

**Can the United States Be Involved in
Simultaneous" Contemporary Peacekeeping"
Operations and Maintain the Flexibility to
Respond to Two, Nearly-Simultaneous
Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs)**

A Monograph
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

CAN THE UNITED STATES BE INVOLVED IN SIMULTANEOUS "CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING" OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO TWO, NEARLY-SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS (MRCs)? by MAJ Todd A. Buchs, USA, 72 pages.

This monograph examines the impact of the United States likely future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations on its ability to successfully implement its national security and national military strategy. There are several potential shortfalls associated with this peacetime component of United States strategy when also considering the United States requirement to fight and win two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs. Possible shortfalls include force structure and force preparedness limitations and delays and logistics shortcomings in the areas of infrastructure, vital logistics components and strategic mobility assets. Although the potential problem areas are not new, how they influence the United States ability to execute its national military strategy has grown in magnitude as a result of a changed security environment. This change has required that contemporary peacekeeping forces be built from assets of major powers such as the United States--assets that will be needed in the initial stages of both MRCs. Therefore, as contemporary peacekeeping operations operationally fulfill the United States national military strategy, they may, in other ways, hinder the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs.

This monograph is divided into five chapters. Chapter one, the introduction, provides background information and establishes the purpose of the study. Chapter two discusses the United States future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations and examines potential contemporary peacekeeping locations where the United States could find itself involved. Chapter three focuses on force structure and force preparedness limitations and delays resulting from United States involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations. Additionally, this chapter examines the time and resources required to prepare a contemporary peacekeeping force for combat. Chapter four identifies potential MRC logistics shortfalls resulting from United States participation in contemporary peacekeeping operations. The final chapter, chapter five, provides conclusions and recommendations.

Conclusions from this study indicate that United States involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations could impact on its ability to successfully implement its national security and national military strategy. Although it is unlikely that any of the shortfalls addressed in this study, could alone, place severe limitations on the United States ability to execute its two-MRC strategy, their cumulative effect could. Therefore, the author proposes ways to lessen the impact of these individual factors on the United States ability to respond effectively to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. United States Involvement in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations.....	5
United States National Security and National Military Strategy.....	6
PDD 25--Selective and More Effective Peacekeeping Operations	8
Potential Locations for United States Involvement in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations	11
III. Potential Force Structure/Force Preparedness Limitations.....	13
Factors Leading to Extended U.S. Military Involvement in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations	14
Factors Leading to Force Preparedness Limitations/Delays, Given That United States Forces Can Be Withdrawn from Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations	18
IV. Potential Logistics Shortfalls	28
Inadequate Infrastructure	28
Lack of Vital Logistics Components	31
Strategic Mobility Time Limitations	37
V. Conclusions and Recommendations	40
Appendices:	
1. "Contemporary Peacekeeping" Activities, Missions and Tasks	48
2. Decision Criteria for United States Forces Participating in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations	50
3. Current Active Ethnic Conflicts	52
4. Percentage of CFP 1-3 Active Support Units Deployed to Somalia	53
5. Percentage of Selected Active Support Units Deployed to Somalia	54
6. Percentage of Selected Support Forces in the Reserve Component	55
Endnotes	56
Bibliography	67

I. Introduction

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the Soviet Union in 1991 came the unleashing of national, religious and ethnic differences within former sovereign states. These differences, combined with the ready availability of modern weapons, have led to a security environment that bears the characteristics of a civil war or insurgency rather than that of a contained and suppressed environment typical of the Cold War years.¹ As a result, there has been a substantial increase in United Nations (UN), and subsequently United States, activities related to the maintenance of peace and security. One such activity is peacekeeping operations.²

Peacekeeping is an important component of the United States national security and national military strategy. If employed effectively, peacekeeping can prevent or resolve a conflict that otherwise could escalate into something more costly and deadly.³ The United States is not new to peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations in the Sinai and Pakistan, dating back to 1948 and 1949, respectively, are just two examples of the United States long-term participation in traditional peacekeeping operations.⁴ However, the end of the Cold War and removal of United States-Soviet Bloc interests and ideological pressures have allowed new conflicts to emerge. These new conflicts, surrounded by an extremely volatile environment prone to alarming escalations in violence, have required a change in peacekeeping operations.⁵ Because the new conflict environment is marked by massive failures such as: humanitarian emergencies, collapsed governments, breakdowns in law and order, and destroyed infrastructures, recent

peacekeeping operations have ambitiously combined a menu of functions from humanitarian relief to disarming troops to laying the groundwork for national reconstruction.⁶ As contemporary peacekeeping operations aim to prevent or establish the conditions for the resolution of conflicts, peacekeepers will "increasingly work in a climate of continuing armed conflict, sometimes where there are no defined borders or cease-fire lines and no guarantee of respect for their safety or role."⁷ Subsequently, the contemporary peacekeeping force will have to take more rigorous steps to reach a standard of military effectiveness that not only achieves the objectives of the mandate but also provides the appropriate degree of force protection in such an environment.

Prior to the commitment of mechanized forces (as part of the Implementation Force) to the peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia, the United States tended to base its force structure for contemporary peacekeeping missions on one used for traditional peacekeeping operations. This force consisted primarily of light infantry augmented by thin-skinned vehicles for added mobility. Contemporary peacekeeping operations, in their more volatile environment with increased and more complex activities,⁸ call for a more combined arms approach.⁹ In terms of mechanized forces, this means that contemporary peacekeeping operations could likely involve company to division-sized heavy/mechanized units operating in conjunction with light forces. This assessment of force structure required for contemporary peacekeeping operations forms the basis for the focus of this paper.

Because of the need for a peacekeeping force structure as described above, future contemporary peacekeeping operations will require the assets of major powers. The

United States, being one of those powers, will be increasingly looked upon to provide the assets needed to form such a peacekeeping force. That, given with the already established fact that peacekeeping is an important component of our national security and national military strategy, could likely result in the United States being involved in simultaneous contemporary peacekeeping operations. This amount of involvement could require the use of a sizeable portion of the United States mechanized forces as well as large percentages of its combat service support forces and equipment and strategic mobility assets.

There are several potential shortfalls associated with this strategy when also considering the United States requirement to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). Possible shortfalls include force structure and force preparedness limitations and delays and logistics shortcomings in the areas of infrastructure, vital logistics components and strategic mobility assets.

Although the potential problem areas are not new, how they influence the United States ability to execute its national military strategy has grown in magnitude as a result of a changed security environment. Not only has the post-Cold War security environment increased the number of peacekeeping operations being performed, it has also qualitatively changed the nature of today's peacekeeping operations. As a result, mechanized forces have now become a key component of the contemporary peacekeeping force structure. Therefore, as contemporary peacekeeping operations operationally fulfill the United States national military strategy, in ways previously mentioned, they may hinder the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs. It is the

purpose of this study to determine what impact the United States involvement in simultaneous contemporary peacekeeping operations has on its ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs. If potential problem areas are found to exist, a secondary purpose of this study is to determine what alternatives are available to the United States military to continue to implement its national military strategy (in the area of contemporary peacekeeping) without jeopardizing its primary responsibility of responding effectively to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs.

Accordingly, this paper is structured in the following manner. Chapter II discusses the United States future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations. The basis for this discussion is centered around the United States national security interests and the national security and national military strategy in place to guarantee those interests. Additionally, this chapter discusses pertinent parts of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) that outline the United States approach to involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations. The final part of this chapter includes a discussion on potential contemporary peacekeeping locations where the United States could find itself involved.

Chapter III seeks to lay out why force structure deficiencies may exist for a second MRC as a result of United States involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations. Second, this chapter focuses on the possible wartime unpreparedness of contemporary peacekeeping forces (specifically, mechanized forces) and what it would take in time and resources to get such a force to a wartime level of proficiency.

The focus of Chapter IV is on potential MRC logistics shortfalls resulting from United States participation in contemporary peacekeeping operations. Areas of concern include, but are not limited to: infrastructure inadequacies in potential contemporary peacekeeping locations; insufficient numbers of vital logistic components; and reaction time failures (in terms of strategic mobility) resulting from and compounded by several factors such as rapidly changing transportation needs, equipment shortages, and mission saturation.

Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations concerning the United States ability to be involved in simultaneous contemporary peacekeeping operations while maintaining the flexibility to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs. It focuses on determining what alternatives are available to the United States military to continue to implement its national military strategy (in the area of contemporary peacekeeping) without jeopardizing its primary responsibility of responding effectively to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs.

II. United States Involvement in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

In order to determine the United States military's likely future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations, it is first necessary to determine to what extent these types of operations fit into the United States national security and national military strategy. Once this has been established, a look at "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (PDD 25) is warranted to gain a better

understanding of what the Administration means when it says that "both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective." ¹⁰ Finally, an examination of potential locations for conflict will help provide a basis for determining the scope of United States involvement in future contemporary peacekeeping operations.

