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
Navy Organic Theater Airlift:
A Viable Option for the Operational Warfighter

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.


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8 November 1996

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Abstract of
NAVY ORGANIC THEATER AIRLIFT:
A VIABLE OPTION FOR THE
OPERATIONAL WARFIGHTER

This paper introduces the reader to the structure, capability, and accessibility of the Naval Reserve Force's Fleet Logistics Support Squadrons to Unified Commander's in Chief (CINCs), and matches these capabilities against the warfighter's typical theater airlift requirements.

As part of the Navy's "Total Force" concept, active and reserve forces operating together to maximize U.S. combat capability, Fleet Logistic Support Squadrons of the Naval Reserve operating C-9/C-130/C-20 aircraft are a critical component to deployed fleet operations. Not just a force in reserve, but a force "in being", these squadrons represent the Navy's sole organic theater airlift capability, providing high-tempo, responsive, flexible, and reliable intratheater movement of high-priority personnel and cargo to the constantly moving carrier battle and amphibious ready groups, 365 days-a-year, around-the-clock, and around the world.

Theater airlift is a valuable resource in which demand invariably exceeds supply. CINCs and Joint Task Force Commanders, as well as Naval component commanders and their staffs, need to be informed and enlightened regarding this capability, and consider utilization of these assets during the contingency planning phase across the full range of joint military operations. Total force and logistic war gaming exercises validate the requirement for CINCs to maintain a robust and flexible intratheater airlift capability to employ

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

At a time when post "Cold-War" downsizing has left theater CINCs with fewer assets to counter growing instability within their geographic areas of responsibility, forces of the Reserve Component are becoming increasingly critical to the planning and execution of viable concepts of operations. The Reserve Components provide unique and complimentary capabilities in time of war or national emergency,¹ and use of these forces is becoming increasingly important. While there is no longer a "main event" in the foreseeable future to mold national military strategy, current defense plans are built around the requirement to respond to two major regional conflicts, nearly simultaneously. If that response is required, Guard and Reserve forces will make up about one-third of the total power of deployed U.S. forces.² The Naval Reserve, increasingly indispensable and closely integrated within the Total Force, is also evolving in concert with the fundamental shift away from countering a global threat in a bipolar world, to projecting power and influence across the seas, as set forth in the Navy's new maritime strategy, "Forward...From the Sea."³

In concert with the Total Force Policy, and in the interest of cost efficiencies and mission compatibility, many mission areas have migrated to the Reserve Components. One capability

¹ Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: 1995), I-6.

² William J. Perry, "More Realism, Readiness, Operations for Guard and Reserve," Defense Issues, March 1995, 1.

³ "Seapower/Reserves," The Almanac of Seapower, January 1995, 242.

inherent within the Naval Reserve, and one that is of vital importance to the warfighting CINC, is theater airlift. Mobility and sustainment, the products of airlift, are critical factors in supporting combat forces able to fight and win. The airlift capability of the Naval Reserve has evolved into a highly effective and readily accessible tool for the operational warfighter.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

As an introduction, it may be useful to acquaint the reader with the general fundamentals and overall structure of the Naval Reserve, and to outline the abbreviated history, background, and purpose of Navy organic air transport operations.

The legal basis for the Naval Reserve is found in Title 10 USC, section 10102. This statute directs the Reserve Components of the U.S. military, in this case the Navy, with the mission of providing:

..."trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as national security requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during, and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified personnel to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components."⁴

The Naval Reserve Force is an echelon II command, reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The Commander,

⁴ U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Purpose of Reserve Components," U.S. Code, Title 10-Armed Forces, 1994 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), sec. 10102.

Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR), an active duty, regular Navy Rear Admiral, serves simultaneously as COMNAVRESFOR, headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and as Director of the Naval Reserve on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. As Director (N095), he serves as the CNO's principle advisor on all matters pertaining to the Naval Reserve, including establishing policy, plans, programs, organizational procedures, and standards for the Naval Reserve. As COMNAVRESFOR, he is responsible for managing Naval Reserve programs and resources, and for the operations, training, programs, and resources of the Naval Reserve.

