Learning Under Fire: Training an Army While at War.
Abstract
This monograph examines the abilities of armies to train themselves while actually fighting a war. Modern doctrine as expressed in FM 100-5 and TRADOC PAM 525-S tacitly assumes that the U.S. Army's peacetime training is adequate for any conflict that might arise. In making this assumption, doctrine ignores several lessons from history, in which armies have had to modify their training to suit the needs of battlefields on which they were actively engaged. In its analysis of the topic, the monograph begins by defining the two forms of adaptation during conflict, reform and innovation, as expressed by Professor Stephen P. Rosen in his book Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military. This analysis establishes the theoretical background for the conduct of two case studies used to illustrate adaptive behavior of military organizations while at war. The first is the German Army's successful effort at reform following the Polish Campaign in 1939 as it readied itself for the invasion of the West. The second case study reflects an unsuccessful attempt at innovation as illustrated by the U.S. Army in Vietnam. In both examples, each army's training programs are assessed to discern how their training programs contributed to their ultimate success. In the final analysis, the monograph draws conclusions from the case studies relevant to current U.S. training doctrine to determine its utility in preparing the Army to train under fire. It ends with several recommendations to improve both doctrine and force structure to ensure that if the Army is not prepared for the next war, it will be able to get it right faster than its opponent.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA314361
Entities
People
- Edward G. Gibbons Jr
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College