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THESIS

**ON THE PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO NATO
ENLARGEMENT**

by

Andrea Rózsa

June 1996

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ON THE PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

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
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

All too often when the issue of NATO enlargement is raised some of the current members object to it due to one of several preconceptions. The more common objections include the potential members' perceived domestic and economic problems, the various disputes between these countries themselves, and the adverse position Russia has taken regarding the question.

The author intends to show that present requirements, as set forth in the September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement," were not applied to previous enlargements, a fact that raises the question of fairness in present members' expectations. Furthermore, by examining three alternative scenarios for Russia in the future, it will be shown that none of these suggests that the issue of enlargement should be dropped. Finally, the study of Hungary, a country representing a "middle ground" among the so-called "Visegrad four," will demonstrate that Hungary is closer today to complying with the strict expectations set forth in the document than previously added members were, although their task was much less demanding. This implies that stereotypes are involved in resistance to NATO enlargement, which should be set aside if only to secure a more stable regional environment in Europe.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The thesis, "On the Perceived Obstacles to NATO Enlargement" examines three commonly held notions in the current NATO enlargement debate. First is the opinion that previous enlargements were extended to countries that were somehow more "worthy" and closer to the "West" than are today's applicants. As Chapter II shows, this was not exactly the case. What is more, if they had had to comply with the requirements set forth in the September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargements", the previous applicants would not have been awarded membership. The Alliance, therefore, risks setting a double standard that, from the outside, might seem devised to keep enlargement at bay rather than aid applicants in their endeavors.

The second notion is that connected to Russia. Various experts judge the future of the Russian Federation differently, but many say that NATO enlargement would be detrimental to European security because of Russia's reaction to it. The thesis examines three scenarios (those of "imperial Russia", weak/"Weimar-type" Russia, democratic future) and comes to the conclusion that NATO enlargement should go forward in any case. Russia could be compensated, but not with being awarded a say in the Alliance's affairs.

Finally, the third such belief is examined in Chapter IV. The chapter questions the notion that none of the current applicants are ready for membership yet. Through the

example of Hungary, it shows the level of compliance with NATO's requirements that has already been achieved, a level significantly higher than many might suspect. It also asks if some of the requirements might be contradictory (e.g., the need to establish a market economy surely clashes with the arguments for force modernization, interoperability, and standardization, which would require significant investments in the military rather than the civilian sphere).

Chapter V examines the options available to NATO. It seems that the Alliance's new mission needs new "markets" -- markets that will not be found inside NATO. Perhaps the fact that the Alliance's new "product" is to be regional security and stability, and the promotion of democratic values, should suggest that new partners be taken on with whom to co-operate in production.

I. INTRODUCTION

Today, in the West, an abundance of publications discusses the merits and possible methods of NATO enlargement *vis-à-vis* Central and Eastern Europe. While many of the proposals are nothing but the guesswork of imaginative scholars and experts, the arguments can be separated into three basic categories. One camp declares that NATO enlargement is not feasible either because the Alliance would lose its identity and credibility if former Warsaw Pact members were allowed to join it and/or because it would antagonize Russia and be harmful to democracy there. The second approach tentatively suggests that while in theory membership would be desirable, present obstacles (for example, economic problems in East and West alike, the lack of properly working democracies in the East, the political inclinations of the U.S. Congress, Western public opinion, etc.) are such that it cannot be achieved, at least not in the short term. A third group claims that enlargement is the way to ensure that the ongoing difficult transformation of the Alliance is successful - and the sooner the better. (Some in this group even see NATO enlargement as a way to enhance democracy in Russia.) This approach also includes the opinion that this may be NATO's last chance to survive its victory in the Cold War. All three camps have one thing in common: the analysis of each does not allow for future situations envisioned by the others.

There are fundamental problems with the current debate. First of all, the discussion is still based mainly on Cold War rhetoric, even though NATO's new strategic doctrine has been in existence for five years. Much of the relevant analysis tends to ascribe the attributes of the Soviet Union to Russia. This may signal one of two things: either present Russian attitudes resemble those of the past (be they those of the USSR or Imperial Russia) too closely, or Sovietologists (and the Alliance) are simply unable to adjust to the changes that have happened during the past decade. If the former reasoning is accepted, it is hard to see what obvious advantages there would be in again leaving East Europe in the Russian sphere of influence, as many of those against enlargement suggest. The tactics of appeasement that these people seem to advise failed to work in the past, so why believe it would be effective today? Furthermore, precedents of NATO enlargement demonstrate that, at least in the case of the "Visegrad four" (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the obstacles to membership are hardly as serious as were those in some of the previous cases.

If, on the other hand, one accepts the reasoning that the post-Cold War situation is fundamentally different from what it was earlier, it is again difficult to see how this would validate the reasoning against enlargement. If the threat is instability (as many during the search for a new NATO doctrine implied), it may be in the best interest of NATO to allow new members into the Alliance, thus aiding the creation of a stable regional environment. In this respect, Russian objections, while they should be taken seriously, should not be

given priority over other relevant considerations regarding the possible advantages of enlargement.

Either way, the arguments for and against widening NATO are less than satisfactory. Meanwhile, a fundamental piece of the puzzle in the debate goes largely undetected. It could be described as the "real", versus the "perceived," membership potential of the applicants. Economic, political, and social indicators that describe these countries' readiness for the Alliance are often subject to prejudiced interpretations.

Although economic models of alliance behavior abound, few experts have dealt with the problems of enlargement in economic terms. This, particularly after decades of acute burden-sharing disputes, is very surprising. The 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement", while it remains fairly vague on the concrete expectations, at least tries to remedy some of these problems. Its four sets of requirements describe the minimum needed for membership. Among them, it is suggested, the economy is the area where the arguments against enlargement could be most persuasive. The thesis will examine this notion through a study of potential Hungarian membership.

There are particular merits to this approach. If the Cold War-like scenario is accepted, then the economic counter-motivations experts sometimes cite could hardly come into play when the containment of an imperial Russia is at stake. If, on the other hand, there is a new agenda, a new international environment, then the Cold War-type reasoning should be entirely abandoned, and a new paradigm found. In this case, the importance of economic factors has yet to be qualified. There is only one instance in which

enlargement to include Central (and/or East) European countries could be dismissed: if the post-Cold War scenario is accepted, and the economic factors indicate that the costs associated with expansion will outweigh the potential benefits. Nevertheless, to decide whether to enlarge or not would require at least a serious examination of such questions, which has not been the case.

Chapter II of the thesis will deal with the question of whether the discussions that accompanied past occasions of enlargement have something relevant to contribute to the current debates. Did today's often-stressed concerns such as "These countries should become stable democracies first," or "We do not want to alienate Russia" have anything to do with past decisions about which countries became members of the Alliance? It is of particular importance to examine the circumstances leading to the formal acceptance of Greece and Turkey (1952), the Federal Republic of Germany (1955), and Spain (1982) into NATO. One must determine what these four countries had to offer NATO that made their membership not only possible but also desirable. It is just as important to have a look at the extent to which these promises were fulfilled. Based on the individual characteristics of these processes, further research can then establish a set of variables to be applied to the present situation. It is not assumed that the cases of these four "late arrivals" will reveal the full spectrum of favorable motivations leading to membership. The presence of these motivations, or the lack thereof, however, is an indicator of where the current process may

lead. In fact, the absence of the motivations of the past may indicate a need to re-examine present circumstances and adjust NATO decision-making accordingly.

Chapter III will detail various possible scenarios regarding the future of Russia -- since the question whether to wait (indeed, ask) for Russian approval of NATO expansion seems to be one of the most divisive issues among those who accept the need for the widening of the Alliance. Does Russia behave as would an imperial power? Or, to the contrary, does it threaten European (and perhaps global) security by its very fragility? Is there a case to be made for the possible emergence of a democratic Russia? In general, the issue is whether Russian disapproval of NATO expansion should be given key consideration.

Once these arguments against enlargement have been examined, Chapter IV will present an examination of the situation based on the requirements set forth in the September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement". It will also examine the economic argument, a hitherto minor issue in the debate. Using Hungarian economic and, to some extent, military statistics, an interpretation of the Hungarian burden-sharing potential in relation to that of current NATO-members will be considered. From this exercise it is hoped that some general conclusions can be drawn regarding the importance of economic factors in the eastward enlargement of the Alliance.

Finally, Chapter V will serve to summarize the results of the inquiry, and also to point up some of the expectations regarding NATO's future.

II. NATO ENLARGEMENT -- THE RELEVANCE OF PAST EXPERIENCES

Enlarging NATO launches us all on a voyage of discovery. Not only will it change NATO, it will also deeply change the environment in which NATO operates.
- Hans Jochen Peters¹

Many times during the years since the end of the Cold War the question of what to do with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has arisen. During the course of the sometimes fervent debates a number of potential solutions were discussed. These suggestions range from closing down business altogether to turning NATO from a collective defense organization into one of collective security. While ample supporters of both proposals exist, it is the alternatives between the two extremes that have been given the most thorough appreciation, and that seem most viable.

Between the two extreme options lies the basic choice of preserving NATO with its current membership, but changing its mission, and that of enlargement to include new members. The latter would also necessarily imply some alterations in the Alliance's mission. The debate that set the stage for these two basic choices was prompted by the Allies' declaration at their November 1991 Rome Summit. It said:

¹
Hans Jochen Peters, "The Political Dimension", in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options (National Defense University, Fort McNair: Washington, D.C., 1995), 167.

[T]he developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which [NATO's] aims would be met in the future. [...] In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved.²

Issued half a year after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, this communique did not address the question of whether the changes in the responsibilities should be followed by changes in the organization's membership. Its main aim was to acknowledge the need to preserve the Alliance. A series of subsequent documents have established a security partnership between the former Warsaw Pact members and NATO. Only lately has enlargement become a central issue. The question itself arguably surfaced first in the 1990 London Declaration, which stated:

We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe.³

Since then, there has been a vast amount of speculation about whether NATO will eventually accept some or most of the former Warsaw Pact members into its ranks, the

2

"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" (NATO Press Communique S-1 (91)85: Brussels, 7th November 1991), 1, 3.

3

U.S. Department of State, NATO Transformed: The London Declaration (Bureau of Public Affairs: Washington, D.C., 1990), 2.

aspirants often including the Russian Federation. Once it became clear that NATO, although wary of alienating a potentially strong Russia, rejected the idea of accepting it as a member (lest it overwhelm NATO due to its sheer size), the question has been reduced to whether any of the East European states could aspire to membership, and if yes, whether Russia would allow them to participate in an Alliance other than one including Russia.

Many Central and East European states see NATO membership as the only way to preserve their sovereignty. As the single viable collective defense organization in Europe today, and as the winner of the Cold War, NATO is a tempting umbrella for the insecure new constellation of states in East Europe. Most of them fear the return of an aggressive Russia, ready to reestablish itself as the greatest power in Europe. Other motivations include the (quite natural) belief that membership in European institutions (e.g., the European Union and NATO) is somehow interconnected, and to achieve one means to achieve the other also.⁴ Another reason to join NATO is to provide an enhanced level of security *within* the turbulent atmosphere of East European politics.

By 1995, members of the Alliance seemed to agree on one thing: membership should be extended only to those states that comply with a set of criteria established by current NATO members. After a lengthy debate, the following four conditions were stipulated as necessary for membership:

4

As explained by Zbigniew Brzezinski's article, "A Plan for Europe", Foreign Affairs 74, no.1 (January/February 1995), 26-42.

72. Prospective members will have to have:

- Demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, as referred to also in paragraph 6 of Chapter 1;
- Shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility;
- Established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defence force;
- Undertaken a commitment to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to achieving the obligations described in section A and C.⁵

It is reasonable to ask whether past precedents of enlargements (Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982) could give some guidance about the pertinence of these criteria as conditions for NATO acceptance. It is often argued that they do not, and that no appropriate comparisons can be drawn. On the other hand, much of the debate still uses arguments that were used in the earlier cases, albeit with a definite twist: the same arguments that seemed to support enlargement in the past are now used to preclude an eastward widening of NATO. What is more, current reasoning against enlargement could just as well have been used in the past, except for the fact that then NATO was evidently prepared to waive such strict requirements.

It is therefore reasonable to examine past experiences of enlargement to see whether Cold War thinking might still guide the decisionmaking process inside the Alliance, or whether the situation today is so different from that of the Cold War that the Alliance's circumspection is in fact warranted. It is very important to test ideas on enlargement

5

"Study on NATO Enlargement" (NATO-OTAN: Brussels, September 1995), 25.

against the same reasoning statesmen and experts used previously. This will give the perspective necessary for a more objective exploration of the issues at stake.

A. THE THRUST TOWARD THE MEDITERRANEAN

The security of the center is directly tied to that of the southern flank. The southern flank provides a frontline of defense. [...] as one of only two NATO states bordering the Soviet Union, Turkey -- depending on the axis of the Soviet attack -- could act to shield the center from Soviet pressure. In addition, any campaign by the Soviets to destabilize central Europe is likely to be initiated on the flank...

- Jed C. Snyder⁶

When in 1948 the signatories to the Brussels Treaty decided to invite the United States to take part in their association, little did they know that in the wake of the Korean War they would end up with a lasting American presence in Europe, much less that they were on the verge of the first enlargements of the Alliance. In the course of debates on NATO's operating concepts, activities, and central tasks, the strategic significance of NATO's southern flank -- to which three of the four states examined here belong -- were often downplayed. It was largely due to the overwhelming American influence in NATO that enlargements happened during the first four decades of the existence of the Alliance.

Contrary to common belief, the Mediterranean area from the beginning of the East-West confrontation was considered of utmost importance -- partly because of its

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Jed C. Snyder, Defending the Fringe. NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf (Westview: Boulder, Colo., 1985), 3.

geographical position (closeness to the Soviet Union, control over many of the sea routes in the Mediterranean, access to the Persian Gulf), and partly because of the zero-sum nature of the bloc-building contest, whereby alliance with a new state was seen as disadvantageous to the other side. Thus, the idea to expand NATO to include Turkey and Greece was born.

1. Turkey and Greece: Parallel “Enrollment”, Similar Problems

Soon after the end of World War II, Turkish-American security cooperation began. In the wake of the Soviet threat the United States took a series of measures to safeguard Turkey and Greece. Large-scale cooperation between the United States and Turkey started in 1947 with the extension of American aid. The United States early on recognized the importance of the geographical position of Turkey, especially its controlling position over the Bosphorus Straits (as described by the Montreux Convention of 1936⁷). The latter provided a warm-water sea exit for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Early in World War II, in 1940, Soviet claims to alter the deliberations in the Montreux Convention so as to allow joint defense of the area had resulted in a rift between the Soviets and Nazi Germany. Later, at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences, the USSR pursued the same objective, again without success. In 1946, a similar Soviet proposal was refused outright by Turkey.

7

Ibid., 22-23.

In the face of the growing tensions between East and West, the Soviet efforts met with general disapproval. Yet at the time of the conclusion of the Washington Treaty in April 1949, which set the stage for NATO's formation, both Turkey and Greece were excluded. The argument against Turkish and Greek membership was that it "would increase the danger of war, would add to the rearmament burden, and would spread NATO too thin."⁸ Turkish officials had been wary of Soviet intentions, all the more so because of the long history of hostility between the two states. In an essay on Turkey's place and role in NATO, A. Karaosmanoglu states:

It is only natural that this violent history, punctuated by thirteen wars between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, created an atmosphere of traditional enmity between the two nations. In the mind of the average Turk, Russia is a hereditary enemy.⁹

In the light of this historical clash of interests it is perhaps not surprising that the Turks chose to align themselves with the West rather than the Soviet-led East. A 1952 reference to the decisions leading to Turkish membership describes the process as a parallel understanding of the benefits of such an alliance:

[T]he West [...] have been brought to the position which the Turks had reached in the course of almost 300 years of intermittent conflict with Russia. During this same period the Turkish people, freed from the rule of the Sultans and the

8

Ali Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts", in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (Routledge: New York, 1988), 296.

9

Ibid., 290.

burdens of empire [...] have emerged as a nation state and entered the full stream of Western progress...¹⁰

While the above quotation might assign undue progress to the Turkey of the late 1940s, it rightly points out that during this period the interests of the West and Turkey coincided to such extent that it was possible to bring Turkey into NATO already in 1952, three years earlier than West German membership was accepted. True enough, by the end of World War II, many signs of the emergence of a proto-Western Turkey had become evident, among them a substantial étatist economic growth in the wake of the Great Depression. A widening educational system had helped develop the political sophistication of the population. In short, Turkey had made at least reasonable progress toward Western-style democracy.

From a Western perspective, Turkey's entry into the Alliance was precipitated by the Korean War. While earlier debates about its possible membership centered around the question of whether to give priority to the balance of power in Western Europe, by the beginning of the war, many experts began to stress the overall importance of the Near East. As one author put it,

¹⁰

George C. McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West", Foreign Affairs 32, no. 4 (July 1952), 618.

Turkey's unique strategic position, enhanced by the changed face of postwar geopolitical realities, gave it an important role to play in the defense of both regions.¹¹

The reciprocity of the potential benefits was influential in bringing about the eventual partnership. By the end of 1951, this requirement had been met: "Support for the balance of power in the Near East interlocked with support for the balance of power in Europe."¹² Turkey, largely due to its history of conflict with Russia and its rejection of the Soviet proposals to share the defense of the Straits, was seen as a reliable, anti-Communist state. It, too, had been linked by a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France since 1939, one that was reaffirmed in 1949. As Gordon Craig writes,

Whether the strategic importance of the Near East was as great to the Western powers as it once had been was [...] at least debatable, although no NATO commander would have admitted for a moment that bases in Turkey were an insignificant contribution to Western defense or that a growth of Soviet influence in the area would have negligible results. As for its economic value to the West, there was no question whatsoever.¹³

While it can be argued that the enlargement of the Alliance to include Turkey resulted in a certain thinning of the allied defense, Turkey in many respects was able to counterbalance this unfavorable situation. Turkish membership in NATO allowed the allies

11

Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi, eds., NATO and the Mediterranean (Scholarly Resources, Inc.: Wilmington, Delaw., 1985), 215.

12

Ibid., 216.

13

Gordon Craig, Europe since 1914 (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich: Orlando, Flor., 1989), 773.

to closely monitor traffic through the Straits, aiding Western intelligence gathering, and denying the Soviets unobserved passage into the Mediterranean Sea. It also allowed the use (or building) of military bases on Turkish territory, which brought Soviet vulnerabilities to a NATO air attack closer to home. As a 1979 account reports,

At the present moment, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany possess the largest NATO military forces in the European theater. [...] Turkey's importance to Western security interests, however, cannot be measured solely by the large numbers of Soviet and Soviet-bloc troops she might engage. A crucial part of America's strategic (and tactical) defense effort relies upon Turkish cooperation and Turkish base concessions... [T]hirty-one U.S., or joint U.S.-Turkish bases have operated in Turkish territory for the purpose of nuclear-weapons storage, detection of Soviet military activities, and communications.¹⁴

While not a high-tech military, Turkish defense forces were significant in number, and Turkey's commitment to NATO -- at least in the beginning -- was clear. Furthermore, Turkish membership in NATO materialized at a time, during the Korean War, when NATO cohesion was low, and when many feared that the dissolution of the Alliance might be imminent.¹⁵

Greece's ascendance to membership started out along similar lines. Although it did not directly border the Soviet Union, it had common borders with three other communist

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Michael M. Boll, "Turkey's New National Security Concept: What it Means for NATO", Orbis 23, no. 3 (Fall 1979), 610.

