

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEN DIVISION ARMY:
SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT OR MANAGED CHAOS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by


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M.P.A., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
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

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ABSTRACT

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEN DIVISION ARMY: SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT OR MANAGED CHAOS. MAJ James K. Johnson, U.S. Army, 78 pages.

Events in the early 1990s (namely the Berlin Wall coming down, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the failed Soviet coup attempt) forced the Department of Defense (DoD) to reassess its strategies, plans, and programs. Then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated an in-depth analysis of DoD from the "bottom-up" to determine the future strategy direction, assess potential threats, tailor a force package accordingly, and develop a modernization timeline to equip said force package. The downsized Army of ten divisions was tailored to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives of thwarting aggression and promoting stability. This work examines whether this force structure can support the U.S. Army's NMS or if it merely performs per a political budget. The central theme asks the question: is the U.S. Army's force structure based on military strategy or based on a budgetary ceiling (headed downward)?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE.	ii
ABSTRACT.	iii
LIST OF TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.	v
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.	1
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE & DEFINITIONS	5
3. ANALYSIS OF THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW (BUR).	16
4. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY	26
5. MILITARY BY STRATEGY	37
6. CONCLUSIONS	50
TABLES	56
FIGURES	58
ENDNOTES.	66
BIBLIOGRAPHY	71
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	73

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Army Deployments to the Desert Shield Theater of Operations	56
2. Historical Army Deployments	57

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures	Page
1. BUR Conflict Dynamics.	58
2. National Military Strategy Linkage	59
3. Achieving National Military Objectives	60
4. Peacetime Engagement Concept	61
5. Deterrence and Conflict Prevention Concept	62
6. Fight and Win Concept.	63
7. United States Central Command Theater Objectives (Operation Desert Storm).	64
8. Strategy/Force/Budget "Linkage".	65

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research thesis is to examine the implications for the ten division Army analyzed against the objectives chartered by the National Military Strategy (NMS). This downsized Army of ten divisions was tailored to support the NMS objectives of thwarting aggression and promoting stability. I specifically want to focus on the concept of selective engagement--one of the cornerstones of the NMS objective of thwarting aggression--with this question for examination: can this ten division force structure support the NMS or does this structure merely perform per a political budget?

Change is the common commodity today in the international world. This is true of the military environment where "a powerful combination of social, technological, and political developments is revising the role of military force in national policy and changing the way wars are fought."¹

Central to the military today is the reality of budgetary constraints. What also is reality is the changed threat. The previous foe for the United States--the former Soviet Union--is no longer and seeks a partnership for peace in an attempt to become a more democratic and economic society.

The end of the Cold War and subsequently the reshaping of the Soviet Union/Russia has fueled the pressure to reduce defense spending as an once tremendously formidable foe is dismantling his own forces. As Americans influence Congressmen to reduce spending dollars on a defense budget, this effect has led to a smaller Army because of lower funding.

As the personnel numbers begin to drop from the rolls, this equates to fewer dollars spent on training, maintaining, equipping, and sustaining these personnel, their dependents, their base/city support networks, and their overall base/post structure systems.

The issues forming the foundation for the drawdown are complex and extremely important. The previously defined threat is now undefined and could easily come from one or more regions of instability. This environment of uncertainty is difficult to plan for soldiers both active and reserve. The number of mission deployments has drastically increased upward over the last five years as the Army has transitioned from a forward deployed force stationed abroad to a force projection force based from the US and specific regions (such as Europe and the Pacific region). The active Army force structure was reduced from eighteen divisions to ten, with current discussions seeking additional cuts from a ceiling of four hundred ninety five thousand to four hundred seventy five thousand.

To discuss our current changing Army fully, a larger "revolution"--revolution in military affairs (RMA)--is the actual context of the bigger picture.

The important question to ask at the outset: is the RMA a revolution in warfare or in the weapons, doctrines, and organizations which fight it? The answer is both, and in fact the two interact. The nature of war itself is indeed changing. Conventional, head-to-head clashes of high technology field armies have been for several decades giving way to guerrilla conflicts, mixed regular and irregular wars, terrorism, non-state conflict, and a host of new information-based military efforts.²

The RMA is not examined in this thesis. The thrust of the RMA significantly influences the designed force structure and the tailoring of strategies, assessments, and analysis for this new spectrum of conflict. Chapter 2 provides a review of the current literature relevant to this thesis topic and briefly presents other authors views on issues such as the RMA, concerns about the Army downsizing, and current/future readiness levels.

Current concerns target what the future force structure will exactly compose and whether or not this force is adequate to the task of supporting the NMS objectives, concepts, and programs when implemented. The force reduction/drawdown undoubtedly affects force projection concepts and applications and also our ability to be a mobile fighting force. I want to examine these concerns against the US concept of selective engagement with the central focus of the plate being too full possibly by design (in terms of the strategy in place) and secondly, is this selective engagement really selective or does the Army force react per a political calling card because the force structure is available. Chapter 3 examines the Army's arrival at ten divisions by over-viewing the Bush administration's Base Force Plan and discussing in depth the Clinton administration's Bottom-Up Review (BUR).

Fundamental to my presentation is the three tiered foundation of strategy, budget, and force structure. Each of these is important for the successful execution of any and all missions. The military must have strategy: specific mission objectives tied to the goal of the operation or campaign; this strategy is targeted against a known threat possessing clearly defined capabilities and limitations; and this strategy must delineate specific roles for forces, nations, and/or allies to execute. This strategy for successful mission accomplishment must be supported by diplomatic means, informational means, and economic means prior to military forces being employed.

When military force is applied, the force structure must be designed or tailored for the specific operation in question. This discussion is presented as chapter 4 with a deeper examination of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Adequate funding from a developed budget is necessary to support the tailored force. Funding is also necessary to provide for modern

weapon systems, strategic air and sealift assets, and information technologies to fully allow the force to act quickly and decisively to defeat the enemy in question.

As stated earlier, change is inevitable. If one uses the analogy of military planning being similar to road construction, the next five, ten, or twenty years will involve a great deal of new and innovative techniques to solve the traffic jams and congestion. As more adversaries learn to drive, buy larger, more powerful vehicles, and enjoy traveling faster, planners must effectively divert these collisions without unnecessary collateral damage to nonparticipants. To execute successful missions, the strategy and force structure must be synchronized.

An example of this synchronization is found in the recommendations released by the bipartisan Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM).

For the armed forces to be successful in future conflicts, joint operations will be the key to operational success. The individual services must sharpen their own "core competencies" and the unified command commanders in chief must focus on planning and training for joint operations. Each of the services has to be ready to work with the others to accomplish an operational mission. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard will depend more on one another as time progresses.³

Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis of selective engagement verses unlimited engagement. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions from the analysis and a recommendation for future forces.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEFINITIONS

Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. The first portion of the chapter will focus on a review of literature pertinent to the implications for the ten division Army. The second part will provide a working definition of the concept "selective engagement."

LITERATURE REVIEW

Within the realm of the changing world environment and the implications for a ten division Army, several writers have contributed a wealth of information on the topic. These contributions range from personnel covering the downsizing impact on each DoD service involved (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.) via periodicals, such as the Army Times to actual testimonies before Congressional hearings by former senior ranking DoD personnel who have strong concerns about the future level of deployability and military capability.

These works, both past and present, provide ample food for thought and developmental facts for this thesis research. They are directly related to my work in that they provide overall insight to a different dimension within the downsizing arena. I seek to add another dimension by raising related issues across a slightly different continuum focusing on the arrived at force structure being capable of supporting the objectives of the NMS.

A number of transcripts from Congressional hearings are available which actually "examine the methodology and recommendations of the 1993

DOD Bottom-Up Review (BUR) to assess post-Cold War threats to the U.S. and determine armed forces strategy, structure, and strengths, including requirements for winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts." I am extremely interested if these documents include detailed testimony discussing the link up of the Army force structure (the BUR authorized 10 divisions) with the achievement and supportability of the NMS objective of selective engagement.

Apparent trends indicate the concerns I have are somewhat valid. Although these other scholars have examined/explored other connections or areas regarding the BUR, each scholar is none the less concerned about the current impact of the BUR, and more importantly, deeply concerned about the future impact of the BUR on combat forces, successful military employment, the industrial base supporting such a force, and the true economic processes within our country. Such free flowing analysis undoubtedly will continue long after my research is complete.

Question, if you will, the scenario played out in models when the BUR force scenarios were run/computer tested to determine which structure would most fit. What question comes to mind is: when the scenarios of "win-hold" verses "win-hold-win" were played, did the National Military Strategy develop thereafter? Or, did the "win-hold-win" more readily adapt to the NMS? Were DoD or Congressional budget constraints factored into these models?

One such previously mentioned scholar published a paper while attending the United States Army War College in 1992. Lieutenant Colonel Pascoe provided these relevant comments:

From the pentomic divisions of the '50s and '60s to the Army of Excellence (AOE) structure of the '80s, the design of our divisions and corps stemmed from parochial beliefs and consensus as much as from a capability to respond to any particular threat. In this paper the author proposes a need to depart from the traditional consensus-building approach used in the past in designing a force. In particular it emphasizes the need to capitalize on those systems that recent advances in technology have provided. As the Army undergoes

downsizing, adopting a plan that simply takes our current division and corps structures and makes fewer of them is a bankrupt strategy. A methodology must be used that builds structure that can be tailored quickly, respond rapidly, and can best contribute to warfighting.²

An excellent historical example from the Korean War (July 1950) is applicable and worth noting. "Task Force Smith was badly mauled by elements of the North Korean 105th Armored Division (AD) and 4th Infantry Division (ID), suffering 184 casualties out of a total strength of 540 personnel. The task force was not only unable to stop the North Koreans, it had barely managed to delay their advance for a few hours."³ The tactical decisions affecting the battlefield at the time is not important in this example. The period in discussion here (July 1950) easily replicates the period of today (July 1992) when the downsizing began. "Task Force Smith" provides a sterling example of what might reoccur-- "primarily the failure of the Army and the nation to adequately prepare in peacetime for war. In this respect, the experience of Task Force Smith provides a valuable case study in unreadiness."⁴

Kuiper recounts the period by depicting the political pressures of the times to "bring the boys" home. The consensus resulted in the armed forces being "precipitously demobilized." By 1950, an Army that had boasted 89 divisions at war's end was reduced to only ten (understrength) divisions. The US Army force had at the time four significant problems: (1) deployment initiatives would bring slightly more than one-half of the force to the Korean campaign, (2) a severe manpower shortage existed, (3) forces were no longer well trained, and (4) the forces were no longer well equipped either.

