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
**RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:
Two Views**

Peggy Falkenheim Meyer
Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko


Edited by
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U.S. Army War College



STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE



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Since the end of the Cold War and, in particular, the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the tendency in the West was to overlook the new Russia's place in Asia. The authors discuss a wide range of Russian defense and security policies from civil-military relations to defense economics, and regional policies: Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Region, particularly Western and Russian views on Russian policy in East Asia and its challenges.

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TWO VIEWS**

**Peggy Falkenheim Meyer
Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko**

**Edited by
Stephen J. Blank**

May 27, 1996

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FOREWORD

In May 1995, the British Ministry of Defence, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the RAND Corporation, the Institute for National Security Studies of the U.S. Air Force Academy, and King's College, London, hosted a conference at King's College on "Russian Defense and Security Policy."

The participants at the conference discussed a wide range of Russian defense and security policies from civil-military relations to defense economics, and regional policies: Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Region. The two papers offered here, written by Dr. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer and Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko, reflect Western and Russian views on Russian policy in East Asia and its challenges. In this form, as throughout the conference, the intent was to juxtapose Western and Russian views on topical issues.

SSI welcomes reader comments on these papers and is pleased to offer them to our audience in the spirit of continuing this dialogue.



RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
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INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

Since the conquest of Siberia, Russia has been an Asian and Pacific power. The end of the Cold War transformed this entire region's security structure, a transformation that accelerated when the Soviet Union fell apart and was replaced by Russia. Russia faces new security challenges in this most dynamic of regions, which still holds substantial possibilities of military conflict. But there has been a tendency in the West to overlook the new Russia's place in Asia.

Among the objectives of the London conference was the intention to remedy this gap in our perceptions and bring to our audience an understanding by both Russian and Western scholars of the threats and challenges Russia faces here and its efforts to deal with those challenges. Thus, these papers focus on Russia's relations with key Asian states and with its efforts to obtain a military detente with the United States and reduce the dangers and threats of nuclear war with the United States. These papers should help to improve our understanding of how Russian elites view Asia and the challenges Russia faces, while at the same time Russians learn how Western analysts view their policy. This enhanced mutual understanding should contribute to the debate and discussion that began in London and facilitate mutual understanding among Russian, Asian, European, and American observers and audiences.

FROM COLD WAR TO COLD PEACE?: U.S.-RUSSIAN SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

Peggy Falkenheim Meyer

Introduction.

Immediately after the Cold War, observers anticipated that a new partnership, or even quasi-alliance, would replace the conflictual relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, growing nationalism and anti-Western sentiments in Russia and increasing U.S. distrust of Russian motives and intentions have dashed these hopes. The past few years have seen growing differences between Moscow and Washington over many issues: the former Yugoslavia, NATO expansion, and arms sales to Iran and other countries.

These growing conflicts have led observers in Russia and the United States to predict the emergence of a more confrontational relationship, one which some have dubbed a cold peace. This paper will assess the growing differences between Russia and the West in the Far East and their implications for U.S. policy. It will argue that U.S.-Russian relations in East Asia have become more contentious than was anticipated during the brief post-Cold War honeymoon. However, Moscow and Washington still have a number of common interests in East Asia that are worth pursuing.

The Sea of Okhotsk.

In the Far East, the atmosphere between Russia and the United States has vastly improved since the end of the Cold War but there still are remnants of the previous competition. Russia's new military doctrine adopted in November 1993 does not name any specific external threat.

But the Russian military continues to express concern about the potential threat that U.S. and Japanese forces in the Northwest Pacific pose to their ports, airfields, Navy, and other regional military assets whose relative importance have increased now that Russia has lost facilities in other former Soviet republics.

The Russian military is particularly concerned about protecting its strategic nuclear submarine bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk. The importance of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against conventional as well as nuclear attack was reaffirmed in Russia's new military doctrine which also modifies Moscow's previous no first-use pledge. If the START-II treaty is ratified and implemented, the changes it mandates will further increase the importance of Russia's submarine-based nuclear weapons by forcing Moscow to deploy a larger proportion of its much reduced strategic nuclear arsenal at sea.

Early in the next century, Russia may be forced to close down its Sea of Okhotsk SSBN bastion and to base all of its remaining strategic nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea. Geoffrey Jukes has speculated that the substantial reductions in Russia's strategic submarine fleet required by START-II, the growing obsolescence of Russian submarines based in the Northwest Pacific, the high cost of maintaining facilities there, and the closing down of regional repair and maintenance facilities may persuade Russian military officials that it no longer makes sense to keep two SSBN bastions.¹ At the moment, Russian military officials are determined to resist these pressures and to keep two SSBN bastions. However, financial stringency may force them to change their mind. Unless and until this happens, the U.S. and Japanese military deployments in this region will be perceived as a threat by the Russian military because their SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk have become more vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) attacks. And conversely, the United States and Japan may perceive the deployment by the Russian military of forces designed to protect their strategic nuclear submarines as a threat.²

The Northern Territories.

The continuing importance of the Sea of Okhotsk SSBN bastion complicates Russia's relations with Japan. During the brief post-Cold War honeymoon, it was anticipated that Russia and Japan would make progress toward resolving their territorial dispute. However, this did not occur. Instead, President Boris Yeltsin postponed his planned September 1992 trip to Tokyo after meeting strong opposition to any territorial concession from the military and a broad spectrum of Russian politicians and society. At parliamentary hearings in the summer of 1992, the Russian military stressed the strategic significance of the disputed Northern Territories, (the Japanese term for the Kurile Islands) which border the Sea of Okhotsk, as the main reason for their opposition to any territorial concession.³

The military's underlying motivation most likely was to use the territorial issue as support for the struggle which then was taking place against Foreign Minister Kozyrev's pro-Western foreign policy. In mid-1992, policy toward Japan had become one of the main arenas of this struggle. Cancellation of Yeltsin's visit was one of the first triumphs of opponents of the pro-Western line.

The failure to make progress toward resolving the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan has caused problems in their relations as have Russian coast guard attacks on Japanese fishermen operating near the disputed islands and the Russian navy's dumping of radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan. Efforts are now being made to find solutions to these and other problems. Russia and Japan are conducting negotiations on a safe fishing operations agreement. Japan is helping Russia construct nuclear waste reprocessing facilities. But nationalist passions still impede the resolution of the territorial dispute and are likely to do so for quite a long time.

Sino-Russian Relations.

If Russia's relations with Japan have been more strained than was anticipated during the brief post-Cold War

honeymoon, Moscow's relations with Beijing have been much better. The downfall of communism in the USSR and the coming to power of a new reformist leadership in Moscow had created strains in Sino-Russian relations. Chinese leaders had prior knowledge of and tacitly supported the August 1991 coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev. They were dismayed by the downfall of socialism in East Europe and the USSR which had negative implications for their own legitimacy. They were concerned when Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and other Russian leaders talked about the possibility of Russia's joining NATO. They were not amused when then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev came to Beijing in early 1992 and lectured them on human rights.⁴

Despite these strains, the trend toward normalization, begun under Gorbachev, has continued, moving to what Yeltsin and other leaders now call a "constructive partnership." This trend was encouraged by the reorientation of Russian foreign policy in mid-1992 away from Kozyrev's initial pro-Western emphasis to a new stress on improving relations with other former Soviet republics, Islamic countries and Asian countries, in particular, China. Chinese leaders, viewing the political chaos and economic crisis in Russia, have become far less concerned that Russia poses a threat to their own legitimacy. Yeltsin now is attracted by the Chinese model which combines economic reform and rapid economic growth with an authoritarian political system. Russian leaders, like Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, undoubtedly feel comfortable with Chinese leaders with similar training and apparatchik backgrounds. The growing anti-Western mood in Moscow is more in tune with Chinese views of the United States. Chinese and Russian leaders have a shared concern with Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia which they fear could affect their own Muslim populations.

