission might be impossible to contain in society. This is at the root of civil-military tension.

In the past, national security has been occasionally perceived as more important than preservation of democratic principles, particularly when the issue was the defense of the country. Thomas Jefferson suggested that the "laws of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of a higher obligation" than a "strict observance of the written laws."²⁶ But what if the pursuit of national interests does not entail the self preservation of the United States? Does the pursuit of a U.S. national interest take precedence over written laws or Constitutional values? And who, ultimately should decide?

Those who study the American professional military ethic commonly reflect on ethical dilemmas that soldiers face in combat. "War is the hardest place: if comprehensive and consistent moral judgements are possible there, they are possible everywhere."²⁷ This paper does not focus on those dilemmas, except to point out that applying a professional military ethic to the decision making process off the battlefield in war and peacetime is just as important.

Equally difficult political choices are made during war. The most serious example of a plausible rationale for overt violation of law and democratic principle during a crisis occurred when President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus after the Rebels attacked Fort Sumter.²⁸ No President had ever suspended the writ of habeas corpus; yet from the windows of the White House Lincoln could see the Confederate flags flying over the town of Alexandria, and laws were being resisted and rejected in one-third of the states.²⁹ Another example is the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II. In this case constitutional and democratic values were treated as secondary to perceived national security values.

No doubt President Lincoln and President Roosevelt agonized over these decisions. Clearly these were situations involving competing ethical values. An ethical decision had to be made, requiring the violation of one principle to uphold another. Both situations occurred during major wars where a case could be made that national self-preservation was at stake; yet hindsight

suggests that the internment of Japanese-Americans was too extreme. The point is that such decisions are made infrequently, are made at the highest level of government, and demonstrate that even during wartime, placing national security values ahead of constitutional values ought to be undertaken with utmost deliberation.

It would be comforting if the military were never forced to face such dilemmas, but that is unrealistic. During World War I, World War II, and the Cold War the American military institution found itself weighing democratic values against the perceived needs of national defense. In the 1980s members of the National Security Council claimed they were acting in conformance with the intentions of their Commander in Chief, in direct violation of Congressional law, pitting Constitutional values against personal values. These military officers were frustrated, not only with Congress and the American people, but with the restrictions of American democracy.³⁰ What should they have done in the face of public and Congressional opposition to their desire to pursue national security values? Evaluation of problem situations and the formulations of solutions may not get easier, and may in fact become more difficult, as we enter the information age.

A professional military ethic is required to guide the officer's choices and actions. Applying a professional military ethic will facilitate good ethical decision making in the gray areas where laws do not provide unquestioned directives and there are conflicting interests to be served. One such area will

continue to be the prioritizing of democratic and national defense values, particularly as we enter the information age and the role of public opinion and the impact of the media changes. At times in our nation's history, providing for and maintaining national security has taken precedence over democratic values, often for good reason. How do we determine when national security requirements should take precedence over democratic values?

There will be no easy answers, but the search for ethical solutions requires an understanding of the issues; while sometimes more costly and less convenient, ethical solutions are worthy ends in themselves. Establishing a professional military ethic will draw constitutional boundaries on our choices and limit our actions; it also will give us our touchstone as military officers. Developing and applying our professional military ethic must be a continuous educational process for military officers, a challenge as compelling and important as the challenge of achieving functional excellence.

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu--The Art Of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 88.
2. James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance--The Burden of Military Ethics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 9.
3. For a discussion of the loyalty dilemma, see Toner, 26-30.

4. Anthony E. Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 153. Hartle suggests that American professional military ethic (PME) is expressed and explained in many documents, even though there is no formal or comprehensive code. He argues that the American PME then, is "a set of moral guidelines for practice that are perpetuated by many informal mechanisms as well as through formal training and schooling within the military system." See Hartle, note 11, 157.
5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1 - Joint Warfare Of The US Armed Forces (Washington: 1991), II, 1.
6. American Forces Information Service, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington: 1988), 3.
7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1 - Joint Warfare Of The US Armed Forces (Washington: 1991), II, 2.
8. Just War principles are mainly derived from the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, Suarez, Vittoria, Calvin and others. The seven conditions I have suggested come from a variety of sources. See Michael Walzer, Just And Unjust Wars--A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 74-216; Malham M. Wakin, ed., War, Morality, and the Military Profession, 2nd ed (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 256-296.
9. See Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1996). Sandel suggests that the meaning of freedom has changed over time. Part of America's problem today is that Americans have forgotten that the Founding Fathers definition of freedom also involved civic participation and responsibility.
10. Hartle, 93.
11. The historian Henry Steele Commager suggested that for the Founding Fathers, equality was a great word and that Tocqueville's book on democracy was really about equality in America. "We were the only country in the world that had equality." See Bill Moyers' interview with Henry Steele Commager in Bill Moyers, A World Of Ideas (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 229, 221-235.
12. This was a revolutionary idea. Our British comrades in arms are subjects, not citizens. In 1642 the British military soldier's oath was to "swear, to be true and faithful to my Sovereign (sic) Lord King Charles, and to His Heirs and lawful Successors (sic); and to be obedient in all things to His Lieutenant General...." During the Civil War, Confederate soldiers simply swore to "bear true faith, and yield obedience to

the CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA...." See England and Wales, King Charles I, Military Orders and Articles Established by His Majesty for the better Ordering and Government of His Majesties Army, 1642, 13; and Confederate States of America, Military Oath form, 1861 from Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee.

13. Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of Itself (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), 398.

14. Joint doctrine states that we provide for the common defense based on a "constitutional foundation of checks and balances and civilian control of the military." See U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2 - Joint Warfare and Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington: 24 February 1995), I, 1.

15. Constitution, art. II, sec. 2.

16. Constitution, Art I. sec. 8; The debate over war powers continues. For a discussion of separation of powers and the War Powers Act as they pertained to the Gulf War, see Michael J. Glennon, "The Gulf War And The Constitution," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1991): 84-101. Glennon suggests that a lesson from the Gulf War was that "the political will and public outrage needed to make the War Powers resolution work is too ephemeral to promote consistent compliance." Also see Theodore Draper, "Presidential Wars," New York Review of Books, 26 September, 1991, 64-72; Louis Henken, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

17. Constitution, art. III, sec. 2.

18. We relearned this lesson during the war in Vietnam. "When the army is committed the American people are committed, when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try and keep the Army committed." See General Fred C. Weyand, "Vietnam Myths and American Realities," Commanders Call (July-August 1976) as cited by Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy--A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1982), 33.

19. As cited in Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln--The War Years, Vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 469.

20. Cited in Hartle, 50, from Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 233. Hartle suggests this may be somewhat naive. He suggests for further discussion to look at Charles H. Coates and Ronald J. Pellegrin, Military Sociology (University Park, Md.: Social Science Press, 1965); Sam C. Sarkesian, The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972); Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 8-15, chap. 5, and especially chap. 16.

21. Hartle, 51. See U.S. Department of Defense, Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces, DOD Directive 1344.10 (Washington: 15 Jun 1990). The political activity of military personnel has been of some concern since the earliest days of the Republic, but it was not until the Hatch Acts were passed in 1939 and 1940 that political activity was limited by law. See U.S. Navy Dept., Political Activities, SECNAVINST 5370.6 (Washington: 1992), 1.

22. Manuel M. Davenport, "Professionals or Hired Guns? Loyalties Are the Difference," Army, May 1980, 14.

23. Hartle, 154.

24. The fear of a standing army was real. Of the 80 proposed changes to the Constitution, one was the prohibition of a standing army. Alexander Hamilton argued that the "prohibition to the raising of armies in time of peace" would produce "the most extraordinary spectacle, which the world has yet seen," suggesting that a nation would be "incapacitated by its constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded." Madison was also on point, suggesting: "With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense, be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence?...The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack." See Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 161, 270 (No. 25, 41). For early discussion of national defense also see The Federalist, Numbers, 4, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29 and 41.

25. Uri Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 41.

26. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 24, 25.

27. Michael Walzer, xvii.; Hartle, 1.

28. Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 285.

29. Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln--The War Years, Vol 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 261, 281.

30. Some would argue that this was a fight between the executive branch and the Congress and the American people; a classic case of checks and balances as envisioned by the Founding Fathers. One should remember that there was no gridlock on the substantive issue in the House of Representatives. The first Boland Amendment prohibiting the United States from funding efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua was passed in

the House by a vote of 411-0. Toner suggests that a basic question for military officers is what branch of government receives their loyalty? See Toner, 34-38.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONSTITUTION AND DEMOCRACY: CORE VALUES LIMITING THE OPTIONS

Nothing is more deceptive or more dangerous than the pretence of a desire to simplify government. The simplest governments are despotisms; the next simplest, limited monarchies. Every free government is necessarily complicated.

Daniel Webster¹

No democracy has ever long survived the failure of its adherents to be ready to die for it....

David Lloyd George²

The Constitution has survived the industrial revolution, a bloody civil war, and two world wars. The ideals and values of freedom, democracy, equality and individualism that are the constitutional bedrock of the American professional military ethic have held up reasonably well.³ The complexity of civilization increases for every cultural mile traveled, yet as James Madison suggested more than two hundred years ago, a "system of government meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them."⁴ The Constitution and its core values have proven to be more than passing products of time and place; they have been relevant and substantial principles which have proven flexible and resilient. Many would argue that we have more freedom, more democracy, more political equality and more individualism than ever before.⁵ Implementing these core values through the constitutional process

of our governing institutions and laws has been quite successful, but it is a dynamic process that requires constant vigilance.

This chapter examines the changing nature of democracy, a core constitutional value forming the American professional military ethic. The importance of this topic to the American military will be brought out in detail in a later chapter. For the moment, the reader is invited to keep in mind several basic ideas about the American military's relation to the nation's form of government.

First of all, that relationship is affected by communications technology changes. The Constitution and America's democratic form of government face a new test. "When a pervasive technology changes dramatically, as in the case with computing and telecommunications, the social changes it induces can be complex and unmanageable...creating a kind of exponential explosion in the rate of change that may distort the social structure and make the path to the future uncertain and often perilous."⁶ Just as the military organization tries to consider "the system after next" in taking advantage of the limitations and constraints that emerging technologies place on the changing nature of war, it is equally important to consider the "system after next" as it applies to the form of government and civil society the military protects.

Second, scholars and interested citizens are making concerted efforts to make democracy work in this new information age. In his new book, The Voice of the People, James Fishkin

suggests that the four conditions necessary for a healthy democracy are political equality, deliberation, participation, and non-tyranny, or the avoidance of "tyranny of the majority."⁷ Protecting and fostering each of these values simultaneously in the political process could sustain an ideal democracy of civic engagement.⁸

Third, as military members charged with defending and supporting the American political system, we have a vested interest in making sure it continues to succeed. The test will be whether the democratic framework created by the Constitution can guide America through turbulent times by providing the shared beliefs and necessary social cohesion to sustain society.⁹ This may or may not be achieved in the future; but by evaluating America's progress toward these goals and focusing on the changing role of public opinion and the media in the political process, the military officer may develop an understanding of the changing nature of democracy and its impact on the military.

The Founding Fathers: Representative or Participatory Democracy?

Democratic institutions are never done; they are like living tissue, always a-making. It is a strenuous thing, this of living the life of a free people.

Woodrow Wilson¹⁰

Every day the United States sends young men and women out as ambassadors to other countries, promoting a concept of democracy which even scholars find difficult to define. Ironically the United States military has 20 year old diplomat-warriors accomplishing great things in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, while much of the academic community that studies

political science suggests that the United States has neither a representative nor a participatory model of democracy, particularly in reference to U.S. foreign policy.¹¹ Is this true?

America is a democratic republic which is defined as "a government in which adult citizens determine policies and laws through elected officials and representatives and in which no individual has a vested right to office," but the question of who speaks for the people and when the people can best speak for themselves continues to be debated.¹² Is American democracy an indirect Madisonian form of democracy based on representation and factions, or is it a more participatory, Jeffersonian form of democracy dependent upon general civic participation?¹³ Some political scientists argue that modern America has a democratic elitism in which the public participates without exercising real power or influence.¹⁴ The debate began over two hundred years ago, and continues today with no clear-cut answer or utopian solution.

The Federalist is an important collection of essays running a close third in political importance to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.¹⁵ James Madison, author of the tenth Federalist, is the Founding Father most commonly associated with the principle of representative government. In this essay he characterized the principle of representation as the "pivot of American republicanism." Madison believed that the soundness of constitutional government rested upon a legislative

stability achieved by combining the ideas of diversity and equilibrium with representation.¹⁶ He suggested that the problem was twofold: to enable the government to control the governed, and to oblige the government to control itself without the coercion of the sword. This Madisonian model envisions dependence on the people as the "primary control," but experience convinced him of the need for "auxiliary precautions."¹⁷

The Founding Fathers had grave reservations about the capacity of a republic to survive a gifted politician "manipulating the support of an uninformed electorate and mediating the struggle of groups standing between the individual and the state."¹⁸ They sought to insulate the individual from a political world in which the ordinary citizen neither understood nor controlled the political process but participated through representative government. Power was given to Congress to act for the citizen.¹⁹ The citizens' elected representatives were expected to "refine and enlarge the public views" by filtering those views through in Madison's words a "chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations."²⁰ The representatives of the people, the elite, were expected to have superior virtue and wisdom, enabling them to resist the "temporary delusions" of public opinion.²¹ The formal education of the eighteenth-century elite class emphasized the importance of civic duties and responsibilities.

Madison recognized that every decade would bring changes resulting in differences of political culture, particularly between the landowners of the South and merchants of the North.²² He believed that the survival of the democratic republic depended chiefly on the stability of a legislature consisting of upright and independent legislators. Restraint upon government power had to be built into the constitutional framework through a system of checks and balances; thus the Congress was to be the embodiment of public opinion, and representative government was to institute an "empire of laws, not of men, even in the face of contingencies or change." The American Constitutional government was revolutionary, deriving all governmental authority not from a sovereign or state but from the people.²³

Madison did not, however, rely solely on the checks and balances of representative government which were built into our system institutionally as a brake on mass rule, he also believed that the "sheer size" and "diversity" of the American electorate would render a tyranny of the masses unlikely. To the extent that the electorate is numerous and diverse in interests, a monolithic majority faction was less likely to exist.²⁴

Madison recognized and rejected two different and equally unacceptable approaches to the potential tyranny of the majority: "the one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."²⁵ Madison

wrote that the first remedy was "worse than the disease" and the second "is as impractical as the first would be unwise."²⁶ For Madison the solution was representative democracy.

Fear of majority tyranny, however, was very much on the minds of other founders of American democracy, and they had no intention of creating a democratic form of government which would allow the mob to rule. Their lack of enthusiasm for popular participation was based on the fear that the masses could be aroused in dangerous factions and become dangerously hostile to the rights of individuals.²⁷

The primacy of Madison's representative government model and the concept of filtering public opinion was challenged from the very beginning by the anti-Federalists. Less fearful of the potential tyranny of the masses and less convinced of a need for a deliberative body of elites that filtered public views, the anti-Federalists thought that the Constitution neglected political equality and participation.²⁸

Hence, the anti-Federalists argued that "the distance between the people and their representatives would be too great," that the elites acting as representatives would be "ignorant of the sentiments of the middling classes," and that representation would become "a mere burlesque."²⁹ The anti-Federalists wanted a system of government that was closer to the people, and argued for representatives elected for short terms of office, with frequent elections and provisions for direct public influence on government.³⁰

The anti-Federalists lost the initial battle, and the basic pattern of American constitutionalism evolved, "conflict within consensus in a representative government."³¹ With the exception of Rhode Island, which, after some arm twisting, reluctantly ratified the Constitution in 1790, consensus on the ratification of the Constitution was reached fairly quickly. Both Federalists and anti-Federalists agreed that governments derived their power from the consent of the governed, but there was conflict in that consensus. The debate continued to rage over the protection of personal political equality and public participation in government. Indeed, every word of the Constitution, Madison wrote, "decides a question between power and liberty."³²

One way to evaluate the historical trend which has developed toward greater public participation is to look at the Amendments to the Constitution in terms of an increase in direct political participation. In 1789, Madison was persuaded by Thomas Jefferson, to submit seventeen constitutional amendments to the House. The first ten are commonly referred to as the Bill of Rights. Adopted by three-quarters of the states by the end of the 1791, these amendments would be the anti-Federalists' most impressive legacy; they immortalize both the importance of the individual and direct participation in the political process.

These Amendments restricted the power of the federal government and increased the power of not only the states, but the individual. They protected freedom of speech, religion, press and assembly, as well as the right to bear arms and the

right to trial by jury. The Tenth Amendment suggested that if the Constitution did not specifically delegate powers to the federal government, these powers were "reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."³³ By 1824 18 out of 24 states held a popular vote for the President, and in 1865 slavery was outlawed by the 13th Amendment. By 1913 the 17th Amendment allowed the public to elect Senators directly, and in 1920 the 19th Amendment was adopted, giving women the right to vote. Five decades later 18 year olds were given the right to vote by another amendment.

Both Federalists and anti-Federalists left a Constitutional legacy. The Federalists taught the value of representative government with its capacity to deliberate and reflect, analyze consequences and scrutinize the details of national and international questions, and deter tyranny. The anti-Federalists countered with the values of participation, political equality, and a healthy skepticism of government in general.³⁴ Which view survived and flourished?

Over time Madison's concept of indirect elections of president, vice president, and senators that allowed an elite to deliberate, refine, and filter information, has been challenged and replaced by essentially direct elections of these offices with less deliberation and filtering of the public's views. Indeed the constitutional amendments which implemented these changes were sought and argued over by the people. They were not top down, but bottom-up changes to American democracy, reflecting

Jefferson's faith in the public. For men like Thomas Jefferson this responsiveness to the people would be the hallmark of a free government; the people were "the most honest and safe, although not the most wise depository of the public interest...."³⁵

Democracy, the Constitution and Foreign Policy

Examination of the constitutional amendments demonstrates a trend in American democracy toward more direct involvement of the public in the political process; however, in the area of foreign policy, not only has the public been left on the sideline, but even the "Constitution itself has been roundly ignored."³⁶ The constitutional system of checks and balances in government has not been the same in practice for both foreign and domestic policy issues.