The message and analogy drawn from Kuiper's article relates directly to current selective engagement initiatives. The four points stressed above may not be totally present today, but one wonders what the next five or ten years will net. Two examples are applicable here.

First, although the M1A2 Abrams tank is not "of age" yet, a void currently exists for armored firepower within light infantry units. The recently canceled Armored Gun System (AGS) was to fill this void, but was scrapped to pay for personnel costs and programs. Second, active units throughout the Army are curtailing training to fund mission deployments as the DoD seeks new ways to finance peacekeeping operations in various regions of the world--the most current example being Bosnia. With the current political move afoot to fund a more "domestic agenda" will the message in Kuiper's passage repeat itself?

During the period of the early nineteenth century through the War in the Philippines (1899-1913), a number of changes occurred with how the Army applied its doctrine, its organization, and how it chose to wage warfare. John Waghelstein discusses the period after the War of 1812 where these successes were followed by victories over the Indians (Creek, 1813-14 and Black Hawk, 1831-32) with, as he calls it, "the establishment" playing their strong suit of superior organization, discipline and firepower.

One of the unfortunate legacies of the time was the inability to deal with a new foe who learned from previous experience (its own and ours). The Second Seminole War lasted seven years (1853-43). Rather than defeating the Seminoles, the US Army declared victory and went home (a war termination technique repeated in Southeast Asia in 1973). What Russell F. Weigley calls "The American Way of War" became institutionalized in the 1860s in its focus on massed firepower and overwhelming force.⁵

During this same period, the military academies were teaching the European tactics from the Napoleonic Wars. Much of this instruction which focused on massive armies/forces and developing combined arms warfare for shock effect was ineffective against the unconventional warfare waged by the Indians. The Civil War was a different story--for it more readily fit the Napoleonic War model for the use of combined

arms warfare. The Philippines campaign (1899-1913) more closely resembled the skirmishes and wars with the Indians.

Change is inevitable. Waghelstein emphasizes the Army has a problem adapting to unconventional warfare.

If the next war coincides with our concept and our enemy cooperates by providing a challenge in conventional terms, as they did most recently, there should be no difficulty in refighting Operation Desert Storm. If an enemy decides not to challenge us directly, but rather finesses our strong suit and opts for a low-intensity setting, we could find ourselves in a dilemma similar to our experiences in the Indian, Philippine, or Vietnam wars.⁶

Since Desert Storm, the Army has deployed on several peacekeeping missions to regions of instability in support of operations where potential US interests are directly or indirectly at stake.

Waghelstein is concerned about future wars, their context, and their political framework. Is it as simple as conventional warfare verses unconventional warfare?

What is being reexamined in the classrooms of the various war colleges is the role of war as politics by other means. The US view of warfare sees war as separate and distinct from peace. Vladimir Lenin saw confrontation, struggle and war as an unbroken thread, a point of view very different from that held by most Americans.⁷

Waghelstein's overall thrust focuses on future adaptability, especially in ever-changing environments of regional instability. The typical US response of massive firepower perhaps may not be appropriate for any and all scenarios. The challenger, once he or they step forward, may dictate war by "unique" means--conventional, unconventional, or a combination of both.

Another separate publication produced by the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) highlights the actual logistical framework used to support Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Table 1 provides a list of the Army participants deployed in Phases I and II, respectively. Table 2 compares historical deployment information from the Korean War, Vietnam War, and that deployed during Desert Shield/Storm. The AUSA

logistical overview stressed a number of points, two of which are extremely worth discussion here. First, command and control over extended distances is challenging.

Broad-based and theater-wide communications to inform supporting units of the priorities of resupply, allocation of transportation assets and use of main supply routes are essential components of an effective logistical system. This was stressed during Desert Shield and Desert Storm and sometimes found wanting. It is time to reassess the communications available to logisticians.⁸

The second AUSA point stresses the issue of regional factors significantly enhancing the success of the operation.

The United States and the coalition enjoyed some significant advantages, to include: time, host nation and allied support, modern sea- and airport facilities, enforce economic sanctions, air and sea supremacy, failure of the Iraqis to press the attack and incompetent Iraqi leadership. We cannot expect many of these factors to exist in a future contingency of this nature. Resulting assessments should ensure that the Army is given the strategic support necessary to rapidly deploy a sustainable combat force in the future.⁹

General Dennis J. Reimer recently assumed the reins as the Army's newest Chief of Staff. Prior to assuming command of Forces Command, he served as Vice Chief of Staff of Army under General Sullivan and was heavily involved in the preparations for and beginning execution of the Army's drawdown effort. In an interview with James Kitfield (March 1993), General Reimer's discussion on the drawdown focused on five points--people, leadership development, training, doctrine, and modernization. The big picture of these five tenants is "the tumultuous change as the Army shrinks in response to the end of the Cold War."¹⁰

The current drawdown is the first for the all volunteer force. General Reimer stresses "people" because the Army wants to be fair and take care of its people. Leadership development focuses on institutional training (of officers), keeping the flow of operational assignments constant, and continuing to stress the importance of self-development. Training will continue its level of importance with the Army fighting to retain its realistic, force-on-force training at the various high-tech

combat training centers (the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)). The new doctrine will focus on the changed parameter for the Army as power projection force verses the forward based force of the past. Power projection will require a greater emphasis on mobilization--far faster than that experienced during Desert Shield/Storm. Modernization embodies the Army's movement toward a digitized battlefield and improved operations at night with an overall intent of "remaining the most modern army in the world."¹¹

Eliot Cohen discusses one of the issues at the heart of selective engagement--that being strategy. The concept of selective engagement requires a foundation of decisive direction, clear implementation rules, and sound analysis of the threat(s) faced. This foundation coupled with a political framework utilizing diplomatic, informational, and economic means will provide for US interests during periods of conflict.

Alas, strategy is not so simple a business. Analysts, and not merely generals, like to fight the last battle. Unfortunately, their opponents don't. The Gulf war is just one kind of conflict in which the United States might find itself. More importantly, if Hussein's defeat taught America's foes anything, it was that they should *not* replicate the Iraqi strategy. Invaders cognizant of Iraqi mistakes will make sure they intermingle their forces with civilians to render American bombing politically unattractive, mine and sabotage the ports where American forces disembark and (above all) brandish the nuclear weapons they will build, buy or steal during the coming decade.¹²

Cohen's second point attacks the BUR force structure, ties closely to his first point of strategy, and emphasizes the requirement for modern day forces to be adequately funded.

The size of the BUR military, if the administration attempts to preserve is, may soothe a defense establishment that has already undergone dramatic cuts. To be sure, our forces will look formidable enough, with ten active Army and three Marine divisions, twelve aircraft carriers and thirteen active Air force wings. But it will be a military that will defer replacing major capital items such as helicopters and tanks; at some point, ten or fifteen years from now, it will face a massive junking of obsolescent gear. It will also be a military that in order to keep overall numbers and salaries up--and to pay for such activities as peacekeeping and environmental cleanup

(together about \$5 billion per year)--will find itself running short of training dollars and ammunition stockpiles. Indeed, some American forces in Europe and elsewhere have already started reducing readiness rates and curtailing training in response to their limited funds.¹³

The current price tag of balancing training and readiness will cost more in the long term because the cost of *remaining* the best--especially with state of the art technology--increases exponentially.

In chapter 1, "change" was mentioned as a common commodity in today's global marketplace. "Conflict," like change, is common place throughout history. The United States has arguably increased its world burden as it seeks to foster democracy and freedom.

This shell game would make little difference if the United States could ignore the prospect of having to fight wars. But can it? Sooner or later the United States will face upheavals overseas that cannot be accommodated or negotiated away. It may be a Ukrainian civil war, a war on the Korean peninsula, an Islamic fundamentalist takeover in Algeria or Egypt (or both), or the collapse of the Iraqi state following the death of Saddam Hussein. And this is only in the short term. In the longer term the United States must consider more daunting possibilities--a world in which China becomes an assertive Asian power, perhaps provoking a Japanese nuclear response, or a world in which nuclear weapons are not merely developed but occasionally used, or a world in which the former Soviet Union becomes a maelstrom of violence along the lines of Bosnia, but raised to a new magnitude.¹⁴

Ralph Peters discusses change in his article entitled "After the Revolution." Peters assesses the world as changing fundamentally, and likewise the US forces must change with that world. He advocates that ... a new human understanding of our environment would be of far more use than any number of brilliant machines. We have fallen in love with the wrong revolution.¹⁵

The preparations now underway via technology for the warfare of the twenty-first century are in fact how the United States views wars occurring--or rather how the US desires to dominate these wars.

Peters emphasizes an earnest investment in a revolutionary understanding of the US nation-state and the impact on the military. Is our strategy feasible for the world, do we understand the world well

enough to define an effective strategy? Is the analysis process for possible conflicts thorough or is the enemy underestimated? "I understand the many reasons why it is preferable to think about, to write about, and to act upon the issues summed up by the phrase "Revolution in Military Affairs." The RMA offers us refuge within an antiseptic cocoon, and, for all its stunning science, it translates into continuity. To the earnest, the RMA offers an opportunity for engagement; to the careerist, it promises advancement and lucrative post-military employment; to the academic, it offers intellectual finiteness--concrete specifications rather than confounding ideas. The RMA allows the traditionalist to appear forward-minded, and permits the forward-minded to avoid unpleasant realities. Most of the best minds within and surrounding the military have been drawn into RMA-related issues. Much of this effort is of great value, but perhaps just a few of those bright officers and analysts would better serve their country by taking an open-eyed look at the black, hideous, broken, career-destroying world around us.¹⁶

David Hackworth, in an article he produced for Newsweek, takes an unpopular position in advocating a combination of the current force structure to reduce the "fat in the pork barrel." Hackworth essentially supports the need for a comprehensive look at roles and missions based against the potential threats to be faced.

If the four-engine approach is not dropped, the chiefs of the various services are sure to resort to an old game. Instead of consolidating scarce resources to counter real threats, they will take away bits and pieces from each engine, leaving four shells--and nothing fit to run. By the year 2000, only the hollow forces will still be standing: hundreds of flagpoles and headquarters full of brass, but not enough properly equipped and trained warriors down on the ground where the slugs snap and blood flows.¹⁷

Hackworth's argument has merit, but survivability of programs (across the services) in a budget/resource intense environment is linked directly to individuals surviving themselves.

We must not preserve the blubber in the pork barrel while we lose lean beef. The brass need to look up and repeat the oath they took as lieutenants and ensigns. They'll probably be surprised to hear that they swore to defend America, not their individual services.¹⁸

What Hackworth advocates is preventing, in the Army's case, another "Task Force Smith," similar to what Kuiper discussed. Time will tell if either of these authors are correct.

