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THE NO-FLY ZONES IN IRAQ:  
AIR OCCUPATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAVID E. PETERSEN, MAJ, USAF  
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1984

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1996

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
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
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
  
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THE NO-FLY ZONES IN IRAQ: AIR OCCUPATION by MAJ David E. Petersen,  
USAF, 90 pages.

The end of the Persian Gulf War was followed by the establishment of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Both of these operations have no-fly zones as their centerpieces. These first no-fly zones have already been followed by a no-fly zone in the former Yugoslavia. Given the current willingness in the U.S. to use airpower, and specifically no-fly zones in conflict resolution, further analysis is warranted.

This thesis examines the use of no-fly zones in Iraq to accomplish the strategic goals of occupation. A historical comparison of these no-fly zones and the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan is used to measure, compare, and contrast these post-war actions. The subjective analysis of the no-fly zones is the basis for determining if they accomplish the strategic objectives of occupation.

The historical analysis conducted in this research shows that the use of no-fly zones accomplishes both components of occupation, holding and controlling. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the use of no-fly zones accomplishes the strategic goals of occupation.

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I can not say enough to my committee. They have been an integral part of this project. Without our weekly meetings and their constant review, this project would not have stood a chance. Colonel Peterman, Mark Cioffi, and Phil Bradley read and reread this thesis as it developed, providing valuable insight and guiding suggestions. I must thank Major Leeson for his expertise in making this a much clearer and more focused work.

Finally, to all the other friends and family who have supported me throughout my life and Air Force career I thank you. Most of all to my parents who taught me to set goals and to work diligently to achieve them, I thank you.

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#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|              |                                  |
|--------------|----------------------------------|
| U.S. CENTCOM | United States Central Command    |
| U.S. EUCOM   | United States European Command   |
| ODF          | Operation DENY FLIGHT            |
| OPC          | Operation PROVIDE COMFORT        |
| OSW          | Operation SOUTHERN WATCH         |
| SCAP         | Supreme Commander, Allied Powers |

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil.<sup>1</sup>

Clausewitz, On War

As the renowned military theorist Clausewitz points out, in war, termination of conflict is not necessarily the end. Unfortunately, victory is often viewed as a panacea to war-causing problems. In fact, war termination can be a long, difficult challenge for all sides.

In his book Liberation, Occupation and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, Dr. John T. Fishel outlines several applicable findings to war termination under "A Strategic Concept for Post-Conflict Operations." Extracts include:

International Law requires the victor in war to undertake specific responsibilities toward the people of a defeated nation. The role of "liberator" carries most of the same responsibilities as an occupier.

The experiences of post-World War II occupations provide a basis for lessons learned in planning and executing occupation.

Strategic concepts for post-conflict operations are determined by the military and political objectives for which a war has been fought. Not only must we know what our objectives are, but we should also be able to fully describe the desired end state--at least in general terms.

Our post-conflict strategy needs to develop the proper organizations to achieve the requisite unity of effort in the interagency, combined and joint environments.<sup>2</sup>

### Establish the Problem

War termination is an area of great concern to strategists and planners. This thesis focuses on the post-war role of occupation and the inclusion of airpower in occupation. As Dr. Fishel points out, occupation forces have responsibilities to the vanquished enemy. He recommends examination of World War II for lessons in planning and executing an occupation. In his book, he focuses primarily on the civil affairs aspects of occupation; however, there are many other areas to consider. This thesis addresses the use of airpower.

Dr. Fishel asserts that while the end state of a conflict is generally part of U.S. strategic military objectives, in occupation, end states generally remain evasive. Occupation end states may not be clearly stated, but they usually can be deduced.<sup>3</sup> Examples from World War II and Iraq follow.

Allied victory in World War II resulted in the occupation of Germany and Japan. The Allies' desired end state of the war was the unconditional surrender of the German and Japanese governments. This was the precursor to international occupation of both countries. In order to accomplish this occupation and to establish and maintain control of these countries, numerous allied forces were garrisoned or based within their borders. A clear end state for the German occupation was the de-Nazification of Germany and the establishment of a stable democratic regime with free elections.<sup>4</sup>

Coalition victory in the Gulf War resulted in the need for another occupation force. Post-war Iraqi military attacks on the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north, as well as the

instability of the region as a whole, required the U.N. to take actions to establish control over both northern and southern Iraq. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in the north and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in the south occupy much of the airspace over Iraq in order to control and monitor Iraqi air and ground activities.

The end state of the operations in Iraq is difficult to deduce. Much of the political rhetoric during the Gulf War led Iraqi dissidents and others to believe that the U.S. sought three independent states: one for the Kurds in the north, one for the Shiites in the south, and the third for the Sunnis and Saddam in the center of the country. Many of the citizens of Iraq, oppressed by Saddam Hussein, believed that world leaders were encouraging them to revolt and be free.<sup>5</sup> However, this would have promoted virtual anarchy in the region, not stability. A close look at the Gulf region reveals that a unified Iraq is the surest way to promote regional stability, which was the U.N. desired outcome of the war. Accordingly, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) planners worked to ensure Iraq remained a sovereign nation.<sup>6</sup> Once the end state was established, the task was to achieve it effectively. The strategic objective of regional stability dictated the need for an occupation force.

#### Importance

According to the U.S. National Military Strategy, promoting stability is a national objective of the U.S. military.<sup>7</sup> An examination of the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II suggests that stability is most effectively achieved through employment of appropriate forces capable of holding and controlling the occupied

area. This thesis addresses the question of whether coalition airpower, through enforcement of no-fly zones in Iraq, accomplishes the strategic goals in occupation and is capable of supporting regional stability.

For background, this thesis looks at the advent of the no-fly zone as an acceptable and effective means of holding and controlling an area or country in order to serve as an occupation force. Occupation force responsibilities include monitoring cease-fire terms, enforcing sanctions, and peacekeeping. The no-fly zone appears to be a viable option for post-war occupation for several reasons. First, upon cursory inspection, no-fly zones appear to be less costly financially in comparison to land occupation. Second, the American public has become less tolerant of American casualties, and operating a no-fly zone puts fewer military personnel in harm's way than does land occupation.

If the no-fly zone is a suitable alternative for future occupations, a clear understanding of that occupation's strategic objective is required. This thesis seeks to determine when a no-fly zone can complement or replace land occupation. The strengths and limitations of airpower when used to enforce no-fly zones will be examined and will provide a guide as to whether a no-fly zone can achieve the objective of stabilizing another country through occupation.

#### Background

This thesis compares post-World War II occupations to post-Gulf War no-fly zones in Iraq. The world has been affected not only by how these wars were fought, but by the state of the involved countries and their relationships after the war. First, however, a brief examination of the concept of war termination is in order.

War termination can be thought of as a spectrum, beginning with the "cessation of combat" and ending with "conflict resolution."<sup>8</sup>

Surrender of one side during a conflict is just one of the possible outcomes that can range from total destruction to surrender.

A surrender entails one side yielding control of some or all of its forces permanently to the other side but a surrender may be local or general; it may involve small units or large formations; and it may be with conditions or unconditional.<sup>9</sup>

Two wars where the victors clearly and decisively drove the enemy to the point of surrender are covered in this thesis. By examining the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan, the essence of a successful occupation can be distilled. The occupiers' ability to hold and control their areas was a prerequisite to the accomplishment of the strategic objective of regional stability.

Occupations dramatically influence regional stability. The outcome of World War II continues to be a driving force in the structure of today's world. Decisions made by world leaders concerning the occupation of defeated countries have shaped those countries and their respective regions of the world. The current status of Japan and Germany clearly illustrate the importance of a well-administered occupation. These two countries are now among the top seven economic countries in the world.

The resolution of the Gulf War is currently underway and it is too early to measure overall success or failure. The conflict began with age-old disputes and disagreements which erupted into armed conflagration.<sup>10</sup> The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was due, in part, to a claim of ownership of the prime ports and oil-rich fields. The outcome of the Gulf War, as opposed to World War II, was not unconditional

surrender. It does, however, fit the mold of decisive victory and brokered peace with a need for an occupying, stabilizing force. Airpower provides that force.

Airpower was decisive in the Gulf War. Its role in weakening the Iraqis prior to the ground war was a new step in warfare, brought about by such technological advances as precision weapons and stealth technology. Furthermore, the use of airpower ensured the coalition forces met their objectives of limiting casualties and ending the war quickly. A look at airpower's impact is in order to prepare for its use as the "enforcer" of the terms of surrender and as occupier. The Gulf War Air Power Survey summarizes it this way:

Air power had destroyed not only large amounts of equipment. It had destroyed the confidence of the Iraqi soldiers that the equipment would do them any good--on the contrary, the equipment was seen as a magnet for air strikes. Whether or for how long the Iraqi troops could have held on and for how long, even without a ground attack, are matters for speculation. The demonstrable fact is that the Iraqis simply could not react once the ground attack took place and Coalition forces swept through the theater. This Survey could not assess possible differences in Iraqi resistance if the Coalition ground forces had less air support or had there been a shorter air campaign. The survey did determine, however, that air power made that resistance disorganized and totally ineffective.<sup>11</sup>

Generally, the same types of aircraft responsible for destroying the Iraqi military during the war are currently in place in the no-fly zones over Iraq. The two no-fly zones currently in effect are components of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.

When Saddam Hussein forcefully crushed the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq shortly after the Gulf War, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was born.<sup>12</sup> Worldwide media attention was still focused on Iraq. While Saddam's attacks on the Kurds were not a new development, this was the first time the world was able to watch at home. Iraqi attacks on the

Kurds were due to the lack of regional stability, initially brokered at the conclusion of the war. The Kurds knew that Saddam was measurably weakened by the war. Saddam also knew this and knew that maintaining control of Iraq would require pushing back the Kurds to prevent encroachment. World opinion would not permit this atrocity to continue. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 688, requesting "the Secretary-General use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population."<sup>13</sup> Troops were sent in as peacekeepers, and a no-fly zone was established to prevent Iraqi air attacks on Kurdish refugees. The United States, Great Britain, France, and Turkey have been operating primarily out of Incirlik Air Base in southeastern Turkey for most of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

Doctrinally, the USAF does not have a no-fly zone mission. Establishing this no-fly zone was a difficult undertaking. Its purpose is to prevent Iraqi aircraft from flying north of the 36th parallel. Aircraft have been patrolling the skies over northern Iraq during specific time periods almost every day since the end of the war. This process is in its fifth year with no end in sight.

The Shiites in southern Iraq also have a long-standing dispute with the ruling Sunni Muslims. Allied forces operating out of Saudi Arabia assumed a unique mission at the end of the war. The allies were initially tasked to keep at least one aircraft in the air over Kuwait twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to monitor Iraqi activities from across the border and show U.S. resolve to the nations of the

region and world. This process continued until 26 August 1992 when President George Bush announced the establishment of the no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel (Operation SOUTHERN WATCH) in response to Saddam Hussein's attacks on Shiites in southern Iraq. Again air power was tasked to provide protection for minorities in Iraq.<sup>14</sup> The Shiite dispute with Saddam, like the Kurdish one in the north, had been ongoing for years but this time international interest was immediately piqued by the residual presence of the media in Iraq. The long-running historical nature of this conflict makes quick resolution difficult.

This southern no-fly zone is a 24-hour-a-day operation with the same basic premise as the northern no-fly zone. These aerial patrols have demonstrated their utility on several occasions since 1992. On 27 December 1993, an American F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG-25 in the no-fly zone. The intentions of this Iraqi interceptor/reconnaissance aircraft were not clear; most likely the pilot was testing the will and capabilities of the Americans.<sup>15</sup> On two other occasions, the allies were able to watch Saddam mass his armies and move them south, threatening Kuwait both times. In October 1994, after just such troop movements, U.S. and coalition forces responded by deploying troops into the theater under Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The U.S. deployment caused Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from their threatening positions.<sup>16</sup> The southern no-fly zone, like Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, has no end in sight.

Just as the occupation of Germany and Japan shaped the world after World War II, the enforcement of no-fly zones will most likely have far-reaching effects on Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. The potential

for the loss of life, whether friendly, hostile, or neutral is immense. The expense and risk inherent to ground occupation make it unattractive to America and its allies. As no-fly zones continue in use, the objectives/goals and inherent costs must be critically analyzed. While this discussion concerns the establishment of no-fly zones after war, portions of this thesis may be applicable to no-fly zones not linked to war termination. The U.S. hopefully will not find itself soon embroiled in a "shooting war." However, U.S. forces may very well be tasked to come to the aid of countries in peacekeeping or peace enforcement situations where the effective use of airpower and no-fly zones may be a valid solution. The lessons from the current situation may be applicable to these other situations.

The post-conflict use of no-fly zones is just beginning. A cost-effective way of controlling the activities of a defeated nation would be an important asset in international diplomacy. The post-conflict occupation of another country has been necessary before and will continue to be necessary. If no-fly zones are to continue to be used to accomplish the strategic goals of post-conflict occupation, a thorough look at their relative advantages and disadvantages is required.

#### Key Definitions

It is important to establish a common understanding of occupation by looking at the definitions of this term. Working from the general to the more precise, specifically, from the dictionary to joint publication definitions, the concept of occupation remains somewhat unclear. The following summary of the applicable definitions attempts to provide a clearer picture of this concept.

Occupation: Definition in Merriam Webster, Collegiate

Dictionary, 10th ed., 1989 is:

2a: The possession, use, or settlement of land : occupancy. 3a: The act or process of taking possession of a place or area : seizure. 3b: The holding and control of an area by a foreign military force. 3c: The military force occupying a country or the policies carried out by it.<sup>17</sup>

Military Occupation: Joint Publication 1-02 defines it as:

A condition in which territory is under the effective control of a foreign armed force. See also occupied territory; phases of military government.<sup>18</sup>

Occupied Territory: Joint Publication 1-02 defines it as:

Territory under the authority and effective control of a belligerent armed force. The term is not applicable to territory being administered pursuant to peace terms, treaty, or other agreement, express or implied, with the civil authority of the territory.<sup>19</sup>

Phases of Military Government: Joint Publication 1-02 defines it as:

1. Assault--That period which commences with first contact with civilians ashore and extends to the establishment of military government control ashore by the landing force. 2. Consolidation--That period which commences with the establishment of military government control ashore by the landing force and extends to the establishment of control by occupation forces. 3. Occupation--That period which commences when an area has been occupied in fact, and the military commander within that area is in a position to enforce public safety and order.<sup>20</sup>

Summarizing the previous definitions reveals two main themes: holding and controlling a given area. For this thesis, occupation will be limited to the post-war actions of the victor who has taken an area and now holds and controls it. Occupiers must accomplish both holding and controlling to occupy an area. Further, these two themes are considered in this thesis to be the strategic goals in occupation. Contrary to the Joint Publication 1-02 definition of occupied territory, this definition will be applied to countries that have surrendered. As

there are no definitions for "hold" and "control" in joint publications, the following are dictionary definitions.