In the security realm, Russia and China have taken steps to reduce prospects for conflict and to reassure each other about their peaceful intentions. Agreements delineating the Sino-Russian border have been signed. The

Joint Declaration on the Principles of Relations Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed in 1992 commits Russia and China not to join any political-military alliance directed against the other side, not to allow third parties to use their territory to the detriment of the other side's security, and not to use force or the threat of force against each other. On several occasions, Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and other high Russian officials have promised that Russia would honor a no-first-use pledge in its relations with China. In a symbolic gesture, Yeltsin and President Jiang Zemin signed a joint communique, during the latter's September 1994 visit to Moscow, in which they pledged that Russia and China no longer would target nuclear missiles against each other.

The opening of Russia's border with China to greatly expanded trade and tourism has helped to create an atmosphere of greater trust. During the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute, normal interaction between the Chinese and Russians living near the border was artificially cut off. New economic, transportation, and other links are proliferating. Overall, this opening of the border has had a positive impact on Sino-Russian relations although it also has created some resentment, particularly among Russians living in border regions not benefiting from the growing economic ties.⁵

China is negotiating an agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for the reduction of forces and the restructuring of those forces along their mutual border. In a memorandum signed during Yeltsin's December 1992 visit to Beijing, it was stipulated that this agreement should provide for the gradual reduction of forces along the border so that by the year 2000 they would be at the minimum level consonant with good-neighborly and friendly relations. In addition, the agreement should require the defensive restructuring of border zone forces, the removal of the most destabilizing weapons systems from the border zone and the reduction of military activity near the border. Russia and China have agreed that the zone would extend to 100 kilometers on each side of the border.

China originally had wanted to establish a zone extending 300 kilometers on either side of the border, but Russia refused because it would have meant withdrawing its troops to the Siberian taiga which lacks infrastructure and power supplies. Russia has proposed to China that the treaty cover not just the forces within a narrow border zone but the entire territory of the Russian and Chinese border regions, similar to the provisions of the agreement regulating conventional forces in Europe.⁶ Contacts and exchanges between the Russian and Chinese militaries have expanded rapidly, and there has been a marked improvement in their relations.⁷

In November 1993, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian signed a 5-year agreement providing for regular consultations between top Defense Ministry officials, the establishment of direct ties between adjoining Russian and Chinese military districts, military exchanges between the two countries' armed forces at all levels, and an increase in the number of military attaches posted in each other's capital. The Russian and Chinese defense ministers agreed to inform each other of plans for military maneuvers in border districts and to exchange information on military doctrine and military construction.⁸

Contacts between the Russian and Chinese militaries have been expanding, and there has been an exchange of naval vessels. Three Russian naval vessels called at Qingdao in August 1993. The following May three Chinese vessels visited Vladivostok. In April 1994, the Chief of Russia's General Staff, General Mikhail Kolesnikov revealed, during a visit to Beijing, that Russia and China were discussing plans to send Russian military specialists to China to train the Chinese in the proper use of Russian arms and to bring Chinese officers to Russia for training in military schools up to the level of the General Staff Academy.⁹ In July, the Russian and Chinese Defense Ministers signed an agreement to prevent inadvertent or dangerous military confrontation between their forces.¹⁰ In November 1994, Admiral Feliks Gromov, commander of the Russian Navy, visited China and agreed to expand training

and technology exchanges between the Russian and Chinese navies. It was reported during his visit that China had accepted Russia's offer to train officers and crews of Chinese naval vessels.¹¹

Russia has expanded its arms sales and military technology transfer to China. There are strong motivations for this on both sides. Beijing hopes to attain from Russia military equipment at bargain basement prices and technology the West is unwilling to provide. Russia is interested in earning hard currency and keeping its defense industrial enterprises from going bankrupt. In 1992-93, Russia sold China weapons worth \$3-5 billion including 26 Sukhoi-27 (SU-27) supersonic fighter bombers, 24 MiG-31 high altitude interceptors, heavy military transport planes, T-72 tanks and other military vehicles. China and Russia are discussing the possibility of Chinese production of additional Su-27s under license.¹² China has bought 4 S-300 anti-aircraft missile complexes for testing and is considering the purchase of 100 to 150 more launchers, each to be equipped with approximately 8 missiles.¹³ In November 1994, China signed a U.S.\$1 billion contract to purchase four Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia.¹⁴ Subsequently, China agreed to buy 6 additional Kilo-class submarines and completed preliminary discussions with Moscow about the purchase of 12 more over the next 5 years.¹⁵

Despite a number of reports over the past few years that China is negotiating to buy an aircraft carrier from Ukraine, this sale has not been consummated. Various explanations have been offered as to why this sale has not gone through, including U.S. pressure, China's inability to pay for the carrier and Russia's refusal to supply the electronics for the partially completed carrier and/or to pay for its completion.¹⁶ Although there were allegations in the Japanese press that two Kiev-class aircraft carriers from Russia's Pacific Fleet, the Minsk and the Novorossisk, sold to a South Korean company for scrap might end up in China instead, this does not seem to be happening.¹⁷ The weapons, navigation equipment and communications equipment

were removed from the carriers before they were turned over to the South Korean company, and Russian representatives are monitoring implementation of the contract which provides for the carriers to be cut up into strips no more than two meters wide.¹⁸

Besides these arms sales, there also is a significant military technology transfer between Russia and China. China has sent between 300 and 400 of its defense specialists to work in Russia's aerospace research and development institutes. More than one thousand Russian defense industry scientists and technicians have gone to China since 1991 for shorter or longer periods to consult with and work in China's defense industry.¹⁹ The Chinese are particularly interested in acquiring aerospace, rocketry, air defense and antisubmarine warfare technology.²⁰ U.S. intelligence agencies are concerned that Russia and perhaps Ukraine are transferring technology to China from the advanced SS-25 mobile missiles and from multiple and independently targetable warheads.²¹

Russian officials have promised to control this flow of Russian military specialists to China so as not harm their own security and the security of other countries, but it is not clear that they are able to do so. A Western diplomat, posted in Beijing, noted that he and others often run into Russian defense industry specialists on the street whose presence is not known to the Russian embassy.²² An October 1993 article by Andrei Kabannikov in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* cited a Russian military expert in Beijing who acknowledged that there was no effective state control over military specialists who can cross the border easily. He mentioned that two Russian laser weapons' specialists and one missile specialist were recognized on the streets of Beijing quite by chance.²³

Russia's arms sales to China have become an irritant in Russia's relations with the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and other countries who fear that they may upset the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, a strategic region where there are a number of territorial disputes involving China. India and Vietnam also

are uneasy about Russian arms sales to China and about the improvement in Sino-Russian relations which allows China to direct more of its forces to the south and southwest.

Overall, Sino-Russian relations have improved so much that some Western analysts have even expressed concern about the reemergence of an anti-Western alliance or quasi-alliance between Moscow and Beijing. Writing in the March 1993 issue of *Asian Survey*, Hung P. Nguyen, for example, talks about the possibility of a "strategic rapprochement" between China and Russia which he describes as the modern Eastern version of the 1920's Rapallo treaty between Germany and Russia, "two continental powers united by their real or imagined grievances against the West." Nguyen argues that geopolitical reversals in Europe may persuade Russian nationalists that Russia is being shut out of that continent and increase the likelihood that they will seek "geopolitical compensation" in the East.²⁴

The Korean Peninsula.