15

Charles M. Spofford, "NATO's Growing Pains", Foreign Affairs 31, no. 1 (Oct. 1952), 95-105.

states: Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The first two had also had territorial claims at the expense of Greece. Greece had also been the guardian of much of the Aegean Sea, and an ally to the antifascist coalition during World War II. Greece has a history that doubtless connects it with the "West", and which has, on occasion, invited the intervention of Western powers in favor of this country, as in the formulation of the Yalta percentages. When, after the end of the war, a bloody civil war erupted between the British-supported Greek government and the leftist-led resistance movement, Britain pleaded with the United States to support the Greek government in its stead. Stalin's break with his pledge given to Churchill in 1944 -- namely, that Greece would belong to the Western sphere of influence -- underscored the delicacy of the Greek situation. The result was the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which committed the USA "to come to the aid of Greece and Turkey against Communist pressures."¹⁶

The first steps toward the future partnership were followed by the disappointment of the refusal, in 1950, of the original members of NATO to allow Greece membership in the Alliance. The Greeks believed that NATO membership was their only chance of national security in their weakened state. It was at the time presumed that Greece, like Turkey, belonged strategically more to the Middle East than to Western Europe.

The Greeks expected that membership would result in an enhanced national security, thereby allowing them to pursue reconstruction after the ravages of almost a decade of

¹⁶

S. Victor Papacosma, "Greece and NATO", in Kaplan, Clawson, and Luraghi, eds., *ibid.*, 191.

warfare. More than anything, the Greeks wanted political stability, because the polarization of politics, ideology, and institutions during the Civil War of 1946-49 had left a lasting heritage of imbalance. Controversy between pro-American ideals and pro-Soviet inclinations was constant. Nevertheless, the Marshall Plan was extended to Greece and, as Cold War tensions grew, the United States came to view Greece increasingly “as a bulwark against communist expansion and its administrative, military economic and political institutions were shaped to serve that purpose.”¹⁷

In the wake of the Korean War, much of the former opposition to enlargement was abandoned, and approval for Greek membership was formally given at the 1951 Ottawa session of NATO. The U.S. interest in the widening of the Alliance lay in the fact that by widening NATO, it could better surround, and therefore contain, the USSR and its vassals. An American military presence followed shortly after the Ottawa decision by way of a bilateral base agreement in 1953, which “provided the United States with the right to establish and supply its bases and the use of Greek airspace. It has also set out the legal status of U.S. forces in Greece.”¹⁸

Ironically, the Greek-Turkish debate that would sour relations between the two countries and with NATO was nowhere in sight during the period under discussion. On the

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Thanos Veremis, “Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change”, in Chipman, ed., *ibid.*, 241.

18

Ibid., 243.

contrary, everything seemed to be in order, the Greeks and the Turks each having professed good relations toward the other. In fact,

In the postwar period, this reservoir of goodwill led to close cooperation between the two countries under the benign umbrella of the Truman Doctrine. Their sense of common destiny was also enhanced by the communist thrust in Greece and by Soviet demands on Turkey.¹⁹

While not quite so important strategically as Turkey, Greece had a number of factors that facilitated its entry into NATO: it was a "Western" country in its cultural traditions; it did not border on the USSR (therefore, direct objections to its membership could not be made on this account); and it was originally "handed over" to the West during the Moscow and Yalta negotiations of 1944. It was also a Christian country, and therefore, evoked moral obligations in Western Europe as well as in the United States. All things considered, the 1952 enlargements were aptly described by Chester Wilmot, who in 1953 suggested:

Southern Europe is not perhaps of such direct importance for the protection of the Allied forces in Central Europe, but it offers much greater opportunities for compelling the Russians to disperse their forces defensively... [Greek and Turkish forces] are neither so well trained nor so well equipped, but they are very much closer to areas the Russians must defend.²⁰

19

Nuri Eren, Turkey, NATO and Europe: a Deteriorating Relationship?, Atlantic Papers no. 34 (The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977), 35.

20

Chester Wilmot, "If NATO Had to Fight", Foreign Affairs 31, no. 2 (January 1953), 212.

B. GERMANY: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE

Many of NATO's wounds stemmed from two very real problems, both internal and both in many ways self-inflicted. One was the inflammation of the German question from 1952 to 1956...

- Lawrence S. Kaplan²¹

Next in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the Federal Republic of Germany (1955). Its participation in the Alliance, however, was not accepted quite so easily as was that of Turkey and Greece. In the case of West Germany, opposition from the Soviet Union was very strong. Its domination of the eastern part of Germany resulted in a period of stalemate. The question of the postwar division of the country had three potential outcomes, two of them favorable to the USSR. First, there could have been unification of Germany under Soviet domination. Second, Germany could have been re-unified under the pretext of neutralization (which could only be seen as merely a preparatory phase to Soviet takeover). And third, the outcome could be the one that ultimately happened, i.e. division. Throughout much of the post-World War II period prior to West German membership in NATO, Soviet proposals and actions were aimed at achieving either of the first two options.

Soviet antagonism aside, objections came from within the Alliance. Nazi Germany's victims viewed postwar Germany as genetically related to its predecessor, prone to repeat the war-making mistakes of the past. Loudest among the protestors was France.

21

Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States. The Enduring Alliance (Twayne Publishers: New York, 1994, updated edition), 60.

A further difficulty was that the Germans themselves were divided on the issue of membership. On the one hand, they had difficulty accepting the division of their country, and knew that should they decide to join NATO, the issue would remain unresolved -- at least for the time being. To many, the Soviet offers of neutralization seemed preferable to this solution. On the other hand, Germany had to redeem itself in the eyes not only of Europe, but of human civilization, too.²² To rebuild after the war it needed the loans and aid the United States alone could then provide, and to guard itself against the Soviet Union, Germany needed Western cooperation. As World War I, World War II had left Germany an economic wasteland. This time, however, due largely to the United States's positive influence and the emergence of the Atlantic cooperation, Germany did not stand alone.

The creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 was prompted by the failure of the Western occupying powers to reach agreement with the Soviet Union.²³ In Craig's words, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer

did not concentrate his energies on the pursuit of national unity and the liberation of seventeen million Germans in the Soviet zone, for these things seemed remote and impossible [...] Instead, he bent his efforts to reducing the restrictions still imposed on West Germany by the Allies.²⁴

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See: David Clay Large, Germans to the Front. West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (The University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 1996), particularly: Chs. 6-8. Also: Lawrence S. Kaplan, *ibid.*, 60-64.

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Gordon Craig, *ibid.*, 724-9.

24

Ibid., 726.

His shrewd politics served to secure Bundestag assent for entrance into NATO, a final step in the Federal Republic's reacceptance into the West. Western cooperation during the first Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 was influential in bringing NATO into existence. Six years later, after a number of Soviet proposals to unite Germany on Soviet terms or, as a last concession, under the slogan of neutralization,²⁵ Germany decided to join NATO and abandon the dream of early unification. However, at the time of joining the Alliance, the answer to the question, "Is Germany part of `the West`?" was still being pondered by many Germans.²⁶

In 1955, several months before German membership in NATO had materialized, Adenauer summed up his tasks in the following three directives: (1) Germany must become an equal partner in the community of free nations; (2) the failure of the European Defense Community has left a vacuum in its wake that must be filled;²⁷ (3) the Brussels Pact of 1948

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David Clay Large, *ibid.*, 147. Also: John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge University: Cambridge, 1994), 317.

26

Walter F. Hahn, "The Germans and the West", *Orbis* 1, no. 1 (April 1957), 184-198.

27

Designed to provide Western Europe with a standing multinational army, the EDC Treaty was signed in 1952 after lengthy debates -- only to come up short of ratification at the hands of its originators, the French, in 1954. Its demise made it necessary to create an alternative arrangement for the armament of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was prompted by the overwhelming imbalance in conventional forces on the Continent, an imbalance that begged for West German participation in the defense of Western Europe.

(the basis of the Western European Union) must be harmonized with NATO, and its anti-German character must be dropped.²⁸

For the West, it was essential to bring West Germany under the umbrella of collective defense and into the community of Western democracies. Germany's admittance into the Alliance was preceded by a period when, due to the increased Soviet threat, there were serious doubts about the West's ability to defend itself. The United States wanted to see its European allies more attuned to the idea of self-help. When the plans to create a European Defense Community were torpedoed in the French Assembly, alternative arrangements had to be made to allow for West German participation in the defense of the West. Without the Federal Republic of Germany, NATO had lacked strategic depth in the central front, a fact that was widely seen with apprehension during the early years of NATO's existence. In the case of a Soviet attack, the Allies thought, there would be nowhere to draw back to, and Allied strength would easily be split by invading Soviet bloc forces. As Chester Wilmot concluded in 1953,

The European campaigns of 1940-45 provide two significant lessons in this respect. First, a powerful enemy breakthrough on the Rhine cannot be checked short of the Channel if there is no strong mobile force in reserve. [...] Secondly, in dealing with the Soviet preponderance in numbers, the defenders must be free to yield ground in order both to cushion the assault and to canalize the thrusts so that they become vulnerable to counterattack. [...] It is this need for

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Konrad Adenauer, "Germany, the New Partner", Foreign Affairs 33, no. 2 (January 1955), 177-180.

strategic depth which makes it so important that Western Germany should be incorporated into the defense structure of Western Europe.²⁹

A Soviet-united or neutralized Germany would have made this picture even bleaker. In that case, NATO members supposed, the combined German military potential would soon be used to break the resistance of the West and establish some sort of a Soviet “protectorate” over the rest of Europe, too.³⁰ Strategically, it would have been possible for the Soviets to withdraw from the Elbe to the Oder, but West Europe would have been at risk if it had been forced to withdraw behind the Rhine, as proposals for the neutralization of Germany suggested.

A significant, and at the time very divisive, issue in allowing Germany to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the need to accommodate and pacify a still potentially dangerous Germany in Europe.³¹ In fact,

America’s conversion to the EDC was a function *both* of a desire to get Germany rearmed *and* of a continuing determination to keep it under firm control until the Germans could prove their “worthiness” for full and unrestricted membership in the community of nations.³²

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Chester Wilmot, *ibid.*, 205 & 207.

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See: David Clay Large, *ibid.*, 147 & John Lamberton Harper, *ibid.*, 317.

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Later, a neatly put formula of Lord Ismay described NATO’s aims as follows: “To keep the Americans in, the Soviets out, and the Germans down.”

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David Clay Large, *ibid.*, 129.

Many people in Europe saw the division of Germany as the ultimate solution to the eternal "German Question". This notion was grounded in the reasoning that by keeping the two Germanies from uniting, their ambitions would be reduced to achieving unification, in sharp contrast with their previous dreams.

After a period of Soviet probing into the firmness of the Alliance, even Khrushchev had to accept the unchangeable. In an early "admission of defeat" in 1955, the German Democratic Republic was recognized by the USSR as a sovereign state, "... and thereafter the Moscow leaders took the line that German reunification could come about only as a result of negotiations between the two German governments."³³

C. SPAIN: THE LATEST OR THE LAST?

Spanish entry into NATO was largely the result of domestic political considerations. It was hoped that Alliance membership would help to control and professionalize the military. [...] Great efforts have been made to force the military to look towards external threats and away from its traditional introspective role.

- Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse³⁴

Of the four states granted membership in NATO after 1949, Spain came last. Its path into the Alliance in many ways resembled the Mediterranean pattern, but it also had

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Gordon Craig, *ibid.*, 727.

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Bruce George and Mark Stenhouse, "Western Perspectives of Spain", in Kenneth Maxwell, ed., Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy, (Westview: Boulder, Colo., 1991), 74-75.

significant similarities to the German case. When the country officially became a member of NATO in 1982, this was but the seal of approval on some thirty years of military cooperation between (mostly) the United States and Spain.

Already in the early 1950s American plans existed to bring Spain into NATO. From the American perspective, the country's strategic importance consisted of three factors.

First,

from the standpoint of air traffic the peninsula has become, if not exactly a bridge, at least an important way station between the two continents. [...] Looked upon as an "outpost" of Europe, Spain also offers to military strategists the promise of a last-ditch European stand against an invasion from the East...³⁵

As a third issue of strategic importance, Spanish control over the seas surrounding the Iberian peninsula was considered a bonus in the West's aspiration to deny the Soviets access to the Atlantic from across the Mediterranean. Spanish harbors and bases were deemed excellent locations to host NATO ships and to extend coordinated air and sea action. That fascism still ruled the country was viewed by many as a further signal of Spanish anti-Communism. Says Antonio Marquina,

With respect to the threats to Spanish national security, the Franco regime was profoundly anti-communist -- a consequence of the Civil War -- and considered that the fundamental objectives of the Soviet Union were clearly expansionist regarding the West. Spain would thus find itself, in Franco's view, involved in any European war between the Soviet Union and NATO.³⁶

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Lawrence Fernsworth, "Spain in Western Defense", *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 4 (July 1953), 651.

36

Antonio Marquina, "Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy Since Democratization", in Kenneth Maxwell, ed., *ibid.*, 20.

Still, the fact is that Spain remained a dictatorship. Its ruling regime was blamed not only for the crimes committed during the Civil War, but it stood accused for its pro-Axis stance during the War as well. It was an “outcast among nations”, having been denied membership in the UN, and it was refused the economic aid given to Western Europe. The outbreak of the Cold War helped Spain to emerge as a member of the international community, although not a respectable one. Says Angel Viñas,

Spain’s value as a potential ally was not lost on U.S. security planners and Franco’s strong anti-communism complemented the American need to deploy forces in Spain.³⁷

The change in the evaluation of Spain was followed by a number of lesser agreements and, in 1953, an important one with the United States, in which the Spanish government authorized the Americans to establish, maintain, and use bases, military and transit facilities, and oil pipelines on Spanish territory. In exchange, Spain was given significant American economic aid and the pretext of respectability. Says Theodore J. Lowi,

As in the contemporary American decision to rearm Germany, the U.S process of deciding to establish bases in Spain reflected the pangs of a reversal of policy required because of a victorious war turned out to be an unhappy peace... [T]he most immediate, or most visible, objective was strengthening the defense of NATO by extra-NATO means...³⁸

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Angel Viñas, “Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges”, in Chipman, ed., *ibid.*, 147.

38

Theodore J. Lowi, Bases in Spain, Inter-University Case Program no. 101 (Bobbs-Merrill: New York, 1963), 35.

After the initial refusal to allow Spain entry into NATO in 1949 (originally only Portugal supported its membership), Spain did not for a while openly press for membership. The American assistance in the rebuilding of the Spanish economy, as well as the protection provided by the U.S. presence, helped General Franco's regime to survive, and the occasional stopover visits by John Foster Dulles to inform Spain about NATO decisions did not go unnoticed. Already in 1955, the American government viewed the idea of Spanish membership in NATO favorably.³⁹ One is hard pressed to see these acts as anything other than American opportunism in the face of a more important antagonist. Had its NATO partners been willing, the United States would have, without hesitation, gone ahead with incorporating Spain into the Alliance -- even though Spain would not have satisfied the requirement of being a stable democracy.

Much support to the proposal was granted by the British and the French governments, and even West Germany gave it some thought. However, liberal opposition, and the outright protests from lesser Allies (e.g., Denmark, Norway, and Belgium) throughout the 1950s and 1960s made it impossible for Spain to join NATO. Spanish sentiments, too, hindered the process. NATO in Spain was widely identified with American "interference" on Spanish territory. The United States, on the other hand, was often blamed for Spanish problems after the conclusion of the bases agreement between the two countries. As Whitaker points out,

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See: Victor Alba, "Spain's Entry Into NATO", in Kaplan, Clawson, and Luraghi, eds., *ibid.*, 97-113.

“For a variety of reasons, [...] the agreement was opposed from the start by some elements addicted to the regime as well as by most of its adversaries.”⁴⁰

American bases in Spain were often blamed for rising prices and everyday economic problems as well as for “propping up” the Franco regime. Communist-influenced labor groups opposed everything American on principle. Those in the pro-Franco camp, meanwhile, were ridden with xenophobia, or disliked America because of its “crudeness” or Protestantism.

While America and the Americans were often seen in unfavorable terms, no such images of the Soviet Union existed. As a matter of fact, left-wing forces in Spain thought of the USSR as the power that had helped the “democratic” cause during the Civil War. In contrast,

The United States became a firm ally of the Franco dictatorship in order to secure for itself the use of military bases and facilities [...] This arrangement provoked anti-American sentiment...⁴¹

Franco’s dictatorship, repressive as it was, had stimulated some economic development. After his death in 1975, King Juan Carlos became head of state, and considerable democratization followed. In the new atmosphere, Spain joined its Western

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Arthur P. Whitaker, “Anti-Americanism in Spain”, *Orbis* 3, no. 3 (Fall 1959), 313.

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Angel Viñas, *ibid.*, 142.

European neighbors in the Council of Europe, and the issue of NATO membership re-emerged.

Those who argued for membership as a way to stabilize the political life of the country were quickly reminded that in Greece and Turkey NATO membership had not been enough to immunize these countries against military coups. The Communists argued that membership would ignite new conflicts between East and West, and that it would upset the military balance. Those who wanted to see the return of Gibraltar to Spain maintained that

since Britain is more powerful than Spain, NATO would always support the United Kingdom on the issue of Gibraltar; consequently, membership would restrain Spain's ability to maneuver.⁴²

The Soviets, too, did not want another NATO enlargement. Their anti-membership campaign was all the more influential because of their role in the Civil War. Even approval of the Spanish desire for the return of Gibraltar was included in the Soviet proposals.

Support for membership inside Spain was more guarded. Between 1977 and 1982 the leading Christian Democratic Union saw the benefits of joining the alliance as: (1) a reduction of the chances for a military coup, and (2) the establishment of closer ties with (Western) Europe through admission to European institutions. From a NATO perspective, Spain's request to join the organization was received with some doubt. First of all, Franco's heritage still frightened some people. Also, Spanish wishes to link membership in NATO to that in the European Economic Community were received lukewarmly. The issue of Gibraltar was dismissed out of hand.

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Victor Alba, *ibid.*, 103.

From a geostrategic view, however, Spain seemed to be a definite gain. It could prevent the Soviet Union from becoming the most important naval power in the Mediterranean. During a Soviet attack, it could serve as a fallback position if all else failed.

As Snyder remarked,

NATO forces could stage from Spanish air and naval bases and retreat to those bases if the war in Central Europe went badly. [...] Access to Spanish bases could assume special importance for U.S. plans to move military forces perhaps through the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to the Persian Gulf.⁴³

Existing Spanish-American ties, too, predisposed Spain toward entry to the Alliance. Membership, Spain was told, would result in the creation of an Iberian Command, to include Portugal and Spain. While the military was broadly skeptical of the country's new civilian leadership, "the armed forces, as a whole, [took] a position in favor of Spanish participation in NATO."⁴⁴ Spanish membership, it was supposed, could be beneficial in another way. NATO allies were worried about the instability of Portugal, a country that after the end of dictatorship was then experiencing a series of coups, thereby reducing its reliability as a partner. Finally, after seven years of deliberation (and almost thirty years after the conclusion of the first U.S.-Spanish bases agreement), membership was granted to Spain in 1982.

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Jed C. Snyder, *ibid.*, 66 & 68.

44

Victor Alba, *ibid.*, 109.

D. CONCLUSION

From these case histories it seems clear that arguments against enlargement could not outweigh purely (geo)strategic considerations. All four of the previous enlargements were evidently granted because of these countries' strategic significance, as related to the rivalry between East and West.

