

THE FALL AND RISE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

A Monograph
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Abstract

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Using Sir James Cable's model of coercive diplomacy, this monograph examines why the efforts between 1991 and 1995 were ineffective and why in 1995, the international community was successful in bringing the warring factions to a diplomatic settlement. This paper concludes that, based on Cable's model, the international community failed to solve the conflict because it used the least effective form of coercive diplomacy. When the international community finally agreed upon a course of action and implemented it with purposeful coercion, the warring parties agreed to work out a diplomatic settlement and produced the Dayton Accords. Implementation of this accord is being enforced by NATO combat forces in the former Yugoslavia, and indications are that their efforts are meeting with success.


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
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
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Table of Contents

	Page
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Cable on Coercive Diplomacy.....	7
III. Twentieth Century Yugoslavia.....	14
IV. Analysis.....	26
V. Conclusion.....	35
VI. Endnotes.....	40
VII. Bibliography.....	48

Introduction

Coercive diplomacy is a resort to specific threats or to injurious actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.¹

The European Community (EC), the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) have attempted to find a solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia since the outbreak of civil war in 1991. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate international efforts at coercive diplomacy aimed at stopping the fighting in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. According to Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, "Since June 1991, the [UN] Security Council has adopted more than 60 resolutions and experimented with almost every available form of coercion short of war."²

The first UN resolution to apply coercion, in the form of an arms embargo, was passed in September 1991 with approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713. Though international consensus was achieved with this resolution there was no consensus on the specifics of enforcing these sanctions.³ For the next four years, EC, US and UN actions based on similar inconsistencies failed to bring the fighting in the former Yugoslavia to a halt. In 1995, the international community finally succeeded in bringing the warring parties to a diplomatic peace settlement. Their success was due, in large measure, to a shift in the type of coercive diplomacy applied to warring factions. Using Sir James Cable's model of coercive diplomacy, this monograph examines why early efforts at coercive diplomacy were ineffective, and why the shift caused the factions to

agree to a peace plan.⁴

Cable's model was chosen for its simplicity and its discussion of actions encompassing a range of diplomatic and military responses. Another model was considered, Paul K. Huth's theory of extended-immediate deterrence, but was rejected because it was recently used in a similar study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.⁵ Cable emphasizes the impact and importance of perceptions to each side in a confrontation.⁶ To understand why international measures failed to yield a solution in the former Yugoslavia requires an understanding of not only what the measures sought to achieve but also the context in which they were applied as seen from the viewpoint of the faction leaders in the former Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia's Communist ruler, Joseph Broz Tito, died in 1980 after nearly forty years in power. Following his death, governmental power shifted from a powerful central committee composed of Tito and a small circle of administrators to a diffuse, multi-tiered system of collective leadership.⁷ Though the intent of the collective leadership was to decentralize control of the republics and autonomous provinces, the diffusion of power at a time when Yugoslavia's economy was very weak led to the state's increasing internal instability. As economic resources dwindled and austerity measures took hold, each republic and province placed greater demands on the Yugoslav government for scarce economic resources. The government could not meet these demands and between 1987 and 1990, Yugoslavia suffered a succession of national strikes and provincial referendums

supporting secession from the Yugoslav federation. By 1991, Yugoslavia dissolved and became mired in a civil war that created an international crisis.⁸

The world community led by the United Nations had difficulty defining what to do and how to respond to this crisis. The Europeans acknowledged that they needed help because they could not achieve consensus on a course of action and asked for US leadership. However, the United States saw the situation as strictly a European problem.⁹ In an effort to establish grounds for peace, the Europeans were quick to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia, but were loath to provide a stabilizing influence in the form of military presence or economic and governmental assistance in each country. The United Nations also recognized these countries as well as Bosnia. In February 1992 the UN Security Council approved Resolution 743 to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and in April 1992, approved UNSCR 749 authorizing UNPROFOR's full deployment to Bosnia to help separate the warring factions and control their heavy weapons in an attempt to restore peace. However, the fighting continued and by 1995, the UN mission was generally regarded as a failure.¹⁰ One of the UN mission's fundamental flaws was that without sufficient troops on the ground, the UN could not enforce weapons control.¹¹

The cause of failure can be tied to misunderstanding of the problems and how the Balkan region integrated into European and US national interests. The Europeans and the US had fundamentally different perceptions of the root problem. These perceptions were also at variance with the real problems. The

conflict stems from a blending of cultural, political, and economic factors beginning with the dictates of the Versailles Treaty following WWI and continuing through WWII and the Cold War.¹² As a result of conflicting viewpoints, the UN could not achieve a consensus for decisive action.

The US has also had difficulty deciding what to do. James Nathan, a former foreign service officer and current Eminent Scholar at Auburn University, stated that in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, coercive diplomacy fell into disrepute and that traditional tools such as gradual response, nation building and counterinsurgency have floundered.¹³ He further notes that the idea of combining force and diplomacy which gathered authority in the 1950's and 1960's has never been achieved.¹⁴ In 1985, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated his doctrine for use of force. Thereafter, the U. S. military's list of restrictions began to grow. The Weinberger doctrine was intended to keep the US out of a prolonged involvement and indecisive war such as experienced in Vietnam. Weinberger had a three-part test: first, not to use force unless the situation was "vital to our national interest;" second, that the American people had to give their full support; and third, that force must be brought to bear in an overwhelming fashion. This weakened the credibility of US coercive diplomacy and took away what had historically been an effective tool of the diplomats' trade.¹⁵ As an outgrowth of the "Weinberger Doctrine," the U. S. military sought to avoid missions with ambiguous political and military objectives and vague end states.

President George Bush distanced himself from the Weinberger doctrine

after Operation Desert Storm. In a January 1993 speech to the Corps of Cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point, he stated that the relative importance of an interest is not a guide. Military force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but less than vital. He also rejected the notion that force had to be overwhelming; rather, it needed to be effective and applied where the potential benefits justified the potential costs and sacrifice.¹⁶ President William Clinton amplified on these thoughts in his 1995 National Security Strategy (NSS) stating that US forces may be employed where “important, but not vital, US interests are threatened” and where humanitarian interests are at stake.¹⁷ The former Yugoslavia presented the US with a dichotomy. In the 1970's, the US might have escalated to general if not nuclear war had the USSR encroached on the territory.¹⁸ Twenty years later, after heavy investment in economic aid and trade benefits, the US stated that it could not discern vital strategic interest in the region.¹⁹ This statement is contrary to the published US interests as stated in the NSS and Bush's statements.²⁰ Based on the NSS and the history of US involvement in NATO and the Balkans, the former Yugoslavia represents an area that clearly meets both requirements of “important interests” and “humanitarian interests.”