In the historical context of expansionist foreign policy between 1890 and 1920, two subsequent world wars, and the Cold War, presidential power has increased. By the turn of the century, imperial presidents, weak congresses and cautious courts had severed foreign policy from traditional constitutional restraints by arranging that international and domestic relations should be dealt with separately.³⁷ While both Madison and Hamilton had argued that the Constitution's provisions could protect liberty at home and safeguard U.S. interests abroad, neither they, the Federalists, nor the anti-Federalists suggested disconnecting domestic policy from foreign policy.

Yet by 1910 Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland found that if the government was to carry out the Constitution's intent

to "provide for the Common Defense," then the end is "always" more important than the means.³⁸ Scholars have argued that Sutherland's views were narrow, oversimplified, and based on a false and dangerous separation of foreign and domestic politics; but this view has nonetheless survived and flourished.

The trend was clearly toward executive control and dominance of foreign policy, and the constitutional checks and balances of democratic government were seen as a "lion in the path" of American overseas expansion at the turn of the century. One of the great naval strategists, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote: "I can conceive few more pitiful sensations than that of fretting about what the public thinks...."³⁹ Mahan's view of the public's role in shaping foreign policy and national security strategy was not unique and remained the predominant view.

By World War I the role of democracies, representative government and constitutional restraint was being discredited. Worried about unleashing the masses in total war, President Wilson thought the Constitution, free speech and the right to assembly would not survive the war. It was in the context of World War I, and the birth of a new science called public relations, that a critical argument in American history over Constitutional government and democracy took place between two important political philosophers and analysts, John Dewey and Walter Lippmann.⁴⁰

The Lippmann-Dewey Debates

An advisor to President Wilson and a journalist by trade,

Walter Lippmann wrote an important book in 1922 on modern democratic theory, Public Opinion. Lippmann argued that the nature of democracy had fundamentally changed and that government based on the informed consent of an engaged public was simply no longer feasible. According to Lippmann, America's hope lay in cultivating a group of well trained experts who would manage the country's newspapers as well as the government. The experiences of World War I suggested that war could no longer be waged for rational ends and that "the people have acquired power which they are incapable of exercising....A mass cannot govern."⁴¹

Lippmann argued that members of mass society were not directly engaged with the real world and had neither the time nor the opportunity to discriminate between what was true and what was false; therefore, it was possible, when necessary (i.e., during time of war), to create "one public opinion all over America."⁴² Lippmann also argued that congressional or representative rule was not the answer. Congressional representatives were essentially a group of "blind men in a vast unknown world."⁴³ By 1925 Lippmann had all but given up on democracy as an ideal, suggesting that there was only a phantom public and that democracy as a way of life could not survive the technological changes in society. Lippmann viewed elections as the way for the elite to control the public, not as a means for the public to control its government or its own destiny.⁴⁴

In contrast, Dewey argued that a healthy process of democratic self government was at least as important as

efficiency and that if the public was not actively engaged in the decision making process the outcome of those decisions would be seriously flawed. Dewey drew a bright line, suggesting that democracy was too fundamental a value to abandon simply because of rapid technological advancement.⁴⁵ Dewey argued that democracy needed to be fixed not discarded.

Dewey rejected Lippmann's assertion that the public was simply a phantom and argued that a state without a public and a civil society was on the road to ruin. The most glaring example, Dewey observed, was the Soviet Union, a country with a family organizational structure at the bottom, a national party and government at the top, and nothing in between. Dewey saw the problem of the public as the inherent problem of democratic society. Without public deliberation and consensus, there would be no community, no civil society. Dewey believed democratic government required more than expert management; it required public communication, knowledge, and participation in order to flourish.⁴⁶

The clearest example of the need for public involvement in the decision making process was found in the context of modern warfare. By World War I mass military service had created a democratic imperative. Winston Churchill put this perfectly clearly after World War II when he said about the British workers: "They have saved this country; they have the right to rule it."⁴⁷

Scholars argued that modern warfare requires a joint effort

and the suffering of many; therefore, unless a leader knew what all the rest could not know, the public has a right to necessary information and to be part of the decision making process. It is one thing to argue that the people lack the knowledge that is necessary to make war and quite another to argue that they should not have the information at all.⁴⁸

Dewey insisted that the press and government have a responsibility to engage the public in the decision making process. Lippmann's analysis was simple but undemocratic; yet as ethically powerful as Dewey's argument was, Lippmann's theory largely prevailed.

In the 1950s the threat of nuclear war from the Soviet Union and the "loss of China" increased the power of the executive branch of government and further reduced the role of the public in making and implementing U.S. foreign policy. Foreign policy issues were increasingly cloaked in secrecy, and the mass public often became a political target. National security interests increasingly were given precedence over the preservation of democratic ideals. The public became a spectator in the foreign policy arena with very little impact.

By the 1960s political scientists no longer argued over whether the American political system was a republican model or a participatory model; they argued over whether the political process was closer to a pluralism or elitism model. Pluralists suggested powerful groups competed for influence in society and government. The American citizen was part of the democratic

process only because of his membership in such groups. Fearing the power of fascism on the right and communism on the left, pluralism was seen as a means to prevent the collapse of democracy which might be stimulated by the rise of mass society, mass communications, and charismatic leadership. Hitler's and Stalin's rise to power were embedded in the American subconscious. For the pluralists, "mass society promoted too much freedom and too much potential for change with too little order."⁴⁹

In disputing the pluralist democratic model, some scholars argued that political power was concentrated among a small group of elites and that the general public had little or no real influence in the political process. It was a top-down system in which a disproportionate amount of power was vested in the leaders of business, the military establishment, and the federal bureaucracy. Proponents of elitism asserted beliefs in democracy and the principles embodied in the American Constitution but argued that changes in society since the Civil War, particularly the growth of industry and bureaucracy, both of which called upon the skills of administrators and experts, had transformed democracy into an elitist system.⁵⁰ The elitists argued that American democracy based on public influence could not be restored until the public became more informed, more interested, and more active in politics.⁵¹

Other variants of pluralist and elitist models were used to analyze American democracy; but generally scholars suggest that a

combination of pluralism and elitism exists today with elitism prevalent in U.S. foreign policy. The role of the public in the foreign policy process, however, actually appears to be more dynamic and more complex than Lippmann or the elitist model suggest. The significance of the public lies at the heart of the tension between national security interests and the principles of democracy in implementing U.S. foreign policy, for in the American constitutional democracy it is the public that draws the lines within which the government and the military must operate.

Information Age Democracy and the Consequential Public

Politicians court it; statesmen appeal to it; philosophers extol or condemn it; merchants cater to it; military leaders fear it; sociologists analyze it; statisticians measure it; and constitution-makers try to make it sovereign.⁵²

What is the public? Lippmann had a simple monolithic view of the public, but the American public and its beliefs are far more subtle and complex than Lippmann postulated. The public's role in the foreign policy process can only be understood by examining the different groups that constitute the public and make up its values and beliefs.

Briefly, there are at least two types of publics: the elite and mass public. The elite public is generally subclassified into two groups: the opinion leaders and the attentive public. Opinion leaders tend to be the most informed about national and international events and they communicate their views, which may or may not be correct. The attentive public is relatively attentive and informed, but does not widely disseminate its

views. The elite public represents anywhere between ten and twenty-five percent of the public, depending on the media coverage of the topic. The other two-thirds to three-fourths of the public is considered to be the mass public with respect to most issues.

Many scholars suggest that the different levels of interest, information and engagement that place the public in these categories is based on education and socioeconomic class. Education and money make a difference. The vast majority of the 250 million Americans fall into the mass public category, and generally their public opinion is characterized as uninterested, uninformed, apathetic, and erratic; yet, somewhat contradictorily, the mass public can also be resistant to pressure, stable, and capable of learning, particularly when it is motivated and mobilized.⁵³

The traditional view of the public in foreign policy is that the mass public is uninformed, uninterested, and fickle in its opinions. Lack of knowledge about foreign affairs is viewed as stemming as much from disinterest as deficiencies in education. The public understands that nuclear proliferation is not good, but its ability to make rational and educated decisions on what to do about it is deemed limited.

However, while the mass public rarely reads national news articles, its exposure (not knowledge) to current events has dramatically increased due to such media phenomena as talk radio, CNN, and the evening news, all of which are limited in depth.⁵⁴

This trend is disturbing since many people think visual exposure equals knowledge, or, put another way, if it is not on television it did not happen.

The American public participates in the political process through elections, but may not exercise much influence or power. They often do not see voting as a rational act. Each vote is one in a million, so why vote? The mass public's apathy is demonstrated by low voter turnouts and low levels of political participation in general. Consider that Reagan and Clinton received votes from only 28 and 24.5 percent of the electorate respectively and that the largest party affiliation in the country is registered as independent.⁵⁵ The traditional view is that the public is easily manipulated by political elites, plays an insignificant and fleeting role in foreign policy, and has little influence.⁵⁶

As in the case of most stereotypes there is much truth in this traditional picture; but recent scholarship suggests the existence of a more complex, contradictory, and consequential public. Major public policy initiative in America today must pay careful attention to public opinion. Public opinion can act as a brake or constraint on foreign policy initiatives, but it may also act as a stimulus, particularly when the issue is specific and the public is mobilized. For example, the pictures of jeering Somalis dragging the body of a dead U.S. soldier through the streets of Mogadishu illustrated how the media increased the public's participation in foreign affairs by showing the results

of governmental decisions. Adverse public opinion quickly put pressure on the Clinton administration to bring troops troops immediately.⁵⁷

While not the only means of influencing policy makers, public opinion polls have become a dominant source of public influence on policy makers. Polls have become an essential currency of American politics, providing a type of virtual representation for the millions of nonvoters; yet polls provide only an isolated picture of the momentary opinion of the public.⁵⁸ That opinion is soft and open to change, however, in response to new situations and conditions, suggesting that the public learns. Scholars and concerned citizens are actively pursuing experiments in democracy to make public opinion more deliberate and the public more informed.⁵⁹

Policy makers know that during crisis periods, such as when troops are deployed abroad, the public tends to "rally 'round the flag" and support the president and his policies. Political leaders influence public opinion through education or manipulation in an effort to gain support for foreign policy goals. The public may reinforce and strengthen the president's position with its support or act as a direct constraint on policy since elected officials are highly sensitive to negative public opinion.⁶⁰

If the public feels strongly on an issue, it will attempt to restrict the choices available to the policymakers; public support may turn rapidly to disapproval. Generally, the longer a

war or deployment lasts, the more public support will erode. Lack of public support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam was directly related to the increasing numbers of American casualties. The attitude of the mass public toward a war or deployment of troops abroad may have more to do with slogans, generalizations, and the personalities associated with one side or the other than the actual substance of the national security issue. Currently, the collapse of the common enemy and the end of a Cold War consensus made public opinion less responsive to the president and more difficult to mobilize.⁶¹

Some writers maintain that foreign policy issues are as important to the American people as domestic issues, perhaps more so. This scholarship suggests that more important than the level of public interest or knowledge is whether or not the mass public holds "politically relevant foreign policy beliefs." These beliefs may not satisfy journalists or political scientists, but are nonetheless simple, coherent, and politically relevant.⁶² This viewpoint holds that the existence of public opinion on the important questions is unremitting and that the people know what matters. For example, by 1969 40% of the American public felt the Vietnam war was morally wrong.⁶³ The proportion grew to 65% two years later and remained at that level for a decade.⁶⁴ The stability and strength of this polling data is compelling.

Finally, the latest and most rigorous scholarship discredits the elitist view that the public is volatile and poorly informed and suggests that American public opinion has a direct impact on

foreign policy decision making and implementation.⁶⁵ American public opinion is rational and event driven, capable of making prudent decisions when it comes to the use of military force and that, in the future, public opinion will play a more autonomous role.⁶⁶

Information Age Democracy and the Media: What Kind of Tool?

Crises and confrontations abroad will continue to create temptations and opportunities for leaders to manipulate the public; with a more significant role, the public's capability to make rational choices on foreign policy is dependent on government leadership and the nation's media. The public learns about what important issues confront American democracy through the media, a part of modern society that is at the heart of the technological change in the information age we are entering.

Exponential changes in communications technology have increased institutional transparency and the amount and diversity of information available to the public, but in most cases more information does not insure a more knowledgeable public.⁶⁷ Increasingly the mass public and the attentive public get their news from radio and television, rather than from newspapers or periodicals. By listening to talk radio or having CNN on in the work place, the public acquires the sense that it knows what is going on in the world. An argument can be made that the public is superficially informed and less involved but believes that it knows more about the issues.⁶⁸ Symbols, images and the visual overwhelm substance; sound bite deliberation creates vague

impressions and emotional responses rather than analytical reactions. The public is not required to scrutinize the details of major issues or consider alternatives and consequences.

In addition, the increasing use of polls to speak for the public in regard to complex questions of public policy is probably not an accurate indicator of what the mass public thinks or will support. Polls are a snapshot of what the country is thinking at a specific time and do not account for deliberation or discussion of alternatives; yet polls are increasingly becoming the event and replacing examination of issues themselves. Findings from published polls have replaced reasoned arguments on many editorial pages; eight second uninterrupted sound bites on the evening news are supposed to provide the public with enough information to choose a president.⁶⁹ There is very little depth of understanding in the public dialogue, if this is indeed all that it amounts to.

Increasing centralization and monopoly control of the media by one company or by the government, particularly in the domain of broadcasting and common carriers of information, is another trend that may not be conducive to freedom and democracy. A previous trend toward decentralization and fragmentation of the media appears to be coming to an end with the consolidation of common carriers of electronic information and the domination by electronic media, not only in the United States, but worldwide.

For now the Internet appears to be a highway of information with no rules, capable of transmitting not only information but

misinformation very effectively. The phrase "communications policy" or "information warfare" should raise some concern in a discussion of freedom from government, for freedom is also a policy objective that aims at pluralism of expression rather than dissemination of preferred ideas. Some thinkers suggest that the essential question that affects the constitutional values of democracy and freedom may be whether the electronic resources for communication can be as free of government regulation in the future as the pulpit, street corner, or printing press have been in the past.⁷⁰

If civil society is the place where democracy is sustained, where there is personal contact and deliberation on issues, virtual communities connected only by fiber optics may have a profound impact on democracy and society. Electronic townhalls do not provide the political efficacy and psychological legitimacy that face to face democracy does.⁷¹ It may be that face to face contact between the elite and attentive public, and between the opinion makers and the mass public, is critical to sustaining democracy. Robert Putnam, a political scientist at Harvard, suggests that Americans, particularly educated Americans, are no longer joining groups and clubs that promote trust and cooperation. Putnam suggests that this undermines democracy.⁷² As opinion makers, the attentive or elite public's lack of community involvement and distance from the mass public may disrupt social cohesion and undermine democracy. In many ways, it is the electronic media that creates this situation.

Even in small towns people can watch the city council meetings on local television, rather than attend the meeting.

There is an increasing use of public relations experts, by private and government organizations. More appropriately called "handlers" or "spinmasters," they package information and shape public perceptions; but the efforts to shape public opinion have increased public cynicism toward government, leading to less real participation by the public and more staged or virtual participation. The French philosopher Baudrillard argues that uncertainty results not only from a lack of information, but from an excess of information. "Spin masters" and "handlers" give the public simulations and hyperreality that replace reality. The media spreads "hyperreality" that deprives "the rational subject of its privileged access to truth."⁷³

Contrarily, real-time coverage of events worldwide seems to mean greater transparency of issues and events. This higher level of exposure increases the amount of good and bad press an organization receives. It is tempting, therefore, either to ignore media coverage or overclassify and restrict information in hopes of avoiding the problem; but history suggests that either approach leads to further distrust and alienation.

Implications for the Military

As we have seen, over the last two hundred years, the trend has been toward both a more participatory and a more representative democracy, except in the area of American foreign policy. A more elitist or pluralist model of democracy has

emerged in the United States, with respect to national security and foreign policy, particularly since World War I. The public's role in the process is complex, contradictory, and dependent on the different types of publics, beliefs, and influence exercised. Public opinion and the increasing use of polls suggest an increasingly superficial but restraining involvement of a complex and consequential public. The potential for manipulation of the public is of concern to the military officer and society in general, since the legitimacy of using military force in any society, and particularly in a democratic one, is based on the will of the people.

As an institution with high standards, the military should continue to expect frustration caused by the media's ability to put and keep it on the stage and in the spotlight. Military leaders also should expect to be frustrated over the superficial nature of that exposure, and the lack of real understanding of what the military's mission involves. This frustration will increase due to several factors. The military has become more partisan and less diverse, more conscious of itself as a separate entity but less tolerant of the diversity of American society. The pervasive liberalism of society, the expansion of constitutional values of freedom, equality, democracy, and individualism, are at odds with the inherent conservatism of the military profession. Like the anti-Federalists before them, the baby boomers question the legitimacy of that nation-state, and the use of force to promote the interests of the nation-state.⁷⁴

With the end of compulsory military service, there is a smaller pool of people with military experience in politics. The lack of a draft and introduction of the all-volunteer force means there may be very few Jack Kennedys or George Bushes in our future--children of the elite who serve in uniform.⁷⁵ While the needs of military security will be different in the future, the demands of the public and elected officials are likely to result in less tolerance and understanding of the military profession. It is the civilian leadership of our country which must balance the needs of a democratic society against the needs of U.S. national security, under the more watchful eye of the TV camera and, ultimately, the American public.