United States National Security and National Military Strategy

Our military forces must perform three sets of activities to accomplish our national military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. They are: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars.¹¹ Although preparing to fight and win the Nation's wars (third activity) remains our primary responsibility, thus governing all our military activities,¹² conducting multilateral, contemporary peacekeeping operations (element of first and second activities) is also an important component of our strategy. Multilateral, contemporary peacekeeping operations are sometimes the best way to prevent or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.¹³ Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral, contemporary peacekeeping operations is part of our National Security and National Military Strategy.¹⁴

Peacekeeping operations often have served, and continue to serve, important United States national interests.¹⁵ Contemporary peacekeeping operations, to the extent that they downplay the role of force in international affairs, are consistent with United States interests. There is some concern that if the United States decreases its commitment to contemporary peacekeeping operations, states will have to look out for their own self interests, possibly leading to the purchase of advanced weapon systems or even weapons

of mass destruction. Therefore, to the extent that a contemporary peacekeeping operation increases a state's sense of security, United States nonproliferation interests are being served. Additionally, a perceived lack of commitment from the United States could erode its position on the UN Security Council. Finally, as mentioned above, contemporary peacekeeping operations can serve as a preventive tool, precluding the need to intervene in a larger and more costly operation at a later time or preventing the spread of an already existing conflict.¹⁶

United States military participation in multilateral, contemporary peacekeeping operations can serve United States interests in the following ways. First, United States military participation may be necessary to persuade others to participate in certain operations. Second, United States military participation may be a means of exercising United States influence over an important contemporary peacekeeping operation without unilaterally bearing the costs and risks associated with such an operation. Finally, the United States may be called upon and choose to provide unique skills and capabilities to certain contemporary peacekeeping operations--skills and capabilities that most countries capable of conducting traditional peacekeeping operations do not possess.¹⁷

Another aspect of the national security and national military strategy of concern here is when will the United States and when will it not participate in contemporary peacekeeping operations. The "when" part of this will be discussed in the next section under PDD 25; however, the "when will it not" part seems to be fairly straightforward, at least in theory. In the Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, stated:

If a major regional conflict erupts, the United States will deploy a substantial number of forces to the theater along with some overseas presence forces to quickly defeat the aggressor. If it is prudent to do so, limited U.S. forces may remain engaged in a smaller-scale operation like peacekeeping while the MRC is ongoing. If not, U.S. forces will be withdrawn from peace operations in order to help constitute sufficient forces to deter and, if necessary, fight and win a second MRC.¹⁸

To make it even more straightforward, General John M. Shalikashvili stated before the Senate Committee on Armed Services that, ". . . in the event we become involved in a major conflict, we will have to withdraw our forces committed to Operations Other Than War in order to restore our posture to respond to a second major conflict."¹⁹ Evident from these two statements is the fact that the force that emerged from the Bottom-Up Review eliminated the latitude of supporting two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs while also sustaining active force involvement in any significant smaller-scale operations.²⁰ Now the "when."

PDD 25 -- Selective and More Effective Peacekeeping Operations

In 1993, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework that would be better suited for the post-Cold War era. The policy review resulted in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).²¹ An important result of this review was the development of criteria to be used in determining whether or not the United States should participate in a given contemporary peacekeeping operation. A complete list of criteria contained in The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (A summary of the key elements of the Directive) can be

found in Appendix 2. The following is a list of just a few of the criteria chosen to show the latitude that exists for including the United States military in a given contemporary peacekeeping operation.

- Participation advances U.S. interests.
- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
 - International aggression.
 - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence.
 - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success.²²

Although the policy states that any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of all the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant, it is only realistic to believe that factors (such as the last two listed above) will have more significance than others.²³ This is evidenced by the United States decision to participate in the contemporary peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia.

Another important outcome of this decision directive was the United States recognition that the character of peacekeeping operations has changed in the post-Cold War era. Specifically, in The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, it states:

They [peace operations] are no longer limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive, unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives.²⁴

The policy goes on to state that:

The expansion of peacekeeping operations without a commensurate expansion of capabilities has contributed to noticeable setbacks. If the U.S. is to support the full range of peace operations effectively, when it is in our interests to do so, our government, not just the UN, must adapt.²⁵

These passages demonstrate the United States recognition that future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations will require the involvement of a wider range of United States military capabilities. This wide range of capabilities is required to achieve a standard of military effectiveness that not only ensures the effective implementation of the mandate but also the protection of the peacekeeping force.

At first glance, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations appears to extremely limit United States participation in future contemporary peacekeeping operations; however, as Adam Roberts said in The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, "The Directive leaves more scope, however, for US participation in UN peacekeeping than some early press reports indicated."²⁶ The reason for this likely participation in future contemporary peacekeeping operations appears to be centered around United States interests. This is best brought out in the conclusion to The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, which states:

Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states--crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests.²⁷

Potential Locations for United States Involvement in Contemporary Peacekeeping

Operations

Although not as discernible during the Cold War years, ethnic tensions have been and will likely continue to be among the most frequent causes of conflict.²⁸ Currently, there are approximately 33 active ethnic conflicts.²⁹ A list of these current ethnic conflicts can be found in Appendix 3. This list is probably not complete, but it shows the magnitude of ethnic-based conflict throughout the world today. Considering the potential for conflict and the probable impact on United States interests, the former Soviet Union is the most dangerous area.³⁰ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, emphasized this point when he stated:

When you allow yourself to step back and view it from a geostrategic perspective, you cannot help but notice that the main event in Europe today is not Bosnia.³¹ . . . We believe that our own stability and security are inextricably linked to how stable and secure the Eastern half of Europe feels. We know that this stability and security will not be rooted in a weak Russia.³²

In areas such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, where the Soviet Union once suppressed ethnic and nationalistic fervor, ancient conflicts have continued to erupt. As is the case in the Caucasus, several minority groups within Russia are restive--making the future of Russia as a consolidated state questionable. Additionally, irredentist issues continue to arise throughout Central Asia, where there are millions of ethnic Russians living in most of the other former republics.³³

Borders in Africa, still based on divisions made by European states, are another source of ethnic and religious tension. Ethiopia, Kenya and Zaire are just a few of the

states which possess a significant potential for ethnic conflict. Additionally, in South Africa, a major escalation of violence is likely to break out should the transition to black majority rule falter. South Asia clearly has a very high incidence of ethnic conflicts. Here, the Kashmir issue could lead to interstate conflict between India and Pakistan; however, the potential for intrastate conflict in India is even greater as existing conflicts involving Punjab, Assam, and Muslims threaten to escalate markedly under the impact of minority assertiveness and Hindu nationalism. Eruptions will likely continue in such regions as Afghanistan, Kurdistan (split between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey) and west Africa, where tribal boundaries rarely match political or national ones. The Middle East has somewhat fewer cases of ethnic conflict, but these are some of the most persistent and violent to be found anywhere. Finally, there is the potential for renewed conflict in the Balkans if the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement are not fully met or are fractured by any one of the ethnic groups living in that region. If this were to happen, there is potential for expansion of the conflict into the Kosovo region or into Macedonia.³⁴

At the outset, it may not appear to be within the United States national interests to intervene in such conflicts; however, if the ethnic conflict were to spread throughout a region, the expansion of conflict may require the commitment of a substantial number of military forces and capabilities. An example of this occurred in the Balkans, where the internal conflict did not constitute a major regional conflict, but if it had expanded to Kosovo, the conflict could have triggered involvement by Greece and Turkey. This, in turn, could have created a situation that would require the commitment of substantial military forces and capabilities from both the United States and its NATO allies. As

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. stated in his article Dimensions of the Post-Cold War World, "the basis for a more clearly defined concept of national interest lies in an understanding of the **potential** for ethno-sectarian and other primarily internal conflicts within an existing or former political unit to be escalated to regional level."³⁵

Given that multilateral, contemporary peacekeeping operations are an important component of our national military strategy, that PDD 25 does not impede United States participation in UN or other multilateral peacekeeping operations, and that an increasing number of ethnic conflicts have the potential to spread deeper into regions that effect United States national interests; the United States could easily find itself involved in simultaneous, contemporary peacekeeping operations in the future. The focus of the next two chapters is to show how this potential heavy involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations, with forces described in Chapter I, would affect the United States preparedness to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs.

III. Potential Force Structure / Force Preparedness Limitations

As discussions in Chapter II concerning United States military strategy point out, in the event the United States becomes involved in a MRC, military forces, if required, will be withdrawn from peacekeeping operations in order to help constitute sufficient forces to respond to a second MRC. Although in theory this strategy may be viable, the nature of contemporary peacekeeping operations and the political implications associated with withdrawing United States forces from a multinational peacekeeping force may make this

strategy untenable. Additionally, if the forces could be withdrawn, one must then ask the question--are these forces at a level of readiness to participate in a MRC and, if not, how long will it take them to prepare? Providing insight into these issues is the focus of this chapter.

Factors Leading to Extended U.S. Military Involvement in Contemporary

Peacekeeping Operations

Because of the ferocity of ethnic violence, potential for escalation, and the sophisticated nature of intrastate conflicts, United States forces, equipment and capabilities are often necessary to successfully carry out UN mandates. Once committed, United States forces often have a difficult time turning contemporary peacekeeping operations over to either the UN or regional organizations. Specifically, both the UN and regional organizations depend heavily on third world armies to construct a peacekeeping force. Because contemporary peacekeeping operations are often too militarily complex and difficult for most third world armies to carry out, without inadvertently getting into a drawn-out combat situation with local powers, the UN and regional organizations are often reluctant to replace United States peacekeeping forces.³⁶ In northern Iraq, the United States used its unequalled resources to create the conditions for the UN to carry on with an international operation to provide protection and humanitarian aid to the approximately 800,000 Kurdish refugees who fled from Saddam Hussein's troops in March 1991. Plans to withdraw troops in June 1991 were delayed because of UN fears that the Kurds would again flee to the mountains for fear of no protection. A withdrawal took place a month later only after the creation of a United States-led rapid reaction force

of some 5,000 soldiers and aircrew.³⁷ Similarly, in Somalia, the replacement of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) by the UN peacekeeping force was delayed by three months because the Secretary General and Secretariat could not field a force necessary to replace the American coalition. When the second UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) force finally replaced UNITAF on 4 May 1993, the United States still kept a 4500-man force in Somalia to form a capable reserve for the UN peacekeeping force.³⁸ Even in Haiti, considered somewhat benign in relation to other contemporary peacekeeping operations, United States participation was essential to the success of the UN mission. This participation required the commitment of United States combat, combat support and combat service support units for nearly a year-and-a-half after 20,000 United States troops headed south to invade Haiti.³⁹