In 1995, the US finally acknowledged that the former Yugoslavia represented an area of important interest and supported NATO involvement first by hosting negotiations at Wright Patterson Air Force base near Dayton, Ohio, and then by putting US troops on the ground to enforce the peace agreement. The negotiations involved the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia; on 21

November they agreed on a peace accord.²¹ Unlike previous plans, the Dayton accords provide a framework to begin establishing a settlement in the region based on a division of territory that closely matches the situation on the ground. With US ground forces arriving in December 1995 and NATO taking over the UN mission, the fighting in the Balkan region has stopped. On the surface, it appears that the use of overt and direct military coercion is working.²²

To evaluate the effectiveness of military coercion, this paper defines and describes a model of coercive diplomacy developed by Sir James Cable. James Cable describes four types of coercive diplomacy: Expressive, Catalytic, Definitive and Purposeful. Expressive coercion is simply a verbal statement or statements expressing a nation's position. Catalytic coercion includes elements of expression as well as more overt actions such as deployment of naval vessels; definitive applies to a unilateral action taken quickly against a target state to present them with a *fait accompli*. Lastly, purposeful coercion is simply the threat of inflicting such pain on the target state that compliance offers the course of least resistance.

Following the description of Cable's model the monograph provides a brief history of Yugoslavia in the 20th century to establish a background and context for understanding the events that caused the nation's violent breakup in 1991. Based on this framework, key international coercive actions aimed at influencing events in the Balkans from 1991 through 1995 are examined using Cable's model. This analysis is used to determine why the diplomatic measures taken prior to 1995 were ineffective and why current efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Accords are

likely to succeed.

Cable on Coercive Diplomacy

James Cable defines coercive diplomacy as "a resort to specific threats or to injurious actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state."²³ He further specifies that to be coercive a threat must be more than a general prediction of terrible consequences at some unspecified time in the future, regardless of the issuing state's credibility. The coercive threat must express readiness to do something to injure the interests of the target government unless that government either takes a specified course of action or stops an unwanted action. Cable stresses that the threatening act must be a "clear departure from the established pattern of relations between the two governments concerned."²⁴ Otherwise it is simply regarded as behavior within the normal pattern of relations and fails to convey the urgency or importance of the dispute. Clearly, perception plays a vital role in coercive diplomacy. The initiator of the coercion must present the threat in such a manner that it is perceived as a threat by the target state.

An example of coercive diplomacy that highlights the national differences in interpretation of a coercive act and deterrence is the incident involving the Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-55. The first study of this incident that makes use of Chinese sources in addition to US sources was conducted by G. H.

Chang and He Di in 1993.²⁵ This study was chosen because it presents the Chinese point of view based on Chinese records, not the Chinese view based on US interpretation of their actions.

On September 3, 1954 the Chinese army shelled the islands of Quemoy and Matsu to interdict Nationalist Chinese resupply efforts. These islands were the subject of dispute between communist China within whose territorial waters they lay, and the Nationalist Chinese who occupied them. The dispute began in 1949 and continued into the 1950's. During that period, China's propaganda campaign focused on unifying the islands with the mainland, including Taiwan. The Eisenhower administration assumed that the it had clearly communicated to China that an attack on Nationalist held offshore islands might provoke armed US response.²⁶ When the islands were shelled, it appeared logical to the Eisenhower administration that this action was in preparation for an invasion. The US responded by dispatching a naval task force to the area. Though the Eisenhower administration perceived the events as a crisis, China simply noted an increased level of US interest in their actions. According to Chinese records, though Mao Tse Tung, China's Communist leader, had no plans to invade Taiwan, he also did not want to generate US interest in the region. However, Mao did want to open a dialogue between the US and China because the mutual isolation often caused each to misread the other's intentions and fostered an atmosphere of distrust.²⁷ The fact that Chinese actions never led to the invasion of Taiwan, which is what the US actions were aimed at preventing, caused the Eisenhower administration to

conclude that their efforts at coercion were successful when, based on Chinese records, that period was not noted as tense nor deviating from a normal state of affairs.²⁸ The Chinese records indicate that Mao did not perceive the coercive message the Eisenhower administration sent in its intended manner.²⁹

Though the Quemoy-Matsu incident demonstrated the use of naval forces as an instrument of coercive diplomacy, coercion does not necessarily equate to violence. Coercion can be applied with all four instruments of national power, each representing varying degrees of subtlety ranging from deployment of a naval task force, economic sanctions, or simply a political statement expressing disagreement and displeasure at another state's actions. Furthermore, coercion is a double edged sword: it can be used as a punishment or as a reward. If a nation is generally seen as willing and capable of not only punishing but also rewarding behavior, then coercion can be applied very subtly through promises of such things as additional foreign aid or trade benefits. The threat or use of armed force is only the dramatic spear-tip of coercive diplomacy.³⁰

The foundation of deterrence is an effective program of coercive diplomacy. As with deterrence, the objective of coercive diplomacy is to avoid war while providing a carrot and stick to resolve disputes. Coercive diplomacy is an alternative to war, and if it leads to war, it has failed. In seeking to avoid war, it seems natural to regard compromise as the method of first choice for resolving a dispute. However, Cable notes that diplomacy is seldom as simple as finding a middle road between conflicting aspirations. Many disputes arise not from

different applications or interpretations of the same principle, but from the clash of two incompatible principles.³¹ More fundamentally, one state should not expect its logic to be mirrored by the state on the other side of the diplomatic table. Nations think differently and one Nation's logic may be very illogical to the other, and vice versa.³² Differences in logic account for states not behaving or responding in an expected manner. The logic applied to a coercive act may present the victim with a series of bad options, none of which are good enough to yield to the coercion.

There is a two-fold paradox associated with coercion. First is "Capacity for the exercise of appropriate force is unevenly distributed and more closely related to the circumstances of particular disputes than to any comparison of aggregate resources."³³ This means that sheer force size and capability in and of itself does not correlate directly to its likelihood of winning. A recent example of well resourced forces losing to a technologically inferior force occurred in Somalia with the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).³⁴ The second paradox is the capability of some governments with a reputation for irresponsibility or instability to exercise coercion for "they must be pandered to lest they change sides or collapse."³⁵

According to Cable, the emphasis of the expressive mode is on expressing one's own attitude rather than on directly influencing the adversary's actions. This mode is generally attempted by governments who attach greater importance to their own motives than to getting results from their actions. Expressive coercive diplomacy is frequently obtuse (or cant in Cable's words): the words do not match

the state's actions. An example of this mode was the US verbal condemnation of Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, while continuing its sales of grain to the USSR. To make the diplomacy more coercive, the US could have stopped its grain export to the USSR, thereby unifying its words and actions. When using the catalytic mode, a state will deploy forces for fairly vague reasons: something seems to be about to happen that might be prevented if force were available at the critical moment. In this way some advantage might be gained by being at the right place at the right time. This mode is particularly suited to deployment of naval forces which by their presence can "raise the temperature" without direct intrusion. Raising the temperature will, even in the absence of coercive measures directly relevant to the dispute, encourage a disposition to compromise or comply.³⁶ The US deployment of an amphibious group to Liberia in 1990 in anticipation of civil strife is an example of the catalytic mode. Though it did not prevent the strife, it did provide a ready means to evacuate US personnel from the country.