Where and when should the United States intervene with military force? While the public generally agrees that the military should defend the country against direct attack, there is little or no consensus about what constitutes America's vital interests, where and when we should employ a force capable of reassuring, deterring, and compelling, and above all where and why military intervention should occur.⁷⁶

There does not, for example, appear to be a clear mandate from the people to use force to create stability.⁷⁷ The American public does not understand the major ramifications of forward presence and treaty obligations.⁷⁸ The majority of Congress did not want to send troops to Bosnia, but it was unwilling to debate the real issue: should the United States continue not only to be a member of NATO but to provide the

leadership for NATO?⁷⁹

Some scholars suggest that future intervention will be focused on turbulence within other nations and that the United States will intervene militarily to promote stability since American interests can flourish only in a stable world. It is difficult, if not impossible, to arouse the passions of the people for that type of intervention. A 1993 Roper survey found that 94% of Americans would use force to repel an attack on the United States, 82% to stop illegal drugs and 70% to police illegal immigration. These are essentially domestic issues. In contrast, a majority opposed defending South Korea and just 53% supported military involvement "if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia"; yet these are two regions in which the United States plans to fight in the event of a major regional conflict.⁸⁰

Certainly, developing a long term strategy and a budget with which to fight the unknown in 2005 is difficult enough without the deployment of American forces under the scrutiny of CNN and an American public which expects conflicts to have few casualties and little collateral damage. Although they were once the purview of only a small group of men, steeped in the belief that foreign policy was something to be shaped by the executive branch of government with little or no input from congress and no policy guidance from the general public, foreign policy decisions today and in the future are and will continue to be intimately affected by public opinion.⁸¹ Thus, analysts developing national security strategy and determining when to use force in the future

must recognize the problem of defining vital interests and address the importance of public opinion and media coverage. Of course, the media will play an increasingly significant role as a tool with which to engage the public in the formation of national security policy.

It is difficult to base strategy on a moving target, and public support for military intervention is, to say the least, uncertain. Indeed the military rides a never ending roller coaster with respect to public opinion. The public adopts the national interest as espoused by political leaders for a little while and responds to the television image that appears as story #1 because "if it bleeds it leads."⁸² The public then displays schizophrenic tendencies, sometimes oscillating toward either advocating primacy or exalting isolationism.

Polls suggest, however, that American voters generally do not support politicians who are thought to be advocating either extreme.⁸³ In fact, some scholars argue that "public judgements have tended to be no worse than the judgements of the political elite" and that technological changes have enabled the American people to become "the new fourth branch of government."⁸⁴

Many question the public's willingness to sacrifice. "Something has broken down in the debate about the use of force," General John Shalikashvili recently remarked to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake as they walked across the battlefield at Gettysburg, juxtaposing in their minds the scene of Pickett's futile charge (where 20,000 people lost their lives) and a recent

Somalia mission labeled a disaster because 18 soldiers were killed.⁸⁵ Is the loss of life the only point; or is public outrage at loss of life incrementally related to disaffection with the policy which caused the loss?

The French have had 49 men killed and 300 wounded in Bosnia, yet there was no real outcry for their removal. An expert on foreign policy argues the "French have the instincts of a traditional great power, but they don't have the means. The United States has the means, but it doesn't have the instincts."⁸⁶ Is it just an American identity crisis over the nation's position in the world? People believed Pickett's charge was a supreme effort to defend the country. National survival was at stake. The public is clearly willing to accept casualties and collateral damage when it involves defending the United States.⁸⁷ Most other countries would find this acceptable as well.

It is in the more obscure situation of using force to support "interests" as defined by our political leaders and national security strategists that the American public has a hard time mustering support for military deployment. The public understands and generally supports political, economic and informational policies to promote our way of life and to keep us engaged in the world. How willing American citizens are to pay or die for military intervention except in the defense of the United States is much less clear.

If the legitimate authority in a democracy is, in the end,

the people, public support is requisite to the justification of intervention by military force. In this regard, there may be a fundamental disconnect today between national defense policy makers and the American people.⁸⁸ As information proliferates, political decisions increasingly involve and affect the entire public. Despite its apparent low level of interest, the public insists on ratifying or rejecting major foreign policy decisions, particularly when sacrifices and difficult choices are involved. The voters know that foreign policy and defense decisions compete with domestic resources, so they increasingly scrutinize the use of limited resources. The public wants to be part of the process that deliberates and considers choices when democratic and national security values compete.

We must note that the trend toward more democracy and political equality, sometimes fragmentary, and sometimes integrative, has taken place both internally in the United States and externally in the world. Mass and elite public participation demands moral legitimation for war and some justification and open debate of proposed strategy. The United States military in particular is faced with increased transparency. Defense policies are reported, evaluated, and accepted or rejected by Congress and the public as greater supervision is undertaken and more consultation and input are demanded.⁸⁹

What should the military as an institution do about the rising power of public opinion? Are the public and the media to be viewed as in some sense an "enemy" to be targeted and

manipulated, or are they better seen as part of the democratic process, a constituency to inform, consult, and work for? Secondly, but relatedly, should military leaders work to change national policy or should they try to change the public's opinions? At one time professional military officers thought of themselves as being in the service. A simple prepositional phrase that captures the identity of the American military profession, it also suggests how, why, and with what restrictions we may engage the public.⁹⁰

NOTES

1. Quoted by Henry W. Elson, Side Lights on American History (London: Macmillan, 1900), 376-377.
2. Prime Minister Lloyd George, address, conference of trade union delegates, London, January 18, 1918, as reported by The Times (London), January 19, 1918, 8.
3. The values as well as the laws and institutions have survived. For example the struggle for political equality and ideological and political space has already taken place. As Dr. Claire Gaudiani puts it, "everybody is at the table...all men and women, of all colors, whether or not they are property owners, regardless of their religion...." However, one of the problems military officers face directly is the fact that not everybody is at the table globally. See Claire L. Gaudiani, "The Changing Status of American Society and a View to the Future," Naval War College Review, Vol. XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 50-58.
4. Alpheus T. Mason, and Gordon E. Baker, Free Government In The Making: Readings in American Political Thought, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 16.
5. Some scholars focus on the instability created by the increase in democratic societies worldwide. See Judith Miller, "At Hour of Triumph, Democracy Recedes as the Global Ideal," New York Times, 18 February 1996, E-1,5; Robert D. Kaplan, "Democracy's Trap," New York Times, 24 December 1995, E-9; Lynn H. Miller, Global Order: Values and Power in International

Politics (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 43-72, especially 52-53. Miller suggests that a paradoxical result of spreading democracy and other values fostering legal order globally is that we may have "stretched it beyond its capacity to do its work, that is, maintaining acceptable order." To see how far we have come one only needs to compare the efforts by reservists and active duty military in the on-going Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti to efforts to promote democracy in Nicaragua in 1912. Major General Smedley Butler wrote: "The opposition candidates were declared bandits when it became necessary to elect our man to office. Our candidates always win. In one election nobody liked the fellow;...the district was canvassed, and 400 were found who would vote for the proper candidate. Notice of the opening of the polls was given five minutes beforehand, the 400 votes were assembled in a line and when they had voted, in about two hours, the polls were closed." See Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine, General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 56.

6. G. Anthony Gorry, "Society in the Information Age," in Rice Faculty Papers--Prepared for the Inaugural Annual Conference of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 13-14 November 1995, 48. Also see Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983).

7. James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People--Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 34. His complete definitions are as follows: 1. Political Equality: citizens' preferences count equally in a process that can be plausibly viewed as representative of everyone; 2. Deliberation: a wide range of competing arguments is given careful consideration in small-group, face-to-face discussion; 3. Participation: a significant proportion of the citizenry is engaged in the process; 4. Non-tyranny: the political process avoids, whenever possible, depriving any portion of the citizenry of rights or essential interests. Even when the process is democratic in all the other senses just defined, it must also avoid the "tyranny of the majority."

8. Fishkin, 63.

9. Gaudiani, 51. Social cohesion, or what we do together about what we believe, is the basis for face-to-face democracy, an ideal form of democracy that we continually try to adapt to the political process. Can electronic connections alone provide the needed qualitative interaction? How radical are these changes to democracy and what are the consequences for the military? It would be an oversimplification to suggest that technology alone creates radical changes in society. Yet forces of integration and fragmentation, the forces to secure freedom from want and the

search for freedom from fear, still exist, internally and externally. "Movement too far toward freedom from want can produce fear; movement too far toward freedom from fear can produce want." The historian John Lewis Gaddis develops this idea in the context of international relations, but I would suggest that the framework is equally valuable in examining civil society in the United States. Gaddis argues that in the future balancing power in international relationships will require balancing the forces of integration and fragmentation against each other. See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, The Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History, Vol. 16 (September 1992): 234-246. Some scholars argue that we should jettison the Constitution, that the Constitution deserves little or no respect; see Daniel Lazare, The Frozen Republic: How the Constitution Is Paralyzing Democracy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996).

10. Woodrow Wilson, An Old Master and Other Political Essays; as cited by Mason, 1.

11. Jerel A. Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy (Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), 546.

12. Conrad Smith and Arnold John Zurcher, eds., Dictionary of American Politics (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1958), 327. Schumpeter describes the democratic method as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Huntington defines a democratic political system in the 20th century as a government where the "most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all of the adult population is eligible to vote." He adds that "this implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns." See Joseph Schumpeter's seminal work, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1947), 269; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave--Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman Okla.: University Of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 6-7. For a different view, see Carole Pateman, Participation And Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Pateman supports arguments by Rousseau, Mill and Cole that suggest people learn to participate by participating and that the psychological effects of participation are rarely considered when dealing with democratic theory. Pateman argues that we "can still have a modern, viable theory of democracy which retains the notion of participation at its heart." See Pateman, 105, 111.

13. Peter deLeon, "Democratic Values and the Policy Sciences," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 4 (November 1995): 886.
14. Charles Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy--Pattern and Process, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 299. Also see Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960); Peter Bachrach, ed., Political Elites In A Democracy (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), 8-9.
15. Briefly, The Federalist papers were a series of articles written under the pseudonym "Publius," appearing in New York newspapers in September and October 1787 defending the proposed Constitution. The majority of the essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay and represent significant contributions to United States political philosophy. Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), ix, xi. All further references to The Federalist will be to this edition and cited as "Federalist."
16. Robert J. Morgan, "Madison's Theory of Representation in the Tenth Federalist," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (November 1974): 853; Federalist, 427 (No. 63).
17. Mason, 9.
18. Morgan, 882.
19. Ibid.
20. Federalist, 62 (No. 10).
21. Fishkin, 59.
22. Morgan, 874; James Madison, The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt, 9 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900-1910), III, 286.
23. Morgan, 882. For other interpretations see Allen Smith, The Spirit of American Government (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1965); Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, 3 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1927); Charles A. Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947).
24. Morgan, 855; Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 5. Madison wrote: "A well proportioned Congress would serve the public well through free consultation and discussion and assure the supremacy of reason over passion...." "Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates," Madison wrote, "every Athenian assembly would still

have been a mob." Morgan, 864; The Federalist, 374 (No. 55, Madison).

25. Federalist, 58 (No. 10).

26. Ibid. Madison had a realistic picture of elected officials. He recognized the "vicious arts by which elections are too often carried," but reasoned that in a large republic, such practices would be difficult, and in every case, "ambition can be made to counteract ambition." Fishkin, 58.

27. Ralph Ketcham, ed., The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: Penguin Group, 1986), 16-20.

28. Ibid.

29. Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 Vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), Vol. 2, 380-381; cited by Fishkin, 61.

30. Fishkin, 62.

31. Michael A. Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of Itself--The Constitution In American Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), 29.

32. Walter LaFeber, "The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation," Journal of American History, Vol. 74, no. 3 (December 1987): 695.

33. Constitution, amend. X. Also see Amendments 14, 15, 24, and 26 for a clear trend toward more participation and protection of the individual.

34. Fishkin, 142.

35. Alpheus Thomas Mason and Richard H. Leach, In Quest Of Freedom (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 201.

36. The changing roles of Congress and the president in American foreign policy is beyond the scope of this paper, except to note that the growth of presidential power in foreign affairs affected the public as well as Congress. See Louis Henkin et al, eds., Foreign Affairs and the U. S. Constitution (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1990), vii. For an excellent summary of the role of the Constitution and U.S. foreign policy, see Walter LaFeber, "The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation," Journal of American History, Vol. 74, no. 3 (December 1987), 695-717. LaFeber presents a historical argument that suggests foreign policy was conducted without due regard for constitutional restraint.

37. LaFeber, 696.
38. LaFeber, 713.
39. As quoted by Walter LaFeber, "The 'Lion in the Path': The U.S. Emergence as a World Power," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no. 5 (1986): 717. Mahan saw democracy and the Constitution ("the lion in the path") as obstacles to the president's ability to protect U.S. interests overseas. War was "an occasional excess, from which recovery is easy." See Walter LaFeber, The American Age--United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1989), 223; William L. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 263.
40. Peter T. Manicas, War and Democracy (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 339; LaFeber, 707. Also see Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1947), 172; and James Fallows, Breaking The News--How the Media Undermine American Democracy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1996), 235-247.
41. Fallows, 235-236; Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1922); Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), 14-18.
42. Lippmann, Public Opinion, 47; Manicas, 367.
43. Manicas, 370; Lippmann, Public Opinion, 288.
44. Compare Lippmann with Robert A. Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 131-132. Dahl agrees with Lippmann that there is no way for the public in mass democracies to influence policy, but "elections are crucial devices to control leaders." Manicas asks what controlling leaders means, implying that civil freedom is not democracy.
45. Fallows, 237.
46. Manicas, 375.
47. Bruce D. Porter, War And The Rise Of The State (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 173.
48. Manicas, 375.
49. Rosati, 547; Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 24, 298.
50. Bachrach, 8.

51. Rosati, 16; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 28, 29, 131.
52. Harold L. Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation and Role (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1965); as cited by Kegley, 280.
53. Rosati, 360-363; Kegley, 299, 279-322.
54. For a discussion of the distortions from talk shows, see Fishkin, 24-25.
55. Fishkin, 47.
56. Rosati, 358-359.
57. Jacqueline Sharkey, "When Pictures Drive Foreign Policy," American Journalism Review, December 1993, 14. The pictures did not give the public the history of the conflict, but it did provide them there was something wrong with American policy.
58. Fishkin, 46. For a historical perspective on the effect of polls on foreign policy making, see Melvin Small, "Public Opinion," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165-176.
59. See Fishkin's concept of "deliberative polling," 134-161; Richard Morin, "Influencing Opinion With Information," Washington Post National Weekly, 12-18 February 1996, 34.
60. Rosati, 366-367; also see Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," American Political Science Review, vol. 77 (March 1983): 175-190; Daniel Yankelovich and John Immerwahr, eds., "The Rules of Public Engagement," in Beyond the Beltway (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 45.
61. Rosati, 368. See John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 266; Yankelovich and Immerwahr, 44.
62. Kegley, 283.
63. Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), 312. Wittkopf tracked one Gallup and two Harris polls between 1969 to 1986 that asked the following questions: 1. The war in Vietnam is morally wrong and we should get out as fast as possible. (Harris) 2. Do you think it is morally right or morally wrong for the U.S. to be fighting in Vietnam? (Harris). 3. The Vietnam War was more than a mistake; it

was fundamentally wrong and immoral. (Gallup) See Wittkopf, Appendix 5, "Historical Data on Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1947-86," especially 312.

64. Kegley, 287; Wittkopf, 312.

65. See Robert V. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and Public Opinion," in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, ed. David A. Deese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 216-235; Thomas W. Graham, "Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making," Thomas W. Graham in The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, ed. David A. Deese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 19-215.

66. Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion And Foreign Policy: Attitude Structures Of Opinion Leaders After The Cold War," in The Domestic Sources Of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 39, 51, 36-56; Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion On The Use Of Military Force," in The Domestic Sources Of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 76, 75-78.

67. What is not new are technological changes in communications; it is the speed with which this new technology is assaulting the political world that is of concern. See Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War--Is Media Technology Driving International Politics? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 8, 265-269.

68. Fishkin, 24-25, 38.

69. Ibid., 42-43.

70. Pool, 5,8. Pool suggests that "freedom is fostered when the means of communications are dispersed, decentralized, and easily available, as are printing presses and the microchip." Also see Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information?--From Privacy to Public Access (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 159-174.

71. G. Anthony Gorry, 48; Pool, 8; Pateman, 105.

72. Others dispute the statistics, suggesting the mass public is as involved as it ever has been. What is not disputed is the attentive or elite public's decline in joining groups and direct involvement in civic life. See Robert J. Samuelson, "We are not really 'bowling alone'," Providence Journal-Bulletin, 16 April 1996, B-6.

73. The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard argues that proliferation of communication through the media is creating a culture dominated by simulations, one in which people are defined by what they consume, and therefore they are controlled mostly by

desire rather than the referent of utility or value. This may help explain why society's values seem to be changing. The impact on the military could be profound. See Mark Poster, Jean Baudrillard--Selected Writings (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 1-8, 12-13, 210.

74. Samuel Huntington, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest (Summer 1994): 27.

75. John Lehman, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest (Summer 1994): 23.

76. Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth suggest that "more often than not, what is blamed on the media is really the public acting on its deep-seated judgements about the basic wisdom of an intervention." See Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms And The People," Foreign Affairs (November/December 1994): 55, 56 & 58.

77. See David S. Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 79. Yost argues that the political stabilization function of overseas military presence may "become less and less credible in domestic politics." Past interventions were based on an explicitly imperial rationale, balance of power politics, or spreading an ideology. Aron Friedberg suggests that continuing U.S. engagement will involve blending ideology, power politics and an "appeal from necessity." See Aron Friedberg, "America's Strategic Position," Parameters (Winter 1996): 30-36.

