Defining the Operational End State: Operation Desert Storm.
Abstract
Defining the Operational End State: Operation Desert Storm, By Major Richard E. Matthews, 39 pages. This monograph examines what the author believes should be the critical first step in operational planning, defining and determining the end state. The operational end state is determined by an understanding of the strategic or political aim, and a linking of tactical engagements to achieve that aim. History has shown that America's armed forces have not always been committed in conflicts with clearly defined end states, and sometimes when it has, commanders on their own have deviated from the previously agreed upon end state. Too often there is a desire to become actively involved in a conflict without any idea for how things will be resolved. Having a clear end state is a vision for accomplishing the desired the ends. The Persian Gulf War serves an example of the military success that can be achieved, if political leaders first, define the desired end state, and second, allowed military leaders the means and the flexibility to fight the battles to achieve the political goal. Using a combination of theory, doctrine, and history, this paper seeks to establish that end states must be given more importance in our doctrine and planning. Military forces should not be committed unless leaders at every level--strategic, operational, and tactical--have articulated what is to be accomplished. When the end state has been carefully and clearly stated, American forces have proven they will give the full measure of devotion to that cause.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA314310
Entities
People
- Richard E. Matthews
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College