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MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONS: A STUDY OF THE EVOLVING
RELATIONSHIP DURING AND AFTER THE GULF WAR

by

ANTOINETTE THERESA KEMPER

B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1987

A thesis proposal submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts
School of Journalism and Mass Communication

1996

This thesis is for the Master of Arts degree by

Antoinette T. Kemper

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
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
by

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Stewart M. Hoover

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Frank L. Kaplan

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Robert Trager

Date April 25, 1996

Kemper, Antoinette T. (M.A., Mass Communication)

Military-Media Relations: A Study of the Evolving Relationship During and After the
Gulf War

Thesis directed by Professor Stewart M. Hoover

The study examines the status of military-media relations in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Based on public relations theory, studies on source-journalist relationships, the historical precedence of wartime military-media relations, studies about military public affairs, and critiques of the Gulf War situation, the author assesses the Gulf War media policy, the post-Gulf War revised DoD policy, and their impact on present relations. The perspectives of media representatives, military representatives, and communication scholars about Gulf War and present military-media relations were gathered through interviews. Findings of each study group were analyzed and compared. Findings of previous studies on the subject are also discussed.

The researcher concludes, while some provisions of the Gulf War policy did not facilitate open media coverage, problems in the policy's execution created more tension between the military and the media. Hostility towards the media also remained from the Vietnam era. Military commanders' support is also a prerequisite for media access to units.

Military education programs to foster a better appreciation of a free press' role free in a democracy are needed for all members. In addition, the author recommends additional public affairs training, including a mentoring program, be instituted. Also, while the military should continue to provide opportunities for reporters to participate in training exercises to learn about the military, it is unrealistic to expect that most reporters can participate due to shrinking resources at news organizations. Finally, military and media representatives continue a dialogue to regularly discuss issues of mutual concern.

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CHAPTER 1

THE ISSUE

Background of the Issue

"In the long history of the military-media relationship, particularly in time of war, there has never been a protracted peace between the two institutions. Underlying the relationship in peace and war is a tension between the two professions that seem antithetical to each other."¹ Both institutions protect and preserve American democracy—the former protects national interest at home and abroad, and the latter serve as a Fourth Estate, a fourth branch of government. "While the military needs the press in order to retain the support of the public and Congress, it fears the success of its mission will be compromised by a probing press corps," according to The Center for Defense Information's America's Defense Monitor.² The media, by nature, are "skeptical and intrusive" and act as a "watchdog over institutions of power, be they military, political, economic, or social. Their job is to inform the people about the doings of their institutions."³

The respective roles of the military and the media in wartime bring First Amendment rights and the need for military security into conflict. "Wars come with built-in contradictions. The press seeks rapid and complete disclosure of all but the

¹ M. David Arant and Michael L. Warden, "The Military and the Media: A Clash of Views on the Role of the Press in Time of War," The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf, Contributions in Military Studies 148, eds. Thomas A. McCain and Leonard Shyles (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994) 35.

² "The Press and the Pentagon," America's Defense Monitor, ts. 824 (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 1995) 3.

³ Bernard E. Trainor, "The Military and the Media: A Troubled Embrace," The Media and the Gulf War, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 71.

most sensitive of information; yet the military leaders generally want to control the flow of news."¹ The military's interest in controlling the flow of information to protect the lives of its troops and operational security opposes the requirements for a free press and the public's unfettered access to information. The institutions' conflicting views concerning who has the right to determine what information will be withheld from the public fuels the controversy.

"Striking the proper balance between the people's 'right to know' and the military's 'need for secrecy' has always been a contentious rhetorical battleground."² Since the American Revolution, the U.S. government and military have attempted to restrict the activities of war correspondents covering U.S. troops in combat.³ Historically, the government and military have set policies for correspondents covering the wars to follow. Whether compliance to media policies was voluntary or strictly enforced through censorship, they resulted in varying degrees of self-censorship among war correspondents. That censorship can be imposed in this country, under any circumstances, is disturbing to some. According to the author of *Reporting the Wars*, Joseph J. Mathews, the reasons necessitating military censorship and associated news controls that developed from the necessity to withhold information from the enemy during wartime have made the practice "palatable in democratic societies when political censorship was unacceptable."⁴

The issue of access versus security was raised again during the recent Persian Gulf War. At the onset of the conflict, the media protested the military's ground rules and guidelines for media covering the war with little effect. After the war, there was

¹ Gary C. Woodward, "The Rules of the Game: The Military and the Press in the Persian Gulf War," *The Media and the Persian Gulf War*, ed. Robert E. Denton, Jr. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993) 1-2.

² Arant and Warden 27.

³ Margaret A. Blanchard, "Free Expression and Wartime: Lessons from the Past, Hopes for the Future," *Journalism Quarterly* 69 (1992) 5.

⁴ Joseph J. Mathews, *Reporting the Wars* (1957; Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972) 197.

considerable concern among media organizations. Restraints on coverage not only set a precedence for media coverage of future conflicts, but it also cost the American public access to unbiased and accurate information about the war effort. These concerns led to meetings between military and media representatives, and new principles for media coverage of contingency operations resulted. (See Appendix C.) However, the Department of Defense's (DoD) revised media policy does not fully reconcile the opposing concerns of the two institutions in times of war.

Unresolved fundamental issues concerning the government's ability to impose restrictions on war coverage remain. Underlying this issue is the question of what the media's function, relative to the government, is in a democratic society and whether the function changes during war. Some scholars believe the media's role can change in times of war. For instance, M. David Arant and Michael L. Warden argue the First Amendment is not an end in itself or an absolute, but an ideal that may be subordinated to other ideals, such as the need for military security, when necessary for the good of our society.¹ Retired Army Colonel Harry G. Summers has a more extreme view of the media's obligation to their nation: "Newsmen, like every other American citizen, are bound by the Preamble of the Constitution to 'provide for the common defense.' And if they choose to abdicate that responsibility, then they have no claim to rights under the First Amendment of that Constitution."² According to Patrick O'Heffernan, Senior Fellow and Assistant to the Director of the Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, this view is made obsolete by advances in communication technology. He argues that before the existence of "global, interconnected, multinational live television" the issue of whether news

¹ Arant and Warden 22.

² Harry G. Summers, "Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs," The Media and the Gulf War, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 86.

should carry coverage from the "enemy camp" or air reports which may undermine the U.S. military security and morale was answered by the notion that one's primary duty is to one's country. However, television has made national borders porous, so national loyalty cannot remain impervious.¹

Retired Vice Admiral John Shanahan states that "misunderstandings as to how, when and who should inform the American people about military activities can and do create adversarial relationships between the Pentagon and the press."² Both serve the public and are "vital to our national well-being," but inherent differences between the two causes tension in their relationship.³ Each may recognize the importance of the other in a free society but also resent the way the other conducts business, especially in periods of crisis. The military, attempting to maintain secrecy for its operations, frustrates the media trying to fully inform the public about the government's actions, and vice versa. Some adversity in the military-media relationship is necessary since too much cooperation between the two undermines objective reporting and full disclosure of defense information. However, do the respective roles of these two institutions of public trust require them to remain in opposition?

Purpose of the Study

This study aims to analyze the current status of the evolving military-media relationship using the Persian Gulf War as a case study. The importance of each institution and the public's interest in their performance are heightened during war. Both have critical roles in protecting the U.S. democracy; the military protects national security and interests from external threats or perceived threats, and the media call attention to violations of democratic principles within the U.S. government.

¹ Patrick O'Heffernan, "Sobering Thoughts on Sound Bites Seen 'Round the World," Desert Storm and the Mass Media, eds. Bradley S. Greenberg and Walter Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1993) 27.

² "The Press and the Pentagon" 3.

³ "The Press and the Pentagon" 16.

Military-media relations during the United States' most recent war is the product of each institution's philosophy concerning the press in wartime and the historical precedence for their present relationship.

The military's media policy during the Gulf War reflects the military's overriding concern for security and its general attitude towards the media. The policy indicates how much the military believes the media can be trusted and how much discretion the military is willing to allow the media in wartime. The extent to which the media were willing (or not willing) to abide by the policy and the tone of Gulf War coverage indicates the media's trust of and attitudes towards the military. The protest and criticisms of the policy stem from the media's concern about infringements on the role of a free press in covering the United States at war.

Working relations between the military and the media during the Gulf War had a significant impact on the present military-media relationship in the author's opinion. Journalists who had positive experiences with helpful and professional military personnel are more likely to trust the military in the future. On the other hand, bad experiences with uncooperative military public affairs officers and abuses of the security review process will surely taint some journalists' attitudes towards the military. By the same token, media representatives who were experienced, professional, and knowledgeable about military operations surely impressed military members and promoted a positive image of the media among the military. Therefore, by examining military-media relations during the Gulf War, much can be revealed about the present state of the military-media relationship.

After the Gulf War, both the military and the media recognized the need for changes in the Pentagon's media policy. By working together, a new policy was written—but not completely agreed upon. The updated DoD principles for media coverage of military operations reflect the status of the current military-media relationship. The ability of the policy to meet the needs of both institutions of public

trust will determine its success in future crisis operations and the future of the military-media relationship.

Research Questions

Military public affairs policies are based on public relations principles. Some or all of the following interests of the military can influence public affairs policies: (1) garner public support for the military, especially during wartime, and secure public consent for its activities; (2) garner support for the U.S. government's national security policies and decisions; (3) protect the military's own political interests, such as obtaining funding from Congress; (4) support policies of the Executive Branch and the decisions of the commander in chief; (5) enhance the military's image and recruit people for the Armed Forces; and (6) protect national security. The success of military public affairs programs in meeting these objectives—especially while facing federal budget cuts and manpower reductions of the all-volunteer force—is critical to maintaining the military's desired level of operational readiness.

During war, communication strategies targeting the American public and the enemy are an important component of military strategy. To prevent breaches in security, the military imposes restrictions on the media. Critics charge the Gulf War media policy was designed to protect primarily political, not military, security and garner public support for the war effort at the expense of a free press and informed public.

The researcher argues that the bulk of the scholarly studies concerning Gulf War coverage excludes the perspective of the military. Many studies fail to include a single military source. This raises the question of whether perceptions concerning the utility of the media policy during the Gulf War and the current status of the military-media relationship are accurate or if they primarily reflect one side of the issue. Whether existing scholarly research on the issue includes military or primary sources and original research or a few sources are used as a basis for subsequent studies indicates whether the opinions of a few are reflected in the conclusions of these studies.

Studies and historical accounts of wartime military-media relations trace the development of the present relationship. In each of the wars in which America has fought, media policies and practices were instituted by the government to restrict press coverage. Common elements of the policies governing combat coverage from the Civil War to the Gulf War include: (1) prior restraint; (2) post hoc censorship, (3) restrictions on access to troops and units, (4) accreditation for war correspondents, and (5) sanctions for violating the rules. Therefore, the lessons of previous wars were reflected in Gulf War media ground rules and guidelines.

The utility of the Gulf War media policy has been debated between representatives of the military and the media. In assessing the utility and shortcomings of the Pentagon's policy, several points need to be considered. First, were the restrictions placed on the media the minimum necessary to protect military security or were other interests, such as maintaining public support for the war and U.S. policies, being protected? Next, was the policy reasonably enforceable or did enforcing the policy's provisions hinder the reporting process and military public affairs objectives? Did the policy's provisions hinder or facilitate the free flow of information about the war to the American public? Finally, how much of the war was accessible to the media and how much could have been? The utility of the Gulf War media policy will be analyzed based primarily on information gathered through interviews conducted with military public affairs officers, media representatives who covered the Gulf War, and communication scholars who have studied military-media relations during war.

Next, the utility of the current DoD principles of media coverage of DoD operations will be assessed. Since the military serves the American people, it is obligated to keep the public informed of its activities. However, it also depends on public consent for its activities. Public support for prolonged combat operations is

needed but cannot be obtained by shielding the public from the horror of war.¹ Bona fide public consent can only be the result of informed decisions made by informed citizens who will support a just war, according to the Center for Defense Information.² Therefore, the military must communicate its objectives to the public through the media. The media serve to inform the public about the activities of the government and the decisions leading to the use of military force, and provide an up-to-date account of military operations. The media want to observe the war first-hand and report on it as impartial observers, including as many perspectives about the war as possible. Does the Pentagon's media policy facilitate or hinder each institution's ability to meet their objectives? Does the policy protect legitimate security interests while facilitating a free flow of information about the military's activities? Can the media have unfettered access to freely report on the war's events and inform the public while not compromising military security? While the author recognizes it is a difficult to impossible task to reconcile the divergent concerns of both the military and the media in one policy, how close does the current policy come to meeting the needs of both institutions? Since the existing policy indicates the prognosis for military-media relations, the author will suggest what elements this policy should or should not include. The analyses and recommendations will be made from information gathered through personal interviews and from literature on the subject.

Finally, the study assesses the future of military-media relations. Interviews with military representatives, media representatives, and communication scholars will indicate the state of current relations and opinions about future relations between the military and the media.

¹ "The Media in the Iraq War," America's Defense Monitor, ts. 447 (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 1995) 14.

² "The Media in the Iraq War" 14.

In summary, the research questions for the study are:

1. Was the Gulf War media policy effective in allowing the media to fully cover the events leading to and during the war, or did it hinder the newsgathering process? What goals were implicit in the DoD policy? How well were they met?
2. How well do the current DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations meet the needs of both the military and the media? What are the needs of each in a democratic society?
3. What should the DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations include?
4. What is the outlook for the military-media relationship?