I close section one by providing one last author's assessment of the massive drawdown being worse than people think.

The issue is whether or not we are prepared, on the one hand, to recognize that the world is not really all that different. It may be different from the world of the Cold War, but it is not all that different from the world where nations come to war with other nations. Of course, I would like the world to be the way I would like to see it. Realistically, I also know what I do see. Unfortunately, it is a world where budgetary resources will be curtailed until a balloon goes up, just as they were after the Korean War broke out. Choices will have to be made--choices that hurt.¹⁹

Definitions

Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, published in 1984 by Riverside Publishing, Boston, MA, defines selective as "to pick out or choose from a number of choices; carefully picked or chosen; fastidious in selection: discriminating." Engagement is defined as "a promise, especially to meet someone; employment; a battle." Combining these two provides a carefully chosen battle or carefully picked employment. To relate either of these two combinations to the National Security Strategy (NSS) is difficult because the NSS does not provide a distinct definition of "engagement." Instead, engagement is a frame of reference, first to the past, and second, to the future. The "past" spoke of a unitary threat that dominated the United States' engagement during the Cold War. The "future" stresses engagement as being selective, focusing on specific challenges most relevant to US interests and applying US resources where they are most productive and beneficial. The National Military Strategy (NMS), as an offshoot and derivative of

the NSS, speaks of selective engagement as a concept which embodies several activities to broaden the US interests internationally. Again, a clear, definitive statement is not provided.

From a diplomatic or political point of reference, the US concept of selective engagement builds partnerships and common coalitions. The focus of these bilateral or multilateral groups is worldwide stability. A present day example is the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher "spearheading" the Bosnian-Serb peace accord to stabilize the unnecessary fighting. Economic engagement fosters and supports a global marketplace, which directly benefits US interests and potentially strengthens US prosperity. An example of economic "engagement" was the US business investments in the former Soviet Union immediately after the Cold War ended.

A simple definition of "a carefully chosen battle or employment" will suffice for "selective engagement" throughout my discussions. Chapter 4 provides more analysis of the concepts supporting the NSS and the NMS.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF THE TEN DIVISION FORCE STRUCTURE

Over the past six years several world events set the stage for the development of a new world order, much apart from what we all were once accustomed to. Three of these events among others were distinct in their own right, and had a tremendous impact on the United States' defense strategy and all the components intertwined in said strategy. First, in 1989 the Berlin Wall came tumbling down signaling an end to communism in Germany and that the Cold War was over. Second, in 1990 Iraq invaded the small country of Kuwait. This invasion presented new regional initiatives within the context of security, world diplomacy, and economic dangers facing America from one country attempting to rule a specific region via tyranny. Third, in 1991 the people of Russia (former Soviet Union) demonstrated their resolve toward moving to a democratic society by not allowing a "Soviet" coup attempt to succeed. With this move to democracy, Russia seeks to signal to the United States their new "position" as friend versus former foe.

With the impact of the above events firmly felt throughout all of DoD, I would like to use chapter 3 to provide a foundation for how the Army force structure arrived at ten divisions, discuss how this force structure supports the NMS, and initially layout issues for examination in chapter 5. To examine how the force structure arrived at ten divisions, I will begin with a look at the Bush Administration's Base Force Plan, crafted by former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell. I will follow with a discussion of the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up

Review, which was authored by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and General Powell.

The end of the Cold War and subsequently the reshaping of the Soviet Union/Russia has fueled the pressure to reduce defense spending as a once tremendously formidable foe is dismantling his own forces. As Americans get behind their congressmen to reduce spending dollars on a defense budget, this effect leads to a smaller Army because of fewer funds. As the personnel numbers begin to drop from the rolls, this equates to fewer dollars spent on training, maintaining, equipping, and sustaining these personnel, their dependents, their base/city support networks, and their overall base/post structure systems.

As the budget drops, people are happy because this extra money can be laterally transferred to other programs deemed more important or perhaps more critical by key groups and the Congressmen they (groups) influence. The concern here is as the cuts are made to personnel, what is the direct relationship to the force structure, the mission(s) at hand, the domino effect on the capability of the force, and the true future impact on military readiness?

From a historical perspective, the downsizing effort began prior to the 1993 BUR plan presented by the Clinton administration (former Secretary of Defense Aspin and GEN Colin Powell, CJCS).

Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney presented the Base Force Plan to Congress in 1991 as the basis for the Fiscal 92/93 defense budget. In it, he laid the foundation for military structure and strength changes through 1995. While some dollar revisions have been made in the current defense budget, the Base Force Plan remains the template for military force planning. The plan calls for the Army to be cut from its 1990 force of 28 combat divisions (18 active and 10 reserve component) to 18 combat divisions (12 active, 6 reserve, plus two cadre divisions), by the end of 1995. That means personnel cuts in all elements of the Total Army, i.e., active, reserve, and civilian employees.¹

The conceptual design and execution of a "drawdown" affects the personnel involved in various ways, regardless of the component (active,

reserve, or civilian) in which one serves. The attitudes/concerns developed and displayed by personnel affected--whether directly or indirectly--are paramount to the quality Army of today and tomorrow correlating directly with the ability to fight and win two distinct conflicts.

All of the above caused a dire need for an analysis of the military's defense strategy--for the framework which was the previous foundation was not applicable under the conditions presented by the state of the new world situation. "The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities."² Secretary Aspin set the wheels in motion for this comprehensive review in March 1993 to reassess the current concepts, plans, and programs of the U.S. Defense Department. Once the BUR was completed, Secretary Aspin discussed three points which the BUR accomplished:

First and foremost, the Bottom-Up Review provides the direction for shifting America's focus away from a strategy designed to meet a global Soviet threat to one oriented toward the new dangers of the post-Cold War era. Second, the review's results demonstrate to our allies, friends, and potential foes alike that the United States will remain a world power in this new era. We are not going to withdraw from our involvement around the world. While we no longer need to prepare for global war, the new dangers to our interests are global. Our review spelled out what military forces and capabilities will be needed to meet the new dangers. Finally, the review lays the foundation for what is needed to fulfill President Clinton's pledge to keep America's military the best-trained, best-equipped, best-prepared fighting force in the world.³

Chief among the new dangers is that of aggression by regional powers. One of the central factors in the thesis analysis was the judgment that the United States must field forces capable, in concert with its allies, of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. This capability is important in part because the U.S. does not want a potential aggressor in one region to be

tempted to take advantage if it is already engaged in halting aggression in another. Further, sizing U.S. forces to fight and win two major regional conflicts provides a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary might one day confront the U.S. with a larger-than-expected threat. The BUR analysis showed the U.S. could maintain a capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts and still make prudent reductions in our overall force structure--so long as a series of critical force enhancements are implemented to improve our strategic mobility and strengthen our early-arriving antiarmor capability, and take other steps to ensure our ability to halt regional aggression quickly.⁴

When the planners and strategists were initially developing the BUR concept, a strategy was needed for this newly created force to be structured against. I would like to highlight the four points of the defense strategy, the forces to implement the defense strategy, the major regional conflict (MRC) concept, and lastly the building of the overall force structure. These concepts form the foundation of the BUR force--describing a strategic perspective or direction and defining their mission parameters and deployment framework.

The four areas the new defense strategy is built upon are: nuclear dangers and opportunities, regional dangers and opportunities, new dangers to democracy and opportunities for democratic reform, and building future capabilities--guiding principles. When nuclear dangers and opportunities was examined, three subcategories were noted as important. Nonproliferation, cooperative threat reduction, and counterproliferation all seek to rid our world of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through diplomatic channels, as well as being prepared to deter, prevent, or to defend against a foe engaging in acts of such use. Nonproliferation seeks to limit the spread of WMD to nonpossessing

countries by limiting the flow of technologies/materials primarily through diplomatic channels.

An example of the nonproliferation efforts is currently in progress with other nations throughout the international arena. The new mission focus in Washington for the Department of Defense (DoD) agencies working arms control agreements and/or programs is cooperative threat reduction (CTR). CTR seeks to foster the reduction of current nuclear, biological, and chemical stocks on hand within the countries comprising the Former Soviet Union. Specific agreements (ex. the Chemical Weapons Convention) will eliminate the production, stockpiling, weaponization, and use of certain schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals for all signatories of the convention. CTR primarily targets the areas within the former Soviet Union (FSU) and beyond their immediate borders. Counterproliferation targets deterrence, prevention of use, and the actual defense against WMD if the previous tiers fail. The second point of the defense strategy is that of regional dangers and opportunities. These dangers and opportunities are derived from our country's involvement in major regional conflicts (Iraq-Desert Storm, Somalia-Restore Hope), a need to maintain an overseas presence, and lastly, our involvement in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other intervention operations (example the current conflict in Bosnia). Our involvement in MRCs stems from the need to thwart aggression around the world--not as the world's policemen, but as allies with other nations who request our assistance. This also serves to protect U.S. interests in those specific regions of the world where this aggression might readily occur (example: the Middle East and U.S. oil interests).

The U.S. will maintain a forward presence in key locations around the globe from a necessity standpoint to allow rapid response/deployment to that respective area when called to do so. This rapid response is the

only alternative to having the large force structure remain on foreign soil when that large force is now severely reduced in size. Stationing a smaller force still sends a message that U.S. presence is still in the region and has not abandoned nor removed itself completely. This deters advisories from contemplating unwarranted actions had the U.S. force removed itself altogether. The peacekeeping, enforcement, and intervention operations all hover around the involvement of troops in operations just short of war. These operations establish the U.S. commitment to allies across the world in protecting vital interests and providing humanitarian assistance when necessary.

The third point seeks to influence or resolve any new dangers to democracy and those opportunities for democratic reform around the globe. Prime examples of this theme are the establishment of democracies in the areas comprising the FSU, continuing this establishment in the Latin American region, and contributing economic aid, training assistance, and educational programs to strengthen countries in need. Within these new dangers, the military has specific objectives tied to nuclear dangers, regional dangers, dangers to democratic reform, and dangers to American economic prosperity. Secretary Aspin mentioned several objectives tied to each of these (respectively): deter the use of NBC weapons against the U.S., its forces, and its allies; deter/defeat aggression in regions important to the U.S.; use military-to-military contacts to foster democracy; and actively assist nations in their transition from controlled to market economies.

The last major point for the U.S. defense strategy is building future capabilities. There are three guiding principles tied to these future capabilities: keep the U.S. forces ready to fight, maintain the quality of American people, and maintain the technological superiority. Being ready to fight means having a high readiness level, having a

trained and ready force capable of multitasked operations, and having equipment readily available from prepositioned stocks/positions around the globe. Maintaining the quality soldier is paramount to successful operations. The soldier is the foundation for all successful engagements--for without him or her, the equipment and all its technological advantage will not engage, nor defeat the enemy.