The objective of the purposeful mode is to threaten or to inflict such damage on the victim that the victim will prefer to escape further pain by adopting the indicated course of action. This is a use of limited force to achieve objectives defined in advance, to extract precisely defined concessions or to deter a foreign government from an expected course of action. This mode, as with all modes, is not always successful. For example, in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 it worked to keep that country under the Soviet yoke. However, it failed in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, with the definitive mode, the objective

is to present the victim with a *fait accompli* which can only be responded to by acquiescence or escalation. The assumption is that the victim will acquiesce. For example, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait presented the world with a situation in which the international community could do one of two things, acquiesce or escalate. The day before the invasion, Saddam Hussein met with the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, to discuss US-Iraqi relations. During that meeting Ambassador Glaspie stated "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."³⁷ In this case, Saddam Hussein probably felt that his actions would meet with acquiescence. Following the invasion of Kuwait, Joseph Wilson, deputy chief of the US mission in Baghdad, was summoned to a meeting with Hussein to discuss the situation. Coming out of that meeting, Wilson felt that Saddam Hussein regarded the invasion as a *fait accompli*.³⁸

Having determined the mode of coercive diplomacy, the next problem is determining whether the coercion produced the intended results. The difficult part in any analysis of coercive diplomacy is to discriminate between success and failure. Cable proposes several questions to help sort out success from failure:³⁹

What was the purpose of the initiating government?

What is the end state desired?

Was it substantially achieved?

Was success lasting or transitory?

Did it lead to war or other undesirable consequences?

Was the result worth the cost of coercion?

To gauge the effect of the coercion, Cable sets a time limit of five years. Any kind of coercion has repercussions in addition to results. Some of these repercussions may extend over centuries and may call into question the evaluation of the initial result. However, such large time scales are too big to be practical for decision makers. International disputes evolve quickly and the resulting changes can yield a framework of relations and balances that make the original dispute almost unrecognizable after about five years.⁴⁰ "To argue about cause and effect, success or failure, one must do so soon. Otherwise the debate will be both academic and infinite."⁴¹ Additionally, governments resorting to coercive diplomacy are trying to quickly resolve what they see as an unsatisfactory situation. The results of coercive diplomacy can be measured in the framework of what the governments were trying to achieve within the time frame of five years.⁴²

Coercive diplomacy can involve the use of force against another nation, but when is the use of force in an international dispute not an act of war? Cable separates the two as follows:

"An act war is the use of armed force against or in a foreign state for the primary purpose of injuring that state, whether as part of an existing policy of injuring the other state...or to initiate such a policy, or without regard to the risk that the reaction of the victim state will go beyond mere self-defense to a reciprocal adoption of injury rather than profit as the prime motive for policy. An act of coercive diplomacy is intended to secure some specific advantage from another state and forfeits its diplomatic character if it either contemplates the infliction of injury unrelated to obtaining that advantage or results in the victim attempting the infliction of injury after the original objective has been either achieved or abandoned."⁴³

For the purposes of this argument, an act of war is either the use of force against an alien enemy during an existing war or, though conducted in a time of peace, has the

effect of starting a war.⁴⁴ Cable postulates two motives that would cause a government to use violence against a foreigner. The first is to gain something, and the second is to injure the foreigners or their state. In total war both of these motives are linked together.⁴⁵ In a limited war though, there are far greater restraints on objectives and the acceptable level of violence.⁴⁶ In times of peace the likelihood of injuring foreigners is frequently a disincentive to using violence.

In summary, Cable defines four modes of coercive diplomacy: expressive, catalytic, purposeful and definitive. Coercive diplomacy occupies a position between war and diplomacy, using the threat of limited force that can be applied with any of the instruments of national power. Coercive diplomacy's use is governed by the desired ends, the scope of the dispute and time limits. As with any form of diplomacy, coercion is most effective when it removes the cause of the dispute.

Twentieth Century Yugoslavia

Twentieth century Yugoslavia reflects a continuum of disputes unresolved by diplomacy. Yugoslavia's history since the turn of the century can be described by four periods. The first period (1900-1918) covers the two Balkan wars and the first world war, which some have argued was in part the third Balkan war, wherein nationalism and expansionism grew as the power of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires waned.⁴⁷ The second period (1918-1945) represents the Versailles solution to the European concern over Balkan instability by creating a country, the

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and its subsequent collapse in World War Two. Though the third period (1945-1991) began with another post-war power settlement, it saw the consolidation of Yugoslavia as a nation under a nominally populist communist government.⁴⁸ The fourth period (1991-1995) represents the collapse of Yugoslavia as a nation and the resurgence of independent nationalism and expansionism. In essence, the first three periods were shaped by European and US settlements and the fourth was the fallout of these settlements.

By the early 1900's, the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires were collapsing. As their power dwindled, tensions and conflict grew as nationalist passions stirred and sought to expand or retake land. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece were independent states, each with claims to various portions of the Balkan peninsula. Serbia specifically wanted to form a union with Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, in 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, intentionally frustrating Serbian nationalist goals.⁴⁹ By 1912, the First Balkan war broke out between the Ottomans and an alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece. The alliance quickly defeated the Ottomans and then began to argue over the division of Macedonia and Albania.

Austria and Italy were particularly concerned about Serbian and Greek intentions over Albania. Neither Austria nor Italy wanted Serbia to become a strong power on the Adriatic. As a result, the European Powers imposed a peace settlement that once again frustrated Serb nationalist desires. The peace was short-lived and by June 1913, the second Balkan war broke out when Bulgaria attacked

Greece and Serbia. This time the Ottomans joined an alliance with Greece, Serbia and Romania. Following Bulgaria's defeat, the Great Powers stepped in again and imposed a territorial solution with the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913. With this treaty, Serbia and Greece were allowed to keep those portions of Macedonia they seized in the war. Bulgaria retained a part of Macedonia as well as some coastline in Thrace along the Aegean Sea, but lost Thessaloniki to Greece, and Albania was established as an independent state. The final settlement satisfied only the Albanians and Romanians; all other states were again frustrated.⁵⁰

World War I began as a result of a Bosnian-Serb terrorist, Gavrilo Princip, assassinating Austria's heir to the Hapsburg throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, in June 1914. Princip's intent was to promote the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia by initiating a third Balkan war aimed at releasing Bosnia from Austrian control. Rather than releasing Bosnia, WWI devastated the region's industry, agriculture and demographics. Yugoslavia as a whole lost 1,900,000 dead, and Serbia alone lost nearly fifty percent of her young male population.⁵¹ Further aggravating the sense of loss was the perceived inequity of the territorial settlements resulting from the Versailles Treaty.

