War Termination: The Application of Operational Art to Negotiating Peace.
Abstract
Trends in modern warfare make it imperative for operational design to be adaptive. Most modern wars will be limited wars fought for limited objectives. War termination strategy will shift during the course of the war from military victory to negotiated settlement. This strategic shift warrants a change in operational objectives from those intended to secure military victory to ones intended to influence negotiations by managing the costs of war in general. The adversary will act rationally. He will react act within the structure of a value system to give predictable responses to stimuli. Negotiations can be influenced by attacking those objectives that the adversary values most. The imposition of cost on an adversary requires expenditure of assets. The commander must consider efficiency both from the aspect of the cost of an operation to him compared to the cost imposed on the adversary and with respect to the value of the anticipated improvement in the negotiated settlement. Negotiations will probably take place while fighting continues, thus the military is a powerful tool to influence negotiations and to signal future intentions. Not all military actions need be carried out in order to have an impact on negotiations. Fighting while negotiating presents pitfalls against which operational design must guard. The enemy may use negotiations to sap your domestic support while bolstering his own, the morale of your forces may sag, and escalation may occur as negotiations draw to a close. Changed military prospects may cause changes in war termination strategy. The Korean War of 1950-1953 is a case study of operational design that changed to adapt to changed war termination strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 14, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA312615
Entities
People
- John Schwanz
Organizations
- Naval War College