Scope of the Study

A qualitative analysis of existing research on military-media relations, military public affairs policies and practices, and personal and telephone interviews are the primary research methods for the study. Interview subjects are included in one of three study groups, which are composed of military representatives, media representatives, and communication scholars. The composition of each study group is listed in Appendix H. Separate interview agendas were designed for each study group. A total of 33 people were interviewed: 14 media representatives, nine military representatives and 10 scholars. Interviews were taped with the subjects' permission and transcribed.

Data Limitations

In order to limit the study, the media representative study group includes representatives of the print media only. The role of broadcasting during the Gulf War—with the advent of “real-time” coverage and the case of Cable News Network—deserve separate studies in their own right. While some of the research referred to in the literature review addresses the content of television network Vietnam War and Gulf War reports, the studies illustrate key points about coverage of the wars.

Also, the military representative study group includes primarily Air Force representatives. Since the study is being conducted for the benefit of the Air Force, it addresses issue from an Air Force perspective. Since there are more similarities than

differences among the public affairs programs of the respective services and they all follow DoD directives, this factor will not skew the study.

Other Limitations

The prominence of some of the proposed interview subjects made them unable to participate in the study. Therefore, some individuals who may have shared some unique and valuable perspectives on the issue were not included in the study.

The author is an Air Force public affairs officer, who has her own opinions and perspectives about the issue. On the other hand, the author did not serve in the Gulf region during the Gulf War, and, therefore, can remain more objective when analyzing conflicting opinions between the military and the media who were there. Therefore, the interview agendas are designed to minimize subjectivity. (See Appendices E-G.)

Arrangement of the Thesis

The first chapter introduces the issue. Current military-media relations have been shaped by historical precedence, institutional cultures of the military and the media, and the experiences of those in the professions. The research questions for the study and research methods are discussed.

The second chapter introduces the literature and theories pertinent to the study. Public relations theory, journalist-source relations, military-media relations, and the case of the Gulf War are discussed. Some of the theories introduced will be used as an analytical framework for the research data.

The third chapter traces the methodology of the study. The chapter includes an outline to show how each research question is addressed in the study in the form of interview agenda questions. A description of the interview subjects' backgrounds are included in the chapter. In addition, the limitations of the research approaches and design are addressed.

Next, the research methods used in the study are reviewed in the fourth chapter. First, the findings of each of the individual study groups are reviewed and then trends

among the three study groups are compared to identify common areas of agreement and disagreement.

In the final chapter, the findings of the study are discussed and the research questions are addressed. Based on the study's findings and answers to the research questions, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made. Finally, suggestions for subsequent studies on military-media relations are made.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Chapter Overview

The military continually prepares for the next conflict, and developing communications strategies to support military operations is an important aspect of the planning. At the inception of a military operation, generic public affairs directives are modified to meet the specific requirements and conditions of the operation. The military's concerns for operational security, protecting the lives of troops and tactical information, are reflected in the guidelines for news media covering military operations. The guidelines are products of the experiences of previous wars and a concern to control the flow of information.

Effective information programs have become vital to the success of the military in peacetime and wartime. Public and political support are needed to fund defense programs or commit military forces to and sustain them in combat. Once troops are committed, information programs are an integral component in the conduct of modern warfare. Ray E. Hiebert, Professor of Journalism at the University of Maryland, states:

The effective use of words and media today, in times of crisis, is just as important as the effective use of bullets and bombs. In the end, it is no longer enough just to be strong. Now it is necessary to communicate. To win a war today, government not only has to win on the battlefield; it must also win the minds of its publics. Or, put another way, when the government has to win, it also has to explain *why* it has to win. Stability, continuity, and even victory in the long run will only come when both action and communication are effective. The war in the Gulf has just given us a case in point. It may well be a scenario for all future wars to come.¹

¹ Ray E. Hiebert, "Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern Warfare," Public Relations Review 17 (1991): 115-116.

The communication strategy Hiebert describes basically constitutes a propaganda effort where tailored information is released in order to garner support for the war effort. According to Walter Lippman, "Without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strict sense of the word is impossible."¹ Historically, the government has tried to control information flow in wartime, and critics argue the controls were imposed for political reasons, either the government's or the military's, not for military security. Despite the restrictions, the military and the media have had a generally cooperative relationship when our nation was at war. The needs of an open and free press were, for the most part, agreeably subordinated to national security concerns. Based on the historical precedent, the military expected cooperation from the media during the Vietnam War. When the media refused to allow the military to use them to deceive the enemy—and the American public—the military was confused.² The Vietnam War proved to be major turning point in military-media relations. The traditional alliance between the government and the media in wartime broke down and the military began to consider the media adversaries.³

The legacy of the Vietnam War was present when the United States entered its next major conflict, the Persian Gulf War. Here, the media confronted a sophisticated military public affairs organization with restrictions barring them from freely witnessing the war's events. The legacies of the Gulf War—the perspectives of those who covered the war from the Gulf region, tone of war reporting, and discussions between military and media representatives concerning the military's media policy in wartime—are prime indicators of the status of military-media relationship.

¹ Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, 1922) 43.

² Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty. From Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker (1975; London: Quartet, 1982) 344.

³ Arant and Warden 22-23.

In order to understand the foundation of contemporary military-media relations, the literature pertaining to public relations, journalist-source relationships, the history of military-media relations in wartime, the case of the Gulf War, and the prognosis for the future of military-media relations are reviewed.

First, military public affairs programs are based on basic public relations principles tailored to the military's unique mission. Therefore, there are great similarities between military public affairs and corporate public relations. Public relations practices, such as protecting the company's image, conveying a unified message through various media to different audiences, and proactive media relations programs, are incorporated into military public affairs directives. A review of some working definitions of public relations and public relations strategies provide a basic understanding of corporate public relations as well as military public affairs.

Next, a study of the relationship between reporters and sources is critical to an analysis of the military-media relationship. Conclusions of studies of the relationship between journalists and public relations practitioners are useful in constructing a model for the working relationship between journalists and military public affairs officers, the corporate public relations executive equivalent. A review of the relationship between journalists and official sources is particularly relevant to analyzing the interaction of reporters and Pentagon officials. The type of working relationship established between military officials and media representatives can influence the type of news coverage the military gets.

Further, working relations between military and media representatives can depend on the competence of military public affairs officers, which determines how well the media's needs are met and how credible the media consider them as sources of information. Few scholars have specifically studied the performance of military public affairs officers, but those available are included in this section.

The historical development of the military-media relationship in times of war provides insight into how the military and the media interact during critical periods for both professions. The experiences in previous wars set the precedent for the military's Gulf War media policy and the media's expectations for covering the war.

Our nation's most recent war, the Gulf War, provides an ideal case study for understanding contemporary military-media relations. Hiebert believes the academic scrutiny of the Gulf War is the result of surprise regarding the U.S. military's "public relations sophistication" during the campaign. Public relations is a relatively new aspect of warfare and "has never been practiced with such skill as it was in the Gulf War."¹ The military's media policy, shortcomings and criticisms of the policy, and critiques of news reports about the war are reviewed. Finally, some perspectives concerning the outlook for military-media relationship are included.

From the literature reviewed, a model of the current military-media relationship can be constructed. By understanding the nature of the existing relationship between these two institutions, recommendations for how to improve or sustain the relationship, through reasonable policies and practices, can be made.

Public Relations Theory

Public Relations Defined

There are as many definitions of the term "public relations" as there are public relations theorists. However, all definitions or descriptions of the practice share the idea that public relations programs are designed to effectively communicate key messages to various publics in order to enhance an organization's image.

American public relations pioneer Edward L. Bernays defines public relations as: "(1) information given to the public, (2) persuasion directed at the public to modify attitudes and actions, and (3) efforts to integrate attitudes and actions of an institution

¹ Ray E. Hiebert, "Public Relations, Propaganda, and War," Public Relations Review 19 (1993): 293.

with its publics and of publics with that institution.”¹ Scott M. Cutlip describes the “thrust” of public relations specialists’ work, often arising from crises in public opinion, as “mobiliz[ing] public attention and support according to the aims of a paying client” and “set[ting] the public agenda.”² Stan Sauerhaft and Chris Atkins consider public relations “the art and science of creating, altering, strengthening, or overcoming public opinion.”³ “Public relations represents plans and programs for public understanding and acceptance of an organization,” according to Donald W. Blohowiak.⁴

Support from outside the organization, as well as from within it, is necessary, so public relations communication strategies target internal and external audiences. “The function [of public relations or public affairs] includes relations with external groups, such as the press, politicians, citizen groups, and so on, as well as some internal relations, such as employee and shareholder communications,” according to Fred J. Evans.⁵

The definition of public relations, or what it is, determines the types of strategies employed by public relations practitioners to achieve their organizations’ objectives. Military public affairs and corporate public relations programs are based on the same public relations principles. Therefore, an understanding of corporate public relations practices leads to an understanding of military public affairs.

¹ Edward L. Bernays, Public Relations (Norman, OK: U of Oklahoma P, 1952) 3.

² Scott M. Cutlip, “Public Relations: The Manufacture of Opinion,” Gannett Center Journal 3.2 (1989): 105.

³ Stan Sauerhaft and Chris Atkins, Image Wars: Protecting Your Company When There’s No Place to Hide (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989) 13.

⁴ Donald W. Blohowiak, No Comment! An Executive’s Essential Guide to the News Media (New York: Praeger, 1987) 66.

⁵ Fred J. Evans, Managing the Media: Proactive Strategy for Better Business-Press Relations (New York: Quorum Books, 1987) 77.

Public Relations Strategies

"Any person or organization depends ultimately on public approval and is therefore faced with the problem of engineering the public's *consent* to a program or goal."¹ To "engineer consent" a calculated plan of action, designed to garner support for ideas and programs, is employed. This process supplements the educational process, enabling people to understand the basis for their actions, according to Bernays.²

Message consistency, communicating one theme to different audiences using various media, is a strategy that has long been in use by public relations practitioners to promote an organization's agenda.³ According to Bernays, "education through information" can unify public opinion. The Committee on Public Information used this method during World War I to give the public "the information necessary to aid in understanding America's war aims and ideals" using all available media.⁴

In addition, a corporation's reputation determines how much support its actions and policies will receive. John F. Budd, Jr., chairman and CEO of Omega Group, describes reputations as "the collective outcome of building trust and gaining credibility."⁵ Traditionally, the strategy for influencing people's impressions involves selling a point of view by publicizing supporting expert opinion and facts.⁶ If the company's message is tailored to the media and meets the audience's interests and perceptions, it is more effective.⁷

¹ Bernays, Public Relations 159.

² Bernays, Public Relations 159.

³ Sauerhaft and Atkins 26-27.

⁴ Edward L. Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923; New York: Liveright, 1961) 129.

⁵ John F. Budd, Jr., "How to Manage Corporate Reputations," Public Relations Quarterly Winter 1994-95: 11.

⁶ Budd 12.

⁷ Budd 14.

Hiebert describes the public relations rules for crisis management as: "tell as much as you can and tell it fast; centralize the source of information with an effective and well-informed spokesman, usually the chief executive; deal with rumors swiftly; make as much available to the press as possible; update information frequently; stay on the record; and never tell a lie."¹ Many public relations professionals echo Hiebert's last point and believe there is no room for manipulation or deception when dealing with the press.² Open and honest press relations results in more positive coverage while not being open to the media fosters hostility and suspicion. If the press cannot get information from a public relations person, they will get the information elsewhere, and most likely from hostile sources.³

Therefore, media relations are an important aspect of public relations. "A press-oriented public relations function is virtually a necessity for public companies, according to Blohowiak.⁴ Media relations personnel prepare organizational leaders for successful media interviews and protect their organization's interests by accommodating reasonable media inquiries and request.⁵

According to Blohowiak, press conferences are an overused method of disseminating information to the media and should only be used when there is something momentous to announce.⁶ Press conferences are frequently used by the military and were used as one of the standard methods of releasing information to the media during the Gulf War.

¹ Hiebert, "PR as a Weapon" 110.

² Evans xi.

³ Evans xi.

⁴ Blohowiak 69.

⁵ Blohowiak 69.

⁶ Sauerhaft and Atkins 80.

Military public affairs programs generally adhere to what Blohowiak calls the "Mother Hen" approach to public relations. Here, public relations managers are "very protective of the corporate image and the company's personnel," and employees are instructed to "have all press inquiries directed to the public relations staff."¹ The method "theoretically, assures the firm will have control over its public image by presenting a consistent, unified message to the press, and, by extension, to the public."²

While solid public relations programs contribute greatly to the success of an organization, public relations programs are not the only determinant of the amount of news coverage an organization will get. A study by S. Holly Stocking concluded "productive and prestigious" organizations get national news coverage regardless of the amount of public relations activity.³ News value is the prime determinant of whether public relations materials are used, but other factors influence coverage. For example, local and electronic news media may be more likely than national and print news media to use public relations materials or rely on public relations activities. Reporters also rely more on public relations activities when covering more "closed" organizations, such as the military, or when constrained by tight deadlines.⁴ Therefore, journalists and public relations practitioners frequently rely on each other. However, in wartime military public affairs differs from corporate public relations. Since war always has good news value, there is a demand-pull situation for "hard" news information about the war, whereas, the role of public relations activities is to "create" good news when there is no "hard" news story about the organization.

¹ Blohowiak 78-79.

² Blohowiak 79.

³ S. Holly Stocking, "Effect of Public Relations Efforts on Media Visibility of Organizations," *Journalism Quarterly* 63 (1986): 366.

⁴ Stocking 366.