Hold: "To maintain in a certain position or relationship; keep. . . . To keep in one's possession; own. . . . To defend from attack; preserve."<sup>21</sup>

Control: "To exercise authority or dominating influence over; direct; regulate. . . . To hold in restraint; to check. . . . To verify or regulate."<sup>22</sup>

No-Fly Zone: There is no available, joint publication definition of this term either. For this thesis, this term means the placement of air forces in flight over a country or region of a country to ensure compliance with some directed terms. The activities of these aircraft are not strictly limited to counterair missions, but they may be called upon to execute air interdiction or even close air support missions.

Counterair: Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force defines counterair missions as "those whose objective is control of the air."<sup>23</sup>

#### Topic of the Thesis

The question this information leads to and the topic of this thesis is: Do the no-fly zones in Iraq accomplish the strategic goals in post-war occupation?

#### Subordinate Questions

Secondary Questions that must be resolved include:

1. What is occupation?

2. Can airpower hold an area?
3. Can airpower control an area?
4. Are there some things critical to occupation that airpower cannot do?
5. Is a combination of ground and air occupation possible?
6. What are the costs of ground and air occupation?
7. What are the benefits of air occupation vs. ground?
8. What are the risks of air occupation vs. ground?

#### Limitations and Delimitations

There are two distinct categories of limitations to this thesis. First, there is a lack of published information on the ongoing no-fly zones. Many writers are awaiting a final verdict on the utility of no-fly zones. Secondly, there is not a vast amount of information regarding airpower and occupation. This may be due to the limited experiences of airpower in occupation.

The scope of this thesis will be delimited to World War II and the Gulf War. These wars fit the mold of decisive victory with a peace settlement, the terms of which are primarily dictated by the winner. Other occupations or no-fly zones may be referred to in the analysis as examples.

#### Research Approach

In order to answer the thesis question, a comparison will be made between the no-fly zones and the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II. From the subordinate research questions, further

criteria have been developed to measure both the post-World War II and the no-fly zones in Iraq.

The post-World War II examples of occupation in Germany and Japan provide unique situations based on cultural, geographical, and political climates at the time. The no-fly zones in Iraq do not provide the same level of diversity. Therefore, in instances where, due to similarities in the "climates," a misleading conclusion may be drawn, this will be noted. In these cases, the fact that deeper conclusions should not be made without further study will be highlighted. Another area of comparison that may require a logical assumption to be made is the passage of time. While many aspects of the post-World War II occupation can be directly conveyed today, some may not correlate as easily. In these cases, logical assumptions will be applied.

Table 1.--Research Methodology

|             | Germany | Japan | Operation<br>PROVIDE COMFORT | Operation<br>SOUTHERN WATCH |
|-------------|---------|-------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Holding     |         |       |                              |                             |
| Controlling |         |       |                              |                             |
| Costs       |         |       |                              |                             |
| Benefits    |         |       |                              |                             |
| Risks       |         |       |                              |                             |

This thesis employs a matrix-like approach to solve the research question. The four different occupations, Germany, Japan, Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT, and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH are compared against the criteria that come from the definition of occupation and the subordinate research questions which provide a "backbone" for the vertical axis. The criteria used for measuring the different occupations will be used to support the conclusions.

#### Anticipated Outcome

It appears there is enough evidence to make a very strong argument that airpower, by achieving the strategic goals in occupation, can be an effective occupying force upon war termination. However, it is critical to understand the strengths and weaknesses of airpower in order to maximize its effectiveness. This thesis will help to clarify the role of airpower in this important phase of national interest.

Literature pertaining to occupation and airpower is reviewed in the following chapter. This review will lead to the research and analysis.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Wars transform the future. They move boundaries, topple governments, expand or break up empires, and leave scars of death and destruction. The battles fought during a war, of course, contribute to its aftermath; but it is the way in which a war is brought to an end that has the most decisive long-term impact.<sup>1</sup>

Iklé, Every War Must End

This chapter reviews literature on an aspect of war termination, specifically occupation. First, literature dealing with occupation in general will be covered, followed by a chronological review of occupations applicable to this study.

#### Occupation

There is a wide variety of material on the topic of occupation, each very different in its approach. Occupation has been a common element in warfare since the first men fought to gain territory. While modern occupation differs dramatically from early occupations, many early theories and conclusions are still relevant to this discussion.

One example is Occupation, the Policies and Practice of Military Conquerors, by Eric Carlton. Carlton looks at "conquerors," those military leaders who have defeated a country in order to take it in, usually as part of a growing empire. This is not the reason for the occupations reviewed in this thesis; however, certain requirements or actions that he defines as essential will be applicable here.

Carlton maintains that all occupying powers must employ some mechanisms to ensure control. These mechanisms are affected by the situation of the country to be occupied.<sup>2</sup>

To Carlton, control is the main issue in an occupation. The relationship between the occupying force and the civilian population is the central concern. Carlton believes that control can be achieved through a combination of forced compliance, persuasion, or indoctrination. He warns that control by force in the long run may be counter-productive. Persuasion is harder to achieve but may be the longer lasting.<sup>3</sup> From the definition in Chapter 1, control is half of the occupation with holding being the other. How to achieve control is the issue.

Underlying the whole question of control is the issue of conflict. However, understanding the nature of conflict is fundamental to any discussion on controlling populations. Carlton believes that conflict is traced to the nature of man. Is man basically good and law-abiding or is it man's nature to be selfish and out to please himself? Society then is either the corrupting agent if man is inherently good, or the restraining influence if man is evil.<sup>4</sup> Whether the war is with the people or the government of a country is a natural follow-on to this discussion. In World War II and the Gulf War, the rulers of the enemy nations were portrayed as evil influences and the population could be viewed as victims. Taking this idea one step further, the people are basically good, but the society (government) requires restraint. Occupation would then need to be directed at the evil government. The

population's core beliefs do not need to be reshaped, but rather the government must be influenced.

In the book War: Ends and Means Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla address how wars start, how wars are fought, and how wars end. They discuss capitulation and negotiation at the end of a war. The differences between these require more examination.

In capitulation, the defeated nation cannot dictate terms but must accept its lot. A country involved in negotiation, still holds a position of influence. The authors list a set of circumstances the defeated nation may face. From the best to the worst, they are: relinquishing war objectives; changing the form of government; benign occupation; occupation forces who cleanse the society of the main element responsible for the war, punishing it and exacting reparations; to the harshest and most common occupation where the goals are to punish, exploit and radically reform the defeated society.<sup>5</sup>

The American occupation of Japan is cited as an example of benign occupation. The civilians in Japan were treated as innocents and only a handful of the leaders were prosecuted. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, did not disband the Japanese government, but rather, made it clear to all Japanese that their militaristic ways could not continue. He also exacted no reparations from the Japanese.<sup>6</sup>

The less benign Western allied occupation of Germany following World War II is an example of an occupation that eliminates the individuals responsible for the war, punishes the government for the damage it has caused, and exacts reparations. The first two years

following the German surrender found a country in ruin. The occupiers had no guiding principle or force to direct their actions, so the occupation was personality-dependent. The country was divided among the Allies and whichever country was given the area to rule would set the tone for the occupation. Following the first two years, however, the Allied Forces allowed the Germans to organize and choose their own liberal-minded rulers. American aid was a key factor in the revival of Germany after those hard years. The U.S. realized that it needed Germany to become a strong ally against the rising Soviet influence.<sup>7</sup>

The end of World War II caused many of the world's leading thinkers to postulate on the future of warfare and its results. One such post-war study, published in 1957, is Strategic Surrender. The Politics of Victory and Defeat, by Paul Kecskemeti of the Rand Corporation. The topic of this book is the ending of wars, specifically World War II. He describes the surrender of France, Italy, Germany, and Japan.

Kecskemeti discusses the future and reviews the events of World War II. He focuses on nuclear weapons and their impact on the future. However, he also sees changing ideas such as a shifting away from the World War I and II strategies of attrition warfare. His conclusions include:

Complete victory is not synonymous with the enemy's strategic surrender. Victory assumes this form only in wars of a certain type, a type exemplified by World Wars I and II.

All surrender involves an element of bargaining, of mutual concessions. No surrender can be literally unconditional.

In settling conflicts, it is better to assess the enemy's bargaining position realistically than to concentrate one's efforts upon reducing it to zero.<sup>8</sup>

As reflected in the current literature, wars in the past 50 years have tended towards smaller, regional conflicts rather than global thermonuclear war. James D. D. Smith in his book Stopping Wars discusses recent experiences and the future of these kind of conflicts. This book, published in 1995, looks at conflict and describes the obstacles to cease-fire. Smith's focus is on post-World War II conflicts in what he calls the "modern international climate."<sup>9</sup>

In his analysis, occupation is not addressed as an outcome of wars. However, he does cover third party monitoring, peacekeeping, and controlling belligerents. Many of the ideas and activities of this third party could be applied to an occupier. He specifically states that these third party observers and peacekeepers do three things, including dealing with the domestic situation, dealing with units out of control, and settling disputes arising from the cease-fire agreement. If these actions are not accomplished, the belligerent will not be compelled to comply with the cease-fire.<sup>10</sup> Again control is a key element.

#### British Air Control

The British provide the earliest example of the use of airpower in occupation. Shortly after World War I, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was fighting for its existence; the other services were very interested in dissolving it as a separate service. The only use the British had for military forces at this time was in the colonies. So it was only natural to look to airpower as a cost-effective means of controlling the empire.<sup>11</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel David Dean's book Airpower in Small Wars, The British Air Control Experience provides a history of British operations. By 1920, the British had grown tired of chasing Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the "Mad Mullah,"<sup>12</sup> around the eastern tip of Africa, especially in British Somaliland. He had been on a run of terror evading the British regular Army for nearly 15 years.<sup>13</sup>

A team of men and 12 aircraft set out with the simple plan to bomb the Mullah's forts and pursue his bands, driving them to the ground forces in the area. The RAF was very successful in driving the Mullah and his men from their forts. They completed the operation in three weeks time, as opposed to the estimated twelve months it would have taken with a large ground force occupation. Winston Churchill, then Minister of War and Air, had been a major supporter of this plan and believed that "the first duty of the RAF is to garrison the British Empire."<sup>14</sup>

It was Churchill who, after seeing the successful use of air in Somaliland, asked Air Chief Marshal Hugh Trenchard to develop a plan to control Mesopotamia (Iraq) by air. The fledgling Arab government sponsored by the British was not popular among the tribes populating the country. By late 1920, a major rebellion was in progress. The British troops were scattered throughout the country trying to protect population centers while their lines of communication were completely vulnerable. The British were spread so thin that with outbreaks in several areas they were too weak to deal with the problem. Even with the addition of 63 aircraft, putting down the insurrection was costly.<sup>15</sup>

In 1922, Winston Churchill, now Colonial Secretary, began removing ground troops from Iraq and appointed an RAF officer commander in chief of the forces in Iraq, making him the first air force commander of a colonial territory. Realizing the need for further refinement of the air control theory, the RAF determined that the objectives for air control operations were political stability, pacification, and administration. They further discovered that when their operations were aimed at the morale of those who were disturbing the peace, and not at the rest of the population, the results were greater long-term stability and lower cost.<sup>16</sup> This use of airpower was very successful in controlling the various factions in Iraq and allowed the British to shift forces to other colonies that needed to be controlled.

#### Post-World War II Occupations

The definition of occupation arrived at in Chapter One provides the strategic goals of occupation, holding and controlling an area. These two goals are used to review the occupations of Germany and Japan. A review of the post-World War II occupations follows, showing how the occupiers achieved both holding and controlling in their respective occupations. In order to better understand the concept of occupation, the dictionary definitions are used to provide a framework. This same framework is applied in Chapter Three.

#### Holding an Area

The concept of holding an area in an occupation includes many of the dictionary's definition for holding. The joint pub definition of holding follows closely with the dictionary but is not as precise. It

merely addresses maintaining and retaining an area by force. This discussion will focus on the three areas in the dictionary definition, while the next section will address the means by which military forces actually achieve this goal.

### Maintaining the Relationship

Maintaining a relationship during an occupation may appear to be obvious. However, failure to maintain and improve upon the position or relationship achieved in the fighting portion of a war can be disastrous. The occupier must have goals to guide the process of maintaining a relationship. Hopefully, these goals create a benevolent relationship. Unfortunately, there are many examples throughout history where the relationship was not benevolent, but rather hostile, to the point of extermination. One example of a hostile relationship that included extermination is the Nazis in Poland and Russia during World War II.<sup>17</sup>

### Germany

The Allies' relationship to post-war Germany was crucial to the occupation. The Allied forces' overriding goal was to ensure that Germany could not threaten Europe militarily. The Allies were relatively unsympathetic to the plight of the German population initially. The Allies harbored varying degrees of ill will towards the Germans in 1945 and 1946, and the occupation and ensuing relationship with Germany reflected these feelings.<sup>18</sup> The Allies also feared the thoughts produced by German military minds and therefore actively sought to prosecute those individuals suspected of war crimes. To prevent

rearmament, the Allies initially adopted a zero tolerance attitude toward the Germans. For example, the Allies issued an edict that only permitted local governments to operate.<sup>19</sup>

### Japan

The Japanese situation was altogether different from the German's. The personality and ideals of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), were driving forces in establishing the relationship with the Japanese. As SCAP he took steps to direct all actions required to rebuild Japan. He intentionally demanded a benevolent occupation from the Allied occupiers. Charges of war crimes were levied against only the worst military leaders. He did not destroy the civil administration and he left the emperor in place.<sup>20</sup> While most of the credit is given to MacArthur for being the architect, Japanese national and American soldier sentiment also played a part in the relationship developed in this occupation.