The world of the 1990s is surely different from even 1982. Still, it is striking that many NATO members, who appear eager today to dissuade the Alliance from widening toward Eastern Europe, did not have the same kind of reservations then. That some of those countries were less than democratic at the time when they were approved for membership, or that they had interests conflicting with one another's or with those of established members of the Atlantic Community were brushed aside by the reasoning that these issues were not important when the containment of the Soviet Union was at stake. In fact, neither of the four latecomers had much to show to support the existence of a stable democracy: at the most, they were trying to create one. The Federal Republic was not even a sovereign state, much less a democratic one, when negotiations about membership in the Alliance began. More importantly, its potential membership was widely used by Bonn to gain more of the sovereignty it needed.⁴⁵ In this respect, NATO membership, rather than being withheld, was expected to be beneficial to help stabilize these countries -- particularly so

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David Clay Large, *ibid.*, 234.

in the case of the Federal Republic and Spain. It is, therefore, a lame argument to dismiss NATO enlargement on this ground, particularly the way The New York Times did in an editorial, when it stated,

Some prospective members, like the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, are on the way to establishing democracies and market economies, but are not there yet. [...] Rushing expansion would undermine the principles the alliance was established to protect.⁴⁶

Neither were the questions of ethnic minorities abroad (as in the case of Greece and Turkey), and their potential for disrupting the harmony among members, given much consideration. One could argue that the Greek-Turkish conflict over the issue of Cyprus has been so dangerous as to almost eliminate the benefits NATO gained from including these two countries, yet they have both remained members of the Alliance. While not precisely an ethnic conflict, the division of Germany filled many West Germans with dread. The possibility that the occasion might arise when they would have to face their East German brothers and fight them was so repulsive as to almost torpedo the whole question of rearmament.⁴⁷ In light of this, it is surprising that today experts would fear so much that similar conflicts might erupt between the East European applicants.

The question whether the prospective member states were stable market economies did not emerge in the cases of earlier enlargements. Originally, when all European members

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“NATO, Then and Now (Editorial), New York Times, 9 May 1995, p. A26.

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David Clay Large, *ibid.*, 254-55.

were "equally" weak at the end of World War II, it was perhaps natural that their actual economic potential did not come to the fore when deciding on membership. In the case of both the original members and the latecomers, membership was extended to allow them enjoyment of the advantages arising from burden-sharing. This was supposed to aid these countries in creating a more reliable self-defense for themselves. Curiously enough, even in the face of obvious disputes regarding intra-alliance burden-sharing the question of dismantling the alliance or expelling an underpaying member never arose.⁴⁸ This issue should arguably have been given more thorough consideration, at least in the case of Spain, since from the 1970s, burden-sharing disputes have often poisoned the spirit of community.

All of these considerations have been given much attention since the end of the Cold War. One can only conclude that the situation must have changed so much that the arguments that in years past did not manage to stop the widening of NATO are now able to do so. If the notion of such a significant change is accepted, however, is it not also

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Perhaps the closest the United States ever came to penalizing underpaying members was in 1974, when the administration threatened to withdraw American troops from the Continent should the European NATO-members not shoulder a bigger share of the burden.

The Americans in this period often presented the Europeans as "free-riders" who exploited their benefactor. The leader of this lobby in Congress, Senator Mansfield, insisted that should the European allies continue not to shoulder their share in the alliance, US troop reductions in West Europe had to follow. This scenario was made possible by the period of détente. Although the first few years were barren for Sen. Mansfield, American problems were fast becoming complicated enough so that in 1974 the Jackson/Nunn Amendment was accepted, which stated that unless the Europeans paid the balance-of payments deficit of the USA, American troops in Europe would be severely reduced. The Western Europeans, though not eagerly, complied, and in June 1975 President Ford announced that enough payments had been made. See: Simon Lunn, Burden-sharing in NATO, Chatham House Papers no. 18 (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1983), 13-16.

natural that the questions that need be asked should have changed? Is it possible that, in this entirely new era, past experiences of NATO enlargement can no longer be of guidance?

An additional remark should be made, however. If the situation is not as desperate today as it was during previous enlargements, when the need for immediate action encouraged the Allies to waive relevant requirements, paradoxically, even this could be favorable to current applicants. In such a case, present requirements could arguably be more lenient since there is no immediate threat.

This question leads to the examination in Chapter III that will use a set of three alternative scenarios that might become prevalent in Russia in order to establish the relevance of the arguments above.

III. THE "RUSSIAN MENACE"

There is a certain awkwardness in the way the West has treated first the Soviet Union, and later Russia since the 1990 London Declaration.⁴⁹ Then, the issue of utmost importance was to come to terms with the fact that the Cold War was about to end, and to define the nature and functions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the future. Since the question of NATO's expansion has emerged, Russia has been mostly hostile to the idea of widening the Alliance toward the East. Its prestige as a great power is already threatened, and it would become more so should the widening of NATO happen. In many ways, the Russians fear that such a development would go against what they view as legitimate Russian security interests, including that of possessing a substantial sphere of interest (or influence) in the "not-so-far-abroad". Indeed, the single reference to allowing Poland to join NATO was abandoned with haste.⁵⁰ Many experts have consistently warned NATO against enlargement, citing what they say are legitimate Russian interests. Others, on the contrary, have insisted that to cater to Russia's desires in this matter is equal to

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"NATO Transformed: The London Declaration", United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs Selected Document no. 38 (Washington, D.C., 1990).

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During his trip to Poland in the summer of 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin mentioned that "aiming at all-European integration is not contrary to the interests of other states including also Russia." - only to have the statement quickly revoked by his Foreign Minister, Kozyrev, upon his return to Moscow. John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond", International Affairs 71, no. 2 (April 1995), 235.

abandoning all designs to widen the Alliance other than those that would include Russia as well.

Chapter III will contemplate some of the more obvious paths Russia might choose to take, their relationship to historical trends and the characteristics of Russian behavior in the international arena. It will also discuss the question of whether Russian approval or disapproval of NATO enlargement should be taken at face value, or, indeed, taken into account at all. Three different scenarios will be used to provide a look into a range of alternative futures.

A. HANDLING RUSSIA

The problem with those who propose putting Russia first in Western policy is that, for them, there is never a good time for the Alliance to address any of the tough issues it faces.
- Sen. Richard Lugar ⁵¹

While the "Study on NATO Enlargement"⁵² makes no references as to which countries will eventually become members of NATO, there is a whole section detailing the future of relations between Russia and NATO, particularly after the widening of the Alliance. On many occasions NATO officials have stressed the importance of the changes in the international atmosphere and the relationship between the former Soviet Union and

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Senator Lugar's speech to the Atlantic Council of the United States on 9 December, 1993, as quoted by John Borawski, *ibid.*, 238.

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"Study on NATO Enlargement", *ibid.*

the West, declaring the Cold War finished. Consequently, they have urged that NATO be changed to make it better equipped to cope with the challenges posed by a radically altered global environment. Nothing, however, seems to have changed the suspicions regarding Russia's designs on the Continent. Thus, even though the document insists that "the enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe," it also gives a clear warning about the influence Russia may try to exert over the issue of which states would be included in NATO:

[...] NATO decisions, however, cannot be subject to any veto or droit de regard by a non-member state, nor can the Alliance be subordinated to another European security institution.⁵³

The document is very open about the obligations of future members, and about the treatment a cooperative Russia can expect to receive. The consequences of non-cooperative Russian behavior are not elaborated on, but the above statement certainly seems to suggest that NATO has accepted the risks associated with a hostile Russian Federation. These deliberations are, in effect, the result of a lengthy debate about future Russian behavior as suggested by historical evidence, an analysis of current statements and patterns of behavior, and various predictions on the future of Russia. The understanding is that, whichever turn Russian foreign policy and military strategy should take, NATO

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Sections 28 and 27, respectively, in: "Study on NATO Enlargement", *ibid.*, 10.

should not to allow its decision-making to become dependent on Russian wishes. What, then, may have been the major arguments in this debate, and their effect upon the turn of events as signaled by the Study on NATO Enlargement?

B. THE RUSSIAN IMPERIALIST IDEA

By no means all of the history now being rediscovered fits comfortably with ideas of liberal democracy.
- S. Frederick Starr⁵⁴

For many observers of Russian history, nothing is quite so striking as the apparent persistence of imperialist designs against neighboring countries. Although historians do not usually assume that the history of any country proceeds in a strictly cyclical fashion, there was a certain legitimacy to this notion, at least insofar as Soviet foreign policies repeated the tendency established by imperial Russia. Today, experts abound who believe that, after decades of ideology-based expansionism, the Russian Federation is about to revert to Russia's traditional imperialism again, thereby proving that history repeats itself.

In his acclaimed book, The Russian Tradition,⁵⁵ historian Tibor Szamuely showed the link between the Russian state tradition and the Russian revolutionary tradition, thereby establishing a powerful explanation regarding the similarities in the behavior of

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S. Frederick Starr, "Introduction", in S. F. Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the new states of Eurasia (M. E. Sharpe: Armonk, N. Y., 1994), 6.

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Tibor Szamuely, The Russian Tradition (McGraw-Hill: New York, 1974).

imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. In his reckoning, it was the Mongol statesmanship of the thirteenth century combined with the extraordinary struggle for everyday survival that created a statist Russian tradition.

[T]he Mongols, though ignorant of algebra, Aristotle and the finer things of life, were able to give Russia something of more lasting importance: a political and administrative system, a concept of society, quite unlike anything that was to be learned in the West.⁵⁶

While contesting many of the accepted myths on Russian behavior, historian Edward L. Keenan nevertheless arrives at the conclusion that there is “astonishing evidence of how pragmatic and close were the relations between Muscovite and Tatar politicians.”⁵⁷ This close relationship resulted in the Russians’ emergence as the better of the two after centuries of Mongol rule. It was under the Mongol tutelage that Muscovy became the strongest among Russian principalities, relying on the absolute power of the autocrat as contemporary European rulers could not. In the spirit of Mongol despotism, the autocrat personally owned all the land in the country, and exercised unlimited control over his subjects. The occasional revolts did not shake the people’s belief in the legitimacy of the system. In the wake of the French Revolution, Russian revolutionary movements emerged with the very same centralized and absolutist character. Consequently,

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Ibid., 15.

57

Edward L. Keenan, “On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors”, in S. F. Starr, ed., *ibid.*, 27.

The mating of revolutionary conspiracy with the Russian State tradition could hardly be expected to bring a democratic growth, either in Pestel's day [*a reference to the 1825 Decembrist*] or generations later.⁵⁸

Once the link between Russian and Soviet statism is established, it is only natural to expect that this relationship manifest itself in the various aspects of policy-making and behavior. The general understanding is that both tsarist Russia and the USSR were imperialist. There is disagreement regarding the nature of this imperialism (benevolent or malevolent, offensive -- that is, aiming at subjugating neighboring peoples -- or defensive -- striving to fill destabilizing power vacuums). But disagreement about what has motivated Russian (or, indeed, Soviet) imperialism does not deny Russia's essential imperialist tradition. While warning that "we should not exaggerate the degree to which the West has been what we now call democratic"⁵⁹, renowned scholar Martin Malia claims that Russian expansionism was for geopolitical reasons, and its imperialism was not exceptional. By this reasoning he nevertheless admits that Russian behavior was, indeed, imperialist and, he believes, that due solely to its ideology the Soviet system repeated this pattern of behavior.

In a similarly revisionist interpretation, and while challenging three myths of Russian imperialism, Alfred J. Rieber nevertheless subscribes to the existence of a range of

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Tibor Szamuely, *ibid.*, 185.

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Martin Malia, "Tradition, Ideology, and Pragmatism in the Formation of Russian Foreign Policy", in Leon Aron & Kenneth Jensen, eds., The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy, (The U.S. Institute of Peace: Washington, D.C., 1994), 37.

persistent factors that have guided a Russian expansionist policy: economic backwardness, permeable frontiers, a multicultural state, and cultural marginality:

From the earliest days of the centralized Muscovite state, the great sources of natural wealth were located on the periphery of the state's authority... There was thus a natural impulse to advance from this relatively poor resource base into neighboring territories in order to acquire economic advantages.⁶⁰

The population was also affected by traditional Russian/Soviet imperialism. State-building and empire-building went hand in hand in Russia, thereby resulting in the widespread belief that Russia was inseparable from its empire. This was a tradition later encouraged by the Communist Party. To this day, it is a major element of the Russian psyche. The identity crisis that has accompanied the breakup of the Soviet Union is so grave, in Richard Pipes's opinion, that it has relegated the economic disaster to second place. As Pipes puts it,

The postcommunist states of Eastern Europe had an easier time [...] In Russia, the situation is far more complicated because of the confusion of nationhood, statehood, and empire; it is further exacerbated by the fact that communism was indigenous rather than imposed from abroad.⁶¹

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Alfred J. Rieber, "Persistent factors in Russian foreign policy: an interpretative essay", in Hugh Ragsdale, ed., Imperial Russian foreign policy (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1993), 324. The three myths Rieber mentions are (1) the drive for warm-water ports, (2) Russia as a form of Asian despotism, and (3) Russian messianism.

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Richard Pipes, "Introduction", in: Heyward Isham, ed., Remaking Russia (M. E. Sharpe: Armonk, N.Y., 1995), 4.

As an important part of the Russian identity, the question of the origins of Russian imperialism has attracted Russian opinion, too. The drive to enhance Russia's territory was not always practical, much less reasoned. One of the more fantastic explanations is Vyacheslav Ivanov's. He claimed in 1993 that,

[t]he idea of conquering space originated in connection with the proposition that the dead can literally be resurrected, as suggested by Fedorov. [...] The existing space on earth would not suffice in the event of the resurrection of all the generations that had lived on the planet.⁶²

Whatever the explanations (and, often, excuses), the fact remains that both Russian and Soviet behaviors were rooted in imperialism - a tradition which, by the end of World War II, included the desire to rule Eastern Europe as well. It was originally Stalin's idea, but by the 1980s Soviet citizens had grown used to being a superpower, with its own alliance, and morally superior to the West. The question is, then, whether imperialism as a "persistent rather than permanent" characteristic of Russian statehood (to borrow Rieber's phrase) will give way to other, more endearing, traits in the future. It must also be asked whether it should influence NATO decision-making regarding the eastward enlargement of the Alliance.

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Vyacheslav Ivanov, "In My Beginning Is My End. Traditional Values in Russian Social Life and Thought", in *ibid.*, 31-32.

C. THREE SCENARIOS OF FUTURE RUSSIA

For a time the end of the Cold War, like the Russian Revolution, seemed to prefigure a sharp change in the direction of Russian history, this time wholly for the better. [...] That naive euphoria, that belief in the mutation of history, has been replaced by a growing unease, both within Russia and outside, about the way in which Russia might now turn.

- Rodric Braithwaite⁶³

In the academic debate of the past few years, three major alternatives about the Russia of the future have emerged. First is the opinion that the Russia of today is the direct descendant of tsarist Russia (and, for that matter, of Soviet socialism - which may have been, with a twist to Lenin's words, the highest stage of imperialism). Adherents to this argument frequently quote statements and actions of Russian foreign policy resembling the imperialist traditions of old.

The second line of reasoning expects Russian weakness to continue, perhaps deteriorating into chaos and, possibly, a further breakup of the Russian Federation. This interpretation is mostly an extrapolation from the dismal situation in contemporary of Russia, i. e., its deteriorating economy, the failure of reforms, and ongoing ethnic conflicts. This argument does not necessarily contradict the first. Proponents of Russian imperialism themselves admit that it was always dependent on Russia's strength -- and the present period is one of weakness.

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Rodric Braithwaite, "Russian Realities and Western Policy", Survival 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), 11,12.

The third, "optimistic", camp (which includes the most ardent believers in the powers of democracy) considers the current state of affairs in the Russian Federation transitional. Its supporters expect that Russia will, sooner rather than later, become a Western-type democracy, since that is the only "logical" development (and the normal course of history, as Fukuyama might agree). Although Russian leaders have, on occasion, tried to convey this image, the sincerity of their declarations remains questionable, particularly considering recent developments (e.g., the war in Chechnya, or the possibility of a Communist comeback). Western logic and Russia have had little to do with one another -- at least so far.

1. The First Scenario: The Imperialist Revival

As the Russian state has found its bearings again it has reverted to a traditional Russian foreign policy, dictated by its history and geography, which is one of asserting control over its neighbors and competing with the world's other superpower for influence and resources.

- Thomas L. Friedman ⁶⁴

The three scenarios offer different challenges to NATO (particularly regarding the expansion of the Alliance), and those challenges, in turn, demand different solutions. In the first case, if traditional Russian imperialism takes over, NATO is both better and worse off than it is right now. The return of outright imperialism would, in a sordid way, at least clarify the present situation. Unfortunately, it would not make handling it easier.

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Thomas L. Friedman, "The Cold Peace", New York Times, 26 April 1995, p. A25.

As the successor to the Soviet state, the Russian Federation inherited a number of grave problems, many of which are connected to the dismemberment of the USSR. They include, to list but a few, a significant Russian diaspora in the former republics of the Soviet Union, the return of military personnel and equipment from the former empire (including Eastern Europe), and the humiliating fate that befell the military. They are aggravated by the economic problems resulting from the collapse of a highly centralized and bureaucratic system of production, the loss of an all-encompassing explanation of life, and the loss of prestige and great power status.

There are approximately 25 million ethnic Russians in the other former Soviet republics who, in the course of the recent changes, have been reduced from members of an imperial nation to simply ethnic minorities. It is in the interest of the Russian state to protect these minorities, if only indirectly. Many of the former Soviet republics experience ethnic tensions that Russia tries, or might try in the future, to use to its own benefit. The West has not shown much desire to become involved in the settlement of these disputes, thereby providing an opportunity for Russia to create its own solutions. In effect, as Maxim Shashenkov asserts,

peacekeeping could also become a convenient method of protecting and defending the interests and rights of Russian and Russian-speaking populations in the near abroad. [...] Russian assertive peacekeeping in the 'hot spots' of the FSU reduces the chances of the involvement of other regional powers in what Russia sees as its 'traditional sphere of influence'.⁶⁵

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Maxim Shashenkov, "Russian Peacekeeping in the 'Near Abroad'", *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), 50.

The logical question is whether it is the Russian diaspora that the Russian Federation wishes so desperately to protect or whether, on the contrary, it is the pretext of protecting Russians abroad that Russia uses as an excuse to intervene in its “traditional sphere of influence.” Some of the non-Slavic states of the former Soviet Union (e.g., in the Baltics, the Caucasus, or the Transcaucasus) were less than integral parts of the empire, yet now experience tangible Russian interference. In the future, this pretext might be entirely abandoned, and a similar influence demanded in some of the Eastern European states on the grounds that they, too, belong to the Russian sphere. A familiar argument, if ever there was one.

The Russian military, while showing signs of utter disrepair, is not to be discounted. It is still by far the biggest in Europe, and certainly the most desperate. Its first instinct is self-preservation, an inclination that could involve the invention of any number of “new missions”, even reckless ones or ones that discredit democracy.⁶⁶ As Braithwaite puts it, the republics of the “near abroad”, therefore, “fear that - as under the tsars - the Russian

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In an editorial, the New York Times reminded its readers of this tendency quite bluntly: “But surely the example of 1917-18, when greater Russia and its ‘prison house of nations’ last fell apart and subjugated peoples like Estonians and Ukrainians declared their independence, should teach us that just because Russia’s army happens to be down and out does not mean it will remain so for long.” -- Editorial, “East Europe Fears A Renascent Russia”, New York Times, 16 June 1995, p. A26.

military may lead Russia into imperial adventures despite the reassurances of the Foreign Ministry.”⁶⁷

In the economy, already in the early 1990s it became evident that a semblance of the Soviet system had to be preserved at all costs. The reforms have stalled, many of them ending in corruption rather than economic renewal. The distribution of tasks among the various republics was such that the breakup of the Union necessarily brought suffering to all. Even the Russian Federation lost out on the deal, and among the many losers was the military. For it, the losses included strategically important bases, and affected segments of the military (e.g., the Black Sea Fleet), which further reinforced the desire to recapture parts or all of the former empire. The creation of the CIS and the efforts to make it a multipurpose community (involved not only in economic cooperation but also in the security of its members), are seen by some as signaling Russia’s resolve to regain its former territories.