Journalist-Source Relationships

Journalists and Public Relations Practitioners

According to Cutlip, "public relations practitioners and journalists function in a mutually dependent relationship, sometimes as adversaries and sometimes as colleagues," and although there is mutual suspicion and resentment, neither effectively can function alone.¹ Journalists are sometimes "captive" of public relations practitioners' news control.² Practitioners can help set the media's agenda by supplying editors with newsworthy information. Everett M. Rogers, James W. Dearing, and Soonbum Chang studied how the media agenda is determined in the agenda-setting process by gatekeepers, influential media, and spectacular news events—such as our nation going to war.³ They suggested the "issues become more important on various agendas through the addition of new information and new interpretations, while becoming less important on those same agendas due to competition with other issues."⁴ If public relations practitioners can exploit this principle, they can keep positive information about their organization in the news.

Journalists and public relations practitioners may become frustrated with their mutually dependent relationship which can lead to an antagonism. A study by Craig Aronoff concluded journalist generally do not have positive attitudes regarding public relations practitioners. Many journalists consider the practitioner "a suspicious manipulator of the press."⁵

¹ Cutlip 111-112.

² Cutlip 111.

³ Everett M. Rogers, James W. Dearing and Soonbum Chang, "AIDS in the 1980s: The Agenda-Setting Process for a Public Issue," Journalism Monographs No. 126 (1991): 4-6.

⁴ Rogers, Dearing and Chang 7.

⁵ Craig Aronoff, "Credibility of Public Relations for Journalists," Public Relations Review 1 (1975): 51.

While journalists and practitioners consider their relationship cooperative, practitioners believe this to a greater extent.¹ In addition, journalists generally do not consider practitioners of equal status to themselves. Practitioners consider themselves of equal status to the journalists with whom they routinely work but generally rate journalists higher in status than people in their own field, according to a study by Dennis J. Jeffers.²

Some antagonism between journalists and public relations practitioners may stem from their differing views. According to a study by Lillian Lodge Kopenhaver, David L. Martinson and Michael Ryan, while journalists and public relations practitioners agree about the relative importance of news elements, they perceive a gap in their respective views.³ This was particularly true in the case of the journalists who did not perceive practitioners' views accurately and believed their respective views differed significantly.⁴ The results of this study was reinforced by another study in another study by Sandra Kruger Stegall and Keith P. Sanders who concluded that public relations practitioners can assess their journalist counterparts' views better than journalists can assess practitioners' views. They suggest adding public relations courses to journalists' education in order to promote mutual understanding of the professions.⁵

Other researchers attribute the antagonism between journalists and public relations practitioners to beliefs "firmly embedded in journalistic culture."⁶ Michael

¹ Dennis J. Jeffers, "Performance Expectations as a Measure of Relative Status of News and PR People," Journalism Quarterly 54 (1977): 306.

² Jeffers 306.

³ Lillian Lodge Kopenhaver, David L. Martinson and Michael Ryan, "How Public Relations Practitioners and Editors in Florida View Each Other," Journalism Quarterly 61 (1984): 865.

⁴ Kopenhaver, David L. Martinson and Michael Ryan 865.

⁵ Sandra Kruger Stegall and Keith P. Sanders, "Coorientation of PR Practitioners and News Personnel in Education News," Journalism Quarterly 62 (1985): 344, 393.

⁶ Michael Ryan and David L. Martinson, "Journalists and Public Relations Practitioners: Why the Antagonism?," Journalism Quarterly 65 (1988): 139.

Ryan and David L. Martinson concluded some of these attitudes may stem from bad experiences journalists have had with ineffective public relations practitioners. Consequently, and journalists tend to have higher opinions of individual practitioners than they have of the field as a whole.¹

Findings of a study by J. David Pincus, Tony Rimmer, Robert E. Rayfield, and Fritz Cropp confirm the findings of earlier studies that journalists generally have negative attitudes toward public relations practitioners and public relations-generated materials.² "Journalists claim public relations people do not understand news and block their access to organizational sources. Public relations practitioners argue that the media are biased against them and their clients, and they are often unfamiliar with the topics they write about."³

E. W. Brody suggests that the antagonism between journalists and practitioners is more perceived than real.⁴ The perceptions of journalists and practitioners about each others' ethical standards and product quality are more similar than assumed, and mutual respect is also greater than assumed.⁵ Brody found greater differences in perception in terms of ethical factors than in the area of product quality. Also, the two groups agreed on what constitutes good news stories.⁶

Journalists and public relations practitioners may have more in common than they think. The educational backgrounds of public relations practitioners are more

¹ Ryan and Martinson 139-140.

² J. David Pincus, Tony Rimmer, Robert E. Rayfield, and Fritz Cropp, "Newspaper Editors' Perceptions of Public Relations: How Business, News, and Sports Editors Differ," Journal of Public Relations Research 5 (1993): 27.

³ Pincus, Rimmer, Rayfield, and Cropp 28.

⁴ E. W. Brody, "Antipathy Between PR, Journalism Exaggerated," Public Relations Review 10 (1984): 11.

⁵ Brody 15.

⁶ Brody 15.

similar to that of the journalists they work with than to their superiors.¹ A 1987 survey indicated 26 percent of public affairs respondents had undergraduate journalism degrees and 40 percent had degrees in social sciences or humanities. Of the journalists surveyed, 53 percent had journalism degrees and 38 percent had degrees in social sciences or humanities.²

While journalists and public relations practitioners may share some common ground, journalists have a traditionally antagonistic role towards government and big business. Evans' rationale for this is that journalists are a product of academic liberalism, critical thinkers less likely to accept conventional wisdom but challenge the status quo.³ Since some institutions, such as big business and the military, are associated with traditional values and considered the "epitome of the establishment," they are singled out for criticism.⁴

Journalists and Official Sources

Several scholars have studied the mass media's relationships with news sources, including sources within social and political institutions. "Journalists react to all social groups and institutions, not only via news-value criteria, but also according to the degree of respect (or lack of it) to which they are regarded as entitled by the dominant value system."⁵ "Media coverage of a given institution will reflect the interaction between two sets of influences—its more or less abiding sacerdotal standing in the scale of social values and its momentary weight on news-value scales," according to Jay G.

¹ Evans 66.

² Evans 67.

³ Evans 6-7.

⁴ Evans 8.

⁵ Jay G. Blumler and Micheal Gurevitch, "Journalists' Orientations to Political Institutions: The Case of Parliamentary Broadcasting," Communicating Politics: Mass Communication and the Political Process, eds. Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, and Philip Schlesinger (New York: Harper, 1970) 89.

Blumler and Micheal Gurevitch.¹ The “more sacerdotal the media’s orientation towards a given institution,” the more likely that institution will be represented to “reflect its own views of its purposes, values, activities, and relations to society.”² During wartime, the troops fighting for our country have a powerful, symbolic status, representing the American values of democracy, and freedom. Therefore, criticism of the U.S. military and troops is not popular nor usually accepted. The sacred standing of the military can be diminished, as after the Vietnam War, but not completely lost. Our country’s military heritage, which began when the colonists freed our nation from English rule and colonialism, is a sacred and proud tradition. Thus, whereas a corporation can lose all it’s standing in the public’s eye, the military cannot. In this aspect, military public affairs differs from corporate public relations.

Daniel C. Hallin argues that by the 1950s journalism had come to be “defined largely in terms of ‘responsible’ performance of media’s new quasi-official function.” Government officials routinely confided in journalists, and journalists began to rely on officials as a primary source of information. The tenet of objective journalism was rationalized by “‘professional’ standards of news judgment.”³ As a result, news conventions included: the use of official sources; a focus on the president; an absence of interpretation or analysis; and a focus on immediate events.⁴

To enhance the credibility and importance of their account, reporters covering a newsworthy event often use “authoritative sources.”⁵ However, the tendency for

¹ Blumler and Gurevitch 90.

² Blumler and Gurevitch 91.

³ Daniel C. Hallin, The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford UP, 1986) 69-70.

⁴ Hallin 71-74.

⁵ Timothy E. Cook, “Domesticating a Crisis: Washington Newsbeats and the Network News after the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, American Politics and Political Economy Ser., eds. Lance W. Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994) 108.

reporters to use routine channels of information, such as government channels, "constitute[s] the mechanism for official dominance of national and foreign news."¹

Walter Gieber and Walter Johnson studied the relationship between reporters and sources in city government and found "the sources believe that reporters should be 'open' gatekeepers passing unmediated information into the newspapers. The reporters, believing the sources should be 'open-door' informants, reserve the mandate to decide *how* to mediate the information."² "Despite verbalized differences between source and reporters of perception of the other's role, the two groups find themselves mutually dependent. . ." Cooperation and collaboration between reporters and officials results.³

Gieber and Johnson's source-reporter relationship model indicates sources and reporters tend to co-operate in performing their respective communication roles and, thus, form a "mutually agreed perception of their function."⁴ In this case, it is more likely the reporter will assimilate the source's frame of reference and lose some independence in reporting as an "impartial agent of the public 'need to know'."⁵ A reporter who has direct daily contact with officials in one department gradually absorbs the perspectives of the senior officials he or she is covering.⁶

Reporters can become dependent on their sources which results in "some reluctance to offend news sources in the stories they write, considerable willingness to print whatever their sources tell them, and little or no insistence that officials take

¹ Leon V. Sigal, Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1973) 125.

² Walter Gieber and Walter Johnson, "The City Hall 'Beat': A Study of Reporter and Source Roles," Journalism Quarterly 38 (1961): 297.

³ Gieber and Johnson 297.

⁴ Dennis McQuail and Sven Windahl, Communication Models for the Study of Mass Communication (London: Longman House, 1981) 98.

⁵ McQuail and Windahl 98.

⁶ Sigal 47.

responsibility for the information they pass along.”¹ Reporters also tend to defer to the judgment of the official news source as to what is in the national interest to disclose.² In addition, government officials can control the flow of information by setting the rules for disclosing information, and by authorizing and determining when information is released within their organizations.³

The nature of journalism also influences the relationship between reporters and officials. According to Timothy E. Cook the “journalistic world is broken down into newsbeats, the territorial or topical domains individuals are assigned to cover routinely.”⁴ The Pentagon is a topical beat, and reporters often have the title “military affairs correspondent” or “defense correspondent.” “This substantive emphasis enables reporters to interact more smoothly with their sources at the Pentagon, by shared understandings and languages,” according to Cook. As a result, Pentagon reporters become weapons substantive experts who concentrate on the means rather than the ends, and their reports stress preparedness, or explaining to the public how tax dollars are spent.⁵ In the developing phases of the Gulf War where resources were committed and which reporter was featured shaped war coverage. “By emphasizing particular newsbeats, the news select[ed] particular newsmakers and particular perspectives on the invasion, its meaning, and its aftermath.”⁶ For example, Pentagon correspondents covered the military’s perspective while local newsbeat reporters covered anti-war activities.⁷

¹ Sigal 54.

² Sigal 80.

³ Sigal 115.

⁴ Cook 107.

⁵ Cook 110.

⁶ Cook 124.

⁷ Cook 124.

Newsbeat reporting leads to cooperative behavior among competing reporters covering the same beat, as evident in news pool arrangements, and the reliance on routine sources of official information, such as news releases and press conferences.¹ In addition, deadlines and pressure to get the information first force reporters to rely on official sources of information and not readily reject it.²

While the media theoretically function in an adversarial role to the government, there appears to be a great amount of cooperation between journalists and official sources, and the government and media are mutually dependent. O'Heffernan states that "government manipulates television news to set political agendas, influence public opinion, and communicate with other governments," and "television news takes advantage of government to get low-cost information and access to newsmakers and news events."³ Further, Juergen Arthur Heise concluded journalists and military public affairs officers "agree on important issues far more than they disagree."⁴ This cooperative relationship may affect the tone of news coverage of defense issues, as Heise suggests some reporters are "too soft on the military" because of it.⁵

Military-Media Relations

There may be a degree of cooperation between individual military public affairs officers and journalists, but, in general, the relationship between the military and the media remains antagonistic. Summers observed that "most military officers who served in Vietnam hated the news media in general but liked them in the particular."⁶ However, it is the former sentiment that has been passed on. "Bashing of the press by

¹ Sigal 52.

² Sigal 56.

³ O'Heffernan, "Sobering Thoughts" 28.

⁴ Juergen Arthur Heise, Minimum Disclosure: How the Pentagon Manipulates the News (New York: Norton, 1979) 180.

⁵ Heise 180.

⁶ Summers, "Testimony" 84.

the military and the public has been a persistent theme in military-press relationships," according to Thomas A. McCain, who attributes this to the "kill the messenger syndrome," where the media are subject to attack during wars since they carry bad or disturbing news.¹ Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor observed, "Today's officer corps carries as part of its cultural baggage a loathing for the press."² "The military is hostile toward the journalist, while the journalist is indifferent to the military. To the journalist, the military is just another huge bureaucracy to report on, no different from Exxon or Congress," according to Trainor.³

Animosity towards the military among media representatives is reinforced by commentary and literature which is predominantly from the media's perspective. Most recently, the bulk of analyses of Gulf War military-media relations is from the media's perspective. Little has been written from the military perspective, and "much of what has been popularly written and widely circulated unfairly characterizes the military's attitudes toward the press in a democracy," according to Arant and Warden.⁴

According to Peter Braestrup, the gap between the military and the media is widening, partly due to the influx of women into the field of journalism and the end of the draft in 1972, which means many reporters have no military experience.⁵ The military and the media's mutual lack of familiarity can contribute to mutual distrust.⁶ Military public affairs officers must bridge the cultural gap between the two institutions in order to communicate the military's objectives to the public via the media.

¹ Thomas A. McCain, introduction, The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf, Contributions in Military Studies 148, eds. Thomas A. McCain and Leonard Shyles (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994) xvii.

² Trainor, "A Troubled Embrace" 69.

³ Trainor, "A Troubled Embrace" 72.