Below this echelon are the Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force, and Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRRESFOR), also headquartered in New Orleans. Each of these echelon III commands is headed by a Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) one-star flag officer. The senior of these two TAR flag officers also serves as Deputy Commander, Naval Reserve Force.⁵

Within the context of examining Naval Reserve air logistics squadrons, further discussion will focus only on the "air side" of the Force. COMNAVAIRRESFOR currently consists of one carrier air wing, two maritime patrol wings, one helicopter wing, and one fleet logistics support wing. As a result of mirror-image downsizing in relation to the active duty Navy, and squadron consolidations due to Base Realignment and Closure process recommendations, the Naval Air Reserve Force disestablished one entire carrier air wing in 1993, and now consists of 34 Reserve

⁵ The Almanac of Seapower, 245.

Force Squadrons (RESFORONS), down from a total of 51.

Commander, Fleet Logistics Support Wing (CFLSW), located in Dallas, Texas, exercises direct administrative authority over the Navy's Fleet Logistics Support (VR) squadrons. CFLSW reports directly to COMNAVAIRRESFOR, and is the largest airwing within the claimancy. (See Appendix A).

PERSONNEL

To further the reader's understanding of the reserve structure and culture, it is necessary to briefly discuss manning as it pertains to a RESFORON. All RESFORONS are manned by members of the Selected Reserve, as well as those of the TAR program.

Selected Reservists (SELRES) are individuals who, upon completion of their active duty requirement, return to civilian life, but continue to pursue a career in the Naval Reserve. They perform, as a minimum, 48 regular drill periods (generally one weekend per month), and from 14 to 17 days of annual training per year. Pilots and air crewmen are also authorized 72 additional drill periods for the performance of flying duties. Members of the Selected Reserve are subject to recall to active duty under certain mobilization criteria.

Demographics play a critical role in RESFORON manning. In a case of "bring the unit to the reservist", squadrons are located in or near large population centers. Many are located near major airline domiciles and hubs, facilitating access to Selected Reservists who work in the civilian aviation industry.

These individuals bring a wealth of readily-transferable skills and experience to the squadrons. (See Appendix B for CFLSW squadron locations and aircraft type).

The term TAR refers to the active duty component of the Naval Reserve, both officer and enlisted. The program is authorized under Title 10 USC, section 12310(a), as a "reserve ordered to active duty...in connection with organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing or training the reserve components..."⁶ The intent of Congress is to maintain a cadre of warfare qualified specialists who provide continuity and expertise within the Naval Reserve. It is an active duty career path which closely mirrors that of the regular Navy.⁷

Roughly one-third of the total billets in a FLSW RESFORON are TAR, with the remainder being SELRES billets. To illustrate the SELRES/TAR ratio, a typical four-plane C-9 RESFORON is manned with 12 TAR officers, and 100 TAR enlisted personnel. SELRES manning consists of 36 officers and 161 enlisted.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The Navy has been in the air logistics business for many years, beginning with the establishment of the Naval Air Transport Service (NATS) in the early days of World War II. Beginning in 1942, Navy aircrews flying the Douglas C-47 "Skytrain", conducted numerous logistics support missions between India and China. These crews contended with both

⁶ U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Reserves...", U.S. Code, Title 10--Armed Forces, 1994 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), sec. 12310(a).

⁷ "Perspective," Bureau of Naval Personnel, November-December 1995, Volume 1/96, 25.

weather and Japanese fighter aircraft while crossing the Himalayan mountains in carrying out the famous "over-the-hump" operations. NATS continued to grow, and by the end of the War, 430 Navy transport aircraft traversed a world-wide route system of over 70,000 miles in providing airlift to deployed U.S. military forces.⁸

In 1948, shortly after the Department of Defense was created as the unifying central authority over the three services, NATS was combined with the Air Force's Air Transport Command to form the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), the predecessor of today's Air Mobility Command. As an integral part of MATS, Navy VR squadrons flew in a joint effort alongside their Air Force counterparts, engaged in global airlift support. These squadrons distinguished themselves in numerous operations, including the Berlin Airlift, and played important roles in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.⁹

Eventually, Navy participation in MATS ceased, but Congress recognized the importance and unique aspects of Navy air logistics support, and codified the requirement in Title 10 USC, 5062(b), which specifies:

"All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval services as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, **air transport essential for naval operations** (emphasis added),..."¹⁰

⁸ Stanley M. Ulanoff, MATS: The Story of the Military Air Transport System (New York: The Moffa Press, 1964), 17.

