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INDIA'S SECURITY  
ENVIRONMENT:  
Towards the Year 2000


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


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## FOREWORD

In January 1996, the U.S. War College's Strategic Studies Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000."

In his presentation to the conference, Dr. Raju Thomas examined India's defense perspectives and prospects. From the standpoint of national security, India's post-independence history divides neatly into a turbulent first half, which included conflicts with China and Pakistan, and a relatively more stable period since 1971. That stability has been rattled by significant challenges (Kashmir, Sri Lanka, etc.), as Dr. Thomas points out. Five years ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to presage a more troubled era. Certainly, it caused as broad a reassessment of strategic policy in South Asia as elsewhere in the world.

Dr. Thomas analyzes India's security environment and the three levels of challenges that India confronts in this post-Cold War period—internal, conventional military, and nuclear. While the challenges in each arena are profound and interrelated, he finds considerable room for optimism that the early years of the next century will see continued stability in South Asia.

While the risks may be low, the consequences of conflict among states in the region with existing or near nuclear capabilities would be serious indeed. Also, the longer term offers the requirements for accommodating the rise of Chinese power, watching the uncertain political evolution in Pakistan and deciding India's own choices about expanding its role in the region and the world.

Dr. Thomas' survey of Indian security provides valuable insights to issues which will become increasingly germane to U.S. strategic interests.

*Richard H. Witherspoon*

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

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RAJU G. C. THOMAS is Professor of Political Science at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He is the Co-Director of the Joint Center for International Studies of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and Marquette University, one of 16 National Resource Centers set up by the U.S. Department of Education. Professor Thomas was a Visiting Scholar/Research Fellow at Harvard University, the University of California-Los Angeles, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the International Institute for Strategic Studies-London, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has lectured at or consulted with various agencies of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. State Department, the Royal College of Defense Studies and the Royal Naval College of the British Ministry of Defense, and at several universities in the United States, Great Britain, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Australia, Canada, South Korea, and Singapore. Between 1965 and 1969, he worked for British multinational corporations in India. His most recent book is *Democracy, Security and Development in India* (St. Martins Press/Macmillan, 1996), and he is currently editing a volume entitled *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: The Next Phase*. He was educated at Bombay University, the London School of Economics, the University of Southern California, and the University of California-Los Angeles, where he obtained his Ph.D. in political science.

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## **INDIA'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000**

### **Introduction.**

The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, transformed the global security environment. This sudden change generated a catharsis in India's security perspectives and policies. During much of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a pivotal actor that influenced India's formulation and conduct of its security policies.<sup>1</sup>

India had established security and military ties with the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s following wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965. The growing collaboration was highlighted in September 1971 by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was signed at the height of the East Pakistan secessionist movement.<sup>2</sup> With Sino-American "rapprochement" also in progress at the same time, the treaty with the Soviet Union enabled India to resolve the "Bangladesh" issue by force in December 1971. India waged war with Pakistan without much fear of military intervention by Pakistan's then allies, China and the United States. However, even before 1991, India's security problems were not directly related to Cold War politics. The primary sources of Indian security fears were regional, not global, although these fears were compounded by great power intrusions into the region emanating from the politics of the Cold War. Rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and China and the Soviet Union, enabled Pakistan to obtain American and Chinese military assistance to counter Indian military capabilities. Meanwhile, India had turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for weapons to counter or preempt Pakistani arms procurement.

During this period there were constant pressures on the part of both India and Pakistan to become nuclear weapons states. Two underlying characteristics may be noted about the covert or latent nuclear arms race in South Asia, one perpetual and the other a relatively new situation. First, Pakistan's propulsion towards nuclear weapons arose mainly from strategic imperatives, namely, the threat from India. The nuclear energy rationalization

put forward by Pakistan later was an afterthought. The Pakistani program may be viewed, therefore, as a "Security-to-Energy" driven phenomenon. India, on the other hand, perceived nuclear energy programs as critical for meeting anticipated shortfalls in the country's overall energy needs. Thereafter, various security rationalizations for nuclear weapons, such as the Chinese nuclear threat, tended to be spinoffs from the technological capability generated by the energy program. The Indian program, therefore, may be seen as an "Energy-to-Security" driven phenomenon. This analytical distinction is important when attempting to prevent proliferation in South Asia. In the case of Pakistan, it is more critical to address its security concerns, real or imagined. In the case of India, it may be more meaningful to watch its nuclear energy and space programs. These may be for genuine civilian development purposes, but they could be diverted to the making of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.

The second characteristic of the South Asian nuclear situation was the change in the direction of India's primary nuclear threat perceptions. As before, India still insists on maintaining its "nuclear option," i.e., it will neither acquire the bomb nor sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) for the present. But, India also proclaims the right to acquire nuclear weapons in the future if its security warranted such a move. However, the same "option" policy now exists in a radically different setting. Before the 1974 Indian atomic test, India's nuclear option policy was directed solely at China's perceived nuclear threat, but conditioned by Pakistan's expected reaction. But, as Pakistan proceeded headlong towards acquiring the bomb after the 1974 Indian test, there followed a decade of ambiguity and uncertainty in India about the direction from which it faced a nuclear threat. Was it China or was it Pakistan? By the early to mid 1980s, Indian analysts were convinced that Pakistan had put together an effective nuclear weapons program. Thereafter, India's nuclear option policy was directed primarily at the Pakistani nuclear threat.

This change in the orientation and direction of India's perceived nuclear threats continues into the 1990s. It also marks a significant change in India's ability to control the nuclear situation in South Asia. At one time, India had the "luxury," as it were, of deciding whether or not South Asia would become nuclearized. Now Pakistan determines whether South Asia will become nuclearized—while India can only respond.

Meanwhile, India's internal security problems, to include violent secessionist movements and communal (mainly Hindu-Muslim) rioting, have become perennial since independence. Only the extent and intensity of these problems have varied. Until the early 1980s, the separatist movements were largely confined to the tribes of the northeast: Nagas, Mizos, Gharos, Khasis and others. Following long bouts of insurgency and counter-insurgency, carving out three mini-states from the state of Assam (Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya) mainly resolved these pressures. Violent separatist movements in the major states of Punjab, Assam and Kashmir commenced only after 1984. Hindu-Muslim rioting remained sporadic, occurring mainly in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujerat, and Maharashtra.

By rank order, Indian policymakers during the period 1960-90 judged threats in Southern Asia from China and Pakistan to be of paramount concern, followed by the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. The "nuclear option" continued to be an important part of the security debate among policymakers, analysts, and the attentive Indian public. While separatist movements in the northeast and Hindu-Muslim tensions were of concern, by Indian standards, at least, political life went on "as usual."

### **The Shifting Dynamics of India's Security Environment.**

Whether gradual or sudden, substantial alterations have taken place in the India's security environment. The strategic relationships among India, Pakistan, and China at the regional level, and China, Russia (formerly USSR), and the United States at the global level, continue to define the security framework of India, although the nature of these relationships has shifted, and the intensity has declined.<sup>3</sup> Certain specific post-Cold War global political, economic, and social trends—democratization, marketization, increasing concerns about human rights violations, regional integration—further define the evolving Indian strategic environment. These constant or changing regional and global interstate relationships directly or indirectly affect the three basic levels of India's security concerns: internal security, conventional military security, and nuclear security. Each of these three basic levels demands new priorities in policymaking. Considerable interaction takes place among them.

Internal security problems at the first level include domestic violence and proxy wars conducted by India's neighbors across national boundaries in support of Indian secessionist movements. India alleges that Kashmiri and Sikh insurgents operate out of Pakistan with Pakistani support. Before the Indian Peacekeeping Forces went into Sri Lanka, many Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka allegedly operated from India.<sup>4</sup> Before the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, both China and Pakistan supported the Naga and Mizo separatist movements in Northeast India. Secessionist violence continues to rise and fall in Sindh in Pakistan, and Assam in India. India could fuel the neighboring Sindhi separatist movement, and Bangladesh could do the same with the Assamese and Mizo separatist movements. Burma could support separatist violence in Nagaland and Mizoram if it chose to do so. During the height of these tribal insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s, Naga and Mizo guerillas moved freely across the uncontrolled Indo-Burmese frontiers and received small arms from across the Burmese-Chinese border. Insurgency in Tibet in the 1950s led to war between India and China in 1962. Despite improved relations between India and China today, repression or instability in Tibet generates domestic debate in India regarding its relations with China. India is directly or indirectly involved or concerned about all such "internal" security issues both within its own borders and those of its neighbors.

Security pressures at the second level concern the continuing conventional arms race and the prospects for a conventional war between India and Pakistan. The conventional arms race needs to be examined in the context of internal security problems and nuclear weapons capabilities in the region. How effective are conventional forces in dealing with insurgencies and terrorist strategies? Would nuclear weapons capabilities in South Asia make conventional forces and military strategies less relevant? Would this capability prevent conventional wars between India and Pakistan for fear of escalation to nuclear war, not unlike the situation among the nuclear superpowers? Again, would such military paralysis at the conventional and nuclear levels increase wars of proxy through clandestine arms supplies to insurgents across national boundaries?