It is when the economic and military necessities team up with the desire to recapture the prestige of a superpower, or at least conserve the appearance of being a great power,

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Rodric Braithwaite, *ibid.*, 21. Also, one should not forget the imperial adventures that involved more than the territory of the former Soviet Union, or that it is no longer a Westernizer at the top in the Russian Foreign Ministry. The same is true for the Defense Ministry and other important “power ministries” such as the Nuclear Power Ministry. Nuclear Power Minister Viktor Mikhailov explained that “The plan to expand NATO eastwards means that one day there will be tactical nuclear weapons sited in countries like the Czech Republic... Inasmuch as I am responsible for Russia’s nuclear security, I would have to take measures. And these would be very simple. We would do all we could to ensure that those sites did not exist -- and that means they will simply be destroyed.” Such an attitude signals not the rise of democratic values in Russia, but the perceived loss of status and might.--”Yeltsin: Dim View From Metro Crowd”, Moscow Times, 16 February 1996 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

that the full significance of these factors emerges. Since the rule of Peter the Great, Russia has always been considered a great power, a status it must, therefore, desperately wish to preserve. At present, the only remaining proof of that status is Russia's military (first of all, nuclear) capability. The support given by the military to the establishment of common defense (and therefore, to the creation of a NATO-like alliance) within the CIS stems partially from this predicament. Stephen Covington, in an interesting article on Russian insecurity, explains:

The West must recognize that rather than being the world leader in reforming a totalitarian communist state, Moscow has chosen a different course for post-Cold War legitimization of its security needs, its military superpower status.⁶⁸

Why states in the near and far abroad fear a return of Russian imperialism can be partly explained by the great power rhetoric, the daily interference, and the occasional show of strength the Russian Federation has engaged in ever since its proclamation. To be sure, this stance could be taken as a gesture at self-reassurance, and is taken by many as such. But even if that were true, as H. Adomeit maintains,

Nations and governments engaging in 'great power advertising' typically embody more irrational, unpredictable and contradictory traits than the more self-assured and self-confident states.⁶⁹

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Stephen Covington, "Moscow's Insecurity and Eurasian Instability", European Security, 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), 451.

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Hannes Adomeit, "Russia as a 'great power' in world affairs: images and reality", International Affairs 71, no. 1 (1995), 35.

An unpredictable Russia could become far more threatening than a "simply" hostile one: the world has learnt to cope with the latter, but does not have enough experience with the former. The unpredictability, together with the often unveiled threats employed by Russia for policy-making, are often responsible for the fears of the true motives of the Russian leadership, whether it concerns the strengthening of the CIS integration or domestic politics.

What would the interests of NATO dictate regarding the future of the Alliance and the plans of enlargement should the return of imperialism become indisputable? Many experts warn that the eastward expansion of NATO cannot but alienate Russia. These sentiments are enthusiastically picked up by Russians, as in the case of the following proclamation, found in the Moscow Times:

Russia is in no position to mount an attack on Western Europe, nor to invade its former East European satellites, even if it were remotely inclined to do so. Nor is there any reason to suspect that it would try to do this in the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, given NATO's original purpose as a bastion against the advance of Soviet power, it is only natural that Russia would do all it could to resist the alliance's expansion eastward.⁷⁰

The counter-argument, in many respects, sounds more convincing. Should Russia revert to imperialism, a West lulled into a false feeling of security by Russian promises and assertions would be utterly without the means to control the situation. Another Yalta would

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(no byline) "Slow Down Expansion of NATO", Moscow Times, 2 June 1995 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

be entirely out of the question, since the West could probably not summon the same power it did during the Second World War. Should imperialism again take over in Russia, would it not be best to meet it prepared? Would NATO not be better off having at least some Eastern European countries firmly at its side rather than leave them to be exploited (strategically and economically) by such a Russia?⁷¹

Russia should not, by any means, feel intimidated by NATO enlargement. There is no question that it would adversely affect Russia's image (though not necessarily its position) as a great power. It could even be beneficial because it would signal Russian willingness to assume a benign behavior. Furthermore, enlargement would not threaten Russia's existence: that was never in the interest of NATO, and it is not, now. As William Safire stated in the New York Times,

Fear of Russian paranoia must not determine the defense of Europe. NATO has proved itself to be peaceful (and our C.F.E. commitments add to that assurance). But as Russia recovers and rearms, as history suggests it will,

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With a bit of cynicism it is possible to see how it would be in the best interest of NATO to provide an additional belt of security in the form of Eastern European membership: in a conventional or a tactical nuclear attack these countries, rather than the key allies, would suffer the first strike, thereby allowing the heartland to prepare for a proper reaction to any aggression. Also, this could mean the difference between moderation and all-out war (particularly if French jumpiness is taken into account). There is indication of German support of enlargement precisely on this basis. In a (later disavowed) 1994 paper, "Reflections on European Policy", the ruling German coalition stated: "Never again must there be a destabilizing vacuum of power in Central Europe. [...] If (West) European integration were not to progress, Germany might be called upon or tempted by its own security constraints to effect the stabilization of eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way." Not only is this not a reassuring thought, but it hints at the fact that should NATO not fill in the vacuum of power in Eastern Europe, there might be another volunteer only too happy to do so. -- Martin Walker, "Germany Balks At Life on the Edge of NATO, Moscow Times", 12 May 1995, no. 709 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

Moscow's imperialist urge might well rise again -- and then it would be too late and "provocative" to redraw the defense line.⁷²

This would be equal not only to allowing Russia the upper hand, but to the West losing face in the process -- a very dangerous thing when facing a high-context culture (i.e., one where face-saving and personal contacts are uppermost in negotiators' minds).⁷³

In order to prevent Russia from being completely alienated by NATO enlargement the West might do well to provide it with some form of compensation⁷⁴ -- but not the right to decide who may become a new member in the alliance and when. When it threatens the return of the Communists or a takeover by the extreme nationalists, the Yeltsin government and the President bind themselves to a "position of weakness" (Schelling⁷⁵) and use it as a bargaining chip. The problem with this stance is that it may be effective not only abroad, but also vis-à-vis the government's domestic opponents. Any compromise that might today be accepted as necessary to pacify right-wing opposition to the Yeltsin

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William Safire, "Tale of Two Treaties", New York Times, 2 October, p. A17.

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See: I. William Zartman & Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1982).

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Such attempts as the extension of further IMF loans, or the rescheduling of current Russian financial obligations are indicative of the range of action the West might contemplate. However, these very actions, intended to boost Yeltsin's popularity, may bring about the escalation of Russian demands in the future. Michael R. Gordon, "Russia's Communists Have New, Mixed Manifesto", New York Times, 7 May 1996, pp. A1,6.

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Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass., 1960), 21-52.

government may easily appear in the constitution of Russia should the next president come from that part of the political spectrum. Furthermore, while public declarations mostly oppose the eastward widening of NATO, there are those even within the political elite who do not seem to fear it. The quotation below makes one question the sincerity of the present leadership in this regard. One is tempted to believe that this is nothing more but a bargaining chip to be used at Moscow's convenience, as it is implied by the following piece of news:

The chairman of the parliamentary defense committee said Monday that Russia should be made an "associate member" of NATO and head off a nationalist backlash against the enlargement of the alliance. Sergei Yushenkov told a press conference the expansion of NATO was not, in itself, a threat, as it was a long, cumbersome process that he believed would actually weaken NATO as an alliance.⁷⁶

Less benevolent is the hope some Russians harbor that the issue can be divisive enough to lead to serious problems within the Alliance itself.⁷⁷

It is possible that Russia, in the long term, will manage to avoid the trap of imperialism. It is less likely that it could ever be happy about NATO enlargement. This is a matter that Russia should be forced to come to terms with, if for no other reason than to prove how democratic its policies really are.

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Thomas de Waal, "Yushenkov Seeks Part in NATO Club", Moscow Times, 16 May 1995, no. 711 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

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Pavel Felgenhauer, "Russia's Real NATO Policy", Moscow Times, 1 June 1995, no. 723 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

2. The Second Scenario: Weak, Chaotic Russia

[T]here is an uneasiness in the air, borne of fear for the future and unanswered questions.
- David Satter⁷⁸

The second possibility is just as threatening as the first. One reason for this is the inherent instability and unpredictability of such an outcome. What could happen if the center in the Russian Federation totally lost control of its subjects is difficult to say. The further breakup of Russia is possible - with all its dismal consequences. These could include, e.g., refugee flows, the collapse of the state, the emergence of new states, disregard for international law and order, increase in international terrorism, uncontrolled -- and uncontrollable -- redistribution of resources, and nuclear proliferation. This is a process that, according to Malia, resembles the *smuta*⁷⁹ (the "time of troubles") of the early seventeenth century.

Another danger inherent in this scenario is that never in the history of Russia has a period of weakness been followed by democracy. In fact, the opposite usually has held true: chaos and weakness inevitably ended with the emergence of renewed trust in (indeed,

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David Satter, "Yeltsin: Shadow of a Doubt", The National Interest, no. 34 (Winter 1994/95), 52.

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As Malia explains, "The process of general dissolution now under way in the former Soviet Union may be seen as the beginning of a *smuta*, though with one major difference: it is a *smuta*, not in a traditional autocracy and universal service society of gentry and peasants, but in a new kind of order for which we have no adequate and generally accepted term." -- Martin Malia, "From Under the Rubble, What?", Problems of Communism (January-April 1992), 93. On the history of *smuta*, see also: N. V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (Oxford University Press: New York, 1977).

reverence for) a new autocrat. When scholars compare the present Russian political situation to that of Weimar Germany, they do it with a tone of warning. In an insightful essay, G. Starovoitova likened post-World War I Germany and post-Soviet Russia as follows:

Like Russians today, Germans were experiencing a crisis of ethnic identity as a result of alterations in their political geography and reappraisals of their recent history. [...] As a result, in our day Russians as well as Germans have come to associate the ideals and symbols of patriotic unity with totalitarian regimes. Russia's new democratic authorities can ill afford to remind their citizens of such ideals, whereas the Russian chauvinist opposition calls for the restoration of a regime that can whip up patriotic fervor and once again help the nation survive a time of great difficulty.⁸⁰

Thus, the second scenario contains the possibility of the emergence of the first. Ample evidence exists that many people in Russia believe in the superiority of some form of autocracy when compared with what they see as the fallibilities of democracy, among them those who lost out in the changes. These people are even now being led to believe the "strong Russia"-rhetoric the Communists and the nationalists chant. Communist deputy in the State Duma V. Ilyukhin in mid-1995 boldly stated,

There is only one conclusion. In order to save Russia, we need a new president, a new government and a new legislature. But the first step is replacing the constitution which is injurious to Russia. The country needs a charter that will

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Galina Starovoitova, "Modern Russia and the Ghost of Weimar Germany", in Heyward Isham, ed., *ibid.*, 140.

make the government strong and powerful, will make life certain and just and will make the people free and happy.⁸¹

Assertions such as the above are no longer discredited. The ardent wish to make people free and happy (never to allow them to do so on their own) is reminiscent of the golden days of the Soviet Union. One would not expect to see such rhetoric in a self-proclaimed and burgeoning democracy, much less the approving nods it has met. Returning to the question of what would happen if this scenario emerged victorious, there are two options. If, in the mid- to long-term, the *smuta* were replaced by a superimposed autocratic order, the first (imperial Russia) scenario and its consequences would automatically apply. If, on the other hand, Russia itself broke into pieces, the situation would be different.

Many of the threats in such a scenario would require the interference of a regional or international organization other than NATO (e.g., the European Union, the OSCE, or the United Nations). The potential security threats posed by a fragmenting Russia are similar to those experienced during the fragmentation of the (Russian-proclaimed) "sick man of Europe", the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, with the notable difference that it would not only happen on a much larger scale, but that it would also happen in a different, more interdependent world -- one with nuclear weapons. It may not be possible to prevent the virus from spreading the disease, but fighting it without the

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Viktor Ilyukhin, "Russia's Security Crisis", Moscow Times, 14 June 1995, (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTM).

serum represented by NATO would be foolish. There is a role for NATO in this scenario, and the bigger NATO is, the greater the area of regional stability -- as against the chaos in Russia.

3. The Third Scenario: Democracy in Russia, at Last

Once again people are searching for Russia's special 'mission'. This time the most widespread idea is the old one turned upside down: Russia is fulfilling its mission to save the world from the destructiveness of artificial states and social formations, to demonstrate that socialism [...] is not viable [...] I refuse to believe that such a 'mission' has an iota of merit!

- Dmitrii Likachev ⁸²

There are those who sincerely believe that, against all odds, this time Russia will go through a radical change and emerge as a Western-type democracy. The West cannot imagine that Russia, after having let go of the other former Soviet republics, could now re-create a democratic empire. Not so some of the Russians when they reassure the West about the depth of their desire for democracy and in the same breath talk about their "responsibilities" in the near abroad. It is perhaps their limited experience with democracy that allows them the optimism to assume this.

There is, however, a measure of desperation involved in Russian attempts to disavow the notions of an autocratic past. Clearly, they themselves see the negative historical pattern. In the above quoted essay, Likachev tries to discredit the "cliché ... that Russia had

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Dmitrii Likachev, "I Object. What Constitutes the Tragedy of Russian History", in: Heyward Isham, ed., *ibid.*, 60.

no democratic traditions, no normal state authority that in any way took the interests of the people into account.”⁸³ However one might sympathize with his desire to provide Russians with historical evidence of a seed of democracy in their culture, it is impossible to lose sight of the fact that, on balance, Russia has been an autocratic empire for centuries. Szamuely would have probably said that whatever democratic institutions or impulses may have existed in the Russian Empire existed only within the notion of equal slavery before the autocrat.⁸⁴

Nevertheless, at this point, it is not yet entirely impossible that a democratic Russia will emerge when the present chaotic situation is cleared. Let us, therefore, picture a Russia as democratic as its most democratic-minded citizens would like it to be. This would, indeed, be a serious challenge to the existence of NATO. Ever since the 1990 London Declaration the future of the Alliance has been questioned. While some experts and scholars oppose NATO enlargement or even the continuation of the military cooperation within the existing organization, it is simply too early to rely on the OSCE -- just as it had been too early to entrust the feeble League of Nations with the fate of the world before World War II. To forget that it is not only Russia that needs reassurances (but that the West, too, is entitled to getting its own from the Russian Federation) is just as mistaken as to paint Russia automatically in the role of disturber of peace. (Although, there

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Ibid., 54.

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Tibor Szamuely, *ibid.*, 80.

is more legitimacy in doing the latter, considering recent Russian involvements in affairs of its neighbors and of the world.) As John J. Maresca warned in Defense News,

This is not a suggestion to isolate Russia. [...] Rather, it is a suggestion to keep NATO strong as long as it is needed... the West should not be blind to Russia's current activities in the newly independent states around its periphery. [...] To leave Moscow completely unchallenged will only lead to greater problems later.⁸⁵

When Moscow complains about not being treated as a great power should be, or not having a say in NATO enlargement, one should remember an earlier enlargement. The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Alliance was conducted under much more disheartening circumstances, in the middle of the gravest period of the Cold War. Then, even the Soviet superpower's threats and assurances could not put a halt to expansion. In comparison, allowing all four Visegrad countries to become members of NATO would not require quite as much courage. To concede to Russia's wishes in this issue might enhance Russia's public image, but it would not necessarily aid democracy in Moscow -- and, some argue, might further harm it.⁸⁶

Additionally, similarly to the "Russia first" reasoning, a significant argument could be made in favor of the Central and East European applicants. NATO members should not forget that dragging out the process is another way of signaling the undesirability of the

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John J. Maresca, "Russian Gain Is NATO Loss", Defense News, 1-7 August 1994, p. 20.

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Such an action, furthermore, would enhance the image of the Russian Empire, not that of the Russian Federation.

Central and East Europeans. As James W. Morrison puts it, "It could suggest that the West is not sympathetic to these states and their perceived vulnerability, and that the West does not view these states as part of Europe or as important."⁸⁷ This, of course, undermines the essence of the democratic reasoning.

Again, the conclusion is similar. Expanding the Alliance is entirely possible and connected to the future of NATO in a simple way. If NATO were to disassemble, it would do so regardless of the number of its members. If it were to be transformed into an organization of collective security, then the fact that some Eastern European states were allowed to join it earlier than others would not make a difference.

D. WHAT HAS HAPPENED SO FAR?

But frank recognition of a sharp break with the comfortable illusions of perestroika is unsettling to too many Western political, as well as Sovietological, interests to be readily accepted.

-- Martin Malia ⁸⁸

The three scenarios depicted above (imperial Russia, weak/anarchic Russia, and democratic Russia) boil down to one significant difference between the individual camps. This difference is the argument whether nations are prone to follow a historically

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James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments McNair Paper no. 40 (April 1995), 30.

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Martin Malia, *ibid.* (1992), 91.

prescribed destiny, or can and do change, thereby altering the course of history. In his essay, "A Different Dance", Leon Aron calls the former reasoning "Historical", the latter, "Romantic".⁸⁹ The Historical school expects Russia to revert to type, while the Romantics point out that democratic change, as proven by the examples of the F.R.G. and Japan, is possible. Actually, this latter point is not entirely correct. As General W. Odom reminds us, the shift from totalitarian to democratic regimes in Germany (and Japan) was accomplished under the presence of massive occupying forces.⁹⁰ This could not be the case in Russia.

Aron believes that while neither camp is totally correct in its expectations, there is a chance that what we see as renewed imperialist strife might, in fact, be the "muddling through" aspect of a change without precedents rather than the return of outright imperialism. In the recent history of the Russian Federation, however, ample reasoning can be found for both arguments.

Even before the breakup, it was obvious that a fairly strong camp in favor of the Soviet system existed inside the USSR. In domestic as well as the foreign policy-making, the opinions from these people resonated with the confidence of the previous seventy-odd years. A particularly early expression of the present Russian warnings about the

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Leon Aron, "A Different Dance - from Tango to Minuet", The National Interest, no. 39 (Spring 1995), 27-37.

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William E. Odom, "William Odom responds", The National Interest, no. 40 (Summer 1995), 104.

consequences of NATO enlargement eastward can be found in a 1991 issue of the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda. The search for new policies, it says,

is wide and includes such options as full neutrality, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and even the desire to join NATO... [This] evokes a degree of surprise, even bewilderment. [...] After all, with the dismantling of the WTO military structure we have gone only halfway towards a safe future for Europe -- the Eastern half of the way.⁹¹

This interpretation blatantly ignores the fact that the WTO fell apart due to the pressure exerted by its own membership, which is hardly the case for NATO. It shows, however, that even when democracy seemed to be acquiring a pleasant shine in the Soviet Union, there were those who looked upon the alterations in the post-World War II status quo with growing resentment. It also indicates that some in Russia not only oppose NATO's eastward expansion, they oppose the idea of expansion *per se*.⁹²

Following the declaration of independence of the Russian Federation and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the West believed that Russia would become a democratic state. Many perhaps thought this would occur overnight. Not only did that not happen, but after a period of wavering democratic urges, a state of quasi-autocracy reasserted itself, not in the

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L. Klyusa, "The Halfway Point", Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 March 1991, p. 5.

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However, due to its momentary weakness, it might allow other, formerly not WTO-member states to join NATO. One example could be Sweden, should it decide to revoke its self-imposed neutrality. Ultimately, Finland's membership is not inconceivable, particularly since in 1995 it joined the Partnership for Peace initiative.

least because democratic institutions seemed to be too weak to effectively handle the many problems Russia has been facing.

One thing is certain: what the West gloried in as Russia's choice of democracy leaves much to be desired. The first few months of the newly established Russian Federation were spent in a state of blissful euphoria -- both in Russia and (perhaps more so) in the West. Many are the experts who remarked on how optimistic the Russian leadership and the population were regarding the nature and size of the help the West would give.