78. The classic example is when President Bush committed the first token troops to defend Saudi Arabia and they were in danger of being overrun. One could argue that by deploying a token force, and declaring his intentions to defeat Iraqi aggression, "the president of the United States was, in fact, committing the United States to nuclear war...." See William V. Kennedy, The Military and the Media--Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War (London: Praeger, 1993), x.

79. NATO expansion is a monumental issue that has stirred little debate among the general public and Congress, yet any NATO expansion directly impacts on U.S. strategy and force structure. Based on their reluctance to use any force in Bosnia, it is clear that the American public does not understand the political and military implications of NATO obligations. See "NATO Expansion: Are Americans Snoozing?", Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1995, B4.

80. Kohut, 55, 56, 58.

81. See Lt. Col. Kevin F. Donovan, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Information Age," undated National Security Decision Making (NSDM) paper used at the Naval War College, 1995,

1. Can we trust the polls? Some scholars suggest that polling and public opinion are political and manipulative rather than an "objective nonpartisan science for identifying Americans' preferences...." See Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1995): 165-192.

82. See Dennis M. Drew, "Why the military rides a nonstop roller coaster," Air Force Times, 7 August 1995, 54, and Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy," Parameters (Winter 1994-95): 16. In 1981 a national poll indicated that only 15% of the public thought the government was spending too much on national defense. That figure jumped to 42% in 1995. See Patrick Pexton, "New civilian poll gives higher nod to social programs," Navy Times, 14 August 1995, 10.

83. William Adams suggests that the public supports military interventions that are quick, successful, rescue Americans, have limited casualties and achieve clear objectives. See William C. Adams, "Opinion And Foreign Policy," Foreign Service Journal (May 1984): 30-32.

84. See Lawrence K. Grossman, The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age (New York: Viking, 1995), 4, 6, 68. This is one of the first serious looks at how the information age will affect our political system. Grossman argues that direct democracy brings the public closer to their government, but they feel it is less responsive. He suggests that government can become more responsive to the people, but also government can be manipulated by the tyranny of the majority.

85. In three days General Lee lost more than 20,000 men, reducing his army as a whole to about two thirds of their former strength. See Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), 536. Jason DeParle, "The Man Inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy," New York Times Magazine, 20 August 1995, 38. The concern over casualty and collateral free conflicts was restated by General Shalikashvili in his hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is worried that we are setting a standard that cannot be achieved, and second, that we are producing a set of leaders who, based on this standard, might not use force when they need to. CSPAN coverage of General John Shalikashvili testimony to United States Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee on 22 September 1995.

86. Quote is Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University; quoted by Thomas L. Friedman, "The No-Dead War," New York Times, 23 August 1995, 21.

87. Some authors argue that one of the problems with the modern U.S. military is that it forgot what its primary job is; to win wars. For an excellent critique of current non-traditional missions for the armed service and a call for using the military in only a combat role, see Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, "The Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional Missions and the Decline of the U.S. Armed Forces," The Fletcher Forum (Winter/Spring, 1994): 65-82. On the other hand, the world needs a global cop for a variety of security and humanitarian reasons. Some Canadians suggest this should be a separate organization associated with the UN. See Christopher Wren, "Canada Proposes Force to Help U.N. Respond Rapidly to Crises," New York Times, 29 September 1995, A7.

88. Ronald Steel writes, "...there is a chasm between a foreign-policy establishment mesmerized by notions of American leadership and 'global responsibilities' and an American public concerned by drug trafficking and addiction, jobs, illegal aliens, crime, health care costs, and the environment." See Ronald Steel, "The Domestic Core Of Foreign Policy," Atlantic Monthly, June 1995, 85. Another problem identified by Charles Moskos is whether the military is becoming more of an occupation and less of an institution. Financial incentives rather than patriotism and the ethic of national service play a much greater part in enlistment decisions and service motivations. The reduction in force size and diminishing base of military experience among national leadership and opinion makers are shaping not only the meaning of military service, but also where, when and why the public thinks we should intervene. See John H. Faris, "The Looking-Glass Army: Patriotism in the Post-Cold War Era," Armed Forces and Society (Spring 1995): 411, 432.

89. The majority of scholarly work on civil-military relations is on civil-military relations in other countries. It was a natural area to study, since authoritarian military rule was usually such a hindrance to establishing democracy. Furthermore, Huntington argues that "movement toward objective civilian control has been in the interest of both military and civilian leaders" and that "sustained involvement in politics has disastrous effects on the coherence, efficiency, and discipline of the army." The conclusion is equally applicable to U.S. civil-military relations, albeit on a different scale. Samuel Huntington has documented the trends outside of the United States, suggesting that since 1974 a third democratic wave "became global in scope; about thirty [40 by 1995] countries shifted from authoritarianism to democracy, and at least a score of other countries were affected by the democratic wave." He also suggests that these new democracies face a daunting challenge in a need to drastically reform their civil-military relations. New democracies are faced with "increased transparency of defense policies and often a greater supervisory role by parliaments and public opinion." See Samuel P.

Huntington, "Armed Forces and Democracy--Reforming Civil-Military Relations," Journal of Democracy, Vol 6, No. 4 (October 1995): 5, 9, 11, 13. Definitions are important. For a brief but concise discussion of the meaning of democracy, see Huntington, 5-13 and Joseph Schumpeter's seminal work, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1947), especially chap. 21.

90. James H. Toner, The American Military Ethic--A Meditation (New York: Praeger, 1992), 252.

CHAPTER 4

CLAUSEWITZ'S TRINITY: ENGAGING THE PUBLIC

America's military forces need the support of the public to prepare for and, when necessary, to fight and win the nation's wars--but how does the military obtain and sustain that support in a democratic society? The very nature of a free and democratic country places ethical limitations on efforts to influence public opinion. Of course, the proper method of influencing the American people is by presenting accurate information. There are significant ethical differences between educating or informing on the one hand and manipulating through propaganda on the other. The lines are not always clear, yet the mass communication methodology that the nation's political and military leadership uses will affect the kind of democratic society that survives and flourishes.

Public opinion is becoming more important in the democratic process, and, when coupled with an increasing exposure of defense policies to public scrutiny, there may arise a great temptation to target the American public with a public relations campaign. Yet a new level of transparency and openness in society today makes it extremely difficult to implement policy or develop a national security strategy that is not in line with the core values and vital interests of the American public.

National interests are another way of defining societal values, values which are fluid and change with the aspirations and requirements of the American people. While it may be comparatively easy for the military strategist to define and prioritize national interests, it is another thing to mobilize public opinion in support of the many perceived national interests.¹

In particular, while the American people have always supported the use of force to insure our nation's survival or self-defense, they are becoming increasingly wary of a national military strategy that appears unrelated to the physical defense of the country.² In fact, in a recent survey the general public "appeared willing to go to war for almost nobody."³

America's current national security strategy faces serious budgetary and resource constraints, suggesting that the game plan may exceed the team's capabilities.⁴ The ground swell of opinion in domestic politics indicates that the American people increasingly look to the marketplace to define success and insure the well being of the nation.⁵ In response to numerous political, technical and societal changes, the public may put increasing pressure on strategists and policy makers to use military force only in the actual defense of the country, rather than for more diverse commitments in support of vague "interests."

Changes in communications technology and the corresponding growth of real-time uncensored news coverage, coupled with the

increasing involvement of the public in foreign affairs, may restrict the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy. Furthermore, to obtain public acceptance of future use of military force abroad, the military may be tempted to implement a strategic information policy that will manipulate the American public.

There are historic propaganda models that nations have used to mobilize their populations, particularly prior to and during a war. Both the Soviets and the Nazis adopted such information strategies that many would argue were very effective; but almost everyone would agree that the Nazi and Soviet propaganda model is incompatible with our Constitutional values. Historically, the efforts by U.S. administrations to apply similar models during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War had mixed results and, as shall be shown, were counterproductive to the core institutional and constitutional values of the United States military profession.

The American military profession needs to understand the ramifications of the use of "knowledge strategies" as weapons of the future.⁶ This chapter explores the strategic relationship between the American public, the media, and the military, before examining several past efforts to market strategic information. Finally, this chapter studies the implications of the difficulties that will arise despite efforts to limit the effects of information warfare to the battlefield.

It may be useful to begin with some definitions. Mass

communication theory has always included the manipulative dimension of communication commonly referred to as propaganda. Propaganda has been an instrument of American national security strategy for persuading or dominating targeted groups, including the American public. Early scholarship on mass communications defined propaganda as a "language aimed at large masses" for the purpose of influencing "mass attitudes on controversial issues."⁷ The literature is rich in definitions that make numerous hairline distinctions, but there are three important aspects to the definition. First, a mass audience is involved. Second, propaganda attempts to influence behavior in a specific or preconceived manner. Third, although some would argue that the definition is neutral, suggesting that propaganda can be good or bad, true or false, most concepts of propaganda have negative connotations.⁸

Three associated features further characterize propaganda, helping the reader distinguish propaganda from other forms of advertising or public relations. The first is that propaganda involves covert manipulation; the source of the information is not disclosed. The second characteristic of propaganda is the tendency to emphasize "tricky" or "loaded" language--presentations designed either to discourage reflective thought or to inspire an emotional reaction. A third feature of propaganda usually is the massive orchestration of various modes of communication.

The scale of propaganda, the superior power of the proponent

in relationship to the target audience, the focus on only one side of an argument, and the self-serving nature of the rhetorical communication distorts the process of democracy.⁹ We are reminded of the Founding Fathers' political architecture for America: a structured equilibrium of power derived from setting ambition against ambition to preclude the distortion of democracy caused by the arbitrary exercise of power, and the corresponding danger of autocracy.

For the military profession the use of propaganda as a form of psychological warfare against the enemy on the battlefield is a proven force multiplier. Psychological warfare at the operational and tactical level of warfare was historically designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize the enemy's forces, and sustain the morale of supporters. By using simple loudspeakers, aerial leaflet drops, civil radio broadcasts and the creation of documents, posters, and articles, psychological warfare is considered a critical force multiplier because it saves dollars and reduces casualties.¹⁰

However, in an increasingly interdependent world with communications reaching around the world in real time, it is growing exceedingly difficult to limit the effects of "psyops" and other familiar military information warfare activities to the boundaries of the battlefield and enemy populace. The growth of the Internet, expansion of satellite communications and imagery, and instantaneous coverage of world events by television make it problematic at best to control or manipulate information for any

length of time. We shall see later in this chapter that the exposure from attempting to control or manipulate information prior to hostilities or at any time off the battlefield is not without institutional and constitutional consequences and risks.

It has long been known that enemy public opinion can be a center of gravity to be targeted.¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz's analysis of the conflict between the military, the government, and the public remains relevant as long as war remains an instrument of policy. To wage war successfully, political leaders need the support of the people. The "passions of the people" need to be aroused, and the people must agree to pay the price necessary to achieve the stated objective.¹² Different countries with different ethical values have applied this principle and have established various means of promoting public support. For some countries there were no limits.

The Nazi Propaganda Model: An Unethical Instrument of Policy

The Constitution only maps out the arena of battle, not the goal. We enter the legal agencies and in that way will make our party the determining factor. However, once we possess the constitutional power, we will mold the state into the shape we hold to be suitable.

Adolph Hitler, 1930¹³

The Nazis studied and applied many of Clausewitz's principles. They were one of the first movements to claim that psychological warfare should concentrate on both the home front and the front line.¹⁴ Hitler emphasized the need to mobilize the nation psychologically since the people exhibited little enthusiasm for war. In 1938 Hitler spoke of the need to "re-

educate the German people psychologically and to make it clear that there are things that must be achieved by force if peaceful means fail." Hitler pointed out that the process did not require the use of force as such, but rather involved depicting to the German people certain diplomatic events in such a way that the "inner voice of the nation itself gradually began to call for the use of force." This approach called for the total control of the media; it was deemed important to ignore the government's mistakes and portray only the positive, blindly following the principle: "The leadership is always right."¹⁵

It is important to note that Hitler's National Socialist revolution emerged from a quasi-parliamentary democracy to a totalitarian dictatorship by provoking and exploiting government crises and by cloaking Hitler's actions with rationalizations based on the law and the need for order.¹⁶ It is essential to stress this point because the process of totalitarianism was to a great extent made possible by "legalistic camouflage" and manipulation of the public in the name of social order. To Hitler, the German Constitution "merely maps out the arena of battle, not the goal." Laws were inadequate to contain the rise of Hitler.

For Nazi Germany, and the communist political system of the Soviet Union, the state was thought to be superior to the individual. The state-centered ethics of Nazi Germany and the historic determinism of communism incorporated a distrust of rationality as a guide to truth. As a Hegelian concept, truth is

found in the organic state; therefore the task of the national leadership was to pursue the "spirit of the State" and to make decisions in support of the state rather than for the citizens who happen to populate it at any given time.¹⁷ Obedience to the State became a rationale for the ease with which the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany could engage abundantly and unabashedly in all types of propaganda against both the enemy and their own people.

In contrast, America's culture and important political documents have a different ethical basis, rooted in the social contract theories of the Enlightenment and containing some of the Enlightenment's most optimistic and practical philosophy, espoused by John Locke and Charles de Montesquieu.¹⁸ According to Locke, good government is a construct of the people, responsible to them and not to a higher religion, destiny, or ideology. Social and political truth are arrived at through some combination of direct or representative democracy, an approach Locke considered reasonable and rational. And Montesquieu is most noted for suggesting the wisdom of dividing political power as a means of safeguarding individual freedom.¹⁹

Consequently, professional military ethics grounded in the ethical values of the Constitution and the military officer's oath to protect and defend those principles appears to restrict the legitimate means which may be employed to obtain support from the American public.²⁰ President Lyndon B. Johnson reiterated this point when he said: "The United States has no propaganda to peddle, since we are neither advocates nor defenders of any dogma

so fragile or doctrine so frightened as to require it."²¹

Unfortunately there have been times when some of America's political and military leadership have used propaganda in reaching for objectives they considered more important than utilization of the democratic process.²² As we shall see, confronted in the past with challenges from dynamic totalitarian powers, the United States has occasionally believed itself compelled to imitate some of the methods of our adversaries. Persuading--by whatever means--the people and the Congress to support a particular policy was, it was argued, more important than adhering to the democratic process. The ethical value of national security interests was viewed as more pressing than the ethical values of democracy; the threat was perceived as being so great that the ends were believed to justify the means. Reviewing some examples gives the military officer an appreciation for how slippery the slope can be when national security considerations compete with democratic procedural expectations. This is most apparent in practical politics when dealing with the issue of public opinion and public support.

Achieving National Goals During War

It was not until the First World War that America institutionalized and employed propaganda in a modern sense on a domestic audience. Americans did not naturally rally around their leaders during World War I; the national unity attained during World War I was achieved in part by repression, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, censorship of the media and personal

speech, propaganda, and a draft. A million men were needed to fight in World War I, but in the first six months only 73,000 volunteered. Congress voted overwhelmingly for a draft.²³

Under the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the Sedition Act of May 1918 over 8,000 Americans experienced imprisonment, official suppression, or deportation for things as minor as publicly criticizing a Red Cross fund-raising drive.²⁴ The Wilson administration created a Censorship Board and a Committee on Public Information that censored the press, undertook a massive propaganda effort aimed at promoting patriotic feeling and boosting popular support for the war, and distributed millions of pamphlets and other materials for public school teachers in teaching nationalism to their pupils.²⁵

Within two weeks of the declaration of war with Germany, President Wilson appointed George Creel to head the Committee on Public Information. Creating Creel's office was the "equivalent of appointing a separate cabinet minister for propaganda...responsible for every aspect of propaganda work, both at home and abroad."²⁶ Other members of the Committee included the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. This Committee targeted domestic public opinion and concentrated on improving domestic support for the war effort.²⁷ The Committee was disbanded after the war.

The ruthlessness of Nazi Germany and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor easily overshadowed most concerns over coerced conformity, censorship, and use of propaganda such as had

occurred during World War I. The most recent scholarship suggests that during World War II the "United States conducted a propaganda campaign against Nazi Germany of a magnitude never before seen in American history."²⁸ During World War II, the courts and the majority of the people felt consideration of national unity and security should take precedence over the guarantee of civil liberties.

In 1940 in Minersville School district v. Gobitis, the schoolchildren who were Jehovah's Witnesses claimed a constitutionally-protected right not to salute the flag and not to take the pledge of allegiance on the grounds that this ceremonial issue was incompatible with the commands of the scriptures. The Supreme Court ruled (by an eight to one majority) against that claim.²⁹ Three years later the ruling would be reversed, with Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson arguing that unity is not secured by coercion or the elimination of dissent. Jackson found that the First Amendment meant what it said; the First Amendment had been designed to support a government by consent of the governed by denying "those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority."³⁰

In 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Jackson, speaking for the court, wrote:

To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds....But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.³¹

In the midst of total war the judicial branch of government was arguing that the "gates of dissent must be kept open all the way all the time."³²

Remembering the excesses of propaganda campaigns during World War I and the public's reaction, the Office of War Information set up under the Roosevelt Administration attempted to implement a "strategy of truth" that would keep secret only that information that jeopardized military operations or diplomatic negotiations. While doing more than any other major combatant to maintain a free press during war, the United States government still employed propaganda practices.³³ The method of control was far more passive and consisted of withholding information, particularly visual images, while depicting the war in simple terms of good versus evil.

Propaganda and control of visual images were techniques used by the Roosevelt administration but they were probably not needed to unify the American public at this point in American history. Policymakers withheld American pictures of American dead at the outset of World War II, but later in the war made use of the pictures to intensify the commitment to the war effort. The power of that visual wartime imagery is difficult to measure, but

the nature of the enemy, the atrocities committed, and the attack on Pearl Harbor had greater effect in unifying the American public than any public relations effort. While the war was brutal and grisly Americans felt the cause was just, the enemy evil, and the outcome encouraging as well as sobering. The issues of freedom and survival were far from resolved and fundamental disagreement existed among wise and patriotic Americans over the complexity of constitutional democratic rights and national security. Many of the devices used during World War I and II to coerce opinion and stifle discussion would reappear again during the Cold War.