The interaction of domestic and unconventional security problems (insurgency, terrorism, and large-scale civilian violence) with conventional external security problems (traditional inter-state wars) complicates and muddles the role of the armed forces. Should the regular armed forces be used to

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address both problems of security since they impinge upon each other? The Indian armed forces have resisted this idea, claiming that they are not trained to deal with internal security and that such a role would also undermine their effectiveness in dealing with external security threats.

Security concerns at the third level may be found in the potential nuclearization of South Asia and its likely impact on regional and global stability. Is South Asia already nuclearized? Should we attempt to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia, or a nuclear weapons-safe zone? Is it possible for India and Pakistan to develop and deploy nuclear weapons without test detonations? Would a "nuclearized" South Asia be stable or unstable? Needless to say, nuclear developments in South Asia affect proliferation elsewhere, and conversely, proliferation elsewhere (in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Northeast Asia) affects nuclear strategies in South Asia.

All three security levels are interrelated, perhaps as a possible scenario of conflict escalation. Conflict may begin with secessionist violence within a state, which may then spill across international frontiers by a proxy war, sparking a regional conventional war. This may further escalate into a regional nuclear war, then a strategic nuclear conflict as allies are drawn in. This scenario of three-stage escalation applies to Indo-Pakistani confrontations only. However, the first stage of war in South Asia—namely, spillover wars through proxies—could apply to all the major countries of South Asia.

The three levels of security and conflict reflect the origin, sequence, and probability of occurrence. Thus, secessionist or separatist violence, as in the case of Indian Kashmir and Punjab, in Pakistan's Sindh province, and in Sri Lanka's Tamil areas, is most frequent and perpetual. From such internal insurgencies, conventional inter-state war may occur, especially between India and Pakistan. This could escalate to nuclear levels since both India and Pakistan possess the ability to convert their nuclear resources and technology to weapons capabilities at short notice. Indeed, they may already possess covert nuclear weapons stockpiles. Contrary to some speculation, there is little evidence that a covert or mutant "Cuban Missile Crisis"-type situation occurred between India and Pakistan during the intensity of the 1993 Kashmir crisis.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, this scenario's worst-case last stage of escalation—nuclear war—is mentioned here to prompt methods to prevent it from happening.

Security pressures and violent conflict, or the prospect for such conflict, at each of the three levels are modified or magnified by several emerging conditions and trends, to include greater privatization and democratization; the decline of the non-aligned movement; improvements in Sino-Indian relations; shifting patterns in security relationships; and the general erosion of state sovereignty.

*Greater privatization and democratization.* The trends towards greater privatization (e.g., a market economy) and democratization in South Asia may alleviate these security problems. All the countries of South Asia are now democratic except Bhutan, which represents less than one percent of the population of South Asia. If the recent observation made by Bruce Russett and other political scientists carries merit, namely that democracies have not gone to war against each other over the last 50 years, then it could be argued that the avoidance of war between India and Pakistan throughout the Kashmir crisis was due to prevailing democracies in both countries.<sup>6</sup>

The growth of market economies and democracy may minimize or soften security problems among neighboring countries which possess the same economic and political values. This growth may lead to greater regional economic integration, a trend that may imitate and parallel the one-time warring member states of the European Union and of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN<sup>7</sup> (which now includes Vietnam against whom ASEAN was once directed). But this potential in South Asia remains doubtful. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not been doing so well.<sup>8</sup> Even cricket matches between India and Pakistan, which were expected to serve as confidence-building measures, usually turn out to be a sort of non-shooting war by proxy.<sup>9</sup> Kashmiri Muslims, and indeed probably many Indian Muslims elsewhere, usually cheer Pakistani cricket teams against India. This is not a laughing matter because many Hindu nationalists point to this phenomenon as proof that most Indian Muslims are really "Pakistanis" at heart.

*Decline of the Nonalignment Movement.* Nonalignment, the one-time fulcrum of India's foreign and security policy, has become irrelevant, whether it still exists in some other reincarnation or not.<sup>10</sup> With no competing global power blocs, it may be important for India to take into account that the West is militarily and economically dominant. Russia can be of no

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assistance (as in the past) in countering any pro-Pakistani stance that the United States may take up. At present both India and Pakistan are wooing the United States and the West as possible quasi-allies. Indeed, at the end of the Cold War there was a sudden Indian rush towards embracing the United States. New Delhi sought greater military cooperation with the United States, but soon ran into several roadblocks. India's refusal to protect American pharmaceutical patents, its decision to buy from Russia cryogenic engines for its rocket program, and the testing of the *Prithvi* missile in defiance of American warnings, have cooled U.S. interest to establish closer military ties, and provoked growing suspicions in India about American friendship.<sup>11</sup> However, it is important to note that while Indo-American *military* ties have not progressed as well as India would desire, *economic* ties have been booming as never before. The United States was always India's main trading partner, but now leading American corporations have rushed into India with investment capital following New Delhi's economic liberalization.<sup>12</sup>

Correspondingly, while it has become clear that Russia has few economic benefits to offer India, the sudden break in Indo-Soviet military collaboration following the end of the Cold War is now being mended. Much of this change stems from India's desire to purchase or manufacture under license Russian weapons, especially the *MiG-29* and the *Sukhoi-30* combat aircraft.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, proponents in both India and Russia push the creation of a new triangular defence relationship between India, Russia, and China.<sup>14</sup>

*Improvement in Sino-Indian Relations.* Sino-Indian relations have recently shown considerable improvement, possibly to Pakistan's security detriment.<sup>15</sup> A *de facto* solution to the Sino-Indian border dispute has taken effect.<sup>16</sup> Relations at the official level have displayed increasing cooperation, although various Indian analysts have pointed out the potential for future disputes and military rivalry.<sup>17</sup> A basic and underlying rivalry still remains, especially since the Chinese conventional and nuclear arms buildup continues unabated. India's development of the *Agni* Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the conversion of Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles to match the capability of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) appear "targeted" against China, not Pakistan. A growing Sino-Indian naval rivalry is possible in the future. The Chinese Navy has been active around the Spratly and Paracell Islands, and there have been reports that China is aiding Burma to build a naval base at

Rangoon. Since India's maritime territorial jurisdiction extends from the Lakshwadeep Islands in the Arabian Sea, to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, stretching up to the Straits of Malacca, the possibility increases of Sino-Indian naval confrontation.

*Shifting Patterns in Security Relationships.* India and Pakistan are looking now in different directions to define the central aspects of their foreign and security policies.<sup>18</sup> Pakistan is looking west towards the Islamic world (Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey) to foster closer political, economic, and perhaps military ties. Pakistan has been at the forefront of promoting the enlarged Economic Cooperative Organization (ECO), a kind of successor to the Pakistan-Iran-Turkey Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) which emerged from the old Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) defense pact.<sup>19</sup> The ECO consists of these three states, joined by all six of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union,<sup>20</sup> plus Afghanistan. But the ECO is not working all that well.<sup>21</sup> Afghanistan as a functioning country barely exists anymore. An on-and-off civil war continues in Tajikistan. Iran and Turkey are pursuing their own political agendas in the Central Asian republics. At the same time, India is looking eastward towards Southeast Asia and East Asia for economic ties, and inwards to deal with its numerous internal security problems.

*General Erosion of State Sovereignty.* Finally, state sovereignty is generally eroding, especially where human rights violations are taking place. This erosion affects India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka's handling of its internal security problems, especially in the Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Sindh, and Tamil regions. Serious human rights violations now often result in international intervention, as in the cases of Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Undoubtedly, it is much more difficult to threaten to intervene in the case of states as big and powerful as China (in Tibet), Russia (in Chechnya), or India (in Kashmir), but they could face international economic sanctions.

### **Internal Security Issues.**

The most serious threats to the states of South Asia are internal conflict and the potential for state disintegration.<sup>22</sup> Two successful secessionist movements have already taken place on the subcontinent: the creation of Pakistan out of British India in 1947 and the creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan in 1971. The

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creation of these two states was preceded by bloody communal conflict, followed by Indo-Pakistani wars. Similarly, within Europe the breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s were extremely violent, as was, after a bloody 10-year African war, Eritrea's 1993 break from Ethiopia.

The basic dilemma underlying secessionist conflict is whether to recognize the right to national self-determination of various ethnic groups who feel that their future is best served by carving out their own independent states or to support the right of the state to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity as it sees fit because it is sovereign and independent.

