'Not a Precise Science': Assessing Effects of Operational Fires.
Abstract
Battle Damage Assessment is one area that appears positioned to benefit from high technology collection and analysis systems, but the view is deceiving. The Persian Gulf Conflict revealed that while we had the latest state-of-the-art national level reconnaissance available at the operational level, we did BDA the same way we have always done it--by forming ad hoc structures that do not exist in peacetime, reassessing the questions that we sought to answer with BDA, and tying those answers into the operational commander's evaluation of operational and strategic objectives. Surprisingly, more information did not ease the job, suggesting that we need better intelligence, not more data, and that we must expand our conception of BDA toward 'combat assessment'--evaluation of what BDA means to accomplishment of objectives. Current joint doctrine is deficient in providing the 'umbrella concept' for joint combat assessment. Despite collection deficiencies at the tactical level, U.S. ability to gather BDA and combat assessment information is unequalled. We need to adopt a doctrinal approach to solving the BDA 'problem' for two reasons--to better use what we have and to build a sound base for future equipment and structure decisions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 14, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA312158
Entities
People
- William M. Bransford
Organizations
- Naval War College