Technology is extremely important because it fosters better planning with added information and having that information at a moments notice allows a faster defeat of the enemy, thereby causing fewer casualties or losses of American lives. In our age of dwindling resources, with technology comes the balance of buying the right amount of equipment against verified needs verses buying more weapons than necessary to do the job or more than we can afford.

This defense strategy will be implemented against "four broad classes of potential military operations" as discussed by Secretary Aspin:

1) major regional conflicts; 2) smaller-scale conflicts or crises that would require U.S. forces to conduct peace enforcement or intervention operations; 3) overseas presence--the need for U.S. military forces to conduct normal peacetime operations in critical regions; and 4) deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction, either against U.S. territory, U.S. forces, or the territory and forces of U.S. allies. This list is not all-inclusive. We will provide forces and military support for other types of operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and to counter international drug trafficking.⁵

This analysis of force structure resulted in a "modular approach" to designing forces which could be quickly tailored to specific and/or general scenarios currently at hand.

A "modular approach" in its simplest definition will apply specific units with specific capabilities to a specific, tailored scenario, whether conflict or an operation other than war. An example of the modular approach was the peacekeeping missions in Haiti and Somalia, where units, both active and reserve/national guard, were selected for

mission commitment because of unique mission objectives within the regions.

This tailored force built from various modules would then apply itself to the four phases of combat operations utilized in the BUR study. These were: halt the invasion, build up U.S. combat power, defeat the enemy, and provide for postwar stability. Halting the invasion would involve using the host nation's assets combined with initial U.S. forces to hold the initial conditions from escalating too much further. Following this initial hold, the U.S. would continue to build-up the area with the right force package against the enemy's capabilities or threatened action(s). The built up forces, together with other allies as well as the host nation, would soundly defeat the aggressor(s), followed immediately by these same assets providing assistance to transition to postwar stability. Figure 1, entitled Conflict Dynamics (BUR, p. 27) depicts the modular approach to win two MRCs nearly simultaneously by using overseas presence, active forces, and reserve forces deployed via strategic lift and relying on forward prepositioned sets of equipment.

From an overall force structure perspective, the Army structure envisioned for the future (1999) would compose ten active divisions and five plus reserve divisions. The BUR planners analyzed four options to arrive at the 1999 future structure. The four options were applied against four strategies or situations to determine the force mix to successfully accomplish the given mission. Option one strategy was to win one MRC--this required eight active divisions and six reserve division equivalents. Option two strategy was to win one MRC and hold in the second MRC--this required ten active divisions and six reserve division equivalents. Option three strategy was to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs--this required ten active divisions and fifteen reserve enhanced-readiness brigades. Option four strategy was win two nearly

simultaneous MRCs plus conduct smaller operations--this required twelve active divisions and eight reserve enhance equivalents.

As the BUR planners applied weights in each of their analysis strategies, the bottom line of the BUR was dwindling resources. The force recommended for 1999 is based on specific budget constraints, the effect of the Cold War implying a need for a smaller force, and determining the minimum essential force capable of the most (mission accomplishment) with what was to remain.

A critic of the downsizing effort--where the force structure has come and may yet still go--asks the question: what if the world unravels?

Can we console ourselves by saying we have multinational collective security systems, or most of our operations will be short of war, or the sort of thing that I consider to be a cop out? What is the lesson we get from our actions in Somalia when 18 people were killed? The reason we did not pull out of major wars when tens and tens of thousands were killed, and even hundreds of thousands were killed, was because of what we were fighting for. This country did not in any way understand why we were in Somalia in the first place; so all it took was 18 people to get us out. If that number had been 10, we still would have gotten out. We simply did not know why we were there.⁶

I conclude chapter 3 (a discussion of how the Army force structure arrived at ten divisions) by providing some discussion points for analysis in chapter 3. Each enumeration is followed by an initial assessment comment, which amplifies the problem to some degree. The first of these points is: DoD future demands and the linkage to the NMS/NSS.

Even though the focus of the BUR is to design a force capable of winning two MRCs, it also acknowledges that other future demands will be made on DoD. In keeping with the concept of engagement and enlargement contained in the National Security Strategy, United States military forces will likely become engaged most often in so-called "operations other than war," such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, disaster and humanitarian relief, or other types of intervention. The BUR assumes that maintaining the necessary force structure to counter two MRCs will afford the capability to handle these kinds of contingencies as well.⁷

The second of these discussion points is: what are the feasibility, acceptability, and supportability concerns with retaining the BUR structure long term?

Mindful of the problems associated with the "hollow military" of the late 1970s, the BUR accords top priority to maintaining the readiness of U.S. forces. The intent is to field forces that are well-trained, well-equipped, and well-prepared for rapid deployment to "come as you are" conflicts that, with U.S. technological superiority, will allow victory to be achieved more quickly than in the past and with fewer casualties. Although The Bottom-Up Review's architect, Secretary of Defense Aspin, has resigned, President Clinton remains publicly committed to the Bottom-Up Review defense program.⁸

The third discussion point is: the long term U.S. security requirements must be clearly identified, linked to a decisive strategy-- with that strategy fully achievable by military means (if necessary).

If adopted, the BUR's defense program will exert profound influence on the long-term security of the United States, and on the federal budget. As noted, Congress and the American people are being asked to support a defense program that will cost some \$1.3 trillion over the next five years. The program is designed to break the Defense Department loose from its Cold War era focus on what was a relatively clear and predictable Soviet threat, and to orient the U.S. defense posture on new security challenges and threats that are very uncertain, both in terms of their identity and the time frame within which they are likely to emerge.⁹

The U.S. security interests involve funding to ensure these needs are met successfully. I will discuss budgetary issues in chapter 4 and the budget's linkage to the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

CHAPTER 4

A DISCUSSION OF STRATEGY AND BUDGET

Chapter 4 discusses the significant points of both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). I follow with an examination of the interrelationship of strategy, force structure, and budget.

To set the tone for my discussion of the NSS, I provide this concern:

In any event, given President Clinton's early focus on peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation-building, and humanitarian assistance operations, meeting two regional contingency requirements may prove to be an elusive goal, especially considering shortfalls in strategic airlift. But the review asserts that U.S. forces must be sized and structured to act unilaterally. In some ways that begs the question of what constitutes President Clinton's national security strategy. Are we buying an insurance policy to meet the Pentagon's regional contingencies? To meet the administration's peacemaking objectives?¹

President Clinton, in the preface of the NSS, describes the world much the same as was presented in chapters 1 and 2.

The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions.²

The NSS seeks to address these new threats, calling them new opportunities, and in addressing has three central goals: (a) to sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight and promote cooperative security measures, (b) to bolster America's economic revitalization by opening foreign markets, thereby spurring global economic growth, and (c) to promote democracy abroad.

This national security strategy report is premised on a belief that the line between the United States' domestic and foreign policies is disappearing--that the U.S. must revitalize her economy if it is to sustain superior military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and the U.S. must engage actively abroad if it is to open foreign markets and create jobs for American citizens.

The three goals of enhancing U.S. security, bolstering U.S. economic prosperity, and promoting democracy worldwide are supposedly mutually supportable. With these aims, the U.S. believes that other nations throughout the international arena who are secure themselves are in turn far more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic societies.

Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development.³

Specific examples were mentioned in the NSS speaking directly to enhancing global security. Some of the more important ones are: pursuing peace initiatives with the countries of the Middle East; establishing NATO's Partnership for Peace and initiating a process to lead to the expansion of NATO; securing the participation of the former Soviet Block countries (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and these countries agreement/commitment to eliminate their nuclear stockpiles from their respective territories--which ultimately led to the ratification and entry into force of the START I Treaty.

Within the framework of bolstering prosperity at home and around the world, the Clinton administration has secured American, Canadian, and Mexican interests by lobbying for and eventually gaining enacting legislation to successfully implement both the North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA). A similar example was fostered with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which sought to limit the severity of tariffs and thereby increase free trade in that specific region of the world.

In supporting democracy across the international world boundaries, the current administration supported reform within South Africa to assist their (South Africa's) transformation to a democratic society for all people. The administration, or rather the United States, has invested heavily in the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), (formerly known as the Soviet Union) as Russia and these new states begin/continue their respective transformation from a social regime of communism to one of democracy and individual freedoms. Another key example of bolstering democracy was the restoring of the democratic government of the country of Haiti.

The NSS cites initially the elements of the United States' national power as: (a) extraordinary diplomatic leverage, (b) economic strength, and (c) military force. Of the three, the military force remains an indispensable element of our nation's power.

Even with the Cold War over, our nation must maintain military forces sufficient to deter diverse threats and, when necessary, to fight and win against our adversaries. While many factors ultimately contribute to our nation's safety and well-being, no single component is more important than the men and women who wear America's uniform and stand sentry over our security. Their skill, service and dedication constitute the core of our defenses.⁴

The national security strategy's primary objectives of enhancing U.S. security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy is applied as a concept of "advancing our interests through engagement and enlargement." Engagement, as defined in chapter 1, means American involvement. One example of engagement is American leadership via preventive diplomacy--assistance with regional problems and/or situations

prior to escalation into regional crises, which may require other means to resolve from economic sanctions to military force.

The national security strategy speaks to U.S. engagement as being selective in nature, with a focus on regional problems and situations which are relevant to U.S. interests. The U.S. is also interested in applying limited resources well and in specific situations where these resources do in fact make a difference.

We must also use the right tools--being willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community. In all cases, we seek to protect the nature of our own long-term national interests. Those interests are ultimately defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical defense and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as well as the security of values achieved through expansion of the community of democratic nations.⁵

"Enhancing our security," as a concept, seeks to protect the lives of American citizens as a function of the U.S. government. The national security strategy realizes the importance of sharing this burden from an international perspective with its international partners. The solution to specific regional problems is best found when reached by several parties or nations, versus unilaterally by the U.S. The actions of small or multiple coalitions will form the peaceable resolutions for regional instabilities throughout the changing world.

In addition to maintaining multilateral relationships, the U.S. must maintain a strong defense capability, second to none.