Except for the creations of Pakistan and Bangladesh, all nationalist-secessionist movements in South Asia have been crushed or simply dissipated through a combination of military pressure and political negotiations. The Baluchi and Pashtun separatist movements have melted away, while the Sindh separatist movement may also hopefully go the same way. In India, the Dravidastan separatist movement among the Tamils simply dissipated after the DMK gained power in Tamil Nadu in the mid 1960s. The Naga, Mizo, and Khasi/Gharo secessionist movements were resolved through a combination of military force and political concessions, mainly by allowing new mini-states to be formed within the Indian Union. A combination of military force and political concessions short of conceding independence resolved the Sikh and Assamese separatist movements. Thus, the three main problem areas remaining are Kashmir (in India), the Tamil Ealam movement (in Sri Lanka), and the Sindhi-Mohajir question (in Pakistan).

The Kashmir situation somewhat differs from the other separatist movements because it involves a dispute between India and Pakistan that dates back to partition in 1947, when the Muslim province remained a part of India. For Pakistan, the Kashmir question is the unfinished business of partition. As far as India is concerned, the Kashmir problem is an internal problem; it considers the accession by the Maharaja of Kashmir legal and final.<sup>23</sup> After the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, the Kashmir issue seemed finally settled. Pakistan no longer appeared to represent the Muslims of the subcontinent, especially given the Mohajir situation in Sindh and Islamabad's internal war with Sindhi Muslims. Pakistan rarely made serious claims to Kashmir after 1971 until the revolt erupted in Indian Kashmir following the rigged elections of 1987.

Unlike past crises over Kashmir that provoked conventional wars between India and Pakistan, this crisis involves terrorism, insurgency, a proxy war, and a fundamental and qualitative shift in the nature of the crisis itself. Past differences between India and Pakistan concerned the acceptance and validity of the "two-nation theory" of Hindu and Muslim nations in an undivided India. The current Kashmir crisis is far more "international" and "Islamic" in character. Various Kashmiri insurgent groups have accepted the Islamic fundamentalist beliefs of Iran, adopted the insurgency tactics of the mujaheddin struggle in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, and assumed the style and approach of the Palestinian *Intifada*.

Under the present conditions of Muslim alienation from India in Kashmir, if a two-way plebiscite (a choice between India or Pakistan) were to be held in Kashmir today, in all likelihood India would lose the plebiscite, and the majority of Muslim Kashmiris would vote to join Pakistan. However, if a third option, of independence, were offered, the majority of Kashmiris would probably choose independence. Ultimately, India's power will prevail, affirming its international legal right to rule in Kashmir whether or not it earns the political legitimacy bestowed by the consent of the governed.

Nevertheless, it would appear more advisable to maintain the territorial *status quo* in South Asia whatever India's legal and moral rights in Kashmir. There are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan or Bangladesh, and sending Kashmir to Pakistan could set Indian Muslims back to the bloody strife of 1947. Some extreme Hindu nationalists have declared that if Kashmir is ceded to Pakistan, Pakistan should be prepared to save the remaining 120 million Indian Muslims as well. Perhaps there may be a growing feeling among moderate Hindus that hanging on to Kashmir has become counterproductive, not unlike the feeling of some in Great Britain about hanging on to Northern Ireland. Let Kashmir go to Pakistan and let Northern Ireland go to Ireland as they probably should have when Pakistan was created in 1947 and Ireland in 1921. But, the difference is the probable consequences for 120 million Indian Muslims if Kashmir is transferred to Pakistan. Besides, whether Northern Ireland is part of Great Britain or Ireland may make little difference now, since Great Britain and Ireland are now both members of the European Union which maintains open borders among the member states. South Asia has not yet reached that stage.

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As regards Tamil demands for an independent Tamil Ealam carved out of Sri Lanka, and Sindhi demands for a free Sindhudesh independent of Pakistan, it appears doubtful if either of these demands will be conceded. Prospects for Tamil Ealam are now even more distant, with India supporting Sri Lanka to maintain its territorial integrity against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE). India has thrown a naval cordon around Sri Lanka to prevent the smuggling of arms to the Tamil Tigers. Much of the official Indian anger towards the Tamil Tigers began with the bloody involvement of the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces (IPKF) with the Tamil insurgents whom the IPKF had gone to protect. India's withdrawal of support for the Tamil cause (although this was always short of Tamil independence) followed the assassination of then Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, by a Tamil Tiger suicide killer. Indeed, this event alienated much of ethnic Tamil support within India's Tamil Nadu for the Tamil Ealam movement in Sri Lanka.

Within Pakistan's Sindh province, Mohajir demands for their own state *within Pakistan* pits them against the Sindhis, the sons of the soil, who believe they have already been dispossessed by the Indian emigre Muslim population. Sindhis want an independent Sindhudesh. Mohajirs talk about creating their own province within Pakistan out of its Sindh province linking the main cities of Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur through corridors, or just creating a state south of the 26th parallel. This would leave an impoverished and rump Sindh province with virtually no resources. India's position on this issue has remained ambiguous, wavering between sympathy for both the Sindhi separatists and the Indian Muslim emigres. The Sindh separatist movement and the opposing Mohajir's violent struggle against the Sindhis undermines Pakistan's moral claims to Kashmir. Although India appears to be less involved, if at all, in the violent struggle taking place in Pakistan's Sindh province, instability in Sindh counterbalances instability in Kashmir. Pakistan's ability to undermine India by playing the "Kashmir" card, can be countered by India's ability to undermine Pakistan by playing the "Sindh" card.

Meanwhile, through Indian application of armed force and political concessions, the Assamese and Sikh separatist movements were fizzling out in the early 1990s, although there is some revival of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) which spearheaded the Assamese independence movement.<sup>24</sup> There is a similar revival of the Naga independence movement.

There are other demands in India for new mini-states within India such as Gurkhaland and Bodoland in the northeast, and the carving out of a large new state for the Adivasis out of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa to be called Jharkand.

The fact is, with the exception of Bangladesh which has a minor tribal separatist movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are all vulnerable. The threat to the territorial integrity of these states comes mainly from within. Successful internal security management will determine the survival of these states in their present form.

### **Conventional Forces and External Security.**

In the past, the conventional arms race and the balance of conventional forces in South Asia were usually considered crucial in understanding the probabilities of war occurrence and war outcome in South Asia. The conventional military balance now appears relatively less deterministic about such probabilities compared to the earlier decades. Any war between India and Pakistan in the future must take into account each side's ability to conduct wars of proxy concurrently, and the threat to escalate the war to nuclear levels. They constitute complicating or supplementary factors in devising strategies of conventional wars in South Asia.

In South Asia, land forces remain crucial to the conduct of wars, and while some global technological advances will have been absorbed by the armed forces, technological levels do not equal those found in the United States and the West. Efforts by South Asian countries to upgrade their weapons systems with advancing military technology (such as precision guided missiles) for all the Services will not radically change their military strategy; doctrine continues to give the primary combat role to ground forces, with air and naval forces providing mainly supporting roles.

Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India's defense against China has rested on the 10 to 11 lightly-armed mountain/infantry divisions raised in the 1960s, which supposedly act as a "trip-wire." But, there is really no fall-back conventional defense measure short of demonstrating an Indian nuclear deterrent based on IRBMs tipped with nuclear warheads. This is precisely what the Indian *Agni* missile and covert nuclear weapons programs are intended to serve.

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Against Pakistan, India's battle scenarios do not look fundamentally different from the those fought in 1965 and 1971. In the 1965 war, the armies and air forces of India and Pakistan fought independent and separate battles with limited close air support. For the greater part, the Indian Air Force and the Pakistan Air Force conducted their own separate interdiction campaigns, targeting ammunition dumps and air bases. The navies of the two countries were not involved. During the 1971 war, all three services were engaged, but there was not much synchronization except for the Indian naval attack on Karachi harbor, which was coordinated with an Indian air attack on the city to draw away the Pakistan Air Force. For the rest, the air forces and navies on either side conducted their own wars with limited ground support provided in certain battles.

Military legacies and traditions change slowly in South Asia. Not even the major shock of 1971 losses provoked a change to Pakistani military strategy which continues to emphasize land forces. There is an effort to obtain advanced aircraft from the West (including unsuccessful efforts to obtain F-16s from the United States), and there has been a modest build up of the Pakistan Navy with the acquisition of short-range *Augusto* and *Daphne*-class submarines and a few frigates. The Pakistan Army remains the backbone of the Pakistani military. India has adjusted better, with the army now drawing only 60 percent of the defense budget (down from a high of almost 80 percent in the 1950s). India paid greater attention to its air force and navy. But even here the lessons of the Gulf War and Bosnia highlighting high-tech, precision-guided weapons have not been incorporated in Indian strategic thinking, force structure, and equipment.<sup>25</sup> The failure to copy Western military strategy based on the supremacy of high-tech air power may result from India's inability to procure or pay for such technology. Also, direct Western military intervention in another war in South Asia, which would upset the regional military balance, is not expected.