In World War II, the Germans fought a protracted land battle for the second time in 30 years. The defeat of Germany was accomplished in a traditional way, defeating the enemy on a conventional battlefield. Conversely, defeat of the Japanese was through a completely new and novel approach. The Allies demonstrated that they could wreak havoc on the entire Japanese nation, not their army but their people, with only a few bombs. This led to some American feelings of sympathy or at least dimmed the flames of hatred from the soldiers. This relationship was a first in warfare. Occupiers were brought into a land upon which they had not fought, but which had suffered tremendous damage.

## Keeping possession

Annexation of the defeated country is not an objective in any of the examples in this thesis. However, in a much broader sense, occupying a conquered country's territory may be considered possession. It prevents the defeated enemy from using his territory or forces to attack another country's interests or allies. The best use of a country may be the denial of its use by another. In this sense, possession is not necessarily so much physical as psychological, as seen in the following examples.

### Germany

One of the problems with coalition warfare is the differing interests of the countries involved. A prime example of this is the situation in post-war Germany, where the nation was split between the victors. The Soviets in eastern Europe, to include East Germany, provide one of the harshest examples of occupation. The brutality the East German people endured at the hands of the Soviets included rape, torture, and murder.<sup>21</sup> Contrasting this brutality with the western Allies in West Germany clearly demonstrates that while the Allies had common war objectives, their conflict termination ideas were vastly different. In spite of their resentment of the Germans for starting the war, western Allies soon realized that they had a very real need for a country to join them against the Soviets. They needed to ensure that Germany would not become another Soviet satellite.

The initial western occupation of Germany was a disorganized process. The Allies had possession of a huge country but were not certain what to do with it. By 1947, it became apparent to the West

that West Germany was needed for the common defense against the Soviets. Through aid packages to rebuild the country, the Allies showed their concern for the plight of the German people. The Allies needed to possess as much land as possible in Europe to counter the growing Soviet threat. Germany's ascendancy into the western fold met this requirement.

The strategic position of Germany, in the center of Europe, was critical to the western nations. The Allies, upon the formation of NATO, needed an ally in countering the Soviet threat as well as bases for forward deployed forces. Another more subtle use of Germany was as an example to nondemocratic countries of the world. The stark contrast between western influence and the oppression of the Soviets could not be overlooked. Germany was also used as a business client or customer for all manner of products. In contrast, the eastern bloc states' economies were driven by the Soviets and they were not allowed the trading freedoms enjoyed by West Germany.

#### Japan

Of the four occupations in this thesis, the occupation of Japan most closely illustrates the definition of possession. The Japanese ruler in place was subordinate to the U.S. government. As such, the Allies were able to manipulate the workings of Japanese society and the Japanese people harbored surprising little resentment towards the forces in place. Americans were able to come and go as they pleased, subject to the approval of General MacArthur. The Japanese people were so taken with the General that many actively encouraged him to run for President of the United States. Signs posted in Tokyo in English and Japanese

reflected this support. Many Japanese realized the downside to this was that if General MacArthur, the leader who had won the hearts and minds of many of the Japanese people, left to run for office, they would lose his presence in Japan.<sup>22</sup>

The rising tide of communism was also a key factor in the occupation of Japan. The U.S. needed a foothold in the Pacific rim. China was falling victim to the communist forces and the future of Formosa (currently Taiwan) was unclear. Shipping capabilities were limited by the need for fuel, nuclear powered ships did not exist. Aircraft ranges were also still quite limited and bases were required to support U.S. overseas operations. Japan was very useful for both military and civilian transportation.

Another important use for Japan was as an example. There were no Asian democracies. Japan's history certainly did not make it a likely candidate for this prospect. From his earliest days in Japan, MacArthur worked to revolutionize the culture in order to bring it to a more democratic state. He did not eliminate the Emperor, but rather made him unimportant in the administration of Japan. He also sought to establish voting rights for women. Japan's success was influential to other countries in the region struggling against the communist influence.

#### Defend from Attack/Preserve

A country that has possession of, or wants the use of another, would certainly protect it from harm. A dilemma arises when the country that just fought and won the war would like to send its troops home. The last thing the victorious country's population wants is to prolong

their troops' stay in the area. If the victor does not want to annex or otherwise own the vanquished country, then it must allow it to establish its own defenses. Determining when the defeated country is in a position to defend itself rather than being in a position to reattack is extremely difficult. Planning the duration of an occupation becomes a difficult task for policy makers.

#### Germany

The defense of Germany immediately after the war, focused more on defending against disease and poverty than on any foreign enemy. In 1945 all of Europe was recovering from the destruction of the war. Confusion about the future was the rule. The Allies occupying Germany ensured order, but the population of Germany was more concerned with its next meal than with overthrowing them.<sup>23</sup> The confusion in occupation planning was apparent in the Allies lack of compassion for the suffering of their "possession."

The threat of Soviet expansion caused the Allies to realize the importance of Germany's position. The Allies were quick to respond to this threat by protecting their possession, through monetary and other aid. This influx of aid not only protected the Germans from military forces, but also from disease and starvation. This aid came far more quickly than it would have, had there not been a threat.<sup>24</sup>

#### Japan

At the end of the war there was no one in the Pacific region with the strength to attack or conquer Japan. The only country in any position at all was the Soviet Union. The Soviets at Potsdam agreed to

a single American commander in Tokyo. However, at the end of the war the Soviets began to press for divided command. MacArthur leaked to the press that he would not stay if he had to share command. Public opinion (both U.S. and Japanese) was so strongly behind MacArthur that the U.S. could not bend to Soviet demands for a four party rule in Japan.<sup>25</sup> Because of these agreements and their other activities at the time, the Soviets stayed out of Japan.

The only other threat to the Japanese was from within. Their country was in ruins, their leaders had led them to destruction and this once proud nation was under the rule of another. There were minor uprisings springing from these feelings, but most of the population was too busy trying to rebuild their country and lives. The terrorist threat was great, but it was kept under control by the forces in place. Most of the threat was aimed at the occupation forces themselves.<sup>26</sup> These threats were so isolated as to have no impact on the occupation.

### Controlling an Area

The next goal of an occupation force is to control an area. To have an area and not control it would very quickly lead to the end of the occupation. Once again, the dictionary provides the definition for key aspects of control. These aspects are exercising authority or influence, directive authority, regulatory authority, and to hold in restraint or check.<sup>27</sup>

### Exert Authority or Influence

The exertion of authority or influence can be seen or felt for many years or it may be more short lived. Hopefully, the effect of this

influence is coupled directly with the desired end-state of the conflict. For example, if a desired end state is to eliminate the Communist Party, one type of influence is required, whereas returning the nation to its own means in as short a time as possible requires a completely different kind of authority. Specific examples follow.

#### Germany

The Allies exerted great influence over the Germans. This was due in large part to the severity of the defeat Germany had suffered. After Hitler's death, many German forces wanted to surrender. However, these forces only wanted to surrender to Britain, France or the U.S. The U.S. sought simultaneous and unconditional surrender on all fronts, not a piecemeal surrender. Troops were surrendering to the western forces in mass but continuing to fight against the Soviets in the east.<sup>28</sup> The devastation of war was all around and the forces of the victors were in country, preparing to stay. Once the surrender came, the occupation began without a clear purpose.

After two years of occupation, as most countries were on the rebound, the real influence began in Germany. During the first two years, only local elections occurred. Starting in 1948, the Allies began allowing the Germans to elect liberal-minded leaders and facilitated the transition to a free-market economy. The need for an ally against the looming Soviet threat also resulted in the importation of western products.<sup>29</sup> It did not take long, due to security arrangements and the need for mutual support, for the Western influence to become widespread throughout Germany.

## Japan

No example of authority and influence in occupation is quite as telling as the American occupation of Japan following World War II. General Douglas MacArthur's reign in Japan, referred to as a "cultural conquest" in the book War: Ends and Means epitomizes this example.<sup>30</sup> The General wanted the Japanese to like what was happening to them. He did this by turning the Japanese culture, with their incredible discipline, to focus on an area other than war, commerce. He knew that the Japanese could apply the same discipline they had demonstrated in war to trade. Once MacArthur had established this process, he was able to allow the Japanese to take it over and run it themselves.<sup>31</sup>

Much credit is given to General MacArthur for developing this plan to control Japan. But, just as important in the control of Japan was the acceptance of the situation by the population. Over 1,270,000 Japanese were killed in action in the last four years of the war's fighting and 670,000 civilians died in the U.S. bombings. Over two million homes were destroyed by these bombings and the Japanese had razed an additional one-half million to make firebreaks. The Japanese had lost a substantial portion of its labor force in battles throughout the Pacific. Almost seven million Japanese soldiers, who had occupied various Asian countries, returned with only the skills of warriors.<sup>32</sup> The country was in shock after being rocked with the first two nuclear attacks in the world's history. The conditions were ripe for MacArthur's plan, and the true genius was that he realized it and made it work so successfully.

MacArthur ensured many subtle western influences found their way into Japanese society. He arranged for the Crown Prince to be tutored by Elizabeth Gray Vining of Bryn Mawr. Two million Japanese became Christians. There was even a petition from the Japanese to the U.S. Congress to admit Japan as the 49th state. All of these efforts greatly influenced the Japanese and had a marked effect on their culture. However, by the time MacArthur left Japan in 1951, wartime heroes were being eulogized favorably in popular Japanese literature. This was not an altogether bad sign. It shows that the Japanese could accept the positive aspects from two vastly different cultures and blend them to create the new Japan. Probably the most important American influence was the institutionalizing of a western system of popular government.<sup>33</sup>

#### Direct

A nation's ability to use directive authority and receive compliance limits the amount of force it must employ. If the occupier directs an action and the occupied country complies, military action will not normally be required. This direction can be overt or subtle, or even covert. In many situations it is best to let the occupied country save face by the occupier being less overt.

#### Germany

In their occupation, the Allied powers may have been unclear on the way in which to rebuild Germany, but there was no confusion on what would be prohibited. The post-World War I experience had shown that an undirected settlement would not lead to peace, but rather to resentment and the eventual rearming of the losers. The example of the 1920s

showed that if all the Allies tried to do was extract reparations without thought to the administration of the country, all that would be returned would be useless money. The resultant resentment would lead to future aggression.<sup>34</sup>

A more thoroughly thought out armistice and the direction provided by the occupiers played a critical role in the re-establishment of a functioning German nation. The direction provided was crucial to the establishment of a free-market economy. This economy was one of the major differences between the settlements at the end of World Wars I and II.

#### Japan

In order to allow the Japanese to maintain their dignity General MacArthur realized that he would need to work with their leadership. His acute understanding of their culture was crucial to his dealings with the Japanese. Many critics expressed outrage that the Emperor remained in place and the civil administration would continue to function. MacArthur knew that the Japanese reaction to having the same individuals in charge would stabilize the situation and allow them to set about the task of rebuilding their severely battered nation.<sup>35</sup>

Allowing the administration to continue working also worked to the General's favor in directing the activities of the country. Permitting the Japanese to remain in their positions should not be confused with allowing them to direct the activities of their nation. There was one man in charge of guiding Japan, and he was General MacArthur. The American Ambassador to Japan, William J. Seabald, was quoted as saying, "Never before in the history of the United States had

such enormous and absolute power been placed in the hands of a single individual."<sup>36</sup>

### Regulate

The ability to regulate an enemy's activities is crucial to an occupation. The occupier may not think it is necessary to direct some activities. In these cases, regulation may be the desired operation. The nature of the situation will determine how much of the occupier's authority is dedicated to directing and how much to regulating.

### Germany

The regulation of Germany was a vengeful, but not malevolent, one. The Allies thought the Germans needed to make reparations for the damage done during the war. The problem was that attempts to exact these reparations were uncoordinated and unorganized. Problems with regulations could be seen in the different occupied zones. American ideas for handling the German government were vastly different than those of the newly elected British Labour Party.<sup>37</sup>

An example of the problems can be seen in the use of German coal for reparations and foreign exchange. The Allies demanded coal for reparations. They established a regulatory system to ensure that most of the coal was turned over to the Allies. The coal miners had to be fed, but food was also being regulated and used for reparations. The Allies created a virtual Catch-22 with everything produced being regulated and earmarked for the occupiers.<sup>38</sup> This excessive regulation of the population maintained control, but would have eventually proved

disastrous had the Allies not realized the advantages of a strong rebuilt Germany.

### Japan

There were many examples of well-coordinated regulation in Japan. could suspend the emperor's functions, dissolve the Diet, outlaw political parties, and disqualify individuals from public office. He dismissed all legislators who had belonged to right-wing, militaristic societies. The Prime Minister's entire cabinet threatened to quit and MacArthur informed them they would be replaced. He alone regulated the activities of the government.<sup>39</sup>

MacArthur also regulated information in Japan. All Japanese newspapers were required to carry the full text of his messages. The newspapers could be shut down at any time. American journalists were not censored, but if they displeased the General, they could be forbidden from returning to Japan. He controlled the entry of American businessmen into the country as well. He even went so far as to set the exchange rate for money. As stated, previously, never has one American had this kind of power.

### Restrain

Restraint of a country can involve many aspects. It may be restrained from returning to its old habits. It may be restrained from seeking to attack its neighbors. Finally, it may be restrained from attacking its own people or the people may be restrained from attacking their leaders. Restraint may not always be carried out through military means, it may be political or even financial as well.

## Germany

Germany's condition at the end of the war restrained its actions significantly. Because of the depletion of resources, militarily, economically, and politically, Germany was not a threat to its neighbors. The primary restraint the Allied military provided was against the elements of society that sought to capitalize on the omnipresent misery. This military force provided a police function as the Germans were unable to provide this themselves. Politically, the occupation forces restrained the governing bodies from organizing and from establishing views too close to the old ways of doing business.

