Is Interservice Coordination Imperative Prior to Employing Fires in the Tactical Zone?
Abstract
This thesis investigates the subject of coordination as it applies to interservice fires. Reports from Desert Storm indicate a level of dissatisfaction regarding the requirement and/or the need to coordinate with the other service prior to employing fires in a certain region of the battlefield. With the fielding of deep strike weapons systems, the U.S. Army can now apply fires to a region of the battlefield previously reached only by fixed wing aircraft. Prior to this, the Air Force had experienced a degree of independence and autonomy in conducting interdiction operations. To place the issue in a historical context this study examines the growth of coordination between U.S. air and ground forces in specific time periods from World War II to Desert Storm. This study identifies successful elements of coordination from the periods examined in an attempt to determine current coordination requirements. Current joint doctrine states that coordination is highly desirable but is not always required. This study concludes the risks of not coordinating are too great and the benefits of coordination are significant. Further, it concludes coordination prior to application of fires to that portion of the battlefield within range of both air Force and Army systems is essential.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 07, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA312362
Entities
People
- Paul T. Johnson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College