The widely held notion of the supremacy of the Western model led most Russians to believe that switching to democracy would be, if not entirely painless, at least quick. The first few months of 1992, therefore, were characterized by a desire to cooperate, and a show of democratic feelings. In those early days, the failure of the Soviet state still loomed large in the minds of the population, unaltered by images of the failure of reforms. After all, what else could explain Russia's willingness to let go of the republics of the former Soviet Union, vote against Serbia, a traditional Russian protégé, in the UN Security Council, and support domestic economic and political reforms on an unheard-of scale?

From the end of 1991 to about the middle of 1992 Russia reinvented itself: in international and regional organizations, in its attitude toward the United States and the West, in its understanding of its own roles and responsibilities. Just as domestic economic reforms signaled an end to an era in history, so the image projected toward the international community showed a dramatic departure from previous behavior. The overwhelming feeling was, as H. Adomeit quotes the Russian foreign minister saying, that

[y]et another failure “to integrate into the democratic community of states and thus the world economy [...] would amount to a betrayal of the nation and the final slide of Russia down to the category of third rank states”.⁹³

The resultant sense of urgency allowed the Westernizers of Russia to claim a short-lived victory over the traditional arguments of the Slavophile/Eurasian camp. It was this behavior that convinced the West that Russia was well on its way to democracy, and that it was in the West’s best interest to promote a “Russia first” approach. The early omens of a much less comfortable future were, for the time being, disregarded. The official rhetoric from Russia did not, at this time, belie the expectations. The hope in the emergence of a “new international order” was reflected in the renewed interest in various international organizations, among them the United Nations and the CSCE. Initial Russian cooperation seemed to reinforce these hopes.

It was in this atmosphere that the future necessity of NATO came into question. It was this hopefulness that resulted in the changes of NATO military doctrine and strategic aims -- as announced by the Rome Declaration of 1991.⁹⁴ This positive Russian behavior allowed NATO to put the question of enlargement temporarily aside. And the remnants of this optimism are responsible for many of the arguments opposing the eastward widening

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Hannes Adomeit, *ibid.*, 44.

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“The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8th November 1991”, NATO Handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, 1995), 235-248.

of the Alliance. In this benevolent atmosphere, Russia insisted, the need for NATO enlargement was small, the need for pacifying and aiding Russia great.

Unfortunately, this “internationalist”, accommodating approach remained at the center of foreign policy for about six months only. By then, many serious criticisms had emerged. One was the fact that Western support did not fulfill Russian expectations. Second, that many among the Russian *intelligentsia* accused Russian foreign policy of failing to identify and promote the national interest. Third, foreign minister Kozyrev came to be seen as too pro-Western, too obliging. Finally, lacking a political party’s backing, nobody but the reformers themselves seemed to propagate these policies.⁹⁵

What has happened to bring these changes about? As in any state, in Russia, too, foreign and security policy is strongly connected to, and dependent on, the twists and turns of domestic politics. While reforms were attractive to the population, Communists and nationalists alike had less to offer the people. When the reforms came to be seen as ineffective, hardliners and centrists with their suggestions to return to traditional Russian policies, began to gain popularity. First, economic reformers were ousted from the government. It was, some said, the natural swing back of the pendulum after the swing in the opposite direction provided by *perestroika*. The reality is probably less reassuring. A RAND Corporation study explains that the removal of economic reformer Gaidar was probably behind a startling speech by Foreign Minister Kozyrev at the Stockholm CSCE

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Renée de Nevers, Russia’s Strategic Renovation. Russian security strategies and foreign policy in the post-imperial era, Adelphi Paper no. 289 (IISS: London, 1994), 25-26.

meeting, a speech that described a hardline, irredentist Russian foreign policy -- delivered, Kozyrev subsequently explained, to remind the participants of what "might" happen should Russia's democrats (i.e., Yeltsin) be ousted.⁹⁶

While for the past five years the Russian Federation has been busy building its own identity and statehood, the nature of this identity has increasingly emerged as assertive, at times aggressive. It is unclear how much of this rhetoric is just that and how much it reflects the present reality of Russian politics. Nevertheless, the possibility of the reinstatement of the Russian statist-imperialist tradition has been confirmed from different corners.

President Boris Yeltsin's rule has been hardly what could be called "uneventful". Many of those events are among the sources of doubt regarding the nature of the present Russian state, and its possible future choices. Starting from the position of (quasi)democratic opposition to the Soviet government, by the end of his (first?) presidency he has been forced to make allowances to the more and more popular nationalist movement, and even to his Communist opposition.

The very actions hailed by many as protecting the fragile democracy in Russia are scorned by others who see them as less than democratic in themselves. Today, Yeltsin is supported by the West because he is seen as the lesser and known evil, and not because he is any great democrat. His decision to disband Parliament in 1993 was unconstitutional

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Eugene B. Rumer, Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition, RAND -- Project Air Force, 1995, p. 26.

and, according to Satter, a deliberate plot to boost his presidency. The result of this was “the loss of the possibility to lay the basis for an enduring constitution and, with it, the rule of law.”⁹⁷ Russians also ended up with a constitution that strengthened the president to such an extent as to allow him to govern almost entirely by decrees. Clearly, Yeltsin has grown into his nickname, “Tsar Boris.”⁹⁸ So far, Russia’s yet uncrowned autocrat has managed to depict himself as the West’s only choice, allowing him to enjoy the fruits of unfailing support abroad. He does not hesitate to use his “moderation” to advantage. Often, Yeltsin’s public appearances are aimed at frightening the West into extending further support to his regime. In a recent public address, for example, he tried to scare the West as follows:

[W]hat worries me most of all is the absence so far of firm guarantees of the irreversibility of the changes that are taking place. There is no guarantee that five years from now new presidential elections will be held. Russia is again at a crossroads.⁹⁹

By the end of 1993, it had become obvious that the period of enthusiastic changes was over. The Russian liberal Yuri Afanasyev publicly rued the passing of the era of

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David Satter, *ibid.*, 55.

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Says L. Batkin, “Thus we now have an illegitimate president and as a consequence of a real innovative spirit we have a Constitution imposed upon us by that president. We now have a kind of mirror-image of Soviet ‘constitutionalism’.” -- Leonid Batkin, “The Minefield of Russian Constitutionalism Before and After October 1993”, in Heyward Isham, ed., *ibid.*, 124.

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Yeltsin’s speech at the opening of the Yekaterinburg Metro. “Yeltsin: Dim View From Metro Crowd”, Moscow Times, 16 February 1996, no. 900 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

reforms, claiming that the domestic political struggles in 1993 signaled the “return of the military”, the “foxhole mentality” of the leadership. He sadly confirmed that the reforms had barely scraped the surface.¹⁰⁰ Last year, when testifying to the U.S. Congress, well-known financier George Soros captured another aspect of the link between Russia’s domestic political agenda and its foreign policies. In his testimony he warned that

Russia and the other successor states are in need of outside assistance to make headway with their internal transformation. They do not perceive issues of external security as a threat; rather, they see them as opportunities to divert attention from their economic failure and to mobilize political support.¹⁰¹

This, in some respects, resembles the situation prior to the Russo-Japanese war, when Russia attempted to eliminate the domestic threats to the legitimacy of the autocracy. The fields of security and foreign policy, most important in respect to NATO enlargement, have also been subject to the fluctuations of domestic politics. Creating a separate national identity and the requisite political ideas is not easy, particularly when the past is not exactly full of examples to follow.

The most important foreign and security policy decisions and documents are the products of 1992 and 1993. Unfortunately, since then, many of their stipulations have been called into question. While during 1991 and 1992 the Foreign Ministry, staffed with a team

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Yuri N. Afanasyev, “Russian Reform Is Dead. Back to Central Planning”, Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (April/May 1994), 21-26.

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“Creating an open society will take ample energy. Soros testifies to the U. S. Congress”, Budapest Business Journal, 2 September 1994, p. 19.

of reformers, enjoyed the support of the leadership, from the end of 1993 the centrist and extremist forces in the State Duma have grown strong enough to alter many pro-Western policies.¹⁰² It has become obvious that the Duma's and the Defense Ministry's views on the conduct and essence of foreign policy are closer than are the Duma's and the Foreign Ministry's. Of course, it is inevitable considering the changes in the Duma's membership since 1991 -- reformers and moderates have, by now, been in many cases replaced by moderates and extremists.

The first signs of the successes of the Defense Ministry are to be found in the new Russian military doctrine of 1993, often dubbed Russia's "Monroe Doctrine." In it, the Russian Federation essentially recreated the idea of a wider sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics, inasmuch as they were given a special status as the "near abroad". Already in the summer of 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev warned that "... Russia cannot be a successful member of the international community without the ex-Soviet states."¹⁰³

In effect, Russia has pursued a neo-imperial policy and the restoration of hegemonic influence in the other republics of the former Soviet Union. The process is symbolized by the attempts to create a CIS-wide security cooperation, much in the vein of NATO, that

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Neil Malcolm, "Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making", in Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990 (Westview Press: Boulder, Colo., 1995) 23- 51.

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Mark Smith, Pax Russica: Russia's Monroe Doctrine (The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies: London, 1993), 7.

in time could negotiate with NATO as its equal. While the need to temporarily reconstruct some form of common defense in the FSU is understandable, the methods Russia has used to make the other republics comply with its designs (e. g., threats of economic sanctions, coercion, support to ethnic minorities, and blackmail -- as in the case of Georgia) are not conducive to the behavior of the benevolent protector of neighboring small states. The efforts to assure Russian "peacekeeping" a free hand and even make it attractive within the UN are "... clearly a perceptible desire for an internationally sanctioned *droit de regard* over its former colonies."¹⁰⁴ Russian attempts at reintegration of the two other Slavic republics, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, although not yet successful in the case of the second, are indicative of the spirit of the empire-reconstructors.

These trends are symptomatic of the demise of the pro-Western foreign policy the Russian Federation had initially cultivated. However, as de Nevers warns, "... current trends in foreign and security policy should not be written off as a temporary reaction, or as a concession to conservative forces at home. They reflect a deeper reassessment of Russia's national interests and identity."¹⁰⁵ Apparently, this identity is different from the ideals of Russian Westernizers, and much more so from the West's.

The major differences among these Russian political trends had only begun to show when the explosive issue of NATO enlargement forced them into the open. What in 1991

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Eugene B. Rumer, *ibid.*, 26.

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Renée de Nevers, *ibid.*, 37-38.

was ridiculed by Krasnaya Zvezda became, by 1994, an issue of immediate importance. Yeltsin's 1993 approval for Polish NATO membership (or, what the West understood to be his cautious approval) was quickly revoked and qualified: it was suggested that NATO enlargement without Russian membership was not to be allowed. Russia and the West increasingly disagreed about NATO expansion. Presently the Foreign Minister of Russia, then head of Foreign Intelligence Service, Yevgeniy Primakov warned that Russia was "far from indifferent to which bloc extends its area of responsibility up to our borders".¹⁰⁶ With this message the Russian leadership interpreted NATO expansion within the context of its 1993 Military Doctrine which lists the "expansion of military blocks and alliances to the detriment of the interests of military security of the Russian Federation" as a source of external danger.¹⁰⁷

The document also separates military dangers and threats, the latter being more serious in nature -- relegating the enlargement of NATO to the category of "danger". In this respect, the rejection of NATO expansion seems symptomatic of the struggle that is raging between the various political forces -- what the military doctrine deemed of moderate significance is now being presented to the public as an issue of utmost importance. In this we can see the signs of a Russian departure from the policies of the

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"Is the Expansion of NATO Justified?", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 November 1993.

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The excerpt is quoted in: Igor Tishin, "National Interests and Geopolitics: A Primer on 'The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation'", European Security 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 118.

early post-Soviet state. Then, as it was confirmed in the military doctrine and elsewhere, the most important task was to retain influence in the former Union republics and, wherever possible, promote integration with them. Today, this has been all but eclipsed by the imperative of not allowing NATO to expand, or at least getting significant concessions from the Alliance should it decide to go along with the plan.

Perhaps this is the true meaning of the more and more menacing Russian stance on the issue. Yeltsin says that the expansion of NATO “will mean a conflagration of war throughout Europe, for sure. [...] That’s why I’m against NATO enlargement. When NATO approaches the borders of the Russian Federation, you can say that there will be two military blocs, and this will be a restoration of what we have already had, [...] to the detriment of European security.”¹⁰⁸ It is possible that what he is really saying is that further concessions from the West are necessary for Russia to swallow its pride. It would be welcome news if speeches such as this were given for such reasons rather than due to the unfavorable changes in the relative strengths of various political factions.

In statements such as this, Yeltsin speaks as if he were the protector of the status quo in East Europe -- a fact that many observers connect to his plans to run for the presidency. These observers say that it is expected from the Russian leader that he show strength and “courage” to his people, thereby countering the strength and decisiveness both the

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President Yeltsin’s words quoted in: Steven Erlanger, “In a New Attack Against NATO, Yeltsin Talks of a ‘Conflagration of War’” New York Times, 2 October 1995, p. A17.

Communists and the radical nationalists emanate.¹⁰⁹ In truth, fifty years ago the Soviet Union created a belt of semi-sovereign satellites to protect itself, conveniently forgetting that it had no legal right to do so. In this respect, what is happening today is closer to creating a new status quo than disturbing one. (Also, what Eastern Europe is experiencing at present could hardly be called a status quo -- it is more like mild chaos.)

Often, hostile remarks from various Russian politicians, not excepting the president himself, have been explained as some sort of "publicity trick". In a 1995 article in Foreign Policy, Kozyrev addressed the question of Russian superpower rhetoric as follows:

[T]he West is not yet accustomed to the fact that public opinion and the legislature play a similar, if not a more important, role in Russian foreign policy than they play in the United States and Western Europe. We would be miserable democrats if we ignored various political trends in parliament and public sentiments, even if we find them highly disagreeable.¹¹⁰

It is one thing to listen to such "disagreeable" arguments, and another to heed them, if for nothing else, than to promote president Yeltsin's chances of re-election. In the end, Foreign Minister Kozyrev could do little but try to accommodate these forces while also attempting to preserve a semblance of the foreign policy he wished to represent. In his

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W. Safire in his article, "Tale of Two Treaties", explains, "Other sources say the Russian President sees two ways to retrieve his Chechnyan and Bosnian failures: One is to force major changes in the Conventional Forces Treaty with the West; the other is to frighten NATO out of extending protection to states freed from Soviet domination." In William Safire, *ibid.* See also: Alessandra Stanley, "With Campaign Staff in Disarray, Yeltsin Depends on Perks of Office", New York Times, 13 May 1996, pp. A1,5.

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Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace?", Foreign Policy no. 99 (Summer 1995), 8.

person one can see the failure of Russian reforms. Starting from the aspiration to cooperate with the West to raise Russia from its isolation, he was first forced to moderate his hopes, then, to stand by a more assertive foreign policy toward the "near abroad". In the end, he confirmed that Russia would not stand by idly should NATO attempt to go through with enlargement. Although Russia signed the Partnership for Peace agreement rather than being left out, it did so with the understanding that it

might leave PFP if NATO goes ahead with eastward expansion of the alliance. [Kozyrev] said that Russia opposes the organization's expansion in principle and that 'it must be clarified whom NATO intends to defend Europe from'. Kozyrev and the Foreign Ministry hold the most dovish, pro-Western position on NATO's expansion and East-West cooperation among the entire Russian policy-making establishment.¹¹¹

In the end, even this was not enough. After the struggles of the past couple of years, in January 1996 the "great Westernizer" himself was forced to resign. With him went the last hopes of the "Romantic" school of thought, leaving in its wake the image of an increasingly dangerous Russia, which seems to be passing through the three scenarios earlier depicted -- though in the reverse order. It started out from a democratic ideal, is now in a near-chaotic state, from which it may conceivably emerge imperialist again.

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Pavel Felgenhauer, "Army could sabotage PFP", Moscow Times, 15 June 1995, no. 732 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

E. CAVEATS

Russian leaders with whom a clear-headed Western plan [...] could be constructively discussed are being locked into an increasingly negative posture by the rising crescendo of highly vocal Russian opposition. There is little to be gained and a great deal to be risked by more delay [of NATO expansion]...

- Zbigniew Brzezinski ¹¹²

Many experts warn against NATO enlargement because they believe it would alienate Russia and lead to the collapse of the democratic movement. Because of this worry, some suggest it would be better not to go through with the enlargement at all. Michael Mandelbaum, for example, goes so far as to assert that NATO enlargement is probably not even necessary (in any case, it might cause more trouble than it is worth). His opinion is that even if Russia chooses to antagonize the West, "Because Russia is so weak, chaotic, and preoccupied with its internal affairs, the West *has* a long time."¹¹³ A similar argument was raised by Michael Brown in the Washington Post.¹¹⁴

Whatever the reasons behind NATO enlargement, as long as Russia is not a member (and it is generally agreed that as long as NATO remains a collective defense organization, this will not happen), it will find reason to complain about the process. The widening of the Alliance in such circumstances will necessarily hurt Russian prestige. It is debatable

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Zbigniew Brzezinski, *ibid.*, 29.

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Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion", International Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), 13.

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Michael E. Brown, "NATO Expansion: Wait and See", Washington Post, 26 December 1994, p. A29.

whether it would hurt Russia's interests, unless those are imperialistic. What the West could do is help Russia preserve its own self-esteem. This could be done by offering, parallel with the "stick" of enlargement, a "carrot" or even carrots that would help preserve Russian pride. What must be clearly understood, however, is that it is impossible to have this (carrot) cake and eat it, too. Russia cannot be compensated for NATO's expansion by offering it a carrot from the same sack, i.e., a say in what NATO can and cannot do, lest the West compromise the future of the Alliance. After all, NATO is an association of sovereign states where decision-making rests in the hand of the membership, not with some outside actor.

On the other hand, many experts argue, consistently with various NATO documents, that the eastward extension of NATO would help project stability and peace into a region that has been the source of many clashes among European powers. Whether it is but a part of a wider security architecture or the chief guarantor of security in Central and Eastern Europe,

NATO is the keystone of the new European security architecture, by dint of its past successes, its integrated military forces, the enduring commitment and leadership of the United States, and NATO's proven capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to new demands.¹¹⁵

It is also to be observed that to accept the proposal to enlarge NATO only after Russia has given proof of aggressive intent may be to wait until it becomes entirely too late

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"Enlargement: Part of a strategy for projecting stability into Central Europe", NATO Review, May 1995, pp. 3-8.

to do anything -- for two reasons. First, because from that moment on, the West would have to make the move in a hostile atmosphere that could easily lead to misunderstanding or intentional misinterpretation by such a Russia. It is easy to see that this idea is more a convenient excuse not to expand the Alliance than an intelligent solution. If NATO does not move while Russia can still be reasoned with, why (and how) would it move when action could result in outright confrontation? Second, NATO is a collective defense organization, built around the hypothesis of a common threat that the members want protection against. It is not an OSCE-like loose collective security organization. If NATO is to fulfill its mission, its preparedness must be maintained at all times. Consequently, should Russia become a threat to European security, NATO could not be effectively introduced in Eastern Europe overnight, as some experts suggest (nor would Russia likely let it happen).¹¹⁶ Then, the political consultation and cooperation available today would hardly compensate for what the Eastern Europeans would be forced to face.

This is the most difficult dilemma of enlargement: how not to allow Russia the right to dictate the who and when of enlargement, and at the same time not hurt Russian feelings in a way that could worsen the current precarious situation of its democrats. As Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee put it,

The alliance should make a serious attempt to reassure Moscow about NATO expansion, while recognising that Russia's future is uncertain and that the Alliance's role in shaping that future is limited. It is also premature to conclude that NATO expansion can decisively tip the power balance in Moscow.

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See: Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps", *Survival* 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 7-33, "Strategic Response".