There also are some differences between Russian and U.S. attitudes toward Korea although here they share a number of common objectives. These include stopping North Korea's nuclear program, ensuring a "soft landing" for the increasingly troubled North Korean economy, and facilitating a peaceful resolution of North-South differences. It is not hard to fathom why Russians are concerned about stability on the Korean peninsula. Russia has a border with North Korea not far from its main naval base at Vladivostok. Russia would be directly affected by an economic collapse in North Korea which produced a flood of refugees or outburst of violence on the peninsula with conflict or nuclear radiation spilling over the border. In order to reduce the danger that Russia would become involved in a Korean conflict, Moscow has reinterpreted its 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Pyongyang. Russia has made it clear that it will not come to Pyongyang's assistance if it commits an act of aggression or a "provocative" act that invites aggression. And, in

September 1995, Russia proposed a new treaty to North Korea that eliminates any reference to Russian military support if it is attacked or the "victim of aggression," as in the 1961 treaty.

Although Russia and the United States have a number of common objectives in Korea, they have at times disagreed about the best means to achieve these objectives. In 1994 Moscow favored negotiations over sanctions as a way to curtail North Korea's reported nuclear program. Russian assessments of the state of North Korea's nuclear program have tended to be less alarmist than American assessments.

As is true in the Yugoslav case, Russia has reacted negatively to any sign that it is being excluded from international efforts to deal with Korean problems. Although Yeltsin's Russia no longer has any pretense to be a superpower, it does consider itself a great power. As affirmation of its regional great power status, it wants to be included in multilateral discussions of regional problems, particularly those like Korea or the former Yugoslavia in which it has a clear interest. Whenever Russia has felt that it is in danger of being excluded, it has taken steps to try to make sure it is not ignored. One example of this in the Korean case is Russia's repeated calls for an 8-party conference, including itself, to discuss Korean problems. In November 1994, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr' N. Panov reiterated the importance of this proposal which, he said, had not been superseded by the recent U.S.-North Korean nuclear agreement because the 8-party conference is intended to deal with issues broader than the nuclear dispute.²⁵ More recently, Russia has tried to play a greater role on the Korean peninsula and to earn hard currency by offering to supply light water reactors to North Korea in fulfillment of the U.S.-North Korean agreement. Although Russia's efforts were reportedly supported by Pyongyang which does not want the humiliation of having to accept South Korean reactors, they have been adamantly rejected by Washington and Seoul. And in the end Washington prevailed and North Korea had to accept the South's reactors. The Russian Foreign

Ministry reacted to this rejection by threatening to refuse a U.S. invitation to join the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which is arranging for the supply of these reactors, on the grounds that it does not want to play a secondary role.²⁶ But in the end Russia found it had no alternative but to participate in the KEDO.

Common Concerns.

There is a danger that the United States may overreact to these growing differences with Russia in the Far East. This danger is particularly acute now because the increasingly anti-Western tone of Russia's foreign policy, the growing differences between Russia and the United States over NATO expansion, arms sales to Iran, and Russia's invasion and bloody subjugation of Chechnya have created a sharply negative reaction in the United States and other countries. There is a danger that problems between Moscow and Washington in other regions will spill over into East Asia and aggravate U.S.-Russian relations. It is impossible to fully insulate U.S.-Russian relations in East Asia from what happens elsewhere. But the United States should try. Outrage over Russian behavior in other regions should not induce Washington to ignore or downplay the fact that Russia and the United States have a number of shared interests and concerns in the Far East.

One common interest is in managing their strategic competition around the Sea of Okhotsk in a way that avoids accidents or destabilizing change. It is doubtful that the U.S. Navy would agree to Moscow's proposals for limits on anti-submarine warfare activity. But it may be possible to negotiate an agreement to prevent accidents between SSBNs and submarines tracking them. An accord of this kind regulating underwater activity could supplement the incidents-at-sea agreement which regulates the activities of surface vessels.

Russia and the United States also have a shared interest in denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and in

maintaining stability there. Any analysis of Russian policy that criticizes a perceived growing pro-North Korea bias in Russian policy ignores or discounts the fact that Russia recently has been trying to improve its relations with Pyongyang in order to reestablish some balance in its relations with the two Koreas which have tilted very far in a pro-South Korean direction. Moscow is doing this in order to regain some influence on the Korean peninsula and thereby reverse the precipitous decline in its influence which has occurred since the late Gorbachev period.

Without a doubt, some Russian extreme nationalists would like to go farther than this and reestablish close relations with Pyongyang. However, even if these "patriots" came to power, they would find it difficult to do this. Russia's past relationship with North Korea was heavily subsidized through the sale of weapons and energy at below world market prices, in both cases for credits which often were never repaid. Russia today would find it difficult, if not impossible, to take on this kind of economic burden. Moreover, it is not clear that Pyongyang would want to return to its past close relations with Moscow since North Korea has much to gain from improving its relations with the economically better off and technologically more advanced Western and East Asian countries.

Another common concern relates to Japan. Neither Russia nor the United States would like to see Japan reemerge as a major military power. U.S. and Japanese military forces around the Sea of Okhotsk may be portrayed by Russian military officials as a threat, but many influential Russians now support the U.S.-Japan security alliance as a constraint on Japan. In November 1994, Sergei Blagovolin reminded the participants at a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Council that Japan was capable of developing a nuclear weapon in a short time. He said that Russians should welcome Japan's ties with the United States because without them "the situation could take a drastic turn for the worse."²⁷

Analysts who fear the reemergence of an alliance or quasi-alliance between China and Russia ignore the

underlying tensions in their relations. Many Russians share with the West a concern about China's future stability and ambitions. If China falls apart, it could have negative repercussions on Russia, a neighbor, and on the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, a sphere of vital Russian interests. If China stays together and prospers and turns to a more aggressive, expansionist foreign policy, Russian interests could suffer.

Concern about China is not limited to one end of the Russian political spectrum. A number of Russian conservatives as well as moderates oppose moving too close to China. They do not want to see Russia become too dependent on any one foreign power. They fear that this kind of dependence would limit Russia's flexibility in a multipolar world. Such dependence would be of particular concern now because, unlike the 1950s, Russia would be the junior partner in the relationship and China the senior partner.

So it would be wrong to assume that the coming to power of a more conservative or extreme nationalist leadership in Moscow would necessarily lead to an alliance or quasi-alliance between Russia and China. It also is not clear that China would want that. Beijing was forced, in part, by the negative Western reaction to Tiananmen into closer relations with Moscow. Now that relations between China and the West are apparently improving, the Chinese most likely would prefer to establish greater equidistance in their relations with Russia and the West.

In the past, mutual distrust of Japan was one of the main incentives for the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s. More recently, China and Russia have shared a growing disillusionment with the United States. But neither the United States nor Japan today presents a credible external threat to Russia or China. In the absence of a mutual threat, there is little basis for long-term strategic cooperation between Russia and China. This situation is likely to persist unless Japan or another country emerges as a credible external threat.