Experience has shown that contemporary peacekeeping operations are successful when they crystallize around a "lead country." Although such deployments remain UN operations, one country becomes the lead country in forming the ad hoc task force, in terms of command and control, operations, and contributed troops and equipment.⁴⁰ Operations in northern Iraq, Somalia and Haiti are examples of this "lead country" concept, where the United States was the lead country. The danger with this concept occurred in Somalia when the departure of the lead country, the United States, acted as a catalyst for the departure of other peacekeeping nations from the region. The United States attempted to exercise world leadership, calling on other nations to remain behind in Somalia after United States forces left, but the attempt was futile.⁴¹

The loss of United States leadership was probably the primary reason for other nations to leave Somalia; however, the loss of United States capabilities in terms of forces and equipment and support apparatuses (such as imported infrastructure, mobility assets, and communications equipment) also factored into other countries' decisions to exit Somalia.⁴² The departure of other nations from a contemporary peacekeeping operation, resulting from the loss of United States capabilities, occurs primarily because of unilateral planning on the part of the United States. The United States, as the lead country, tends to plan coalition operations in a vacuum, not taking into account the limitations and capabilities of other nations. Once a plan is developed, it is then "internationalized" to represent the efforts of a coalition. The problem occurs when the United States departs an operation whose successful execution depends on United States capabilities--capabilities that most nations do not possess.⁴³ As the United States continues to take on the role of "lead country" in future contemporary peacekeeping operations, its departure from such operations will be made more difficult because of the void that is created in terms of leadership and capabilities.

Ethnic conflicts seem to last a long time, thus possibly requiring a long-lasting commitment by contemporary peacekeeping forces. Although contemporary peacekeeping operations seek to establish conditions for the resolution of intrastate conflicts, the nature of such conflicts makes this a difficult task. If the nature of the conflict is defined by differences in unalterable or nearly unalterable factors such as race, religion or language, the tension between parties is likely to be long-lasting. This may, in turn, create the conditions for a long-lasting conflict as well. Conflict resolution may be

even more difficult to attain in conflicts where tensions are exacerbated by brutal and divisive war, as is the case in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union.⁴⁴

Thus, any fragile states created in conjunction with outside intervention will most likely have difficulty surviving the withdrawal of contemporary peacekeeping forces.⁴⁵

Negative political implications associated with withdrawing United States forces from multilateral, contemporary peacekeeping operations could also lead to extended United States involvement in such operations. The President's National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, has established a clear priority for military operations by stating:

We will never compromise military readiness to support peacekeeping. Nor would we hesitate to end our engagement in a peacekeeping operation if that were necessary to concentrate our forces against an adversary in a major regional conflict.⁴⁶

Although this statement does in fact represent a clear priority, this "black and white" approach to decision making may be made more complex by other factors.

Global transparency and the technological capability for real-time coverage of violence throughout the world, combined with unprecedented opportunities for travel and immigration (legal and illegal), will strengthen the ability of ethnic groups with populations living in the United States to influence American policy.⁴⁷ These efforts by ethnic groups to influence American policy are not new, but they are on the rise. This is happening primarily because these new mediums of communication are now encouraging the interaction between the homeland and the diaspora in the United States. Furthermore, where the diaspora is linked by ethnicity, the effort to influence American policy is even greater. This situation is exacerbated as the United States faces such a large influx of

immigrants, making political and social integration extremely difficult, if not impossible.⁴⁸ Though not strong enough to solely control United States policy, ethnic influences from abroad could easily sway American policy makers toward a continued United States presence in a given conflict area.

United States participation in a particular contemporary peacekeeping operation sends a political signal that the United States has a strong interest in the particular operation and that the UN means business. If the United States withdraws from the peacekeeping mission, a particularly damaging political signal would be sent regarding UN will and US backing.⁴⁹ This is of particular concern when a state's sovereignty is at stake. Specifically, traditional peacekeeping operations depended on the consent of all the parties involved, which were usually sovereign states. Today, however, most peacekeeping operations cannot depend on the consent of all parties concerned, even when these parties are sovereign states. As a result, states willingly, and sometimes unwillingly, surrender some of their sovereignty to the UN in contemporary peacekeeping operations. The United States must realize that by strongly supporting UN efforts in this area, it limits its flexibility to withdraw from such operations. For if it does, not only would the UN's efforts be weakened politically but also operationally--a dangerous endeavor, especially when a state has surrendered its sovereignty unwillingly.⁵⁰

Factors Leading to Force Preparedness Limitations/Delays, Given That United States Forces Can Be Withdrawn from Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

In response to a United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs, Department of Defense

(DoD) stated:

It is also important to recognize that while there may be some stress on support forces, the availability of combat units will not be a problem, because the types of forces that are typically committed to peace operations--light infantry, Marines and Special Forces--are not the same as those that are likely to be required during the initial stages of a major regional conflict.⁵¹

This response seems to rely on the faulty assumption that mechanized forces will not be part of the contemporary peacekeeping force structure. Although mechanized forces involved in contemporary peacekeeping operations will not come from the contingency force pool (5-1/3 divisions) designed to respond to the first MRC, they will be a key component of the force pool required to augment those forces in the first MRC or required during the initial stages of the second MRC.⁵² Therefore, combat readiness is a key issue for these later deploying mechanized forces who find themselves involved in contemporary peacekeeping operations for the reasons previously described. Below is a discussion of those factors which could lead to a contemporary peacekeeping force's limited preparedness for conventional operations required in a MRC.

Like light infantry units involved in contemporary peacekeeping operations, mechanized forces will most likely lose their warfighting edge the longer they remain involved in an operation more focused on noncombat rules of engagement and individual/crew versus collective/units skills. Some leaders believe that rules of engagement are the most obvious contrast between contemporary peacekeeping operations and operations required for combat.⁵³ In fact, Army leaders have stated that some peacekeeping missions teach troops lessons they will have to unlearn once they

return to their home station. An example used is presence patrols, stating that 'Presence patrols are the antithesis of good scout [tactics], . . . A scout wants to patrol and not be seen . . .'⁵⁴ These beliefs are not only the perspective of United States leaders but also leaders from other peacekeeping nations. Kjeld Hillingsø, a lead Danish peacekeeper stated, "The difference is that in peace support training, we teach the soldiers new attitudes. We teach them to react differently, often directly contrary to normal combat reactions."⁵⁵ Because these noncombat rules of engagement drive soldiers to take risks that would not normally be taken in combat situations, the Army has relied on extensive combat-oriented retraining for units returning from contemporary peacekeeping operations.⁵⁶

In addition to noncombat rules of engagement, contemporary peacekeeping missions consist of operations with a focus on individuals and crews as opposed to units. For a mechanized or armor unit, whose lowest common denominator for combat is the platoon, such a focus will definitely dull its combat edge. The inability for that platoon to train on platoon gunnery (Table XII) or that company to train on collective tasks such as tactical roadmarches or offensive maneuvers will surely degrade the combat readiness of such units involved in contemporary peacekeeping operations.⁵⁷ Only a thorough retraining can bring these units back up to a level of readiness required for combat operations.

Typically, contemporary peacekeeping operations extending beyond one year involve a total commitment three times the size of the deployed force: one third preparing to go, one third executing, and one third recovering.⁵⁸ If a contemporary peacekeeping

operation requires a mechanized brigade as part of the peacekeeping force structure, a mechanized or armored division, in reality, is not available for immediate commitment to a MRC. This scope of commitment to contemporary peacekeeping operations only amplifies the limited preparedness that mechanized forces will face as a result of their involvement in such operations.

When deploying a unit from a contemporary peacekeeping operation to a MRC, several factors must be taken into consideration when determining the amount of time and resources needed to prepare a unit for deployment to combat. One such factor centers around the operational environment. Specifically, how much time will it take to transfer the peacekeeping mission to a replacement unit?⁵⁹ The United States National Military Strategy states that:

Normally our Armed Forces will withdraw from operations other than war when the security situation is stabilized and other organizations are prepared to assume responsibility for relief or security. In times of crisis, we need to accelerate this process. . . Activities not involving critical US interests will be turned over to the United Nations or other responsible regional security organizations while we attend to higher priority taskings.⁶⁰

Although each operation will require a different timeline for the transfer of its mission, it is likely that each timeline will be lengthened by the factors previously discussed. Extensive time will be required for the UN or regional organizations to provide replacement forces, equipment and capabilities necessary to continue to effectively implement the established mandate. Delays by the UN in Somalia attest to this fact. Additionally, a new command and control structure, with the necessary

communications, will have to be installed to replace that which was used by the United States to effectively execute the mission. Furthermore, the UN or regional organization must replace the enormous support structure/infrastructure the United States has put into place to support the overall operation, because without an adequate support structure, the operation will come to a grinding halt. All of this, if it can be done, will require time--the same time that contemporary peacekeeping forces need to prepare for a MRC.

A second factor to consider concerns the location of units prior to deployment to a MRC. Units deployed to contemporary peacekeeping operations should first be deployed to their home station before follow-on deployment to a MRC. This should occur for four primary reasons: to link-up with stay-behind soldiers and equipment not deployed to the peacekeeping operation, to train the combined arms team for combat, to perform quality maintenance on vehicles and equipment, both deployed and left behind, and to arrange personal and family affairs before deploying to a MRC.⁶¹

Units do not normally deploy to a contemporary peacekeeping operation with all modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) soldiers and equipment because of troop and equipment limitations placed on them by the established mandate.⁶² Such equipment may include area fire weapon systems used by the field artillery and mortar units, air defense artillery systems, and some direct fire weapon systems, all of which are an integral part of the combined arms force needed in a MRC. Subsequently, a unit deployed to a contemporary peacekeeping operation would need to redeploy to its home station to link-up with any stay-behind personnel and equipment prior to deployment to a MRC.