U.S. military capabilities are critical to the success of our strategy. This nation has unparalleled military capabilities: the United States is the only nation capable of conducting large-scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders. This fact, coupled with our unique position as the security partner of choice in many regions, provides a foundation for regional stability through mutually beneficial security partnerships. Our willingness and ability to play a leading role in defending common interests also help ensure that the United States will remain an influential voice in international affairs--political, military and economic--that affect our well-being, so long as we retain the military wherewithal to underwrite our commitments credibly.⁶

The national security strategy tasked military forces with accomplishing the following tasks: (a) deterring and defeating aggression in major regional conflicts, (b) providing a credible overseas presence, (c) countering weapons of mass destruction, (d) contributing to multilateral peace operations, and (e) supporting counterterrorism efforts and other national security objectives. To ensure mission accomplishment of these diversified tasks, military forces must be capable of rapid responses, stressing effective operations. Fighting and winning is the ultimate goal of any employed force. Once committed, no other solution is intended. To achieve this end state, this demands highly trained, qualified, and motivated men and women with well maintained, modern equipment--capable of strategic mobility when called upon to execute.

In maintaining a strong defense capability, two of the five previously enumerated tasks relate directly to the implications for the ten division Army. These tasks are deterring/defeating aggression in major regional contingencies and providing a credible overseas presence.

The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. To deter aggression, prevent coercion of allied or friendly governments and, ultimately, defeat aggression should it occur, we must prepare our forces to confront this scale of threat, preferably in concert with our allies and friends, but unilaterally if necessary. To do this, we must have forces that can deploy quickly and supplement U.S. forward based and forward deployed forces, along with regional allies, in halting an invasion and defeating the aggressor, just as we demonstrated by our rapid response in October 1994 when Iraq threatened aggression against Kuwait.⁷

Overseas presence affords forward credibility and importance to U.S. interests in various regions of the world. This overseas presence also directly impacts and determines the force structure necessary to protect these interests. The national security strategy lists this presence in several forms: permanently stationed forces, pre-positioned

equipment, deployments and combined exercises, port calls and other "show" of force visits, and lastly, military-to-military contacts.

These various forms of military overseas presence are all aimed at specific benefits: (a) give form and substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments, (b) demonstrate determination to defend U.S. and allied interests in critical regions, (c) provide forward elements for rapid response in crises as well as the bases, ports and other infrastructure essential for air, sea, and land deployments, (d) enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, improving our ability to operate with other nations, and (e) underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to regional security.

Critics of the U.S. dwindling force structure (and in response to the national security strategy) do not fully share the administration's belief in the accomplishment of such a tall order.

To think that we should train and plan for the future without viable forces by saying we are going to rely on all these alternative engagements is just fooling ourselves. The day will come when we will not be able to meet a major military challenge. That does not appear to worry us. The real issue is the fact that threats, the kinds of threats that people died for in the past, are not going away. Our interests are not going to go away. Our interests are worldwide; that is why we have allies worldwide. They are vital to our interests. This country is not some charitable institution relative to most of our allies. We have forces overseas for ulterior motives because it is in our interests.⁸

The NSS seeks to improve the defense capabilities of U.S. allies, demonstrate commitment for the defense of common interests, and encourage all parties concerned to share their respective responsibilities.

That means, therefore, a concomitant responsibility to help defend our allies. You cannot do that if you have allies and vital interests around the world, but lack the forces to defend them; otherwise, the whole string starts to unravel. They question your credibility to defend them. In that case, allies will want you out of their countries. As a result, you are in an even worse position to defend your interests. That is what is happening to us. Somehow that has to be turned around.⁹

I would like to transition to the National Military Strategy for discussion of key concepts and objectives. The national military

strategy is prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is a result of extensive coordination with other components of the Department of Defense.

General John M. Shalikashvili, the current chairman, provided an excellent overview in his introductory comments.

This new national military strategy, derived from the national security strategy and the defense framework outlined in the Bottom-Up Review, describes the critical role which the Armed Forces will play in helping to achieve our Nation's objectives. This is a strategy of flexible and selective engagement required to support our Nation's interests. Reflecting the ambiguous nature of our security challenges, the strategy emphasizes full spectrum capabilities for our Armed Forces.¹⁰

Figure 2 graphically reflects the linkage of the National Security Strategy to the National Military Strategy and military objectives, tasks, and capabilities.

The national military strategy has two national military objectives: (a) promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction, and (b) thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 depict the components (or critical tasks, if you will) for these two objectives.

In discussing the first objective of promoting stability, one must understand the representative framework present in the world today. In chapter one, I described the world situation as being ever changing. From a historical perspective, the current stability of the world resembles the period after World War II--in that the "settling down" period for all post-war nations took a number of years. An example tied to the current period is the aftermath of Desert Storm in 1991. The world environment remains unstable in specific regions, with Desert Storm reminding all how quickly things can escalate.

The national military objective of promoting stability seeks long-term benefits for the United States.

There is ample historical precedent in this century that regional instability in military, economic, and political terms can escalate into global conflict. Our strategy further promotes stability in order to establish the conditions under which democracy can take hold and expand around the world. We intend to use the daily, peacetime activities of the Armed Forces to pursue this effort. U.S. forces stationed overseas, as well as those temporarily deployed, participate with allies at all levels in cooperative and defensive security arrangements that help preclude conflict and foster the peaceful enlargement of the community of free market nations.¹¹

The key thrust of the national military strategy is as a strategy of flexible and selective engagement. Flexibility is important because just as the NMS is connected to the NSS, the overall activities of the military must connect to the other elements of the nation's power. This point was stressed in the NSS discussion, but is also emphasized in the NMS to reinforce the connectivity and the importance of this concept.

The concept of flexible and selective engagement comprises three sets of tasks: remaining constructively engaged in peacetime; acting to deter aggression and prevent conflict; and fighting and winning our Nation's wars when called upon."¹²

To accomplish flexible and selective engagement, two strategic concepts, overseas presence and power projection, are critically involved as a foundation for military response or activities. There are also three components associated with these strategic concepts: (a) peacetime engagement, (b) deterrence and conflict prevention, and (c) warfighting.

The first of two strategic concepts--that of overseas presence--was discussed earlier in the NSS discussion. Examples of this overseas presence are: U.S. forces (Navy, Air Force, Marines, and in the Army's case--the 25th Infantry Division (Light)) stationed in the Hawaiian Pacific; forces stationed in Western Europe (although now deployed to Bosnia); forces deployed in the Middle East and Southwest Asia; as well as forces stationed in the Republic of Korea.

Power projection is the ability of forces to react and deploy quickly when called upon to do so.

With fewer U.S. forces permanently stationed overseas, we must increase our capability to project forces abroad. Credible power projection capability complements our overseas presence in acting as

a deterrent to potential adversaries. Effective power projection capabilities also provide greater flexibility in employing military force. Coupled with overseas forces, the ability to project tailored forces through rapid, strategic mobility gives national leaders additional time for consultation and increased options in response to potential crises and conflicts.¹²

The components of the strategy (peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win) all involve subcomponents, which I would like to briefly discuss. Beginning with peacetime engagement, the concept seeks to "engage" other nations during peacetime via military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. Bosnia is an immediate example of current peacekeeping operations utilizing American forces in a multilateral coalition effort in Europe. An example of humanitarian operations was the providing of food stuffs and dairy products to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) during Operation Provide Hope, specifically the delivery of rice to Murmansk, Russia, and butter to Dudinka, Russia.

The concept of deterrence and conflict prevention involves: nuclear deterrence, regional alliances, crisis response, arms control, confidence-building measures, noncombatant evacuation operations, sanctions enforcement, and peace enforcement. An example of peace enforcement readily coming to mind was the U.S. contingency forces remaining in the country of Haiti to ensure a peaceful transition after the democratically elected president was returned to power.

Examples of U.S. involvement in the arms control arena are: the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Russia, where a total of ten chemical inspections occurred to foster destruction of current stockpiles and prevent the production of specific schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals; ratification of START I; continued work on the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and implementation of the

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to reduce stockpiles of armored vehicles in Europe.

The concept of fight and win has the following tenets: clear objectives for decisive force, wartime power projection, fight combined and joint, win the information war, counter weapons of mass destruction, two major regional contingency focus, force generation, and win the peace. Critical to the force structure discussion and specifically the implications for the ten division Army are fighting combined and joint, as well as the two MRC focus. The two MRC focus was discussed in chapter three as part of the BUR examination.

Fighting combined and joint involves the respective strengths and capabilities of each of the services.

Each service has both a role and primary and collateral functions to execute, for which it must train, organize, and equip its forces. Land forces must be capable of deploying rapidly and if necessary, executing forcible entry to seize the initiative and close with and destroy enemy forces through synchronized maneuver and precision fires throughout the breadth and depth of the battle area. They must be capable of achieving operational and tactical freedom of maneuver and be sufficiently agile to achieve their objectives before opponents can effect counter-measures.¹⁴

The Impact of Budgets

There is no doubt a linkage exists between both strategies (NSS and NMS) and dollars applied to them for mission execution. Without budgetary dollars to fund programs within the various theaters, the fulfillment of achieving the policy objectives (for example protecting American lives) is near impossible. The concern from a budgetary perspective is: does the defense budget drive the national security strategy? "Reduced budgets and force structure translate into greater risk for the nation. As the custodians of national security, the leadership of the armed forces will always seek to minimize that risk, hence their desire for adequate budgets and force structure. The JCS evidently believed the BUR strategy minimized risk, but the force

structure and budget to support that strategy was found unaffordable by the Administration."¹⁵

In answering a second question, Does the budget drive our force structure? Also pertinent to the budget, one is hard pressed to disagree, especially when world events have suggested such structure is no longer needed.

While most DOD services and agencies preferred the larger budgets and force structures they enjoyed under the Bush Administration, they recognized the domestic agenda demanded more resources. The BUR methodology, flawed as it was, offered a sound rationale for more budget authority than they would otherwise retain. Mr. Aspin, a genuinely conscientious and intellectually honest public servant, found himself caught between his intellectually driven BUR results and the fiscally driven budget constraints of the domestically focused Clinton Administration. The result was his resignation.¹⁶

In looking at actual numbers, the BUR force falls short of the Administration's target ceilings. Part of the problem is the use of dollars calculated in FY 1994 dollars, not those projected in the respective years of comparison. The near-term (five year projection) prospect for the BUR fell \$13 billion dollars short of where the Administration desired to be--which was \$104 billion below the level of the Bush Administration's target.