Although Russian democrats are understandably concerned that nationalists will exploit the issue against them, NATO expansion is only one small factor in the equation that will determine Russia's future.¹¹⁷

The discouraging fact is that, no matter what the West does, Russia may already be treading the path of increasing assertiveness and decreasing moderation. At the moment, "Russia and the West are developing different definitions of what constitutes Eurasian stability after the Cold War. [...] Russia not only opposes NATO expansion, but holds views about Europe's ultimate security structure that diminish NATO's role in Europe".¹¹⁸

Thus, while the handling of this problem will take much ingenuity, it should not, in the interest of European security, take a long time.

F. CONCLUSION

Russia can either stay within the limits of its zone and desperately try to find weak points in its boundaries, thus keeping the West in a condition of permanent alert. Or both Russia and the West can find civilized ways of co-operating. This will help secure the development of Russia as a democratic power.

- Irina Kobrinskaya¹¹⁹

It seems that Russia has already chosen a non-Western path. Its persistent rhetoric about its desire to join the ranks of the liberal democratic nations has been increasingly at

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Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps", *Survival* 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 29-30.

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Stephen Covington, *ibid.*, 452, 453.

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Irina Kobrinskaya, "Dangers of Isolationism", *Moscow Times*, 19 January 1996, no. 880 (Lexis-Nexis/NEWS/MOSTMS).

odds with its ever more assertive foreign and defense policies. In this respect, it is difficult to believe that an attempt by the West to support Moscow's democrats through restraining from NATO enlargement could achieve much more than making the job easier for Russia's very own new nationalists or the Communists.

Critical of William Odom's undisguised support for NATO enlargement, Owen Harries suggests that the West today is about to make the opposite mistake it made prior to World War II. Then, the West believed that Nazi Germany could be reasoned with in the same way as Weimar Germany. Now, he says, it would be a similarly mistaken notion to act "on the assumption that the policy and attitudes of the struggling democracy in Moscow are no different [...] from those of its totalitarian Soviet and authoritarian Tsarist predecessors."¹²⁰ His point is just as wrong as it is nicely argued. After all, the appeasement tactics of the West were partially responsible for allowing Hitler to believe that he could fulfill his dreams for the Third Reich. There is more reason to suspect that Russia is hovering at the edge of becoming a totalitarian regime again than to applaud its miraculous transformation. Furthermore, the solution Harris suggests can easily be seen as appeasement. The situation, therefore, would be the same as, and not the opposite of, that of Weimar Germany (possibly with similar consequences). A democratic Russia would have little to fear of NATO enlargement, not in the least because of the assurances NATO has been, and will continue to be, willing to provide. On the other hand, it seems

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"Expanding NATO: An Exchange between Odom and his Critics", The National Interest, no. 40 (Summer 1995), 104.

strange that, while it is building what it perceives to be its own alliance among the members of the CIS, the Russian Federation would deny NATO expansion on the grounds that it would threaten Russian interests.

In the event that a truly democratic Russia emerged and managed to stabilize the country, the issue of the transformation or the total dismantling of NATO could be considered. Such a transformation would be conducive to the enlargement of the Alliance, while its elimination would have nothing to do with how many members it might then have. As long as there is no real democracy in Russia, however, it is not to be assumed that the boisterous, but so far relatively peaceful, attitude of Russian foreign policy is due to anything else but the present state of weakness. It is better to be prepared for any emergency than be caught unawares. In the case of Russia, there is a peculiar correctness to the old saying, "Trust must be earned".

IV. HUNGARIAN MEMBERSHIP POTENTIAL

With regard to the common defence, the sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities embraces a wide range of contributions by member countries. [...] Precise comparisons of one type of contribution with another are not possible. Perceptions vary of the value and the cost of individual contributions...

- Enhancing Alliance Collective Security [...]. A NATO Report¹²¹

As the preceding chapters have shown, previous NATO enlargements were by no means unproblematic, neither were they in keeping with the requirements set for present applicants. The good opinion of the Soviet Union, against whose potential aggression the Alliance had been created, was not coveted. On the contrary, enlargements happened in the face of Soviet threats.

Paradoxically, the “Russia first” argument (which is another way of showing respect toward one’s powerful, resurgent enemy) is often coupled with the opinion that the applicants would not be able to comply with the requirements of NATO (thus, they would be a destabilizing influence). Clearly, both beliefs cannot be held up against enlargement at the same time. According to the former, “neo-containment” reasoning, enlargement should not be decided by the Russian Federation. The “Study on NATO Enlargement” clearly is a step in this direction.

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Enhancing Alliance Collective Security. Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance A Report by NATO’s Defence Planning Committee (NATO: Brussels, 1988), i.

On the other hand, if the threat is instability, then leaving the region to cope with its many problems alone might work against the desires of the West. The Yugoslav crisis indicates that the West does have a vested interest in maintaining the peace of not only its territory, but also that of the neighboring area. In this case, the fact that the applicants may not immediately be able to pull their "fair share" is perhaps not as important as the fact that they are willing to try, and that by enlarging, the Alliance might solve one of the recurring problems of the Continent. Enlargement would also help balance Germany. As Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee put it,

East-Central Europe's democrats well understand that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic, and military community. The West, too, previously understood this link -- as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. [...] Similarly, NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. Those who insist that democratic credentials must be presented to alliance membership should remember that the need for a stable security framework is greatest when democracy is most fragile and threatened.¹²²

Even if one accepts the fact that the situation has changed since the time Spain joined NATO, it is difficult to say that current debates about which countries to allow into the Alliance and in what order, are unprejudiced: some of these debates are based on perceptions that do not entirely reflect reality. These perceptions, in turn, have been fueled by a range of factors. Most common among them is the belief that not only would enlargement be costly to the current membership, but it would also harm the Alliance's

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Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), 35-36.

capabilities and lead to more frequent disagreements. Often, those against early enlargement stress that unanimous decisionmaking would become increasingly difficult. It is perhaps so -- but NATO learned to live with such consequences in the past. In a strictly statistical sense, enlargement from twelve to sixteen members was more significant than enlargement from sixteen to perhaps twenty.

A. COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE "STUDY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT"

Hungary's bid for membership of NATO and the EU is not driven just by security perceptions, it's a part of a modernization policy based on shared values with Western democracies.
- Paul Beaver¹²³

As an applicant for NATO membership, Hungary represents a certain natural middle ground among the other candidates. Its population, now 10.2 million, is about a fourth of Poland's, but still more than double of Slovakia's. Its territory, 93,030 sq. kms, also ranks middle among the extremes of the region.¹²⁴ Its resources are moderate, with the exception

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Paul Beaver, "The JANE's Interview" (with Hungarian Deputy State Secretary for International Affairs Tibor Toth), Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 6 (7 February 1996), 32.

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András Inotai, "Die Visegrád-Länder: Eine Zwischenbilanz", Europäische Rundschau 22, no. 1 (Winter 1994), 59-60. Poland's population (appr. 39 million) is roughly four times the size of Hungary. Regarding the GDP and per capita GDP, different publications list different amounts. According to Inotai, at \$3,447/cap., Hungarian GDP ranked first among the Visegrád four in 1992, with Czechoslovakia following at \$2,544/capita. Another estimate from 1995 says that Czech per capita GDP in 1995 was \$6,750, whereas Hungarian (the second highest in Eastern Europe), \$6,080. According to the same publication Polish per capita GDP ranks third, with \$4,500. See: Nations in Transit. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (Freedom House, Inc., 1995), 44, 64, and 102.

of a well-educated, innovative population. Although it is not contiguous with present NATO territory, neither does it have a common border with Russia, its neighbors including Austria to the west, Slovakia to the north, the Ukraine to the northwest, Romania to the east, the former Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia), Croatia, and Slovenia to the south. With the exception of neutral Ukraine and Romania, all of its neighbors are smaller than Hungary itself.

The reforms Hungary has gone through since the system change of 1989 have not been easy, and they are far from complete.¹²⁵ However, sufficient time has passed so that it is now possible to evaluate some of these processes, often simply referred to as “democratization”. The above characteristics make it fairly easy to use Hungary as the proverbial “veterinarian’s horse”, in an attempt to establish how far along this area might be on its way to fulfilling membership requirements in the Alliance. It is all the more important because these observations might prove useful in dispensing with some of the commonly raised objections against Hungary’s acceptance into NATO. In the following pages, the four requirements established by the “Study on NATO Enlargement” will be assessed in order to establish whether Hungary is really ready for enlargement or, whether the sceptics are right, and the whole process should be drawn out.

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I. Gyarmati, a high-ranking Hungarian official put it in similar terms, “Nach den freien Wahlen in Ungarn im Frühjahr 1990 war die neue Regierung mit schwer zu lösenden Aufgaben konfrontiert. Sie mußte die größte Herausforderung vielleicht aller Zeiten bestehen, das Land und das Volk nach vielen Jahren totalitärer Regimes in die Freiheit, Demokratie, und Marktwirtschaft zu führen.” István Gyarmati, “Ungarns Sicherheitspolitik nach der ‘Wende’”, Europäische Rundschau 22, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 93.

1. Acceptance of OSCE Norms and Principles

Hungary is widely regarded as perhaps the most compliant among the countries of the region regarding the observance of political freedoms, international law and norms of behavior, as demands the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The country is now in the middle of the second term of government since the first free elections of 1990. The U.S. Department of State's 1995 report on human rights, while listing the fact that the government still controls most of the radio and television channels, nevertheless comments on the independence of the written media, and establishes that Hungary is a working parliamentary democracy.¹²⁶

A recent Freedom House publication, similarly, stresses the importance of the changes in the Hungarian political process and civil society. When measured on a 1-to-7 scale (1= totally free, 7= not free), political rights in Hungary were given a rating of 1, civilian liberties, a 2, in 1995.¹²⁷ As Table 1 shows, there has been a consistent improvement in both areas since the system change in 1989-1990.

¹²⁶

"Az euro-atlanti integráció egy hónapja (1996. március)", Hírlevél no. 11, 5 April 1996 (<http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/news11.htm>).

¹²⁷

Nations in Transit. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, *ibid.*, 64-69.

	1988-1989	1989-1990	1990-1991	1991-1992	1992-1993	1993-1994	1994-1995
Political Rights (PR)	5	4	2	2	2	1	1
Civil Liberties (CL)	4	3	2	2	2	2	2
Status (S)	partly free	partly free	free	free	free	free	free

Table 1. Freedom House Ratings - Hungary

Hungary's achievement ranks on the same level as the Czech Republic's {PR=1, CL= 2, S=free} in 1995, and precedes all other countries of East Central Europe and the former Soviet republics. Poland's rating in 1995 was {2, 2, free}, Slovakia's, {2, 3, free}, in sharp contrast with the abysmal ratings some of the Newly Independent States generated (Kazakhstan, e.g., "achieved" a {6, 5, not free}, Azerbaijan, a {6, 6, not free}, while Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were both given the worst possible evaluation {7, 7, not free}). In the same year, the Russian Federation was given a less-than-respectable score, {4, 5, partly free}.¹²⁸

One of the most serious arguments against Hungarian membership has been the problem associated with the fairly large Hungarian minorities in the surrounding countries. This, however, may not be the correct approach. In a recent article Karsten Voigt stressed that

¹²⁸

See: *ibid.*

a wait-and-see attitude could invite the very instabilities that membership of NATO could alleviate. The prospect of membership has already proved an important spur to resolving national differences, as for example in the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty.¹²⁹

Actually, Hungary has attempted to negotiate bilateral "basic treaties" designed to maintain good neighborly relations with most of the surrounding countries. Today, such treaties exist with Ukraine, Slovakia, and Slovenia. With Austria, no such treaty was negotiated since the nature of relations between the two countries did not change, and the bilateral relationship has been cordial for a long time. Croatian ratification of such a treaty is imminent. Romania has announced that its national interests for the present dictate that it does not sign the treaty, although negotiations have reached an advanced phase.¹³⁰ Due to the Yugoslav breakup, until recently no diplomatic relationship has been established with Serbia. Undoubtedly, once a more relaxed atmosphere materializes, talks will begin.¹³¹

In accordance with European Union requirements, the treaties include similar formulae regarding mutual treatment of ethnic minorities. Thus, the potential for ethnic conflict among future members, or between future members and states bordering on them,

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Karsten Voigt, "NATO Enlargement: sustaining the motion", NATO Review 1996/2, 15.

130

Peter Bale, "NATO's Solana tries to reassure Romania", Reuters World Service, 3 May 1996 (Lexis-Nexis: NEWS/CURNWS).

131

Jan Krcmar, "Slovakia soothes Hungary, Western fears on treaty", Reuters World Service, 9 May 1996 (Lexis-Nexis:NEWS/TOPNWS). See also, "Magyarország és a NATO kapcsolata az elmúlt 12 hónapban", Hírlevél no. 2, 8 February 1996 (<http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/news2.htm>).

has effectively diminished.¹³² This has come about despite widely held notions regarding the irreconcilability of interests in this area.

Two additional comments about the minority issue need be raised. First of all, Hungary never officially voiced irredentist claims regarding the territories taken from it in the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920. Says Charles Dick,

There is now a large, though not universal, consensus which accepts that Trianon, as restored and modified by the Paris Treaty of 1947, is, despite its perceived injustices, irreversible. Of course, reconciliation to existing frontiers does not imply indifference to the fate of Hungarian minorities abroad.¹³³

As long as the requirements set forth by the current treaties are observed, Hungary has no grounds for complaint, much less to initiate any conflict.¹³⁴ Even without the protection provided by such a treaty, Hungary did not start an armed confrontation with Serbia, although some suggested that in view of the Serbian treatment of the Hungarian minority during the new Balkan conflict, such action would have been justifiable. Instead, Hungary constrained itself to purely diplomatic efforts, complying with the norms set forth

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This comment is made regarding the Hungarian Republic. Whether the other potential members have made similar arrangements (excepting Slovakia, since it is party to the treaty with Hungary), is not known by the Author.

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Charles Dick, "Hungary's Security Policy", Jane's Intelligence Review 6, no. 7 (July 1994), 310.

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Incidentally, the issue has not been raised that Hungarian maltreatment of its own minorities might result in intervention from neighboring countries. Two reasons for this come to mind: (1) the ethnic homogeneity of Hungary and (2) the admittedly good treatment of its minorities. See: Nations in Transit. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, *ibid*, 64.

by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.¹³⁵ Often since, Hungarian caution has been seen as a source of unreliability. It is important to note, however, that no NATO guarantees were given at the time, and that the country certainly could not afford to endanger the Hungarian minority in Serbia.¹³⁶ Due to a recent decision, Hungarian troops now participate in the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia, reflecting "Hungary's interest in peace for Bosnia as well as a long-standing policy to support a peaceful settlement of the conflict."¹³⁷

Conflicts are, of course, not unknown in the region. It is wise to remember, however, that while the Warsaw Treaty Organization was said to prevent such intra-alliance disputes, even without the Soviet Union's interference, these countries, at least the Visegrad four, have managed to maintain a peaceful attitude in the settlement of ethnic issues. The fact that they have steered clear from such conflicts should also signal to NATO that such concerns may be exaggerated. This should positively influence Western thinking -- but has failed to make an impression so far.

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As Jane's Intelligence Review establishes, "[T]he country is not merely a disinterested spectator of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Hungary is particularly concerned about the treatment of some 300,000 ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina in northern Serbia. To date, the leadership has been keen to avoid exacerbating tensions between Budapest and Belgrade.", Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 4. (1 April 1996), 148.

136

Ibid., 148.

137

Stephane Lefebvre, "Hungarian participation in IFOR", Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 2 (1 February 1996), 57.

2. Economic and Social Stability

Although the study establishes that selection of new NATO members will be granted individually, in keeping with the above statement, it is worth stressing the potential importance of the Visegrad countries to Europe. The four (Poland, the Czech and the Slovak Republics, and Hungary), constitute an area roughly the same size as France, with a population of close to 65 million (bigger than that of France, smaller than Germany's).¹³⁸ It is hard to dismiss the significance of a market this size -- particularly if the expectations regarding the future growth in the region materialize.

In the years since 1989 Hungary has gone through an extensive economic transformation. The command economy as a whole has almost totally been dismantled, and the foundations of a genuine market economy have been laid. Current economic achievements include:

- the creation of the first stock exchange in Eastern Europe (in 1988);
- the privatization (often: reprivatization) of state property. Today, 80 percent of all property is in private hands, including over 90 percent of agricultural lands. Approximately 97 percent of housing is either private or in the hands of municipalities. Up to 65 percent of industry, and over 70 percent of business and services are also in private hands. The amended constitution guarantees the inviolability of private property,¹³⁹
- the restructuring of the economy;
- introduction of Hungarian bonds and company stocks to foreign exchanges;
- associate membership in the European Union (1994);
- export-import liberalization (completed in 1995);

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András Inotai, *ibid.*, 60.

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Nations in Transit. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, *ibid.*, 69.

- harmonization of laws and economic regulation with those in the EU as part of requirements in connection with application for full membership;
- foreign investment in Hungary today is over \$10 bn, highest in the entire region, higher than investment volume in Russia
- the curbing of inflation (from approximatel 33.4 percent in 1990 to 21.2 percent in 1994) .¹⁴⁰

1996's achievements so far have been:

- the creation of full convertibility for the Hungarian currency, the Forint (during the spring), followed by a further decrease in the expected rate of inflation and the decision of the Hungarian National Bank to lower its basic interest rates;
- gaining membership in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (in May).¹⁴¹

These steps were not easy, since out of necessity they have been conducted in an atmosphere of economic crisis. This was due to several factors. First of all, the global economy was experiencing difficulties. Second, due to inherent systemic problems, the economy of Hungary (and of the other CMEA members¹⁴²) was in an even deeper decline. It was also severely affected by the Yugoslav crisis and, more particularly, by the trade sanctions and the effective stopping of traffic on the Danube.¹⁴³ Furthermore, shortly after

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See: Hungary. Structural Reforms for Sustainable Growth (The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1995).

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(No byline) "Poland Sees OECD Membership in September", Reuter European Business Report, 13 May 1996.

¹⁴²

CMEA = Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the East's former trading bloc until 1991. It was characterized by set quotas and prices, and a measure of cooperation prompted by Soviet needs to provide for the "war economy".

¹⁴³

Hungary. Structural Reforms for Sustainable Growth, *ibid.*, 2.

the system change, in a region-wide frenzy for West European approval, these states drastically reduced trade with one another in favor of better Western goods -- an action that proved to be a huge shock to their underdeveloped productive capabilities. Unfortunately, attitudes within the EU have contributed to the region's (and Hungary's) difficulties. Says Brigitte Sauerwein,

The European Union (EU) maintains restrictions on certain "sensitive" imports (for example steel, cement and textiles) from ECE countries on the grounds of "fair trade", a far protectionist cry from free trade.¹⁴⁴

The Hungarian economy today seems to be on the mend, as its membership in the OECD proves. The national debt burden is still high (currently at \$28 bn, the World Bank study says), nevertheless in 1996 economic growth in the range of two percent is expected. Of course, it is meager compensation for six years of economic decline, but, if it can be maintained, this trend might turn the economy around. A range of co-operation agreements with Western companies has been concluded, aiding modernization. The fact that Western investment in the region is highest in Hungary also underlines the trust investors have in the recovery of the country.¹⁴⁵ Thus, the basic requirements for a genuine, working market economy have been laid down. While it is not as strong as its Western counterparts, it is on its way to becoming a reliable, if not yet first-rank, economy, able to satisfy NATO's

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Brigitte Sauerwein, "Focus on East-Central Europe", International Defense Review Special Report no. 2 (1994), 3.

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(Editorial) "Deal Diplomacy", Budapest Business Journal, 28 July 1995

membership requirements. This transformation also signals the existence of shared values, so important according to the "Study on NATO Enlargement."