Recall that India conducted a proxy war in East Pakistan throughout 1971 before a two-front conventional war broke out between India and East and West Pakistan.<sup>26</sup> The insurgency in East Pakistan speeded up the Indian military victory in the east. In the west there was a stalemate. The conduct of another India-Pakistan war must take into account Pakistan's ability to simultaneously feed the Kashmiri insurgents, and India's potential to fuel unrest in Sindh. In that respect, Kashmir is India's "Bangladesh."<sup>27</sup> In a similar vein, Sindhi nationalists in

Hyderabad and London told me that they had made a mistake when they failed to seize the opportunity to carve out a "Sindhudesh" in 1971 with the help of the Indian armed forces while they were "liberating" Bangladesh.<sup>28</sup> Thus, if India loses Kashmir in another Indo-Pakistani war (although quite unlikely), Pakistan could also lose Sindh. The loss of Kashmir or the loss of Sindh could completely unravel both India and Pakistan into several independent states, as happened in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. A future Indo-Pakistani war could be messy, with aspects of the Vietnam/Afghanistan syndrome coming into play.

Along the Himalayan frontiers, in the less likely event of another conventional Sino-Indian war, India could stir up insurgents in Tibet, while China could do the same in Kashmir, Assam, and the other mini-states of Northeast India. India still deploys its ten mountain divisions ready to fight the last war of 1962 again. Sino-Indian tensions would only occur in the event of another Tibetan uprising which seems unlikely at present. This is in part because—through migrations and settlements—Han Chinese have become the majority in Greater Tibet. Hindu Nationalists advocate a similar resettlement policy and solution for Kashmir as well. Indeed, three million Kashmiri Muslims could easily have been overwhelmed decades ago through Hindu and Sikh settlements in Kashmir. This India has not done.

Despite the renewed, but mellowed, wave of "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are Brothers), voices within India are cautious regarding the growth of Chinese military capabilities.<sup>29</sup> China's aggressive policies toward Hong Kong, the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and Taiwan, have produced periodic criticism in the Indian parliament and press regarding the current Congress government's rush towards embracing China without serious qualifications.<sup>30</sup> In early 1996, former chiefs of the Indian armed forces urged the Congress government to bolster its military capability and focus on China's long-term plans in South Asia. According to the assessment of Lieutenant General K.K. Hazari, "Pakistan is not a military threat, but we have to work out a long-term perspective on capability *vis-a-vis* China, say after 15 or 20 years."<sup>31</sup> According to retired Vice Admiral R.B. Suri, "China is making inroads into the Indian Ocean by building up a navy that in the next 10-15 years could interfere with our interests in the region."<sup>32</sup> However, Indian concerns about the growth of Chinese conventional and nuclear military power and its aggressive territorial claims to the Spratly

Islands and Taiwan are countered by those who argue that Indian political—if not military—cooperation with China and Russia is essential to counter the military, economic, and political dominance of a U.S.-led West.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to say that while the Defense Ministry is warning about Chinese threats, the External Affairs Ministry is seeking to promote Sino-Indian and Indo-Russian cooperation.

Chinese military modernization has targeted air and naval forces. In early 1996, China contracted with Russia to purchase 72 Su-27 multi-role fighters to replace some of its aging 4,000 indigenously built aircraft based on 1950s Soviet technology.<sup>34</sup> The Chinese have claimed that these purchases were to counter Taiwanese purchases of American F-16s and French Mirage-2000s. The size of China's land and air forces is numerically overwhelming, although the qualitative standards of some of its equipment may be inferior to that of India. As in the growth of the Indian Navy in 1980s, it is the growth of the Chinese Navy in the 1990s that may be of greater concern to the Southeast Asian countries. The following comparison of the basic sizes of the militaries of China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Pakistan illustrate the wide divergence in the regional military balance.<sup>35</sup>

	China	India	Pakistan	Vietnam	Indonesia
Land Forces	2.2m	1.0m	0.5m	0.5m	0.2m
Tanks	8,000	2,400	2,050	1,300	330
Towed Arty	14,500	4,075	1,566	2,300	170
Combat Aircraft	4,970	844	430	190	73
Combat Ships	50	25	11	7	13
Submarines	50	15	9	0	2
Patrol/Combat Boats	870	41	13	57	44

Neither India nor China have “blue water” navies;<sup>36</sup> they can be better described as “brown water” navies. Whereas India has two ex-British aging aircraft carriers, China has none. On the other hand, whereas India's naval expansion has slowed down or even halted, the Chinese Navy has begun to expand. In 1995, China arranged for the purchase of four submarines from Moscow at a cost of \$4 billion.<sup>37</sup> The purchase of another six submarines is being negotiated, with the purchase of yet another 12 by the end of the decade. The purchase of 22 submarines in 5 years

suggests that China is moving well beyond a coastal defense role and towards an offensive naval capability. Both India and China sought to buy from Ukraine a former Soviet aircraft carrier, now rusting in a Ukrainian harbor, but the quality and price proved unacceptable. Both India and China are attempting to promote and establish indigenous naval technologies. Although India's recent efforts to produce its own submarines in collaboration with a German firm has been abandoned (only two were produced), India's indigenous *Godavari*-class frigate development program, an extension of the construction of the *Leander*-class frigates in Bombay in collaboration with a British firm, has been a major success.

Any major expansion of the Indian Navy into a blue water capability has always raised the possibility, albeit remote, of a naval response from Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran, the three major Muslim countries of Asia. However remote this may now appear, it could potentially create a virtual Islamic naval triangle around India. In the 1960s, the Indonesian Navy under Sukarno attempted to expand, and likewise, the Shah of Iran sought to build up a significant Iranian naval force during the 1970s. Meanwhile, Pakistan, in response to India's naval buildup, has acquired nine submarines (including two *Augusto*-class submarines from Italy and four *Daphne*-class submarines from France) and 11 combat ships (including three ex-U.S. destroyers and six ex-U.K. frigates). Similarly, any major expansion of the Chinese Navy may invite an Indian naval response and also trigger naval purchases in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.<sup>38</sup> The Asian security dilemma at sea may interlock naval rivalries among the littoral states of the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the South China Sea.

In any future Indo-Pakistani or Sino-Indian conventional war, the nuclear factor must be taken into account, quite unlike the past, when all wars in South Asia were strictly among conventional powers. China tested its first bomb in 1964, two years *after* the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India tested its first bomb (or peaceful nuclear device) in 1974, about two years *after* the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. No wars between India and its traditional antagonists have occurred since these wars in the decade between 1962 and 1971. The present conditions for another conventional war are now under the shadow of nuclear capabilities in China, India, and Pakistan. A "nuclear India" could deploy IRBMs capable of reaching the industrial cities of south China. India now possesses a second-strike capability against

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China. Both India and Pakistan possess aircraft capable of dropping nuclear weapons. Mutual retaliatory strike capability exists between India and Pakistan. All of this affects conventional war strategy in South Asia. The threatened use of nuclear weapons in South Asia may be seen as a strategy of conventional war deterrence, or, if war did break out, of conventional war termination.

Since the end of the Cold War, the conventional arms race in South Asia has slowed down considerably.<sup>39</sup> No major new weapons acquisitions have taken place. Pakistan is trying to obtain the F-16 fighters whose purchase from the United States was halted by the Pressler Amendment, or get its money back; India is trying to obtain from Russia a few more MiG-29 fighters and some T-72 tanks. Indigenous design, development, and production of weapons systems continue as before in India, but successes have been limited to certain parts and sections of weapons systems. Development of the Light Combat aircraft has floundered, while several prototypes of the Main Battle Tank have not met the expectations of the Indian Army and have proven very costly. However, a variety of aircraft, tanks, frigates and submarines have been produced in India through technology transfers from overseas manufacturers. Although India's naval capabilities are quite modest, its navy still appears overwhelming compared to that of Pakistan. However, much of India's Soviet-vintage submarine fleet (old and dangerous because of malfunctions) is being taken out of commission. Efforts failed to obtain a third carrier, but two old British carriers remain in service. Conventional weapons purchases in South Asia have been relatively quiet despite the availability of weapons from the ex-Soviet republics at bargain basement prices. The size of the Indian Army has actually declined from about 1.2 million uniformed personnel at its peak in the 1970s to just under 1 million in the mid-1990s.

Size alone is an inaccurate tool to evaluate ground forces. Indian force capabilities dwarf those of Pakistan, but the force deployment throughout the various regions, especially in the north and east, produces local parity. India argues that raw numbers of men and equipment, without an assessment of their comparative technological sophistication, are insufficient to determine military advantage. Terrain and duration also play a role. India claims to have the disadvantage in fighting wars against Pakistan and China in Kashmir and along the Himalayan frontiers, respectively, and in wars that last barely a month,

quantitative superiority in weapons is less decisive than the effectiveness of frontline equipment that can be deployed immediately.