The Versailles Treaty determined the shape and composition of a new country called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In creating a single state out of the many small Balkan nations, Britain and France hoped this would stabilize the region and create a buffer between Austria and Serbia, the states most directly involved in starting WWI. Serbia was the only state not satisfied with the

idea of the Kingdom because it had fought as an equal and independent state for the Allies and lost nearly half its adult male population. It wanted to be a nation in its own right as it had been since the second half of the nineteenth century.⁵² In compensation, the Serbian royal house along with its army and political system became the foundation for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later known as Yugoslavia.⁵³ However, the interwar kingdom was politically unstable and the liberal democratic constitution written at Versailles gave way to dictatorship when the primary source of trade revenue as well as the support from British and French financial credits collapsed in the Great Depression.⁵⁴

With the collapse of British and French financial support, the Kingdom turned to Germany. Ties to Germany's re-armament and expansion in the 1930's helped funnel money back into Yugoslavia, easing the poor economic conditions and helping democracy return in 1935. But these ties to Germany backfired in 1941 when a Yugoslav Air Force coup against the Prince Regent resulted in Axis invasion. Yugoslavia's government fled the country and set itself up as a government in exile for the duration of World War II. The Axis occupation divided the country between the armies of Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Hitler created an independent Croatian state headed by the Croatian fascists (Ustashi) who perpetrated genocide against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in Krajina and Bosnia. For their part, the Serbian nationalists (Chetniks) retaliated in kind, focusing their efforts on Croats and especially on Muslims who were allied with the Croats.⁵⁵

David Owen, co-chairman of the Steering Committee of the International

Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and one of the architects of the 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, noted that WWII was in large measure a front for civil war.⁵⁶

Prior to World War II, all political parties in Yugoslavia were ethnically based except the Communist Party, which was illegal. Because the Communist Party had no ties to ethnicity, it was capable of uniting the different nationalities not only to fight against the Axis occupation but also to displace the old social order in the name of a federal, socialist Yugoslavia.⁵⁷ Josip Broz Tito led the communist party in organizing the partisan fight against the Axis powers. In addition to fighting the war, Tito set up provincial committees to administer areas liberated by the communist partisans. The partisan army was organized to eventually link the separate provincial committees in liberated areas to form a provisional government.⁵⁸ Though civil war continued between the Ustashi and Chetniks, Tito suppressed that fact from the Allies and, as much as possible, from the Yugoslav population. He needed Allied support during the war and popular support after the war, acknowledging that it would simply detract from the victory and make it harder to unite the country.⁵⁹

Tito successfully replaced the old Serbian-dominated monarchy and led Yugoslavia out of the Second World War as a Federal Republic. However, he was not entirely free to run Yugoslavia because of continued interest from the USSR and Britain. Despite Tito's reputation for fierce independence, he had to operate within the constraints of the Percentages Agreement made between Churchill and

Stalin in October 1944. This agreement equally divided East-West influence in Yugoslavia following the war.⁶⁰

The postwar Yugoslav constitution enumerated fundamental principles that were written into every successive Yugoslavian constitution. The principles specify that Yugoslavia is a multinational state; that the union of its peoples was freely willed and they have the right to national self-determination (including secession); that the principle of absolute national equality must govern all internal relations; and that the republics are nearly-sovereign national states with well-defined borders which cannot be changed without the consent of the parties concerned.⁶¹ These constitutional elements did not lend the country to willingly submit to the yoke of any outside power, particularly the Soviet Union. This independent mindset led to Tito's well publicized disagreement with Stalin in 1948. Their disagreement distanced Yugoslavia from Soviet influence and helped it gain and maintain its status as a socialist and independent state.⁶² Though the US encouraged and rewarded Yugoslavia with trade and financial assistance in 1949, Yugoslavia was denied the membership in the Marshall Plan that Tito actively sought.⁶³

Meanwhile, Tito recognized that he had a problem of simmering conflict between Croatia and Serbia. Though they represented the two most powerful parts of the country, he also recognized that the Serbs represented the most powerful portion of Yugoslavia and could pose problems for his government unless they were weakened. Tito accomplished this by turning pre-war "Southern Serbia" into the Republic of Macedonia, by making the tiny former Serb kingdom of

Montenegro a nation in its own right, and creating two federal units within Serbia

itself, the “autonomous regions” of Kosovo, with its sizeable Albanian population, and Vojvodina, where many other minorities lived. Turning to Bosnia, a critical area for Yugoslavia, Tito declared that “its future would be neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Muslim but



Former Yugoslavia

rather Serbian and Croatian and Muslim.” Because Yugoslavia was to be a multinational socialist state, Bosnia would be its most genuinely multinational portion.⁶⁴

Concurrent with efforts to diffuse ethnic consciousness, Tito’s government also focused on Yugoslavia’s economic sector, finally settling on ‘market socialism’ vice the centrally controlled Soviet economic system. ‘Market socialism’, first introduced in the 1950’s and given full reign with the economic reforms of 1965, increased the gap in the standard of living between the richer provinces in the northeast and the poorer southeastern regions. Meanwhile, on the political front,

the development of 'market socialism' was accompanied by a redefinition of the role of the party. Power was nominally decentralized to workers' councils on the industrial side for self-management, and to the constituent republics for day to day administration. The Party changed its name to the League of Communists, and proclaimed that it was moving away from direct administration to the role of a guide. Though the key political role continued in reality to be played by the Party, the locus of its power was the republics' regional centers. As a result of this decentralization, local party bosses emerged, gained strength and provided an institutional channel for the growth of nationalism.⁶⁵

The late 1960's saw a revival of nationalist politics, mitigated only by the ousting of the Croatian party leadership in 1970 and then the Serbian party leadership in 1972. However, this did not stop the republics from increasing their demands for greater autonomy. These demands led to a re-writing of the Yugoslav constitution in 1974. The 1974 constitution was the high water mark of Tito's decentralization.⁶⁶ Before 1974, the constitution specified full equality only for the six South Slav nations (Croat, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Moslem, Serb and Slovene). In 1974, the new constitution granted equal rights to national minorities as well. As a result, Kosovo and Vojvodina became Federal members in their own right alongside the republics.⁶⁷