In December 1993, the Administration reported that because of Congress's passage of a 2.2 percent military pay raise in FY 1994 and new (higher) inflation estimates the Pentagon's budgetary requirements through FY 1999 had grown by \$20 billion. However, it indicated that only an additional \$10 billion was likely to be provided. Other reports placed the added funding requirement at as much as \$50 billion. Even assuming the Administration's estimate is correct, the effect is to add another \$20 billion to the Defense Department's underfunding problem, bringing the total five-year funding shortfall to close to \$35 billion.¹⁷

The force structure was tailored by budget constraints. The national security strategy and the national military strategy are sufficiently linked to one another from a conceptual framework point of view. The last leg of the triangle is for the force structure to execute the various endeavors outlined/specified in the "selective engagement" environment. Let's examine the consequences of said engagements.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY BY STRATEGY

Chapter 5 begins with a revisit and in-depth look at the questions raised in chapter 3. I will analyze these questions by relating historical examples to the current problems of today. First, the long term U.S. security requirements must be clearly identified, linked to a decisive strategy--with that strategy fully achievable by military means (if necessary). The national security strategy and the national military strategy both are elements or foundation pieces to the larger context of the U.S. instruments of national power. The United States has, just as any other nation in the international world does, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means available at its disposal to resolve disagreements, conflicts, or other circumstances deemed inappropriate. These "means" are called the DIME model. I will explore each of these individually.

The diplomatic portion of DIME involves the participation in the international arena as nations communicate with each other via direct dialogue (conferences, summits, meetings, etc.), indirect dialogue (telephonic, video teleconferencing, cable messages, etc.), and participation in international bodies, such as the United Nations.

Every nation has a diplomatic corps that promotes and protects its purposes and interests with other nations. Diplomacy is the art of communications and relationships in the global environment. Ideas, prestige, and commitment are the currencies of the field. A nation responds to formal and informal communiqués and public pronouncements by its friends and competitors. The volume, clarity, and consistency of a nation's diplomatic signals convey intents that may or may not be well-intentioned. The tools of diplomatic power include negotiations, recognition, treaties, and alliances.¹

Sterling examples of the diplomatic instrument of national power are the U.S. led "thrust" in rallying support for the liberation of Kuwait from and within the international community when Iraq invaded in the fall of 1990, as well as the U.S. led discussions and negotiations between the Bosnians and the Serbs--which eventually resulted in the peace accord between these warring parties. Other examples include the U.S. participation in various treaties seeking to rid the world of undesirable materials such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; encouraging other nations to render these munitions safe in ways which are environmentally safe for their respective countrymen, as well as the neighbors who share their borders; and alliances with other nations on subjects which are important to mankind as a whole--where more positive results are effected with the alliance verses each country involved acting unilaterally.

The second instrument of national power for initial definition is that of informational means.

Bureaucracies that employ military, economic, and diplomatic power spend a great deal of effort acquiring and using information. For the informational instrument of power, however, no single government agency generates the informational power. Yet the power of ideas and information cannot be understated. Clear and honest expression of intent and motive can generate public support and good will at home and abroad. Shared intelligence about a common enemy or competitor can shape alliances and coalitions. Diplomacy could not occur without the power of ideas and information. The power of psychological warfare and civil affairs programs enhance military operations. Information and forums in which to express it are essential to success in the international system.²

The immediate example of the informational means as a source of national power readily associates also with the Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The media (and the products they generate) is a great informational reference and source of the power of influence. The media generated countless stories during both operations to keep the public informed, serve the international community with trends resulting from the events themselves, and serve and directly assist the diplomatic

efforts/accords as a reference source to pass critical and/or time sensitive information. The media (as an element of the informational means) can sway the national will of the people based on the information produced, how its produced (slanted or factual) and when its produced (timely or untimely).

The military element is the next source of instrumental power within the DIME model.

A nation's armed force can be its most awesome, expensive, and effective instrument of power. Military power is the collection of a nation's weapons and equipment, trained manpower, organizations, doctrines, industrial base, and sustainment capacity. Professional officers must be deeply concerned about military power and must be committed to its generation and sustainment--areas to be studied throughout their military careers.³

Historical examples of the military as a source of power abound and range from the deployment of forces to respond to a conflict (as elements of the Ranger Regiment, the 7th Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division did during Operation Just Cause) to the targeting of a specific military position for destruction using a bomb (i.e., the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the atom bomb at the end of World War II). The military as a source of power is the one source of power most readily thought of for application when a situation escalates quickly. Since forces are required to train frequently and maintain a state of quick, rapid responsiveness, elected officials are apt to use the military instrument of power to change or reverse these quickly developing situations to the desired state or outcome.

The last source of the instruments of national power evolves from a nation's economy.

All nations have trading partners; no nation is self-sufficient, and the strength and vitality of a nation's economy provides the capacity of that nation to influence the foreign policy behavior of other nations. A nation's possession of and need for minerals, products, and services shape its role in global trading markets. Economic instruments include trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, and bans), loans and loan guarantees (granting, structuring, and the like), technology

transfers, foreign aid subsidies, and monetary policies (exchange rates and convertible currency). Nation-states employ those instruments to protect their own industries and markets, to improve the quality of life of their people, to stabilize the economy and government of their friends and allies, and to deter destabilizing and hostile actions by other nation-states. Nations that have a vital interest in their own economic well-being usually have sources and instruments of economic power. Economic well-being may be an indicator of how important trade and commerce are to a nation.⁴

The economic trends of today are more international than ever before. Because no nation is totally independent or autocratic, the global market place brings new pressures to countries and governments never conceived. The overall result is a growing interdependence on one another throughout specific sectors of the world and with other non-sector trading partners. Examples of this are the countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) selling oil on the market place to prospective buyers/consumers and signatories of the North American Free Trade Agreement buying and selling products within a specific continent.

Each of these elements as instruments of national power are in fact a subset of a larger picture. One must fully understand the larger picture at least in context and concept before adequately mastering one of the elements individually. These elements are far more effective when employed in unison or in step sequence when resolving a conflict rather than singularly applying one of them on a conflict expecting total resolution. Each of these "means" are critical to the success of a decisive strategy, one clearly defined to the goals, objectives, and intent of a nation or country.

Obviously, the military as a instrument of national power is directly applicable to this discussion of the force structure

implications for the ten division Army. An understanding of the military involves the concept of strategy:

the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force. During a visit to the U.S. Army War College in 1981, General Maxwell D. Taylor characterized strategy as consisting of objectives, ways, and means. We can express this concept as an equation: strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved). This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strategy--military, political, economic, etc., depending upon the element of national power employed⁵

The concept of the national military strategy (ends, ways, and means) is distinct and separate from the concept of a national strategy.

National strategy:

may be defined as: the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. Military strategy is one part of this all-encompassing national strategy.⁵

To tie this first point (the long term U.S. security interests must be clearly identified, linked to a decisive strategy) all together requires "connectivity." There are two parts to this statement worth noting. The United States must identify its long-term security requirements. Secondly, and most importantly, regardless of what those security interests are, those interests must be unequivocally linked to a decisive, national strategy. From this national strategy (in the U.S.'s case now the national security strategy) flows the national military strategy to fully describe what is expected of the military forces in execution actions as an instrument of national power.

An historical example of a not so tightly wound, yet decisive strategy occurred in Somalia in 1992.

After the successful employment of forces throughout southern Somalia, USCENTCOM received numerous requests for coalition forces to perform additional tasks. The United Nations (UN), for example, wanted United Task Force (UNITAF) to expand its operations beyond the area of greatest need to establish a presence in the northern part of the country. The UN also pressed UNITAF to begin disarming factional

militia forces. Similarly, the UN sought to involve UNITAF in reestablishing a national police force for Somalia and assisting in the repatriation of Somali refugees. These tasks represented a new phenomenon labeled "mission creep." In essence, political agendas of key participants in the operation sought to expand the UNITAF activities and areas of operation beyond their initial, carefully limited scope defined by the mission of securing the environment for humanitarian relief operations.⁶

The force structure in place in Somalia conducted operations per their mission statement which did not include UN operations, especially of the magnitude previously described. Had the adequate force structure been in place to adequately undertake such a mission or role, then the respective governments involved would have determined mission refinement or continuation of the currently defined mission. The U.S. position in that instance had clear connectivity to a strategy, perhaps not fully from a military point of view, but most likely also involved diplomatic concerns as well.

An opposing view also from operations in Somalia speaks to the testing of the "peace-enforcement" experiment.

America had taken matters into its own hands with Restore Hope which showed that a massive deployment of force could halt factional fighting and safeguard relief operations, thereby saving thousands of innocent lives while suffering almost no casualties. The transition to United Nations (U.N.) authority represented not only a change in command and the rules of engagement, but also a major transformation in the world community's stated purposes in Somalia. Fundamentally, it marked the successful end of Restore Hope, with its narrow focus on saving innocent lives, and the start of a much bolder and broader operation. Its sweeping agenda encompassed: economic relief and rehabilitation; national and regional institutions; police and law and order; international humanitarian law, refugees and displaced persons, the clearing of land mines; and public information programs to support U.N. activities.⁷

The second discussion point from chapter three is: what are the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability concerns with retaining the BUR structure long term? As previously stated, the BUR intended for the remaining forces to be well-trained, well-equipped, and well-prepared for rapid deployment to a "come as you are" conflict without the hollowness

experienced during the Vietnam conflict. Lets define and discuss each of the principles separately.

What is feasibility?

Feasibility: Can the action be accomplished by the means available? A military objective is feasible if it has a reasonable chance of success. Feasibility is an assessment of the strategic concept (ways) given the resources available (means). Determining feasibility involves art and science. Feasibility is based on comparative resources: the means available and the means opposing influenced by the factor of prevailing physical conditions in the field of action. In other words, friendly capability versus threat capability given the nature of the environment. Feasibility is the comparison of friendly weapon systems, organizations, doctrine, leadership, and sustainment versus the nature of the opposition and/or obstacles that could cause defeat. The test of feasibility must include examining the underlying assumptions of the strategic concept and the impact of time (solve quickly or with patience), and geography.⁸

An example of feasibility, in that sufficient assets were not available, occurred during Operation Restore Hope as explained by the commander of U.S. Army forces.

Our mission was to secure relief operations in our assigned Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS) and break the cycle of starvation. The end state we envisioned was an environment where humanitarian agencies and UN peacekeepers could effectively conduct humanitarian relief efforts without our presence and support. Deploying 7,500 miles into heavily damaged infrastructure in Somalia was also difficult. The number of C-141 sorties available per day to ARFOR (Army Forces) changed as the division began to plan its deployment sequence for air and sea shipment. Initially, we had been told to plan on more than 20 sorties per day--we received less than 10 per day. Clearly, our strategic lift needs revitalizing.⁹

The BUR identified strategic lift as a shortfall, but assets are needed now to fulfill future missions of this magnitude successfully. The counter argument occurred during the actual mission in that ARFOR made the successful adjustment to a rerouting of C-141 aircraft sorties and still completed the operation. Were any lives lost because of this rerouting of aircraft? If there were lives lost, they were probably not Americans. Had there been, this rerouting action would not be acceptable to the American public. In a long-term sense, are troops and other Americans going to suffer if these described situations continue into the

future. Back on the budget soapbox, there is a price tag associated with the revitalization of strategic lift assets. Is the price of soldiers' blood worthy of the investment in the short-term and long-term to maintain deployable capabilities--especially when emphasized in the various strategies (NSS and NMS) as being crucial?