The real danger in the eyes of some Russians is not that Russia will reestablish an alliance or quasi-alliance with China but that it will push China away. The China issue now is being driven by Russian domestic politics in the way that the Japan issue has been since the late Gorbachev period. Politicians at both the national and local levels are trying to build up their own popular support by playing on people's fears of the growing number of Chinese in Russia and what they depict as the negative results of the border demarcation process. Not surprisingly, some of the most extreme statements have been made by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. During a tour of Siberia in August 1994, Zhirinovskiy told audiences in Irkutsk and Khabarovsk that they should worry about the two million Chinese in the Far East [meaning the Russian Far East; this number is a gross exaggeration] and about the 100 million over the border in China. "What will happen," he warned, "if even 20 million Chinese come to visit their brothers in Russia."²⁸ Since the beginning of 1994, Russia has tightened up on visa requirements for Chinese citizens, a change that has contributed to a drop in Sino Russian border trade. In early 1995, Russia expelled more than 1,000 Chinese citizens from the Russian Far East for carrying counterfeit passports or expired visas.²⁹

Relations between Russia and China have been strained by local politicians in the Far East who have called for the renunciation of the 1991 border agreement. Yevgeny Nazdratenko, governor of Primorsky Krai (Russia's Maritime Province), claims that Russian interests have not been protected during the border demarcation process implementing the treaty. Officials in Chita Oblast, which borders China, also are concerned about the treaty and may not support its implementation. When Kozyrev visited China in March 1995, he tried to reassure his Chinese hosts by promising them that Russia would uphold the border treaty.

Some Russian officials have sharply criticized these attempts to undermine the border demarcation process. One of these critics is Vladimir Lukin, former Russian

ambassador to Washington, now Chair of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee. Lukin previously was a harsh critic of Kozyrev's pro-Western policy which he felt undermined Russia's national interests. Lukin now warns that Russia is in danger of switching from a masochistic foreign policy to a boorish policy which threatens to alienate China and the West at the same time. He argues that it would be very foolish for Russia to take actions which run the risk of creating a new anti-Russian coalition. Lukin calls for maintaining a balance in Russia's relations with China and the West, arguing that the "level of our relations with the PRC in the field of security must not be inferior to our corresponding relations with the West but must not appreciably exceed them either."³⁰

Russians also share with the West a concern about stemming proliferation. At present, Russia's desperate need for hard currency sometimes overrides reservations that Russians may have about the wisdom of selling arms to China and other countries. Russia's weak state institutions, porous borders and the strong influence of criminal organizations make it difficult to control proliferation. This situation could change for the better if Russia's economy recovers and if state institutions become strong enough to control criminal activity and Russia's borders. A stronger economy would reduce the incentive for Russian military specialists to sell their expertise to foreign countries. On the other hand, if Russia's economy fails to recover and if an extreme nationalist regime comes to power in Moscow, the danger of proliferation emanating from Russia could become much worse.

Another area of common concern is threats to the environment and other unconventional threats. These include the management of fish stock and other natural resources and combatting crime, poaching and piracy. These concerns have become increasingly important to Russians because of their effect on their standard of living and quality of life which have suffered a precipitous decline.

Multilateral Dialogue.

These common interests and shared concerns in the Far East provide an ample basis for continuing East-West cooperation. Recently, a number of formal and informal processes have been put in place to dampen conflict and to facilitate cooperation. These include, for example, an expansion of military exchanges and confidence-building measures between the United States and Russia, Japan and Russia, Russia and the Republic of Korea, and Russia and China; the initiation of an unofficial trilateral security dialogue among Washington, Tokyo and Moscow; the convening of U.N.-sponsored, multilateral conferences to discuss environmental management in East Asia; and, the initiation of multilateral talks to manage fisheries resources in the Sea of Okhotsk.³¹ These processes should be expanded and encouraged.

When the time is ripe, consideration should be given to establishing a multilateral framework for security dialogue in Northeast Asia to supplement the much larger Asian Regional Forum (ARF) initiated by ASEAN. The creation of a Northeast Asian forum would regularize and institutionalize dialogue at a time when relations among most Northeast Asian countries are improving. If relations deteriorate once again, it would be useful to have in place a structure that brings representatives of various countries together on a regular basis, giving them an opportunity to hold informal "corridor" discussions outside the limelight of official publicity.

Not too long ago, only minimal ties existed between some countries in Northeast Asia. Now the situation is improving but it is not clear whether this change will last. Russia is not the only country in the region experiencing political instability and leadership struggle which could bring about a significant reorientation of its domestic and foreign policy. It would make sense to institutionalize and regularize new habits of dialogue before new tensions arise.

It is important to include Russia in any such forum. Too often Russia is either ignored or deliberately excluded.

There seems to be some lingering concern that Russia might try to use an Asia-Pacific forum to undermine U.S. bilateral relationships with Japan and other countries in Asia.³² This may have been Moscow's intention in the early Gorbachev years. But it is not likely to be Russia's intention today. And even if it is, there is scant danger that Russia would be successful. If the U.S.-Japan security alliance ends up being undermined, it will be mostly for reasons confined to the bilateral relationship itself, not because of anything Russia says or does at a multilateral gathering.

The challenge today is to react intelligently to Russian weakness, not to try to contain Russian strength. Russia today is even less influential in East Asia than it was before. Previously, Russia was a unidimensional military power in East Asia with little political or economic influence. Now its military power has declined, but there has not been a commensurate increase in its economic and political strength. Moscow's influence in East Asia is undermined by the preoccupation of Russian leaders with urgent domestic problems and with crises in other regions where there are strong separatist movements and a large Russian diaspora.

Rather than worrying about Russia undermining U.S. relationships in Asia, we should be concerned with devising ways to treat a humiliated power so as not to cause future problems. Here the lessons of Weimar Germany versus post-World War II West Germany are instructive. West Germany was well treated and became a constructive member of the international community. Weimar Germany was not, with consequences we all know. The risks we take by accepting and integrating Russia into the multilateral security process in East Asia will be far less than the risk of isolating and humiliating her.

ENDNOTES

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RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY

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New Approaches to Russian Security.

Practically speaking, Russia is the successor to the former Soviet Union in the Far East and Northeast Asia. As such, it has also inherited M.S. Gorbachev's so called Vladivostok-Krasnoyarsk program of peace, security and cooperation, that derived from his speeches of 1986-88 in those cities. This program was connected with Gorbachev's philosophy of "new thinking" based on the freedom of choice, a new approach to international relations that was not based on ideological stereotypes, respect for the sovereign rights of peoples, and the balance of interests between states. Other key points of this program were an unconditional refusal of military-political confrontation with the United States and the belief that our countries are no longer rivals both in Europe and in Asia. These ideas formed the basis of new Soviet and then Russian strategy for the Asian-Pacific region.

These initiatives should not be considered as a set of concrete proposals but rather as a declaration of intention to Northeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific Region, and a strategic estimate of the ways to resolve regional problems. But already, in practice, these initiatives have given birth to many positive results. The USSR and then Russia have made an important contribution to stabilizing the situation in Northeast Asia, overall and regional disarmament, and confidence-building measures. Russia's and the Soviet Union's actions include:

- Normalizing relations with China;
- Establishing diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea;
- Eliminating short- and medium-range nuclear missiles;
- Refraining from increasing its nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region;
- Reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in the Asian part of Russia;
- Withdrawing troops from Mongolia; and,
- Negotiating on mutual reduction of troops and strengthening military confidence-building measures near the Russian-Chinese border.

The disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and creation of 15 independent states have greatly complicated Russia's post-Soviet position in the Asian-Pacific Region and in the world as a whole. Russia now finds itself in a difficult situation. Its geopolitical position has severely deteriorated. The country has been pushed back from the Baltic and Black Seas, coasts which it took centuries to reach and which were vital to its security. Russia faces not only general threats of a global character but many particular, i.e., local or regional, military threats. In some republics of the former Soviet Union nationalists describe Russia as their enemy. Territorial claims are being made along Russia's frontiers. There are many serious contradictions between former republics who are now independent states. Efforts are being made to isolate Russia still further. Numerous armed conflicts are raging or threatening to break out in the immediate proximity of Russian borders: in the Caucasus and Central Asia.¹

After the end of the Cold War, Asia-Pacific security matters are no longer considered in the context of the East-West confrontation. The region enjoys a relative

stability which, by the way, has become one of the sources for the rapid economic and social progress in Northeast and Southeast Asia. However, this stability can hardly be called solid because of such aggravating factors as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the issue of reunification of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, and the multilateral territorial dispute around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The South Kuriles issue that divides Russia from Japan, together with other bilateral territorial disputes, remain unresolved, and various controversies over fishery zones and maritime borders of "special economic zones" make the situation even more complicated.