⁹ Ibid., 60.

¹⁰ U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "United States Navy: composition; functions," U.S. Code, Title 10--Armed Forces. 1994 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), sec. 5062(b).

The modern era began in the mid-1970s with the acquisition of 15 C-9B "Skytrain II" aircraft to replace the logistics support fleet, primarily aging C-118s. Over the next few years, the original procurement of new C-9B aircraft was supplemented by the purchase of 12 used DC-9 aircraft, bought from various civilian operators. These aircraft brought the total C-9 fleet to its current inventory of 27. To meet Navy mission requirements, these aircraft were heavily modified to include cargo doors, strengthened cabin flooring, two additional fuselage fuel tanks, upgraded navigational equipment and cockpit standardization modifications.¹¹

In June 1991, the Naval Reserve took delivery of the first of a planned fleet of 20 C-130T aircraft. The C-130T has the ability to carry large amounts of cargo over considerable distances, and to operate out of short, austere airfields. The addition of the C-130T significantly increased the oversize cargo capability available to theater commanders.

More recently, Fleet Logistics Support Wing acquired four C-20G aircraft, adding a new and vital dimension of capability to the inventory. Designed to carry both passengers and cargo, as required, long distances at high speed, the C-20G also provides the flexibility to provide efficient transport for smaller lifts that do not require a larger aircraft. (See Appendix C for an overview of Navy theater aircraft and capabilities).

In the interest of cost savings, efficiency, and mission compatibility, the Navy's in-CONUS air logistics support

¹¹ Richard L. Smith, "VR-The Navy's Logistics Support Airline," Wings of Gold, Spring 1996, 22.

capability was assigned to the Naval Reserve, where it remains today. The significant efficiencies inherent in the Naval Reserve operating 100% of the Navy's in-CONUS airlift capability was further extended, when due to down-sizing initiatives, all overseas-based regular Navy fleet logistics support squadrons (VR-22/VR-24/VRC-50), were disestablished. Fleet Logistics Support Wing C-9 and C-130 squadrons capably filled the void by dramatically increasing the level and tempo of forward-deployed involvement. By way of comparison, in 1989, FLSW squadrons provided 18 two-week out-CONUS detachments in support of theater commanders. In Fiscal Year 1996, the combined C-9/C-130 fleet will execute the equivalent of 122 two-week detachments, over 1,700 total days of support, to the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and Middle East/Southwest Asia theaters.¹²

¹² Ibid.

CHAPTER II

MISSION

Organic airlift forces primarily support their respective Service functions. The Service Secretaries organize, train, equip, and provide these forces.¹³ The Navy's requirement for organic airlift stems from the constantly changing, "moving target" nature of deployed naval forces, and the need to quickly airlift high-priority cargo and passengers to and from these forces, often in unpredictable locations. Naval forces, typically the first to arrive on-scene during a crisis situation, and the last to leave, require a flexible, reliable logistics chain. When ships and airwings are deployed, their warfighting capabilities are directly related to the condition of their weapons systems and personnel. Using theater airlift to move critical material and personnel to at-sea forces can make a significant difference in the warfighting capability of a force at sea.¹⁴

Naval organic airlift is complementary to and does not compete with, nor is duplicative of, Air Mobility Command (AMC) or the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). AMC is responsible for providing intertheater, or strategic, airlift, and does an outstanding job. However, lack of flexibility in the AMC approach to scheduling severely limits airlift capability to meet unforeseen and emerging Navy demands. The wartime purpose

¹³ Joint Publication 4-01.1, Airlift Support to Joint Operations, (Proposed Final Draft Pub), The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: 1993), I-5.