The concept of acceptability relates directly to economics and the bottom line of dollars.

If the military objective is suitable and the military concept is feasible, the military means required must be cost effective. Acceptability: Are the consequences of cost justified by the importance of the effect desired? A reckoning of the profit-and-loss account of the whole undertaking is essential to determining if the undertaking will be advantageous. Success must be at a reasonable cost. Acceptability is determined by comparing the resources required (means) and the benefits to be achieved (ends).¹⁰

Acceptability seems clearly based on dollars. There are two distinctions worth noting here. One can divide costs into two separate categories: tangible and intangible costs.

Intangible costs like prestige, public support, and credibility must be considered. Additionally, tangential consequences not related to the desired end may be important. For example: A consequence of using a coalition during the Persian Gulf War may be the expectation that future employment of force must be under the umbrella of collective security, which make unilateral action difficult to justify even if it was truly required.¹¹

Tangible costs involve things which are readily countable, like dollars used to purchase or replace equipment, the actual number of casualties lost in a particular battle or engagement.

An example of the concept of acceptability occurred in Rwanda as U.S. forces participated in humanitarian relief efforts.

Rwanda is an example of a disaster intentionally begun during a political struggle which quickly ran out of control. Rwanda will not be the last disaster that requires U.S. military intervention. Simply ignoring calls for help is neither ethical nor politically feasible. Although not all African disasters draw the attention of the American people, when they do, the public demands a quick and effective reaction. Only the U.S. military has the full range of resources, training, and experience to react rapidly to geographically isolated disasters when local order and authority

collapse. This is especially true of specialized capabilities in logistics, transportation, and intelligence. Many nations can provide infantry, but none can match the wide and integrated capabilities of the United States. Whether due to politics or resource limitations, African states cannot confront large-scale crises without outside assistance.¹²

Additional lessons from Operation Restore Hope point to the acceptability of specific risks by forces on the ground. One key lesson learned from Task Force 2-87 dealt with the lack of intelligence.

Intelligence gathering in Somalia was based almost exclusively on human intelligence: information provided voluntarily by Somalis or through interrogation of captured bandits or gunmen by counterintelligence (CI) personnel. Because of the nature of the operation, there was very little "top-down" intelligence. TF Kismayu only gave vague locations and estimates as to numbers of insurgents or weapons. Nor was there a clear picture of the various factions' intent.¹³

Suitability ties directly with the discussion of connectivity. The first evaluation of a strategy is linkage of objectives which can apply to other strategies (e.g. economic and diplomatic). Suitability: Will attainment of the objective accomplish the desired effect? A military objective is suitable if, when achieved, it leads to a desired political or national security objective. Suitability requires that military strategists translate political objectives into military objectives. A military strategist must make this translation during peace and war. Translating political objectives into military objectives is the art half of strategy. The art of strategy is an intuitive translation based on the experience, education, and wisdom of senior military leaders."¹⁴

An example of this translation process (from Desert Storm) of the national objectives to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater objectives is at figure 7.

I would like to characterize the national military strategy concept of selective engagement with an opposing view/concept of unlimited engagement. "Selective engagement" was simply defined as "a carefully chosen battle or employment" for use throughout this discussion. When one examines the feasible, acceptable, and suitable concepts in totality applied to a set of objectives or missions, doubt does come to mind.

Take for example the list of missions described in the BUR study for the ten division Army to accomplish (refer to figures 3, 4, 5, and

6): a total of twenty-two operations or activities ranging from military-to-military contacts to fighting and winning two MRCs "nearly" simultaneously. One does not doubt the professionalism of the military soldier which has stood the test of time. One does, however, wonder about the ratio of twenty-two to ten or two point one to one being adequate to ensure continued success. The previous discussion of "intangible acceptable" applies here. A person or unit does have a limit in terms of what can be expected.

A historical example of this occurred during the World War II campaigns. The events of World War II closely resemble the two MRC scenario because as events were coming to a close in the east (the European front), the west (Far Pacific) was in need of replacements or additional fighting power due to heavy losses as a result of the tenacious defensive operations employed by the Japanese. The soldiers who fought hard and well in Europe felt they had earned their rest and relaxation enroute "home," not enroute to another MRC of intense fighting.¹⁵ This same concept applies to fighting Desert Storm, immediately followed by fighting Korea. Korea would easily resemble the World War II fighting in the Pacific because of the similarities in compartmented and restrictive terrain.

The concern/implication for the ten division Army is: do you have "enough" to fulfill the requirements. The example from Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) demonstrated the phenomenon of "mission creep" and the exploration of peacekeeping moving to peace-enforcement"--clearly a U.N. hidden (correction different) agenda or the initiative to seize the test-bed opportunity. These concerns are real and lead to my third question (from chapter 3).

The third point flows from the national security strategy of engagement and enlargement and the concept of selective engagement from

the national military strategy: the DoD will receive future demands as a linkage to the NSS/NMS. President Clinton expressed it best:

the United States recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a great power. Our global interests and our historic ideals impel us to oppose those who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbors. Nations should be able to expect that their borders and their sovereignty will always be secure. At the same time, this does not mean we or the international community must tolerate gross violations of human rights within those borders.¹⁶

The concept of "special responsibility" coupled with twenty two operations (from the categories of peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win) equates to unlimited engagement--what I term "managed chaos"--verses the actual selective engagement. Having a force structure on-hand with the range of experience to handle the various missions is quite different from having an adequate force available to accept/execute the operations. As the force dwindles, should the strategy, specifically the number of requirements or missions, dwindle as well?

Clearly, we must define our goals and establish just what it is we want to accomplish within the limits of the resources available. As we reshape and downsize our military for the future, we have a central goal of continuing to support our commanders in the field--and our men and women in uniform--with the full range of capabilities necessary to do their jobs in peace, crisis or, if necessary, war. The reference to capabilities--not numbers of ships, squadrons or battalions--becomes a crucial change not only as lexicon, but more important, as a new way of thinking. Over the years Americans have not bought and paid for a force designed solely to defeat the Soviet Union. . . let alone Iraq. Instead, they have purchased definable capabilities that span the entire spectrum of conflict with tools to accomplish the mission--wherever, whenever, and however they are needed."¹⁷

The previous periods known and familiar to military personnel of large, bountiful budgets and steady force levels are no longer. The current period encompasses uncertainty about future force structure levels and projected budget cuts.

The American people have bought and paid for the finest Armed Forces this nation has ever had--the finest in the world today. We must maintain the broad defense capability needed for major regional contingencies, but maintaining that capability while deploying

effective force packages for peacetime presence and contingency response in regional operations are two separate and distinct issues.¹⁸

The final point for discussion involves planning for conflicts and the relationship to real-world activity. Planning for conflicts, whether the given term is war plan, operations plan, or contingency plan, is in fact an assessment of what is most likely to occur in a given operation. A valid threat assessment is absolutely critical for the creation of a sound and workable plan. These plans are all updated prior to execution with the updated intelligence situation and the threat's impact on the operation at hand. This preparation analysis rolls right into my concept discussion of "preparedness verses unpreparedness."

As I discussed operations in Vietnam in chapter 2, it was clear "Task Force Smith" was unprepared for the enemy they encountered. The same is true for the amphibious landing attempted and completed by the Marines on the Tarawa Island (heavily defended by the Japanese) during the Pacific Campaign of World War II. In both cases, was the analysis lacking, or was the operation suffering from the assets necessary to make a complete analysis in order to prevent such massive loss of life?

With the shrinking budgets of today, Army units can longer afford to "hoard" supplies as a precaution to having the necessary parts available during critical mission periods or field deployments. This reaction called "just in case" has been replaced by the logistics community's new slogan "just in time." Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the United States' capability to haul massive quantities of supplies across the world to turn around and bring it back from the "just in case" application. What is even harder to understand is the concept of inventorying supplies to determine exactly the amount on-hand "in time" versus continuing to receive the "in case" amounts to then reship them back to the United States. Complete knowledge of what

is on the ground--now called total asset visibility--would preclude the need for massive quantities of "in case" supplies.

Just like most Americans at Thanksgiving, where massive quantities of turkey, stuffing, pies, rolls, etc., are cooked and maybe half of it actually consumed, the military fighting force has had to cut back on what was and is going to be prepared for the big meal. When conflict occurs, this country always has and always will maintain the industrial responsiveness to crank out the necessary supplies to ensure successful operations. My point here is projected budget cuts have and continue to trim away the extra pies and rolls from the meal. Are the cuts going to allow for the key ingredients to remain for the traditional holiday meal or will the turkey (and associated dishes) be replaced by a meal "just as good," but healthier for the American economy?

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Change is inevitable. It occurs daily and in many cases becomes more intricate and more complex. This is certainly the case for the United States' security interests, both in the short term, but more importantly in the long term. The central theme of this discussion was an examination of implications for the current force structure and the linkage of those implications to a decisive strategy--a functional strategy secured by military force if and when necessary. The force structure and strategy are both funded by a budget which enables fiscal execution year after year in theoretical balance with the former two components.

The strategy, in concert with the various themes/concepts which form a framework for understanding (engagement and enlargement, flexible and selective engagement, promote stability, thwart aggression, etc.), has a foundation of two critical components which enable and determine its success or failure. These two critical components are: (a) an adequate budget to fund "engagement and enlargement" investments with regional alliances and economically minded countries throughout the international marketplace, and (b) a "well-trained, well-equipped, rapid response" military force.

Tied all together--strategy, budget, force structure--these three form an execution triangle for the future success, continued prosperity, and economic well being of the United States. As a superpower, the U.S. is engaged throughout the international marketplace to foster continued

stability. An application of the "triangle" in action occurred in the U.S. Pacific Command in 1995. Admiral Macke, commander-in-chief, took the concepts of "engagement and enlargement" and "flexible and selective engagement" to form a concept for his theater area of responsibility (AOR) known as "cooperative engagement"¹.

The three components of Admiral Macke's cooperative engagement are: deterrence, compellence, and reassurance. "Military forces must be prepared for more than "making people not do things"--the deterrence of "threats" that characterized the Cold War. Military forces must be prepared for more than "making people do things"--such as leave Kuwait," a function we can call "compellence." Military forces must be able to directly reinforce the regional confidence essential for long-term stability. This function is "reassurance." Cooperative engagement is a well-established, winning, military strategy. It is a comprehensive approach that guides the employment of the entire range of military resources provided to me by the American people."²

I use the Pacific Command example to cite a current day analogy of the application of the national security strategy and the national military strategy at work. With reduced budgets and manpower (forces available), Admiral Macke discusses the concept of trading access to places for bases to replace the basing rights lost in the Philippines as a means to accomplish the forward presence requirement. He also discusses the peacetime pursuit of "reassurance through the forward stationing and deployment of our military forces."