The most important reason for redeploying a unit to home station is to allow it to train uninterrupted and with sufficient resources for combat. Collective training activities (above platoon level) in the contemporary peacekeeping operations area are usually prohibited by the UN, host nation, or circumstances of the mission itself. Furthermore, the unit will have the constraint of having to continue the performance of its peacekeeping duties until relieved. If the unit is deployed directly from the peacekeeping operation to the MRC, training resources (training ammunition, ranges, land and special equipment), facilities and time in the MRC area of operations will be limited.⁶³ Therefore, in order to sufficiently resource a unit's combat training prior to its deployment to a MRC, the unit should be redeployed to its home station where all its personnel, equipment, and resources can be joined together to prepare for its upcoming combat mission.

Redeploying a unit to its home station to allow for quality maintenance to be performed on all vehicles and equipment, both deployed and left behind, is yet another reason for redeploying a peacekeeping unit to home station first.⁶⁴ The extensive use of certain equipment, combined with the harsh environmental effects encountered in certain contemporary peacekeeping operations, requires that thorough maintenance be performed on all peacekeeping equipment prior to using it in combat operations.⁶⁵ Furthermore, quality maintenance includes services, deferred maintenance, and calibration of weapon systems and equipment--all of which are probably not being performed during the contemporary peacekeeping operation.⁶⁶ At the same time maintenance is performed on vehicles and equipment used in the peacekeeping operation, maintenance must also be

performed on stay-behind vehicles and equipment. Experience has shown that vehicles and equipment that stay behind are often neglected by rear detachment personnel, thus also requiring services, deferred maintenance and calibration of weapons systems and equipment.⁶⁷

A final reason for redeploying a unit to home station is to allow the soldiers to take care of personal and family affairs before deploying to a MRC.⁶⁸ This will become even more necessary as the Army gets smaller and the deployments increase. Frequent deployments and their impact on the Army's ability to fight and win two wars has become of increasing concern to the Army's top leadership.⁶⁹ Certainly, the basis of this concern centers around the morale of the soldier and how it will affect his performance of duties in a MRC.⁷⁰

A third factor to consider when deploying a unit from a contemporary peacekeeping operation to a MRC is acclimation of personnel and equipment. If significant weather or terrain differences exist between the location of the contemporary peacekeeping operation, unit home station, and/or MRC, additional time for acclimation of personnel and equipment may be required. For personnel, this may also include issuance of supplemental TA-50 and additional shots, and for vehicles and equipment this may include modifications in lubricants, prescribed load lists (PLLs), and tools.⁷¹

A final factor concerns the time required for strategic mobility assets to move a contemporary peacekeeping force directly to a MRC, or to its home station and then to a MRC.⁷² This time will be dependent upon several logistics factors to be discussed in the next chapter.

How much time will it take for units returning from contemporary peacekeeping operations to return to a level of readiness required for combat? Although times will vary based on the factors previously described, estimated timelines are available based on experiences of former contemporary peacekeeping units. The following is a discussion of these timelines, all beginning **after** the unit is redeployed to home station.

Accepting what may be some risk, combat arms units require a minimum of sixty days to return to an acceptable level of combat readiness. Although most training requirements will be met at the individual/crew/platoon level, not all will be met at the company/battalion level. With just two months available, gunnery will be accelerated to allow for the completion of platoon qualifications on Tank or Bradley Table XII. However, it will be difficult to complete any live-fire exercises at the company level or above. Furthermore, with only two months available, maneuver exercises or field training exercises (FTXs) will probably only be conducted through the company/company team level. In terms of maintenance, deadline maintenance will be the focus with some services able to be completed. Additionally, calibration will be a priority focus. To accept less risk, commanders should require ninety days of preparation prior to deployment to a MRC. This amount of time would allow for the conduct of live-fire exercises and a task force FTX, as well as more detailed maintenance.⁷³

Combat support (CS) units require forty-five to sixty days minimum to return to an acceptable level of combat readiness. Although CS units will also focus on training mission essential task list (METL) tasks not needed during the contemporary peacekeeping operation, a significant portion of their time will be spent on maintenance

of a large number of vehicles and equipment. Combat support units such as the combat engineers will be on the high end of the timeline because of competing requirements to maintain their high density of vehicles as well as train with the combined arms team. Like the combat arms units, commanders of CS units should require ninety days of preparation prior to deployment to a MRC. This allows for more maintenance and equipment preparation time as well as time to train with the combat arms units.⁷⁴

Combat service support (CSS) units should be given up to sixty days to prepare for combat operations. This time will vary among CSS units since they vary significantly in equipment density and mission. The most important issues for CSS units are the condition of the unit equipment and how much is on hand. Many key pieces of equipment are only "one-deep," making their maintenance even more important. Furthermore, CSS units will need personnel replacements because of essential one-of-a-kind specialists needing to be replaced.⁷⁵ Combat service support units are dual and triple tasked because of the need not only to recover themselves but also to help recover the combat units in terms of maintenance and parts. Furthermore, they must support training that will start early on in an abbreviated recovery/MRC preparation cycle.⁷⁶

Keeping in mind that contemporary peacekeeping operations extending beyond one year will involve a total commitment three times the size of the deployed force, the two forces not deployed will also require adequate time to prepare for combat. Their estimated time for preparation, although probably not as extensive as the currently deployed unit, must be taken into consideration when deploying units to a MRC.

As the beginning of this chapter points out, there are several factors that could lead to the extended involvement of United States military forces in contemporary peacekeeping operations, thus preventing or delaying their use in a MRC. If and when released from peacekeeping duty, there are further delays (in terms of redeployment and preparation for combat) that would be placed on these units, making them unavailable for immediate deployment to a second MRC.⁷⁷ This analysis supports a conclusion in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which states:

Adoption of new missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, . . . , has the potential to place far greater demands on the operating and deployment tempos (time deployed) of our forces. Combat force contributions to peacekeeping operations, for example, will in most cases be infantry and SOF-intensive and will likely involve force commitments of an extended duration. . . . Moreover, once committed to peacekeeping operations, these forces will not be readily available to respond to crises elsewhere.⁷⁸

This statement, as written, is very significant because it recognizes that forces committed to peacekeeping will not be readily available for commitment to a MRC. However, if one takes into account that combat force contributions for contemporary peacekeeping operations will not only be infantry and special operations forces (SOF), but also mechanized forces, this statement takes on an even greater level of significance in terms of the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs, given an involvement in simultaneous contemporary peacekeeping operations. The impact of such an involvement is clearly stated in another conclusion formed in the BUR, which states:

Protracted commitments to peace operations could lower the overall readiness of U.S. active duty forces over time, and in turn, reduce our ability to fulfill our strategy to be able to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.⁷⁹

The next chapter looks at some potential logistics shortfalls that could further reduce the United States military's flexibility in responding to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs, given an involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations.

IV. Potential Logistics Shortfalls

In addition to the force structure/force preparedness issues discussed in the previous chapter, there are three primary logistics issues that could reduce the United States military's flexibility in responding to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs, given its current and likely future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations. They are: inadequate infrastructure at points of debarkation, lack of vital logistics components, and strategic mobility time limitations. Although all these issues are pertinent whether the contemporary peacekeeping force is predominantly light- or heavy-based, the introduction of mechanized forces into a theater intensifies the scope of these issues.

Inadequate Infrastructure

Because contemporary peacekeeping operations often occur in austere locations where there is limited electric power, roads, water, port facilities, and air fields; airlift and sealift flow into and out of the area of operations (AOR) will be constrained.⁸⁰ In Somalia, for example, the rate of airlift deployments to Somalia was constrained by the

inadequacy of the airfield facilities there. In fact, it became necessary to meter airlift into the theater to match the available airfield capacity.⁸¹ Additionally, shipping deliveries were below theoretical capacity largely because of capacity constraints at Mogadishu. There was only a single berth capable of handling fast sealift ships, requiring these ships to be metered into the port one after the other.⁸² Draft limitations on ships caused by seaport limitations place an additional constraint on the flow of shipping into these austere locations. In Somalia, the draft of afloat prepositioned ships was too great to allow them to enter the port of Mogadishu. This required the ships to offload their lighters (barges) "in the stream." However, because of bad weather and high seas, no attempt was made to offload the cargo. Further delays were encountered when these ships tried to offload at other ports along the coast of Somalia. The length of the ships, in addition to continuing bad weather and high seas, prevented these ships from offloading at these other ports. As a result of these delays and others, earliest deliveries came at D+34, the latest at D+68, when the expected deliveries were scheduled for D+7.⁸³

This same situation, although not nearly to the same degree, could be found at a potential MRC AOR. During Desert Storm, airlift operations in Saudi Arabia were constrained because operations were largely limited to a single airfield-- Dhahran. Although other airfields existed, they did not have the infrastructure necessary to support large airlift operations.⁸⁴ Even in Dhahran, the airlift capacity normally remained at 30 missions per day because of the infrastructure limitations and other uses being made of the airfield.⁸⁵ Furthermore, materiel handling equipment (MHE) problems placed

additional constraints on airlift operations in Dhahran by restricting the maximum number of aircraft that could be handled at the base at any given time.⁸⁶

The only way to establish, improve upon and provide continued infrastructure support for areas as described above is to deploy the necessary infrastructure equipment and personnel to the required areas of operation. In Somalia, because the reception operations were conditioned by the devastated state of the seaport and airport facilities, and the onward movement infrastructure was severely limited, planners understood that essentially all the deployment infrastructure needed would have to be deployed.⁸⁷ The experiences in Saudi Arabia highlight the necessity of having an adequate airlift infrastructure, often attained by flying in the appropriate equipment needed to maintain the required airlift flow.⁸⁸

Because deployable infrastructure (in terms of equipment and personnel) exists in limited numbers and types--a point of discussion below--the United States military will have to weigh the risks of sending this valuable resource to a contemporary peacekeeping operation, and not having it available for a MRC. Specifically, the United States military must either accept that deployment into and out of contemporary peacekeeping operations will be largely constrained by inadequate infrastructure (ultimately increasing the deployment time for peacekeeping forces to get to a MRC) or that the deployable infrastructure will not be available for a MRC because it was used to expand the infrastructure in contemporary peacekeeping AORs. In weighing these risks, a primary consideration for the United States will be that this deployable infrastructure not only supports the United States but also supports coalition forces and the local population. If

taken away and not adequately replaced, this loss of infrastructure could cause a collapse in the overall contemporary peacekeeping operation.