Though leading countries have effected some reductions in armed forces, the arms race continues, primarily in regard to creating new weapons and modernizing existing ones. In the Asia-Pacific region military budgets are growing in all countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia, except the United States and Russia. The preservation of tremendous military power in key regions of the globe, including the Asia-Pacific region, is potentially dangerous for Russia. Russian Defence Minister, Marshal Pavel Grachev, has pointed out that 530 divisions, 42,000 tanks, and 12,000 combat aircraft are in the countries along Russia's borders.²

As is emphasized in the "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" adopted in 1993,

In preventing wars and armed conflicts, political-diplomatic, international legal, economic, and other nonmilitary means and collective actions of the world community with regard to the threat to peace, violations of peace, and acts of aggression are acquiring priority.³

The national security of Russia depends on domestic and international factors. Domestic factors include the resolution of economic, political and social problems in the course of the ongoing reforms in Russia. International factors include the condition of Russia's relations with the

rest of the world, especially with the neighboring countries and leading powers.

On the international scene, according to the “Basic Provisions”:

- The Russian Federation abides by the principles of peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity of the states, noninterference into their domestic affairs, inviolability of state borders and other universally accepted principles of international law;
- Does not see any state as its adversary;
- Would not use its armed forces or other troops against any state except for its individual or collective self-defense in case of armed attack against the Russian Federation, its citizens, territory, armed forces, other troops, or its allies;
- Contributes to the efforts of the world community and various bodies of collective security in prevention of wars and armed conflicts and in sustaining or restoring peace;
- Participates in the further development of international law, and in elaboration, adoption and implementation by all countries of a set of efficient measures for prevention of wars and armed conflicts.⁴

Threats to Russian Security and Northeast Asian Stability.

Russia’s complex security situation means that it now faces many threats to its security. The main challenges and threats to Russia are:

- *Internal social and political instability.* As long as neither the fate of reforms nor the nature of the governmental system are decided, and the political system and society at large are riven by crime and

corruption, as well as a general sense of lawlessness, an acute political instability persists.

- *Tendencies of separatism in some regions of Russia, including Siberia and Far East.* While the war in Chechnya is the most prominent example of the dangers contained in local aspirations to separatism, neither Chechnya nor the overall North Caucasus region is unique. There are serious signs of growing efforts by regional governments in Siberia, Asiatic Russia, and the Far Eastern Maritime Province (Primorskii Krai) to usurp central state prerogatives.⁵
- *Economic crises, [especially the] necessity of conversion of a major part of defense industry.* There is no doubt that not only do most citizens believe their conditions have deteriorated, the economy has not yet shown signs of positive growth. Furthermore, in the military sector, troops are going hungry, are underfunded, and are unable to train. Likewise, procurement of defense equipment and weapons has fallen and is still falling dramatically. All of Russia's military forces, except perhaps the strategic nuclear forces, are unable to get the weapons they need to stay abreast of current requirements. Moreover, Russia will not be able to maintain its existing nuclear weapons past 2003 and cannot afford the costs that are to be incurred in complying with existing arms control treaties. Consequently, the defense industry is failing and the armed forces are in danger of failing with it.
- *Aggressive nationalism.* Here again, Chechnya is only the most prominent example. But the continuing wars in Abkhazia, Tajikistan, and Nagorno-Karabakh that have yet to be resolved, underscore the threat to Russia because they all involve Russian forces in protracted, inconclusive, unpopular, and costly conflicts. If these wars spread, Russian analysts believe they could ignite a general anti-Russian nationalist uprising, especially among Muslims.

- *Establishing a new system of relations with former Soviet republics.* Although Russia has officially proclaimed a policy of integration in economics, politics, and defense as its goal with the intention of forming a new (not Soviet) union, its relationship with the former Soviet republics remains to varying degrees a contested one, depending on the republic in question. Ukraine is resisting virtually all forms of integration, and Azerbaidzhan is following suit. There are also many difficulties with Central Asian states. Furthermore, the borders between Russia and these states have not been formally delimited yet, and this too is a source of concern among them, especially Ukraine.
- *External isolation.* Russia feels this particularly in Europe and in Asia. It regards NATO expansion as the expansion of a hostile military alliance (in the first instance) up to its “heartlands” and borders and sees that as creating a dividing line in Europe from which it would then be excluded. In the world economy, Russia feels itself to be the object of a policy that would exclude it from international participation in the institutions of the global economy and leave it in a semi-colonial position as an exporter of raw materials to more developed states. And in the Far East it sees itself being excluded from major trends like the international supervision of North Korea’s nuclear program and from institutions like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
- *Reconstruction of the Russian armed forces, military reform.* As stated above, the armed forces are in a desperate economic condition, yet at the same time they have not really undergone the kind of reform that was talked about for years. Civilian control is not recognized and today there are at least five different armed forces (Ministry of Interior, Border Troops, Federal Security Service, Railroad Troops, and the regular Armed forces, not to mention special elite

formations for the Kremlin who are directly under presidential control, e.g., the Main Administration Organization (GUO)). Many of these formations do not answer to the Ministry of Defense. As long as there is no agreed upon concept for reform, such conditions will persist and diminish Russia's effective military power and means of self-defense.

These challenges to Russia's security are the real problems which have created the definite geostrategic destabilization connected with the region of Northeast Asia. In Northeast Asia these challenges to Russia's security assume a specific reflection in regard to many aspects of Russia's security agenda. The disintegration of the USSR and objective weakening of the Russian position in Northeast Asia can create a geopolitical vacuum there simply by taking a major player out of the game and marginalizing it as a factor in the region's politics. At worst, if this disintegration goes unchecked, it could lead to the actual breakup of the state into a condition of secession or where the center only enjoys a nominal authority over the autonomous Asian provinces. This could then lead to a scramble for influence or worse yet, territory, or to civil war/s where one or more sides have access to nuclear materials or weapons.

The reduction of Russia's presence in the region demands, as a compensating mechanism, a reconstructed system to ensure stability in Northeast Asia. This task or responsibility falls especially to the United States because it alone enjoys the power and influence in both economics and military power, as well as the relative confidence of the players to undertake this task. More specifically, this also means that it is up to Washington to take the initiative in launching a viable system of multilateral security structures for Northeast Asia and to undertake confidence and stability building measures (CSBMs) to lessen the threat of war, especially in regard to nuclear weapons.

Russia must now build new relations with the regional countries: China, Japan, North and South Korea. This means the development of objectives, policies, strategies,

and institutions for managing those relations with these states in drastically changed conditions and to a very large degree from a completely new starting point.

Similarly the development of economic reform in Russia will put the question of Russia's full-scale involvement in regional trade and economic processes on the regional agenda. Russia seeks international investment for itself on a large scale, and nondiscriminatory, open access to world markets for its goods and service. Russia also seeks equal participation in all of the international economic institutions that are shaping the emerging global and Asian international orders. Therefore any continuing effort to hinder Russian membership there will probably be seen as an unfriendly policy designed to isolate Russia.

By declaring the policy of openness and stimulation of foreign participation in the development of Siberia and Russian Far East, Russia has put on the agenda the question of creating joint economic zones including the Russian Far East, Northeast China and Korea (the U.N. Development Program for the Tiumen River region—a project that includes North and South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan). International investment is crucial to overcoming Russia's economic crisis and the threat of the further deterioration of socio-economic and political conditions in Asiatic Russia. And if those regions fail to surmount the current crisis then the threat of regionalism becomes acute.