## Japan

The restraints on Japan were all encompassing. However, this was a country that was used to restrictions. The occupation government controlled many activities, but was less restraining in many respects than the Japanese government had been. An example is the issue of women's rights. General MacArthur not only gave women the right to vote, but also pressed for the elimination of sex discrimination.<sup>40</sup> This demonstrates westernization, however, the occupation government was anything but democratic. If General MacArthur approved, things happened. The Japanese constitution, for instance, written with his inputs, restrained Japan from forming anything but self-defense forces. This constitution was clearly a way for the occupation forces to restrain the Japanese from falling victim to efforts to move them back to a warrior culture. This is not to say the constitution was bad; many of the restraints are still in effect today.

### Operation DESERT STORM

The application of airpower to achieve military objectives took a major leap forward in the Gulf War. Few would argue that the plan for attacking the Iraqis was anything short of a major success. The success of this operation therefore, demands a look to airpower in post-war applications. An architect of this operation was Colonel John A. Warden, III. Through a review of the theory regarding the use of airpower, its success in the Gulf War can be more clearly understood.

In the Air University book, Challenge and Response, Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns, Colonel Warden included a chapter entitled, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century." In this chapter he reviews the "five rings" (fig. 1) and future applications. His "five rings" diagram is used to illustrate the linking of strategic goals to tactical targets. He asserts that diagramming the enemy's key areas provides a way to know the enemy and to know ourselves.<sup>41</sup>




Fig. 1. Warden's Ring Diagram. Source: Colonel John A. Warden, III, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," in Challenge and Response, Anticipating US Military Security Concerns, ed. Karl Magyar (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), 319.

The ring diagram shows the relationship of politics to war. The center ring is the country's leadership. The country's leaders are responsible for the country's actions and the leaders are the very individuals whose decisions must be influenced. Moving out from the center of the rings, strategic goals or needs are encountered.<sup>42</sup>

Colonel Warden addresses strategic paralysis in war. By attacking the concentric rings, a country can be brought to the state of strategic paralysis. Paralysis of the enemy in an occupation may be an objective, but often it is not. Turning to the issue of influencing the enemy, Colonel Warden asserts that the rings beyond the inner one are determined by assessing the cost to our enemy. We attack the things that will cost him most in order to persuade him to act in the desired manner. For instance critical communications nodes may be eliminated denying the enemy current status updates. One of the problems with the effectiveness of air attacks may be the elimination of virtually all information to the enemy leadership. These attacks may cost him dearly, but without information flow, he may not be influenced in any way. Ignorance may be bliss. This can be overcome, but to ensure success the enemy must know what is happening to his country.<sup>43</sup>

U.S. use of airpower in the Gulf War differed from much of the conventional wisdom at the time which advocated the use of airpower to support ground forces and not much else. However, this new approach to war, using airpower to strike areas that will cost the enemy most prior to a land assault and its use as other than a supporting arm, led to our current post-war situation, which is discussed next.

### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) was initiated on 5 April 1991 by President George Bush. Within 36 hours, the first phase began. At the end of the Gulf War, 1.4 million residents of northern Iraq fled to Iran and almost half a million to Turkey. Those who didn't escape were forced into the northern mountains by Saddam Hussein's forces. Relief was required and humanitarian supplies were airlifted in. The first stage of OPC continued until 1 July 1991.<sup>44</sup>

The mission, from July 1991 on, transitioned from one of life sustainment, "to one of deterring Iraqi aggression, monitoring compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, enforcing the no-fly zone above the 36th parallel, and managing funds for humanitarian aid."<sup>45</sup>

The book The General's War, by Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, provides a thorough examination of the major terms of the Gulf War cease-fire. It includes a thorough discussion of the negotiations, prior to the signing of the cease-fire agreement, between General Schwarzkopf, U.S. CENTCOM commander, and Iraqi Lieutenant General Ahmad, chief of staff of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. It was General Ahmad who requested permission for Iraqi military helicopter flights, saying, "We would like to agree that helicopter flights sometimes are needed to carry some of our officials, ... to be transported from one place to another because the roads and bridges are out."<sup>46</sup> General Schwarzkopf conceded saying, "military helicopters can fly over Iraq. Not fighters, not bombers."<sup>47</sup>

Several experts, including Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor and former Air Force general, had grave concerns about the cease-fire provision that allowed the Iraqis to continue to use their helicopters.<sup>48</sup> According to Air Force Brigadier General "Buster" Glosson, chief air planner, "The only reason we gave them permission was that there was no airman in the tent at Safwan."<sup>49</sup> The Iraqis didn't hesitate to take advantage of their ability to fly at will. They used helicopters to crush revolts by Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south.

The end of the war came, but the U.S. and the Iraqis were still greatly at odds. The U.S. administration encountered the problem of stopping the suffering in the north and south. The coalition goal was never to split Iraq. Yet, the revolutionaries in Iraq felt that is what the U.S. desired. A Shiite refugee said, "Bush told us to revolt against Saddam. We revolt against Saddam. But where is Bush? Where is he?"<sup>50</sup> The resultant instability has kept the U.S. involved far longer than desired.<sup>51</sup> CENTCOM planners found themselves with a serious dilemma. U.S. forces would not be going away but would have to stay around in one form or another for quite some time. Gordon Brown, Schwarzkopf's chief foreign policy adviser at CENTCOM said, "We never did have a plan to terminate the war."<sup>52</sup>

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

This ongoing operation receives the least amount of coverage of all current U.S. contingency operations. References are available but not to the extent of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. A difficulty with

gaining information from these operations is much of the activity is recorded in classified areas only.

A good source of information comes from U.S. CENTCOM. Each year they publish posture statements, which are unclassified documents detailing the activities of CENTCOM. The primary information gleaned from these areas are sortie counts and major actions taken.

Monographs and research papers also provide limited information on this operation to include facts of the operations as well as, some analysis.

One such monograph is A Piece of the Puzzle, Tactical Airpower in Operations Other Than War, by Lieutenant Commander William H. Johnson from the Naval War College. He describes the forces in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH as a means to permit the "massing of offensive firepower, security of friendly forces and a show of resolve."<sup>53</sup> He draws several applicable conclusions from the operation, including that airpower's strengths include perseverance and unity of effort. This conclusion is based on the length of the operation and the amount of area covered. He also sees advantages in coordination and security. The air forces involved are comfortable talking to each other and share a common vocabulary even though they come from various countries and services. Security is enhanced by keeping the support personnel far removed from the area of concern and by limiting the number of individuals in the area.<sup>54</sup>

For all operations, significant contributions are made by airpower in the areas of legitimacy, planning for uncertainty, perseverance, and balance. Other areas include security, unity of

effort, and coordination. Commander Johnson's biggest concern is restraint. Restraint is the ability to answer infractions in like manner. He sees any inability to demonstrate restraint as a way that airpower can lose credibility.<sup>55</sup> This is very true, but equally true for ground forces. More often than not, the issue of restraint is determined by political decisions that direct compliance. His overall conclusion is that if a premium is not placed on restraint, airpower can be very useful in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). It could be said that this is true for all military force, not just airpower.

#### Air Occupation

The curriculum at the Air Command and Staff College includes several courses on war termination. Occupation is discussed as well as the term "Air Occupation." One of the required readings is the article "Air Power as a Tool of Foreign Policy: Air Occupation" by Major Gary Cox. Five conflicts are used as examples of air occupation. His definition of air occupation is as follows:

The use of air and space power in the intrusive control of specified territory, or territorial activities, of an adversarial nation or group for a specified period of time.<sup>56</sup>

He states that this is the ideal and must be qualified by three characteristics. First, air superiority must be achieved. Second, there must be a desire to limit or eliminate the use of ground forces. Third, air occupation combines the elements of intelligence, surveillance, presence, and deterrence.<sup>57</sup>

Major Cox asserts that the no-fly zones in Iraq are not air occupations, because they do not control activity on the ground. He states that these forces do not constitute air occupation on their own

but could be part of an occupation. He cites their lack of enforcement capability in precluding them from being an air occupation force.<sup>58</sup>

The previous assertions require further review. The forces in place for these no-fly zones are the very same type used in what Cox terms "Air Dominance" in the Gulf War. In fact the air-to-ground capable aircraft still carry munitions similar to their wartime loads. The fact that they have not often been used to influence ground operations is a political decision, not due to a lack of capability. The passage of UN Security Council resolution 949 in October 1994 directed the forces of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH to control Iraqi ground activity south of the 32nd parallel.<sup>59</sup> The numbers of aircraft and munitions have been reduced to meet the known threat. Cox, like many others, questions the ability of these forces to accomplish the strategic goals of occupation. This thesis will examine the no-fly zones in Iraq and provide specific examples of how airpower is being used to accomplish the strategic goals of occupation.

#### Summary

Post-war occupation is an area of interest to planners, both military and civilian. The area of air occupation and the use of no-fly zones requires more research and documentation. This thesis addresses this void in post-conflict resolution with the goal of determining if the no-fly zones in Iraq accomplish the strategic goals of occupation.

The next chapter covers the research and analysis conducted on the no-fly zones in Iraq. The subordinate questions are used to frame this discourse. The final chapter will answer the research question and conclude the thesis.

### CHAPTER 3

#### RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

##### Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the research in order to answer the research question and the subordinate questions. Specifically, this chapter seeks to answer whether airpower can accomplish the strategic goals of occupation in Iraq.

This chapter begins with a look at occupation. The dictionary definition was covered earlier; this review is a modern look at occupation. A discussion of the capability of airpower to hold and control an area follows. The components of holding and controlling are used to determine if airpower can accomplish these strategic goals in occupation. The combination of ground and air in occupation is the next area of coverage, and finally the costs, benefits and risks are assessed. The next chapter will answer the research question and conclude the thesis with recommendations.

##### Occupation

In the literature review, the components of holding and controlling an area were used to examine the occupations in Germany and Japan. These same components will be used to dissect the no-fly zones in Iraq. While these steps are warranted, a practical examination of occupation is also in order.

Military occupations have changed considerably over time, primarily in terms of objective. Throughout history, wars have been fought to gain territory. In many instances, the purpose was to annex and gain long-term ownership of the land. Even today, this kind of occupation still occurs, as was so clearly the case in Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in 1990.

Kuwait became a British protectorate in 1914 and relied on the British initially for security from external threats. It gained its independence from Britain in 1961. When Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, it was a textbook case of one country annexing another. He maintained that he was reclaiming what was rightfully his, because both Iraq and Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman Empire prior to 1914. The Iraqis needed Kuwait's ports and oil money to offset the expenses from the war with Iran.<sup>1</sup> This need launched the Gulf War.

This is an example of annexation in the classic sense; occupation to restore international peace is a newer concept which emerged at the end of World War I. The occupiers of post-World War I Germany were vengeful against the populace as a whole. They viewed their role as their nation's instrument to ensure the Germans met their obligations under the peace terms agreed upon at the end of World War I. The threat of invasion was their primary tool pressuring the Germans to comply.<sup>2</sup> This occupation left Germany in a ravaged condition and established the groundwork for future turmoil.

The end World War II resulted in a far different Allied approach to occupation. The Allies viewed the vanquished civilian population as innocents. The U.S.-led occupiers prosecuted those responsible for the

war and did not try to take over the civil authority on a permanent basis.<sup>3</sup>

As in post-war Germany, the U.S. did not want to occupy Iraq following the Gulf War. Throughout the war, President Bush asserted that the coalition was not fighting the Iraqi people, but rather their government. President Bush, answering reporter's questions on 26 April 1991, nearly two months after the cessation of hostilities, said, "We don't have any fight with the Iraqi people, I've said that from day one."<sup>4</sup> President Bill Clinton has maintained the same hard line against the government, not the people, of Iraq. On 17 May 1995, in his letter to Congressional leaders he said, "Iraq may rejoin the community of civilized nations by adopting democratic processes, respecting human rights, treating its people equitably, and adhering to basic norms of international behavior."<sup>5</sup>

Clearly then, promoting stability, as opposed to annexation, was the driving issue in these post-war occupations. The National Military Strategy of 1995 reiterates President Clinton's statement:

We must not expect an easy transition to the stable, multipolar world we seek. The last transition of such magnitude, at the end of World War II, took years and saw numerous conflicts: and the form of that stability posed a threat to our nation for nearly 40 years.

A primary thrust of our strategy must be to promote a long-term stability that is advantageous to the United States. There is ample historical precedent in this century that regional instability in military, economic, and political terms can escalate into global conflict. Our strategy further promotes stability in order to establish the conditions under which democracy can take hold and expand around the world.<sup>6</sup>

In an occupation to achieve stability, the occupying country does not want to maintain the defeated nation any longer than necessary. The goal is for the defeated nation to arrive at a position where it can

manage its own internal and external affairs and act in accordance with international standards. The occupying country, not planning on being in the defeated country for long, would like to use as few troops as possible. This minimal force must be able to hold and control the country or area as described in the dictionary definition. This occupation force keeps the country or area from splitting apart and protects the citizens until the government is willing and capable of doing this for itself.

#### Airpower Holding an Area

Both Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, currently underway in Iraq, illustrate the success of airpower in holding an area. The definition of holding, as shown in Chapter One, provides three requirements for an occupier. These requirements are, keeping the area in a certain position or relationship, keeping possession, and defending from attack. The following examination of these concepts reveals that there are instances when the use of airpower is optimized in holding an area.

#### Maintaining the Relationship

Without a clear objective, the utility of airpower, and for that matter, all military power, is severely limited. It is the objective that determines the relationship between occupier and occupied. Both operations in Iraq demonstrate airpower's ability to maintain relationships with the government and people of Iraq. The following analysis reveals that airpower appears to work best in a directive relationship, like the one in Iraq.

### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi citizens in northern Iraq, predominantly Kurds, began operations to gain autonomy from Iraq. Saddam Hussein's forces responded immediately to repulse the rebels. These attacks crushed the revolt and resulted in over one-half million refugees in the mountains on the Iraqi-Turkish border.<sup>7</sup> This situation was vastly different from conditions at the beginning of the Gulf War. The fate of these refugees demanded action and Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began with the objective of stopping the suffering. The initial relief efforts were primarily airdrops of food and supplies, however airdrops to refugees clinging to the side of a mountain was not sufficient. Returning the Kurds to their homes and providing initial security was the next step in the operation. A multinational coalition of air and ground forces deployed in the initial operation to care for the refugees. Once the refugees were returned to their homes, most of the ground forces left and the second phase of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began. To this day, a residual coalition force of less than 5,000 personnel, headquartered at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, maintains armed flights over the area to ensure the relationship between the Kurds and Iraqis does not revert to one of armed conflict.

This residual force is tasked to enforce U.N. Security Council resolution 688. This resolution establishes the no-fly zone for Iraqi fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft and seeks to ensure the protection of the people of northern Iraq. The objective of this resolution and of the no-fly zones, in the words of President George Bush,

is not intended as a permanent solution. . . . Our long-term objective remains the same; for the Iraqi Kurds and, indeed, for all

Iraqi refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in peace, free from repression, free to live their lives.<sup>8</sup>

The relationship established by the U.N., advanced by the President and enforced with airpower, is one of directed compliance by the government of Iraq. The government's compliance with the resolution and coalition airpower's presence over Iraq, create an atmosphere of security for the people of northern Iraq.

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

This operation also maintains a directive enforcement posture with the Iraqis. The relationship in OSW is with both Iraq's ruling Sunnis and the inhabitants of the south, the Shiites. There are significant differences between the nature of the no-fly zone in OSW and the no-fly zone in OPC. In the south, with implementation of U.N. Security Council resolution, ground activities are directed by airpower.

The Iraqi Shiite Muslims, not to be mistaken as aligned with Iranian Shiites, are not a unified community. Many of these Iraqi Shiites fought on Iraq's side in Saddam Hussein's eight year battle with Iran.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, within Iraq, pro-Iranian groups joined the opposition in the bloody Iran-Iraq War.

Some factions, in the predominantly Shiite south, actively pursue a western democratic form of government, while others want nothing but an Islamic totalitarian state.<sup>10</sup> The vast differences in peoples within the area makes establishing and maintaining a consolidated relationship nearly impossible for any government. Airpower provides the separation necessary between these disparate

groups so that they can resolve their problems without resorting to large-scale armed conflict.

#### Keeping possession

Annexation of Iraq was not an objective of the Gulf War.

However, preventing Saddam Hussein from using portions of his country became important. In this case, possession by the coalition has been the denial of use of these areas by Saddam. The possession of airspace is similar to the possession of high ground. Holding the high ground allows the holder to impact lower ground activities. So it is with airspace. In order to hold this high ground, airpower must be free to act without threat from surface weapons.

Another advantage to possessing "the high ground" is the ability to employ surveillance assets at our choosing. Satellites provide a unique and irreplaceable presence over the occupied area. While lacking the duration of satellites, aircraft, such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), can also provide surveillance of ground activities. The ability to monitor and track movement within an occupied area is critical to denying its use by others. Again, as with the no-fly zone aircraft, a permissive environment must exist in order to successfully employ reconnaissance assets.

#### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

The displaced populace of northern Iraq was in a dire situation when the coalition came to their aid in April of 1991. Their oppressors were the members of the ruling party in Baghdad. The coalition was able

to establish the airspace over them and the exclusion zone, on the ground, as areas over which Baghdad had little influence.

Thus, the fact that the Iraqis currently do not possess this area, particularly its airspace, suggests if not possession then at least the denial of possession by the hostile force. The Iraqi government is not able to use these areas to attack U.S. interests or those of our allies.

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

While the ground in OPC was initially occupied, this was not the case in the south. The Shiite population began an uprising similar to that in the north. But, like the rebels in the north, they were no match for the Iraqi troops. The rebels mistakenly believed the coalition would reduce Iraqi forces to a level that would make them incapable of any action. They quickly realized that the coalition had only reduced the external threat from the military; they were still quite capable of internal defense.<sup>11</sup>

The southern populace was not faced with starvation and exposure to the same extent as those in the north. Iraqi attacks in the south were direct military assaults on the population, and the gradual draining of the life-sustaining marshes. The coalition realized that unless these attacks were stopped, the southern population would be eradicated. A no-fly zone was established to deny Saddam his largest advantage over the population: the use of airpower.

Conflict over possession of this area is decades old and shows no sign of ending. The culturally diverse Shiites of southern Iraq are closely tied to the Iranians rather than the Iraqis. However, Iranians

maintain a strong sense of nationalism, so strong that they view this group as Iraqi and not Shiite. This population is truly surrounded by enemies.<sup>12</sup> Providing an area where the Shiites can live in peace is the goal of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and airpower is the means of providing this area.

#### Defend from Attack/Preserve

Air occupation, like ground occupation, must defend an area from attacks that are either internal or external. Most occupations are threatened by one or the other. Since the end of the Gulf War, the greatest threat in Iraq has been internal. - The oppression of minority populations gave rise to both no-fly zones, and remains the greatest threat to Iraqi stability. Protecting the oppressed and yet not encouraging them to break away is the dilemma the coalition forces face.

Shortly after the initiation of OPC, President Bush, during a news conference reiterated the fact that the U.S. sought a unified Iraq. He reminded a reporter, "I said early on that it was not an objective of the United States to see a fractured, destabilized Iraq."<sup>13</sup> The protection of a fractured country is difficult if not impossible. It is much easier to occupy a unified country than to occupy the pieces of a shattered one.

Airpower in an occupation is able to assess the situation on the ground from a distance. A prerequisite is security of the aircraft from surface attack. Once this is met, aircraft are able to ensure that neither side in a conflict is able to inflict attacks against the other. The air forces in place also serve as a strong deterrent to regional would-be attackers. A weakened post-war country is an easy target for

opportunistic neighbors. Airpower can provide the protection required from this threat.

#### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Defending the Kurds from attack has proven to be no easy undertaking. Both of the two neighboring countries, Turkey and Iran, harbor deep seated resentment and ill will towards the Kurdish factions. Members of extremist Kurdish terrorist groups have been committing acts of violence in both of these countries for years.

Iran and Turkey have undertaken limited, retaliatory ventures. Before Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the Kurds were suffering virtual genocide. The Military Coordination Center (MCC) established at Silopi continues to be the coalition agency for communicating with the Kurdish population.<sup>14</sup> Routine helicopter flights from the MCC to varying parts of the region monitor the progress of Kurdish rebuilding efforts. The Kurdish state in northern Iraq serves as a model for other minorities oppressed by the Baghdad government, but its work is far from over.<sup>15</sup>

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

The protection of the population of southern Iraq is perhaps the most controversial of all. The attacks on the "marsh people" of southern Iraq are perhaps the most brutal examples of Hussein's oppressive regime. The exploitation of the marshes in the search for oil has all but destroyed their food producing capability. According to some accounts, the military attacks by Saddam have increased with the establishment of the no-fly zone.<sup>16</sup> With this in mind, some would argue

that the coalition has not done nearly enough to protect these people and has turned a blind eye.

The diverse nature of the population of this region has already been discussed. Trying to discern which Shiites are friendly and which are not would be impossible. Prohibiting the Iraqis from taking any disciplinary action in the region would be tantamount to anarchy. Placing U.S. troops in the region would be suicide. What airpower does is prohibit major attacks by ground or air forces. In addition to helicopters, Saddam's air force still possesses TU-22 bombers capable of carrying large payloads of bombs.<sup>17</sup> This no-fly zone protects the population from overwhelming land or aerial attack.

#### Airpower Controlling an Area

As with holding an area, controlling can be divided into separate requirements. An occupier must accomplish several requirements to control an area including, exert authority or influence, direct, regulate, and restrain. Both Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH accomplish these, and also provide some insight on when airpower is optimized in controlling an area.

#### Exert Authority or Influence

Airpower's authority is primarily a function of its ability to threaten the application of military force. Policing the skies is but one aspect of this authority. The ability to impact ground as well as air activities expands airpower's authority. This authority can be relatively unintrusive, as in OPC and OSW, where the population does not always see the aircraft as they patrol the area. It could also be far

more intrusive if warranted by the situation. Airpower is unique in its ability to attack quickly over a large area when required, but most of the time remains out of sight.

If the occupier's aim is to influence the population, various aircraft are available. Much of this capability comes from platforms involved in psychological operations which can influence a population in various ways. While more influence is wielded through direct contact with the populace, the accompanying risk may be too great to be acceptable. A decision on which assets to employ to achieve the optimum influence is required.

#### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

As opposed to World War II, after the Gulf War, there was not widespread damage throughout Iraq. The existing damage was, for the most part, right where the coalition had planned it. However, there were a few stray bombs. Some journalists sought these out and claimed widespread destruction. Comparing these few instances to either Japan or Germany quickly dilutes the argument. The Iraqi people did not experience the same kind of defeat that the losers in World War II had known. There was no capitulation by the Iraqi leadership and Saddam had enough of an Army left to destroy any internal faction that rebelled. The Kurds were just such a faction. The failed rebellion of the Kurds was the precursor to OPC.

Even after the initial humanitarian stages of OPC were complete, U.S. influence continued. Establishment of free elections in Iraqi Kurdistan is evidence of this influence. Their constitution, while

differing from most western examples, is a unique adaptation of the principles and ideas of the occupying country.<sup>18</sup>

U.S. influence is apparent in the skies over northern Iraq where the only aircraft in flight are Allied jets, helicopters and U.N. helicopters. The U.S. influence is that of a military that does not torture and maim civilians. The authority exercised by the coalition serves notice to Iraqis, civilians as well as military, that violations of the post-war settlements will not be tolerated.

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

While democratic influence is felt in the north, the vast cultural disparity in the south stands as an obstacle to a similar movement. The glaring reason that U.S. influence is not felt in this area is the lack of U.S. understanding of the area. For the U.S., or its allies, to try to influence this area in any manner other than militarily would most likely meet with disaster. With as many pro-Saddam individuals as those opposed, it would be difficult to change many opinions. While in the previous examples, the people were willing to accept change, this is not necessarily the case in the south.

Exercising authority is the only choice left. The U.S. aircraft in the no-fly zone carry bombs and air-to-surface munitions in order to effect this authority. The U.S. Cruise Missile attack from Navy ships on 25 June 1993 and the 18 April 1993 attack by 75 Allied aircraft on targets within the no-fly zone speak to the power of authority.<sup>19</sup> While bombing the country is not a favorable situation, when political actions break down or the situation begins to deteriorate, military actions may have to be taken.

## Direct

Occupiers must decide on the optimum means of ensuring compliance with their directives. In modern occupations, this is often accomplished through U.N. Security Council resolutions. The occupying country interprets these broad directives and determines the best way to implement them. Airpower is a viable and compelling tool in this task. As shown in Chapter Two, in the 1920s, the British were able to deliver ultimatums to the enemy, backed up by the threat of violence from airborne forces. The population was willing to comply, thus it was difficult for rogue factions to gain and enjoy the popular support they needed. Airpower was highly capable of delivering the direction and providing the threat.<sup>20</sup>

Major Timothy D. Livsey, USA, in his monograph, Air Occupation: A Viable Concept for Campaign Planning? addresses the asymmetric application of power. He cites the British Control experience and the no-fly zones over Iraq as examples of this asymmetry. The no-fly zones provide a threat of force to enable weapons inspection teams to travel throughout Iraq, in accordance with U.N. directives. He describes the asymmetric application of airpower as providing an umbrella for these inspectors as well as protecting the Kurds and Shiites.<sup>21</sup> This umbrella is a sound example of airpower's directive authority in Iraq. Allowing the occupied country to "save face" while still being directive, can be very important.

## Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Saving face is almost as large an issue in the Arab world as it is in eastern cultures. In fact many authorities insist that the Gulf

War could not have been stopped once America publicly threatened Saddam: he could not afford to lose face. This is demonstrated in Hussein's response to Russian President Gorbachov's plea on 18 January (a day after Coalition attacks began), "We should not be asked to make statements that would make the United States appear to be shaking our steadfast will."<sup>22</sup> With this in mind the occupation of northern Iraq takes on many striking differences from those after World War II.

The coalition had not devastated the Iraqis in Operation DESERT STORM. The force in northern Iraq was enforcing U.N. resolutions and protecting the inhabitants against brutal attacks from their own government. The decision was made not to pursue and eliminate the Iraqi leadership. Coalition forces were not in the same situation as occupiers in Japan, where the people had been shocked into submission.

The means of directing Iraqi actions is through the threat of violence. The U.N. has turned to the military in establishing no-fly zones to ensure compliance with their resolution. The U.N. forces' goal is to assist the 3.5 million people living in northern Iraq as they return to a state of normalcy and self-sufficiency. The end result of this will be their reintegration into Iraq. For now the sole direction of the occupation is compliance with the U.N. resolutions.<sup>23</sup>

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

The threat of force is also the prime tool in OSW. This threat has been demonstrated on occasions already mentioned. Like OPC, this threat directs the Iraqi government to comply with the U.N. resolutions and to cease attacks against their people. The year 1994 proved to be the quietest year in the region, for the first nine months. In October,

Saddam Hussein began troop movements into southern Iraq, threatening Kuwait. Saddam was directed, by the U.N., to cease this activity. When he did not, Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR began with force deployments back into the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Saddam subsequently removed his forces from their threatening position. The threat of violence was again used to direct his actions.