¹⁴ Center for Naval Analyses, Operations and Support Division, DON Shore-to-Shore and Shore-to-Ship Airlift Requirements Report, CRM 89-333 (Alexandria, VA: 1990), 1-1.

of naval organic airlift is to transfer essential personnel and material forward to their final destination, throughout the wartime theater, to forward airheads, after they have been delivered to the theater by other means, such as AMC, CRAF, or sealift. Short range carrier-on-board (COD) and vertical-on-board (VOD) assets then move the material or personnel from the forward airhead to ships at sea. A study done by the Center for Naval Analyses has validated this requirement, and also identified a potential shortfall in this capability, based on the demands generated by an 11 carrier battle group Navy involved in a two major regional contingency scenario.¹⁵

Peacetime contributory support is a key aspect of the Navy's transport community. As previously stated, the Naval Reserve represents 100% of the Navy's organic airlift capability; there is no active duty counterpart. The mission of VR does not differ significantly between peacetime and wartime--only tempo of operations and squadron location change.¹⁶ To illustrate the level of support rendered to fleet commanders and CINCs, in Fiscal Year 1995, Navy C-9/C-130/C-20 aircraft flew nearly 58,000 flight hours, including 10,000 hours out-CONUS, in transporting some 318,000 passengers and 24.5 million pounds of cargo. Of the total number of flight hours, 85% were flown in direct support of CINC requirements.¹⁷

¹⁵ U.S. Dept. of Defense, The Future Naval Reserve: Roles and Missions, Size and Shape (Washington: 1994), C-67.

¹⁶ Ibid., 25.

¹⁷ Navy Air Logistics Office, Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Report (New Orleans, LA: 1995).

THEATER AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS

How does the demonstrated capability of Naval Reserve logistics support squadrons match the needs of warfighting CINCs? A four-year, in-depth Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study (WIMS), examined intratheater movement in Europe, Southwest Asia, and in the Pacific. In each theater, the study developed, in close consultation and with input from the theater CINC, intratheater airlift requirements necessary to support stated concepts of operations. The detailed aspects of the comprehensive study are classified, but the overall analysis of theater airlift requirements is telling. WIMS concluded that, in every theater, events are expected to occur which exceed the intratheater fleet capability. From a historical perspective, the quantity and variety of requirements for airlift have almost always been greater than anticipated.¹⁸

Joint Publication 4-01.1 (Proposed Final Draft) defines the mission of theater airlift as airlift used to support operations directed by the theater CINC. The theater CINC uses theater airlift to:

1. Deploy, employ, and redeploy forces.
2. Sustain deployed forces.
3. Conduct aeromedical evacuation operations.
4. Evacuate non-combatants.¹⁹

¹⁸ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study--Final Report (Washington: 1988), Annex G-5.

¹⁹ Joint Publication 4-01.1, Airlift Support to Joint Operations, (Proposed Final Draft Pub), The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: 1993), III-1.

Naval Reserve organic logistics support aircraft have the capability to meet each of these broad theater airlift mission requirements. Theater CINCs exercise combatant command (COCOM) over assigned airlift forces, both common-user and Service organic. While tasking component organic airlift only under exceptional circumstances, the Joint Force Commander should allocate any aviation assets under his control to perform airlift for other service components when in the best interest of joint combat operations.²⁰ The significant capabilities of FLSW aircraft, especially in light of the recent acquisition and on-line, full-mission status of the C-130 fleet, represent a viable resource which should be planned for, and utilized.

ACCESSIBILITY

The theater airlift capability of the Naval Reserve Force is irrelevant to the operational commander without the requisite accessibility. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates should be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of both active and reserve component forces, blending them in such a manner as to maximize the overall capability of the joint force. JFCs and their staffs need to be familiar with reserve component call-up authority and response times.²¹

Fundamental to the Total Force Policy is the accessibility of the Reserve Forces. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

²⁰ Ibid., III-21.

²¹ Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington: 1995), I-6.

Staff said recently,

"As the size of our forces decreases, and as the resources available for national defense become increasingly constrained, it becomes more and more important that we utilize the Reserve Component intelligently--that we use the special skills and capabilities they offer as a force multiplier in meeting our everyday operational commitments, as well as our potential need for strategic reinforcement...In short, we cannot afford to leave our Guardsmen and Reservists "on the shelf" until we need them. We need them now. We need them every day. We need them to be accessible and readily integrated into the joint force packages that the theater commanders need to respond to crisis."²²

Planned utilization of reserve assets requires an understanding of the mobilization process. The request to seek mobilization of Naval Reserve forces from the National Command Authority (NCA) is usually initiated by the supported command (unified or specified commander-in-chief) through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mobilization approval from the NCA normally flows to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy, then to the Chief of Naval Operations, who issues the mobilization order.