⁴ Arant and Warden 27-28.

⁵ Peter Braestrup, Battle Lines: Report of the Twentieth Century Task Force on the Military and the Media (New York: Priority, 1985) 24.

⁶ "The Press and the Pentagon" 14.

Military Public Affairs

There are three primary avenues of citizen access to information about military activities according to Lauren Rabinovitz and Susan Jeffords: the government, eyewitness observers and journalists, and the military itself.¹ The amount of information that will be provided by these sources is determined by the individual interests of each source. For instance, the government wants to control the flow of information to prevent the enemy from obtaining information that will endanger national security, and it is also unlikely the government will provide information which supports anti-war points of view.² The mass media do not function separate from the military or the government in their war coverage and often reproduce or interpret the government's or military's war reports. In addition, the government or military may censor war reports.³ Therefore, even non-government organizations are limited in the scope and amount of information they will provide about military activities. The third source, the military itself, has its own objectives to protect public image and status and, therefore, is careful to release information which will protect these interests.⁴ Military public affairs programs are designed to further the interests of the Defense Department while providing maximum information to the public—objectives that are sometimes conflicting.

According to Senator J. W. Fulbright, military public relations campaigns target all of the public, with the media being the primary target.⁵ He claims the Pentagon often went beyond its role as advisor to Congress and launched national propaganda and

¹ Lauren Rabinovitz and Susan Jeffords, introduction, Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War, eds. Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1994) 8-11.

² Rabinovitz and Jeffords 8-9.

³ Rabinovitz and Jeffords 11.

⁴ Rabinovitz and Jeffords 10.

⁵ J. W. Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York: Liveright, 1970) 28.

public relations campaigns to garner public and congressional support for programs.¹ The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs was responsible, under the July 5, 1969, Department of Defense Directive 5122.5 for running a program to "provide the American people with maximum information about the Department of Defense consistent with national security," and "initiate and support activities contributing toward good relations between the Department of Defense and all segments of the public at home and abroad."²

However, according to Heise, there are two trends in the military's release of information: releasing good news to garner public support and increasing restrictions on the flow of information.³ To prevent releasable information unfavorable to the military from being published, information was unnecessarily classified, manipulated under the guise of national security, and delayed or distorted by Pentagon officials.⁴

The varying competence of the public information [now called public affairs] officers also influences the Pentagon's information release practices for "bad news."⁵ A 1974 study of Pentagon officers' attitudes towards the media's right to publish military news, found neither a consistently favorable or unfavorable opinion among the officers whose opinions varied depending on the kind of news and professional expertise of the officers.⁶ Another study concluded the experience and training of military officers determined how well they performed as censors and their ability to arbitrate between the media's need to publish and the military's need to maintain

¹ Fulbright 11.

² Fulbright 32-33.

³ Heise 65.

⁴ Heise 95.

⁵ Heise 150.

⁶ Jack E. Orwant and John Ullmann, "Pentagon Officers' Attitudes on Reporting of Military News," Journalism Quarterly 51 (1974): 468.

security.¹ The media's perceptions about public affairs officers' competence can also influence the officers' effectiveness. The media expect military public affairs officers to act primarily to protect the army's interest at the expense of 'candor with the press' but with a small amount of 'personal communication skills'," according to a 1983 study.²

On the other hand, the military's perception of the media influences the amount of information that will be released. Phil G. Goulding, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs during most of the Vietnam War, believes most government public affairs decisions are affected by the impression that media representatives are not responsible.³ According to Goulding, while an experienced information officer knows it is not a good practice to lie to the media and officials should publicly admit their mistakes instead of attempting to cover them up, information officers usually lack the rank to get his or her way on such issues.⁴ Restrictions on the release of information can also be "imposed from above," as some commanders believe a unit's business is "no one's but his."⁵

Despite internal obstacles in conducting media relations programs, government agencies have become more "media savvy."⁶ This could be due to increased awareness within the government and military of the value of public relations and media relations programs in promoting organizations' objectives.

¹ Michael Singletary, "Attitudes of Military Censors and Other Officers On Mass Media Issues," Journalism Quarterly 54 (1977): 732.

² James E. Fletcher and Philip E. Soucy, "Army Public Affairs Officers as Perceived by Press and Military Colleagues," Journalism Quarterly 60 (1983): 96.

³ Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security (New York: Harper, 1970) 47.

⁴ Goulding 46.

⁵ Heise 150.

⁶ Patrick O'Heffernan, "A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy," Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign in the Gulf War, American Politics and Political Economy Ser., eds. Lance W. Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994) 240.

How well military public affairs programs are conducted also influences the military-media relationship and the media's opinions of military public affairs officers. Having trained public affairs personnel is essential to creating and implementing effective public affairs programs, and the military trains its officers well. Many public affairs have advanced degrees, and the Armed Forces run their own public affairs training at the Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin-Harrison, Ind.¹ Quality training can produce quality results for the military.

According to Jon Katz, during the Gulf War the media were "isolated and manipulated by a new generation of media-savvy military men."² Media-sophisticated organizations, such as the military public affairs' Joint Information Bureau (JIB) during the Gulf War, "can mitigate or even reverse the influence of the media on an issue," and they can redirect media attention from negative information toward benign story topics.³ The current sophistication of military public affairs programs is the cumulative result of continuous training, policy revisions, war preparation, and wartime experience.

History and Evolution of Wartime Media Policy

Jacqueline E. Sharkey proposes that the debate between the media and the military does not only concern national security and press freedom; it is also an issue of politicians' desire to gain support for the decision to go to war. As a result, national security considerations are often based on political considerations.⁴ Since the American Revolution, the government has attempted to control press activity and restrict First Amendment rights during wartime.⁵ Nations involved in war have always tried to "muzzle war correspondents"; the stated purpose is to "keep secrets from the enemy"

¹ Hiebert "PR, Propaganda and War" 300.

² Jon Katz, "Collateral Damage to Network News," Columbia Journalism Review 29 (1991): 29.

³ O'Heffernan, "Mutual Exploitation" 240.

⁴ Jacqueline E. Sharkey, Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media From Grenada to the Persian Gulf. (Washington, DC: The Center for Public Integrity, 1991) 8.

⁵ Blanchard 5.

while the unstated reason is to "keep secrets from the citizens back home" when things go badly.¹

"During the Persian Gulf War many Americans felt as if they were experiencing something new in terms of suppression of dissent, restrictions on reporters, manipulation of information and the like," but these same issues were raised during the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War and the Civil War, according to Margaret A. Blanchard.² David L. Paletz argues that while journalists attempt to maintain the standards of objective reporting during wartime, the government justifies "secrecy, limiting access to information, and engaging in disinformation (this last is rarely admitted)" by "the objectives sought and the costs of failure."³ "In times of crisis, government leaders often feel that they can rule without the consent of the governed," but "continued efforts at the suppression and repression of the free flow of information may well cost the nation some of its most prized freedoms," according to Blanchard.⁴

Civil War

"U.S. government censorship of the news media during wartime originated during the Civil War," according to David Stebenne.⁵ Censorship in the South was more rigid than in the North, but the Northern press faced inconsistent government policies.⁶ Control of censorship was placed under the authority of the War Department

¹ Arthur Lubow, "Read Some About It," The Media and the Gulf War, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 94.

² Blanchard 16.

³ David L. Paletz, "Just Deserts?," Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, American Politics and Political Economy Ser., eds. Lance W. Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994) 291.

⁴ Blanchard 16-17.

⁵ David Stebenne, "The Military and the Media," The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict, eds. Craig LaMay, Martha Fitzsimon, and Jeanne Sahadi (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991) 8.

⁶ Stebenne 8.

in early 1862.¹ President Lincoln, in an attempt to manage news about the war, reminded newsmen they could be “court-martialed for espionage if their stories aided the enemy.”² A House resolution signed by General McClellan and several Washington correspondents in 1861 stated the press would not publish “any description, any information giving aid and comfort to the enemy.” Censorship was later expanded to prevent criticism of the Northern war effort from being published.³

Correspondents objected to the imposed censorship, charging censors were inept, and some mailed news stories to circumvent the censorship process.⁴ A June 1863 meeting of newspaper publishers protesting the federal government’s infringement on the freedom of the press failed to attract the editors of the important papers. However, four declarations were approved at the meeting. One denied the military’s right to suppress issues or prevent the circulation of journals “hundreds of miles from the seat of war.”⁵

Despite the protest, self-censorship was common in Civil War reporting. “The Confederate press lent itself to the government’s propaganda line much more readily than did the Northern press, according to Phillip Knightley.⁶ Twenty newspapers were suppressed in the North compared to only one in the South, where the Confederate war effort was supported and criticism was kept “within well-defined limits” to avoid a “despondent fault-finding tone.”⁷ The government, in turn, would facilitate the

¹ Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) 129.

² David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power (New York: Random, 1973) 141.

³ Knightley 24.

⁴ Harper 129.

⁵ Harper 135.

⁶ Knightley 25.

⁷ Knightley 25.

transmission of information “suitable for publication, particularly news that concerned engagements with the enemy.”¹

In the North, control of modes of communication enabled the government to enforce censorship by denying offending papers access to mail service and supervising the transmission of news reports over telegraph lines. Newspapers which published information deemed helpful to Confederate military efforts were prosecuted.² Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton suspended newspapers that had broken censorship rules, arrested editors, threatened proprietors with court-martial, banned correspondents from the front, and even issued orders for one reporter, Henry Wing of the *New York Tribune*, to be shot for refusing to relinquish one of his dispatches.³

In addition, unpopular reporters with reputations for critical reporting could have difficulty obtaining permission to accompany military units.⁴ Some commanders hated war correspondents and discouraged them from traveling with their units. General William Sherman went as far as threatening to treat correspondents as spies.⁵

Despite lapses in the overall quality of war coverage, the Civil War set a precedence for the role of war correspondents in future wars. According to Knightley, the Civil War served to make war correspondence “a separate section in the practice of journalism” and established a “new breed of reporter, and also of reader, to justify his expensive existence.”⁶ On the other hand, the steps taken by the Union government to restrain the Northern press during the Civil War set a significant precedence for the future of military-media relations in the United States.⁷

¹ Harper 130.

² Stebenne 8-9.

³ Knightley 27.

⁴ Knightley 35.

⁵ Knightley 28.

⁶ Knightley 39.

⁷ Stebenne 8.

World War I

World War I is known as the “first information war,” and public communication became part of the strategy for conducting the war. Censorship was immediately implemented when the United States entered the war in 1917.¹

Initially, public support was lacking, so, in order to raise support, a new propaganda effort was launched on the home front. The U.S. Committee on Public Information (CPI), headed by former newspaper editor George Creel, was formed.² The CPI had no precedent in America and marked “the first organized use of propaganda by our government,” according to Bernays, who worked directly for the Committee.³

One task of the CPI was to “hold fast the inner lines”—a concept which is still used in wartime.⁴ The Committee “codified and standardized” popular ideas, made the ideas more powerful by using emotional impact, and portrayed President Wilson’s program as an ideal “worth dying for.”⁵ While the Committee publicized positive propaganda, it was also concerned with negative public opinion, and ideas against the war effort were suppressed.⁶ Press dispatches from the war zone were censored by a committee made up of former journalists commissioned into the reserves and career military officers.⁷

Censorship rules were voluntary, but the accreditation process for war correspondents was intense. In order to be accredited, war correspondents had to personally appear before a representative of the Secretary of War and swear to “convey

¹ Stebenne 9.

² Knightley 106; Stebenne 9.

³ Edward L. Bernays, Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel (New York: Simon, 1965) 155.

⁴ James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information 1917-1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1939) 339.

⁵ Mock and Larson 8-10.

⁶ Mock and Larson 19.

⁷ Stebenne 10.

the truth to the people of the United States” and not disclose information which would aid the enemy.¹ Among other requirements, \$1,000 had to be paid to the Army to cover the correspondent’s costs, and a \$10,000 bond had to be posted. If a correspondent were sent back for any infraction of the rules, the money would be forfeited.²

Sanctions for violations of the censorship rules could be severe. While the Committee had no legal power to enforce the press’ voluntary censorship rules, the Espionage Bill, which allowed the government to prosecute anyone who hurt the war effort, was a powerful force behind it.³ In addition, the Sedition Act forbade criticism of the U.S. government or military, and offenders could be imprisoned up to 20 years and fined as much as \$10,000.⁴ As a result, most press censorship was self-administered.⁵

At the end of the war, the CPI served as a blueprint for wartime government public relations. Plans were drafted for the Public Relations Administration, the successor of the CPI, which would serve the following functions in wartime:

1. To coordinate publicity programs of government departments and agencies.
2. To serve as an information bureau to which the nation and the world might look for accurate and unbiased facts regarding war aims.
3. To combat disaffection at home.
4. To counteract enemy propaganda both at home and abroad.
5. To organize all existing propaganda media for the prosecution of the war.
6. To secure the cooperation of the press, the radio, and the film industry.
7. To formulate and administer rules of censorship.⁶

According to James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, “If another war should come to this country, no American would need to read the story of the CPI. He would relive it.”⁷

¹ Knightley 108.

² Knightley 108.

³ Mock and Larson 46.

⁴ Stebenne 10.

⁵ Mock and Larson 46.

⁶ Mock and Larson 343.

⁷ Mock and Larson 346.