India justifies this naval expansion since it was never really tied to Pakistani naval capabilities but to India's large coastline, its island territories, the increasing seaborne trade, and so on. The power of the Chinese Navy and claims to the Spratly Islands and Paracell Islands suggest a future possible Sino-Indian naval arms race as China extends its naval reach to the Straits of Malacca. However, as with the other two services, Indian naval policy has been largely that of force maintenance and sustenance rather than expansion.

Economic reforms in India and Pakistan, especially the process of marketization and privatization, affect weapons procurement. In India, "privatization" unleashed the private (not public) sector and opened up the Indian market to foreign investments. Public sector undertakings, to include defense, have not benefitted; rather, they are just being allowed to wither away slowly. It is unclear what the government intends to do about public sector defense production; the government may neglect industries such as Hindustan Aeronautics, Mazagon Docks, Bharat Electronics, and so forth, or replace them with private sector contracting for defense goods. Indeed, it is unknown whether these defense public sector undertakings will be sustained. In other words, India's privatization may not apply to defense production, at least in the short run.

### **Conventional Forces and Internal Security.**

The fact that future conventional wars in South Asia will possibly involve concurrent domestic low-intensity conflicts raises the question of the use of conventional forces to deal with internal conflict and security. The militaries of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have been used to crush secessionist movements at various times: in the northeast tribal belt, in Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir by the Indian Army; in East Pakistan (unsuccessfully), in Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier Province and Sindh by the Pakistan Army; and in the Tamil areas of the Northern and Eastern provinces by the Sri Lankan Army.

Until the Indian Army's assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple in Punjab in 1984, the military was viewed by much of the Indian population as a symbol of national unity. To most Indians, the

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military was, and still is, the trusted friend of the people. Indeed, the Indian military sees itself as the defender of the nation and as an important symbol of national unity, and it would like to keep things that way. The military acts as an integrating force in its national recruitment efforts; its role as the defender of the nation against external aggression; and, its role in providing disaster relief and other assistance to the civilian authorities during natural calamities. The recruitment policy and composition of the Indian military are largely responsible for the stability of India's democracy; the absence of such pressure may provide clues, on the other hand, to why democracy in Pakistan failed, even though Pakistan inherited one-third of the British Indian military services.

Perceptions of the regular armed forces as symbols of national unity and integrity began to decline following the 1984 assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple in Amritsar. Its prestige fell further as a result of its reluctant role in the maintenance of internal security. Controversy over the use of force to quell domestic insurgencies, of course, surrounds both the paramilitary forces and the armed forces. In the case of the paramilitary forces, the issue is not whether they have a role to play in the maintenance of internal security; they were, after all, raised for that purpose. The issue is whether such special internal security forces could be misused by the government in power. Arguably, the greater the size of paramilitary forces, the greater the probability that democratic processes and the freedom of the citizens are likely to be undermined. On the other hand, in the case of the regular armed forces, the question is whether such forces should be used at all in the maintenance of internal order.

The Indian military, unhappy about this role, has protested that the use of the military to deal with internal conflicts could lead to military demoralization, increasing politicization of the military, and to the breakdown of civilian controlled democracies. The use of the Indian Army to attack the Sikh's Golden Temple nearly led to a mutiny by some Sikh soldiers of the Indian Army, and it destroyed civilian-military confidence in Punjab.<sup>40</sup>

The military argues that to use the armed services "against their own people" would not only produce a breakdown in the military-civilian trust that has been built up over several decades, but also—if the army were deployed on domestic security missions in the border provinces such as Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam—would undermine its own ability to fight a conventional

war because of the alienation of the people living in those regions.<sup>41</sup> The military would eventually be seen as the enemy of the people, a situation already found in Pakistan and several other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, these military misgivings have not stopped the civilian authorities from ordering the armed forces to deal with internal security; the military is resigned to the situation given the growing threats to the security and sovereignty of the Indian state from within. As a former Army chief, General V.N. Sharma, noted:

What is the alternative? The police, despite its vast rising strength of armed battalions under the Central Home Ministry or under the various states, with thousands of *crores* of expenditure, is unable to easily control the violent masses when the police itself is subservient to criminal political masters and their fawning bureaucrats.<sup>42</sup>

India would like to avoid the type of political involvement experienced by the Pakistani military, which has a record of violent suppression in Baluchistan and in East Pakistan (before it broke away to form the independent state of Bangladesh). The military regime of Zia-ul Haq engaged in political battles against various opposition groups in Pakistan, especially the "Movement for the Restoration of Democracy" led by Benazir Bhutto. After Bhutto came to power through the electoral process, the military continued to be a threat to her government. Eventually, she was deposed by the civilian president of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, but there were suspicions that the military was behind the dismissal of her government.

The Indian armed forces are not equipped or trained to deal with problems of internal law and order. As Lieutenant General M. L. Thapan noted, "A fundamental principle of war is concentration of men and materiel at the right place and at the right time."<sup>43</sup> Internal security duties, on the other hand, "require dispersion and the use of minimum force since our own countrymen are involved."<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Lieutenant General A. M. Vohra observed that because the army does not mingle with the crowds (as the police are required to do), the army's ability to sense and deal with internal riots is severely limited.<sup>45</sup>

The use of the armed services for internal security may produce a breakdown in military training and their readiness to deal with external threats. Frequent use of the military for

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internal purposes would invariably create friction and arouse the emotions of both civilians and soldiers. Politicization and corruption could eventually result in struggles for power, leading to military coups and takeovers.

The Indian civilian authorities' response has been to build up the paramilitary forces under the Home Ministry. But this has had its own problems. The Indian paramilitary forces, especially the Central Reserve Police Force and the Provincial Armed Constabulary, are not very disciplined. The growth of such forces to nearly half a million potentially threatens civilian authorities. They often get caught up in the emotions of Hindu-Muslim or Hindu-Sikh conflict and take sides. The Provincial Armed Constabulary and the Central Reserve Police Force have been notorious in getting involved in communal conflict against Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and Gujerat. Allegations of human rights violations in Kashmir have been mainly directed at paramilitary forces such as the Border Security Force.

India has one advantage over Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the deployment of armed forces to deal with internal conflicts; it is capable of introducing a "neutral" force in the old imperial military tradition of British India. For example, the Indian government could send Gurkhas to Kashmir, Madras regiments to Punjab, the Maratha Light Infantry or Sikh regiments to Assam, Dogra regiments to Nagaland or Mizoram, and so on. On the other hand, because of Punjabi-Pashtun domination of the military in Pakistan and the exclusive Sinhalese composition of the Sri Lanka armed forces, the use of "neutral" forces becomes less possible in these countries. Arguably, Punjabi-Pashtun intervention between Sindhis and Mohajirs constitutes intervention by a neutral force, but it may deteriorate into a three-way ethnic conflict. It does little for Pakistan's national integration and may only reinforce the image of Punjabi military domination. Similarly, when the Sri Lankan army is sent to crush Tamil separatism, it aggravates the Sinhalese-Tamil divide.

### **Nuclear Weapons and Missile Capabilities.**

The recent NPT renewal conference in April 1995 went better than expected.<sup>46</sup> Virtually everybody signed except India, Pakistan, and Israel. Israel says it will sign when all the problems revolving around the Israeli-PLO Peace Accords are settled. That would leave only India and Pakistan as the significant "hold-out" states. Shortly after the Cold War, Thomas Graham of the

Rockefeller Foundation declared that the United States must not think just about “coping” with proliferation, but with “winning” the struggle against proliferation.<sup>47</sup> The renewal of the NPT in 1995 would indicate trends in that direction. With the 1974 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) also in effect, it would appear that the world is now becoming safer from dangerous unconventional weapons. However, whereas the BWC and CWC are non-discriminatory universal treaties,<sup>48</sup> the problem with the NPT is that it remains a discriminatory non-universal treaty. So long as China has nuclear weapons, India is reluctant to sign the NPT; if India does not sign, Pakistan will not sign as well. Fortunately, the chain appears to end here.

There are still two other general problems. First, nuclear proliferation in the future, especially among NPT signatories, is likely to be either latent or covert where nuclear weapons technology (short of putting the bomb together) will be maintained. Little difference exists between India’s peaceful nuclear energy program and that of Japan. Indeed, Japan stockpiles or has access to greater levels of plutonium and enriched uranium than India. The American determination of who is a potential proliferator or not is based on motivations rather than technological capabilities. Thus, for instance, Pakistan is considered a more likely proliferator than India, and India a more likely proliferator than Japan.

Secondly, verification will remain difficult. Iraqi and North Korean nuclear weapons development were discovered quite late.<sup>49</sup> Because India, Pakistan, and Israel (with suspected development programs) have not signed the renewed NPT, attention is constantly focused on them; therefore, they are more readily monitored and illicit activity detected. Verification is even more difficult when attempting to detect clandestine production of chemical weapons. The CWC is a very large document of over 200 pages, much of it dealing with verification; the NPT is only about two or three pages long—with little said about verification and compliance enforcement. So long as there is no technological “fix” to trace the shift from a peaceful nuclear energy program to a nuclear weapons program, reliable verification will prove elusive.