The Cold War: Means Justify the Ends

For most Americans the Cold War divided the world into two groups: "free peoples," and the people of the communist world whose governments relied on terror and oppression to maintain control. There were no gray areas. The nations of the world were largely depicted as "free" or "Red," with few states recognized as truly neutral. The United States embarked on a moral crusade for peace and the containment of communism.³⁴ National unity and mobilization of public support of U.S. foreign policy were critical in order to fund and sustain this newly defined foreign policy. In 1947 Senator Arthur Vandenberg reportedly told President Truman that he would have to "scare hell out of the American People" to get their support.³⁵ Truman successfully mobilized public opinion with his 12 March 1947 speech which demanded that Congress and the public take sides:

one was either sympathetic to communism, or anti-communist. In contrast to the world America faces today, there was clarity and purpose in the Cold War era.

During the 1950s the policy of containment continued. The famous National Security Document NSC-68, written in 1950, recommended a tripling of the peacetime defense budget, not only for the purpose of containing the communist threat but in order to roll it back. The United States was considered so rich that it could use 20% of its gross national product for arms without suffering national bankruptcy. This key historical document signaled a major policy shift.³⁶ One of the consultants who was asked to comment on NSC-68 suggested that a larger and more effective propaganda machine be created at home and abroad, arguing that the "efforts of a 'Department of Dirty Tricks' should be commensurate with that of all other agencies."³⁷

In 1954 a classified report suggested that "there were no rules in such a game....We must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us." The authors of this document further recognized that the American public would not approve of these new methods; they would, however, have to "be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy."³⁸

By 1957, Paul Nitze and other authors of NSC-68 wrote the "Gaither Report," projecting the extent of the Soviet military build-up. The authors erroneously believed that the Soviets

would soon have enough intercontinental ballistic missiles to overwhelm America's defenses. In the strongest possible terms the report urged an immediate defense build-up and "an effort to indoctrinate the public into a crisis mentality."³⁹ Whether the containment policy was wise, necessary, or responsible for winning the Cold War remains the subject of controversy among historians; but it is clear that the legacy of NSC-68 went well beyond defense budgets and developing force structure. It determined in part the ideology of American foreign policy during the Cold War and enhanced the natural tendency of American national security officials to develop policy based on a "worst case" scenario, even though buying security and developing force structure based on "worst case" scenarios is expensive and requires a concerted effort to mobilize public opinion.⁴⁰

In Science of Coercion, Christopher Simpson explores the relationship linking Cold War politics and the development of national security strategy with communications research in the years between 1945 and 1960. By researching Army and National Security Council documents, Simpson found that "the targets of U.S. psychological warfare were not only the 'enemy', but also the people of the United States and its allies."⁴¹ Simpson argues that "modern psychological warfare has been a tool for managing empire,...where coercion and manipulation pose as 'communication' and close off opportunities for other, more genuine, forms of understanding."⁴²

In the Cold War context, the diplomat George Kennan

wrestled with the problem of how to win support from Congress and the public for a strategic containment policy without oversimplifying and distorting it.⁴³ The "us versus them" mentality meant, he felt, that leadership used exaggerated rhetoric rather than education; this attitude, he worried, resulted in the limitation of options for dealing with the Soviets. On the other hand, discussions with the Soviets were viewed by Congress and the public as a sign of a "thaw" in the Cold War, in which case support for defense and foreign aid requirements would no longer be needed; or worse yet, such discussions were viewed as a sign of appeasement.⁴⁴ Once the public and Congress had been led to believe that the Soviet Union was and always would be--to use a later phrase--"an evil empire," the option of open negotiation did not exist for American leaders who wished to maintain their credibility.

This quandary developed in a time when few people had moral qualms about the anti-democratic potential of teaching the government to manipulate the public and the media if the end result was the defeat of Nazism or communism. As one student at the Naval War College in 1965 wrote: "Americans might conclude that since their objectives are good and their propaganda supports these objectives, U.S. propaganda is a reflection of good." American constitutional values were seen as a "leash" that must be discarded, but "as more Americans became aware of the importance of propaganda in American foreign relations, propaganda activities [would] gain greater support."⁴⁵

A concept for the development of a "domestic educational program," closely coordinated with white propaganda and black psychological warfare plans, was developed. The major thrust of the effort was to implement a "world-wide propaganda and counter-propaganda program designed to nullify the Soviet aim of world domination and the Communist doctrine of world revolution."⁴⁶ The clarity of the Cold War public mentality and the bipartisan consensus reached in the early days of the Cold War suggested that few would complain about government efforts to target American public opinion on these issues or that the use of mass communication methodology for these purposes might be incompatible with democratic principles.

The pressure of the Cold War created other ethical dilemmas for political and military leadership in attempting to justify their actions to the American people. In May 1960, following the shootdown of an American U-2 over the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower and his State Department spokesman found themselves denying that the United States intentionally violated Soviet air space, and then stating that while there was "no authorization" for an espionage flight, nevertheless, a U-2 flight somehow had taken place. The incident exposed the full spectrum of Cold War propaganda to include secrecy from Congress and the American public, covert operations, official lies, and tacit press support for the whole operation.⁴⁷

Looking at the Vietnam war in the context of the Cold War attitude provides other examples of the administration's and the

military's attempts to mislead Congress and the American people in order to gain support for U.S. foreign policy goals. Maxwell Taylor suggested that the President should have obtained from Congress a "declaration of war or emergency to silence further critics of war by executive order."⁴⁸

Consider the handling of the Tonkin Gulf incident. In August 1964, the Johnson administration announced that U.S. ships had been attacked twice by North Vietnamese patrol boats in international waters without provocation. In the second incident, initial reports from the destroyers **Maddox** and **Turner Joy**, operating 60 miles off the North Vietnamese coast, indicated they were under attack by possible North Vietnamese gunboats.⁴⁹ While the JCS worked on retaliatory options, the CIA suggested that the North Vietnamese could be responding defensively. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, told the Secretary of Defense that two patrol boats had been "sacrificed." Yet the commander of the **Maddox** had reported no "visual sightings" and recommended that a "complete evaluation" of all the evidence should take place before retaliation was ordered.⁵⁰

We may never know what actually happened, but a complete evaluation of the situation was not done.⁵¹ Nor was it brought out that the **Maddox** was involved in provocative covert raids along North Vietnam's coast. The incident was portrayed as "deliberate attacks" and "open aggression on the high seas." As one congressman put it, "The American flag ha[d] been fired

upon," and Congress quickly passed a Senate resolution 88 to 2 giving the Johnson administration and the military the green light to escalate the Vietnam conflict.⁵²

In both the U-2 incident and the Tonkin Gulf incident, initial congressional and public support for the administration was overwhelming. President Johnson's rating went from 42% to 72% overnight, giving Johnson and the military a solid message to widen the war effort. At the time the president's critics were silenced inside and outside government, but eventually Congress and the American public would conclude that they had been deceived.

The cost of such conclusions appears to be substantial but difficult to quantify. There is no question that a credibility gap produces a perverse distrust of government.⁵³ With the increased transparency of government made possible by modern technology and worldwide media coverage, this lesson about credibility becomes more and more important and problematic. If the United States is not embroiled in a conflict fighting a demonized, monolithic enemy, the military profession must ask what kind of information policy is acceptable and who draws the lines between public relations, public diplomacy, and psychological operations?⁵⁴

The Evolution of Bytes and Bayonets Doctrine

The November 1991 Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, was given "exceptionally broad distribution" and was written to give broad doctrinal guidance to insure that "US Armed

Forces fight successfully together."⁵⁵ This is one of the first doctrinal documents that tells us that the "military must be skilled in the use of bytes and bayonets alike." It also adds to the economic, diplomatic, and military instrument of foreign policy the informational instrument. This informational instrument of national security strategy consists of:

public affairs, psychological operations and public diplomacy....This informational effort is crucial to the success of any contemporary military operation, because it involves the support of the American people, allies, and friendly nations and the morale of the opposing side.⁵⁶

The effectiveness of psychological operations on the morale of the enemy is familiar, having been demonstrated at the operational and tactical level of psychological operations employed in several interventions in the 1980s and, of course, in Desert Storm.⁵⁷ It is difficult to be comfortable, however, with a strategic information plan that targets the international community, Congress, or the American people.

In the 1980s the lines were not very clear. The Reagan administration implemented an enormous public relations process, "a new art form," to sell its Central American foreign policy to the media, Congress, and the American people.⁵⁸ National Security Council documents state that one of the objectives of U.S. policy at that time was to convince people at home and abroad that waging war against Nicaragua was the right thing to do.⁵⁹ The need for a domestic public diplomacy program was outlined in a spring 1983 memorandum by Kate Semerad, an official at the Agency for International Development. She wrote that

there was a need to "counter the Soviet orchestrated effort to influence the United States Congress, the national media, and the general public." The U.S. government "must go over the heads of our Marxist opponents directly to the American people. Our targets would be: within the United States, the Congress, specifically the Foreign Affairs Committees and their staffs,...the general public [and] the media."⁶⁰

By late 1983, the campaign to alter public and Congressional opinion about Contra aid became a top administration priority, and the Office of Public Diplomacy became the focal point. Some said that this was the United States' "first peacetime propaganda ministry," whose primary role was to "manage a covert domestic operation designed to manipulate the Congress and the American public."⁶¹ In 1987 the U.S. Comptroller General confirmed that the Office of Public Diplomacy developed and used "white propaganda" activities that violated federal regulations and Congressional restrictions by engaging in "prohibited covert propaganda activities."⁶²

The Office of Public Diplomacy was eventually phased out in 1987 after Congress made it clear that no further funding would be provided for the program. In spite of this propaganda campaign by the administration, the majority of the people in the United States were never in favor of U.S. participation in the war against Nicaragua. The only lasting change in public opinion was an increased lack of faith in the national government and its leaders. By 1982, it was estimated that the Soviet Union was

spending \$3.5 billion a year on "misinformation and propaganda," a sum far greater than that spent by the United States.⁶³ In fact the USSR always out-spent the United States, and yet the Soviets lost the Cold War.

This highlights another problem with propaganda that runs deeper in American culture than monetary costs. The legacy of the Reagan administration's strategic information plan in the 1980s was the increased skepticism of the American people toward their government. The media was viewed as an effective tool of national power. Rather than clarifying the truth, attempts to use the media to achieve short term goals may actually heighten public uncertainty.

The Media: The Military's Communications Link To The People

A popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both.

James Madison⁶⁴

In a democracy the media informs the public about the political process, including those activities involving the military. The media has a constitutional mandate to give the citizen a rough draft of history, or as the journalist Walter Lippmann once said, "a portrait of reality on which the citizen can act." The Supreme Court has strongly affirmed the media's responsibility to explain the rationale and consequences of sending American troops to war. Justice Hugo Black wrote:

In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors....And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.⁶⁵

Because of a legitimate need for secrecy in certain situations, particularly in time of war, there are and always will be inherent tensions between the media and military cultures that inevitably lead to confrontation.⁶⁶ The difficult issues arise when national security becomes a rationale for controlling information based, not on military concerns related to operational security or troop safety, but on political considerations. Where that line should be drawn is central to the conflict between the media and the military.⁶⁷

The Vietnam war still affects the military's relationship with the media. Regardless of the reasons why America lost the war in Vietnam, scapegoats were sought and myths established. The pain of that experience still festers like an old wound, and common therapy involves blaming many aspects of that loss on the media. Despite evidence to the contrary, the notion still exists that America lost the Vietnam war because of the liberal media and the lack of a strategic information plan.⁶⁸ The persistence of that wound on the American soul is highlighted by President Bush's statement about the Gulf War victory sixteen years after the war in Vietnam ended: "It's a proud day for Americans and by God, we've licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."⁶⁹

During the Gulf War a concerted effort was made to get rid

of the "Vietnam syndrome" and the legacy of the American defeat in Vietnam.⁷⁰ The visual of the U.S. troops landing on the U.S. embassy in Kuwait was supposed to erase the haunting memory of the evacuation of the American embassy in Vietnam; but television and photographic images do not necessarily represent progress in our ability to understand the truth or interpret reality.

Indeed, the well televised landing at the American embassy in Kuwait was done after the embassy had been secured. It was a staged event, simply a "visual" for public consumption.

Staged events and diffused images created by the most technologically advanced systems lack aesthetic quality and produce a virtual reality in which the military experience is reproduced minus the risk.⁷¹ The fog of war is lifted, exposing a sterile technological process full of symbols but devoid of the real horrors of war. Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney suggested that the Gulf War "was the best-covered war in history," but what does best covered mean?⁷²

The legacy of failure in Vietnam and the belief that America lost that war due to negative media coverage prompted the military to search for a new model for media-military relations. The transparency created by real-time visual communications creates several dilemmas for military leadership when troops are deployed. The British government strictly controlled the media during the war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. This model was modified and applied during the U.S. military invasion of Grenada in 1983 and again in Panama in 1989.

In spite of the uproar over the use of this model of press control in Grenada and Panama, the Gulf War included tight restrictions on the press by the military. An extensive campaign was initiated by the White House and the Pentagon to influence public opinion by presenting Americans with carefully controlled images and information concerning the conflict and the issues surrounding the Bush administration's decision to use U.S. troops to resolve the crisis.⁷³ Others suggest that although limiting press freedom and the public's right to know during small wars such as Grenada and Panama is not acceptable, "the sheer size of the U.S. deployment in the Gulf War places it in the category of a vital-interest engagement," and, therefore, severely limiting press coverage and public information was acceptable.

Who decides what vital interests are and whether the size of a particular conflict brings it over the threshold into the domain where censorship and propaganda are justified?⁷⁴ Concern over casualties and press reports about the "Highway of Death" were political factors weighed by the Bush administration and the military. Retired General Bernard E. Trainor suggests that a fundamental question raised by the Gulf War is "whether commanders can be ruthless enough to pursue the enemy to the limit in the television age when the stakes are less than national survival."⁷⁵

Since the Gulf War, many unnecessary media restrictions have been lifted and suggested policy improvements have been implemented.⁷⁶ Efforts are being made to improve working

relationships and to enhance understanding of each other's constitutionally mandated role. The point remains, however, that the desirability of low casualties on a fluid and chaotic battlefield may inhibit future use of force as an instrument of American national power.⁷⁷ The photograph of a crowd cheering the dead American soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu was "a symbol of American power being dragged through the Third World, unable to master the new challenges of the post-Cold War era."⁷⁸

Information Warfare: A Two-Edged Sword

The term 'information' so widely used in our government simply fails completely to cover the situation or to convey any idea of the scope of the operation involved.⁷⁹

Information warfare means different things to different people. The more important a word is, the more difficult it may be to define. Information warfare integrates concepts of electronic warfare, deception, intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and psychological operations to achieve "dominant battlefield awareness."⁸⁰ While most of the effort in conducting information warfare is about information domination on the battlefield, it is the manipulation of information, or conduct of psychological operations off the battlefield, that is of concern here.⁸¹

Some facets of information warfare go beyond the battlefield and target commercial communications systems and the governmental decision making process. Increasing reliance on commercial off-the-shelf cybertechnology, and the fact that currently 95% of

normal Department of Defense and intelligence agencies' voice and data traffic currently use public channels, create an American vulnerability.⁸² On the other hand, the sharing of information and the resulting institutional transparency make the United States the natural coalition leader, because the United States has the capability to provide coalition decision makers with the most accurate and timely information to use in making policy. Accurate real-time situational assessment during pre-hostilities through information dominance may replace nuclear dominance as the key to coalition leadership in the future.

Some hold that public opinion should also be a target of information warfare. The argument is being made again that America should counteract the enemy's propaganda efforts with its own. Some argue that the slow, diffuse, and subtle process of winning hearts and minds cannot be entrusted to the media, the market, or private individuals; therefore, it is argued that the government needs programs such as the National Endowment for Democracy and Radio Free Europe to supplement the private sector's efforts and as a critical component of political warfare in the Clausewitzian sense.⁸³ Information campaigns to expose propaganda earlier in the Rwanda conflict may have mitigated a disaster; a concerted effort to counteract Serbian control of the media in Bosnia might have made a difference.⁸⁴ Limiting the focus of information manipulation to a targeted audience, however, is difficult and problematic.

Since the Cold War, the "threat" has become less specific.

The threat spectrum is made up of more diversified potential adversaries who are difficult to target, have no geographical center of gravity, and are not easily explained to the average American. Who determines whether the government is using propaganda to counteract the enemy's propaganda, or to gain support for its own specific foreign policy objectives? Does it matter?

Efforts at manipulating the media and targeting the American public appear unethical to the student of democracy. With the increased transparency of America's governmental policies and institutions, both at home and abroad, America will be watched very closely to see if it "walks the walk." What are the consequences of putting false information before the public to be relied on when crucial decisions are made? Data manipulation by an information warrior could unwittingly put the essential piece of false information before a foreign decision maker who relies upon it to launch weapons of mass destruction. Since the Peloponnesian wars, countries have acted not only out of anger or pride, but often "from fear caused by the threat perceived in the growth of the other."⁸⁵ If establishing trust is critical to international relations, manipulation of data might be a successful tactic in the short run, but a strategic disaster in the long run.

Consider how close the two superpowers came to launching nuclear weapons at each other during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. We know from well documented accounts that the

president and many of his advisors during the Cuban missile crisis thought that nuclear war was a real possibility, and that in spite of a fairly rational decision making process, several random events took place that pushed both countries closer to the brink.⁸⁶ Decisions with high stakes require a certain amount of trust. Factoring false information into a sensitive equation decreases or destroys trust and increases fear, suggesting that overt or covert manipulation of data is a dangerous game.