Lack of Vital Logistics Components

The Army normally has three shiploads of materiel and equipment prepositioned to facilitate the rapid deployment of a heavy Army brigade. The cargo includes ammunition, food, tents, generators, water production equipment, MHE, hospital equipment and watercraft.⁸⁹ Recent experiences have shown that the equipment and supplies stored on these ships are being used extensively in contemporary peacekeeping operations. In 1992 and 1993, most of the equipment and supplies on these three ships were used in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.⁹⁰ In 1994, the ships were positioned for use in supporting the Rwanda humanitarian operation; however, the need to unload these ships' equipment and supplies never arose. During this same time, the ships were sent to Southwest Asia to support United States forces in Operation Vigilant Warrior.⁹¹ Had the operation in Somalia been extended into 1994 or had the ships been offloaded to support the Rwanda operation, their supplies and equipment would not have been available for use in Southwest Asia--one of the two potential MRCs. Therefore, as the United States continues to involve itself in contemporary peacekeeping operations of the future, it must continually weigh the risks of using these limited assets; for their use in such operations will most likely make them unavailable for a MRC.

The most important resource most vital to the United States military's extensive logistics capabilities--support units--is also a limited asset. To prioritize scarce resources, many of the Army's active support units are assigned fewer people in peacetime than are

required to perform their wartime missions. As a result of these shortcomings, practices such as cross-leveling personnel in the same MOS and retraining personnel in one MOS to fill a void in another are now common practices, each with its own inherent shortcomings.⁹² The shortcoming associated with cross-leveling is that the non-deployed unit contributing forces to the deploying unit has a difficult time in meeting its operational responsibilities at home station.⁹³ Furthermore, and more importantly, this same unit cannot be deployed unless it is augmented itself. This problem occurred in the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, the most ready and resourced of all the Army corps, prior to the deployment of its support units to Somalia. The deploying units were advised that they would need 100 percent or more of their authorized people and equipment to meet operational requirements. Most units did not have the people or equipment to satisfy the requirement, some only having 90 percent or less of their authorized strength and most having only 80 percent or less of their authorized personnel and equipment. As a result, the Army supplemented the personnel-deficient units by borrowing from other support units throughout the Army force structure, thus limiting those units' ability to meet their own operational requirements and deployability criteria.⁹⁴

Also resulting from this under-resourcing of support units is the practice of retraining support personnel in one MOS to fill a void in another MOS. An example of this occurred in Somalia when there was a greater need for water purification teams than for POL units. As a result, personnel in POL units were retrained in the use of water purification equipment and sent to Somalia in such a capacity.⁹⁵ A shortcoming associated with this practice is that those personnel retrained are no longer available for

deployment in their primary MOS, should the need arise as a result of another contemporary peacekeeping operation or the start of a MRC. Secondly, because the equipment being used is normally in limited supply, retraining occurs on equipment borrowed from the reserve component. In some cases, the retrained support forces deploy with the same equipment, again because of the existing equipment shortages.⁹⁶ Therefore, the equipment is no longer available for deployment with reserve forces in case a MRC were to break out at the same time.

Support units that accompany active combat forces to one of the two potential MRCs are organized into seven packages. The first three packages, called Contingency Force Pool (CFP) 1-3, support the first 5-1/3 divisions designated to respond to the first MRC. The fourth package, CFP 4, indirectly supports the first 5-1/3 divisions by rounding out the theater support that would be required for these early deploying forces. Contingency Force Pool 5-7 supports the follow-on 5-1/3 divisions designated to either support the first MRC or respond to the second MRC.⁹⁷

Although planners have been able to minimize the use of the Army's CFP 1-3 support forces in contemporary peacekeeping operations, they have had to use a large portion of some of these support forces because of their limited number in the active component. In Somalia, for example, 50 percent of the active support forces used were from CFP 1-3 units. In fact, 92 percent of the quartermaster forces, 64 percent of the miscellaneous support forces, and 65 percent of transportation forces deployed to Somalia were CFP 1-3 units.⁹⁸ The table in Appendix 4 illustrates the high usage of selected CFP 1-3 support units in the Somalia contemporary peacekeeping operation.

A further analysis of the commitment of active support forces to contemporary peacekeeping operations reveals an even greater problem in terms of the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs. In Somalia, for example, there were some cases in which nearly all the active units for a particular support capability were deployed to meet the operational requirements on the ground. Specifically, 75 percent of the petroleum supply companies, 67 percent of the medium petroleum truck companies, and 100 percent of the air terminal movement control teams in the active force structure deployed to Somalia.⁹⁹ The table in Appendix 5 illustrates the high usage of selected active support units in Somalia. Furthermore, as noted earlier in the chapter, the introduction of mechanized forces into a theater only exacerbates the already existing shortages found in certain CSS units. Mechanized units will require more petroleum supply companies, POL truck companies, ammunition companies and general support supply companies.¹⁰⁰

In comparing the support capabilities needed in the first 30 days of a MRC with the contingency support capabilities deployed to Somalia, statistics show that in some cases 100 percent of certain active component support units would be needed in both.¹⁰¹ Of particular concern are those support forces (such as port handlers, air and sea movement control personnel, petroleum handlers and transportation forces) needed in the initial days of a MRC, that would still be needed within the peacekeeping theater(s) to facilitate disengagement and redeployment.¹⁰² Furthermore, their own disengagement and redeployment would be made more difficult because of delays associated with re-training of war-fighting skills, reconstitution of equipment, and obtainment of sufficient airlift to

redeploy to a given MRC.¹⁰³ At this point, immediate access to reserve component forces would be necessary.¹⁰⁴

Until recently [read Haiti], only reserve volunteers have participated in most peacekeeping operations.¹⁰⁵ While reserve volunteers have been helpful, the volunteers available are not always the ones with the specific capabilities, equipment, and training required for contemporary peacekeeping operations. Moreover, individual volunteers do not meet the Army's requirement for units; therefore, they must be organized into and trained as a unit to perform a mission as a cohesive entity. All of this requires time. In Somalia, for example, Army planners created a postal unit from available volunteers. It took one month to create a 49-person postal unit, a time-consuming process indeed. In an initiative started last year to use reserve volunteers for peacekeeping operations in the Sinai, it took approximately six months to activate and train 420 volunteer reservists for traditional peacekeeping duty.¹⁰⁶ Because preparation time is something even contemporary peacekeeping commanders are not given a lot of, active support units are normally sought to meet the operational requirements of such operations. Unfortunately, many of the support capabilities most heavily relied upon in contemporary peacekeeping operations reside predominantly in the reserves.¹⁰⁷ The table in Appendix 6 illustrates this fact.

Making greater use of the reserves in contemporary peacekeeping operations would ease the burden on Army active support forces. However, DoD policy guidance concerning the use of reserves in contemporary peacekeeping operations requires that maximum consideration be given to the use of volunteers before involuntary activation is

ordered under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). Gaining involuntary access to reserve personnel for any mission is a sensitive matter because it has the potential to disrupt the lives of reservists, their families, and their employers or customers.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, the long-term nature of contemporary peacekeeping operations directly opposes the short-term legal limits on reserve call-ups.¹⁰⁹ That is why PSRC has only been invoked twice since its 1976 enactment--once for the Gulf War and in September 1994 for Haiti.¹¹⁰ According to DoD, "the assumption of many reservists is that reservists would be called up for service only when vital interests of the United States are threatened."¹¹¹ Furthermore, United States Army Reserve Command officials expressed their concerns about the involuntary use of reserves by stating that "involuntary use of the reserves for peace operations would be disruptive to reservist's lives and ultimately could affect the willingness of Americans to join the reserves."¹¹²

The United States military can also use contractors, such as Brown and Root, to augment support forces in contemporary peacekeeping operations. The Army is already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of the support services typically provided by active support personnel, however, there are some shortcomings associated with using these services. First, these services entail additional costs that normally have to be paid out of the Army's operations and maintenance budget. Secondly, as operations in Somalia revealed, the contractor may need to use Army equipment to perform some of its tasks. This requires taking equipment from Army units. Finally, the introduction of contractors into a theater requires a stabilized operating environment, something not likely to be present in today's peacekeeping operations.¹¹³

Strategic Mobility Time Limitations

Recent experiences in Somalia have shown that strategic mobility assets are wasted as a result of Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) turbulence. In Operation Restore Hope, "the inability to offload Army prepositioning ships, the deterioration of runways, the effects of weather, and the deployment requirements of coalition forces,"¹¹⁴ all contributed to TPFDD turbulence. The problem is not in the TPFDD itself, but in the necessity for it to react to the supported CINC's rapidly changing transportation needs. Such changes are likely to be the future trend since on-the-shelf TPFDDs for every possible contingency cannot be constructed, and current TPFDDs for carefully planned contingencies, such as the two MRCs, will most likely change because of the future involvement of United States military forces in contemporary peacekeeping operations.¹¹⁵ When lift operations are relatively small, the occasional short-term waste of transportation can be absorbed.¹¹⁶ This was the case in Somalia. However, when large-scale operations, such as the deployment of forces to a MRC, simultaneous with the redeployment of forces from contemporary peacekeeping operations, are ongoing, transportation waste will cause time delays that may adversely affect the timely generation of required forces into a MRC.

