Operations of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron and the Department of the Gulf in the Gulf of Mexico, 1862-1864.
Abstract
During the Civil War, there were no joint commands with all service components unified under the same commander, with few exceptions. Instead, the command and control structure was based on close cooperation between the services, which was termed 'combined' operations. This study analyzes the combined operations of the U. S. Navy's Western Gulf Blockading Squadron and the U. S. Army's Department of the Gulf to determine the significant factors that affected the success, or failure, of these operations in the Gulf of Mexico between 1862-1864. The study analyzes the battle of New Orleans, operations along the Texas coast including Galveston, Sabine Pass, and the Rio Grande, and the battle of Mobile Bay. In these operations, the personalities and tactical abilities of the Union military leaders, sea power, and technology clearly had the most significant affect on the success of combined operations. The limitations of the command structure and the necessity to develop new tactics placed an added emphasis on the abilities of the commanders. Although Union combined operations were successful overall, it is evident that joint operations have a clear advantage over the divided command structure of combined operations. Joint operations would have enhanced the operations and achieved greater success.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 07, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA313113
Entities
People
- Jeffrey W. Despain
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College