One of the challenges of the post-Cold War era will be determining the parameters of information warfare. In place of the Jeffersonian model of a free press which is given the highest respect and protection in the First Amendment, some people want the media to become a propaganda instrument in a system of social control and power that does not provide additional information or shed any light on reality. This is exactly why the Tofflers argue that we need to use knowledge strategies as instruments of future warfare against the enemy and not against ourselves.⁸⁷ It is also why the abusive and manipulative use of the media by the government to market policy increases public uncertainty and fear, rather than support for government. Colonel Richard Szafranski succinctly summarizes the ethical dilemma:

The great threat of strategic cyberwar is its dependence on successfully creating and sustaining lies. If a democracy uses cyber-weapons and information warriors, its citizens may never again be confident in their relationship with the government.⁸⁸

The American military profession needs the support of the

American people, yet it is dangerous for the military to attempt to create public opinion; in a democracy the military should be controlled by public opinion, not the reverse. The German propaganda model is not an option in the American system of government. Historical examples of America's efforts to use propaganda during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War appear to have been unethical and unwise. Threat of nuclear war narrowed decision makers' options and, in this high stakes game, the players concluded the ends justified the means. National security took precedence over democracy.

Information warfare has many promising possibilities, but it is a two-edged sword which must not be used against American citizens. Data manipulation off the battlefield could be a direct threat to American democracy, diminishing the ability to make rational decisions in international relations, and ultimately reducing the confidence the public has in its government institutions. Alexander Hamilton's sage warning offered more than two hundred years ago is still valid:

Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will after a time give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length run the risk of being less free.⁸⁹

As an institution, the military profession is constantly challenged to resist this tendency to destroy civil and political rights in the name of national security. There are no easy

answers, but choices must be made in the realm of a strong professional military ethic. That professional military ethic can help define the parameters of military influence that are acceptable in an American democracy: this is the subject of the next and final chapter.

NOTES

1. For various definitions of national interests, see Donald E. Neuchterlein, America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 106-114, especially 107. Neuchterlein devises a matrix to try to make sense of all the varying definitions of interests, but still suggests that there remains "much ambiguity about the meaning of the term in scholarly writing." I would suggest even more ambiguity remains in the minds of the American people. James N. Rosenau believes that the concept fails as an analytical tool because of the "ambiguous nature of the nation and the difficulty of specifying whose interests it encompasses." See James N. Rosenau, "National Interest," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol II, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), 34, 37. For other seminal perspectives see Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1934; and Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1951).

2. Edward N. Luttwak suggests that Western democracies will increasingly find it difficult to use military power for other than defensive purposes. See Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy--The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1987), 3. Professor Paul Bracken looks at the war after the next war and suggests that "[t]oday's problems are urgent, but they are not necessarily important for national and international security." He further suggests that even "if these definitions of security are correct in some technical sense, they are unlikely to have the power to catalyze public support for action." See Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1993): 157-174.

3. David S. Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 74. The survey cited by Yost was the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, America's

Place in the World: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public about International Affairs (Washington: Times Mirror Company, November, 1993). Interestingly, the polls showed that only 53% and 31% of the public would support the use of force in fighting Iraq and protecting South Korea, yet both these areas are the focus of strategic planners as major regional conflict scenarios.

4. Reducing the deficit is the pervasive issue facing the nation in 1995. While other Western industrial countries are raising taxes to fund more social programs and develop more infrastructure, the United States is cutting government funding of social programs and infrastructure, except defense spending. See Nathaniel Nash, "Europeans Shrug as Taxes Go Up," New York Times, 16 February 1995, A4. Lawrence Korb notes that the United States spends more on defense than "the world's next 10 largest military establishments." Cold war rhetoric as early as 1960 suggested that it was more important to be ahead in rocket thrust than in color TVs. Is this still true? The US investment in the future is in weapons, while the rest of the western world makes government investment in its people and non-defense infrastructure. While Congress cuts government subsidies to retrain workers in the non-defense sector, it tries to increase subsidies to workers in the defense sector. For example, a proposed House provision to the 1996 Defense Authorization bill would convert 10,000 military jobs to civilian positions; Defense Secretary William Perry argued that it "would be extremely disruptive and wasteful." See New York Times, 14 September 1995, D2, and Rick Maze, "Perry warns Congress on Defense Bill," Air Force Times, 25 September 1995, 4. Finally, the good news is there is at least budgetary convergence between strategists developing future military force structure. The Center for Defense Information usually presents the lowest well reasoned figure, and they now suggest at least a \$175 billion military budget. See "A Post Cold War Military Force," The Defense Monitor (Washington: Center For Defense Information, 1995), 1.

5. Norman R. Augustine, "Waging Peace," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1995): 44-47. In many ways it is the military that is unwilling to accept marketplace solutions. Ironically, Peter F. Drucker's book, The End of Economic Man: The Origins of Totalitarianism, was selected by the British during World War II as the one book distributed to its military officers to indoctrinate them on why they were fighting totalitarianism. Europe was overwhelmed by a return of the demons: war, anarchy, and unemployment. Central to the modern age was that society could be made rational, could be ordered, controlled and understood. With the failure of Marxism, and some thought capitalism (the stock market crash in 1929 and Depression), society became threatened. The revolution of fascism, and more generally, totalitarianism was not only the overthrow of economic organizations, values and beliefs; it was also a revolution that

replaced hope with despair, reason by ideology and magic. Drucker suggests that what "broke down was our acceptance of the supremacy over society of economic values." The debate is ongoing and strikes at the heart of the argument for maintaining a defense industrial base. See Peter F. Drucker, The End of Economic Man: The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: John Day Company, 1939), vii-xii.

6. Alvin and Heidi Toffler suggest that future "policies dealing with the regulation, control, or manipulation of the media--or for defense of freedom of expression--will form a key component of the knowledge strategies of tomorrow." They indicate that democratic armies cannot win wars without popular support, and that First Amendment guarantees of press freedom mean that U.S. spin doctors have to be more subtle and sophisticated than those of countries in which totalitarian control of the media is still a fact. Defining subtle and sophisticated could be difficult and dangerous. See Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War And Anti-War (New York: Time Warner 1993), 173, 206 and chapters 16 and 18.

7. B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, Propaganda, Communications, and Public Opinion (Princeton, New Jersey: University Press, 1946), 1. Also see Harold D. Lasswell, David Lerner, and Hans Speier, eds., Propaganda And Communication In World History, 3 Vols. (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979).

8. Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations And American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 27, 28.

9. J. Sproule, Channels of Propaganda (Bloomington, In.: EDINFO Press, 1994), 3, 6, 9. Noam Chomsky suggests: "Propaganda is to democracy what violence is to the totalitarian state." See Chomsky's interview in Bill Moyers, A World Of Ideas (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 52.

10. William E. Odom, "Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term U.S. Strategic Planning," in Janos Radvanyi, ed., Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic Planning (New York: Praeger, 1990), 8-9; Jack N. Summe, "PSYOP Support to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm," Special Warfare (October 1992): 7, 9.

11. Propaganda is an old concept. The Roman playwright Terence wrote these accusing words more than 2,000 years ago: "There's a demand today for men who can make a wrong appear right." See Melvin Maddocks, "Being Brief," World Monitor, February 1990, 15. Also see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent --The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988), xi, 1-37. Walter Lippmann used the term "manufacture consent," claiming that propaganda in the 1920s was a "regular

organ of popular government." See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1921 reprint; London: Allen and Unwin, 1932), 248.

12. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Book 1, 89. I use a "Summersian" concept of Clausewitz's trinity similar to the way Harry Summers used the concept in his book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Some scholars argue that this is not the real trinity Clausewitz was discussing. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," Parameters, Autumn 1995, 9-19.

13. Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship--The Origins, Structure And Effects Of National Socialism, Trans. by Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger, 1970), 193.

14. Wilhelm Deist, "The Road to Ideological War: Germany, 1918-1945," in Williamson Murray, et al, eds., The Making of Strategy--Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 359.

15. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 549-550. Also see James R. McCain, "They Did Not Lie In Vain--A Study of German, British and American World War I Propaganda," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1965, 22-33; Henri B. Chase, "Hitlerian Propaganda," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport R.I.: 1970.

16. Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Stages of Totalitarian 'Integration' (Gleichschaltung): The Consolidation of National Socialist Rule in 1933 and 1934," in Republic to Reich--The Making of the Nazi Revolution, ed. by Hajo Holborn (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 117.

17. Michael A. Aquino, "Psychological Operations: The Ethical Dimension," Unpublished Research Paper, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, DC: 1987. 14.

18. Aquino, 4-5, 14-15.

19. Alpheus T. Mason and Richard H. Leach, eds., In Quest Of Freedom--American Political Thought and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 23-25.

20. For a different view see Murray Dyer, "The Potentialities of American Psychological Statecraft," John B. Whitton, ed., Propaganda and the Cold War (Princeton, New Jersey: Washington Public Affairs Press, 1963), 40. Dyer writes, "There is nothing about the instrument [propaganda] that makes it essential for a totalitarian regime and unessential for a democratic society. It

is, in fact an instrument we are required to use to its maximum if we are to exercise our responsibilities of leadership in the Free World. It is our sensitive means of talking to people about the issues we consider important and about our intentions." In the early days of the Cold War Dyer's thought carried the day. Some military officers argued vigorously to implement a massive propaganda plan and to ignore "puritan ethics" and democratic principles. See W. Clinton Powell, "The Role of Propaganda in the Achievement of National Goals," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport R.I.: 1965, 42, 42-45, 58-64.

21. President Lyndon B. Johnson, at the swearing-in of USIA Director Leonard Marks, September 1965; quoted by Irving R. Wechsler, "USIA's Mission and Responsibilities," in The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, Vol. 1 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1976), 41-42. President Johnson's words did not always match his actions. For a different perspective see Charles G. Cooper, "The Day It Became the Longest War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1996): 77-79.

22. Aquino, iii.

23. Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 355. Also see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1962), especially 395-414. Janowitz argues that "in time of war the military was forced to accept the public relations principle." Janowitz, 395.

24. Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State--The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994), 273. For a history of the conflict between pro-war and anti-war proponents, see H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents Of War--1917-1918 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957).

25. Porter, 273.

26. Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 18; George Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (New York: Harper, 1920).

27. Leo Bogart, Cool Words, Cold War--A New Look at USIA's Premises for Propaganda, revised ed. (Washington: American University Press, 1995), xii; George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1938), 31; Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Line: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939).

28. Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors--America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 1.
29. Alpheus T. Mason and Richard H. Leach, In Quest of Freedom--American Political Thought and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959) 533-535. For a discussion of the arguments outlined in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, see Mason, 533-540. For studies of propaganda and other forms of visual and verbal persuasion during World War II see Frank W. Fox, Madison Avenue Goes to War: The Strange Military Career of American Advertising, 1941-45 (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1975), especially 3-9; David Culbert, ed., Film and Propaganda in America: A Documentary History (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); Allan Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978); George H. Roeder, Jr., The Censored War--American Visual Experience During World War Two (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 1-25.
30. Mason, 537.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Roeder, 2, 3-6.
34. Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 484-497.
35. Walter LaFeber, The American Age--U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 477.
36. Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938-1976, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1976), 164; Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Steven Warren Guerrier, NSC-68 and the Truman Rearmament: 1950-1953, dissertation (University of Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1988).
37. Guerrier, 100.
38. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Final Report, Book 1, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 26 April 1976, 9; Morton H. Halperin et al., The Lawless State (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), 4.

39. Alan Wolfe, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979), 17.
40. Guerrier, 412.
41. Simpson also found a significant amount of government funding (7-13 million dollars annually) funneled to universities and think tanks for communications-related research, frequently with no public acknowledgment. Psychological warfare projects demanded scientific accuracy and academic integrity, but Simpson argues that they "were at their heart applied research tailored to achieve narrowly defined political or military goals." See Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion--Communications Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 13, 9.
42. Simpson, 8.
43. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies Of Containment--A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 52.
44. Ibid., 86.
45. Powell, 44, 66. Reference endnote 20.
46. U.S. Department of Army General Staff, Plans and Operations Division, Psychological Warfare Study for Guidance in Strategic Planning (originally top secret, now declassified), 11 March 1948, U.S. Army P&O 091.42 TS (section I, cases 1-7), RG 319 U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC, 4, 6. Many of the pertinent records covering this time period were only declassified in 1989. For other records see Simpson's bibliographic essay, 173-193. White psychological warfare is propaganda emanating from a legitimate and stated source, capitalizing on its authoritative source and stressing "simplicity, directness, clarity, repetition, and truthfulness, even though selected." Black Psychological warfare is defined as propaganda emanating from a source other than the actual source and employing subversive activities and sabotage operations. Black propaganda stresses "doubt, uncertainty, and controversy in its attempt to divide, confuse, and terrify." Psychological Warfare Study for Guidance in Strategic Planning, 3, and the definitions annex.
47. Sproule, 59-61; Michael R. Beschloss, May Day (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
48. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 406. For a discussion of other alleged attempts of the Pentagon's "high-pressure propaganda and public relations programs" see J. W. Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York: Liveright, 1970).

(New York: Liveright, 1970).

49. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War--The United States And Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 120. For primary source material see Herring's footnotes on 121.

50. Ibid., 121.

51. There is still considerable disagreement over what actually happened, particularly during the second incident. See Lt. General Phillip B. Davidson, Secrets of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990), 129-132; and Don Stillman, "Tonkin: what should have been asked," Columbia Journalism Review, Winter 1970-1971, 21-22.

52. Herring, 122.

53. Ibid., 175.

54. It is important to note that even the bland term "public relations" is still a marketing term. For example, a public relations person for your local school district makes twice the salary of a teacher and has a job of presenting that school in the best possible light. The job is not to tell you everything about your school. It is to tell you how great your school is. Rarely will you see a comparison of achievement scores with local private schools. The rise in public affairs/public relations personnel in the military serves a very similar purpose. Most people have a healthy distrust for PR, yet some academics suggest that 40% of all news flows directly from public relations offices. See John C. Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Sludge Is Good For You: Lies, Damn Lies, and the Public Relations Industry (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995).

55. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare Of The US Armed Forces, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991), 1.

56. Ibid., 39.

57. See Jeffrey B. Jones and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 28-33 for an excellent overview of how PSYOP is a force multiplier at the operational and tactical level.

58. Quote is from a 25 January memo from W. Scott Thompson to DCI William Casey concerning the development of "Project Democracy." In January 1983, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive No. 77 (NSDD 77), authorizing this project which among other things, was "a new mechanism in order to strengthen the organization, planning and diplomacy...relative to national security." See Report of the Congressional

Cong., 1st sess., November, 1987, 403, 423-425. Kegley and Wittkopf suggest that public diplomacy is a polite term for propaganda. See Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy--Pattern and Process, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) 120-122.

59. Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 115. For the best summaries of this public diplomacy effort see Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Iran-Contra's Untold Story," Foreign Policy (Fall 1988): 3-30, and Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, Unreliable Sources - A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), 131-141.

60. Parry and Kornbluh, 8,9. For information on how Congress was targeted, see Edgar Chamorro, Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation (New York: Institute for Media Analysis, Inc., 1987), 8-16, 42. Also see Jacqueline Sharkey, "Back In Control," Common Cause, September/October 1986, 29-40. In a related trend, some authors suggested that the nature and threat of terrorism meant that internal security files could not be restricted to actual or imminent threats, since terrorist groups could have links to students, clergy, etc. To get around legal and constitutional "impediments" in developing an adequate internal security system, they advocated contracting this type of citizen surveillance work out to the private sector. See Samuel T. Francis, ed., "The Intelligence Community," in Charles L. Heatherly, ed., Mandate for Leadership (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1981), 940-941.

61. Parry and Kornbluh, 4, 5. Parry and Kornbluh's research of primary source documents suggests that the public diplomacy office "pressured journalists and news executives into compliance...[and] deployed secretly funded private sector surrogates to attack anti-contra lawmakers through television and newspaper advertisements," Parry and Kornbluh, 5.

62. Comptroller General's Report, 30 September 1987; Jonathan Miller memo dated 13 March 1985 to Pat Buchanan on "White Propaganda Operation," in Iran-Contra Report, Source Documents, Vol. 2, 579-585, Vol. 1, 7-8, 32-34, 583.

63. By USIA Director Charles Wick, cited by Allen Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age (New York: Praeger, 1984), 158. For other examples of U.S. propaganda efforts during the Cold War see Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action--The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Alvin A. Snyder, "The Cold War Traffic In Phony Information," Washington Post, 27 December 1995, 19.

64. Quoted by Sharkey, iii.

64. Quoted by Sharkey, iii.
65. Justice Hugo Black, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), 717.
66. Patrick Pexton, "Can the press and services be allies?" Air Force Times, 23 October 1995, 12.
67. For a short documented foundation of this relationship see Jacqueline Sharkey, Under Fire--U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf (Washington: Center For Public Integrity, 1991), 8-21.
68. See Major Joe E. Kilgore, "PSYOP in Support of Low-Intensity Conflict," Special Warfare (October 1992): 26-31. Kilgore writes that "the United States [during the Vietnam War] did not fare well against [North Vietnamese] strategic PSYOP programs, and we paid for it with a loss of public support and international support." This idea that the public and the media should have been targeted and that the media lost the war in Vietnam still festers in spite of the overwhelming evidence provided by military historians and analysts that shows lack of political leadership and casualty rates--not press coverage--reduced support for the war. See Summers, On Strategy, 68; William M. Hammond, U.S. Army in Vietnam--Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968, (Washington: Center for Military History--United States Army, 1988), 387; Michael Mandelbaum, "Vietnam: The Television War," Daedalus III, Fall 1982, 157-168; Daniel C. Hallin, "The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Political Support: A Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media," Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 1-23.
69. President George Bush, quoted in Ann Devroy and Guy Gugliotta, "Bush to 'Move Fast' on Mideast Peace," Washington Post, 2 March 1991, 13.
70. For a discussion of earlier attempts to get past the "Vietnam Syndrome," see Michael T. Klare, Beyond the 'Vietnam Syndrome'--U.S. Intervention in the 1980s (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982), 1. Klare gives the "Vietnam Syndrome" a broad definition. He suggests that it is the American public's disinclination to engage in further military interventions in the internal affairs of Third World countries.
71. Robert Dannin, "People and Ideas," Aperture, Summer 1991, 73.
72. Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America's Team: The Odd Couple--A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military (Nashville, Tennessee: Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 102. Real time coverage of the war provides only the rough drafts, but nonetheless, an essential foundation for

later critical and useful analysis. For different levels of critical analysis of the war see Rick Atkinson, Crusade--The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993); Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War--The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995); Barry D. Watts, "Friction in the Gulf," Naval War College Review (Autumn 1995): 93-108.