Under Tito, Yugoslavia developed a hybrid system of government that relied on three things to maintain internal stability. As described by Susan Woodward, first was its international position as a member of the non-aligned

movement, which allowed it to trade and maintain relations both with USSR and the West while maintaining a degree of independence from both. Second was its constitutional order that defined governmental powers and property rights. The central government was responsible for overall state security and providing for national and social welfare. The republics paid taxes to the federal government based on their industrial and agricultural capacity; the federal government was responsible for the redistribution of wealth in the form of state projects aimed at improving economic growth in the poorer republics. Third was its social order and concept of citizenship. Yugoslavia was a federation of republics, each with its own government responsible for day to day administration but dependent upon the central government for overall welfare and security. Citizens' individual welfare was a shared responsibility between the local and federal governments. The latter set minimum wage standards for public firms, social benefits as well as education standards. If the local republic could not meet the minimum standards, the federal government could provide additional economic assistance.⁶⁸ Sarajevo University's Professor Zairian Pajić described the conditions created by the state:

“At the domestic level, for the great majority of people, Yugoslavia offered a predictable life, with a sense of protection and security provided by the “system.” Generation after generation followed the same pattern of protected careers and well-planned futures. Tuition from nursery school to university was free, jobs were easily available (before the 1980's), housing was provided by the state, health service was free, and pensions were guaranteed. The system encouraged mediocrity as a way of life, but this “stable stagnation” was a very comfortable environment for ordinary people, happy with the average and protected from changes and challenges.”⁶⁹

During the 1980's these elements of stability began to break down as a

result of a new round of economic reforms to westernize and liberalize the economy. Competing on the international market in the 1980's required a fundamental shift in Yugoslavia's hybrid system of rights and sovereignties. This led to increasing austerity measures, loss of individual security, and quarrels between the federal and republican governments over economic assets and jurisdiction.⁷⁰ Without Tito's central authority, Yugoslavia's group presidency was incapable of maintaining a national focus. Adding to the effect of austerity measures was the fact that Yugoslavia's economic system did not succeed in developing the country's economy in a uniform manner. As a result, the southern portion of Yugoslavia was much poorer than the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia.⁷¹

"Vast differences in the economic performance of former Yugoslav republics and provinces directly and indirectly stimulated the process of disintegration. Accelerated economic development was a high political priority in the former Yugoslavia, especially following the rift in the socialist bloc in the late 1940's and early 1950s, when workers' self-management was introduced and large-scale investment was required for its realization. The former Yugoslavia belonged to a category of countries that were rapidly developing. This process of development, which during the late 1970s (according to United Nations criteria) resulted in Yugoslavia being classified among the ten newly industrialized countries, was expensive and ineffective."⁷²

This financial disparity would add fuel to future calls to nationalism and republican leaders' techniques of stirring nationalist sympathy and allegiance by blaming their woes on the other groups.

As these adverse economic effects were felt across the country by the mid-1980s, a hard line current began to re-emerge in the League of Communists and in

the Army's party organization represented primarily by Serbians. Facing these hard line conservatives stood Slovenians and Croatians who not only resisted the push toward centralization but sought to increase civil liberties and political pluralism throughout the country. The split continued to widen and in the autumn of 1989, Slovenia, followed by Croatia, unilaterally decided to institute their own multi-party elections the following year. The final result was the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at its 14th Congress held in February 1990 when the Slovenian delegation walked out.⁷³ The remainder of 1990 saw the defeat of the Croatian and Slovenian Communist parties in multiparty elections, Serbia's abolition of self-rule in Kosovo and Vojvodina, protests in Kosovo for the restoration of human rights and free elections, a proposal from the state presidencies of Croatia and Slovenia to restructure Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states, and on December 26th, Slovenia's declaration of sovereignty. When the Yugoslav Federal Constitutional Court annulled Slovenia's declaration in January 1991, Slovenia declared its intent to secede. Shortly thereafter Croatia declared that Croatian law took precedence over Yugoslav law. Based on local referendums, Croatian and Slovenian legislatures declared independence on 25 June 1991.⁷⁴

Following the Croatian declaration, a referendum was held by the Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia. These Krajina Serbs voted to leave Croatia and join Serbia. Subsequent to the Krajina Serb referendum, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared neutrality and mobilized a territorial defense force. This was

followed by the Bosnian Legislature's declaration of independence in October 1991. By the 20th of November, Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegovic, requested UN troops to help protect his borders. Less than two months later, on 15 January 1992, the EC formally recognized Slovenia and Croatia, followed by EC recognition of Bosnia on 6 April. The US followed suit on the 7th of April, recognizing Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia. After international recognition of Bosnia, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia declared its independence. Concurrently, Serbia and Montenegro were at work drafting a new constitution and proclaimed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on the 27th of April. The FRY has never been recognized by the UN. By August 1992, every major group in the former Yugoslavia had declared its independence and sought to maintain neutrality or unite with either the Croats or Serbs. In similar fashion the Croat, Serb and Muslim parts of Bosnia were working to achieve the same objectives, neutrality or unity with the Croats or Serbs. The autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo were bitterly contested by the Croats and Serbs for the territory and populations they held.⁷⁵

“...the national movements that emerged in the former Yugoslavia had almost identical objectives; namely, the establishment of nation-states. This objective was realized through a similar two-part pattern: the first, by constitution of the republic into a nation-state dominated by the majority ethnic group, and the second, through the attempted unification or integration into this nation-state of members of the ethnic group living in other republics.”⁷⁶

Despite their efforts, neither the government of Yugoslavia nor the Yugoslav Army were capable of physically holding the state together, and the government did not

have a unifying figure nor the economic wherewithal to satisfy the demands of a largely unemployed southern population.

Yugoslavia's hybrid system allowed it to develop and benefit from both the east and west. Its ties to the US and its status as a non-aligned nation bordering the Soviet bloc kept the US interested in the region.

“The success of the United States lay in securing Yugoslavia a particular, perhaps even unique, place in the international order. It was uncoupled from the global competition between the superpowers, rescued from the status of gray area, and became instead a country whose security was demonstrably of such interest to the United States that it could not be attacked without the risk of general war.”⁷⁷

The sense of security Yugoslavia enjoyed and the economic inefficiencies foreign aid masked created an illusion of regional stability. However, its continual devolution of power from the central government to the republics worked as long as there was sufficient economic activity to fuel the state. As long as the population was cared for by the state, it worked as a multi-ethnic society. But the world was not stable; the conditions that supported the world order during the cold war collapsed and the economic structure that went with it changed dramatically. This international strategic environment was the crutch that supported Yugoslavia's stability. Yugoslavia's demise was not caused by ethnic faults, it was caused by the loss of its crutch and the constitutional and political changes adopted during its third period.⁷⁸

Analysis

The seeds of collapse sown in Yugoslavia's third period came to fruition in

its fourth period, which saw the complete breakdown of Yugoslavia's central government and the outbreak of civil war. Because the US, EC and UN misperceived the causes of this breakdown, they did little beyond making statements condemning the violence during 1990 and 1991. They simply desired to contain the area to stop the spread of war while seeking to avoid commitment of their own forces to the Balkans. Between 1992 and 1995, the international community slowly evolved a consensus for action. These actions began first with UN Resolutions that were in effect nothing more than verbal expressions of international angst. During this period, the diplomatic actions became more coercive and more effective as the international community realized that the factions in the former Yugoslavia would not respond to anything short of brute force. This chapter traces the evolution of coercion from September 1991 through December 1995 placing these measures in the context of events and perceptions in the former Yugoslavia to determine why they were ineffective.