Although the reforms laid down the foundations of the market economy, they have been costly regarding social stability. While unemployment levels do not resemble those in Russia, Hungarians, too, find it difficult to accept that the days of "goulash Communism" (i.e., the "golden era") are over. Nevertheless, social problems have not resulted in any large-scale desire to "turn back the clock". While the ruling coalition is led by the Hungarian Socialist Party, its policies are aimed at general liberalization and at balancing the state budget in a decidedly conservative manner.

3. Establishment of Democratic and Civilian Control over the Military

The problem of democratic control is a serious one, all the more so because there is no single standard within the Alliance today as to what constitutes an effective civilian and democratic control of the military. The qualifying word "democratic" is needed to differentiate between a dictatorial-type civilian control (e.g., one person or, as in the case of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, one party, independent of the military, decides on its mission) and one that rests on some countrywide consensus. Says Karsten Voigt,

The expression "democratic control" is widely understood as meaning that armed forces are clearly subordinate and accountable to democratically elected authorities and that they do not constitute an autonomous entity capable of exercising excessive influence over policy.¹⁴⁶

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Karsten Voigt, *ibid.*, 18.

In the case of Hungary, a number of measures have been taken since 1989 to create an effective, democratic control over the military, although not all resulted in practical solutions. Often, financial difficulties have undercut good intentions, at other times, the sheer inexperience of those responsible or institutional factors have blocked progress.

During the negotiations on the system change in 1989, already the question of de-politicizing the military came up. Today, Subsection (2) of Section (1) of the Act on National Defence says, "The armed forces shall, in peace and war alike, be under continuous civilian control."¹⁴⁷ The revised Constitution of 1989 signalled the beginnings of a system of civilian control. It delineated the tasks of the National Assembly, the president, the government, and the minister of defense in peacetime, in various crises, and in war. In peace, the civilian minister of defense is responsible for the everyday running of the military, with guidance provided by parliament (expressed in laws and recommendations by the National Defense Committee) and the chief of staff. In crises, parliament decides about the necessary steps to be taken, with a two-thirds majority needed to declare war or a state of emergency. In such a case, parliament, or its National Defense Council, is to conduct a continuous session. The president, who is nominally the commander-in-chief of the military, exercises various functions. These include the inspection and sanctioning of laws in peace; in crisis, if the immediate assembly of parliament for some reason is impossible, the president announces the state of emergency

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Quote from: Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, National Defence '95 (Ministry of Defence: Budapest, 1995), 9.

(or war) and forms the Council of Defense.¹⁴⁸ In such a case, the president is also responsible for the initiation of the emergency measures otherwise assigned to parliament. The Council of Defense includes the president, the head of parliament, the section leaders in parliament, the prime minister and the ministers, the commander of the armed forces, and the chief of staff.¹⁴⁹

Together with the issue of democratic control comes the need to democratize the military itself. Examining the situation in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, Dale Herspring contends that it is a two-stage process. In the first stage, those individuals and structures most supporting the old system must be removed and the primacy of the Communist Party eliminated. In the second stage, the transition from a non-democratic to a democratic military must be made. Presently, these countries are in various stages of this process. The biggest difficulty they have had to cope with is the fact that total destruction of the old military structures, due to a lack of alternatives, would have threatened to undermine national security.¹⁵⁰

The first stage was completed some time ago in Hungary. Many officers who could not condone the changes retired. Early retirement was offered to some, others reached the age limit, still others found occupation in the civilian sphere. Communist Party

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See: "A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya", <http://mkogy.hu/alkotmany/alkot.htm>, Section II., §19, §19/A, B, C, D, and E.

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In the near future, the last two positions are to be integrated into one.

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Dale Herspring, "'Refolution' in Eastern Europe: The Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian Militaries", *European Security* 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994), 665.

membership, as it had been almost compulsory previously, was not to become a dividing line, but the present Act on National Defence does not allow professional members of the military membership in political parties, thereby effectively providing for the neutrality of the armed forces. The same act also laid down the foundations of religious freedom and practice of religion within the military.

The reduction of the size of the military and the associated civilian infrastructure, as shown in Table 2, is a result of four factors: (1) the recognition that with the end of the Cold War, the creation of a smaller, "streamlined" military is now possible and, from the point of the civilian economy and the state budget, desirable; (2) the change in the military doctrine. Warsaw Pact plans foresaw extensive counterattack operations. With the dismantling of the organization, Hungary could create a military doctrine to provide exclusively for the Hungarian national interest. Its defensive character allowed for further reductions in the military. (3) Technology and the new international environment require the existence of a voluntary (professional) force rather than a conscription-based one. (4) Financial strains necessitated strict economizing within the armed forces. Its consequences were spontaneous and forced reductions. The former have been the result of the military's inability to keep up with wages in the civilian sphere. Institutional reductions have followed partly from the military doctrine, and from the series of reforms within the military aimed at the creation of a more effective and stringent organization. This latter aspect, however, has created additional difficulties. For example, the departure of young and middle-aged officers has left the military with an acute problem of succession in

leadership. The morale of those who remained is low, particularly because some 40 percent of them live below the officially recognized poverty level.¹⁵¹

Table 2 below also shows the significant decrease in all categories of personnel. From 1989 to 1996, the number of officers has decreased by approximately 33 percent, that of NCO's, 26 percent. The 60 percent decrease in conscripts' numbers has been a consequence of three factors. First, a reduction in conscription terms (from eighteen to twelve, and, in 1995, to ten months); (2) the introduction of the concept of "conscientious objection" and the possibility to elect civilian instead of military service,¹⁵² and (3) the general reduction in the number of youth in the requisite age groups, a consequence of demographic trends. The number of civilian employees has effectively halved (51 percent decrease). Taking the four categories as a whole, the Hungarian military has gone through a radical 52 percent "half-sizing".

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Lajos Héthy, János Szabó, and György Ungvár, Difficulties of defense conversion in Central and Eastern Europe and the situation in Hungary. A report to the Hungarian DoD, (Budapest, 1992), 18.

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In 1994, 1,500 persons elected civilian service, while the number of those refusing to perform any service was 200. "A League of Persons Opposed to Compulsory Military Service has also been established in Hungary; it recommends the termination of compulsory service, and a transition to a volunteer armed force within a short period of time..." Dr. Károly Csabai and Dr. Lajos Móricz, "Toward a Volunteer Armed Force", Új Honvédségi Szemle no. 5 (May 1995), (FBIS-EEU-95-143), 2.

	Officers	NCOs	Conscripts	Civilian Employees	Total
1989	17,800	12,700	91,900	33,300	155,700
1990	17,300	12,400	81,000	32,500	143,200
1991	16,800	11,900	65,300	27,600	121,600
1992	14,400	8,500	51,100	26,000	100,000
1993	13,700	8,300	52,340	25,660	100,000
1994	13,100	9,000	51,640	24,060	97,800
1995	13,308	9,603	46,350	23,900	93,155
1996 (Projected)	11,983	9,433	36,718	16,329	74,463




Table 2. Downsizing in the Hungarian Military, 1989-1996¹⁵³

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Republic of Hungary Ministry of Defence, *National Defence '95*, *ibid.*, 13. 1996 data: "A Honvédség Költségvetési Létszámának Alakulása" (Magyar Honvédség, 1996).

During the debates about the democratization of the Hungarian military, the question of the transformation from a conscription-based to a volunteer military force has emerged. At present, this option is hampered by the financial situation of the country. Although many say that such a force would better embody democratic values, even advocates predict its establishment could not take place before 2010-2015.¹⁵⁴

To aid the better adjustment of the remaining personnel to democratic civilian control, the system of military education has been significantly changed. The length of education in military colleges has been extended from three years to four, with topics revised to suit the altered circumstances and the needs of a modern, democratic military. For the first time, females can now enter the military through the military colleges, although their choices are less extensive (e.g., they cannot participate in combat training). Additionally, having had many officers trained in the Soviet Union, the need to “familiarize Hungarian officers with how a military officer functions in a democratic society”¹⁵⁵ has emerged. For this reason, courses offered in Western training centers and educational institutions are now eagerly accepted. An international Military Language

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The recent study places the per soldier annual defense appropriation in Hungary at \$6,600. When compared to the leading European nations' \$50-100,000 average, it is a meager amount, indeed. Even Ireland does much better with its \$42,000 per soldier amount. The authors estimate that such a shift could be made on a defense budget two to four times the size of the current. Dr. Károly Csabai and Dr. Lajos Móricz, *ibid.*, 4.

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Dale Herspring, *ibid.*, 684.

Training Centre was also set up to help officers from the region learn to communicate with other Partners and NATO members.¹⁵⁶

All in all, significant steps have been taken to promote the creation of a democratic, civilian-controlled military in Hungary.¹⁵⁷ In the immediate future, further clarification of tasks among the defense minister, parliament, and the president is needed. Much of this depends on the sequencing of work on the new constitution. Many facets of democratic civilian control, however, will require a longer period to take root -- not only because they involve extensive retraining within the military, but also because the population, too, has to accept, and adjust to, these changes.

4. Acceptance of Existing NATO Policies and Doctrines, Adjustment to Military Requirements Inside NATO

NATO needs to be careful about appearing to develop a double standard, with different or tougher requirements for new democracies of the East.
- James W. Morrison¹⁵⁸

As the "Study on NATO Enlargement" specifies, members-to-be "must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits, and burdens of common security and

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"Press Briefing on NATO, Solana Visit" (Magyar Köztársaság Külügyminisztériuma: Sajtótájékoztató no. 66, April 1996), 1.

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Some of these changes have already borne fruit. When in 1991 the Antall government contemplated the use of the military against the so-called "taxi-drivers' blockade," a week of civilian disobedience against the government's policies, the military leadership refused to participate. Seen in this light, Gerhard Wettig's concern that "There has already been an attempt to overthrow the new political order through an alleged taxidrivers' rebellion," is unfounded. See: Gerhard Wettig, *ibid.*, 476.

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James W. Morrison, *ibid.*, 127.

collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and refined in subsequent Ministerial statements.”¹⁵⁹ The most important objectives include: “coordination of multinational force formations, interoperability of military equipment, maintenance of effective communications among different military forces, and overall quality of military forces.”¹⁶⁰ These tasks require extensive harmonization of applicants’ aims and military doctrines with those of NATO, and are not likely to work well unless practiced. Present exercises in the Partnership for Peace Programme and participation in various peacekeeping operations may remedy this situation. Additionally, to be able to share the burdens arising in the Alliance, the economic and military capabilities of the applicants must be brought closer to acceptable NATO levels.

Eastward enlargement in itself may contribute to European security in two forms. In a “negative” way, it could deny control over this territory to a potential aggressor. There are, however, “positive” potentials in enlargements, e.g., the possibility of widening the zone of stability and democracy in Europe. Even in a military sense these countries can be more than a liability. A recent RAND analysis suggests that in terms of NATO’s declared

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“Study on NATO Enlargement”, *ibid.*, 25.

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W. Bruce Weinrod, “NATO Expansion: Myths and Realities”, *Heritage Foundation Reports*, 1 March 1996, p. 4.

new missions, the Visegrad four might have a significant role in future NATO missions because the crisis potential is most acute in those areas where their expertise is greatest.¹⁶¹

The analysis mentions three “comparative advantages” on the Eastern European side: (1) a crisis in Europe or in the territory of the former Soviet Union would probably include Slavic peoples, or at least peoples who can speak a Slavic language. The linguistic abilities of these countries would, in such a scenario, significantly enhance the chances of success. (Although Hungarians are not Slavic, many officers in the military still speak Russian.) (2) Such a crisis (even in more distant corners of the world) would also potentially involve militaries partially equipped with Soviet or Warsaw Pact weaponry, even whole militaries trained by one or other WTO-member’s military experts. In this case, war plans, doctrines, even logistical problems may easier be decoded and analyzed by Eastern Europeans than for other NATO members. (3) The reformed ground forces in the Visegrad countries already conform to the rapid-reaction structure approved in NATO.¹⁶²

a. The Politics of Membership and Co-operation Experiences

On the policy-making level, the need to co-operate with, and achieve membership in, NATO is widely accepted in Hungary. A referendum about NATO membership is scheduled to take place in 1996, not because its final result could be contrary to expectations, but largely to symbolize that there is a wide consensus on this

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Thomas S. Szayna, Central European Defense Industries and NATO Enlargement. Issues for U.S. Policy (RAND MR-717.0-RC, January 1996), 9-14.

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Thomas S. Szayna, *ibid.*, 9-14.

issue. The present ruling coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats, who together control more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, wants to avoid accusations that these two parties would decide matters of national importance between themselves, rather than bend to the popular will. Thus, when Morrison assumes that the referendum means that "there is sufficient desire to defer NATO membership" in Hungary, he misunderstands the domestic political agenda of the country. In fact, president Árpád Göncz predicted that some 70-75 percent of the population would vote for membership in the Alliance.¹⁶³

A further question in the political arena is whether Hungary, if such need arose, would accept the stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil. The new military doctrine states that Hungary would neither possess weapons of mass destruction, nor would it allow any foreign power to deploy or transport such weapons on the country's territory.¹⁶⁴ While this is certainly a limitation for NATO, experts in the East and in the West have stressed that presently, this may not be the key to enlargement. Karsten Voigt stated that "the requirement for NATO to station forces and nuclear weapons on the territory of certain member states has lost its importance; there is no need, therefore, for NATO to deploy such forces on the territory of new members."¹⁶⁵ Defense minister György Keleti in an

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James W. Morrison, *ibid.*, 84.

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Charles Dick, *ibid.*, 1.

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Karsten Voigt, *ibid.*, 16. Ferenc Somogyi, administrative state secretary at the Foreign Ministry, also note that the "Study on NATO Enlargement" does not stipulate the stationing of nuclear weapons as a requirement for membership. See: "Press Briefing on NATO, Solana Visit", *ibid.*, 1.

interview said that while the question whether Hungary would allow nuclear weapons on its soil was still an open one, it would be easier for Russia to accept NATO enlargement if it did not involve nuclear weapons on the territory of former Warsaw Pact members.¹⁶⁶

Willingness to co-operate with NATO has become much more evident in the past year. The process took off slowly, with Hungary emerging from being merely a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, to member of the Council of Europe, associate partner in the WEU, member of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, to gaining associate status to the European Union, and, in 1994, to becoming a signatory to, and participant in, the Partnership for Peace Programme.¹⁶⁷

The 1993 “Basic Principles of National Defense in the Republic of Hungary” announced that the Hungarian military “shall have forces with which to engage in the peacekeeping and peacemaking activities of the UN and other international crisis management organizations.”¹⁶⁸ Since the end of 1994, a fully trained company, capable of carrying out conventional peacekeeping tasks, has been at Hungary’s disposal. While in the past, peacekeeping responsibilities accepted by Hungary mostly involved observers only, presently, a Hungarian contingent of engineers within IFOR helps build roads and bridges, and neutralize mines in Bosnia. Also, a further contingent of approximately 500

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Duncan Shiels, “No NATO nukes deal could placate Russia, Hungary”, Reuters World Service, 6 May 1996 (Lexis-Nexis: NEWS/TOPNWS).

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See: James W. Morrison, *ibid.*, Appendix B, 133. Also: Jeffrey Simon, *ibid.*, 55.

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National Defence '95, *ibid.*, 18.

soldiers is to be sent for regular peacekeeping tasks in the near future. Within this framework, the temporary stationing of American troops on Hungarian soil was accepted in December 1995. NATO's IFOR also has the right to use Hungarian airports and airspace, as well as accomplish logistics functions. In November 1996, the Hungarian parliament ratified the "Status of Forces Agreement" with the United States of America.¹⁶⁹

Says Lefebvre,

Hungary's participation in implementing the Dayton agreement is one of the country's main tests if it is to gain NATO membership. [...] Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs declared that the decision was "a goodwill message which shows the commitment of Hungary to co-operate with NATO".¹⁷⁰

Naturally, joint operations and temporary stationing of troops on Hungarian soil not only signal Hungary's desire to do almost anything necessary for its NATO membership, but they also mean that the country, when deemed necessary, is willing to go "out-of-area". Previously, some experts criticized Hungary for its lack of participation in some Partnership for Peace exercises (especially the first one, held in Poland -- although what exactly Hungary could have contributed to a naval exercise is doubtful). Since then, however, Hungary has participated in a number of Partnership for Peace exercises, and even hosted several of them.

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"Az IFOR Hadművelet és Magyarország", Hirlevél no 1, 30 January 1996, p. 1.
([Http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/news1.htm](http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/news1.htm))

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Stephane Lefebvre, *ibid.*, 57-58.

On occasion, the government itself had been instrumental in bringing about such accusations, e.g., by not allowing AWACS overflights in 1993. However, it must also be remembered that at the time, no NATO guarantees were forthcoming, and the leadership was quite anxious about the Hungarian minority's fate in Serbia. That these difficulties have been overcome is signalled by the level of present Hungarian participation in NATO's Bosnia mission.¹⁷¹

b. Economic and military capabilities, equipment modernization issues

As a test of its capabilities, present Hungarian economic indicators will be compared with some of the major capability indicators within NATO as they existed at the time of previous enlargements, and also with current ones.¹⁷² Table 3 below shows that in this area, there is urgent need for adjustment.

In view of the further reductions that have taken place in Hungary since 1993-1994, Hungary is facing a difficult dilemma: financially, it cannot afford to spend more on its defense, politically, its membership aspirations necessitate to do so.

Table 3 shows that Hungary is lagging behind in the financial indicators (although it still has more than twice the size of Turkish per capita GDP), and has an

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See: Brigitte Sauerwein, *ibid.*

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Table 3 compiled from: (1) Columns (B1)--(E): Secretary of Defense William Perry, Toward a New Partnership in Responsibility Sharing (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1995); (2) Columns (F) -- (G): The Military Balance 1994-1995 (IISS: London, 1995); (3) Hungarian data: Nations in Transit, *ibid.*, 64, The Military Balance 1994-1995, *ibid.*, National Defence '95, *ibid.*, 13., Hungary. Structural Reforms for Sustainable Growth, *ibid.*

average achievement regarding personnel-related indicators. The latter, however, might be misleading because, since 1993, further downsizing reduced personnel levels even more, thereby lessening capabilities.

On a different level, it is possible to see the Hungarian economic and military potential in a more favorable light. When compared to indicators taken from the period shortly after the first phase of previous enlargements had finished in 1955, the gap does not seem quite so threatening. While underachievement is usually explained by the relative inequality in burden-sharing between the USA and the other members, Tables 4 and 5 might show that there is no simple figure to describe potential.

As the tables indicate, it is difficult to establish any comparison. Members have diverged on occasion so much that even a general trend cannot be described. It is even more difficult to estimate the cost-benefit ratio individual members enjoy. While Table 5 shows an earlier stage in the life of the Alliance, surely, its data may still be relevant today. A sign of this controversy is that, since 1986, NATO has been applying the formula, "shared roles, risks, and responsibilities" when measuring members' contributions. As Table 5 demonstrates, the distribution of benefits from the Alliance has been just as unequal as that of burdens.

