The Power of Operational Art's Requirements.
Abstract
In early October 1990, President Bush asked General Colin Powell to present him with military options to liberate Kuwait. For General Powell, the President's request significantly altered his approach to the crisis in the desert. His problem had changed from one of militarily deterring and diplomatically punishing Iraqi aggression to removing the dictator's forces from Kuwait. Although US military commanders and planners had experience deterring aggression during the Cold War, no one had planned or conducted offensive operations on this order of magnitude since the Vietnam War. They would have to orchestrate the military means in a way to liberate Kuwait. The success these designers enjoyed in Desert Storm would suggest that commanders can arrange events at the operational level effortlessly. History suggests a different premise. From Gallipoli to Korea to Vietnam, modem commanders have struggled to orchestrate their military means to achieve the national end state. For the US Army and joint community, a commander learns that operational art will produce the national end state. This monograph will explore operational art's requirements for that commander to meet in order to bring about the nation's end state.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA314300
Entities
People
- George Geczy Iii
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College