World War II

During World War II, the Office of War Information, headed by radio broadcaster Elmer Davis, supervised propaganda efforts aimed at the neutral and Axis powers and encouraged a free flow of information, by releasing what could be released without endangering national security.¹ The practice of voluntary press censorship continued. The Office of Censorship, under the direction of former Associated Press executive news editor Byron Price, censored all civilian modes of communication.² The stated task of the office was to prevent information leaks which would help the enemy, but it also concerned itself with morale and suppressed private letters which portrayed the war negatively.³ As a former journalist, Price opposed censorship in peacetime but agreed that censorship was necessary during wartime to protect the country.⁴

The emphasis of the voluntary wartime code for the press, the *Code of Wartime Practices*, was announced in a January 14, 1942, press release from the Office of Censorship. The release stated: "A maximum of accomplishment will be attained if editors will ask themselves with respect to any given detail, 'Is this information I would like to have if I were the enemy?' and then act accordingly."⁵

Since most war information originated from official sources, it could be withheld by officials.⁶ Within the United States, "censorship at the source" was used to prevent journalists from learning anything the army or navy did not want make public.⁷ Overseas, journalists were not permitted in the theaters of war unless they were

¹ Braestrup, Battle Lines 29.

² Knightley 259.

³ Knightley 259.

⁴ Patrick S. Washburn, "The Office of Censorship's Attempt to Control Press Coverage of the Atomic Bomb During World War II," Journalism Monographs No. 120 (1990): 34.

⁵ qtd. in Washburn 4.

⁶ Richard W. Steele, "News of the 'Good War': World War II News Management," Journalism Quarterly 62 (1985): 708.

⁷ Knightley 259.

accredited. Reporters whose attitudes were “suspect,” or whose reporting “had proven obnoxious” were banned.¹ In addition, a prerequisite of accreditation was that the correspondent agree to submitting all copy to the military for review.² Although subject to censorship, correspondents usually had access to where they wanted to go and often had a military escort to expedite access.³ However, there were not enough journalists in the theater to cover every major battle and those who were depended on the military for access to the war’s events. In the Pacific theater, those selected to accompany units for a major operation were part of a pool and had to share reports with their colleagues.⁴ Once in the field, the journalists also had to deal with military commanders who proved to be “far more restrictive” than the code. For example, General Douglas MacArthur demanded several layers of review of all copy, adding a review by his headquarters to that already required, and pressured journalists to portray troops and commanders in a flattering manner.⁵ He threatened that “any correspondent who interviewed a member of the Allied forces would be banned from advanced bases and the soldier would be court-martialed.”⁶ Conversely, the news wasn’t withheld or delayed when it involved good publicity for “publicity-conscious generals” such as MacArthur.⁷

While journalists occasionally complained about the Office of Censorship’s voluntary regulations concerning atomic energy, there was not one deliberate violation of them.⁸ Nevertheless, a sense of civic responsibility did not preclude uncritical reporting. The fact that World War II enjoyed good press “reflected the nature of the war— which

¹ Steele 708.

² Knightley 259.

³ Braestrup, Battle Lines 27.

⁴ Knightley 279.

⁵ Stebenne 11.

⁶ Knightley 265.

⁷ Knightley 282.

⁸ Washburn 34.

the president orchestrated as much as possible—and the efficient government management of the news.¹

During World War II war correspondents went along with the government's rules because they believed it was in the national interest, and they saw no clear division between the media's and government's roles during wartime.² However, this was the last war "for which censorship would be generally accepted so cavalierly by United States journalists," according to Patrick S. Washburn.³

Korean War

At the beginning of the Korean War, the military instituted a voluntary code of war reporting to protect military security, but criticism of the United Nations' effort prompted full military censorship to be imposed on all news materials from Korea in December 1950.⁴ Correspondents still were able to witness the war's events—at great risk to their personal safety—but, under the new policy, military review of all news reports and film was required.⁵ The government also limited the media's access to critical events. For example, returning American prisoners of war were required to sign a statement preventing them from talking with "journalists not bound by military censorship."⁶ Coverage of peace negotiations were limited to briefings after each session by an Army officer who had been briefed by others who attended the talks.⁷

There were few protests from correspondents when censorship was imposed since it did not suppress the horrors of war or routine criticism of the military from

¹ Steele 783.

² Knightley 260.

³ Washburn 33.

⁴ Knightley 321, 329.

⁵ Stebenne 13.

⁶ Knightley 335.

⁷ Knightley 337.

being reported.¹ In fact, a majority of the correspondents in Korea covering the war favored World War II-style military censorship to ensure military security, and some even thought it would reduce competition among reporters.² The major complaint from war correspondents until mid-1951 concerned chronic communications and transportation difficulties. Later, the inadequate or misleading information about the truce negotiations from United Nations briefings became a major complaint.³

However, restrictions on reporting sensitive military information which could jeopardize operations were soon extended to forbid any criticism of the war effort or United Nations' troops or commanders, according to Knightley. Placed under the Army's jurisdiction, correspondents who violated the policy could be punished by suspension of privileges to deportation or even court-martial, depending on the severity of the violation.⁴

Despite restrictions placed on journalists covering the Korean War, Knightley does not assign all of the blame for the lapses in war coverage on the government. He also faults the correspondents for reporting primarily about military gains and losses of the conflict instead of raising issues about the aims of or reasons for the war.⁵

Although the press' reporting was not blamed when the war became unpopular in the United States, the military hoped to continue the practice of media censorship in wartime, and censorship procedures for future conflicts were formalized.⁶ The Defense

¹ Braestrup, Battle Lines 60.

² Braestrup, Battle Lines 54.

³ Braestrup, Battle Lines 60.

⁴ Knightley 329-330.

⁵ Knightley 340.

⁶ Braestrup, Battle Lines 60; Stebenne 13-14.

Department published a joint service manual, *Field Press Censorship*, "to govern censorship of the press in any subsequent war."¹

Vietnam War

The media had "extraordinary freedom to report the war in Vietnam without direct government control," according to Hallin. For the first time, reporters were accredited to accompany military troops but were not subject to censorship.² Military planners decided against imposing censorship on the press primarily for two reasons. First, "in the early years of the war military officials were anxious to have the press pay more attention to the conflict so as to buttress public support for American intervention. Imposing censorship, military officials feared, would only alienate a press corps they wished to cultivate."³ Second, military officials doubted a mandatory censorship policy could have been effectively enforced based largely on their inability to control the movement of civilians in and around the country.⁴

According to the Fund for Free Expression (FFE), the two basic restrictions on reporting in Vietnam were for the media not to report troop movements prior to engagement nor show the faces of dead or wounded soldiers before their families had been notified. These restrictions were "totally understandable, and there were virtually no violations of the guidelines" by American news organizations.⁵

Although the media did not consider serving the war effort as their purpose, voluntary guidelines for military security worked well, and there were only a handful of violations by the press.⁶ From August 1964 through 1968 only six of the

¹ Stebenne 14.

² Hallin 6

³ Stebenne 14.

⁴ Stebenne 14.

⁵ Fund for Free Expression, "Freedom to Do as They're Told," Index on Censorship Apr.-May 1991: 37.

⁶ Hallin 6, 211.

approximately 2,000 journalists covering the war committed violations severe enough, in the opinion of the military, for their credentials to be revoked.¹ Army historian William M. Hammond also concludes the media were not guilty of revealing tactical security issues while covering the Vietnam War and, for the most part, exercised restraint and common sense.² From 1961 to 1967 the media were "remarkably docile" and official perspectives dominated the headlines, criticism of American policy was restrained, and state secrets were contained, according to Hallin.³ Further, the media's general support for the war effort was indicated by the predominately negative coverage of the antiwar movement and negative editorial comments from journalists about war critics.⁴

While these facts may indicate that the press policy in Vietnam worked well, journalists encountered other obstacles while covering the war. First, many military commanders and troops did not welcome reporters in their units or understand their purpose.⁵ On a larger scale, politics played a major role in shaping the war's coverage.

Gary C. Woodward argues that the Vietnam War's label, the "uncensored war," is "technically accurate but also misleading."⁶ The government tried to shape public consciousness by controlling access to information about its agencies and activities and disseminating information which reflected its agenda.⁷

"The information war," according to Dale Minor, described the "bitter conflict between reporters and government officials" in Vietnam.⁸ The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), with representatives from all the services, gave the press

¹ Stebenne 14-15.

² qtd. in Peter Schmeisser, "The Pool and the Pentagon," Index on Censorship Apr.-May 1991: 33.

³ Hallin 162.

⁴ Hallin 201.

⁵ Knightley 373.

⁶ Woodward 7.

⁷ Minor 12.

⁸ Dale Minor, The Information War (New York: Hawthorn, 1970) vii.

“authorized information,” handled inquiries, helped correspondents get around the country to cover stories, and processed press accreditation with U.S. Forces in Vietnam, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).¹ Accredited media signed an agreement to abide by a set of 15 ground rules designed to protect military security.² Daily 5 p.m. briefings, held at JUSPAO headquarters in Saigon, constituted what Minor describes as the “principle battleground of the Vietnam Information War.”³ Dubbed the “five-o’clock follies,” the briefings, which presented updates on the war’s progress, were an indication to journalists that the government was attempting to manage news about the “overall scope” of the conflict.⁴

According to Minor, JUSPAO, the “Snow Machine,” directed its efforts at shaping the news to reflect “the interests of Administration policy and the ideas, reputations, and personal careers of those responsible for implementing Washington’s policies in Vietnam.”⁵ Official information included statistics, words, and concepts manipulated to portray the desired, but inaccurate, image.⁶ Further, the Department of Defense began producing a series of “V-Series” films in 1966 for airing on commercial television stations in the United States to depict the positive side of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The films, sometimes staged, were devised to foster public support of U.S. policy in Vietnam.⁷

Braestrup surmises that the Vietnam War clarifies that “ultimately, the president is the key figure in military-press relations.” The president sets the agenda for the

¹ Minor 40.

² Knightley 371.

³ Minor 41-42.

⁴ Woodward 7.

⁵ Minor 42.

⁶ Minor 56.

⁷ Fulbright 104-105.

military, and political pressure leads to the military's action to make the "war look good."¹

According to Hallin, it is not clear whether negative public opinion about the war would have prevented by restricted news coverage.² The issues about America's involvement in Vietnam were not seriously discussed in war news coverage because "the constraints of ideology and of journalistic routines tying news coverage to Washington perspectives excluded them from the news agenda."³ Hallin attributes the ability of the administration to influence reporting of the war to two primary factors: Cold War ideology, which produced a bipartisan consensus among Americans, and "objective journalism," or reporting "just the facts," usually supplied by official sources, with little editorializing.⁴

In addition, the mainstream media and American public supported the Vietnam War through 1967, and, only when casualties mounted, U.S. policy shifted from escalation to de-escalation, and the public became disillusioned with the war, did the media start to question the U.S. government's policy.⁵ Most correspondents "were just as interested in seeing the United States win the war as was the Pentagon," but they questioned the tactics used to implement American policy.⁶

Frank D. Russo found no bias against the Nixon administration's policies in Vietnam in NBC and CBS broadcasts during 1969 and 1970.⁷ The public's present perception of Vietnam War coverage is inaccurate, according to Oscar Patterson III. He

¹ Braestrup, Battle Lines 74-75.

² Hallin 213.

³ Hallin 214.

⁴ Hallin 24-25.

⁵ Hallin 9; Nan Levinson, "Snazzy Visuals, Hard Fact and Obscured Issues," Index on Censorship Apr.-May 1991: 27.

⁶ Knightley 348.

⁷ Frank D Russo, "A Study of Bias in TV Coverage of the Vietnam War: 1969 and 1970," Journalism Quarterly 35 (1971-1972): 542.

argues selective perception and retention of coverage of certain dramatic events have led the public to perceive these as characteristic of the war's coverage.¹ "A few graphic, highly dramatic events appear to have so impinged the public's—and the media's—consciousness as to drastically alter their recall of the daily television coverage of the Vietnam war and war-related events."² Nan Levinson claims "the myth of a powerful, tough-minded press took hold of the American imagination and led in time to the current situation."³ While high U.S. casualties and confusion concerning the goals of the war led to decreased public support, many military officers came to blame the media for the decrease.⁴

"The failure of the American military effort in Vietnam, coupled with the failure of its policy toward the press, made inevitable a change in the U.S. military-media relationship," according to Arant and Warden.⁵ The military's attitude toward the media changed. The military had, for the most part, cooperated and assisted journalists in the field, and they did not like what they got in return. As a result, full access for journalists stopped.⁶ In his renowned work on the history of war reporting, *The First Casualty*, Knightley concludes, "It may well be, then, that Vietnam was the peak of the war correspondent's brief career and that the type of war reporting as described in this book will no longer occur."⁷ Of note, however, is Braestrup's description of Knightley's work as a "well-written, sketchily documented, widely read history of war

¹ Oscar Patterson III, "An Analysis of Television Coverage of the Vietnam War," Journal of Broadcasting 28 (1984): 403.

² Patterson 404.

³ Levinson 27.

⁴ Sharkey, Under Fire 57.

⁵ Arant and Warden 23.

⁶ Knightley 395.

⁷ Knightley 400.

reporting” by a British pacifist who never covered a war.¹ While the author can certainly trace the history of war reporting without having personally covered a war, Braestrup identifies a potential bias in Knightley’s work.