#### Regulate

Airpower has the unique capability to monitor and regulate activities, both in the air and on the ground. The no-fly zones in Iraq were initially designed to regulate Iraqi flying activities. However, Saddam's aggressive actions proved that ground activity must be monitored as well. In October 1994, when Saddam massed his troops south of the 32nd parallel and again threatened the Kuwaiti border, coalition aircraft monitored the process. Additionally, coalition ground and air reinforcements redeployed, from their varied nations, as he continued to mass troops. These replacements strengthened the forces in place enough to discourage further Iraqi action. The U.N. Security Council enacted resolution 949 condemning this Iraqi movement and prohibiting similar action. To add further capability to the forces in place, the U.S. deployed A-10 aircraft to Kuwait for an extended period.<sup>24</sup> This addition of "tank killer" aircraft to the previously deployed forces gave the coalition the ability to impact ground activities. The U.N. Security Council added resolution 949 to ensure Iraqi leaders understood that aggressive action toward Kuwait would not be tolerated. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, met with Iraq's U.N. ambassador, Nizar Hamdun, and "left no doubt that our response to

any such violation (any military activity south of the 32nd parallel) would be swift and firm."<sup>25</sup>

#### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

The threat of force accomplishes much of the regulating of northern Iraq. The missions in OPC are all listed on the Air Tasking Order as reconnaissance missions. However, these aircraft, as discussed earlier, are armed and prepared to halt actions that are counter to U.N. resolutions. These missions have observed and reported much of the ground activity that has occurred in the no-fly zone. If the actions of the Iraqis have not warranted immediate reprisal or punitive measures under the rules of engagement, then the reports of the ground activity have been passed through the chain of command to the political leadership.

The primary action these aircraft have regulated is the emplacement of Iraqi air defense weapons. Since January 1993, coalition forces have attacked Iraqi missile or anti-aircraft artillery sites. In fact, in one instance, two F-16Cs and two F-15Es dropped cluster bombs and four laser guided bombs on an Iraqi SA-3 (surface-to-air) missile site, after it launched two missiles at the F-16s and two F-4Gs. All aircraft returned to Incirlik Air Base.<sup>26</sup> Fortunately, most of the regulatory effort is done through political channels, but when the need has arisen, the in-place forces have accomplished the task at hand.

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

Like OPC, the primary regulatory method of the forces in the no-fly zone has been the threat of force. They also can serve as a

retaliatory presence, as was the case mentioned earlier with the cruise missile attack on Baghdad. By directive, the primary purpose of the no-fly zone is the regulation, to the point of prevention, of flight in the area. The forces have been very successful, either through threat or by application of force.

Just like in the north, these forces along with other assets have monitored the ground activities in the area. Since these forces are not permitted or tasked with regulating ground activities, they serve primarily as monitors. Examples of the effectiveness of this force follow. On 18 January 1993, coalition aircraft conducted strikes against Iraqi air defenses. On 17 January 1993, U.S. Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles struck the Zaafaraniyah nuclear fabrication facility in response to Iraq's refusal to comply with U.N. nuclear inspection requirements.<sup>27</sup> Again the primary means of regulation is through political means, due primarily to the terms of the cease-fire.

#### Restrain

Restraining a country from action is closely tied to regulating actions. Iraq is restrained completely in its use of aircraft in the no-fly zones. The political decision-makers chose to prohibit this activity and airpower has successfully enforced that decision. However, the Iraqis also used ground forces to attack the population south of the 32nd parallel. Airpower was not tasked with restraining these actions until late 1994.<sup>28</sup>

Selectivity is one of the great strengths of airpower. Because the forces enforcing these no-fly zones are not at risk, they can allow day-to-day operations to occur, while continuing to monitor. Attacks

that would threaten ground troops in the area and force the occupiers to engage to protect themselves, have little effect on airpower. Air forces are able to restrain hostile activities without having a vested interest in deterring all such actions in the area. Another benefit is the ability of air forces to remain impartial and restrain prohibited actions regardless of who initiates them.

Airpower has limitations dealing with forces intermingled or in very close proximity to innocents, but ground forces are also limited in this regard. The situation in Iraq is somewhat clearly divided between civilians and military. In the open terrain of Iraq, monitoring is accomplished without much obstruction and restraining the intermingling of the military and civilians can be accomplished without great difficulty. However, in environments that are more difficult to monitor, and in situations where the military and civilians are close together, all military forces would have greater difficulty accomplishing the peacekeeping mission.

#### Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

The Iraqis are restrained from using what is normally considered sovereign airspace. The occupations in Germany and Japan restrained different parts of the society. Two years after the war, the U.S. needed Germany to begin to rebuild their military for the common defense. Japanese infrastructure was required to support the Korean war, five years after World War II. Regional stability demands the U.S. maintains a credible force. Restraining the Iraqi military too far would be to invite invasion by Iran. Restraint is a delicate balance. However, in this balance, the wholesale slaughter of an innocent

population cannot be tolerated either. The correct amount of force and the correct point of application are the keys to the operations in Iraq.

#### Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

As discussed in the OPC example, the Iraqi military must be permitted to maintain enough strength to ensure political stability and be able to ensure domestic order. The slaughter undertaken by Saddam went beyond ensuring domestic order, so restraints were imposed. As discussed earlier, the delicate balance of restraint was at issue. With the varying political, ethnic, and ideological makeup of southern Iraq, maintaining social order is a difficult undertaking, with great risk involved. With this in mind, the U.N. Security Council enacted resolution 688 to prevent the continuation of major atrocities in the region and establishment of the no-fly zone.<sup>29</sup>

#### Occupation Tasks Airpower Cannot Perform

Occupation forces can be tasked to accomplish many tasks while serving as occupiers. Different occupations require different tasks be accomplished. Many of these tasks have very little to do with the actual holding or controlling of an area, rather they make life more livable for the populace.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Hanlon, in his paper, The Operational Level of War: After the Smoke Clears, says, "winning is not complete until political stability and public order have been achieved."<sup>30</sup> A whole spectrum of activities may be required in rebuilding and stabilizing an occupied country. The occupations at the end of World War II required much more assistance from Civil Affairs

than did Iraq at the end of the Gulf War. The vast difference in destruction between the two wars is one primary reason. German industry and population centers had been ravaged by inaccurate bombing and other Allied attacks. The Iraqis did not suffer this kind of attack and therefore did not have the same needs for assistance in repairing and improving the damaged areas. In fact, coalition forces never ventured into the more populated areas, thus limiting damage to these areas

#### Combining Air and Ground in Occupation

The concept of occupation incorporates a combination of both air and ground forces. The two post-World War II ground occupations had air components and the two air occupations in Iraq have ground components. With reductions in all military forces and an emphasis on joint operations within the services, it would seem that ground air forces will be used in concert in most, if not all, future operations.

The correct mix of forces will be the crucial decision for future commanders. Maximizing the benefits to be gained while minimizing the cost and risk is imperative. The next discussion reviews the cost, benefits, and risks of each of the occupations. A review of these areas will be helpful in providing future forces.

#### The Costs of Occupation

The costs of occupation will be addressed in both an economic and material sense. Some items discussed in this thesis under costs may be considered risks by some, or vice versa. There is some overlap in the areas of costs and risks, but for this thesis, issues will be discussed as either a cost or a risk, not both.

Monetary costs of each occupation will be covered first followed by their respective material costs. The costs to the occupied nation will not be covered, due to their vast disparity and the hope that a benevolent occupation will minimize these as much as possible. Material cost of occupations can be thought of as the opportunity cost to the occupier. An occupying force becomes unavailable for other deployment. In many instances, the participants are also unable to accomplish required training. Finally, there is a cost in fatigue which can stem from either the occupying nation or the troops themselves. Either group can grow weary of a continued presence that seems to yield little if any return.

#### The Costs in Germany

The U.S. spent great amounts of money and effort in the occupation of Germany, but this is, in reality, only a portion of the total. This discussion only looks at the eight years from 8 May 1945 until the spring of 1953 when the U.S. and Germany were working on a contractual agreement to supersede the occupation.

The occupation of Germany was financed through various funds and was worked through lend-lease programs among others. The following statistics incorporate most of the money spent by the U.S. government. An estimate made in June of 1948 placed the total costs to the U.S. through 30 June of that year at four billion dollars (in 1948 dollars) and that was for only three years of occupation.<sup>31</sup> By March of 1951, the U.S. had extended four billion dollars in aid to Germany and spent another four billion on costs of the occupation.<sup>32</sup> This cumulative total of 8 billion dollars in 1951 was a significant outlay. These

costs in the early fifties grow appreciably when converted to 1996 dollars.

The same force that fought in the theater during the war established the occupation of Germany. There were, in fact, too many individuals in theater, and redeployment was a major issue for the military. Between 12 May 1945 and 30 June 1946 over three million troops were redeployed to the U.S.; two and one-half million were redeployed before December 1945. Of those redeployed, 780,372 went on to serve in the U.S. or Pacific, the rest were demobilized and discharged.<sup>33</sup> The original plan for redeployment had called for the 6th Army Group to be the training command for the theater. With all the movement and confusion this became an impossibility. The ensuing lack of training, coupled with the breakup of units, severely affected the morale and discipline of the troops. Not only were these troops not ready to fight, the idle time resulted in major disturbances. The manpower available to accomplish the occupation dropped from the over three million on V-E day, 8 May 1945, to a relatively stable 135,000 by July 1947. These individuals were mostly under twenty years' old and lacking in basic training. They were troops sent in to replace the veterans. Training of these troops was primarily accomplished in theater.<sup>34</sup>

Initial intheater training was directed toward the defeat of Japan. During the redeployment period, training shifted from an emphasis on warfighting to preparing soldiers for the transition to civilian life through education. Once redeployment was accomplished, the training shifted to areas unique to occupation.<sup>35</sup> Training schools

were established at the Theater and Army levels. Two major areas of emphasis were winter operations and ordnance specialists (since many were lost to redeployment).<sup>36</sup> These forces were trained and capable of conducting the occupation, but were not trained for full scale war.

The problem of fatigue was never truly seen in the occupation of Germany, due to two main factors. The first was the scale of the war. Even the largest occupation seemed small to the American public when compared to the numbers involved in the war. American attitudes toward international affairs for months after VE-Day could best be described as indifferent. The government attitude was the same. After concentrating almost solely on foreign relations, the government looked now to domestic affairs.<sup>37</sup>

The American and German populations' tolerances were also greatly impacted by the Soviet threat. Had there not been a real concern about the rising Soviet threat to the West, the American population may very well have tired of the U.S. presence in Europe. Similarly, had their national security not been threatened, the German people may have struck out against the occupiers, rather than accepting their presence.<sup>38</sup> In any event, fatigue never became a major factor in this occupation.

#### The Costs in Japan

The monetary cost of the occupation of Japan was immense. Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, speaking in 1948 on Japan said, for political stability to continue and for free government to continue in the future, there must be a sound and self-supporting economy. . . . We also realize that the United States cannot forever continue to pour hundreds of millions of dollars annually into relief funds for occupied areas<sup>39</sup>

Secretary Royall was speaking of the U.S. need to turn from a policy of punishing Japan, to a policy of economic rebuilding. The occupation of Japan was costly. However, it became apparent, in 1948, that the way to build stability at the lowest cost was to allocate funds so that Japan could rebuild itself, with assistance from the U.S. On 20 May 1948, 150 million dollars were allocated, by the U.S., strictly for the economic rehabilitation of Japan.<sup>40</sup>

The occupation of Japan which lasted 80 months, also had a very great cost in training and readiness for the United States. Throughout this period, Army strength in Japan averaged 100,000 troops. Including the Navy, Air Force, civilian and dependent personnel, the total number is estimated to have been close to two million Americans for the duration.<sup>41</sup> These troops in Japan were focused on occupation duties to the detriment of warfighting training.

Training for inductees/recruits in the 1945-1950 period focused on providing a steady stream of replacements for occupation troops in Germany, Japan and Austria, not on preparing for war. The eight-week training period was not sufficient to provide well-trained troops. In contradiction of the maxim that the United States has always prepared to fight the last war it had won, the nation was not prepared to fight any war."<sup>42</sup>

The problem was not just training but also a shortage of funds for equipment. The country, and specifically the military were transitioning from the end of the war into peace. The military's rebuilding did not begin until 1948, and when it did, occupation was the top priority and combat training was a much lower priority.<sup>43</sup> These priorities lasted into 1950 and the start of the Korean war.

General MacArthur's Far East Command was in its worst condition since the end of World War II. Four divisions were located in Japan and one in Okinawa. These divisions had demobilized their medium tank battalions because they were too heavy for the Japanese bridges. The divisions had an authorized wartime strength of nearly

19,000 men, yet in June 1950 they had only two-thirds of their authorized men. Manpower cuts had forced MacArthur to reduce his infantry regiments to two battalions instead of the authorized three and the artillery battalions to two instead of the usual three. This meant that the commanders would be unable to maintain reserve units and could not rotate units out of the front line to give them a rest.<sup>44</sup>

As in Germany, fatigue did not become a factor in the occupation of Japan. Before the occupation had ended, the U.S. was deeply involved in the Cold War and war was being fought in Korea. The occupation troops were some of the first to fight in Korea.

#### The costs in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT has helped the 3.5 million inhabitants of northern Iraq return to some form of normalcy. Between 1991 and 1995, the cost to the U.S. in humanitarian aid alone was \$150.2 million. Nineteen nations have contributed to the people of northern Iraq since 1991 and UNICEF invested over \$40 million in water and sanitation systems.<sup>45</sup>

Table 2.--Cost in dollars and hours flown in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

| Fiscal Years | Incremental Cost<br>(Millions of \$) <sup>a</sup> | Hours flown <sup>b</sup> |
|--------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1991         | 172.9                                             | 48,530                   |
| 1992         | 51.4                                              | 35,032                   |
| 1993         | 108.3                                             | 25,992                   |
| 1994         | 83.4                                              | 19,964                   |
| 1995         | 128.4                                             | 23,871                   |
| Total        | 544.4                                             | 153,389                  |

<sup>a</sup>Source: Major Inga O'Neill, Secretary of the Air Force/FMBOI, interview by author, 17 January 1996, Telephone, Ft. Leavenworth, KS to Washington D.C.

<sup>b</sup>Source: Debbie O'Neal, USAF Directorate of Personnel, Training Division, Program Analyst, interview by author, 17 January 1996, Telephone, Ft. Leavenworth, KS to Washington D.C.

Militarily, the costs have been great also. The preceding chart depicts the incremental costs and total hours flown by the U.S. Air Force. The incremental cost is the cost to the unit above what it received for normal training. The hours are the total flown by USAF aircraft in and directly supporting the Operation.

