Germany Against Britain: It Should Have Been a Campaign.
Abstract
German military leadership during World War II is generally recognized for their exceptional performance in the operational and tactical levels of war. During the first nine months of the war, Germany successfully completed three separate major operations defeating France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Poland. Yet, despite these successful operations and Germany's continuing maritime interdiction operations they were not able to defeat their only remaining adversary in the summer of 1940, Britain. Using the principals of war to analyze Germany's efforts, poor operational leadership and inadequate planning were identified as key factors in Germany's failure to coerce Britain to sue for peace or defeat her. The German planning process was impaired by their over-confidence, lack of a clear strategic objective and an incomplete comparison of their capabilities against their intentions. They generated a flawed estimate of the situation against Britain due to an apparently over-optimistic view of their own military capabilities, interservice rivalries and under-estimation of the British. Although they did discuss peripheral warfare as a potential course of action (COA), they limited their serious discussions to direct attacks on England designed to achieve a quick decisive victory. Their COA decided, they implemented two autonomous major operations instead of a synchronized campaign plan designed to exploit the synergism of coordinated operations. Unlike Germany's previous operations, Hitler retained overall command of operations against Britain for himself. He ordered the Luffaffe to attack England and the Kriegsmarine to continue maritime interdiction operations without articulating a clear, defined objective.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 14, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA311685
Entities
People
- Fred P. Drake Jr
Organizations
- Naval War College