James Cable describes the importance of perception on the part of both parties, and that coercive diplomacy is most effective when it removes the cause of the dispute.⁷⁹ US and European views of the causes of dispute were at variance with each other and more importantly, showed a complete lack of understanding of the true causes of Yugoslavia's civil war. The objectives of the national movements in the former Yugoslavia are described by Milorad Pupać, a Sarajevo University professor, as follows:

“The implementation of the similar but conflicting objectives of the national movements in the former Yugoslavia generated a conflict for the following

reasons: in the first place, all these movements, whatever the differences among them, either initiated or accepted the destruction of the Yugoslav state before coming to any agreement on its reconstruction or deconstruction; in the second place, most of these movements, and this is most obvious in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, sought to maintain their own territorial integrity on the one hand, while on the other, advocating the right of their own nationals in other republics to self-determination through secession and through uniting with the "mother country."⁸⁰

Pupać's statement indicates that the factions are fighting essentially over irreconcilable differences in the sense that all parties can make equally valid claims and will not accede to a purely diplomatic solution unless the opponent accedes first.

The Western perception of the conflict, at least for the first years, could not see beyond the superficial manifestations of a horrible civil war. The nature of the problem as seen by the Europeans was that the Balkans conflict was simply a revival of ancient ethnic civil war after the fall of communism. The US view was that the war was an act of Serbian aggression against legitimate governments of sovereign states who were members of the United Nations.⁸¹ Coupled with these perceptions was a rather limited repertoire of US and European crisis response tools. Susan Woodward describes the European and US framework for conflict response as:

"Institutions designed for conflict prevention and resolution during the cold war were based on one of two sets of premises, neither of which applied: cooperation on the basis of mutual interests and reciprocal tradeoffs; or containment on the assumption that conflicts were too great to reconcile. Facing a case characterized instead by irreconcilable conflicts and incompatible interests, mediators and powers did not seek to restructure interests or to create incentives for cooperation but demanded compliance to principles they chose. When that did not work, they resorted to containment. This frame of obedience and containment was particularly

unreceptive to the possibility of independent action by Yugoslav actors, who, by habit of many centuries, saw international action as a resource to exploit."⁸²

Faced with an intelligent opponent who could and would exploit international actions, the US and EC became involved without really examining the situation and understanding Yugoslav framework of action. As Cable stresses, coercive diplomacy is most effective when applied in a manner consistent with the situation.

The objective of UN actions was to stop the factions from fighting, which was consistent with US and EC objectives. The disagreements arose over how that objective should be met, with the Europeans generally favoring a less active approach and the US favoring the use of air strikes.⁸³ When David Owen met with the French on 27 August 1992, he wanted to get them to support putting "some steel" behind the diplomacy, but "Mitterrand specifically warned me of the dangers of aggressive force against the Serbs and ruled out air strikes." The British government, though not entirely opposed to air strikes, was not particularly supportive either.⁸⁴

Beginning with the UN's first coercive act aimed at bringing the fighting to a halt, UN resolution 713 imposed a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia" starting on 25 September 1991. Though the embargo was put in place, there was no power of enforcement given to the vessels who had to carry out the resolution. The initial embargo operation was not carried out under NATO auspices. Beginning in July 1992, NATO vessels became involved to help 'enforce sanctions,' but naval

operations in the Adriatic still had no power to board, search or divert any vessels.

David Owen noted that

“This absurdly weak action sent a signal to the Croatian government that NATO did not mind if they broke the arms embargo and, more importantly, indicated to the FRY that the oil embargo would not be rigidly enforced either. For the Bosnian Serbs it was yet another sign that no one, least of all NATO, was going to intervene to prevent ethnic cleansing.”⁸⁵

This initial UN action was clearly a form of expressive coercion. It satisfied the member states to the extent that they could claim an action, but it did not get any military forces directly involved in Yugoslavia.

As conditions continued to deteriorate in Yugoslavia, the UN recognized that a peacekeeping force would be needed and approved UNSCRs 743 and 749 which established and authorized the ‘earliest possible deployment’ of a UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR. This was an attempt at definitive coercion, presenting the factions with a *fait accompli* in the form of a force that would control heavy weapons and the situation on the ground. UNPROFOR’s mission was to help separate the warring parties and protect selected areas from attack. However, because the UN lacked resolve and power, UNPROFOR was simply an observer group that never managed to control the Serbian army nor gain control of the situation on the ground.⁸⁶ Their inability to control the situation on the ground reached a point in the summer of 1995 where they risked being overrun by the Bosnian Serbs and NATO had plans to extract UNPROFOR from Bosnia while under fire.⁸⁷

Another coercive step was to “ban” flights over Bosnia. UNSCR 781 was

approved on Oct 9, 1992 "to establish a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and undertakes to examine without delay all the information brought to its attention concerning the implementation of the ban and, in the case of violations, to consider urgently the further measures necessary to enforce it."⁸⁸ Named Operation Sky Monitor and executed by NATO, it noted over 500 flight violations between 16 October 1992 and 12 April 1993. Based on these observations, the UN approved Resolution 816 signaling the start of Operation Deny Flight on 12 April 1993. Operation Deny Flight was a shift from the purely expressive coercion of the earlier resolution to the more emphatic catalytic coercion by granting to member states the power to "take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the ban." The first air engagement occurred on 28 February 1994, almost one year later. Additionally, beginning in June 1993, NATO offered to provide Close Air Support (CAS) to UN troops or other personnel in Bosnia if they were attacked and requested air strikes.⁸⁹ Initially, Bosnia Serb perception of the purposeful coercive power of air strikes was described by David Owen

"On 13 October [1992] I met with Karadzic [Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs] in Geneva, after President Bush had said he would enforce a no-fly zone, and virtually pinned him to the wall. At long last I had a stick to our diplomacy. Herb Okum, [ICFY deputy to Cyrus Vance, 1992-93] wearing his American hat, described in vivid terms the consequences if flights continued, and Karadzic folded."⁹⁰

Unfortunately, the events did not materialize as described, and as stated by Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State, the mechanism for approving air strikes was too cumbersome to be effective and until 1995, only provided "pinprick air

strikes."⁹¹ This weak use of power again reinforced the perception that the international community was not going to intervene to stop the factional violence.