Through October 1995, more than 50,000 coalition sorties had been flown in support of OPC. Additionally, more than 40,000 coalition personnel have rotated through OPC since its inception.<sup>46</sup>

The cost in aircrew training has been substantial. Units preparing to deploy must spend time preparing for their tour. The preparation varies by unit and type aircraft, but it takes approximately six sorties per aircrew to prepare.<sup>47</sup> Each unit will conduct this training differently, but it must be approved by the OPC staff. Once in theater, political sensitivities dictate that aircrews only accomplish medium to high altitude training. Also, as all aircraft carry live munitions, no practice air-to-air intercepts or simulated weapons releases are permitted. Night operations are also restricted, resulting in a loss of night training. As a result, aircrews must go through extensive requalification training upon return to their home station. They must also accomplish training that was missed, such as night employment.<sup>48</sup> The result is a squadron without required training in key areas. This status alone can make the unit unavailable for other tasking.

The deployed units usually have only 4-8 aircraft in theater, but there is no capability to perform major maintenance. Required intensive inspections must be accomplished at the home field, so the

affected aircraft must be flown to the home station and a replacement brought in. In order to keep up with the required maintenance, there is normally a rotation schedule developed. Conveniently, the aircrew will also rotate to keep training requirements balanced. The ongoing training requirements as well as scheduled maintenance demands, make the unit unavailable for further tasking.<sup>49</sup>

The concept of fatigue in this operation is an interesting one. The American public has heard very little about this operation since the Blackhawk shootdown in April 1994. In terms of exposure, the public would not appear to be growing tired of this operation.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT has been primarily conducted by units based in Europe. However, the concern for operations tempo has grown as the same units continue to be tasked. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units have been brought in, but this does not stop the European units from deploying virtually every year.<sup>50</sup> The long term impacts of the reduced training and repeated rotations has not yet been felt.

#### The costs in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

Between August 1992 and February 1995, coalition aircraft in OSW flew 58,000 total sorties, 38,000 of which were over Iraq. Joint Task Force Southwest Asia consists of over 100 U.S. aircraft along with a smaller number of allied aircraft. The American squadrons are primarily based in the U.S. and are under the control of CENTCOM.<sup>51</sup>

The following table illustrates USAF specific information on the incremental cost and total hours flown in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.

Table 3.--Cost in dollars and hours flown in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

| Fiscal Years      | Incremental Cost<br>(Millions of \$) <sup>a</sup> | Hours flown <sup>b</sup> |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1991 <sup>c</sup> | 4263.6                                            | 62,703                   |
| 1992              | 984.2                                             | 54,059                   |
| 1993              | 376.7                                             | 68,084                   |
| 1994              | 248.3                                             | 55,457                   |
| 1995              | 328.8 <sup>d</sup>                                | 92,259                   |
| Total             | 6,201.6                                           | 332,562                  |

<sup>a</sup>Source: Major Inga O'Neill, Secretary of the Air Force/FMBOI, interview by author, 17 January 1996, Telephone, Ft. Leavenworth, KS to Washington D.C.

<sup>b</sup>Source: Debbie O'Neal, USAF Directorate of Personnel, Training Division, Program Analyst, interview by author, 17 January 1996, Telephone, Ft. Leavenworth, KS to Washington D.C.

<sup>c</sup>Note: Information provided on forces not under OSW, but in theater still under Operation DESERT STORM.

<sup>d</sup>Note: Includes 105.0 million dollars from Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR.

American forces deploy into the OSW theater for a period of three to four months. As opposed to OPC, entire squadrons deploy with all their aircraft and personnel. Prior to deploying, the same kind of preparation occurs as in OPC. However, the cost to the unit is greater since all aircrews must receive the training. Aircrews average an estimated seven sorties each prior to deployment, again with variations based on squadron and aircraft type.<sup>52</sup> Units deploy to OSW for longer durations, but provide some limited training, mostly air-to-air. The area of training that suffers the most is surface attack. Altitude limitations and other restrictions in training, prevent adequate practice in bombing. Upon their return from the deployment, aircrew

undergo requalification training that averages approximately five sorties each.<sup>53</sup>

Unlike OPC, facilities are available for major maintenance. Units deployed have a priority for parts, so the units in OSW are in good condition in maintenance. In a standard wing there are three squadrons that share many things, spare parts being one area. When one of the three squadrons deploys, the two left behind suffer from the shortage of parts. These same units also have to fly any pilots who did not deploy. The combination of less spare parts and equipment and the requirement to fly more pilots, impacts the remaining units ability to accomplish required training.

Fatigue again does not seem to be a factor for the general population; however, it can be for the troops. With the length of the deployments and the number of units available, units deploy at least every other year. This results in an increase in operations tempo and associated problems. The duration of this operation is unknown and will continue for the foreseeable future.

#### Summary of Cost Analysis

As shown, the dollar costs of the occupations have been great. While the air occupations appear to be less costly, the important fact is that they all drain a country's finances, compounded by the fact that the country's economy is transitioning to a post-war mode. This is a major concern in the post-World War II examples. In terms of force structure, the current U.S. situation is similar to the drawdown in the post-World War II military.

Training and readiness are key factors in this drawdown. As shown, when forces are employed in occupations, training and readiness suffer. Therefore, the larger the number of forces participating in the occupation, the more readiness suffers. The U.S. lack of readiness at the outset of the Korean War clearly illustrated this. Overall, it would appear that air occupation presents a lower cost in terms of both dollars and readiness.

The issue of fatigue is the most elusive. The World War II occupations led right into the Cold War. The size of the occupation forces seemed small when faced with the huge Soviet threat. It is unknown when or if the U.S. public will tire of the Iraq situation. The chance of another Cold War type of confrontation does not appear imminent. The issue of fatigue will be determined in time.

#### The Benefits of Occupation

The benefits of occupations are not universal. What was achieved in one occupation may not be achievable in another. The varying circumstances surrounding each of the occupations and differing environments will, to a large extent, determine what can and cannot be gained.

For the purposes of this study, the benefits gained are assessed from the occupier's perspective. Generally, benefits are shared by both the occupier and the occupied. Any benefits realized by the occupied country alone are not covered here. Benefits are categorized in terms of political, social, and economic gains.

## The Benefits in Germany

The greatest benefit the U.S. realized in occupying Germany was the strategic location of a close ally. This strategic location was important, but not fully realized until 1948, when the complexion of the occupation changed dramatically.

Growing tension between the western occupiers and the Soviet Union culminated in the Soviet blockade of Berlin. The Soviet's restriction on western access to the capitol city was a major crisis. Allied airlift succeeded in not only resupplying the city, but also in uniting the western occupiers and strengthening their collective resolve to oppose the inflammatory actions of the Soviet Union. Opposition to the Soviets reached the point, at which any hopes of reunifying Germany in the foreseeable future, were lost. With these feelings the Allies began the establishment of the West German Federal Republic.<sup>54</sup>

The Cold War was under way and the western Allies had a new partner in the struggle against communism.<sup>55</sup> Politically, the partnership, begun at the end of the war, has influenced the shape of Europe. The same nations that united against the Russians in Germany became the nucleus for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). NATO, as much as any regional alliance of nations, has fostered open communication and discussions reaching far beyond the confines of Europe.

Coupled with the political benefits are the social gains. The social contacts fostered by the intermingling of different cultures have resulted in closer relations and cooperation on projects ranging from scientific experiments to cultural exchanges. Individual American

soldiers appeared to be affluent, which impressed the German public. The perception of the good life in America was a strong impetus for the German people to allow the new western government the opportunity to succeed.<sup>56</sup>

Achieving economic well-being for Germany after the ravages of war was a significant problem for the western occupiers. Hitler's government had been indifferent to established conventions in the world of finance.<sup>57</sup> This indifference coupled with the sheer destruction created a situation that necessitated strong intervention. The struggle was not short-lived. After years of rebuilding and developing, Germany has benefited from its industry. Equally true, is that the Allied trading partners have benefited from their access to German markets.

#### The Benefits in Japan

At the end of World War II, Germany and Japan harbored a natural feeling of distrust for Allied forces. In September 1946, a poll of the American public revealed that 81 percent felt the U.S. needed to have troops in Japan. Three years later, in another poll of the American public, 64 percent thought that Japan was still not ready for peace. According to this same poll, most Americans felt that Japan would oppose the U.S. or remain neutral in another global war. With the rising threat of the spread of communism, both in Russia and in China, Americans viewed Japan as a buffer.<sup>58</sup>

U.S. government sentiment toward Japan mirrored that of the public. The government's assessments were more refined and educated and less emotional, yet still resulted in a strong anti-Soviet consensus. The National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff war plans

reflected this perceived threat. They made clear the belief that East Asia would be a secondary front in a global war.<sup>59</sup>

The occupation of Japan lasted 80 months. From the Japanese point of view it was a generous occupation and to Americans it was successful.<sup>60</sup> The measure of this success is the influence still wielded by the U.S. today. The terms of the cease-fire granted independence to Korea and all other Japanese colonies. The initial phase of the occupation focused on returning Japan to functional status without its previous expansionist bent. A change occurred in 1948 with the beginnings of the Cold War. This change brought about the emphasis on developing Japan's industrial capabilities.<sup>61</sup>

One of the greatest benefits to the U.S. was a chance to discover the true nature of Japan and East Asia. Prior to the war, few Americans had a real understanding of the people of this region. As a result of occupation, many Americans discovered much more about the Japanese. "The occupation involved far more Americans directly with East Asia than ever before in the American national experience. We cannot know exactly how many people went to Japan, but perhaps close to two million."<sup>62</sup>

The peace treaty with Japan was signed in 1952. Forty-eight nations, excluding the Soviet Union and China, were signatories. This treaty ended the occupation of Japan. In light of the perceived threats from the Soviet Union and China, the U.S. and Japan entered a security agreement that allowed American troops to be stationed in Japan for an unspecified period of time. Other countries in the Pacific Rim feared Japan's return to militarism. With this in mind, the U.S. entered into

mutual defense treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.<sup>63</sup> These agreements have shaped U.S. influence in this strategic portion of the world.

#### The Benefits in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT has provided benefits to the U.S. politically, socially, and economically. Politically, there are new allies in the region; socially, like the U.S. experience in Japan, a broader understanding of the Arab world is occurring; and economically, many of the nations of the region are anxious to trade with the U.S. OPC alone does not provide these benefits, but it is an additive in their advancement.

On 6 March 1991 President George Bush in an address to a joint session of Congress, commented:

Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the strong. . . . A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations."<sup>64</sup>

Little did he know that he was foreshadowing events that would begin in just over a month to protect the Kurds. As Operation DESERT STORM was the first use of force in this "new world order," OPC was the first peace mission. Shortly after OPC began, on 16 July 1991, the members of the Group of Seven released a communique including the statement, "The U.N.'s role in peacekeeping should be reinforced and we are prepared to do this strongly."<sup>65</sup> This "new world order" including the U.N. as a key player in the international community is evidenced by

the peacekeeping operations run by the U.N. The U.S. politically is working with many new or emerging countries and not just the same western European allies.

U.S. relations with countries in the Gulf region prior to the War were often strained. However, the successful coalition effort in the war endeared the U.S. to many of the coalition partners. Through post-war efforts, these countries have seen that the U.S. does care about human life and will step in to help defray conflict whenever possible. In a recent interview, Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's National Security Adviser, was asked if he had any second thoughts about the way the Gulf War ended. He replied that the U.S. could have captured Saddam Hussein, but by doing that "we would have lost the big benefit, which was the Middle East peace process."<sup>66</sup> This Middle East peace process is a byproduct of the U.S. concern for, and active participation with, its coalition partners in the Gulf region.

Economically, the U.S. stands in good stead in the region. Turkey, where the OPC aircraft are based continues to be a major trading partner. In fact, they not only fly F-16 aircraft, but now produce their own. The continued goodwill in the area is very important to U.S. businesses with interests in the area.

#### The Benefits in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

The benefits received from OPC apply to OSW as well. One benefit not covered in the previous discussion but which also applies is the benefit of predeployed troops.

With its carefully selected mix of reconnaissance, air-to-air, air-to-ground and support aircraft, this force enhances regional defensive capabilities, facilitates rapid buildup of U.S. combat naval and airpower during crisis and is capable of inflicting

significant damage on enemy force in the first hours of hostilities. Furthermore, air operations involving regional forces strengthen relations with regional friends. All of these benefits of forward-positioned air forces were demonstrated in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, where presence facilitated rapid reinforcement and signaled Iraq and other would-be aggressors that the U.S. was capable of unleashing punishing attacks against its foes.<sup>67</sup>

#### Summary of Benefit Analysis

All of these occupations reaped significant benefits for the U.S. in their times. All helped shape a "new world order." The ground force occupations allowed the U.S. the opportunity to enmesh itself into the workings of two future world leaders. The air occupations have provided the opportunity to strengthen our ties with our allies. In every case, the prepositioning of troops has been critical to future conflict resolution; Germany--the Cold War, Japan--the Korean War, OPC and OSW--Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. Each occupation has been crucial in U.S. foreign policy.

#### The Risks of Occupation

An occupation force can be faced with many and varied risks. The greatest risk appears to be the threat to human life. This very real and ever present risk is felt by all occupiers. However, on a broader scale, the major risk is failing to accomplish the goal. For example, in Northern Ireland or post-World War I Germany, the fighting continued or was merely delayed a few years.

#### The Risks in Germany

The risk to individual soldiers was relatively minor. Off-duty, many of the soldiers were difficult to distinguish from the rest of the populace. With the country segmented into four distinct areas, the

occupation of Germany took on a much different tone than the occupation in Japan. Initially this was not a popular decision with the Germans, but the treatment they received from the Western allies was much better than their fellow Germans received from the Soviets in the East.

Failure and lack of support on the home front were two large risks in this occupation. They were overcome by increased public support, due in large part, to the rising Soviet threat. The strength of the alliance between Germany and the U.S. clearly illustrates this support.

#### The Risks in Japan

The threat to personnel conducting occupation duties in Japan was very high. It was very easy to tell who the American soldiers were, on- or off-duty. While the majority of the Japanese people were pleased with the occupation forces, there were some who were not.