73. See Sharkey, 1. Also see Marie Gottschalk, "Operation Desert Cloud: The Media and the Gulf War," World Policy Journal (Summer 1992): 449-486. Defending the government's position see Pete Williams, "The Pentagon Is Not in the Censorship Business," Washington Post National Weekly, 25-31 March 1991, 23; Aukofer, 100-104.

74. See E. L. Pattullo, "War and the American Press," Parameters (Winter 1992-1993): 61-69. For a different view see Stephen R. Graubard, Mr. Bush's War--Adventures in the Politics of Illusion (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992). On the importance of public support see Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy II--A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992), 7-21.

75. Gordon and Trainor, 470.

76. For thoughtful recommendations, see Aukofer, 53-55; and Sharkey, 157-171. Critics have suggested that the military's Bosnia Link was the latest and subtlest form of spin control, but the ability of the military to control the Internet appears to be wishful thinking. Military spokespersons suggest it will be good for democracy. See Eric Schmitt, "Military Puts Bosnia on the Web," New York Times, 17 December 1995, E-14.

77. Gordon and Trainor, 470.

78. Marvin Kalb quote from Jacqueline Sharkey, "When Pictures Drive Foreign Policy," American Journalism Review, December 1993, 19.

79. Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). These scholars rejected information warfare as too bland and psychological warfare as too narrow, settling on strategic psychological operations to deal with the informational or psychological instrument of foreign policy.

80. James R. Clapper, Jr., and Eben H. Trevino, "Critical Security Dominates Information Warfare Moves," Signal, March 1995, 71-72. For information warfare definitions, see Alan D. Campen, "Rush to Information-Based Warfare Gambles with National Security," Signal, July 1995, 68. Also see Donald E. Ryan, "Implications of Information-Based Warfare," Joint Force

Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 114; Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War (Fairfax, Virginia: AFCEA International Press, 1992); Martin C. Libicki, "What is Information Warfare?" (Washington: National Defense University, 21 July 1995), Draft Report; Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994).

81. A recent Rand study proposed seven basic features of strategic information warfare, including an "expanded role for perception management." The study argued that "there may be a decreased capability to build and maintain domestic support for controversial political actions" and that U.S. administrations "might face a daunting task in shaping and sustaining domestic support for any action marked by a high degree of ambiguity and uncertainty in the [information warfare] realm." There was no discussion on possible democratic and Constitutional limitations. See Roger C. Molander, et al., Strategic Information Warfare--A New Face of War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), xiv, xv.

82. Ryan, 114; S. E. Goodman, The Information Technologies and Defense: A Demand-Pull Assessment, (Stanford University: Center for International Security and Arms Control, February 1996), 25.

83. Clapper, 72; Nye, 34; Odom, 8-9.

84. Joseph S. Nye Jr., and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no.2 (March/April 1996): 32. For Serb president Slobodan Milosevic's control of the media, see Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor--A Story of War (New York: Knopf, 1996).

85. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts (New York: HarperCollins College, 1993), 12.

86. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 132-158; G. T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking In Time--The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986), 1-17.

87. Toffler, 206. The Tofflers use and recognize many of Baudrillard's concepts in chapter 18.

88. Richard Szafranski, "When Waves Collide: Future Conflict," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1995, 84. Ironically, one of the primary problems that Service Chiefs are trying to address is accountability and integrity in senior officers. See Art Pine, "Air Force Critics Seek to Clip Wings of an Elitist Culture," Los Angeles Times, 8 October 1995, 4.

89. Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist, No. 8 (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 45.

CHAPTER 5

DEMOCRACY IS OPINION: DETERMINING THE PARAMETERS OF MILITARY INFLUENCE

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes....Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

President Dwight Eisenhower¹

The words of President Eisenhower's 1961 farewell address are at least as important today as they were then. No postwar president had a tighter rein on the military. Eisenhower was plainly concerned about civil-military relations, aware of how easily "the arsenal of democracy" could become a military-industrial complex with unwarranted influence.

Recognition of the potential for misplaced power and military influence, understanding of the crucial role of a knowledgeable citizenry in safeguarding the democratic process, and appreciation of the requirement to maintain a free and democratic society remain issues which continue to demand attention from the military profession. How does the American military officer address these issues when faced with rapid technological changes that alter both society and warfare?

This concluding chapter discusses the application of the professional military ethic described in chapter two and offers a constitutional and philosophical framework which addresses limitations on how we fight and clarifies the American military's role in society. This analysis applies the previously described professional military ethic consisting of three power fibers: constitutional values, institutional values, and the laws of war.

The ethical dilemmas examined in this paper primarily concern the relationship of the institutional ethical values of moral courage and integrity and the recognition of constitutional ethical values, including democracy and civilian control of the military. The conclusions and questions raised in this research postulate a lack of knowledge and awareness of the proper relationship the military must have in American democracy. Measures are proposed to assist senior military leaders in inculcating in the American armed forces--particularly the officer corps--a heightened understanding of their professional military responsibilities.

The Professional Military Ethic: Defining The Military's Role in America

The ethical dilemmas discussed throughout this paper have focused on balancing the ethical value of national security and the ethical value of democratic principles. Weighing the relative merits of these two ethical values is difficult, sometimes involving the highest levels of judgement and the sharpest acuity of vision. To override one ethical principle in deference to another is rarely a comfortable moral position, but

it is sometimes necessary. This is precisely when the professional military ethic can and must provide guidance.

A strong professional military ethic may restrict use of some militarily attractive options. Historically, "strict adherence to professional, ethical, and moral codes has been essential if the power and influence of the military organization [is] to be an effective servant, rather than the arbitrary master, of the state."²

A professional military ethic based on moral courage and integrity supported by the guiding principles of American constitutional values subordinates the preservation of American security to a fundamental allegiance to American democratic principles in order to insure that we do not become more safe at the risk of being less free.³ The Founding Fathers chose liberty over efficiency.

In one of its roles as servant of the people and the government, the military profession acts as an expert advisor only. It lacks the broad perspective on all the divergent interests and elements which must be considered in making national policy decisions, just as it lacks legitimate policymaking authority.⁴ Understanding where that authority lies, and mustering the moral courage needed to make the right decision on constitutional principles, was illustrated by the late William E. Colby's decision and rationale for disclosing damaging information to Congress on C.I.A. activities up to the mid-1970s. Colby had come to believe that "American intelligence

must operate under the confines of the Constitution we Americans have established as the framework to govern our affairs."⁵ The military officer has a similar compelling responsibility.

Some sociologists have characterized a theoretical construct--the "military mind"--and inferred that by the nature of its business, the military profession must have a skeptical view of human nature. The resulting conservative outlook is sometimes far more pessimistic than that of the public generally and is at odds with liberal social values and more optimistic views of human nature and the future. This difference might be a pertinent factor in formulating national policy; for example, in determining whether America should use a carrot (most favored nation clause) in dealing with a possible future adversary like China or whether America should use the stick by applying trade restrictions or developing a military containment policy for China.

No single viewpoint or theory is necessarily right or wrong. Yale professor Bruce Russett suggests that the "shape of the world will depend on which theory we think is true, and how we try to make it come true."⁶ In a democracy, the military profession's view and advice is sought, as is the perspective of other advisors with different worldviews. The immense power and responsibility given to the military profession to defend the nation causes the military to be a conservative element; but this is not necessarily the best or wisest--and it certainly is not always the controlling--outlook of national policy. The military

view is important, necessary, and sought after by policymakers; but only elected officials and the people should determine when and how it affects overall policy.

Politics is beyond the scope of military concern because participation in politics divides the profession against itself and shifts its focus away from the bedrock institutional values.⁷ Weapon systems may be purchased and contracts negotiated to support jobs programs to get congressmen elected, but the military profession must maintain its core value of integrity and offer candid and expert advice regardless. Spirited and scholarly debate over the benefits and drawbacks of competing weapon systems is accomplished through military journals and war college seminars. Through the ballot box, the public will ultimately decide what kind of military America has and what weapon systems are purchased or rejected.

The job of the senior military leadership is not to make policy or influence the public, but to provide expert advice concerning military security issues to constitutionally elected or appointed decision makers, who in turn must balance the desirability of maximizing military security against its cost and other societal values.⁸

Constitutionally mandated civilian control of the military is endangered when the advisor's role becomes indistinguishable from that of a powerful political interest group. A strong professional military ethic based on constitutional values and appreciation of democratic principles which require civilian

control of the military will keep the military profession clear of the danger zone. Armed with institutional and constitutional ethical values, parameters on the military profession's relationship to the American people become clearer. In its advisory role the American military profession should avoid manipulating or even influencing the public through public diplomacy or propaganda efforts.

This does not mean the military should not advertise nor have a public relations budget and campaign to recruit and promote America's armed forces, its rich heritage and historical role. Nor does it imply that the military should not have a public affairs program that provides timely and accurate information on military policies, programs, and activities. On the contrary, public information must be provided in the spirit of Casper Weinberger's and Dick Cheney's "Principles of Information."⁹

However, the line between public affairs and its explanatory role and public diplomacy and its political role is not clear. As will be discussed later in this chapter, it is a contention of this paper that this gray area needs to be defined for both war and peacetime. As it stands now, the gray area is not defined because the lines are not clearly drawn for military officers or the military as an institution.

Having established the military profession's role as advisor and servant of the government and the people, we should also remember the difficulties involved in maintaining dual loyalty to

democratic values on the one hand and national security interests on the other. The debate is about the pattern of civil-military relations that will be compatible with American liberal democratic values while best maintaining the security of the American nation. Obtaining the right balance is a dynamic process demanding constant attention and adjustment. Purely military decisions are rare and civilian control is indistinct and situational, with no cookbook answers or school solutions; but the military profession has individual and institutional responsibilities to know where the lines are drawn.¹⁰

Many ethical dilemmas can and should be avoided by drawing lines for individuals and institutions. While it may be fuzzy and situational, the line between military and civilian authority is drawn by the elected civilian leadership, not the military. The military profession, however, must not only know where that line is, but avoid the danger zone which borders it, because even the appearance of a transgression may concern the American electorate and damage its trust in the military establishment.

For example, participating in public debate about military and foreign policy or aggressively pursuing public and congressional support for parochial defense funding are temptations that bump up against the professional military ethic and the line of demarcation between military and civilian authority. These are not advisory roles. The military profession must have enough confidence in the democratic process to allow elected officials to develop policy and strategy, and to

rely on Congress and the President to articulate that policy. Like the ideal independent judiciary, the ideal American military profession has an important responsibility to the Constitution: to stay out of politics.

Senior military leadership must be prepared to provide broad military advice based on a global perspective and consideration and evaluation of relevant political, economic, sociological and even psychological implications. Having a narrow but focused role as an advisor does not suggest limited knowledge, only limited policy influence and authority.

This may be difficult since there is a lack of consensus and a sense of frustration in the military, in the government, and amongst the American people over America's leadership role in the world. World leadership is costly and entails sacrifices. The price of world leadership and influence will have to be articulated by the political leadership; but, ultimately, it is the American people who will determine what national interests are worth fighting for.

This paper has argued that attempts to manipulate the public have had limited success and violate institutional and constitutional ethical values. Unfortunately, American history is replete with policy makers who ignored the Constitution and the public in order to protect perceived national interests as they saw fit. This bypassing of the public and Congress appears increasingly unlikely to work in the information age. "The American people must understand the need to persevere and must

agree that national interests warrant the commitments."¹¹

Instead of public relations campaigns targeting the American public, a more complex process of discussion, deliberation, and interactions needs to take place.

Past uses and limitations of propaganda have been discussed. Propaganda is neither harmless nor has it brought an end to democracy. It is, however, corrosive to the military institution and its relationship to the American people. If the public thinks of the military as spin doctors who wear khaki, a part of government that sees the public as an enemy to be targeted, we risk everything and slide down a very slippery slope.¹² Put bluntly and succinctly in The Armed Forces Officer: the military profession "must not, as has happened in our nation's history, distort information to serve the ends of anything other than the Constitution."¹³

Balancing Information Age Challenges With The Professional Military Ethic

Based on constitutional and institutional ethical values, the military has a limited role in influencing the public in the American democratic system, but the information age increases the temptation for a more active role. The information revolution, like the industrial revolution before it, is changing the nature of warfare and American democracy. Lieutenant General Ervin Rokke, president of the National Defense University, recently wrote: "The emerging information highway, which extends from earth to geosynchronous orbit, will certainly alter society, to

say nothing of conflict."¹⁴

The evolving nature of democracy was discussed in chapter two, suggesting a greater role for the media and the public. The experiment continues and democracy recreates itself through efforts at the local and national level to motivate collective discussion by an informed public over a sustained period of time. Alexander Hamilton suggested more than two hundred years ago that the American people would decide the important questions and that it was his vision that they would establish good government "from reflection and choice," not by "accident and force."¹⁵ The American military should expect changes in the media and the political process. The role of the public will continue to evolve.¹⁶

As democracy continues to develop and the public assumes a more cognizant supervisory role, the military profession needs to adjust to these trends in democracy. The long term trend in America appears to be toward a more participatory democracy that creates new roles for a complex and consequential public. In Pawns: The Plight of the Citizen-Soldier, Peter Barnes suggests that the real question facing the American military is whether it "will adjust to democracy or continue to insist that democracy adjust to it."¹⁷ The professional military ethic outlined in this paper requires the American military to adjust to democracy.

American democracy will survive so long as consistent attention is paid to its moral imperatives; yet the military profession is frequently tempted to give up on democracy. One of

the military profession's concerns will continue to be the lack of deliberation which the Federalists considered so important in the democratic process. The temptation for the military to manipulate the public is increasing as the means expand: but while protection of national interests has been viewed as sufficient justification for systematic deception of the public and members of Congress in the past, it is not likely to provide adequate justification in the future. It is debatable whether the public was ever truly duped in the long run in any event, and the increased transparency of government institutions which is developing will make it difficult to deceive the public for any length of time in the future.

For example, the increased pace of world events may not be fully understood, but the events will be exposed by the media. A military strategist recently wrote: "Of all of technology's heavy constraints on the makers of strategy, media transparency is far from the lightest."¹⁸ Demand for casualty and collateral damage free conflicts will continue. Showing the true face of war can restrict options and even deter involvement in a war. One misconception is that television's "unique ability to manipulate emotion through symbols and pictures, its shocking immediacy and built in selectivity of presentation, offer amazing opportunities to manipulate opinion in democracies...."¹⁹ Television may offer the opportunity to manipulate public opinion, but the empirical data suggests that deception is exposed quickly, increasing cynicism and eroding trust in government institutions.

The power of the media is thus something of a wild card. It can be a force multiplier at the operational and tactical level. It can be a force decoupler at the strategic level, separating the military from the people rather than forming a bridge of communication based on common values and interests. Or it can affect all three levels in a variety of ways.

The military must recognize that the truth will be exposed, and exposed far more quickly with improving technology and the emergence of forty more democracies worldwide. The importance of continuity in word and deed will be essential to maintaining credibility and alleviating cynicism about government.²⁰

Increased transparency means more exposure to failures as well as successes because the American military is not a spectator but an involved player on the world stage.

While increased exposure is problematic, information age technology, like most new technology, creates new opportunities as well as risks. The revolution in communications technology discussed in this paper continues to accelerate, adding informational warfare as a potential major tool in the military arsenal.

Deliberately interjecting (as has been proposed by students of information warfare) false information into the diplomatic equation can have explosive and unforeseen consequences. Some would argue that years of deception and the lack of a real debate on the subject is directly related to the striking decline in public confidence in American leadership in and out of

government.²¹ Cause and effect relations are difficult to establish empirically, but the military profession must not even get close to that line.

While deception employed in self-defense or in countering unfair coercion by an enemy is justified in principle, deception and manipulation of data is difficult to contain within narrow boundaries, has a tendency to multiply and self-perpetuate, and fails to produce increased national security. For example, consider deception in the context of the stepped up pace of world events. The days when the battle of New Orleans could take place two weeks after the Treaty of Ghent had ended the war are gone. In their place we find times when a deliberately falsified item of information warfare may prompt the completely unanticipated but utterly fatal spasm launch of weapons of mass destruction. So deception may not last long these days, but it need not do so in order to have calamitous outcomes.

Further, targeting data manipulation against a distinct enemy is tough enough without the danger of backfiring. The U-2 incident discussed earlier involved a routine lie directed at the world to cover up for a reconnaissance mission over Soviet territory. That lie was intended for foreign and diplomatic consumption; but it also resulted in the loss of confidence of U.S. citizens in the word of a popular and respected leader.²²

Defining and implementing a strategic knowledge plan is restricted by the ethical values of the institutions the American military fights for. As discussed in this paper, past attempts

at pushing the envelope of public diplomacy have raised serious ethical and moral considerations, and future use may have the unintended consequence of destroying the military's position as the "highest regarded profession in America."²³

Information warfare is a two-edged sword. Using the informational tool is not value neutral. Information warfare is not so much about satellites, wires and computers as it is about influencing people and the decisions they make. If integrity is to be a core value of the military, we need to understand the negative and positive qualities of "knowledge strategies." We certainly must recognize the downside of using the media as a propaganda weapon to manipulate our own people. Covert manipulation and propaganda targeting the American people threaten the legitimate development of democratic public opinion. A free and open information highway where ideas and values are exchanged and debated is the lifeblood of democracy. Democracy is opinion. How the military influences that opinion matters.