In determining the force requirements for the two-MRC strategy, DoD assumed that forces already engaged in other operations could redeploy to a regional conflict. However, DoD did not analyze the feasibility of, or requirement for, such a redeployment during the bottom-up review.¹¹⁷ Preliminary findings as far back as 1994 have stated that, "U.S. military forces would encounter numerous challenges if they needed to redeploy on

short notice from one or more sizeable peace operations to a MRC."¹¹⁸ In June 1994, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements stated that "the United States would 'liquidate' its commitments to peace operations in the event of two simultaneous regional conflicts."¹¹⁹ He went on to state that "disengagement from one or more sizeable peace operations and redeployment of forces to a MRC on short notice could be difficult."¹²⁰

One of the primary challenges associated with redeploying contemporary peacekeeping forces and equipment to a MRC is obtaining sufficient airlift. Already limited airlift assets flying from the United States to a MRC would have to be diverted to the contemporary peacekeeping AOR(s) to pick up personnel and equipment and deliver them to the MRC. This problem is complicated even further if forces and equipment are redeployed to home station prior to deployment to the MRC. The Air Force has not fully studied the impact of such redeployments, and therefore, cannot quantify the effect of these potential delays on their ability to meet MRC deployment requirements.¹²¹

A second challenge concerns the sealift portion of the military's strategic mobility triad. In a January 1995 naval logistics wargame held at the Naval War College, the United States Navy raised issues about the ability of its logistics/sealift to meet national requirements. Issues common to contemporary peacekeeping missions such as extended operating distances, protracted operations, and extensive logistics requirements, led naval officials to comment that "Operations other than war, especially peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, placed great strain on DoD strategic lift."¹²²

Finally, when considering factors that may cause delays in the United States commitment to its two MRCs, one must also consider the degree of involvement that United States strategic mobility assets will have in future contemporary peacekeeping operations. Deterrence in the case of ethnic conflict, both at its outbreak and as a deterrent to escalation to a broader regional level, may depend on the credibility of coalition capabilities to rapidly introduce equipment and personnel into a region to influence the outcome of a conflict.¹²³ If the United States considers rapid deployment necessary, then it would not only have to deploy its own forces but also the forces of other non-Western nations.¹²⁴ In this case, rapid strategic airlift and sealift would be the most effective and critically necessary contribution the United States could make to UN contemporary peacekeeping operations.¹²⁵

However, using strategic mobility assets for contemporary peacekeeping operations may cause unacceptable delays in the United States ability to respond to a MRC. Eventhough Operation Restore Hope was not categorized as a rapid deployment operation, six of the nation's best sealift ships, the Fast Sealift Ships (FSSs), were used. Had a MRC arisen during this time, "complete delivery (closure) of the two heavy divisions of the Contingency Corps would have been delayed about three weeks, from 30 to 50 or more days after C-day. . . "¹²⁶

The alternative is to use older and slower Ready Reserve Force (RRF) roll-on/roll-off ships for contemporary peacekeeping operations. Although using the RRF ships for contemporary peacekeeping operations would help the United States maintain its preparedness for responding to the first MRC, there are shortcomings associated with this

alternative. First, and most obvious, is that the longer response time associated with RRF ships may lessen the deterrent capability of coalition forces responding to a contemporary peacekeeping operation. This is especially true if the deployment of coalition forces and equipment is to occur prior to the outbreak of the conflict. Secondly, because the space on the older RRF ships is less than that found on the newer FSS ships, the costs for contemporary peacekeeping operations would be increased because more ships would be needed. Finally, the impact of using RRF ships in contemporary peacekeeping operations would be felt by elements of later deploying Army combat and support forces who make up the remainder of the contingency force required to respond to the first MRC by C+75.¹²⁷

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This study revealed several factors that could place limitations on the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs, given a peacetime commitment to simultaneous contemporary peacekeeping operations. One such factor is the nature of the contemporary peacekeeping environment. Because the environment is normally characterized by protracted, ethnic-based violence and volatility, contemporary peacekeeping operations often require United States involvement. Experience has shown that once committed, United States forces have a difficult time turning contemporary peacekeeping operations over to either the UN or regional organizations because of the continued need for United States leadership and unique capabilities. This, combined with

negative political implications associated with withdrawing United States forces from these multilateral operations, could lead to an unanticipated, simultaneous commitment of United States military forces to contemporary peacekeeping operations and a MRC(s). Such an unexpected commitment of forces to peacekeeping could prevent, or at least severely delay, the use of such forces in follow-on operations in the first MRC or initial operations in the second MRC.

Even if United States forces were able to be withdrawn from contemporary peacekeeping operations, there are other factors that could cause delays in the commitment of these peacekeeping units to either of the two MRCs. Delays associated with the transfer of the peacekeeping mission, redeployment to home station, and the 3:1 commitment ratio will vary from operation to operation; nevertheless, they will have some degree of impact on the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs.

Delays could also be attributed to logistics shortfalls. Recent operations have shown that contemporary peacekeeping operations will most likely occur in locations where infrastructure is limited if not completely absent. Not only will the United States be required to deploy infrastructure to support its own operations but also that of its coalition partners as well as the local population. Potential MRC locations will also need infrastructure support, although not to the same degree. Because this deployable infrastructure is made up of limited personnel and equipment, it cannot be available in all locations. As a result, delays will occur in the peacekeeping or MRC theaters because of lack of infrastructure to support deploying and arriving personnel and equipment.

The over-use of vital logistics components such as afloat prepositioned equipment and supplies and active component support personnel and equipment (especially those from CFP 1-3 units) could lead to their unavailability for a MRC. This, in turn, could lead to substantial delays in both deploying and supporting United States forces in a MRC. Although volunteer reserve forces and contractors are being used to alleviate some of the pressure placed on active support forces, they too come with their own limitations which prevent their widespread use.

Finally, factors adversely affecting the timely and effective movement of personnel and equipment could also lead to delays in responding to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs. These factors include TPFDD turbulence, mission saturation, and the over-use of rapid deployment assets during contemporary peacekeeping operations.

Although it is unlikely that any of these factors alone could place severe limitations on the United States ability to execute its two-MRC strategy, their cumulative effect could. Therefore, the purpose of the following paragraphs is to discuss some recommended ways to lessen the impact of these factors on the United States flexibility to implement its national military strategy (in the area of contemporary peacekeeping operations) without jeopardizing its primary responsibility of responding effectively to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs.

Presidential Decision Directive 25 outlines several criteria to be used in determining which contemporary peacekeeping operations the United States will involve itself in. Although these criteria may be somewhat effective in filtering out peacekeeping operations not requiring United States participation, the only way to truly limit United

States participation is to help the United Nations, regional organizations and selective states develop the capability to conduct contemporary peacekeeping operations in the future.¹²⁸

In many crises, UN action may be appropriate and helpful; however, the Charter never intended the Security Council to be its only or full time court of first resort. In fact, "Article 52 explicitly mandates regional efforts to resolve or redress threats to peace and security before resort to the UN."¹²⁹ As a result, there is a growing role for regional organizations in this new era of peacekeeping operations. Not without their own limitations, organizations such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may be able to respond in a significant way to regional crises or conflicts.¹³⁰

Clearly, among these, NATO is the only organization in existence today with any viable military capability and political cohesion. In fact, in October 1993, the success of NATO was extended to other parts of Europe through a proposal called Partnership for Peace.¹³¹ Apart from NATO, however, most of these organizations have yet to reach any level of political integration, let alone military capability, to successfully conduct contemporary peacekeeping operations within their regions.¹³² What is needed then is United States leadership within, not outside, the multilateral concept. This, combined with financial and technical support from the permanent members of the Security

Council, would enable these regional organizations to play a much wider and more effective role in contemporary peacekeeping operations.¹³³

As mentioned previously, some crises may require UN action. However, before the UN can become an effective means of facilitating the resolution of conflict within different regions of the world, the United States and other powerful militaries must decide fundamentally whether a continued ad hoc coalition approach is preferable or whether participation in a UN structure is worth the investment.¹³⁴ If the latter is chosen, the United States military will most likely still be involved in contemporary peacekeeping operations, but in a much more limited way with more definitive timelines. If the former is chosen, however, events will continue to necessitate United States involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations, but in a way that depends on United States participation for an unlimited period of time.

In some instances, a situation may exist where it is advantageous for the UN Security Council to authorize an individual state to take a lead role in a country where there is already a UN peacekeeping presence. As Adam Roberts states in The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, "Such a system of authorization involves an implied reproach to internal organizations, yet may be the only way of addressing certain endemic conflicts and failures of government. . ."¹³⁵ The example he uses is Syria's role in Lebanon. He states, "Despite obvious failings, . . . Syria's role in Lebanon has in some respects been more effective than those of either the UN or the multinational peacekeeping forces that have also operated there."¹³⁶

If protection of United States interests does necessitate the involvement of United States military forces in contemporary peacekeeping operations, certain initiatives can be taken to lessen the preparation time for peacekeeping forces redeploying to a MRC. The first concerns deployment of personnel and equipment. If made an option, units should deploy with all personnel and equipment to include those personnel and equipment from normally attached CS and CSS units. In terms of personnel, studies have concluded that units participating in contemporary peacekeeping operations develop very high levels of team cohesion which allows the unit to train quickly for any future operation as long as that team stays together. The more combined arms team players involved in the peacekeeping operation, the less team building that needs to go on in preparation for combat.¹³⁷ As for equipment, just having the equipment in theater available for possible maintenance and training, places the peacekeeping unit further ahead in its preparation for combat. Leaving equipment at home station, if given the option to take it, only lengthens a unit's preparation for combat.

