American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War.
Abstract
This historical study treats the development of the Army's first doctrine for the post-Cold War. Raised to new prominence in the modernization and reform of the Utailed States Army of the 197Os-198Os, Army operational doctrine was rendered obsolescent in the early l99Os by the Cold War's end and by the advanced military technological capabilities demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. The new doctrine formulated under General Frederick Franks, Commanding General of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, sprang from the assumptions of a new strategic era. In the process of rethinking war fighting, a new dynamics of battle emerged, and a new operational doctrine was formulated. This study is intended to present a critical documented record of that important event in late-2Oth century American Army history. Treated are: its listurical antecedents, strategic context, study and formulation, finished results, propagation, and the mecloanics of the effort. This monograph is additionally intended to provided, in its ideational detail, a case-study of the intellectual and institutional processes involved, for use by future doctrine planners.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA317654
Entities
People
- John L. Romjue
Organizations
- United States Army Training and Doctrine Command