In a telephone interview with the author Sharkey explained that when the media now call for a return to the “good old days” of Vietnam War reporting, they are inaccurate in their recollection of the situation there:

There were some pools during the Vietnam war. At one point, the media had conveniently forgotten that they signed a written agreement not to show gruesome pictures of the battlefield because they were worried that their access was going to be cut off if they didn’t comply. That was strictly a political decision. The Johnson administration did not want [the] bad news pictures to get back into American homes. And the news media, much to their disgrace, went along with it and agreed not to show realistic pictures of combat. The good old days of Vietnam are misremembered by both sides, and both sides are in danger of forgetting the real lessons that come out of Vietnam while clinging to the myths that exist about the coverage of that war.²

Grenada Invasion and the Sidle Panel

The 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada occurred without the media and was virtually over before any media arrived there.³ The ban on media access to the war zone not only enabled the military to operate without media and public scrutiny but also prodded some members of the media to accept military censorship for access to future military operations.⁴ To facilitate cooperation between the military and the media, Joint Chief of Staff Chairman General John W. Vessy Jr. formed a panel, under the direction of retired general Winant Sidle, to study the censorship issue and review the military’s media policy for contingency operations.⁵

The Sidle Panel, made up of military representatives and retired respected media personnel, observed that many military commanders believe giving their public affairs

¹ Braestrup, Battle Lines 59.

² Sharkey, telephone interview, 28 Mar. 1996.

³ Woodward 8.

⁴ Stebenne 15.

⁵ Levinson 27; Stebenne 16; Woodward 9.

officer information is the same as giving it to the media.¹ The Panel also observed that mutual mistrust and misunderstanding between the military and the media can be overcome by regular meetings and discussions between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and the senior leadership of media organizations.² The recommendations of the Sidle Commission Report, released in August 1984, included: "voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines; more public affairs planning by the military; logistical help for the media as soon as possible in a military operation; and 'the largest possible pooling procedure to be in place *for the minimum time possible*' ."³ Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger issued the Principles of Information, guidelines which reflected the "content and spirit" of the Armed Forces' information policies, on December 1, 1983.⁴ On October 9, 1984, the establishment of the Department of Defense Media Pool to cover initial stages of military operations was formally announced.⁵

The first test of the Sidle panel's recommendations, the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989, failed. The blame was assigned to the military for acting too slowly and disorganized to facilitate the media's needs.⁶ Fred S. Hoffman, a former Associated Press reporter and DoD official, critiqued media operations for the invasion in the Hoffman Report, which reiterated many of the Sidle Panel's conclusions. He criticized public affairs planning and organization for the operation by the Office of the

¹ Winant Sidle, "Sidle Panel Report," Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media From Grenada to the Persian Gulf, by Jacqueline E. Sharkey (Washington, DC: The Center for Public Integrity, 1991) 8.

² Sidle 15.

³ Levinson 27.

⁴ Sharkey Under Fire 15.

⁵ Fund for Free Expression 37.

⁶ Stebenne 16.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, namely Pete Williams. Hoffman charged that Williams' overriding concern was for secrecy and did not accept the official rationale that secrecy was needed to protect operational security and the journalists' safety.¹ He requested that Defense Secretary Dick Cheney sign and reissue the Principles of Information, which was done.²

Despite the media's experiences during the Grenada operation and Panama invasion, there was "little collective effort to plan for covering future wars," according to Everette E. Dennis.³ The media lacked any systematic planning for war coverage, mostly because of the profession's competitive nature, and entered the United States' next war "with little historical perspective on the role of the press in wartime."⁴

A Historical Review of Wartime Media Policy

Historically, the government's media policy during wartime has had provisions for one or several of the following five elements: (1) prior restraint, or policies that prohibit specific information about military operations from being published, (2) post hoc censorship, or security review, (3) access to units and troops, (4) accreditation of war correspondents, and (5) sanctions for violations of the rules. In addition, disinformation has been part of wartime media relations since the Civil War but was never officially part of the government's policy. For example, during the Civil War, Secretary of War Stanton altered Northern casualty figures so the North's losses seemed less significant.⁵ Disinformation tactics, with the objective of deceiving the

¹ Sharkey, Under Fire 104.

² Sharkey, Under Fire 41.

³ Everette E. Dennis, introduction, The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict, eds. Craig LaMay, Martha FitzSimon, and Jeanne Sahadi (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991) 1.

⁴ Dennis 1.

⁵ Knightley 27.

enemy, have been incorporated into military strategy throughout history, and, until the Vietnam War, the media voluntarily aided the military's disinformation efforts.

Prior restraint has been a constant element of wartime media policy since the Civil War. Most media agree that the unique requirements of war necessitate some limits on reporting to protect the lives of the troops fighting the war.¹ Military censorship shifts the responsibility of judging matters of military security to the experts.² Historically, journalists have agreed to adhere to restrictions on reporting information that could jeopardize military security and endanger the lives of our troops. Voluntary compliance with restrictions and self-censorship by the media have resulted in very few major violations of military security. One of the more severe breaches of security by the press in the history of warfare, is the World War II case of the *Chicago Tribune* unintentionally revealing that the U.S. Navy had broken the Japanese naval codes. Although no harm was ultimately done, the Japanese could have changed their naval codes if the story had been brought to their military's attention. However, during the Korean War the restrictions on reporting sensitive information about military operations were extended to prohibit reporting that criticized military operations or personnel—perhaps the most stringent prior restraint imposed on journalists since World War I.

Post hoc censorship, what the military calls security review, has also been instituted during every major war except the Vietnam War. There was also no censorship in Grenada, but since the military controlled the media's access, censorship was unnecessary, for the most part.³ However, with advances in communication technology, it will become increasingly difficult for the military to censor media reports.

¹ Braestrup, *Battle Lines* 22; Stebenne 8.

² Braestrup, *Battle Lines* 22.

³ Braestrup, *Battle Lines* 22.

Journalists' access to troops and units has also been restricted by policy. Even when policy allowed for free access to units, commanders could block access. In addition, the type of terrain and nature of warfare can prevent access to forward units and combat action. The military can restrict access to units and troops and enforce censorship policies only if it controls access to the war zone—one of the reasons censorship was not imposed in Vietnam.

Accreditation of war correspondents has been a standard prerequisite for journalists to gain access to the war zone since the Civil War. Sometimes the procedure was used to bar journalists from the front. During World War I the most stringent accreditation policies and procedures, which included a significant sum of money to be paid, were instituted. Currently, accreditation for journalists with press credentials is, for the most part, automatic.

Sanctions for violations of wartime media policies have most commonly included revocation of accreditation and suspension from the war zone. In earlier wars, such as the Civil War and World War I, sanctions could be more severe. However, the threat of punishment has been used more often than punishment has actually been carried out. In the earlier example of a major breach of military security by the press during World War II, the U.S. government referred the case to a grand jury, but no indictments were returned.¹

When U.S. troops deployed to the United States' largest military commitment since the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, all five elements of the government's media policy previously discussed were incorporated into the ground rules and guidelines for news media. The military had learned important lessons from experiences with the media in previous wars. While the military's assessment of the media's role in the Vietnam War may not have been accurate, there was a conscious decision among military commanders not to repeat the Vietnam experience and to be ready for future

¹ Stebenne 11.

conflicts in terms of public opinion.¹ Therefore, the military prepared its people to deal with the media in future wars and contingency operations. The issue of "handling" the media was discussed among military officials and included in military professional training sessions, and officers were trained in public affairs and communications strategy.² Consequently, the issues of military-media relations and the military's media policy during the Gulf War are still topics of debate.

The Case of the Gulf War

In the Persian Gulf War, the government conducted business "along the same lines as it did in Vietnam," according to Hiebert.³ The American military used all the classic practices of public relations to secure public support at home, including political strategies, media relations, community relations, employee relations, and crisis management.⁴

According to *U.S. News & World Report*, "News reporters assigned to cover Desert Storm were no match for the machine of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Pentagon. . . . There was virtually no way to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the military."⁵ A *Los Angeles Times* article by Bob Sipschen stated Desert Storm was two wars: the Allies versus Iraqis and the military versus the press.⁶

¹ Dennis 1.

² Dennis 1.

³ Hiebert, "PR, Propaganda and War" 300.

⁴ Hiebert, "PR as a Weapon" 108.

⁵ *U.S. News and World Report*, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times-Random, 1992) 413.

⁶ Bob Sipschen, "The Media Rewrite, Review the Gulf War," *Los Angeles Times* 7 Mar. 1991: E2, qtd. in Herbert I. Schiller, "Manipulating Hearts and Minds," Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf—A Global Perspective, Critical Studies in Communication and in the Cultural Industries, eds. Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert I. Schiller (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992) 25.

The Media Policy

A December 14, 1990, memo to Washington bureau chiefs of the Pentagon press corps, from Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, announced ground rules for news media covering Operation Desert Shield.¹ The media protested, and the ground rules were revised to exclude prohibitions on impromptu interviews and photographing U.S. casualties, but the most hotly contested provisions for security reviews and media pools remained.²

According to Peter Schmeisser, since CENTCOM headquarters reviewed all guideline revisions, tighter restrictions for journalists resulted. For example, Williams had planned for media guidelines in three phases of the possible war. The last stage allowed for independent coverage and no media pools—a provision that was deleted during the CENTCOM review.³

The final version of the Operation Desert Shield media ground rules and guidelines were issued January 14, 1991. The ground rules specified the types of information that was not to be reported, and the guidelines specified how the rules were to be enforced. (See Appendices A and B.) Journalists who violated the ground rules risked losing their credentials, and reporters who ventured out on their own were detained or told to leave upon arrival at forward bases.⁴

¹ Pete Williams, Memo to Washington Bureau Chief of the Pentagon Press Corps, 14 Dec. 1990, Cong. Rec., 20 Feb. 1991: 357.

² William J. Small, "The Gulf War: Mass Media Coverage and Restraints," The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf, Contributions in Military Studies 148, eds. Thomas A. McCain and Leonard Shyles (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994) 4.

³ Schmeisser 32,

⁴ Stig A. Nohrstedt, "Ruling By Pooling," Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf—A Global Perspective, Critical Studies in Communication and in the Cultural Industries, eds. Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert I. Schiller (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992) 120; Douglas Kellner, "The Crisis in the Gulf and the Lack of Critical Media Discourse," Desert Storm and the Mass Media, eds. Bradley S. Greenberg and Walter Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1993) 42.

The guidelines stated all media products from pool participants would be subject to review for conformity to the ground rules.¹ Material was to be cleared in the field by a public affairs escort officer who would discuss any security breaches directly with the reporter. The procedure allowed the military to appeal to news organizations if material in reports violated the ground rules, but the media organization had the final decision whether or not to publish or broadcast the information.² Of 1,351 print pool stories written during the Gulf War, only five were submitted for review at the Pentagon.³

During the Gulf War, the military released information about the conflict through three primary means: the JIB in Dhahran, daily press briefings in Riyadh, and the news pool system.⁴ For journalists who could not gain access to one of the pools, the briefings were a primary source of information, but, according to Philip M. Taylor, they only provided journalists a one-sided perspective of the war and were primarily made up of statistics and military jargon which actually did not reveal much information.⁵

Policy Problems and Issues

The media's fundamental complaints about the media policy in the Gulf centered around access—or lack of it. After media executives “inundated the Pentagon and Congress with complaints,” the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on February 20, 1991, to address media access during the war.⁶

¹ United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules, 14 Jan. 1991.

² Pete Williams, “The Press and the Persian Gulf War,” Parameters 21.4 (1991): 6.

³ Williams, Parameters 6.

⁴ Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester, Eng.: Manchester UP, 1992) 51.

⁵ Taylor 63.

⁶ Sharkey, Under Fire 20.

Woodward described the military's guidelines for media as "heavy and burdensome restrictions on members of the press."¹ The military's media policy resulted in several "layers of filters": first, accreditation from the Pentagon had to be obtained; second, media representatives had to get into a pool; finally, those few who were able to get into a pool had to rely on the escort's choice of location for a story.² Journalists were restricted from visiting front lines, troops, war damage sites, etc., or interviewing troops without a military escort present.³ The escort could either be a help or a hindrance to reporters. Some opened access for reporters while others tried to alter editorial content during the security review.⁴ Chris Hedges, who reported the war independently as a "unilateral," observed that working outside the pool and speaking to troops without the presence of a military escort "did not always mean that we wrote stories that criticized the military, although people were more likely to speak openly if they thought their conversations were not being monitored."⁵

Rune Ottosen claims the news pools enabled the military to control news coverage by restricting access to combat operations and through an effective censorship system.⁶ The pool system only allowed limited numbers of media representatives, mostly representatives of large media organizations, to get to the front lines.⁷ "Undesirable" journalists were also prevented from obtaining pool slots—a practice

¹ Woodward 12.

² Woodward 15.

³ Kellner, "Crisis in the Gulf" 42; Nohrstedt 119; Small 5.

⁴ Woodward 15.

⁵ Chris Hedges, "The Unilaterals," Columbia Journalism Review 30 (1991): 28.

⁶ Rune Ottosen, "Truth: The First Victim of War?," Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf—A Global Perspective, Critical Studies in Communication and in the Cultural Industries, eds. Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert I. Schiller (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992) 139.

⁷ Hiebert, "PR as a Weapon" 109.

reminiscent of World War II.¹ Journalists were supposed to rotate among the pools, but reporters from smaller organizations were usurped by the large media organizations.² In addition, pool positions were reserved for journalists from the countries fighting in the war.³ Therefore, of the approximately 1,000 accredited media representatives in Saudi Arabia, only 126 were assigned to pools.⁴ At any given time during the war, only about 30 reporters were with forward units, the remaining 700 journalists were left in Dhahran or Riyadh to cover briefings.⁵ The situation was further aggravated by the fact that some journalists, once given access to a pool, were not willing to share their reports.⁶ Also, unit commanders in the field could decline to have journalists with them, and many of the pools took reporters to areas of minimal interest to war reporters.⁷

Woodward concedes that, in some cases, the pool system worked. Reporters recognized it was not feasible to get all interested media to specific front line locations, and some military escorts were helpful in getting reporters to key locations and to see specific aspects of military operations.⁸ Also, news pools may have been the only way to accommodate the more than 3,500 reporters who circulated through Saudi Arabia.⁹ From an operational point of view, "the pool system was better than over-tasking units with repetitive unilateral requests, such as 15 media outlets seeking coverage of the same

¹ Ottosen 140.

