The Employment of the Division Artillery Group at the National Training Center.
Abstract
This study examines how the OPFOR's Division Artillery Group (DAG) influences brigade fire support and maneuver training at the NTC. The purpose is to determine whether the NTC should discontinue use of the DAG and, if so, recommend viable alternatives which are consistent with doctrine yet maximize the NTC training experience. The study assesses the DAG's utility as a training vehicle by comparing DAG employment at the NTC to former Soviet and U.S. doctrine and by measuring the effect of DAG fires on the performance of brigade combat teams. The conclusion is that the DAG should remain on the NTC battlefield but the training scenarios should be scripted to include a division proactive counterfire battle designed to reduce the DAG to a strength level which leaves the brigade with sufficient combat power to practice close assault tasks. The study shows that the DAG is correctly portrayed in terms of tube strength and positioning but contributes too heavily to the close fight. Other than the division's reactive counterfire battle, the brigade has no means of countering DAG fires. Introducing proactive counterfire retains the current NTC threat model, advances existing, sound doctrine, and increases the training value to the brigade combat team.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 07, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA312676
Entities
People
- Mark L. Waters
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College