India and Pakistan are probably *de facto* nuclear weapons states if conversion to nuclear capability at short notice is considered the criterion. Some Indian and Pakistani strategists

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have argued that since India, Pakistan, and Israel are virtually nuclear weapons powers anyway, the nuclear club should be opened to them—then closed again with eight members. Iran, Egypt, North Korea, South Korea, or even Japan, are not likely to accept this arrangement. Many states would invoke Article 10 and withdraw from the NPT if the nuclear club was going to be opened to new membership.

Does an increase in the number of nuclear states actually increase the likelihood of nuclear war? The standard interpretation argues that nuclear proliferation is dangerous and could lead to nuclear war.<sup>50</sup> The more the number of nuclear weapons states, the greater the chances of nuclear war.

Opponents contend that a few more nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, Israel, and Japan may actually generate greater nuclear stability through conditions of regional and multiple nuclear deterrence.<sup>51</sup> Non-proliferation prevents nuclear war among potential new nuclear weapons states through denial. Deployment of nuclear weapons and the threat of counter-attack would deter war among new nuclear weapons states. For example, nuclear deterrence may have prevented a conventional war between India and Pakistan during the 1991 Kashmir crisis because both either possessed clandestine nuclear weapons or were on the brink of such capability.

The argument that nuclear weapons in South Asia (implying a legal increase in the number of members) could actually support stability has been put forward in India by K. Subrahmanyam and General K. Sundarji.<sup>52</sup> Indian and Pakistani strategists have argued that instead of attempting to create a Nuclear Weapons *Free Zone* in South Asia, the international community should focus on establishing a Nuclear Weapons *Safe Zone* in South Asia.

There is some limited merit to the nuclear deterrence argument, provided nuclear weapons do not spread beyond the eight powers. If it is possible to have a stable nuclear relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War, then why not a stable relationship among China, India, and Pakistan?

On the other hand, there are four composite and standard arguments supporting the thesis that proliferation in South Asia would be dangerous: Emotional Intensity, Geographical Proximity, Sudden Change, and Frequent Wars.<sup>53</sup> Each argument has its own strengths and weaknesses.

The "Emotional Intensity" argument suggests that religious-based antagonism between India and Pakistan is more dangerous than more secular-based antagonism among the five nuclear powers. Rationality under stress would be difficult for either power to maintain. However, this is not borne out in reality. Indian and Pakistani decisionmakers have always been quite rational when on the brink of war or during the conduct of war. Indeed, Indo-Pakistani wars have been essentially gentlemanly wars. As former Army Chief, General K. Sundarji noted: "India and China are Not Crazy States. They share a civilization going back 5,000 years. During the three wars fought against each other, they have displayed enormous restraint in targeting civilian industry or infrastructure."<sup>54</sup>

The "Geographical Proximity" argument suggests that weapons of mass destruction across common frontiers in each other's backyards could lead to greater paranoia and nuclear preemption. After all, there would be no warning time. The counter to this argument is that nuclear attacks on each other could produce fall-out in the territory of the attacking country, since India and Pakistan are contiguous states. Therefore, there exists a mutual built-in deterrent system between India and Pakistan.

The "Sudden Change" argument suggests that nuclearization in South Asia would occur overnight with little or no learning time. Therefore, this could prove destabilizing. However, this is not necessarily so, because India and Pakistan already understand the logic of nuclear strategy as played out by the nuclear powers during the Cold War. They understand the conditions of nuclear stability and instability.

The "Frequent Wars" in South Asia argument suggests that nuclearization of South Asia would imply greater chances of nuclear war. However, the situation has actually proved to be the opposite. A nuclear India or Pakistan would not even dare engage in conventional wars for fear of escalation to nuclear levels. We should keep in mind that the existing nuclear powers never engaged in direct conventional wars with each other although there were two major wars conducted against each other, by the Soviet Union and the United States through their proxies in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan is conducting a war against India through its Muslim proxies in Kashmir. But there appears to be no imminent danger of a conventional war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, let alone a nuclear

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war. This situation may exist because latent nuclear weapons capabilities in India and Pakistan have now paralyzed military action at the conventional and nuclear levels.

However, the avoidance of wars under the logic of nuclear deterrence implies a restricted number of nuclear weapons states locked especially in a two-way or three-way relationship. Nuclear relationships that were four-way or more, or several two-way and three-way nuclear relationships suggest instability. Nuclear deterrence might create nuclear stability between India and Pakistan, but it might not be relevant if nuclear weapons were to spread to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, the Koreas, Japan, and Taiwan.<sup>55</sup>

There were fears in early 1996 that India, following the examples of France and China, was about to conduct a series of nuclear tests before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finalized.<sup>56</sup> A similar Indian pro-bomb lobby had advocated that India test atomic weapons before the finalization of the NPT in 1968 in order to classify itself as one of the "haves" in the treaty and thereby become exempt from the nuclear weapons ban on the "have-nots." The fear at present is that once the CTBT, which India has always advocated and supported, is "opened for signature,"<sup>57</sup> India would be forever prevented from testing nuclear weapons. Creation of a nuclear device without test detonations is considered technologically difficult for India; to accede to the CTBT before such extensive tests would, in effect, take away India's nuclear option. These considerations have led to Indian demands in early 1996 that the CTBT be accompanied by a firm timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear "haves" as a *quid pro quo* for Indian abstinence from weapons testing.

India and Pakistan have been developing their ballistic missile capabilities as well. India, which performed a nuclear test in 1974 and has material for 20 to 50 bombs, has developed surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and IRBM missile systems. The SSM *Prithvi-150* has a range of 90 miles, while the improved *Prithvi-250* can travel 150 miles. The IRBM *Agni* has a range of 1,500 miles. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear device, but analysts suggest that it has material for 6 to 15 bombs. Its two missile systems, both SSMs, include the indigenous *Haft-1* (range 48 miles) and *Haft-2* (range 180 miles), and the *M-11* (range 180 miles) purchased from China.<sup>58</sup>

Clearly, India does not have unrestricted access to foreign nuclear weapons and missile technology given the restraints imposed by the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, the expected technological sophistication of indigenous nuclear weapons and missiles need not match the quality of those found in the United States, Great Britain or France. The minimum expected requirement at present of such weapons is that bombs must detonate when launched, and missiles must reach their designated targets. Technological parity with existing nuclear weapons states, including China, is not considered important, although this attitude may change if India decides to embark on an overt nuclear and missile arms buildup to rival that of the "medium" nuclear powers. However, India must be reasonably assured that its missiles meet predefined and projected range, payload, accuracy, and other operational requirements. In the case of the Army's short-range tactical missiles, Indian military expectations are that such missiles must match the technological level available to India's adversaries. Medium and intermediate range missiles intended for strategic deterrence need meet less stringent requirements since they serve a somewhat more flexible and ambiguous purpose.

Whether or not the civilian nuclear energy program is economically viable, and whether or not the program is intended primarily to maintain India's nuclear weapons option, the program has acquired considerable resources and "technological self-sufficiency." India has about 50,000 tonnes of uranium deposits (found mainly in Bihar and substantial resources of thorium in Kerala); it is also almost self-sufficient in the basic raw materials needed to conduct the nuclear program. India also has:

developed and constructed a self-sufficient nuclear fuel cycle, with uranium mines and mills, a uranium purification UO<sub>2</sub> plant, fuel fabrication plants, plutonium reprocessing plants, nuclear power reactors and research reactors. In addition, it has a small uranium conversion UF<sub>6</sub> plant, a pilot uranium-enrichment plant, and heavy-water production plants . . . India is experimenting with gas centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.<sup>59</sup>

The civilian nuclear program has run into severe technological snags and breakdowns. India's projected goal of attaining 10,000 megawatts of electricity by the year 2000 is likely to produce in reality only 5,770. However, India's ability to

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siphon off a nuclear weapons program from its energy program is not in doubt. The gestation period of converting civilian programs to weapons programs at one time almost reached 2 years—the period needed to test the first atomic device at Pokharan in Rajasthan in May 1974. Today, however, the period may be as short as 4-6 weeks. By the end of 1995, India's stock of weapons-grade plutonium was estimated at nearly 420 kilograms, enough for about 85 nuclear weapons.<sup>60</sup> Much of this plutonium came from the Dhruva Research Reactor, which is not under international safeguards. Further progress on India's Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) program<sup>61</sup> will provide India with more plutonium for bombs.