Air strikes were a means to increase the pressure on the warring factions in the absence of combat troops on the ground. However, the intermittent and piecemeal application of air power yielded contempt from the factions on the ground.⁹² Concerted bombing efforts first began with the attack on Serbian ammunition dumps near Pale on 25 May 1995 and were followed by Operation Deliberate Force beginning on 29 August 1995. These actions demonstrated the use of Cable's purposeful coercive diplomacy. These strikes yielded the desired reaction from the Serbs; the removal of heavy weapons from the area surrounding Sarajevo and bringing the siege of the city to a halt. The Serbian reaction was not as rapid as perhaps desired, but for the past four years, they had heard EC, US, and UN expressive threats that were never carried out or carried out to such a limited extent that, as Strobe Talbott describes, they were mere pinpricks. According to Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, Operation Deliberate Force was the hammer that brought the warring parties to the diplomatic table in Dayton, and the fact that NATO forces would take over from the UN troops to ensure successful implementation of any agreement reached kept the parties there.⁹³

To determine the effectiveness of any attempted coercion, Cable posed several questions. Though it may be slightly premature to answer his questions since implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords are still underway, it does serve as a useful review of events. Cable's first question is: What was the purpose of the

initiating government? In this case, the UN attempted to create and protect 'safe' areas and separate the warring parties, encouraging diplomatic solutions and cease fires with the objective of encouraging a peaceful settlement. His second question is: What is the end state desired? The end state desired is a diplomatic peace settlement. Third: Was the desired end state substantially achieved? After years of failure, NATO was finally allowed to apply purposeful coercion with a concerted bombing effort which added to the effect of existing sanctions. These purposeful actions convinced the warring factions that the time had come to reach a diplomatic settlement. To date a tenuous peace has been achieved. Based on this fact, it is too early to answer Cable's fourth question: Was success lasting or transitory? The Dayton Accords have been the most successful of any peace proposals in the past five years. As such, these accords hold the possibility of achieving a lasting peace.

The prospect of a lasting peace seems to obviate Cable's fifth question: Did it lead to war or other undesirable consequences? The weak international actions between 1991 and 1995 did lead to undesirable consequences. In particular, these actions led the Serbs and Croats to believe that no one would stop the ethnic cleansing nor enforce the embargo, a signal that their actions met with tacit approval.⁹⁴ Cable's final question asks: Was the result worth the cost of coercion? Again, it is too soon to pass judgement because the peace process is still ongoing. A peaceful Balkan region enhances stability between Greece and Turkey, helps maintain the NATO Alliance, and supports NSS goals of engagement and enlargement. For these reasons, peace in the Balkans region is worth incurring a

fairly substantial cost.⁹⁵

Based on the history of the region, the only way any nation had successfully dealt with the Balkans was with actions, not simply words.⁹⁶ The West's initial failure was not recognizing the region's history beyond its most visible aspect, violence. That violence is a manifestation of action not words. Having recognized the need for action and taken it, Strobe Talbott stated that

“our negotiating team has made real progress. The parties have accepted the continuation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single, multiethnic state within its current, internationally-recognized borders. Within that state, the parties have agreed that there will be two constituent entities. That arrangement will, we believe, make it possible for fratricidal passions to cool. The people of Bosnia need time to recover from the disintegration that they've been through -- and to rediscover first the possibility, then the advantages, of integration.”⁹⁷

It is up to the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) commander to help the people of Bosnia recover from the disintegration and discover the advantages of integration. Consistency of action will have to be the commander's hallmark as he and his forces work to build trust among the factions and the IFOR. Additionally, he should build some understanding of the local political and military leaders' objectives as well as their perceptions of the effect of international actions. The commander must clearly communicate his observations up the NATO chain of command. Most importantly, the operational commander, in a situation such as the Balkans, must have a clear understanding of the region's history, an understanding divorced from popular mythology. This will increase the local political and military leaders' trust and confidence in the commander's actions, and enhance mutual understanding and cooperation.

Conclusion

"I can tell you from my personal experience as Secretary of State that if we are seen as a country that does not follow through on its initiatives, no nation will follow us -- not in Europe, not in the Middle East, not in Asia, not anywhere."⁹⁸

"The Europeans have been exasperated by Washington's vacillation, provoking one senior official involved in the mediation of the Yugoslav wars to tell the Americans to "piss or get off the pot."⁹⁹

This paper evaluated international efforts at coercive diplomacy aimed at stopping the fighting in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. After four years of indecisive actions, EC, US and UN efforts to broker a solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia appear to be finally meeting with success. The cause of initial failure can be tied to misunderstanding of the problems and how the Balkan region integrated into European and US national interests. The Europeans and the US had fundamentally different perceptions of the root problem. These perceptions were also at variance with the real problems which stem from a blending of cultural, political, and economic factors beginning with the dictates of the Versailles Treaty following WWI and continuing through WWII and the Cold War.¹⁰⁰ As a result of these conflicting viewpoints, the UN could not achieve a consensus for decisive action.

The first UN resolution to apply coercion, in the form of an arms embargo, was passed in September 1991 with approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713. Though international consensus was achieved with this resolution there was no consensus on the specifics of enforcing these sanctions.¹⁰¹ In his dealings with the western governments in 1992, David Owen discovered that

the general attitude was that the Balkans were not worth spilling western blood over, "which ensured that international diplomacy without military power was the hallmark of every attitude and action towards the former Yugoslavia."¹⁰² Between July 1992 when NATO ships were brought in to the Adriatic to help enforce sanctions and February 28, 1994 when NATO aircraft engaged in NATO's first combat operation, nothing was achieved beyond agreements to plan for strikes and to fly combat air patrol sorties.¹⁰³

To comprehend why international measures failed to yield a solution requires an understanding of not only what the measures sought to achieve but the context in which they were applied as seen from the viewpoint of the faction leaders in the former Yugoslavia. The fact that all the factions were seeking essentially the same thing, the creation of their own nations, was ignored as was the fact that each group in the former Yugoslavia had backed themselves into a corner and would not or could not concede until their opponent conceded first.¹⁰⁴ The international community was also hampered by a limited selection of options which were based on Cold War crisis response mechanisms.

"There was nothing predestined about the horror that has been raging in the Balkans for the past four years. It was foolish, demagogic local politics, along with short-sighted international diplomacy, that helped trigger, in the late 1980s and early '90s, the Third Balkan war of this century."¹⁰⁵

Robert Kaplan also made this point during his discussion with the students at Fort Leavenworth's School of Advanced Military Studies.¹⁰⁶ He stated that a country does not have a history of ethnic rivalry causing genocide; the genocide occurs when you have ethnic rivalry plus a power vacuum plus economic crisis plus

international inactivity. As seen in the former Yugoslavia, all of these ingredients created an explosive mixture.