² Taylor 52.

³ Nohrstedt 120.

⁴ Woodward 11.

⁵ Richard O'Mara, "In a Gulf of Darkness," Index on Censorship Apr.-May 1991: 30.

⁶ Ottosen 140.

⁷ O'Mara, "In a Gulf of Darkness" 30.

⁸ Woodward 15.

⁹ Arant and Warden 32-33.

story at 15 different times.”¹ A study compiled by DoD to analyze the pool system concluded reporters had access to the front lines. During the ground campaign 69.9 percent of the stories were filed from the front lines, 60.3 percent of the stories included eyewitness accounts of fighting, many with interviews of front line troops, and 72.9 percent of the stories were hard news.²

The requirement for security reviews was one of the most controversial policies.³ What is often misunderstood about this provision is that only the pool reports were required to be submitted for review—not live television or radio reports or other stories based on briefings, pool reports, or interviews not conducted in forward units.⁴ Critics have frequently implied the security review requirement applied to all media reports from the Gulf. Examples of this inaccuracy are too frequent: Kellner writes “press and video coverage was also subject to censorship,” Hiebert states, “all reports had to be submitted to a Joint Information Bureau which would review them for sensitive security information,” Bradley S. Greenberg lists “submitting reports to a review board” as an overt restraint journalists faced in the Gulf, Sandra Moriarty and David Shaw state there was “ever-present censorship,” and H. Bruce Franklin’s claims the government “subjected all written copy, photographs, and videotape to strict censorship.”⁵ In the last example, Franklin cites Stebenne as his source, but Stebenne clarifies that the

¹ United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), JIB Dhahran After Action Report: U.S. Air Force Desk (1991) 4.

² United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Pool Report Content Analysis: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 29 Mar. 1991, 7.

³ Nohrstedt 119; Schmeisser 32.

⁴ Arant and Warden 34; Pete Williams, “Excerpts from Remarks to the National Press Club,” The Media and the Gulf War, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 173-174.

⁵ Kellner, “Crisis is the Gulf,” 42; Hiebert, “Public Relations as a Weapon,” 31; and Bradley S. Greenberg, “Summary and Commentary,” Desert Storm and the Mass Media, eds. Bradley S. Greenberg and Walter Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1993) 397; Sandra Moriarty and David Shaw, “An Antiseptic War: Were News Magazines Images of the Gulf War too Soft?,” Visual Communication Quarterly Spring 1995: 7; H. Bruce Franklin, “From Realism to Virtual Reality: Images of America’s Wars,” Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War, eds. Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1994) 40..

requirement applied only to pool reports.¹ Contributing to the impression that all reports were censored were the use of disclaimers, such as "censored by the military," in news broadcasts. Colonel Mike Gallagher, director of media at the Riyadh JIB, claims censorship labels were misused and put on reports which had not been reviewed by the military.² The presence of censorship disclaimers could have hurt the military's public relations efforts. John Newhagen concluded in his study that news reports with censorship disclaimers tended to be "negative, intense and critical." If the intention of censors were to "mute these effects," they failed.³

Nevertheless, while few media representatives would deny the need to travel with military escorts during the initial invasion or to limit the size of the media pool accompanying the first troops into combat, "conceding the right to final review of stories to the military" is too high a price to gain access to press pools.⁴ According to Sydney Schanberg, reporters do not object to restrictions on reporting sensitive military information, but what is added to the traditional ground rules "constitutes the muzzle."⁵ The review process was also inconsistent among the pools, depending upon the experience and competence of the public affairs escort officer.⁶

The security reviews, along with the military's archaic methods for transporting pool materials from the front lines to the JIB, meant copy could be lost or its transmission back to the media organizations in the United States delayed, from hours to days.⁷ While many media agencies brought the necessary equipment to quickly

¹ Franklin 40; Stebenne 17-18.

² Michael Gallagher, telephone interview, 7 Nov. 1994.

³ John Newhagen, "The Relationship Between Censorship and the Emotional and Critical Tone of Television News Coverage of the Persian Gulf War," Journalism Quarterly 71(1994): 40.

⁴ Woodward 11.

⁵ Sydney H. Schanberg, "Censoring for Political Security," Washington Journalism Review 13.2 (1991): 24.

⁶ Taylor 52-53.

⁷ Arant and Warden 36; Small 5; Taylor 56; Woodward 16.

transmit reports, they were not allowed to use the equipment and had to rely on the military's resources. In many military units, press pool product transmission became low priority, especially after the ground war began.¹ The military agreed with the criticism of this policy, "Delays in moving stories from the pools to the JIB was a main point of contention with the media pools, and certainly an area where criticism was justified."²

The use of disinformation was another controversial issue. Disinformation about the capabilities and number of Iraqi soldiers and the exaggerated risk of Coalition losses avoided public criticism of the legitimacy of the ground war.³ According to a *Wall Street Journal* article the media was used to deceive the enemy, primarily by "leaving the impression that a Marine landing was planned when in fact it was a means to convince Iraq that it had to deploy troops to block an invasion from the sea."⁴ By such methods, the media—and the American public—were deceived along with Saddam Hussein.⁵

In addition, journalists covering the war from the Gulf region were upset that the military's Hometown Program, which authorized journalists to arrive in theater via Military Airlift Command (now named Air Mobility Command) aircraft to visit and cover their hometown units, gave visiting reporters better access to the units while transportation for journalists already there was limited.⁶ Critics claim the program's objective was to get "good press" from journalists friendly to the military, which is not necessarily an accurate assessment. The trips are planned by unit public affairs officers

¹ Arant and Warden 36.

² U.S., Pool Report Content Analysis 7.

³ Ottosen 142.

⁴ qtd. in Small 13.

⁵ Ottosen 142.

⁶ Sharkey, Under Fire 112-113.

to allow beat reporters who routinely cover their units to see the units in action. The program fosters military-media relations at the local level and was conducted separate from the CENTCOM operations in the Gulf region, although CENTCOM approval for the trip was required. The media in-country were frustrated by the lack of resources available to accommodate them. However, public affairs staffs who were not deployed, could concentrate on unit program and usually had the resources to organize a media trip for local media to units in the Gulf.

In addition to policy issues, the military and the media recognize there were other challenges to reporting from the Gulf region. A July 1991 Interim Report to Congress from DoD identified obstacles to full news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Among the obstacles were: the reluctance of the host nation to allow western media into the country; the large number of news media in Saudi Arabia; combat operations involved high technology equipment over vast distances and from ships; rapid operations were employed; and, for the first time in warfare, live broadcasts were possible. The military also recognized several shortcomings of their media policy: command support for public affairs efforts was uneven; public affairs officers were not prepared to properly judge operational security violations in the security review process; and some public affairs officers "overzealously" performed their duties and disrupted the reporting process..¹

Reporting from the Middle East was not an easy endeavor for Western reporters. There was a limited presence of American media in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq before the war. Reporters lacked local contacts who could provide information, few spoke Arabic, and the environment was not conducive to reporting from safe outposts. These factors made the media more dependent than usual on the military for support, even for essential services such as transportation, field equipment, and access to

¹ United States, Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, July 1991, Cong. Rec., 20 Feb. 1991: 774.

fax equipment or satellite up-links.¹ Also, the region was not friendly to Western reporters or free press principles. The Saudis were reluctant to issue visas to foreign reporters, and women reporters encountered problems trying to work within a society who's culture forbid women to drive or be with a man who was not her husband.²

The press may have also been overwhelmed and maybe intimidated by the amount of public support for the war, which proved to be an obstacle to objective war coverage.³ In addition, there was a new challenge to the news media's role of protecting the public's right to know during the Gulf War—"the public's apparent desire not to know beyond the sketchiest details what [was] going on."⁴

Criticism of the Policy

Critics of the military's Gulf War media policy claim it reflected the government's interests rather than the needs of a free press. The Pentagon aimed to preserve its political legitimacy and prevent budget cuts which would result from a poor showing during the operation.⁵ According to Schanberg, "political security requires that the government do as complete job as possible at blackening out stories that might lead to embarrassment or criticism of the government or to questions from ordinary Americans about the war policy."⁶ Although the military flooded the press with information about the war, it was the information the military wanted made public.⁷

¹ Woodward 18-20.

² Woodward 19-20.

³ Woodward 22.

⁴ Taylor 274.

⁵ Jarol B. Manheim, "Strategic Public Diplomacy: Managing Kuwait's Image During the Gulf Conflict," Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, American Politics and Political Economy Ser., eds. Lance W. Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994) 137.

⁶ Schanberg 25.

⁷ Hiebert, "PR as a Weapon" 111.

Jason DeParle describes the Pentagon's media policy in the Gulf as beginning with "a decision by the administration's most senior officials, including President Bush, to manage the information flow in a way that supported the operation's political goals and avoided the perceived mistakes of Vietnam."¹ The Pentagon's guidelines and ground rules were "designed to limit physical access to the troops and battle zones as well as limit the type of information that could be conveyed to the public," according to Walter Gantz.² "Restrictions were obviously meant to obstruct pictures that might reduce the U.S. public's fighting spirit," according to Ottosen.³ As a result, a bulk of the war coverage was not spontaneous reporting but, instead, rehearsed briefings and presentations to convey the proper antiseptic image of the war, sanitized of death and destruction.⁴

One way the war was trivialized, according to critics, is that it was often portrayed as a game. Moriarty and Shaw state that visuals of combat operations could be used "as settings for Nintendo games."⁵ Marion K. Pinsdorf claims military public relations efforts portrayed the war "almost as a low-risk Nintendo game."⁶ First of all, combat video footage may resembles Nintendo game images for a good reason—the games are designed to imitate actual combat aircraft. Further, it is unfair to assert that those responsible for conducting the war could consider it anything but a serious situation. Air Force Sergeant David Little, the noncommissioned officer in charge of

¹ Jason DeParle, "Military Decision Leading to Gulf War News Censorship," The Media and the Gulf War, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 18.

² Walter Gantz, introduction, Desert Storm and the Mass Media, eds. Bradley S. Greenberg and Walter Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1993) 7.

³ Ottosen 140.

⁴ Hiebert, "PR as a Weapon" 111; Moriarty and Shaw, 8; Margot Norris, "Only the Guns Have Eyes: Military Censorship and the Body Count," Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War, eds. Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1994) 285.

⁵ Moriarty and Shaw 5.

⁶ Marion K. Pinsdorf, "Image Makers of Desert Storm: Bush, Powell, and Schwarzkopf," The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf, Contributions in Military Studies 148, eds. Thomas A. McCain and Leonard Shyles (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994) 49.

civil engineering readiness training for the 21st Space Wing, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, is a Gulf War veteran who conducted chemical warfare training for some of the Air Force personnel deployed to the Gulf. According to him, many of his students were aware that Iraq had the ability to use chemical agents, and "there were a lot of frightened people."¹ Those who were deployed to the Gulf lived with a constant threat of attack. Some of the criticism of statements made by troops in the Gulf War result from a lack of understanding of the military or empathy for the troops' situation. Journalists who have seen combat operations, on the other hand, have long recognized how tough the soldier's job is. During World War II, CBS's Eric Sevareid, who accompanied U.S. troops in battle, recognized that the experiences of journalists accompanying troops in battle are completely separate from those of the soldiers fighting the war. According to him, while correspondents record events, they cannot share the feelings and emotions of the soldiers.²

A widely-held view among members of the media and communication scholars is that censorship during the Gulf War exceeded what was necessary to protect security breaches, and copy which did not violate the ground rules was sometimes changed to protect the military's image and political security.³ A January 16, 1991, editorial in the *Chicago Tribune* stated military censors should operate from an "explicit list of do's and don't's, just as the journalists will be expected to do" to minimize abuses of the security review process⁴

However, a study for the Gannett Foundation (now called The Freedom Forum) does not support the assumption that there were frequent abuses of the policy. Media representatives surveyed after the Gulf War indicated outright censorship by the military

¹ David Little, telephone interview, 24 Oct. 1994.

² Braestrup, *Battle Lines* 44-45.

³ Ottosen 141; Small, "Mass Media Coverage and Constraints" 5; Schanberg 24-25.

⁴ "Gulf News Guidelines Need Refining," *Chicago Tribune* 16 Jan. 1991, final ed.: 12, online, Nexus, 4 Aug. 1995.

was rare and exaggerated in media reports.¹ The *Wall Street Journal*'s John Fialka agrees "officially sanctioned censorship was rarely present."² According to Philip M. Taylor, most censorship of sensitive footage was at the beginning of the news gathering process, and examples of post-censorship were "largely the exceptions rather than the rule." Censorship of news pertained to matters of national security, and "censorship of views was comparatively rare."³

However, it is implied in studies and critiques of Gulf War military-media relations that abuses by the military were more common. The "most well-publicized case" of the military's security review going beyond the scope of its intent is that of the *Detroit Free Press*'s Frank Bruni.⁴ In what Schanberg calls a "typical incident," Bruni's description of bomber pilots returning from a successful mission as "giddy" was changed to "proud" by a military reviewer. When Bruni protested, the official consented to using "pumped up."⁵ The overuse of this example, often used as the sole example of abuses of the security review provision by the military, makes one question the frequency of such abuses. When the case is cited, it is sometimes without attribution or is attributed to excerpts of Bruni's comments in a report compiled by the Ad Hoc Media Group on problems of news coverage in the Gulf War in the July 6 issue of *Editor & Publisher* or to Malcom Browne's testimony before the U.S. Senate

¹ John Pavlik and Seth Rachlin, "On Assignment," *The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict*, eds. Craig LaMay, Martha Fitzsimon, and Jeanne Sahadi (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991) 29.