Certain initiatives in terms of resources are starting to emerge for peacekeeping units. The availability of training support like portable range packages, distance learning, and simulation capability (Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer) are starting to appear in contemporary peacekeeping theaters to help units conduct some warfighting training.¹³⁸ Simulation packages such as JANUS and ARTBASS are also available to allow combined arms staffs to stay proficient on staff procedures and integration techniques.

Units that deploy their own equipment to contemporary peacekeeping operations will stress it heavily during the operation. Therefore, it is imperative that units continue to

conduct quality maintenance during these operations. This includes services, deferred maintenance, calibration and daily PMCS. Performing all to standard will shorten a unit's return-to-combat-readiness timeline.¹³⁹

If initiatives in promoting increased participation and effectiveness by the UN and regional organizations become successful, and timelines for United States involvement become more limited and defined, the United States military should consider reducing the level-of-participation ratio. Instead of requiring a total commitment of three times the deployed force, the United States should limit its obligation to that of only the deployed force. This initiative alone would reduce the number of units not immediately prepared for combat by two-fold.

The initiative above could also facilitate a greater use of the reserve forces for contemporary peacekeeping operations, since the length of contemporary peacekeeping operations has been a key criteria used in determining their participation in such operations. In terms of volunteer reservists, "The Office of Reserve Affairs, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is already examining the limits and impediments to volunteerism and how to expand their use."¹⁴⁰ Impediments such as statutory requirements involving the lack of benefits for reservists on duty less than 31 days, lack of employer support, and lack of funds to pay reservists on active duty must be eliminated if DoD is to rely on expanded use of the reserves.¹⁴¹

To reduce the negative impact that TPFDD turbulence poses to strategic mobility, initiatives need to be taken to identify a method of organizing and coordinating deployments so as to mitigate and control the turbulence created by several factors

influencing the actual flow of personnel and equipment into theater. Initiatives should include: having the appropriate number of Joint Operations Plans and Execution System (JOPES)-trained personnel at both ends of the operation, maintaining up-to-date TPFDDs for planned deployments, and adapting transportation operations to absorb variation by using "hub and spoke" operations, regional deployment centers, more reliable communications systems, and more strenuous and adaptive deployment training exercises for deployment systems operators.¹⁴²

To alleviate the shortages found in active support forces, the Army is looking at its force structure requirements and potential adjustments in considerable detail through its Total Army Analysis - 2003 (TAA-03). Assistant Secretary of Defense, Edward L. Warner III, speaking for DoD, stated that, "Until the TAA-03 is complete, it is premature to draw any conclusions regarding shortfalls in the Army support structure."¹⁴³ Mr. Warner goes on to say that, "If shortfalls are identified during the course of that analysis, the DoD will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure they are corrected--to include the creation of additional force structure for support forces if that is required."¹⁴⁴

Finally, in regards to the use of afloat prepositioned equipment and supplies and the Army's most ready sealift ships--the military must really take a hard look at the risks involved in using these assets for contemporary peacekeeping operations and not having them available for immediate deployment to a MRC.

Appendix 1. "Contemporary Peacekeeping" Activities, Missions and Tasks

Operational Level Activities	Tactical Level Missions	Peacekeeping Tasks
Conflict Prevention	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Surveillance 2. Establishment of demilitarized buffer zones 3. Preventive deployment 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Checkpoint recon and security 2. Checkpoint observation and monitoring 3. Interposition patrols
Demobilization Operations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish and manage a ceasefire 2. Withdrawal and assembly of belligerents 3. Disarm belligerents 4. Interdict supply routes from neighboring states 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interposition patrols 2. Checkpoint recon and security 3. Checkpoint observation and monitoring (static and mobile) 4. Cantonment site patrols 5. Collection of weapons from combatants 6. Establishment of security for disarmed belligerents and local population 7. Collection of war supplies from stockpiles and caches 8. Establishment of reserve in overwatch and support 9. Dispatch patrols to monitor key locations or to limit movement 10. Establishment of roadblocks 11. Cordon and search
Military Assistance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Election security 2. Reaction to civil disturbances and riotous assemblies 3. React to bomb threat or car bomb (terrorism) 4. Assist in establishment of law and order 5. Relocation of refugees and other elements of a displaced population 6. Safeguard individuals, communities and installations 7. Assist in the clearance and removal of unexploded ordnance and mines 8. Limit the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband 9. Demonstrate a show of force 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of reserve in overwatch and support 2. Conduct recon of sites, facilities, routes, etc. 3. Site security 4. Conduct patrols and visible mobile checkpoints 5. Establish roadblocks, barricades or barriers 6. Establish security for civilian movement 7. Establish hasty checkpoints on civilian movement routes 8. Clear traditional routes blocked by mines and obstacles 9. Deny movement on a route to facilitate movement of reserve to critical event 10. Defend against raids or other armed attack 11. Occupy defensive positions 12. Evacuation route security

Operational Level Activities	Tactical Level Missions	Peacekeeping Tasks
Humanitarian Relief	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conduct route recon 2. Defend a convoy 3. Conduct route clearance 4. Provide security for victim population at delivery site 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Form an advance guard, main body escort and reserve 2. Post security when convoy halts 3. React to an attack by unarmed mob --show of force or intimidation effect 4. React to ambush 5. React to minefield/obstacle 6. React to indirect fire 7. Conduct recon of delivery site 8. Provide security at site 9. Defend against raid or other armed attack 10. Patrols and surveillance 11. Provide security for evacuation of non-combatants 12. Establish roadblocks to isolate evacuation area
Guarantee and Denial of Movement	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enforce movement restrictions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dispatch patrols to monitor key locations or to conduct surveillance of potential routes 2. Establish stationary and mobile checkpoints 3. Establish roadblocks¹⁴⁵

Appendix 2. Decision Criteria for United States Forces Participating in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

The Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:

- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
 - International aggression, or;
 - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence;
 - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.
- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operation. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:

- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:

- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.¹⁴⁶

Appendix 3. Current Active Ethnic Conflicts

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union

Georgia
Armenia-
Azerbaijan
Bosnia
Moldova
Tajikistan

Western Europe

Spain
UK

Americas

Haiti¹⁴⁷

Africa

Sudan
Djibouti
Somalia
Chad
Niger
Liberia
Angola
South Africa
Burundi
Rwanda

South Asia

Afghanistan
India
Burma
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka

Far East

Indonesia
Papua-New Guinea
Phillipines

Middle East

Arab-Israel
Iraq
Turkey
Lebanon
Morocco-W. Sahara

Appendix 4. Percentage of CFP 1-3 Active Support Units Deployed to Somalia

Type of Unit	Active CFP 1-3 Units	Active CFP 1-3 Units Deployed to Somalia	Percentage of Active CFP 1-3 Capability Deployed to Somalia
General Supply Company	3	3	100
Air Terminal Movement Control Detachment	1	1	100
Medium Truck Company (Petroleum)	2	2	100
Cargo Transfer Company	1	1	100
Water Purification ROWPU Detachment	1	1	100
Perishable Subsistence Team	1	1	100
Petroleum Supply Company	4	3	75
Light-Medium Truck Company	3	2	67
Fire Fighting Truck Detachment	4	2	50 ¹⁴⁸

Appendix 5. Percentage of Selected Active Support Units Deployed to Somalia

Type of Unit	Number of Active Units	Number Deployed to Somalia	Percentage of Active Units Deployed to Somalia
General Supply Company	4	5	100
Air Terminal Movement Control Detachment	1	1	100
Petroleum Supply Company	4	3	75
Medium Truck Company (Petroleum)	3	2	67
Cargo Transfer Company	3	2	67
Light-Medium Truck Company	10	6	60
Fire Fighting Truck Detachment	7	4	57
Water Purification ROWPU Detachment	4	2	50
Perishable Subsistence Team	2	1	50 ¹⁴⁹

Appendix 6. Percentage of Selected Support Forces in the Reserve Component (As of April 1994)

Support Capability	Percentage of Units in Reserve Component
Quartermaster	76
Engineer	69
Transportation	63 ¹⁵⁰

ENDNOTES

1. British Army, Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping, (Fourth Draft), (Trenchard Lines, Upavon, July 1994), pp. 1-7 to 1-9.
2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, Second Edition, (New York, 1995), pp. 7-8 and Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," Survival Volume 36, number 3, Autumn 1994, p. 94. Up to the end of 1987 there was only a total of 13 UN peacekeeping operations conducted. The focus of these UN peacekeeping operations was on interstate conflict. There has been 21 peacekeeping operations established since 1988. Of the 21 established, only eight have been related to *interstate* conflict, whereas, the other 13 (62 percent) have been related to *intrastate* conflict. Of the 11 peacekeeping operations established since January 1992, all but two (82 percent) have been related to intrastate conflicts.
3. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," (The White House, G.P.O. Washington D.C., February 1995), p. 16 and "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," (The Joint Chiefs of Staff, G.P.O. Washington D.C., 1995), pp. i-ii.
4. John Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," Survival Volume 36, number 3, Autumn 1994, p. 150, John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," Washington Quarterly Volume 15, Summer 1992, p. 114, and Roberts, p. 94. Traditional peacekeeping activities such as monitoring and enforcing cease-fires, observing frontier lines, and interposing between belligerents were designed to provide a buffer or confidence building mechanism between belligerents that had agreed to a cease-fire or truce. As a result, traditional peacekeeping relied largely on a "token" UN presence and the consent of the belligerent forces rather than on any effective military capability. Consequently, contributions to a traditional peacekeeping force were drawn from middle level or small powers, some with limited military expertise. Nations with more sophisticated military assets provided the support units.
5. British Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping, pp. 1-8 to 1-9. Emerging characteristics of this new intrastate conflict environment include: numerous parties to the conflict; undisciplined factions (lacking restraint and barely accountable to any central or recognized authority); an ineffective cease-fire; absence of law and order; sporadic outbreaks of violence and risk of local armed opposition; the presence and involvement of numerous civilians, including refugees and displaced persons; collapse of civil infrastructure; undefined areas of operation; random atrocity and large-scale human suffering; anarchy; and widespread unmarked mines and residual ordnance.
6. Douglas Bennet, Jr., "Peace-keeping and Multilateral Relations in U.S. Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Volume 5, No. 49, December 5, 1994, p. 809.