Mobilization of the Reserve Component includes the following categories:

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) for Operational Missions--commonly referred to as the Presidential 200K Call-Up. This authority allows for the recall of up to 200,000 selected reservists for 270 days under Title 10 USC

²² John M. Shalikashvili, "The Guard, the Reserve, and a New National Strategy," The Officer, February 1994, 18.

12304 (formerly under section 673(b), since renumbered).²³

This 200,000 Presidential Call-Up authority is scenario-driven and affords flexibility for building up forces prior to a declaration of war or national emergency.²⁴ Members mobilized under this authority must report to their home station within twenty-four hours of notification of activation.

The PSRC is a particularly useful option in circumstances in which the potentially escalatory nature of partial or full mobilization would make them undesirable. It is a tailored operational response, which, though of limited scope, has multiple uses.

Partial Mobilization--expansion of the Armed Forces of not more than 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve. Pursuant to Title 10, this authority requires Presidential declaration of a national emergency. Any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve may be ordered to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 24 consecutive months, without the consent of the person concerned.

Full Mobilization--gives access to the Total Reserve Component under Title 10, but requires a declaration of war, or passage of a public law.²⁵

Section 12304 was enacted to increase access to, and

²³ U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Selected Reserve...", U.S. Code, Title 10--Armed Forces, 1994 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1995), sec. 12304.

²⁴ Ronnie D. James, "Guard and Reserve Issues in Deployment," The Air Force Law Review, Volume 37, 1994, 98.

²⁵ U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Ready Reserve...", U.S. Code, Title 10--Armed Forces, 1994 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), sec. 12302.

integration of, Reserve forces. For the JFC requiring Navy-provided theater airlift in other than a full-blown contingency crisis requiring partial or full mobilization, this section provides the warfighting commander with a number of operational benefits. Select forces can be activated without a declaration of National Emergency or War, and, without the national and international political consequences associated with "mobilization". Congressional approval is not required. This mobilization authority also provides the theater commander with time, (assured duration of up to 270 days), to assess the operational situation while having the additional capability and forces to deal with it.

For regional conflicts, the PSRC could be expected to be used to augment the active components to satisfy specific force shortfalls (such as airlift), relevant to the contingency. It may be initiated before, concurrent with, or after the onset of hostilities. It may be viewed as a precursor to partial mobilization and should be available before unambiguous warning of a potential adversary attack. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored or operational response of limited scope, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization.²⁶ The mobilization process for Operation Desert Shield/Storm was the first use of reserve forces under the PSRC.

Finally, operational commanders should be aware that for short-fused emergent tasking requiring airlift support of a limited duration, Navy theater airlift can respond on demand, and without mobilization. These squadrons maintain a 24-hour,

²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 1996, CJCSM 3110.01 (Washington: 1995), GL-13,14.

seven-day-a-week readiness posture. The TAR cadre, augmented by voluntary Selected Reserve participation, can and has responded to a variety of contingency operations. Most recently, Navy C-9 and C-130 aircraft, responding on short notice, played key roles in operation "Assured Response", flying missions in support of the Marine Amphibious Ready Group and evacuating non-combatants out of Liberia.

CHAPTER III

RECOMMENDATIONS

First, in order to guarantee fleet commanders the air logistics support they have come to expect, and CINCs a wartime airlift asset, the issue of a replacement aircraft for the C-9 needs to be addressed. Two of the three aircraft types in the Navy's organic airlift inventory, the C-130T and the C-20G, are current generation, state-of-the-art platforms with long and productive service lives ahead of them. In contrast, the C-9, the workhorse of the fleet for many years, is an aging, "first generation" aircraft that presents reliability, supportability, and maintainability problems.