Although specific rules are problematic, particularly in the context of information age changes to society and warfare, the military profession requires guidance and some fundamental parameters within which to evaluate its own information strategies. Applying a professional military ethic based on institutional and constitutional values is the right way to start. The proper role of the military in American democratic society is a subject that must be carefully studied and understood by military leaders.

One **recommendation** is to form a group of senior military officers, including public affairs officers, and journalists to study this issue. Cheney and Weinberger's "Principles of Information" could provide a starting point to flesh out the details and make some specific recommendations on where public information ends and unwarranted influence begins. What are the limits in the American democratic system?²⁴

In addition, it is the **major contention of this paper** that ethics and proper civil-military relations must be taught, particularly during senior level professional education--in, to, and by the U.S. military.

Recommendation: Professional Military Ethics And Civil-Military Affairs Course Added to Joint Professional Military Education

The questions and issues raised in this paper suggest that officers preparing for senior military leadership positions require a substantial course in professional military ethics and civil-military affairs. Such a course should be added to all senior war college curricula as part of the joint professional military education requirement.

Some military leaders suggest that the information age and the revolution in military affairs require the center of mass at war colleges to shift toward more technical academic disciplines.²⁵ The questions raised and the issues evaluated in this paper argue just the opposite. The question of why we fight and what we fight for should receive at least as much emphasis as how we are going to fight the next war. Only in the context of understanding American democratic institutions and a professional

military ethic can the use and role of the military be evaluated.

Let us sketch an outline of this course on American Military Bedrock Values. The first block of instruction should be on ethics. Electives and seminars in ethics are currently offered at all U.S. war colleges, but this is not inclusive enough. The issues raised in this paper indicate that the study and application of ethics is important enough to be a core course required for all officers, including foreign students. The ability to consider and do what is best, the "virtue of wisdom," crosses cultural and ethnic barriers, and rejects political correctness or cultural sensitivity outright as obstacles in promoting such universal ethical standards. The "major virtues are mandated not by social convention but by basic facts about our common human condition."²⁶

Some would argue that all that is needed is to rewrite regulations or make tougher laws. This solution ignores the complexity of so many issues. In chapter two the inherent inadequacy of laws, codes and customs in weighing choices between national security interests and democratic values was briefly discussed. Consider the task of writing a regulation that defines and establishes criteria for the use of deception or lying. First, many would find the regulation an insult. Second, one could argue that enforcement would be difficult if not impossible. Third, the subject is imprecise: "Nearly every kind of action can be meant to deceive."²⁷ Lying, being silent, and withholding information are all forms of deception differing by

situation and degree. Is leaking information lying? When and for what purpose?

Surely it was right for the Allies to deceive the Germans during World War II about the time and place of the Normandy landings. But what about President Roosevelt's manner of bringing the American people to accept first the possibility and then the likelihood of war with Germany? President Johnson's and President Nixon's relationship with the public during the Vietnam War was based in part on past examples. "Secrecy and deceit grew at least in part because of existing precedents."²⁸ Sometimes there may be sufficient reason to lie. In what rare case will there be general agreement that there is good reason to lie? What are the criteria?

Rather than attempting to regulate or legislate against lying, and regardless of the existence or non-existence of such laws and regulations, education on moral issues and choices is necessary not only to help officers make good ethical decisions but to develop in them even greater virtue. It was retired Admiral James Stockdale, former president of the Naval War College, who reminded us more than fifteen years ago that the judicial process was not the equivalent of a moral yardstick and that Aristotle taught "that the main objective of society was to instill virtue in its citizenry...."²⁹ Those who face hard ethical choices must not only know what is the right thing to do, but why it is the right thing to do.

Whether the rash of ethical problems affecting the military

profession recently is due to the increased transparency of an institution with high standards or a fundamental problem with society in general, many are suggesting that as a society the ethics of virtue as well as the ethics of right action need to be incorporated into the education process.³⁰ It would appear that the American military needs to do more than enforce the rules. Too much of what is called "ethics regulations" are rules written by Judge Advocate General lawyers; too little reflects the insights and wisdom of Plato, Aristotle, and the Founding Fathers. The American military needs to cultivate moral virtues, so that doing what is right in professional situations can become a matter of course rather than a debate over how to interpret rules.

American ethical and institutional values determine the parameters of warfare. To illustrate the lack of understanding of this point consider a Naval War College research paper written during the Cold War that argued that the United States military needed to get rid of its "Puritan ethics" and adopt Soviet propaganda tactics. That viewpoint alone shows a profound lack of understanding of ethics and American political thought. Establishing a strong professional military ethic is a rational and crucial cornerstone to the military profession and is essential for handling the torque applied to both American society and warfare by information age technology.

The second block of instruction in an American Military Bedrock Values course must cover civil-military relations with a

thorough discussion of the relative weight or influence of the military in government decisions, including military-media relations. This section must begin by examining political thought, specifically in reference to democracy and the Constitution. As discussed in chapter three, democracy is not only a core value of our country, but exporting democracy is part of the United States national security strategy. Adequately characterizing and explaining democracy, and the corresponding limitations it places on the role and character of the military institution, is a difficult and often subtle intellectual challenge. An understanding of America political documents and democratic theory is crucial to explaining the role and place of military influence on a democratically governed state.

The problem is complicated by the fact that the military profession has a large percentage of officers with technical degrees who have had few humanities courses and have little formal education concerning the key documents and theories that define America, its institutions, and the American military profession's proper relationship to the government and people it serves.

This point is illustrated nicely by Robert Timberg in his book, The Nightingale's Song. Timberg suggests that John Poindexter, a brilliant and capable military officer, had no real appreciation of the way the American political system works. At one point, Timberg asserts of the Naval Academy graduate: "He had an idealized view of how congress was supposed to operate that

had barely progressed beyond high school civics."³¹

A provocative statement perhaps, but the implications should not be dismissed lightly. High school may be the last time the majority of active duty military officers with technical degrees studied the American political process. In fact, those serving during the Cold War may have had more professional military education on the enemies' communist or Marxist political thought than American political thought and its historical and theoretical base.

The development of technical knowledge required by the military profession was met to some degree at the expense of education in the humanities for at least the last twenty years; yet the nature of our democracy, including the consensual nature of politics and civil society, respect for the fundamental rights of individuals, the linkage between the rule of law and respect for basic human rights, and the role of the media, defines not only a military commander's actions but the values which are essential to his performance as a military professional.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the difficulty in providing security against terrorism without jeopardizing American freedoms and democracy represent two contemporary cases in point. The World Trade Center bombing, the use of chemical weapons by terrorists on a Japanese subway, and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City illuminate how vulnerable the American people are and how easily a dissatisfied element of society can cause death and

destruction. Chemical and biological warfare can be conducted by small groups with limited funds. Greater security from these threats involves restrictions on American civil liberties.

Consider the uproar over possible initiatives to require American citizens to have identification cards or to provide government access (worldwide) to private bank records. These initiatives would make it easier to track criminals and money, making society more safe but less free. Both measures would be extremely unpopular and arguably undemocratic but perhaps necessary.

Similarly, technology has created new forms of liberty and equality for millions of Internet users; but it is also an equalizer for terrorists which may require a more vigilant government. One need only look at Israel or Northern Ireland to see that when the threat of terrorism strikes at home personal freedoms and rights are often sacrificed for security. The recent anti-terrorism bill is only the beginning of that debate, and understanding the constitutional implications of new uses for the military requires more than a lawyer's interpretation of constitutional law.³²

A civil-military affairs block of instruction must look at the theory and history of the Constitution. What does it mean to "support and defend the Constitution"? The Constitution defines and limits the appropriate use and action of the military, and in giving shape to the military institution it is the bedrock of our national security strategy.³³ Constitutional principles cannot

be left to the lawyers to interpret or on the bookshelf to collect dust; they must be incorporated into the living ethic of the military profession.

A block of instruction must also address the relationship between the media and the military and the media's constitutional role in a free and democratic society. The "primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was...to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official branches."³⁴ Tension will always exist between the military and the media; yet the lack of understanding and appreciation of the media's purpose, while improving, remains disturbing.

Certainly the media is far from perfect, but the tendency to blame the media for a problem is like blaming the referee when the team loses, a scapegoating practice that should be rejected. The persistence of the myth, still shared and perpetuated by many in the military, that Vietnam was lost by the media is a case in point. Time is a great deadener. It took years to get past the practice of scapegoating in order to openly discuss the mistakes made by politicians and senior military officers in that war. Taking that much time to apply lessons learned and to understand errors in a conflict is a luxury the military will not be able to afford in the future.

In the information age, the senior military officer would be wise to consider how a head football coach deals with the media. The transparency of the stadium on Sunday creates thousands of

opinions and little need or use for spin masters. A college football coach has a maximum of 48 hours before he personally must explain to the press and the fans why his team won or why it lost. Tension exists between coach and press, but avoidance or sending a public affairs officer is not an option for the coach. On the battlefield of the future the television cameras will miss few great plays or costly mistakes. In the end the public and the media will debate the outcome and the decisions made. They will judge the coach by his competence and his integrity, standards that all military officers should also want to be judged by. Only the stakes--in lives and the fate of nations--are vastly different.

Finally, with a basic understanding of American political thought and democratic principles and the constitutional role of a free and independent media, this block of instruction under civil-military relations must focus on military influence in society, both economic and political, and determine what civilian control means. What is the military's relationship with Congress? Can the military officer serving as a congressional fellow work on partisan issues? The conditions that maintain civilian control, as well as the forces that erode it, must be examined.³⁵

Are these blocks of instruction needed? Critics could argue that military officers understand the parameters of military influence and the proper role of the military in American democratic society as well as the importance of applying

ethics to the decision making process. The research in this paper suggests otherwise, as do too many embarrassing lessons from the recent past.

Conclusion

A senior officer's career will span numerous presidential administrations. Force structure issues, national priorities and policies, and elected officials will come and go. Threats will change, nations will emerge and disappear, and new technologies will alter society and warfare. The only thing certain is there will be change; but one constant in the process for America has to be the military officer's commitment to defend his or her country and support the Constitution. The military officer must balance the capacity to win the nation's wars with an understanding and ethical grounding that insures that every action is legal, morally correct, and consistent with the Constitution. The destruction of warfare and the moral imperative cannot be separated for the military profession that defends and protects a free society. By understanding and applying this dual mandate the American military profession becomes "the foundation for the continuance of the nation."³⁶

We are entering a period of history in which values are making a fundamental but not unprecedented shift: a postmodern world that Vaclav Havel describes as one "where everything is possible and almost nothing is certain."³⁷ A professional military ethic grounded in proven institutional values and Constitutional values that have stood the test of time provides

the touchstone and certainty to set the course that insures security as well as liberty.

If our leaders' vision is right, the threat is real, and the interest vital, Americans will close ranks behind their leadership. Thomas Jefferson states:

I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves, and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.³⁸

There is a critical difference between information and propaganda, between the American public and the enemy. Professional military ethics grounded in constitutional values requires the military leadership to make the distinctions and reject information strategies which target the American public. A professional military ethic grounded in moral courage and integrity requires military leadership to defend the distinction as a part of the constitutional system the military is honor-bound to support and defend.

The proper civil-military relationship in the American democratic society, and the American political documents and debates that define that relationship, must be examined and understood by the nation's military officers. The resulting knowledge coupled with a strong professional military ethic tells the American people and the world not only who we are but more importantly, what we are for, providing the clarity and certainty to face the next millennium.

NOTES

1. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin, Speeches of the American Presidents (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1988), 595.
2. Cadet Honor Code and System, 1973 (West Point: United States Military Academy, 1973), 1.
3. Alexander Hamilton's quote was "To be more safe, they at length run the risk of being less free." See Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), No. 8, 45.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State--The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 16, 71. Interestingly in 1957 Huntington suggested that "changes in technology and international politics [had] combined to make security now the final goal of policy rather than its starting assumption." See Huntington, 3.
5. "William E. Colby," Washington Post, 7 May 1996, 18.
6. Professor Russett was critiquing John Mearsheimer's classic realist argument that states must "inevitably fight one another in the unceasing anarchic struggle for power and security." That theory obviously requires a robust force structure. See Bruce Russett's letter to the editor, Atlantic Monthly, November 1990, 8.
7. Huntington, 71. For a different perspective see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960), 233-234. He states that "in analyzing the beliefs of the professional soldier, there is no advantage in assuming that they could or should be unpolitical."
8. Huntington, 352. This is commonly referred to as the fusionist theory. See Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," in Components of Defense Policy, ed. Davis B. Bobrow (Chicago: Rand, McNally and Co., 1965), 113, 124, 128; Paul Hammond, Organizing for Defense--The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 346-347. Also see Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control--The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest (Spring 1994): 3-17 and the exchange of letters that article provoked in The National Interest (Summer 1994): 23-31.
9. For recommendations and Cheney and Weinberger principles of information, see Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America's Team--The Odd Couple (Nashville, Tenn.: Freedom Forum First

Amendment Center, 1995), 54, 53-55; Jacqueline E. Sharkey, Under Fire--U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media From Grenada to the Persian Gulf (Washington: Center for Public Integrity, 1991), Appendix A.

10. Richard H. Kohn, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest (Summer 1994): 30. This is not a new debate. In 1962 the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on the "Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies." Many of the same arguments concerning effective civilian control of the military were raised then. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee On Government Operations, Subcommittee On National Security Staffing And Operations, Administration Of National Security--Selected Papers, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, Committee Print, 137-180.

11. William J. Perry, "Employing Forces Short of War," Defense 95 (Issue 3, 1995): 5.

12. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (New York: Time Warner, 1993), 195. They suggest putting the right spin on war news can be as devastating as enemy tanks, but "nobody loves a 'spin doctor' who wears khaki."

13. American Forces Information Service, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington: 1988), 66.

14. Ervin J. Rokke, "Military Education for the New Age," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1995): 19.

15. Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 3 (No. 1).

16. James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People--Public Opinion And Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), 16, 17.

17. Peter Barnes, Pawns: The Plight of the Citizen-Soldier (New York: Warner, 1971), 239.

18. MacGregor Knox, "Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy," in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, eds. Williamson Murray, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 643.

19. MacGregor Knox, 643.

20. The current administration's approval of disclosure of intelligence budget figures, open debate and vigorous opposition to journalists being used as spies, and disclosure by the CIA of the implications of using tainted information from double agents to justify buying expensive weapon systems are all examples of a

far more transparent society. See Walter Pincus, "Clinton Approves Disclosure Of Intelligence Budget Figure," Washington Post, 24 April 1996, 19; "No Press Cards for Spies," New York Times, 18 March 1996, A-14; Walter Pincus and R. Jeffrey Smith, "CIA Defends Rule on Use Of Reporters," New York Times, 23 February 1996, 17; Richard Klein, "Thanks, Maxwell Smart," New York Times, 5 September, 1995, E-15; Tim Weiner, "C.I.A. Admits Failing to Sift Tainted Data," New York Times, 1 November 1995, A-1; Alvin A. Snyder, "The Cold War Traffic In Phony Information," Washington Post, 27 December 1995, 19.

21. Sissela Bok, Lying--Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xviii.

22. Ibid., 141.

23. Roderick R. Magee, II, "Building Strategic Leadership for the 21st Century," Military Review (February 1993): 39.

24. Frank Aukofer and Retired Vice Admiral William Lawrence make a similar recommendation in reference to military-media relations in the information age: "The Pentagon should engage in ongoing deliberations with news organizations and other appropriate institutions and agencies concerning the impact of emerging communications technologies on wartime news reporting." See Aukofer and Lawrence, 54.

25. Rokke, 22.

26. James Rachels, The Elements Of Moral Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 172, 179.

27. Bok, 242.

28. Bok, 180; also see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 356; David Wise, The Politics of Lying (New York: Random House, 1973).

29. James B. Stockdale, "Taking Stock," Naval War College Review (Fall 1978): 1, 2.

30. This requirement is not just for the military profession, but for all professions. For example see Stephen Klaidman and Tom L. Beauchamp, The Virtuous Journalist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Rachels, 159-179.

31. Robert Timberg, The Nightingale's Song (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 445.

32. Robert Kuttner, "Little Brother Is Watching," Washington Post National Weekly, 22-28 April 1996, 5; Anthony Lewis, "Stand Up For Liberty," New York Times, 15 April 1996, A-15; David Cole,

"Terrorizing The Constitution," Nation, 25 March 1996, 12.

33. See Barry McCaffrey, "Human Rights and the Commander," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1995): 10-13. General McCaffrey links human rights and democracy with the commander's responsibilities, particularly in MOOTW scenarios. He buttresses his argument with President Clinton's views on human rights before the U.N. General Assembly in September 1993: "Democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest. It rewards tolerance, not hatred. Democracies rarely wage war on one another. They make reliable partners in trade, in diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment. And democracies, with the rule of law and respect for political, religious, and cultural minorities, are more responsive to their own people and to the protection of human rights."

34. Quote is Justice Stewart's cited in Donald M. Gillmor and Jerome A. Barron, Mass Communication Law Cases & Comment, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1984), 7.

35. Kohn, "An Exchange on Civil Military Relations," 30.

36. The Armed Forces Officer (Washington: American Forces Information Service, 1988), 66, 67.

37. Vaclav Havel made this statement when he received the Philadelphia Liberty Medal on July 4, 1994. He suggests that the fundamental shift in values is not unprecedented and that the distinguishing features of the transitional period we are going through is the "mixing and blending of cultures...." See Vaclav Havel, "A Time for Transcendence," Utne Reader, January-February 1995, 53.

38. Lawrence K. Grossman, The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age (New York: Viking, 1995), 7.

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