During his testimony before a congressional committee, Admiral Macke provided the number of deployments and military activities which occurred in 1994 to demonstrate the tempo in his AOR, to stress the importance of forward presence, and to praise the accomplishments of his personnel with regard to such an important issue of national security.

The number of activities conducted were: 18 multilateral conferences with participants from 36 nations; 411 staff talks in over 28 countries; 192 joint/combined exercises in 20 countries; 77 humanitarian/civic action programs in 23 countries; and 606 port visits in 23 countries.³

From a budget perspective, these missions and activities do cost money to execute. Politicians and strategists alike have chosen to pay for this increased activity versus pay for a larger force structure. The parallelism to the old phrase "do more with less" is apparent, but does go beyond. The activity is cheaper than maintaining the large force of before. The activity links nicely to the overall strategy of engagement (numerous visits) and enlargement (spread democracy and economic well being as much as possible). However, as fiscal budgets continue to decrease, these large numbers of activities will have to decrease also due to a lack of adequate funding. If the number of activities decrease, is the strategy in need of adjustment?

Executing the national security strategy with the force structure available is not an easy task.

Providing for the U.S. territorial integrity and political sovereignty is complicated. We choose to be proactive in our defense. Ours is a strategy that seeks to take action outside our country, thus precluding direct threats to U.S. borders and sovereignty. This kind of strategy is more necessary than ever before because, while international conventions describe a nation's geographic borders, economic and fiscal borders are not as distinct. In the 21st century, they will be even less distinct, for the global marketplace and a shrinking world essentially link our political sovereignty and economic viability to events abroad.⁴

Colonel Tony Wood provided a presentation discussing the United States Marines Corps' vision of the battlefield of the twenty-first century. Colonel Wood had received some initial guidance from the commandant of the Marines Corps General Krulak. Colonel Wood, relaying the words of General Krulak, spoke of a concept of "relevance." This concept of relevance was defined simply as "a trust."⁵ You, as I did, might wonder how relevance equates to trust. General Krulak's vision

encompasses "a trust" to: (a) the National Command Authority (NCA), (b) our citizens (here at home and abroad), and c) our sailors and marines--the fine men and women who professionally represent us daily.

Understanding what General Krulak has as his vision with respect to relevance, I would argue that same "trust" must flow in both directions. The NCA, the U.S. citizens, and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines alike, all must "trust" as well. The chain of command works in two directions--up as well as down, with both being equally important. The linkage in the chain of command described by General Krulak mirrors the linkage discussed in this thesis for the national strategy, the budget, and the current/future force structure. Trust is paramount to the consummate professional. The nation trusts the current forces to execute the strategy. The forces trust a promise of adequate funding to enable mission accomplishment. The current "relevant" dilemma is defining adequate funding to enable execution in accordance with the strategy.

The national strategy of the United States has a foundation of deterrence. Deterrence is used in multiple ways to resolve conflicts between adversaries. The current ten division Army force prides itself on being capable, ready, and effective at a moments notice.

But the ultimate source of deterrence is the belief in the minds of those whom the United States wants to deter that the show-of-force or contingency force is but the lead element of what the United States could bring to bear. Underlying the U.S. strategy that relies heavily upon deterrence is the assumption that the nation has the means (immediately available, capable military forces) and the will to conclude a crisis on the terms we and our allies desire. If this assumption is not valid, then the U.S. deterrent strategy rests upon a house of cards.⁶

I close my discussions with one final quote placing emphasis on preparedness and the linkage required between a strategy, a budget, and a force structure (to implement said strategy if necessary).

What kind of Armed Forces will Congress provide the nation? No doubt it will be smaller, and given the international and domestic situation, a smaller force is both necessary and appropriate.

However, that force must remain capable of providing for the common defense in a world changing as fast as ours. Congressional leaders may attend less to the realities of the strategic environment in which the United States lives than to the immediate issues concerning our domestic environment. Historically the United States has gutted its military force after a major war, and we may be tempted to do the same now that the Cold War is over. In the past, the strategic situation--diplomatic, military, and economic--led decision makers to conclude that the United States could afford the luxury of this behavior. The future, however, will not resemble the past. When the nation's main effort must again turn to external threats to national security, the United States will be found wanting and with little time to recover. Simply put, the payment for unpreparedness is blood.⁷

The military as the most decisive instrument of national power must always be ready at a moment's notice. This has held true in every major war and minor conflict throughout history and still holds true for the current ten division Army. Neither of the adages "do more with less" and "do less better" are applicable today. Doing more with less is physically impossible, while doing less better is achievable--if the current force structure actually had less to do.

The connectivity--a linkage--between the nation's strategy, its budget, and its force structure does exist. In theory, the "linkage" replicates a flowchart, with the steps being: develop the nation's strategy (NSS/NMS), design the force structure to implement the developed strategy, and then fund (via fiscal budgeting) the force to execute the strategy. If the budget, especially from a political agenda perspective (between the Republican and Democratic parties), does in fact limit or establish the force structure, then the budget also likewise drives the national strategy. In the current state of a limited budget, political leaders have failed to realize the "triangle" exists. Military leaders have forgotten their oath of office or their requirement for "moral courage" to tell it like it really is. Admiral Macke's testimony on his current optempo was great and wonderful--but did the politicians receive the correct message. Yes, the admiral accomplishes his mission, but at what cost? How long can the force structure, the old equipment, and the

families continue at such a pace? In theory, the legs of the triangle are equal in length (see figure 8). The strategy leg has remained its original size, while the force structure leg continues to shrink (18 to 12 to 10 to 8 active divisions), along with an increasing leg labeled "budgetary concern" as funding drops as well.

A cost is associated with everything. There is a retirement cost savings associated with the military downsizing of personnel. Conversely, there is a higher optempo cost for those left behind who execute unchanged, ambitious national security and national military strategies. If one remembers the costs associated with Task Force Smith and the then "ten division" Army during the Korean War, the cost paid (as stated before) was in soldier blood from being run over and enveloped. Technology and personnel are mutually exclusive. They do, however, work together. Both cost money, perhaps one more than the other depending upon who does the number crunching, but each requires substantial funding to sustain previous levels of success into the future.

The old Fram Oil commercial adage applies here: "you can pay me now or you can pay me later." Notice that in either situation you pay. The "triangle" needs attention now. The force structure and budget must facilitate strategy execution. If force personnel numbers are reduced commensurate with the fiscal budget, then the strategy (NSS and NMS) must also change. The current day strategy of "selective engagement" is actually managed chaos instead. Chaos exists because of the triangle imbalance between adequate funding, sufficient forces, and a functional strategy. Current military leaders and politicians alike have perhaps simply chosen to overlook this simple fact of connectivity. The United States, nor the United States Army, cannot afford the same "Korean War unpreparedness" moving into the twenty-first century.

TABLE 1
ARMY DEPLOYMENTS TO THE
DESERT SHIELD THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Phase 1

82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA
197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Fort Benning, GA
HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX
1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX
1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX
11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Fort Bliss, TX
XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg, NC
III Corps Artillery (elements), Fort Sill, OK
1st Corps Support Command, Fort Bragg, NC
13th Corps Support Command, Fort Hood, TX
12th Combat Aviation Brigade, Germany
3d Armored Division (aviation elements), Germany
7th Medical Command, Germany
HQ, 3d U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, GA

Phase II

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, KS
1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany
3d Armored Division, Frankfurt, Germany
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Nuremburg, Germany
2d Corps Support Command, Stuttgart, Germany
HQ, VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany

TABLE 2
HISTORICAL ARMY DEPLOYMENTS (SIX MONTHS)
SEALIFT AND AIRLIFT COMBINED

	Passengers	Cargo (STONS)
Korean War	45,800	1,622,200
Vietnam War*	168,400	1,376,400
Saudi Arabia	295,800	2,280,000

* Figures are for all of 1965.

BUR MRC/CONFLICT DYNAMICS

MRC OPTIONS

- 1 - WIN ONE MRC
- 2 - WIN ONE MRC, HOLD IN SECOND
- 3 - WIN TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MRCs
- 4 - WIN TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MRCs PLUS CONDUCT SMALLER OPERATIONS

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

- o 8 ACTIVE/ 6 RESERVE DIVISIONS*
- o 10 ACTIVE/ 6 RESERVE DIVISIONS*
- o 10 ACTIVE DIVISIONS/ 15 RESERVE READINESS BRIGADES
- o 12 ACTIVE/ 8 RESERVE DIVISIONS*

CONFLICT PARAMETERS

- o OVERSEAS PRESENCE VS. FORCE PROJECTION
- o STRATEGIC LIFT CONCERNS
- o PEACEKEEPING VS. PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
- o HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE VS. DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

* RESERVE FORCES ARE DIVISION-EQUIVALENTS

Figure 1




Figure 2

ACHIEVING NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Promote Stability

Through Regional Cooperation
Constructive Interaction

Thwart Aggression

Credible Deterrence
Robust Warfighting Capabilities

Overseas Presence
Power Projection

Figure 3

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Military to Military Contacts

Nation Assistance

Security Assistance

Humanitarian Operations

Counterdrug and Counterterrorism

Peacekeeping

Figure 4

DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Nuclear Deterrence
Regional Alliances
Crisis Response
Arms Control
Confidence Building Measures
NonCombatant Evacuation Operations
Sanctions Enforcement
Peace Enforcement

Figure 5

FIGHT AND WIN

Clear Objectives & Decisive Force
Wartime Power Projection
Fight Joint and Combined
Win the Information War
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Two Major Regional Contingencies Focus
Force Generation
Win the Peace

Figure 6

OPERATION DESERT STORM OBJECTIVES

National Objectives

Achieve the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi Forces From Kuwait

Restore the legitimate government of Kuwait

Remain committed to the restoration of security and stability of the Persian Gulf Region

USCENTCOM Theater Objectives

Attack Iraqi Leadership and command and control
Gain and maintain air supremacy
Cut “totally” Iraqi supply lines
Destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear capability
Destroy the Republican Guard
Arab Forces liberate Kuwait City

Figure 7

STRATEGY/FORCE/BUDGET "LINKAGE"

- DEVELOP NATION'S STRATEGY (NSS/NMS)
- DESIGN FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON REQUIRED STRATEGY
- FUND FORCE STRUCTURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT STRATEGY DECISIVELY




Figure 8

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
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
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