Effective Planning of Joint Air Operations.
Abstract
Immediately following Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, all the services were quick to point out how well they had conducted joint operations throughout the crises. Upon closer examination, it has become evident that Army and Air Force joint operations did not produce seamless effects throughout the area of operations. One of the major areas of concern is planning and coordinating Air Force operations in concert with Army deep operations. This paper addresses how the Army and Air Force plan deep operations and how these planning procedures may be improved to increase the joint effects of their weapon systems. Specifically, what problems still exist in planning joint air operations and how can we fix them? This monograph begins by looking at the aspects of joint operations that are still not conducted successfully and the areas of disagreement that exist between the Air Force and Army. Using this frame of reference the paper establishes the definitions of deep operations that the Air Force and Army use. Next, based on the definitions of deep operations the monograph compares how each service plans their deep operations. A historical analysis is included that shows how deep operations have been planed in the past. It also helps to establish how history has influenced the ways the Air Force and the Army define success Finally, the monograph considers how the historical influence on each service has effected their inability to work together. The monograph concludes with recommendations on various considerations in Army and Air Force deep operations that may enhance the effective planning and execution of deep operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA314768
Entities
People
- Leonard S. Moskal
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College