Consequently, economic and political destabilization in Northeast Asia can arise as a result of an uncontrolled growth of regionalism and separatism in Siberia and Far East. This separatism could arise owing to a failure to overcome the current crisis, failure to attract foreign investment, a further breakdown of central authority, or any of these factors arising in tandem with contradictions emerging between the national interests of Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of the Independent States or of other Asian states in this region.⁶

Toward a New Order in Northeast Asia.

Therefore the following precepts appear to Russian analysts and policymakers as the principles by which a new order in Northeast Asia might be created:

- Normalizing the diplomatic relations in the region. This means establishing diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States and between North Korea and Japan;
- A transition from balance of power to balance of interests, i.e., a refusal to resolve the regional problems by force. Instead, purely political solutions that express the interests of all concerned parties should be pursued;
- Definitive resolution of conflicts and disputes in the region;
- Resolution of the territorial disputes and claims in accordance with international law and on the basis of mutual consideration of national interests;
- Stepping up trade and economic cooperation on the basis of openness: free movement of ideas and capital;
- Observance of human rights and freedoms in all areas of activities;
- Intensifying regional and interregional integration by the United Nations and other global and regional international organizations;
- Effective arms control and disarmament, including denuclearization and prohibition of other means of mass destruction;
- Respect for the freedom of social-political choice of all countries and ethnicities;

- Broad cultural and humanitarian cooperation, cooperation and co-development of different civilizations.

Fortunately, it seems the West is interested in keeping the Russian state united as an alternative to civil strife, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, civil wars and many fierce territorial disputes between many small states. Otherwise, destabilization of the global situation is possible as a result of an unreasonable approach to the crisis in Russia, other former Soviet republics and East European countries. This crisis could be overcome gradually by the development of democracy and a market economy as a part of the world economic system.

The analysis of Russia's involvement in the Northeast Asian security-building process reveals the three categories of military-political measures; those that are being taken unilaterally, bilateral activities, and those occurring within the framework of collective regional efforts.

Unilaterally, Russia has transformed its military doctrine to a defensive one, and is transforming the armed force structures proceeding from the criteria and dimensions of reasonable defense sufficiency at the lowest possible levels that provide equal security for all sides. Russia also continues to reduce the groupings of its armed forces in the Far East. As a result, today Russia has less troops in the area than South Korea.

At the bilateral level, Russia's military security-building efforts in Northeast Asia can be characterized by the effort to achieve regional security cooperation with the United States. Regional security cooperation between the United States and Russia is of great importance in such areas as creating the new order in Northeast Asia, conflict resolution, ensuring peace and stability, fulfillment of the START-I and START-II treaties, and the regulation of regional military activities. Russian-American cooperation could become the core regional multilateral cooperation for resolving regional security problems, arms control, and developing multi-dimensional confidence-building

measures, not to mention problems of economy, ecology, etc. The level of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, and visits between the United States and Russia makes it possible to move to such large-scale steps leading to reduction of armed forces and their activities and to enacting the confidence-building measures in the Northwest Pacific.

Similarly, Russian-Chinese negotiations focus mainly on the reduction of armed forces across the common border. On July 12, 1994, the Russian and Chinese Ministers of Defense signed the Russo-Chinese Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. The document is to provide a reliable mechanism for prevention and peaceful settlement of possible incidents between the two armies. On September 3, 1994, when PRC Chairman Jiang Zemin was visiting Moscow, the two sides also signed the Agreement on Mutual Non-targeting of Missiles.

As far as security on the Korean peninsula is concerned, Russia's main concern pertains to denuclearization of this explosive area. An important step along this direction could be made through realization of the Russian proposal to convene an international conference on security and nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula. Moscow offers this proposal also to achieve an overall solution of all problems of the Korean peninsula. Participation in an international conference on security and nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula could include the Permanent Five (Russia, United States, China, France, and Britain) plus Japan, the DPRK, and the ROK, as well as the U.N. Secretary General and the IAEA Director General. The stated purpose of the proposed conference is to create a mechanism for the comprehensive settlement of nuclear and other problems on the Korean peninsula. Three major issues are proposed for the agenda: the nuclear free status of the Korean peninsula; normalization of DPRK relations with the participant countries, i.e., the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea; and confidence-building measures and improved relations between North and South Korea.

In his first Asian visit to the Republic of Korea, in 1992 the President of Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, put forward a set of measures to enhance security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. During the negotiations in Seoul, Russia and South Korea discussed the possibility of Russia renouncing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that had been signed between the former Soviet Union and the DPRK. Yeltsin assured Seoul that Moscow would discontinue military assistance to North Korea and expressed his intention to revise Russia's alliance relationship with the DPRK. These moves show Russia's commitment to a peaceful settlement in Korea.

The practical solution of most of the military-political problems with Japan is blocked by the maximalist position of the Japanese leadership in respect to the Northern Territories. That the task of resolving this dispute is not easy was revealed in the case study of the military aspect of territorial disengagement with Japan, carried out by a number of Russian military analysts. This case study is focused on the scenario which, being the worst case for Russia, reflects the developments in case of a broad-scale conventional war in the Far East. Actually, this scenario is withdrawn from the context of the military-political changes in the world, the Russian-American agreements, and the already-attained level of confidence. It implies the total defense and protection of the Sea of Okhotsk and adjacent territories against the massive attacks by the adversary.⁷

It appears more reasonable to exercise another approach according to which the military issues in the Kurile and South-Sakhalin zones should be solved on the trilateral basis, through the reductions of Russian, Japanese, and U.S. forces. Further bilateral efforts, especially Russia's negotiations on the key problems of the region with the United States, People's Republic of China, and Japan would help to expand existing arms control measures to the Far East and to move to a regional consensus.

The general principles of a collective security system, realized in Europe, can be used in Northeast Asia with due

consideration of the regional specifics. The first ministerial-level international conference on the issues of peace in the Asia-Pacific region in Bangkok in July 1994 was important not only for ASEAN, but for the entire Asia-Pacific region. It emphasized the need to develop an Asian mechanism of control and settlement of disputes and prevention of armed conflicts over the whole region.

In order to provide security in Northeast Asia, it appears necessary to hold more active negotiations and discussions of various principles and proposals in the context of ongoing changes in the region and in Russian-American relations. As a result, a good basis for regional agreements on easing the military tensions and strengthening security and stability can emerge.

Major outlines of the future security regime in Northeast Asia could lead to the following goals:

- Disengagement of armed forces in the areas of their direct confrontation and the high risk of surprised armed conflict;
- Creation of zones where armaments are limited, including nuclear and chemical weapon free zones;
- Spatial and temporal limitation of military activities, exercises and manoeuvres;
- Transparency and verification measures;
- Creation and institutionalization of bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures;
- Quantitative reduction of armed forces and armaments in the countries of the region, qualitative limitation of arms race;
- Transfer of the armed forces' structure into a defensive posture;

- Creation of multilateral mechanisms for strengthening regional security, the discussion of military doctrines, etc.;
- Creation of a system of regional conflict resolution, and of a regional center for conflict prevention and resolution;
- Creation of regional center of strategic studies.

Thus, regular and military diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region is working to develop the elements of a new security system on the basis of non-confrontational approaches. First and foremost, this diplomacy pertains to the level of military confrontation and the development of prerequisites that would enable states to build a stable infrastructure of security and constructive interstate interaction in Northeast Asia. Militarization of the states in the region is still not presently curbed by any restriction and goes on beyond the framework of existing international negotiations.