This small minority formed a subversive organization to strike back at the occupiers. After the Japanese surrendered, a small group of young Army and Navy officers failed in an attempted coup d'etat. After this failure, they organized underground organizations to prepare for a guerrilla war, led by a young prince. After the first year of occupation, upon discovering that the Americans were not going to abolish the emperor or institute harsh policies, the group disbanded.<sup>68</sup> There was still a threat from individuals, but the organized threat faded away.

By 1948, the American people began to lose interest in the overseas occupations. Without the rise of the Cold War, interest may have driven the investment in occupation down to the point of failure.

The risk that the public support would wane was very real to the politicians who knew that without that support, the occupations would be given up. The occupation in Japan was not eliminated due primarily as a result of the rising Soviet threat and General MacArthur's personality.<sup>69</sup>

#### The Risks in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

The risk to human life is omnipresent in an occupation. By its very nature, an occupation presents hazards to the enforcers. The previous examples dealt with the threat from the enemy, but occupation forces can present a very real threat to themselves. After all, it is the occupiers who are under arms and authorized to shoot in accordance with rules of engagement. Complacency caused by the extended duration of these operations may increase this risk.

The tragic shootdown of two U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters by two U.S. Air Force F-15C aircraft illustrates this risk. The accident was a result of misidentification by the USAF pilots, caused by their lack of awareness of the presence of other friendly aircraft in the area.<sup>70</sup> The risk of misidentification or other mistakes is always present in these operations. However, the risk increases as the duration of the mission increases.

Another friendly fire incident is unlikely to be repeated, but it serves as a strong reminder of the risks in this kind of operation. Loss of public support and therefore a cessation of the mission prior to stabilization of the area is a serious risk. Hopefully the changes in Iraq occur faster than the changes in the American people's attitudes.

## The Risks in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

The risks in OSW are very similar to those in OPC. Enemy threats include fighters and surface-to-air missiles. Other threats include conflicts with the 50 to 125 sorties per day, flown by pilots from different countries and different services.<sup>71</sup> While airspace control measures have been established and procedures exist, there are still a large number of aircraft in a confined area.

Probably the biggest risk these two operations face is failing to provide stability to the region and protection to oppressed peoples. If the political will to continue these operations is lost, then it is highly likely that failure will occur. There is no way to prejudge whether these operations will result in greater stability or not. Only with the passage of time will the operations be judged as successful.

### Summary of Risk Analysis

Land occupation incurs more risk to the occupying forces than air occupation. This is primarily a result of the proximity and numbers of troops involved. Air occupation keeps the occupiers away from the occupied peoples and requires less occupiers.

Without a conclusion to the no-fly zones, an assessment of mission success is impossible. Each occupation has an equal chance to fail or succeed regardless of whether it is conducted in the air or on the ground. The British experience with Air Control was judged a success, as were the two post-World War II occupations.

Overall, risks are present in every operation. In air occupation, the risk is less than in a ground occupation. The risk

exists and, as demonstrated, tragedy can strike. The risk of mission failure appears to be fairly equal.

The next chapter concludes the thesis by answering the research question and providing recommendations for further research. The conclusions from the subordinate research questions arrived at in this chapter are pivotal to the resolution of the thesis.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter answers the research question, "Do the no-fly zones in Iraq accomplish the strategic goals of occupation?" The first chapter provided a background for this discussion. The second provided a review of literature on this topic. The third chapter presented and analyzed the research conducted to answer the subordinate questions, laying a foundation for this final chapter. This chapter covers both the conclusion and recommendations for further research.

#### Conclusion

According to the National Military Strategy, promoting stability is a national objective of the U.S. military.<sup>1</sup> An examination of the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II suggests that stability is most effectively achieved through employment of appropriate forces capable of holding and controlling the occupied area. This thesis addressed the question of whether coalition airpower, through enforcement of no-fly zones in Iraq, accomplishes the strategic goals in occupation and is capable of supporting regional stability.

Analysis of the nature of occupation reveals that the strategic goal of occupation has been and continues to be regional stability. Specifically, the nature of the war, population, and environment have

been primary factors in the shaping of an occupying force's attempts and success in achieving stability.

#### Achieving Stability in Germany

After World War II in Europe, the participating countries were exhausted. The war had depleted capabilities throughout Europe including manpower, natural resources, and personal energy. The population of Germany was without its dominating leadership for the first time in over a decade. The country was in ruin and badly in need of repair.

To stabilize this situation, Allied troops were dispersed throughout the country. Initially, the occupation took on the flavor of retribution. It soon became apparent to the Allies, that this was not going to bring about stability. With the Soviets demonstrating a desire to spread their influence in the East, stability through polarity became a driving influence. A strong ally, rebuilt by the West, was essential to counter the Soviet threat. In many ways a bipolar situation is conducive to developing stability. However, the uneasy calm of the ensuing Cold War bears evidence of the fragility of the bipolar stability.

#### Achieving Stability in Japan

Like Germany, Japan was a weary nation at the end of the War. The U.S. had engaged in an aggressive fire-bombing campaign against Japanese population centers. The culmination of the war was the dropping of the first two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S. However, the Japanese people

remained avid supporters of the emperor, even though most of the major cities were disaster areas.

Luckily for the Allied powers, General MacArthur was available. The Allies needed a leader who understood the Japanese people; General MacArthur's administration took into account the devastation of the war, the people's allegiance to the emperor and the need to rebuild. Once the Japanese could peacefully govern themselves, stability was to follow. The emperor was allowed to remain in his position, while the remaining leadership was scoured to remove the aggressive members. This ability to govern themselves coupled with rising tension in Korea served to hasten the process of rebuilding.

#### Achieving Stability in Iraq

The two no-fly zones are combined in this portion of the discussion. As opposed to World War II, the Gulf War was an extremely limited war. The war was over in less time than most campaigns during World War II. Iraqi noncombatant casualties were held to very low numbers and collateral damage was minimized wherever possible. There was some need for rebuilding, but nowhere near the scale of post-World War II. The general population was not targeted, nor was its ideological belief threatened. While much of the political rhetoric of the time left no doubt that coalition leaders would have liked to have eliminated Iraq's ruler, this did not happen. There was also no overt attempt to change the Iraqi form of government. The Iraqi people are no more united as a country today than before the war.

How is stability measured in the Gulf region? This region is clearly one of the more volatile in the world. During the Cold War, the

Gulf countries, like the rest of the world, generally aligned themselves with one or the other of the superpowers. The conflict between Iraq and Iran, while resulting in war, also polarized the region and kept the two most aggressive countries busy with their own affairs. The end of the Cold War brought an uneasy peace to the region. The polarization and peace were shattered by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. One of the major objectives of the war was restoring Kuwait's sovereignty. However, this alone does not ensure stability. The massing of Iraqi forces on the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 was testament to the continuing Iraqi threat even with coalition forces enforcing the no-fly zone. Charles W. Freeman, the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, relates:

The coalition was unable to set objectives beyond the lowest common denominator agreed to by consensus (liberation of Kuwait, reduction of Iraqi military potential). This left the victors without a vision of a post-war Gulf. With no strategy for war termination, the coalition made no effort to extract an Iraqi endorsement of peace terms or recognition of the political consequences of defeat.

Meanwhile, the lack of an agreed concept for a post-war security structure to deter further Gulf conflict at reasonable cost meant that no such arrangement emerged.<sup>2</sup>

Because the future is uncertain, the no-fly zones persist in Iraq. The U.S. presence is a key to the stability in Iraq and to the region as a whole, and provides an immediate reaction and force projection capability. Currently there is stability, albeit short term, brought about by the presence of U.S. forces in the region. The long term effects can only be measured with the passage of time. The no-fly zones accomplish the strategic goal of occupation. They provide security in accordance with U.S. policy for the region. These no-fly zones appear to be less costly than a ground occupation and achieve many

benefits. The occupier's risk in occupation will always be a factor, whatever means are chosen. General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, USAF, summarizes these thoughts:

Our post-Desert Storm activities in Southwest Asia are another example of employing an asymmetric force to achieve U.S. security objectives. Through the use of airpower, we have enforced United Nations sanctions against Iraq and compelled Hussein to accept the most intrusive U.N. inspection regime that a state has ever had to endure. For more than four years, we and our allies have leveraged our advantage in airpower--both carrier and land based--in Southwest Asia to achieve political objectives without placing large numbers of young Americans in harm's way. This has truly been an air occupation of Iraq.<sup>3</sup>

### Recommendations

The concept of air occupation is emerging as technology advances. However, two main areas of further research are recommended. The first is how best to accomplish air occupation within the constraints of the current military situation. The second area involves future requirements. If air occupation is to be a mission of the future, what kind of forces should be developed to best accomplish it?

Currently, no-fly zones are in place and the leadership develops the plan as they proceed. Given today's force structure, which aircraft are optimized for this mission? What environments are conducive to air occupation? What are the applications in other than post-war environments? There are many more areas, but this is a start.

The future of military forces is always under review by planners and theorists. General Carl Spaatz said:

Science is in the saddle. Science is the dictator whether we like it or not. Science runs ahead of politics and military affairs. Science evolves new conditions to which institutions must be adapted.<sup>4</sup>

With rapidly advancing technology and information, planners must develop equipment that can accomplish required missions. What future developments would be beneficial in air occupation? Should the mission of the Air Force be expanded beyond "the conduct of combat operations in the air?" What role will space forces play in the future of air occupation?" There are more, but these are some of the more pressing questions.

#### Closing

There is a critical role for air forces in our nation's future. The use of air forces to accomplish the strategic goals of occupation is just one small portion of the big picture. Advances in technology will provide planners with more information and a greater ability to influence decision-makers around the world. A key instrument in this influence is airpower. In the words of General Billy Mitchell, "The future of our nation is indissolubly bound up in the development of air power."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>7</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 4.

<sup>8</sup>Michael Codner, "The Implications of War Termination: Considerations for the Operational Commander" (Research Paper, Naval War College, 1991), 8.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Eric Carlton, Occupation, The Policies and Practice of Military Conquerors (Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble Books, 1992), 183.

<sup>11</sup>Thomas A. Kearney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary Report (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 117.

<sup>12</sup>Fran Hazelton, Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), 97.

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<sup>14</sup>William H. Johnson, "A Piece of the Puzzle: Tactical Airpower in Operations Other Than War" (Research Paper, Naval War College, 1994), 12.

<sup>15</sup>William Matthews, "Coverage of Iraqi 'No-Fly' Zone Increases," Air Force Times, 11 January 1993, 4.

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Central Command, 1994 Posture Statement (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 56.

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>21</sup>The American Heritage Dictionary, New College Edition (1979), s.v. "Hold."

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., s.v. "Control."

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<sup>1</sup>Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), vii.

<sup>2</sup>Carlton, vii.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>5</sup>Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War: Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 254-262.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 257.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 258-259.

<sup>8</sup>Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender. The Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), xi.

<sup>9</sup>James D. D. Smith, Stopping Wars (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 7.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 238.

<sup>11</sup>Lieutenant Colonel David J. Dean, Airpower in Small Wars, The British Air Control Experience (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1985), 2.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>17</sup>Carlton, 146.

<sup>18</sup>Seabury and Codevilla, 259.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 257.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 259.

<sup>22</sup>William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), 522.

<sup>23</sup>Seabury and Codevilla, 258.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 259.

<sup>25</sup>Manchester, 470.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 476.

<sup>27</sup>The American Heritage Dictionary, New College Edition (1979), s.v. "Control."

<sup>28</sup>Seabury and Codevilla, 245.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 259.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 267.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Manchester, 465.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 474.

<sup>34</sup>Seabury and Codevilla, 256.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 257.

<sup>36</sup>Manchester, 470.

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 503.

<sup>41</sup>Colonel John A. Warden, III, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," in Challenge and Response, Anticipating US Military Security Concerns, ed. Karl Magyar (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), 316.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 319.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 321.

<sup>44</sup>"Fact Sheet, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT" (Incirlik AB, TU: Combined Task Force Combined Information Bureau, 1995), 1.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>46</sup>Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 446.

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<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 448.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 450.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 456.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 461.

<sup>53</sup>Johnson, 12.

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>59</sup>United Nations Security Council, Resolution 949, New York, 15 October 1994.

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<sup>2</sup>Seabury, 256.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 257.

<sup>4</sup>George Bush, April 26, 1991.

<sup>5</sup>Bill Clinton, May 17, 1995.

<sup>6</sup>National Military Strategy, 4.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. European Command, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT After Action Report, 2.

<sup>8</sup>George Bush, April 16, 1991

<sup>9</sup>Gordon and Trainor, 451.

<sup>10</sup>Hazelton, 239.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 112.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 101.

<sup>13</sup>George Bush, April 16, 1991, 449.

<sup>14</sup>U.S. EUCOM, OPC After Action Report, 9.

<sup>15</sup>Hazelton, 241.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 235.

<sup>17</sup>Gordon and Trainor, 457.

<sup>18</sup>Hazelton, 241.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 259.

<sup>20</sup>Dean, 9.

<sup>21</sup>Major Timothy D. Livsey, "Air Occupation: A Viable Concept for Campaign Planning?" (Research Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 36.

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<sup>23</sup>"Fact Sheet, OPC," 3.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the Middle East (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 30.

<sup>25</sup>Clinton, 3 Jan 95, 4.

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<sup>30</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Hanlon, "The Operational Level of War: After the Smoke Clears" (Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, 1988), 35.

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<sup>44</sup>John Michael Kendall, "The Inflexible Response, United States Army Mobilization Doctrine, 1945-1951" (Master's thesis, Duke University, 1979), 115-116.

<sup>45</sup>U.S. EUCOM, OPC After Action Report, 9.

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<sup>47</sup>Captain George M. Henkel, 493rd Fighter Squadron, RAF Lakenheath, U.K., veteran of two OPC deployments, interview by author, 16 Feb. 1996, Telephone, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, to Lakenheath, U.K.

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>51</sup>General J.H. Binford Peay III, "Meeting the Challenges in the Central Command," Prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 February 1995, in Defense Issues, vol. 10, no. 53, 5.

<sup>52</sup>Major William Horn, veteran of two OSW deployments, interview by author, 10 Feb 1996, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Zink, 110.

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<sup>62</sup>Perry, 168.

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