The Impact of Information Warfare When Conducting Operational Deception.
Abstract
U.S. military leaders placed a renewed emphasis on Operational Art in the late 1970s. The driving factor was the need to give operational commanders the tools necessary to better design campaigns to fill the gap between the strategic and tactical levels of war with a focus on translating national strategy into military objectives across the spectrum of conflict. The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' in the 1980s both enhanced and complicated this effort. Of particular difficulty was properly using expanding Information Warfare (IW) capabilities when planning and executing operational deception. Research reveals three areas where operational commanders may have to adjust their thinking in the operational design of the campaign plan: surprise, security, and boldness. Analysis of the use operational deception and IW in both the air and land campaigns in DESERT STORM reveals how CINCCENT blended these items into a successful operational deception plan. The lessons learned when the reviewing the planning and execution of the deception offer some insights into the use of operational deception with IW in future campaigns. U.S. planners and operational commanders cannot assume that the potential dominant battlefield awareness IW can provide will necessarily translate into successful deception operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 14, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA312053
Entities
People
- Olsen S. Key
Organizations
- Naval War College