The average age of the 27 aircraft that comprise the C-9 fleet is 22 years, and the oldest, part of the used aircraft buy, is 28 years old. The fleet will reach obsolescence within the next decade due to deficiencies in the avionics suite, engines, and airframe aging. These aircraft will become increasingly more expensive to operate and maintain in the very near term. Currently, C-9 rework costs exceed 20 percent of the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force maintenance budget, while accounting for only four percent of its aircraft inventory.²⁷ Although these aircraft are superbly maintained at the organizational (squadron) level, the effects of fatigue and corrosion will continue to manifest themselves, requiring expensive, contractor-provided depot-level maintenance, as well

²⁷ U.S. Dept. of Defense, The Future Naval Reserve: Roles and Missions, Size and Shape (Washington: 1994), C-69.

as significant out-of-service time, to keep them airworthy. The existing engines do not meet soon-to-be-enacted Federal Aviation Administration/International Civil Aviation Organization environmental and noise abatement requirements. In consonance with current SECNAV objectives of acquiring front line equipment for the Naval Reserve,²⁸ a comparable, yet more capable, off-the-shelf aircraft should be funded, and brought into service in an expeditious, progressive manner, replacing the older aircraft first.

Second, Naval Reserve airlift forces should be apportioned to theater CINCs in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Incorporating these forces into the JSCP would help to institutionalize the Total Force Policy regarding Navy theater airlift, encourage familiarity and understanding, and serve to facilitate interaction and communication between the staff of the gaining CINC, and the reserve hierarchy.

SUMMARY


Theater airlift will always be a vital element in operational planning and execution. The successful campaign plan will likely hinge on a robust theater airlift network, and the assets with which to execute it. In this era of regional instability, the future may well present a complex mix of scenarios occurring simultaneously, spanning the spectrum of conflict, as well as the globe. If so, theater airlift assets will be at a premium.

²⁸ John H. Dalton, "The Reserve and the Future of Our Naval Forces," The Officer, April 1994, 14.

This paper has endeavored to provide the reader with a foundation in, and appreciation for, the structure, capability, and accessibility of Navy organic theater airlift. While acknowledging that Service organic airlift assets are primarily dedicated to that particular component, the depth of capability and experience that Naval Reserve airlift squadrons possess should be recognized, and made available to theater commanders. At a time when downsizing has left the operational warfighter with fewer assets to meet an ever-expanding range of possible contingencies, the Fleet Logistics Support squadrons of the Naval Reserve represent a ready, accessible, and cost-effective resource--a resource which should be understood, planned for, and when necessary, utilized.

APPENDIX A

NAVAL RESERVE AIRLIFT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



COMMANDER, FLEET LOGISTICS SUPPORT WING

Aircraft Assignments

18 (C-130)

VR-53 WASHINGTON, DC - 4
VR-54 NEW ORLEANS - 5
VR-55 SANTA CLARA - 5
VR-62 S. WEYMOUTH - 4

27 (C-9)

VR-46 ATLANTA - 3
VR-52 WILLOW GROVE - 4
VR-56 NORFOLK - 4
VR-57 NORTH ISLAND - 4

VR-58 JACKSONVILLE - 4
VR-59 DALLAS - 4
VR-61 WHIDBEY - 4

4 (C-20G)

VR-48 WASH, DC - 2
DET HAWAII - 2



Appendix C

Navy Organic Theater Airlift Aircraft

C-9

Military version of the twin-jet McDonnell-Douglas DC-9. Capable of carrying 90 passengers, or 28,000 pounds of palletized cargo. The aircraft can be quickly configured to carry a combination of both passengers and cargo. Maximum load range is approximately 2,600 nautical miles while carrying a 6,000 pound payload. Utilizes self-contained over-water navigation system. Has a large side cargo door to facilitate pallet loading, and an aft ventral stair for passenger loading. Requires a minimum runway length of 5,000 feet.

C-130T

In use since 1956, the newest production model of the Lockheed "Hercules." Medium-range, four-engine turboprop aircraft capable of carrying 92 passengers, or 74 litters. Maximum payload of 49,180 pounds. Maximum payload range is 2,000 nautical mile, while ferry range is 4,750 nautical miles. Cruising speed of 300 kts. Has a tail-loading capability for bulky, over-sized cargo. Can operate from short, unimproved runways.

C-20G

Military variant of the Gulfstream Aerospace G-IV corporate aircraft. Incorporates a side cargo door and can carry three pallets of cargo, (up to 4,500 pounds), or, in the all-passenger configuration, 26 passengers. Designed for long-range (3,500+ nautical miles) high-speed (.80 Mach/450 kts) transport of medium-sized lifts of high-priority cargo and personnel.

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