7. Gareth J. Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990's and Beyond, (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia, 1993), p. 106.

8. British Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping, pp. 2-1 to 2-2. Because of this new conflict environment and its associated failures, contemporary peacekeeping operations have qualitatively changed from traditional peacekeeping operations. This is most evident in the tasks to be performed by today's peacekeepers. Generally, there are five categories of contemporary peacekeeping tasks. They are: (1) conflict prevention, (2) demobilization operations, (3) military assistance, (4) humanitarian relief, and (5) guarantee and denial of movement. Subordinate to these operational level activities are tactical level missions and tasks. A table illustrating these activities, missions and associated tasks can be found in Appendix 1. Although some tasks resemble traditional peacekeeping tasks, there is an important distinction in the degree of local consent; therefore, the peacekeeping force must take much more rigorous steps to achieve a standard of military effectiveness that ensures their own protection as well as achieve the conditions required in the mandate. To perform these seemingly traditional tasks, combined with those that fall between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, will dictate the need for a more credible military capability than that employed in the past.

9. Todd A. Buchs, "Peacekeeping Operations: Is There A Need for Mechanized Forces as Part of the Peacekeeping Team," (School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, December 1995), pp. 36-9 and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "Dimensions of the Post-Cold War World," in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and Missions, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. 28. In a recent study conducted by the author, it was determined that (in terms of combat forces) a combined arms force could best conduct contemporary peacekeeping operations. The proportion of light and mechanized forces chosen for a particular peacekeeping force structure would be dependent upon the security environment, amount and type of tasks, and other criteria established in the study. Recent analyses based on the information in the study and lessons learned from operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) and in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) seem to support the fact that combined arms forces should form the foundation for a contemporary peacekeeping force. This is in contrast to a traditional peacekeeping force formed solely by light infantry units. Forecasting the overall composition of a contemporary peacekeeping force, it seems likely that future contemporary peacekeeping operations will require military forces with enhanced firepower and mobility, advanced communications and intelligence, and as much overall flexibility as possible. The purpose of having such a force is to provide the peacekeeping force commander with the capability to exercise a wide range of sophisticated military responses as situations escalate and deescalate in this increasingly violent and volatile environment.

10. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," (Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Washington D.C., May 1994), p. 1.

11. "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," p. i.
12. Ibid., p. ii.
13. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," p. 16.
14. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," p. 2.
15. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," p. 16.
16. Sarah Doyle, Kimberly Smith and Kemper Vest, "The Changing Shape of Peacekeeping," (The Center for National Security Negotiations of SAIC, McLean, VA, June 1994), p. 22.
17. Doyle, Smith and Vest, p. 22 and "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," pp. 2-3.
18. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Department of Defense, G.P.O. Washington D.C., February 1995), p. 31.
19. John M. Shalikashvili, General, U.S. Army, (to) Senate Committee on Armed Services, 9 February 1995, LEGIS-SLATE Report for the 104th Congress, dated 17 February 1995, p. 7.
20. Perry, p. 31.
21. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," p. 1.
22. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
23. Ibid., p. 5.
24. Ibid., p. 11.
25. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
26. Roberts, p. 108.
27. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," p. 15.
28. Trent N. Thomas, "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic and Religious Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and Missions, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. 33.
29. Ibid., p. 34.
30. Ibid., p. 37.

31. Remarks made by The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, at the NATO Defence College, Rome, 9 July 1993 were extracted from Richard M. Connaughton, "European Organizations and Intervention," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1994), p. 187.
32. Remarks made by The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, at the Frunze Military Academy, Moscow, 29 January 1993 were extracted from Connaughton, p. 187.
33. Claudia Kennedy, BG, "The Dimensions of Threat," in Looking to the Future: TRADOC's 20th Anniversary Seminar on Future Warfare, (Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 30 June - 1 July 1993), p. 31 and Thomas, pp. 37-8.
34. Ibid.
35. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., pp. 28-9.
36. "The Professionalization of Peacekeeping," A Study Group Report, (United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., August 1993), p. 16 and William A. Stofft, MG, Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future, (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 1994), Foreword.
37. Tim Ripley, "Operation Provide Comfort II: Western Force Protects Kurds," International Defense Review, Vol. 24, October 1991, pp. 1055-1057.
38. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Ft. McNair, Washington D.C., 1995), pp. 17-19.
39. "After 17 Months, Troops Leave Haiti," Army Times, March 18, 1996, p. 2.
40. "The Professionalization of Peacekeeping," pp. 56-7.
41. Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, "UN and the U.S. Military Roles in Regional Organizations in Africa and the Middle East," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1994), p. 162 and Mats Berdal, "Beyond Peacekeeping? - Evolution of International Peacekeeping," (Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, June 2-3, 1994), p. 25. The US decision in October 1993 to pull out all its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994 was quickly followed by similar announcements by Belgium, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and Sweden.
42. "The Professionalization of Peacekeeping," p. 53.

43. Steven Rader, "The U.S. Military Role in a Multilateral Framework," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1994), p. 54.
44. Mats Berdal and Robert Cooper, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," Survival Volume 35, number 1, Spring 1993, p. 133.
45. William J. Doll and Steven Metz, The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions, (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, November 1993), p. 8.
46. Tony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," The New York Times, February 6, 1994, p. E17.
47. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "Domestic, Regional and International Factors Influencing US Policy," in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions, (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 102-3 and Stofft, p. 10.
48. Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, pp. 102-3.
49. "The Professionalization of Peacekeeping, pp. 55-6.
50. Dennis J. Quinn, "Peace Support Operations: Definitions and Implications," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, (National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1994) p. 29.
51. "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO, (March 1995), p. 71.
52. Ibid., p. 42.
53. James H. Baker, "Peace Missions Dull the Army's Combat Edge," Army Times, December 6, 1993, p. 37.
54. Sean D. Naylor, "Well Done, But Warlike It's Not," Army Times, July 3, 1995, p. 16.
55. Kjeld G. H. Hillingso, "Peace Support Organization and Training: A Danish Perspective," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1994), pp. 67-8.
56. Baker, p. 37 and Naylor, p. 16.
57. Sean D. Naylor, "Will Soldiers Become 'Flabby Do-Gooders?'," Army Times, October 11, 1993, p. 15.

58. Quinn, p. 29.
59. Paul M. Rivette, "Special Study: The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," (CALL, U.S. Army TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, February 1996), p. 13.
60. "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," pp. 15-16.
61. Rivette, pp. 13-14.
62. Ibid., p. 13.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., pp. 13-15.
65. GAO Report, "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," p. 48.
66. Rivette, p. 12 and A-22.
67. Ibid., p. A-23.
68. Ibid., p. 13.
69. Steve Vogel, "Secretary Concerned Frequent Deployments 'Will Run Troops Ragged'," Army Times, February 28, 1994, p. 4. With the Army getting smaller, Army Secretary Togo West said he is worried soldiers will be run ragged by frequent deployments. West stated that the 1995 budget (projecting 495,000 soldiers by 1997) will only allow the Army to fight and win two wars. In terms of other contingencies such as peacekeeping, West believes that if the Army has not planned for or anticipated them, then the Army must re-look at the size of force needed for such operations.
70. LTC(P) Ann K. Drach, Monograph Director, provided this idea on a soldier's morale being affected by frequent deployments and the inability to redeploy to home station.
71. Rivette, pp. 14-15.
72. Ibid., p. 13.
73. Rivette, pp. 15-6 and author's own experiences based on the predeployment and deployment operations conducted as part of a Combined Arms Battalion deploying to Desert Shield/Desert Storm from August - October 1990.
74. Ibid.

75. LTC(P) Ann K. Drach, Monograph Director, provided the idea on one-of-a-kind specialists needing to be replaced.
76. Rivette, p. 16.
77. This is using the timeline that the second MRC would occur around 45 days after the first one. Using an estimated timeline: 30-45 days to turn contemporary peacekeeping operation over to UN or regional organization, 21 days to redeploy, 60 days to prep for combat = 126 days. These are very rough calculations, but they do demonstrate the delays associated with contemporary peacekeeping forces deploying to a MRC.
78. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, "Report on the Bottom-Up Review," (Department of Defense, G.P.O. Washington D.C., October 1993), p. 87.
79. Ibid., p. 94.
80. GAO Report, "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," pp. 17-18.
81. David Kassing, "Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope," RAND, (1994), p. xiii.
82. Ibid., p. xiv.
83. Ibid., pp. 31-3.
84. John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corrine Replogle, "Project AIR FORCE Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency," RAND Project Air Force, (1993), p. 41.
85. Ibid., p. 42.
86. Ibid., p. 46.
87. Kassing, pp. xiv and 5.
88. Lund, Berg, and Replogle, pp. 41 and 45.
89. Kassing, p. 31.
90. Ibid., pp. 31-3.
91. GAO Report, "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," p. 46.

92. Ibid., pp. 21-3 and Interview with LTC Marvin Williams, Master Logistician, Command and General Staff Officer College.
93. GAO Report, "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," p. 23.
94. Ibid., pp. 22-3.
95. Interview with LTC Marvin Williams.
96. Ibid.
97. GAO Report, "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," pp. 42-3.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., pp. 20-1.
100. Interview with LTC Marvin Williams.
101. GAO Report, "Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts," p. 47.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., pp. 41 and 48.
104. Ibid., p. 47.
105. Ibid., p. 23.
106. Ibid., pp. 23-4.
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