Arms Control and the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities.

Accordingly, Russia considers the prevention of dangerous military activities to be an important aspect of building confidence, understanding, and an improved climate in international relations. As military equipment is becoming ever more sophisticated, it is necessary to take precautions that some technical or human factors will not cause irreparable damage to relations between friendly neighboring states.

Dangerous military activities can be defined as peacetime actions taken by armed forces, military units and individuals which cause, or can cause, harm to military personnel and the civil population, and/or cause or can cause damage to military or civil equipment, properties and installations, the natural environment, and strategic stability of states and the world at large. Dangerous military

activities, undertaken in local and limited conflicts and other cases where military force is used, are connected with the excessive and unreasonable losses of military personnel and civil population, as well as with destruction and other types of material damage which evidently are not justified by the military need.

The issue of prevention of dangerous military activities is connected with the ongoing reassessment of values after the end of the Cold War and the global nuclear confrontation. Striving to thwart the disaster, the leading powers built up their military capabilities and actively prepared their armed forces for hostilities which would have caused massive losses among both the armed forces and the civilian population. Preparedness for any sacrifice in the name of perceived great ideals was seen as the indisputable truth. Armed incidents, e.g., losses of SSNs and their crews due to technical malfunctions, sometimes with tragic results, became the normal attribute of military operations during the nuclear/conventional arms race of the Cold War era. Considerable human losses occurring within the armed forces in the circumstances of peacetime combat training become ever more tangible in their impact and ever less understandable. In most cases such losses result from catastrophes, equipment failures, or accidents caused by unintentional negligence or dangerous activities of armed people.

It should be noted that the absolute majority of human losses has been caused by dangerous actions of the military taken in their home country or within the units of armed forces as such. As for the international scene, the aftermath of dangerous military activities can be even worse than a mere danger to lives of personnel or civil population. Such activities can cause a threat of retaliatory action and the erroneous, accidental or unauthorized use of conventional or even nuclear-missile weapons. Naturally when such threats are raised, they complicate international relations. In the circumstances of armed conflicts, dangerous military activities would lead to unreasonable material damage and

excessive, unreasonable and useless losses among military personnel and population.

Therefore, prevention of dangerous military incidents and activities is a crucial domestic and international task. Domestic activities to minimize conditions that could lead to accidents or their aftermath include the publication of relevant charters, guidelines, and instructions that regulate the everyday activities and training of armed forces. Supervising the implementation of safety regulations and preventing accidents are important aspects in such army and naval activities as training flights, target practice, field and high-sea exercises.

At the international level, the most dangerous effect of incidents involving armed forces and units of two or more countries is the threat of misunderstanding about them and the ensuing mistaken and unnecessary armed reaction to the other side's intention. Most dangerous effects can be caused by the incidents that bear a potential of misunderstanding with regard to strategic offensive forces which, in the circumstances of sharp reduction, continue to be the instruments of regional and global deterrence and stabilization. There have been reports of dangerous malfunctions in the American and Soviet early warning systems, as well as on the nuclear weapons defaults occurring in the strategic nuclear forces of both countries.⁸

Politically and diplomatically, prevention of dangerous military activities is being effected through declarations (at the level of international treaties and law) and practical realization of principles aiming at prevention of violation of agreed standards of armed defense as well as prevention of harm to individuals and property. The task is to be achieved through the observance of the coordinated limits of activities and implementation of other agreed confidence-building measures.

Current local conflicts manifest an impressive scale of long-lasting hostilities. When these wars take place with the added factor of the development of ever more powerful conventional weapons, they stimulate an international

demand for resolving issues surrounding the restriction of the use of certain types of weapons and for unconditionally banning the most lethal systems by a world-wide treaty (e.g., the non-proliferation treaty or treaties on biological and chemical weapons).

The Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA-1972) provides for safe navigation of the two parties' naval vessels throughout their territorial waters and for safe overflights by their military aircraft in their air-space. Following international law, the agreement contains mutual commitments to lessen the risks involved in the activities of their ships and aircraft in proximity to one another. In particular, military ships should, in all cases, stay "in sufficient distance" from the other side's ships to avoid the risks of collision.

Military ships must not exercise simulation attacks that involve targeting of cannons, launchers, torpedo devices and other weapons against the approaching ships of the other party in a manner that could pose a danger for approaching ships or hamper navigation. The use of searchlights or other powerful light devices to light the navigator's bridges of approaching vessels is also banned.

Aircraft crew commanders, too, must be most cautious and prudent in approaching the aircraft and ships of the other party. Guided by the interests of mutual safety, they should not simulate attacks against the aircraft and ships of the other party, conduct dangerous maneuvers or engage in aerobatics over the ships, or discharge any objects that might be dangerous for the ships or hinder their navigation.

The procedure to consider mutual claims has been greatly simplified. In conformity with the Incidents at Sea Agreement, naval forces can dispense with official diplomatic presentation and expeditiously exchange information on incidents at sea through their naval attaches. The two parties also hold regular consultations where their representatives (usually, admirals and naval officers) professionally analyze the incidents of the

preceding year, work out mutually acceptable recommendations to prevent such incidents in future, and discuss the proposals to improve certain provisions.

The Agreement On The Prevention of Incidents at Sea was an important link in the chain of bilateral confidence-building agreements that have brought the tactical activities of Russian and U.S. armed forces into harmony. In 1986 the USSR signed a similar agreement with Great Britain, and since 1988 has signed similar agreements with other countries including Japan. Regular review meetings revealed the positive results attained in the practical implementation of INCSEA agreements. However, these meetings covered only naval activities undertaken on the high seas.

On June 12, 1989, during the visit to Moscow of Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, he and Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, Army-General Mikhail Moiseyev, signed the new Soviet-American Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, which entered into force on January 1, 1990. Like the INCSEA agreement, this document refers to peacetime activities of military personnel taking place in proximity to military personnel and equipment of the other party. The new agreement was the first to cover the activities of ground troops, air-forces and air-defense forces.

The growing number of similar bilateral agreements is evidence of their positive role and viability. After the work had been done with the United States, Russia signed the INCSEA agreements with more than ten countries, and agreements on prevention of dangerous military activities with Canada, Greece, and China. These agreements have proved to be useful in building confidence and security, and a valuable mechanism of conflict prevention and resolution.

Work on preventing dangerous military activities in the tactical field implies strengthening and developing the agreements cited above. This can be done by supplementing them with protocols on coordinated criteria of danger involved in certain activities, extending the agreements to

new types of dangerous military activities, and elaborating the qualitative and quantitative criteria for preventing these activities.

As present relations show, the INCSEA and DMA agreements have created good prerequisites for prevention of dangerous incidents in the following possible activities of the two countries' armed forces:

- Activities in the border zone including territorial waters;
- The use of radio-emitting means in close proximity to one another;
- The use of dangerous technical means (such as lasers) in the vicinity of each other;
- Establishment of special caution areas when the armed forces' units of the two countries undertake activities in dangerous regions;
- Encounters of ships and aircraft at high seas beyond the limits of territorial waters.

Further work on the provisions of these agreements is connected with coordination of many technical values and criteria of dangerous action. The main emphasis should be on the classification of danger by the level, dimension, and the distance from the source of danger. Special attention should be paid to the specific types of military activities which are seen by the other party as a provocation or a cause of incidents to include intelligence activities in proximity to the other side's border, aircraft overflights in the areas of naval exercises, and various activities by attack submarines.