Meanwhile, India's civilian space rocket and satellite development programs indirectly support the military *Agni* and *Prithvi* missile programs.<sup>62</sup> The MTCR does not carry the same legal constraints as the NPT, which is a multilateral and near-universal treaty. The MTCR is an American-initiated, informal agreement among the G-7 industrialized countries (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan) not to transfer missile and rocket technology to those countries aspiring to develop missiles. The MTCR does not prohibit an overt program to acquire missile technology; signatories agree merely to take all measures to prevent the transfer of such technology. Similarly, New Delhi has also embarked on the indigenous development of nuclear powered submarines, which India agrees falls within a grey area not covered by the NPT. The development of the submarine program at Mazagon Docks in Bombay (in collaboration with HDW of Germany) ran into political problems involving alleged kickbacks and had to be cancelled. However, the development of the reactor and its containment vessel has been progressing at a satisfactory pace. Indeed, the former Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, M.R. Srinivasan, pointed out that the "work on the reactor was in fact proceeding faster than the work on the boat itself."<sup>63</sup>

### **Concluding Remarks.**

These security issues discussed impinge upon each other. Internal security problems complicate the conduct of external conventional wars and raise the question of whether conventional armed forces should be used to crush domestic insurgencies. Concepts of nuclear deterrence, conventional war escalation

control, and threatened nuclear utilization to terminate conventional war overshadow conventional military strategies. On the other hand, democratization and marketization tend to mellow these security concerns. Wars appear increasingly less worthwhile. Another conventional war would likely be a stalemate, while a nuclear war would be catastrophic and unacceptable.

In conclusion, we may ask whether political pressures arising from security problems affect democratic processes in South Asia, and whether marketization and privatization trends reduce security pressures.<sup>64</sup> The experience in South Asia (and elsewhere in the developing and developed world) has been that internal security pressures tend to corrupt democratic practices through the introduction of draconian laws restricting individuals' rights. Such pressures increase the levels of human rights violations, and they politicize the armed forces when they are used to deal with domestic violence. However, the emphasis on economic reforms and development issues in South Asia tend to counter these trends to produce a greater level of strategic stability in the region. India's security environment towards the year 2000 looks relatively stable and manageable compared to the turbulence and uncertainty that existed in the decade between the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.

## ENDNOTES

1. The urge to restore Indo-Russian ties is still strong in India. See Dina Vakil, "From Sentiment to Realism: New Chapter in Indo-Russian Ties," *Times of India*, June 27, 1994.

2. For articles assessing the changing strategic situation at the time, see Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 1972, pp. 463-474; J. D. Sethi, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and Nonalignment," *India Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 4, October-December 1971, pp. 327-336; and Sisir Gupta, "Sino-U.S. Detente and India," *India Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3, July-September, 1971, pp. 179-184. For the full text of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 23, No. 32, September 7, 1971, p. 5.

3. For two studies of the South Asian strategic environment at the end of the Cold War, see Peter Lyon, "South Asia and the Geostrategies of the 1990s," *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1992, pp. 25-39; and Sandy Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War: Winners and Losers," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 10, October 1995, pp. 879-895.

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4. The Sri Lankan situation has radically changed since the Indian government threw its weight behind the Sri Lankan government's efforts to crush the Tamil rebellion; at the end of 1995, Sri Lankan forces seized the Jaffna peninsula, the Tamil stronghold.

5. Seymour Hersh made this claim in his "On the Nuclear Edge," *The New Yorker*, March 29, 1993, pp. 56-73.

6. Bruce Russett of Yale University pointed out the following:

Over the past 50 years, pairs of democratic states have been only one-eighth as likely as other kinds of states to threaten to use force against one another, and only one-tenth as likely to carry out these threats. Democracies have also been less likely to escalate disputes with one another, and more likely to avail themselves of third-party mediation. Moreover, the fact of peaceful relations between democracies cannot be attributed solely to other influences, such as their distance from each other, wealth or common alliances. These influences do matter; but in quantitative analyses that compensate for their effect, democracy still exerts a powerful, independent pacifying influence. There are many cases of distant authoritarian states fighting each other. The two World Wars pitted several wealthy industrialized states against one another; the Soviet Union invaded its ally Hungary in 1956. [And we may add Communist China attacked Communist Vietnam in 1978.] There are no such examples of war between democracies however.

From "Letters," *The Economist*, April 29-May 5, 1995, p. 8.

7. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Newly-independent Brunei joined in 1984. Vietnam and Cambodia were granted observer status in 1992; Vietnam became a full member in 1995.

8. While pointing out the failures of SAARC, S.D. Muni takes an optimistic view about its future. See S. D. Muni, "Dynamics of Future Cooperation Takes Shape," *India Abroad*, January 28, 1996.

9. However, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lankan Cricket Boards showed considerable cooperation during the joint staging of the World Cup cricket matches in February and March 1996. See Mayank Chhaya, "Cricketing Show of South Asian Solidarity," *India Abroad*, February 23, 1996.

10. For an extended discussion of the status of India's nonalignment policy, see Raju G. C. Thomas, *South Asian Security in the 1990s*, *Adelphi Paper No. 278*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, pp. 5-14.

11. See N.C. Menon, "U.S. Proposes to Improve Defence Ties with India," *Hindustan Times*, November 12, 1994; Manoj Joshi, "Reviewing Indo-U.S. Technology Transfer Ties," *Times of India*, November 18, 1994; C. Raja Mohan, "Progress Likely in Indo-U.S. Defence Ties," *The Hindu*, November 26, 1994; and, M.D. Nalapat, "Indo-U.S. Relations: Giving Away Too Much for Nothing," *Times of India*, June 6, 1995.

12. See Badar Alam Iqbal, "Indo-U.S. Trade in the 90s," *Patriot* (New Delhi), July 18, 1994.

13. Jasjit Singh, "Future of Indo-Russian Cooperation," *Economic Times* (Bombay), January 11, 1995; Pushpinder Singh, "Fighters in the Sky: IAF Returns to Russia," *Times of India*, July 27, 1994; John Cherian, "Back on Track, Almost: On Indo-Russian Relations," *Frontline* (Madras), December 16, 1994; Dina Vakil, "From Sentiment to Realism: New Chapter in Indo-Russian Ties," *Times of India*, June 27, 1994.

14. See Pravin Sawhney, "India, Russia and China Should Form a Bloc," *Asian Age* (New Delhi) November 11, 1994; and the report in *The Telegraph* (Calcutta) dated November 6, 1994, that the chairman of the Russian Federal Assembly would like to see defense ties between Russia, India, and China.

15. For some studies of the origins and nature of Sino-Indian disputes leading to war, see Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, London: Oxford University Press, 1964; B.N. Mullik, *The Chinese Betrayal*, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971; Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, New York: Doubleday Press, 1972; Nancy Jetly, *India-China Relations, 1947-1977*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979; and Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

16. See *Reuter's* news report entitled, "China, India Sign Landmark Border Agreement," September 7, 1993. The agreement was signed in Beijing by Chinese and Indian prime ministers, Li Peng and P.V. Narasimha Rao. The Indian Embassy in Beijing issued the following statement: "Pending a boundary settlement, India and China have agreed to respect and observe the line of actual control" (which separated their troops since the 1962 border war.) "The two countries have agreed to undertake a series of confidence-building measures, including the reduction of military forces deployed along the India-China border.

India and China have agreed to keep their military forces in areas along the border in conformity with the principle of mutual and equal security."

17. See Rita Manchanda, "Beyond the Rhetoric of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai," *The Pioneer* (New Delhi), July 8, 1994; Ram Jethmalani, "India's China Policy: Dismal Spectacle of Ineptitude and Lack of Respect," *Indian Express*, August 5, 1994; Kamendra Kanwar, "Perils of Appeasement: India Cannot Ignore China's Hegemonism," *Indian Express*, June 20, 1994; Brahma Chellaney, "The Dragon's Rise," *Hindustan Times*, June 16, 1994; Lt. General J.F.R. Jacob, "China is a Long-Term Threat to India," *Asian Age* (New Delhi), January 12, 1995; Dipankar Banerjee, "China Sees India as a Potential Threat," *Asian Age* (New Delhi), January 12, 1995; and, Tarun Basu, "Harm Seen in India-China Axis," *India Abroad*, December 20, 1991.

18. For two early comprehensive studies of relations between the two countries, see Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations*, Bombay: Asia Publishing, 1966; Robert W. Jackson, *South Asia Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, A Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 War*, New York: Praeger Press, 1975; and, Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

19. See special article entitled, "The Expanded ECO: A New Phenomenon in the Islamic World," *Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly*, June 12, 1992.

20. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan from Central Asia, plus Azerbaijan from the Caucasus.

21. A much more optimistic assessment is provided by Dr. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, "Prospects for Cooperation with Central Asia," *Nation*, October 8, 1991. Bhatti points out some of same obstacles—the instability of Afghanistan and uneven levels of *per capita* incomes—but feels that these problems can be overcome eventually.

22. For three comprehensive studies of ethnic conflict in South Asia, see Urmilla Phadnis, *Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990; Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991; and Ralph R. Premdas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, and Alan B. Anderson, eds., *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.

23. Alastair Lamb refutes the India case at length. See Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990*, Hertfordshire, England: Roxbury Press, 1991. For opposing views, see Rajesh Kadian, *The Kashmir Tangle*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993; and M. J.