Once that mixture exploded, the Europeans and US sought to avoid getting involved in the region. Desiring to do something without committing forces, the only apparent alternative was rhetoric. All verbally condemned the violence, but did nothing substantial to end it. Two years later when sanctions were finally agreed to, no enforcement mechanism was put in place. By the time the fourth period began, Europe and the US were concerned, but not concerned enough to really commit themselves to a solution involving intervention and fearing a long term commitment in an uncertain area.¹⁰⁷ This attitude stood in marked contrast to the West's policy during Yugoslavia's third period where the NATO allies were committed to Yugoslavia's security. Bleckman and Kaplan noted that this concern included economic as well as political security.

"The striking feature of this [US] commitment is the care that was taken by the United States to associate its NATO allies, the United Kingdom and France, with both the economic and the military assistance. The United States has consistently sought to ensure Yugoslav security, but it has never been alone in evincing concern. This is of great importance in assessing potential reactions to a succession crisis."¹⁰⁸

Yugoslavia continues to be vital to US interests for much the same reasons that it was vital to the US in the past. On one hand, the Balkans effect the relations between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. According to David Owen, "there is a real risk of Turkey and Greece being on opposite sides in any Balkan war, particularly one which brings the Serbs and the Albanians into confrontation. Such a wider war would affect the vital interests of the EU as well as NATO and the

US.”¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, the region can act as a de-stabilizing influence for Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary; all of whom lay some historical claim to portions of the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, any influences on these three countries is of interest to Russia with whom they share a common border.¹¹⁰

Based on Cable’s model, when the international community used the least effective form of coercive diplomacy, expressive coercion, it failed to solve the conflict. When the international community finally agreed upon a course of action and implemented it with purposeful coercion, the warring parties agreed to work out a diplomatic settlement and produced the Dayton Accords. Implementation of this accord is being enforced by NATO combat forces in the former Yugoslavia, and indications are that their efforts are meeting with success.¹¹¹ Now that the implementation of the settlement is well under way, the international community needs to consider taking action that will directly help the Balkan states recover.

Milorad Pupovać, in describing the impoverishment created by the war, stated:

“It is extremely difficult to achieve trust and peace in a poor society with people who have been indoctrinated, and it is even more difficult to build a civil society. ...In other words, the sanctions should be lifted and, instead, the doors of international economic, trade, financial, and other organizations should be opened as part of a larger program of active and direct assistance to establish democracy in the tormented Balkan region.”¹¹²

The implication is that this is an opportunity to pick up the pieces of nation-building that Nathan claims the US lost in the wake of Vietnam.¹¹³ This presents the US with a situation where it can truly take the lead as an international facilitator and “relate its national interests to the interests of other states and the larger purposes of international society.”¹¹⁴ The US must act decisively as a world leader, guiding

nations to meet individual interests in the context of achieving a greater good for the international community as a whole.

Endnotes

1. James Cable, Diplomacy at Sea (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press,, 1985), 18.
2. Lawrence Freedman, "Why the West Failed" Foreign Policy Number 97 (Winter 1994-95): 59.
3. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1995), 12 and Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 7.
4. Sir James Cable is a retired British diplomat and former ambassador to Finland. He has authored ten books on various aspects of international relations and naval affairs. His best-known book is Gunboat Diplomacy, which is in its third edition. He holds a Phd from the University of Cambridge.
5. Walter M. Petraj, "Conflict Containment in the Balkans: Testing Extended Deterrence" Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California, March 1995.
6. Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988): 16-18, 33-34, 57, and John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983): 14-15, and Alexander L. George, and Smoke, R. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974): 11. All focus on use of military force and its threat to prevent one nation from taking actions against another. Though deterrence represents a form of coercion and coercive diplomacy, Cable's model categorizes a wider variety of actions and therefore appears to be a practical method for examining the effects of coercive diplomacy in the former Yugoslavia. For a study of the region based on Huth's theory, see Pjetraj, W. M. "Conflict Containment in the Balkans: Testing Extended Deterrence" Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1995.
7. Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, (London: Verso, 1993): 80. She describes Tito's plan for the shift in political power to a collective leadership. The composition of the collective leadership was based on the twin principles of rotation of all elected officials and equal representation for the six component republics and two 'autonomous provinces that made up Yugoslavia. There was three supreme organs: the State Presidency, with eight members, one for each republic and province; the similarly structured Executive Bureau of the Party; and a special committee set up in 1975 to safeguard the new Federal Constitution adopted a year earlier at the 10th Party Congress. The special committee included the ministers of defense and the interior. By checking and balancing each other, these three bodies should, in theory at least, have enabled the new leadership to continue smoothly along Tito's established road and maintain equitable relations between the country's diverse ethnic groups.
8. Lawrence Freedman, "Why the West Failed," discusses the crisis pp 57-62.
9. Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds" Foreign Policy Number 91 (Summer 1993): 4, and Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 5,6.

10. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 43. Also, Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, lists the UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential statements on Yugoslavia between September 1991 and January 1995. UNSCR 743 and 749 are listed on p 402. The UNSCR called for the UNPROFOR to protect selected areas and stop the fighting; the fighting continued, and the UN mission did not achieve its stated objectives.

11. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 28.

12. For a series of discussions on the subject see William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1995) which is a good thumbnail sketch of the history of the Balkans but ignores the political and in particular economic influence exerted by Europe, USSR and the US. Branka Magaš The Destruction of Yugoslavia presents a more left wing perspective on Yugoslavia's collapse placing greater blame on the powers outside the country for either actively aiding the fall or at least doing nothing but watching the fallout of decisions they made following WWII. The most balanced and detailed treatment of the economic and political decisions made by the US, USSR, Europe, the IMF, and Yugoslavian government is Susan Woodward's Balkan Tragedy. Another excellent source is Payam Akhavan and Howse, R. eds., Yugoslavia: the Former and Future (Washington: The Brookings Institution and Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute For Social Development, 1995) which is a compilation of essays by scholars from the region, each focusing on one particular aspect of Yugoslavia's dissolution.

13. Nathan, "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft," 59.

14. James Nathan, "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings volume 121/10/1,112 (October 1995): 59.

15. Caspar Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Defense, (January 1985): 9-10.

16. George Bush, "The Uses of Military Force, The President's Difficult Choice," Defense Issues 8 (January 1993): 3.

17. William Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington D.C.: The White House, February 1995): 12-13.

18. Barry M. Blechman, and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978): 508.

19. Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 449, and Misha Glenny, "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans" Foreign Affairs 74 No. 3 (May/June 1995): 101. Blechman and Kaplan discuss US interests and investment and Glenny discusses US inability to discern vital US interests in the region.

20. Bush, "The Use of Military Force, The President's Difficult Choice," 3 and Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, xx.

21. Dayton Peace Accords on Bosnia on the Department of State Website, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/www/current/bosnia/bosagree.html>, updated 31 march 1996.
22. Craig R. Whitney, "NATO in Bosnia: Credibility Is Enhanced, for Now" The New York Times International, Sunday, March 31, 1996, p 6.
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