Quantities and qualities of arms represent the most important and salient aspect of military power. Another important component is represented by the capability to effect reliable command and control over the troops during the armed forces' operational activities. Therefore, control

over operational activities of armed forces in general and strategic nuclear forces in particular is a most important element in reducing international tensions and eliminating risks of armed confrontation. Arms reduction alone will not produce clearly positive results in building mutual security if it is not supplemented by limiting armed forces' operational activities, controlling the possible intentional and unintentional use of weapons, and coordinating principles for activities that the armed forces conduct in various situations.

In the past, the problem of controlling the operational activities of armed forces was left to the margins of disarmament negotiations. The measures that the nuclear weapon states adopted to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were unilateral ones. There was neither consultation nor institutionalization of such measures in bilateral or multilateral agreements. The continuous climate of tensions blocked the necessary exchange of information and did not make it possible to develop the proper regime for verification of these agreements. For example, the very idea of providing the other side (even on a mutual basis) with access to information on the systems and procedures of command and control of strategic forces and their operational activities was perceived as incompatible with nuclear deterrence. Therefore, past agendas never implied any serious discussion of the need to extend arms control to operational activities or to issues of command and control.

Today, the entirely new approach to verification, embodied in the U.S.-Soviet/Russian disarmament treaties and agreements, lays down the basis for the new regime of military transparency. The new Russian-U.S. relations must lead to a gradual evolution from mutual to joint deterrence. Control over operational activities should not only drive the transformation of both countries' nuclear policies from confrontation to cooperation, but also should become the central instrument to realize this new deterrence regime.

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Stability.

Russian and American research proved that neither quantitative nor qualitative build-ups of strategic nuclear forces or strike capability could deprive other states of the capability to retaliate effectively and cause irreparable damage to the adversary. Today, as warhead numbers are reduced, the trends in development of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces are such that their deterrence potentials (the efficiency of retaliatory action) and the counterforce potentials (capability to strike strategic nuclear installations in a preventive action) are becoming practically equal.

However, there are some destabilizing factors that may break the strategic balance. These include breakthroughs in military technologies that can sharply reduce the survivability and efficiency of the strategic forces' combat and support systems, deployment of ABM systems, strikes against strategic nuclear installations by conventional warheads, and, formation of coalitions of nuclear states.

With the transition to radically reduced levels of strategic offensive forces, it becomes most important to realize the principle to prevent intentional and unintentional action impeding the everyday activities of the ICBM, SSBN, and bomber units. It is equally important to remove the threat of their virtual destruction or neutralization by nuclear or conventional strikes near their home bases. In the ICBMs' case, this could mean the ABM system with outer space-basing elements that could destroy these systems at or near their bases. Anti-submarine defense systems that possess permanent capabilities for tracking and striking (hunt and kill) SSBNs pose a serious threat to them. The threat to strategic aviation (bombers) is variously-based (land, air, and sea) long-range cruise missiles capable of striking air force bases.

These unacceptable military activities bear a potential threat to strategic offensive forces of the other side. If they are deployed, they would violate the spirit of the START agreements, increase mutual suspicion and distrust, and

deprive mutual military cooperation of trust. Such activities would also endanger the stability of strategic offensive forces. To prevent this outcome, Russia and the United States would likely start to develop—quite often on a new technological basis—counter-measures against anti-missile, anti-submarine, and air defense systems. These countermeasures would have the effect of strengthening their strategic forces' offensive strike capability and should include:

- More intensive surveillance and higher combat capability at all levels of forces;
- Setting a mutual regime of operational activities of strategic forces (to the largest possible extent);
- Creating a newly-based threat to the adversary's strategic offensive forces.

Realizing these measures to improve strategic offensive capabilities and require mobilization of a considerable number of military industries could result in a new arms race. Moreover, because the strategic offensive and the opposing forces operate in vast expanses, other countries, too, could become involved in the confrontation. In particular, the zone of the Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan can become an area of even more serious contradictions, adding to the vestiges of the Cold War global confrontation and the Northern Territories issue.

In this connection attempts to create strategic missile defenses and to revise the ABM Treaty of 1972 would also undermine the basis of cooperation related to development of tactical or military theater ABM systems. Russia and the United States might then eventually choose to cooperate in excluding certain parts of their respective military industrial complexes from nuclear agreements. They could then maintain their scientific, technological and production potentials. But they would then drift apart and start another round of their costly and even more rigid rivalry that would make the situation even more dangerous and uncertain for themselves and the world.

At a time when other countries still possess nuclear weapons, the very spirit of Russian-American agreements on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons requires these two states to construct a situation where:

- The two sides would have limited numbers of strategic warheads and delivery systems and place no obstacles to each other's strategic nuclear forces;
- The two countries (and, probably, other nuclear powers) would upgrade their military and political interaction to a higher level of interaction between their strategic nuclear forces to prevent dangerous incidents. Ultimately the goals should be to put the world's strategic nuclear forces under the auspices of the United Nations.

Asian-Pacific regional specifics are marked by the emphasis on naval weapons including nuclear powered submarines (SSNs and missile-carrying submarines-SSBNs). It seems necessary to reach a special agreement that would limit anti-submarine defense capabilities and provide for the survivability of naval forces as a stabilizing factor of deterrence. That agreement could be on ocean zones free from strategic submarines and on reduction of anti-submarine activities.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof was signed in 1971. The Treaty provides the procedures to control its implementation and to verify the sub-surface installations which cause suspicion among the signatories, as well as the necessary measures to be taken. However, the absence of an agreement that would fully ban the use of the seabed and the ocean floor for military purposes leads to development of conventional sub-surface weapons and military equipment. A most dangerous example of such work is represented by construction of stationary submarine detecting systems which can be deployed on the continental shelf or in the middle deep-water part of the ocean floor. Actually, these systems

become another component of strategic weapons as they can help in obtaining data needed in order to destroy the sub-surface carriers of nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia and other nuclear powers could also facilitate the practical realization of the principle of parity and equal security in the sphere of strategic weapons through an agreement on setting the SSBN navigation zones where any anti-submarine activities would be prohibited.

The mutual commitments taken under the Russian-American ABM Treaty suggest that freeing the ocean zones from the means of detecting, monitoring and destroying submarines would give each side, in all cases, the necessary survivable second-strike naval strategic weapons capability. Each side would then possess a reliable means of retaliation which would make the aggressor's decision to start a nuclear attack senseless and substantially diminish the probability of nuclear war. Given the specific physical qualities of the ocean environment, naval sub-surface carriers of nuclear weapons can become the most reliable means of retaliation, while it would be rather simple to verify the proposed agreement.⁹

Conclusion.

As a first step to foster a plan of regional security, it appears useful to start with unofficial, expert, and academic discussions on a bilateral (Russian-American, Russian-South Korean, etc.) and multilateral basis. These discussions would clarify the participants' positions and prepare the ground for the official negotiations. Thus, a political impulse is needed to start moving towards a system of collective or cooperative security. In today's specific regional context, including the differences of positions among various states, such a process is hardly possible for the whole Asian-Pacific region. The task seems more feasible at the sub-regional level of Northeast Asia where the number of the involved countries is not too large. At the same time, movement to an accord could be generated there rather efficiently, considering the vast expanses of the Far East and Northwestern Pacific.

In the context of a most complicated strategic, military, and political situation in that region, progress on strategic issues might be easier to achieve than discussions on conventional disarmament and confidence-building measures. Thus the Asian-Pacific countries face certain difficulties in elaborating the new national strategy for the region, and even more in working out the strategy for joint action. Attempts are still being made to solve new issues on the basis of the old stereotypes. Nevertheless, expanded and deeper military-to-military contacts, greater confidence, the lower level of military confrontation, and Northeast Asian states' negotiations on a system of collective/cooperative interaction would contribute to military security and stability in this vast region of the globe.

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