(A) Country	(B) GDP		(C) Defense Expenditure			(D) Active Duty Military and Civilian Pers. (000)	(E) % of Labor Force	(F) Estimated Reserve (000)	(G) Para-military (000)
	(B1) total, \$ bn	(B2) \$ per cap.	(C1) \$ mn	(C2) \$/cap.	(C3) % of GDP				
Belgium	211	20,903	3,800	376	1.8	75	1.8	228.8	n.a.
Canada	552	19,003	10,300	355	1.9	110	0.8	37.2	n.a.
Denmark	136	26,247	2,700	521	2.0	37	1.3	70	n.a.
France	1,254	21,722	42,600	738	3.4	614	2.5	339.8	91.8
Germany	1,911	23,510	36,700	451	1.9	584	1.6	442.7	24.1
Greece	73	7,014	4,100	394	5.6	238	5.8	406.0	26.5
Iceland	6.6	16,400	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.13
Italy	993	17,426	20,600	361	2.1	502	2.2	584.0	111.8
Luxembourg	10	25,633	100	256	1.0	1	0.7	n.a.	0.56
Netherlands	309	20,226	7,100	465	2.3	109	1.5	130.6	3.6
Norway	103	24,005	3,200	746	3.1	38	1.8	282.0	n.a.
Portugal	75	7,558	2,200	222	2.9	79	1.7	210	49.8
Spain	479	12,221	8,300	212	1.7	249	1.6	498.0	72
Turkey	163	2,693	7,100	117	4.3	755	3.5	952.3	70
UK	946	16,303	34,100	588	3.6	406	1.5	376.2	3.0
USA	6,348	24,612	297,600	1,154	4.7	2,760	2.1	1,839.4	68.0
Hungary	62	6,080	702	68	0.9	100	2.5	192.0	22.3

Table 3. Defense Expenditure and Military Manpower in NATO and in Hungary, 1993

Member	1960		1975		1993	
	GNP	D/GNP	GNP	D/GNP	GDP	D/GDP
USA	1	1	1	3	1	2
FRG	2	7	2	6	2	11
UK	3	3	4	4	5	4
France	4	2	3	5	3	5
Italy	5	10	5	12	4	9
Canada	6	6	6	13	6	12
Netherlands	7	9	7	8	8	8
Belgium	8	11	8	10	9	13
Turkey	9	5	10	7	10	3
Denmark	10	13	9	11	11	10
Norway	11	12	11	9	12	6
Greece	12	4	12	2	14	1
Portugal	13	8	13	1	13	7
Luxembourg	14	14	14	14	15	15
Spain	-	-	-	-	7	14

Table 4. Ranking of NATO-members according to GNP (GDP) and D/GNP (D/GDP) in 1960, 1975, and 1993¹⁷³

The Federal Republic and Italy have consistently underachieved during the decades, yet in other respects they are said to have been shouldering their fair shares. On the other end of the spectrum, Greece and Turkey's overextension in D/GDP has started with the conflict over Cyprus (which undoubtedly contributes to their poor showing in

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* GNPs were converted to USD at current exchange rates, but at constant 1963 prices (except for Canada, Turkey and Spain, where constant 1961, 1968 and 1958 prices were used, respectively);
 ** Spain joined the alliance only later, therefore data about Spanish GNP and D/GNP are not presented in the first two instances; Iceland, on the other hand, has relied on the USA for her defence and that is why it is not included in the table. See: Gavin Kennedy, "An Economic Theory of Alliances: A Note", Discussion Paper 1978/2 (University of Strathclyde: Glasgow), 12-3 and Toward a New Partnership in Responsibility Sharing, *ibid.* Data from 1993 are based on Table 3.

terms of GDP and per capita GDP, as seen in Table 3). Meanwhile, Norway has significantly improved its score, whereas Canada moved from the middle ranks to the rear guard in terms of D/GDP.¹⁷³

Country	Defense Expenditure		Population		GNP		Border Length*		Average Share**	
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
Belgium	0.64	0.72	1.92	1.81	1.40	1.50	0.14	0.14	1.15	1.15
Canada	2.64	1.95	3.76	4.01	4.39	4.81	20.02	20.02	9.39	9.61
Denmark	0.33	0.35	0.96	0.93	0.86	0.90	2.23	2.23	1.35	1.35
France	6.34	5.67	9.59	9.55	7.18	8.22	4.44	4.44	7.07	7.40
FRG	5.38	5.92	11.64	11.41	10.29	10.94	2.75	2.75	8.23	8.37
Greece	0.26	0.45	1.75	1.65	0.42	0.58	5.84	5.84	2.67	2.69
Italy	2.06	2.40	10.54	10.10	4.75	5.36	9.09	9.09	8.13	8.18
Luxembourg	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.04
Netherlands	0.88	1.06	2.41	2.45	1.67	1.84	0.92	0.92	1.67	1.74
Norway	0.28	0.37	0.75	0.73	0.61	0.65	5.67	5.67	2.34	2.35
Portugal	0.20	0.42	1.86	1.64	0.30	0.36	1.50	1.50	1.22	1.17
Turkey	0.49	0.55	5.78	6.65	0.65	0.75	10.72	10.72	5.72	6.04
United Kingdom	7.25	5.60	11.04	10.45	8.15	7.05	9.27	9.27	9.49	8.92
USA	73.24	74.52	37.93	38.55	59.26	56.98	27.42	27.42	41.54	40.98
NATO Europe	24.12	23.53	58.31	57.44	36.35	38.21	52.56	52.56	49.07	49.40
North America	75.88	76.47	41.69	42.56	63.65	61.79	47.44	47.44	50.93	50.60

* Border length with "hostile" countries

** Average share from the benefits provided in the Alliance

Table 5. Relative Defense Burdens and Benefits in NATO in 1960 and 1970, %¹⁷⁴

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See: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1994), Section II.

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Todd Sandler and John F. Forbes, "Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO", Occasional Paper 1979/2 (University of Aberdeen, Dept. of Political Economy, 1979), 20-23.

Thus, the requirement that the new applicants should not become a burden to NATO due to their weakness in financial or military capabilities is somewhat inconsistent with Alliance practices. Furthermore, the West should recognize the difficulty in fulfilling both requirement #2 and #4 at the same time: to enhance defense spending at the moment would not only further endanger economic stability and potential growth, but it could lead to a scenario the Alliance wishes to avoid: (1) it might buttress the perception of a regional arms race, thereby destabilizing the region,¹⁷⁵ and (2) it could contribute to a Russian misinterpretation of the situation.

Equipment issues in Hungary are likewise controversial. Standardization and interoperability are key concerns within NATO -- not surprisingly, they are given an added importance in the case of applicants. A level of standardization and interoperability that does not exist as yet is needed to effectively co-operate with Allies and contribute to the common defense. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the problem, due largely to the financial situation of the applicants.

In the Hungarian military, two contradictory, but not illogical, processes have evolved during the past few years. First, recent weapons and equipment acquisitions have mainly come from former WTO arsenals. The reasons for this are manifold. In the case of the MIG-29 squadron (28 planes plus spare parts), it was the only satisfactory way Russia could clear its one billion-dollar debt toward Hungary.¹⁷⁶ With German unification,

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Duncan Shiels, "No NATO nukes deal could placate Russia, Hungary", *ibid.*

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Charles Hebbert, *ibid.*, also Brigitte Sauerwein, *ibid.*, 441.

Hungary could acquire fairly modern East German equipment free of cost (other than that of shipping). This helped to avoid further cannibalization of equipment within the Hungarian military, and also allowed for some upgrading, since the East German military was generally better equipped than was the Hungarian. A similar deal has recently been made with Belarus, in which case T-72 tanks, of which Belarus exceeds CFE limitations, are being brought into Hungary at five percent of their original price. The issue has been debated in parliament, but since the replacement of old and battered T-55 tanks is badly needed, there was ample evidence that the purchase would improve the military's capabilities. NATO did not raise any objections.¹⁷⁷ Additionally, the CFE Treaty limits inadvertently contributed to the modernization of the military by calling for the elimination of some of the most dated tanks.¹⁷⁸

Second, attempts are being made to acquire some Western polish as well. Plans to comply with this requirement in NATO have not been entirely abandoned. Parliament has given its approval to obtain price quotes from various foreign companies for thirty NATO-compatible fighter planes to replace the aging MIG-21s.¹⁷⁹ The options are many, since the billion-dollar deal has attracted the Lockheed, Saab, Dassault, and McDonnell Douglas/Northrop companies. The deal will be offered not necessarily to the cheapest

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(No byline) "Defence minister explains Russian tank deal, air force modernization", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts from Magyar Hírlap, 7 May 1996, p. 10. (Lexis-Nexis: NEWS/TOPNWS).

¹⁷⁸

See: Brigitte Sauerwein, "Focus on East-Central Europe", *ibid.*, 43.

¹⁷⁹

Ben Sullivan, "Defense Ministry looks into U.S. fighters", Budapest Business Journal, 12 February 1996, p. 16.

supplier, since what Hungary needs most is a lengthy payment schedule and the possibility of an offset agreement with the supplier or its country.¹⁸⁰ Other modernization attempts would involve financial resources not as yet available, although the United States has signalled its willingness to provide some financial assistance to the program.

B. CONCLUSION

[T]here will not always be smooth interaction between current NATO forces and those of newer members whose quality varies greatly at this point. After all, NATO's Cold War defense structure was developed over many years.
- W. Bruce Weinrod¹⁸¹

Various estimates of the costs of NATO expansion today exist. They range from between 10 to 50 or 20 to 50 billion dollars, to a maximum of between 60,6 to 124,7 billions.¹⁸² Not all of the expenses would be borne by the applicants, but even in the lower range, significant contributions must be made. All depends on how soon NATO's requirements for equitable burden-sharing and fair contributions will be implemented, and

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Duncan Shiels, "Hungary's Fighter Deal Almost Cleared for Take-off", Reuter Business Report, 12 May 1996 (Lexis-Nexis: NEWS/TOPNWS). Says Shiels, "Paul Beaver, analyst for Jane's Defence Weekly, discounts the F-18, which at \$40 million per plane, is twice the price of an F16 or Gripen. 'It's too expensive and too capable,' he said. 'The Hungarians don't need a strike fighter. In fact, it would breach their law which stipulates that it should operate defensively'."

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W. Bruce Weinrod, *ibid.*, 4.

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The first estimate is given by Richard L. Kugler. See: Richard L. Kugler, "Defense Program Requirements", in Jeffrey Simon, ed., *ibid.* The second estimate is that of Weinrod, in Bruce B. Weinrod, *ibid.*, the third, that of the American Congress, see: "Az euro-atlanti integráció egy hónapja (1996 április)", Hírlevél no. 16 (10 May 1996), 2. (<http://www.mkogy.hu/nato/news16.htm>.)

on the question of what the new members would be asked to contribute to the Alliance initially.¹⁸³ Kugler lists various options available to NATO as follows:

If the Alliance's goal is merely to configure ECE forces to defend themselves with NATO help only in the areas of C³I and logistics support, then the cost will be relatively low. If the alliance decides to supplement this commitment with sizable NATO combat forces through a purely power-projection strategy from Western Europe, the cost will rise. The cost will grow further if steps are taken to develop a military infrastructure in East Central Europe so that NATO combat forces can deploy there quickly.¹⁸⁴

Meanwhile, co-operation in other fronts continues. The government has allocated some Ft 310 million from the central budget to cover the costs of supplying the Hungarian IFOR contingent,¹⁸⁵ although more will be needed now that Hungary is sending another 500 troops into the region. The stationing of American troops on Hungarian soil has proven to be a good deal more effective in strengthening communication and understanding between NATO (and especially the American military) and Hungary than was expected. Says Michael Roddy,

Hungarians and Americans agree the ... cohabitation between a former east-bloc communist country and the world's only remaining superpower has been a success -- because this time the foreign troops were invited. [Logistics commander of the American forces Major General Wright said] "All of the land lines of communication, the roads, the railroads lead us to

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Karsten Voigt, *ibid.* Voigt also quotes the "Study on NATO Enlargement" as follows: "[N]ew members will be expected to take part in the full spectrum of Alliance missions to the extent appropriate to their capabilities." This he sees as a welcome sign of a realistic approach within the Alliance.

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Richard L. Kugler, *ibid.*, 191-192.

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Ben Sullivan, "Hungary chips in for Bosnia Peace Plan", Budapest Business Journal, 15 January 1996, p. 32.

this place... So the strategic value of Hungary [...] was absolutely essential for our success.”¹⁸⁶

As Chapter Four has shown, much more work than this has been done in Hungary to create a military that could satisfy the altered demands of the country. In all but the last requirement of the “Study on NATO Enlargement”, Hungary has already proven itself an ample candidate for membership, more so than was the case with previous enlargements.

Even on the fourth count, Hungary has launched a program of modernization which, while not assuring compatibility at the moment, will result in a more capable force, a force that, while not in the same rank as the more advanced NATO members’, might still be convincingly compared to second-tier Allies’. As Szayna believes,

The central European militaries come out even better than the Spanish and the Portuguese in a comparison of the quality of CFE-limited major weapons systems. Moreover, the central Europeans actually have the equipment, whereas the Iberians often do not.¹⁸⁷

In view of these arguments, perhaps it is time for the Alliance to announce additional requirements, if there are any. Hungary is obviously better prepared to deal with the problems of membership in NATO than were the previous four candidates, adequately fulfills three of the four criteria, and has been adamantly trying to cope with the fourth.

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Michael Roddy, “U.S. base in Hungary blazing post-Cold War trail”, Reuters World Service (11 May, 1996), 2. (Lexis-Nexis: NEWS/TOPNWS).

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Thomas S. Szayna, *ibid.*, 17.

V. TO BE OR NATO BE: ENLARGEMENT REVISITED

What NATO is doing in 1995 is thus part of a common understanding among the 16 Allies upon which they are already acting: an awareness that the continued, collective security of the North Atlantic Treaty nations also depends vitally on their helping to provide security for countries in a region stretching eastward beyond the old Cold War confrontation line.

- NATO Review¹⁸⁸

It is striking how much our world has changed since 1989. Then, with the Warsaw Treaty Organization still operational, NATO's eastward enlargement was unimaginable. After the final dismantling of the WTO, however, early demands to create an alternative security arrangement for Eastern Europe were voiced. These demands were partially prompted by such optimistic NATO documents as the Rome and London Declarations.¹⁸⁹ In the beginning, the Central and Eastern European states knew little beyond the desire to join the Alliance. Requirements were often swept aside by the observation that the West "owed it" to them, after having allowed the Soviet Union control over the region for 45 years.¹⁹⁰ Often, Central European politicians argued that had it not been for their pressure to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty Organization, or other such services, the Cold War might still be fought. As G. Wettig observes, "This argument basically

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"Enlargement: Part of a strategy for projecting stability into Central Europe", NATO Review, May 1995, p. 3.

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NATO Transformed: The London Declaration & The Alliance's New Strategic Concept. NATO Press Communique S-1(91)85, *ibid*.

¹⁹⁰

Gerhard Wettig, "Post-Soviet Central Europe in International Security", European Security 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), 476-7.

implied NATO's obligation to do whatever might be necessary for the protection of Central European countries."¹⁹¹

Since 1993, when the question was raised in earnest, many Western experts have sought to prove that NATO enlargement is dangerous, that it could only worsen the precarious situation in the Eastern part of the continent. Among them, Howard E. Fast opined that

The term "security vacuum" implies that, with Soviet forces gone from East Europe, something essential to the region's security has been removed and another powerful force will rush in to fill the space. One could begin to question the metaphor by challenging its pre-vacuum stage: Do the leaders of these states feel that their countries' security interests were "filled" [...] by the Warsaw Pact? Presumably not. [...] But [security] problems do not create a security vacuum.¹⁹²

Using his method of argument, however, one cannot help but wonder if a security vacuum, nevertheless, consists of security problems. Clearly, NATO must have felt so, thus, in September 1995 the "Study on NATO Enlargement" was created. To what extent present applicants are able to satisfy the criteria drawn up in the document is, of course, open to debate.

An early and insightful argument for these countries' usefulness was made by Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee in 1993. They said that since the Visegrád four are pro-American, their membership would enhance the Atlanticist orientation of the Alliance.

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Gerhard Wettig, *ibid.*, 473.

¹⁹²

Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security", *Orbis* 37, no. 1 (Winter 1993), 37-38.

Ultimately, instead of loosening the ties between Europe and the United States, the authors stressed, the enlargement could work for reaffirming commitment to NATO. Meanwhile, "NATO should create the preconditions for the eventual integration of these countries into the alliance by expanding defense cooperation".¹⁹³

There is something peculiar about the fact that there are still those who oppose enlargement *per se*. The influential Josef Joffe, for example, started his own field in political science by applying business concepts to his work. He says,

NATO finds itself in a position of a firm that, having been an exemplar of excellence for decades, suddenly faces a severe downward shift of the demand curve for its traditional wares. [...] Faced with an ailing cash cow, what does such a company do?¹⁹⁴

According to business theory, such a company may take one of the following four paths: 1) it may sell its remaining assets and close down shop altogether; 2) it may decide to downsize and accept the decline in demand; 3) it may decide to develop new products; 4) it may try to conquer new markets. Joffe suggests that while NATO has been valiantly trying to promote options #3 and #4, it has not been successful in either. He suggests that more attention should instead be given to option #2, downsizing. The problem with this attitude, however, is that downsizing is not a solution -- it is a temporary asylum for companies that cannot keep up with the market. Downsizing, if not followed by

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Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), 35-36.

¹⁹⁴

Josef Joffe, "Is There Life After Victory? What NATO Can and Cannot Do", The National Interest no. 41 (Fall 1995), 20.

rejuvenation, usually only lengthens the suffering of the company, and leads to the same ultimate result: shutdown. However, Joffe does not suggest the dismantling of NATO.

Joffe says that neither of the two positive options has been successful. But is that so? The concept of “new product” within NATO might well be the promotion and enhancement of regional stability, something NATO has been involved with ever since it decided to take matters in Bosnia in hand (even longer if the first post-Cold War declarations are counted). The cooperation with former WTO-members, resulting from the Partnership for Peace program, also signals that NATO has become more flexible, more ready to take on new missions.

The “out-of-area” issue seems to have led NATO to the idea of new markets. These new markets include the Central and East European countries -- who, for that matter, seem not to be too eager to turn to Russia, nor create NATO’s competition, which should at least signal Joffe that while NATO may not at present be the perfect solution, the alternatives are considered no better. Another source of demand is the United Nations. The organization has relied on NATO troops in a variety of situations.

It is strange that while Joffe supposedly wants to help the Alliance to adjust to the new situation, when it comes to real life, he derisively dismisses such “business”. He says, “by acting as ‘subcontractor’ to the UN, NATO has imposed on itself an absurd chain of command ... ergo, NATO cannot act”.¹⁹⁵ NATO has since proven that it can act.

¹⁹⁵

Ibid., 20.

Difficulties of the complex and untried cooperation aside, what company in its right mind would want to alienate its potential customers?

A way to avoid alienating Russia while not allowing it to dictate the rules of the game is to stress, as Voigt has done, that “enlargement is stability-driven rather than threat-driven”. Central and Eastern European countries seek membership in the Alliance for fear of general instability and because of the psychological reassurances such an arrangement might provide to a region that has long been the victim of contending great power interests.¹⁹⁶

At any rate, for thirty-six years the Federal Republic of Germany, as a member of the Alliance, had a common border with two Warsaw Pact countries -- the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. While this unfortunate situation greatly disturbed NATO, including the Federal Republic into the Alliance was still seen as the better alternative. Today, when the threat is supposed to be diffused and smaller, to argue against enlargement on the ground of the need to avoid new dividing lines on the continent sounds both simplistic and illogical. Would Central European states in such circumstances have an interest in promoting such an image?¹⁹⁷ Would they deliberately try to provoke Russia? Or is it possible that, as Germany did with its Ostpolitik and détente, these countries could actually contribute to the region’s stability? I believe the latter is true.

¹⁹⁶

Karsten Voigt, *ibid.*, 16.

¹⁹⁷

Wojciech Gebicki and Anna Marta Gebicka, “Central Europe: A Shift to the Left?”, *Survival* 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), 134.

The West, in any case, should avoid the trap of giving too little, too late. Its interests in the short term might not coincide with fast NATO expansion, but as the thesis has shown, from a long-term perspective, sooner may well be better. Otherwise, as Max Jakobson asserts, "A cynic reading the fine print might conclude that NATO membership will be available to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe when they no longer need it."¹⁹⁸ That outcome might very well signal the end of the Alliance as we know it today.

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Max Jakobson, "Collective Security in Europe Today", Washington Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 65.

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