Akbar, *Kashmir: Beyond the Vale*, New Delhi: Viking Penguin Press, 1991. For a variety of viewpoints from Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris, see Raju G. C. Thomas, *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

24. For a study of the Sikh problem, see Rajiv Kapur, *Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1986. For the Assam situation, see Subir Bhaumik, "Is Assam Going the Kashmir War?" *India Abroad*, October 11, 1991; and Farzand Ahmed, "Assam: A Critical Crackdown," *India Today*, October 15, 1991.

25. For some studies of the Revolution in Military Affairs, see James R. Fitzsimonds, "The Coming Military Revolution: Opportunities and Risks," *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 30-36; and Brigadier Peter J. Dunn, "Time x Technology x Tactics = RMA: Why We Need a Revolution in Military Affairs and How to Begin It!," unpublished manuscript submitted to the Director General, Force Development (Land), Headquarters Australian Defence Force, Canberra, Australia.

26. For an excellent study of factors leading to war, see Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: India, Pakistan and the Creation of Bangladesh*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

27. See Mushahid Hussain, "The Kashmir Issue: Its New International Dimensions," in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 341-349.

28. This occurred during my lecture at the University of Hyderabad, Jamshoro, Pakistan, February 1992.

29. See Rita Manchanda, "Beyond the Rhetoric of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai," *The Pioneer* (New Delhi), July 8, 1994.

30. For a detailed assessment, see Mark J. Valencia, *China and the South China Sea Disputes*, *Adelphi Paper No. 298*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1995. For claims and activities, see pages 8 to 11.

31. See Sonali Verma, "Indian Defence Should Focus on China, not Pakistan," *Reuters*, January 29, 1996.

32. *Ibid.* See also articles by Major General Dipankar Banerji, "China Sees India as a Potential Threat," *Asian Age* (New Delhi), January 12, 1995; Lieutenant General J. F. R. Jacob, "China is a Long Term Threat to India," *Asian Age* (New Delhi), January 12, 1995.

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33. See Jasjit Singh, "Future of Indo-Russian Cooperation," *Economic Times* (New Delhi), January 11, 1995; "Russian Plan for Peace in Asia: Defense Ties with India and China Proposed," *The Telegraph* (Calcutta), November 6, 1994.

34. Patrick E. Tyler, "China to Buy 72 Advanced Fighter Planes from Russia," *New York Times*, February 7, 1996.

35. *The Military Balance, 1995/96*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, 1995.

36. For a collection of views on the Indian Navy, see Robert H. Bruce, ed., *The Modern Indian Navy*, Perth, Australia: Curtin University of Technology, 1989.

37. See Benjamin C. Ostrov, "The PLA, Chinese Foreign Policy, and Asian Regionalism," unpublished paper presented at the Conference on the Politics and Economics of Regional Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia, April 28-29, 1995, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, p. 22.

38. See K. Subrahmanyam, "China and the Indian Ocean," *Economic Times*, January 4, 1995; Major General Ashok K. Mehta, "All At Sea," *Sunday* (Calcutta), January 8, 1995; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "Showing the Flag Can Earn India Much Goodwill," *Economic Times*, April 3, 1994.

39. For studies of India's weapons procurement efforts, see Paul S. Killingworth and Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Indian Defense Program in the 1980's: Ambitions and Realities," unpublished manuscript, Rand Corporation Working Draft-5897, prepared for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, October 1992; David A. Fulghum, "Indian Air Force Faces Tough Choices," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, July 25, 1994; Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of India," *SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] Yearbook, 1994*; Raja Menon, "Modernising Navy: Submarine's Key Role," *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), June 22, 1994; Rita Manchanda, "India's Nuclear Submarine Project: Extravagance at Sea," *The Pioneer* (New Delhi), December 22, 1994; Rita Manchanda, *Tribune* (Chandigarh), September 9, 1994; Manoj Joshi, "Desperately Copying Charlie: India Designs Nuclear Submarine," *Times of India*, December 14, 1994; and M.R. Srinivasan, "The Nuclear Submarine Project," *The Hindu*, December 8, 1994.

40. Despite efforts to recruit the military from broad segments of Indian society, Sikhs still constitute about 12 percent of the combat forces. Overall, the Indian Army is still about 20 percent Punjabi, Sikh, and Hindu. In comparison, the Pakistan Army is about 70-80 percent

Punjabi, with much of the rest being Pashtun. Suppressing violence among Sindhis, Mohajirs, and Baluchis has meant Punjabi-Pashtun military suppression.

41. See Lieutenant General M. L. Thapan, "The Army: How Far to Aid the Civil Authority," *Statesman* (Calcutta), August 3, 1980; Lieutenant General A. M. Vohra, "Other Tasks of Armed Forces," *Tribune* (Ambala), April 14, 1980; and, Lieutenant General A. M. Vohra, "Coups and Military Takeovers," *Tribune* (Ambala), March 28, 1980.

42. General V. N. Sharma, "National Security: More Threats from Within," *Hindustan Times*, December 18, 1994.

43. Thapan, "The Army."

44. *Ibid.*

45. Vohra, "Other Tasks of Armed Forces."

46. For a study of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear relationship, see Mario E. Carranza, "Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations After the Cold War," in Marvin G. Weinbaum, and Chetan Kumar, eds., *South Asia Approaches the Millennium: Reexamining National Security*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 103-126.

47. See Thomas W. Graham, "Winning the Nonproliferation Battle," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 21, No. 7, September 1991, pp. 8-13.

48. In a "non-discriminatory universal treaty," the terms apply equally to all states and all have signed the treaty; in a "discriminatory non-universal treaty," the terms do not apply equally to all states and not all have signed the treaty.

49. For various reports of developments in North Korea, see *Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, No. 24, 4th Quarter 1993; *The International Herald Tribune*, October 28, 1991; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 7, 1991; *Financial Times* (London), November 14, 1991; and, *The Independent* (London), November 20, 1991. For an argument against military strikes to take out the Yongbyon nuclear research reactor, see the editorial by William J. Taylor and Michael Mazarr, "Defusing North Korea's Nuclear Notions," *New York Times*, April 13, 1992. For the Iraqi situation, see David A. V. Fischer, "The Future of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency-ed.]," *Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Issue Review*, No. 2, Southampton, Great Britain: University of Southampton Press, December 1993. Fischer argues that the failure in Iraq was chiefly a failure by leading governments to acquire and share the findings of intelligence. It was not the failure of

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the NPT safeguards system as it was drawn up by 45 countries in 1970-71 and is set forth in the IAEA document INFCIRC [Information Circular-ed.] 153. The 1971 system was not designed to detect the existence of a wholly independent, clandestine nuclear fuel cycle—such as Saddam Hussein's.

50. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1995.

51. Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better*, *Adelphi Paper No. 171*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981. The arguments made by Sagan and Waltz will be discussed by Devan Haggerty in an upcoming issue of *International Security* under the title "The Logic of Nuclear Non-Proliferation" and the "Logic of Nuclear Deterrence."

52. See K. Subrahmanyam's introductory chapter in his edited book, *Nuclear Myths and Realities*, New Delhi: Lancer International Press, 1987; and General (Retired) K. Sundarji, "Nuclear Realpolitik," *India Today*, August 31, 1991.

53. In a book put out by Los Alamos National Laboratory, I summarized four composite and standard arguments that supported the Sagan thesis that proliferation in South Asia would be dangerous. Then I argued against those arguments in support of the Waltz thesis. See Raju G. C. Thomas, "India and the NPT After the Cold War," in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds., *1995: A New Beginning for the NPT*, New York: Plenum Press, 1995, pp. 91-120.

54. K. Sundarji, "Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Notions of Deterrence," *Indian Express*, November 25, 1994.

55. The implications of a nuclear arms and missile race is discussed by T.T. Poulouse, "Thinking Beyond the Pakistan Bomb," *Hindustan Times*, October 4, 1994.

56. See Sunil Adam, "The Politics of a Noncomprehensive Test Ban," *India Abroad*, February 23, 1996; Brahma Chellany, "The Military Nuclear Option Poses a Grave Dilemma for India," *International Herald Tribune*, January 26, 1996.

57. "Opened for signature" means that the treaty is finalized and ready for signature. It takes effect after a certain minimum number of states sign and ratify the treaty.

58. *U.S. News and World Report*, February 12, 1996.

59. Frank Barnaby, *How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s*, London: Routledge Press, 1993, p. 68.

60. *Ibid*, p. 73.

61. A research FBR has already been established at Kalpakkam in Madras.

62. A study of the missile program in India may be found in Atul Aneja, "Security By Deterrence," *The Hindu*, June 19, 1994.

63. M.R. Srinivasan, "The Nuclear Submarine Project," *The Hindu*, December 8, 1994.

64. For an extended discussion of these issues, see Raju G. C. Thomas, *Democracy, Security, and Development in India*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

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