² John J. Fialka, *Hotel Warriors* (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1991) 7.

³ Taylor 269.

⁴ Sharkey, *Under Fire* 25.

⁵ Schanberg 24.

Committee on Governmental Affairs or his article "The Military vs. the Press" in the March 3, 1991, issue of *The New York Times Magazine*.¹ Coincidentally, Bruni stated, in a telephone interview, that the well-known incident was atypical of his experience with the military's review of his copy.²

Some critics claim military censorship during the Gulf War was not needed. "Some could say that the rigid control of the American media was hardly necessary. With few exceptions, the media did their own self-censorship," according to Herbert I. Schiller.³ Taylor agrees there was not much need for the military to censor views since most of the media supported the conflict.⁴

Assessment of Gulf War Reporting

The military's media policy may have limited the media's ability to report the war, according to Robert Jensen, but "the media and the military worked together without argument."⁵ Tamar Liebes describes complaints from the media about the military's control as "more like attempts to shift responsibility to the 'other side' rather than honest acknowledgment of the role [the media] played during the conflict."⁶

Several scholars are critical of the media's reporting of the Gulf War. O'Heffernan states the U.S. television organizations abandoned balance and objectivity

¹ Arant and Warden 34; Malcolm Browne, "Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs," *The Media and the Gulf War*, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 138; Hiebert, "Public Relations as a Weapon" 31; Levinson 28; Michael Massing, "Another Front," *Columbia Journalism Review* 30 (1991): 23; Schanberg 24; Small, "Mass Media Coverage and Constraints" 5-6; Sharkey, *Under Fire* 25; Bruce W. Watson, "The Issue of Media Access to Information," *Military Lessons of the Gulf War*, ed. Bruce W. Watson (Novato, CA: Presidio, London: Greenhill, 1991) 205.

² Frank Bruni, telephone interview, 11 Mar. 1996.

³ Schiller 25.

⁴ Taylor 269.

⁵ Robert Jensen, "Fighting Objectivity: The Illusion of Journalistic Neutrality in Coverage of the Persian Gulf War," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 16.1 (1992): 29.

⁶ Tamar Liebes, "Our War/Their War: Comparing the *Infifadeh* and the Gulf War on U.S. and Israeli Television," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 9 (1992): 54.

in order to capitalize on supporting our troops and not risk criticizing a popular war.¹ According to Lauren Rabinovitz and Susan Jeffords, the "mainstream media constructed public support in ways that made it easier, if not altogether possible, for the Bush administration to proceed with the war."² The lack of critical media discourse about the crisis in the Gulf shaped consensus for the war, "promoted the agenda of the Bush administration and Pentagon," and manufactured consent for their policies.³ The mainstream media failed to neutrally present events leading to and during the Gulf War.⁴ Ignorance about the region and an emphasis on spot news contributed to uninformed reporting from the Middle East.⁵ Western journalists, obstructed by their own cultural biases, tended to fall back on stereotypes and failed to put the conflict into its historical context.⁶ Ella Shohat charges media reports "framed events along the lines of the war genre, thereby suturing the spectator into a familiar discourse of patriotism." The story of "Hussein as the villain, Bush as the hero, and the U.S. rescuing the victim is typical of colonial narratives."⁷

The media's language constructed a "reality" of the war with a clear villain, Iraq, and heroes, the Coalition Forces, and framed reports as "a struggle between good and evil," using the "Saddam-as-Hitler" theme and other biased reporting.⁸ Americans remaining in Kuwait were described as "hostages," which conjured images of

¹ O'Heffernan, "Sobering Thoughts" 21-22.

² Rabinovitz and Jeffords 12.

³ Jensen 26; Douglas Kellner, "Television, the Crisis of Democracy and the Persian Gulf War," Media, Crisis and Democracy: Mass Communication and the Disruption of Social Order, eds. Marc Raboy and Bernard Dagenais (London: Sage, 1992) 45,52; Kellner, "Crisis in the Gulf" 46.

⁴ Gantz 7; Jensen 20.

⁵ Woodward 21.

⁶ Ottosen 141.

⁷ Ella Shohat, "The Media's War," Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War, eds. Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1994) 153.

⁸ Jensen 26; Kellner, "Crisis in the Gulf" 46-47; George Cheney, "We're Talking War: Symbols, Strategies and Images," Desert Storm and the Mass Media, eds. Bradley S. Greenberg and Walter Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1993) 70-73.

terrorism.¹ The demonization of Saddam Hussein was part of the rhetoric of war coverage that functioned as moral persuasion, according to Farrel Corcoran. For instance, while documented human rights violations in the region by allies of the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, were ignored by the media, the report that Iraqis took premature Kuwaiti babies from incubators was a highly-publicized atrocity.² An August 4, 1995, *Lexus* search of major daily newspapers and national news magazines found 2,579 references to "Iraqi aggression" in 1990 and 1,139 references in 1991. "Liberate Kuwait" was found in 547 references in 1990 and 2,288 in 1991.

In addition, Iraqi lives were attributed low value throughout the war.³ The number of American and Iraqi dead were concealed, and there is no accurate count of Iraqi war fatalities. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates 100,000 Iraqi soldiers died, give or take 50,000.⁴

A study conducted by Roger D. Haney concluded that there was considerable duplication in news mix in Gulf War reports, indicating a homogeneity in coverage of the war.⁵ The public was informed about the official version of the Gulf War but not the pros and cons of the military operation. Timothy E. Cook attributes this to the media's "risk averseness" and "chronic dependence upon officialdom to provide the main focus of their work and the source of their criticism."⁶ The Director of Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR), Jeff Cohen, claims the media's reporting of the Gulf

¹ Garth S. Jowett, "Toward A Propaganda Analysis of the Gulf War," Desert Storm and the Mass Media, eds. Bradley S. Greenberg and Walter Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1993) 83.

² Farrel Corcoran, "War Reporting: Collateral Damage in the European Theater," Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf—A Global Perspective, Critical Studies in Communication and in the Cultural Industries, eds. Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert I. Schiller (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992) 108-109.

³ Shohat 154.

⁴ Norris 290.

⁵ Roger D. Haney, "Agenda Setting During the Persian Gulf Crisis," Desert Storm and the Mass Media, eds. Bradley S. Greenberg and Walter Gantz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1993) 123.

⁶ Cook 126-127.

War reflected a "pro-establishment bias."¹ FAIR found only 1% of the network news reporting during the first five months of war dealt with "grass-roots opposition to the troop buildup."² Journalists also relied too heavily on official sources of information, engaging in "official" journalism by reporting the government's "party line."³ Almost exclusively, media sources were "expert" commentators who were either retired military, national security officials, or from the "establishment academic community."⁴ Foreign policy beat reporters, who were the main providers of most news stories, relied on their sources in Washington, DC, and "stories by investigative reporters, who are outside the process, or have an outsider's perspective, were uncommon until after the war," according to David L. Paletz.⁵

Hallin and Todd Gitlin offer another reason for the coverage of the Gulf War:

Many critics, and journalists themselves, have blamed military censorship for their rosy coverage of the war. But we believe the emphasis is misplaced. Journalists had other reasons for enthusiastic participation in the ritual of the war. The war had a narrative logic full of suspense, crescendos, and collective emotion. It was the stuff for high drama—valuable not only for high ratings but for high excitement in the community and the newsroom alike. It made for bonds of solidarity between the populace and its troops. And in popular culture, this is the point of war. The primary role of the media in wartime in the Anglo-American world has long been to maintain the ties of sentiment between the soldiers in the field and the home front.⁶

The media also became part of the Gulf War story. "Media coverage of the crisis shifted from the story itself to 'media-in-the-story'," according to Marc Raboy

¹ qtd. in Katherine Seelye and Dick Polman, "Hindsight: Can the Press Be Free in Wartime?," The Media and the Gulf War, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 372.

² Seelye and Polman 372.

³ Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing," Communication Research 20 (1993): 382.

⁴ Jensen 29.

⁵ Paletz 283.

⁶ Daniel C. Hallin and Todd Gitlin, "The Gulf War as Popular Culture and Television Drama," Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, American Politics and Political Economy Ser., eds. Lance W. Bennett and David L. Paletz (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994) 161.

and Bernard Dagenais.¹ Media discourse about itself was homogeneous and stressed: denunciation of censorship, criticism of television's limitations as "an explanatory medium," concern about the effects of spectacularization and the tendency to approach the war as a sporting match, and recognition of the "limitations and constraints of technologically determined journalism."² "Critics concurred that the missing ingredient of the war coverage was the war itself. Coverage was of the *crisis*, in the abstract."³

One member of the media who participated in an April 1992 McCormick Foundation military-media conference emphasized the importance of the media's social responsibility role:

It may be that those of you in the military do not trust that Americans would be able to tolerate the reality of war and still show the resolve that it takes to fight and win even in a just cause. But I am afraid that this is where the differences in our institutions are starkest. If Americans cannot accept what you do on their behalf, then it should not be done. It is just that simple. No other position even begins to accord with the idea of self-government.⁴

The Media's Role in Reporting Future Conflicts

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the opinion that "traditional American journalism," along with Saddam Hussein, had lost against the Bush administration, and that independent reporting had been seriously compromised prevailed among media critics.⁵ "The system was not supposed to be adversarial, yet many concluded that [it] did in fact become so, and that the military had 'won'," according to Donald L. Shaw

¹ Marc Raboy and Bernard Dagenais, "Introduction: Media and the Politics of Crisis," Media, Crisis and Democracy: Mass Communication and the Disruption of Social Order, eds. Marc Raboy and Bernard Dagenais (London: Sage, 1992) 6.

² Raboy and Dagenais 6-7.

³ Raboy and Dagenais 7.

⁴ Nancy Ethiel, ed., Reporting the Next War, Proc. of a Conference by the Cantigny Conference Ser., Apr. 23-24 1992 (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1992) 22.

⁵ Small, "Mass Media Coverage and Constraints" 3.

and Shannon E. Martin.¹ The military and the media agreed that the system of reporting during the Gulf War needed to be reevaluated.² Concerns about what went wrong prompted discussions between Pentagon officials and news media representatives and, after more than a year of negotiations, new principles for media coverage of future military operations resulted.

A May 21, 1992, news release from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs announced the military and the media had agreed on nine principles for combat coverage but could not agree on a tenth principle regarding reviews of news material. The new principles established open and independent reporting of U.S. military operations as the primary method of newsgathering. Pools would be used as a temporary system, only when necessary, and would not be the only means of newsgathering. Ground rules, specifying the types of information which could compromise the safety and security of U.S. forces and should not be reported, would be instated and media who violated the ground rules would risk losing their credentials. Military public affairs officers would serve as liaisons and not interfere with the reporting process, and journalists would be able to transmit reports using their own equipment when military equipment is not available.

In addition, the Department of Defense Directive 5122.5 was revised December 2, 1993, to include the new principles of coverage and reiterate the policy of ensuring "a free flow of news and information . . . limited only by national security constraints. . . ."³ The DoD Principles of Information, also included in the directive, state: "It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and

¹ Donald L. Shaw and Shannon E. Martin, "The Natural, and Inevitable, Phase of War Reporting: Historical Shadows, New Communication in the Persian Gulf," The Media and the Persian Gulf War, Praeger Ser. in Political Communication, by Robert E. Denton, Jr. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993) 52.

² Arant and Warden 35.

³ United States, Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5122.5, 2 Dec. 1993, 1.

accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy.”¹ (See Appendix D.)

Despite policy changes, William J. Small predicts challenges to unlimited media access will remain in future wartime operations and other crisis situations due to the precedence set in the Gulf War:

The success of the Pentagon, and the fact that the public at large has lost interest, mitigate against any change in policy. Indeed, an administration, having learned how it could contain the press, is not likely to overlook that lesson either in future international conflicts or domestic political ones.²

Others share this less-than-optimistic outlook of future military-media relations. Arant and Warden conclude, “While the Persian Gulf War has added another page to the history of [the military-media] relationship, nothing resembling an armistice has been reached in its aftermath.”³

The former Air Force Chief of Staff, retired General Michael J. Dugan says the following about military-media relations:

Can the tension between the military and the media be eliminated? No, and there are no simple answers for improving relations. Nevertheless, it would be advantageous for both institutions to find a continuing, independent forum for discussion and for researching ways to better serve the public interest. Both the military and the media view themselves as professionals. It would be a useful start if each viewed the other in the same light—and acted accordingly.⁴

Fueling the adversarial relationship is misunderstanding and failure to “set the record straight” about the amount of cooperation and professionalism among both institutions. Following every military operation public affairs after-action reports accessing media operations are written. However, they are not used to the extent they could be to correct problems. Journalists and military commanders usually do not see

¹ U.S., DoD Directive 5122.5 2-1.

² Small, “Mass Media Coverage and Constraints” 17.

³ Arant and Warden 35.

⁴ Michael J. Dugan, “Generals vs. Journalists, Cont.” The New York Times, 24 May 1991: A31, rpt. as “Generals vs. Journalists,” The Media and the Gulf War, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC: Seven Locks, 1992) 62.

these reports. As a result, the military's assessment of the amount of cooperation from media representatives concerning security and safety matters does not reach military commanders or media executives.¹ Thus, the legacy of animosity in military-media relations continues.

¹ Sharkey, Under Fire 162.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In order to evaluate military-media relations during and since the Gulf War, interviews were conducted with members of three study groups: media representatives, military representatives and communication scholars who have expertise in the research topic. Using three study groups enabled the researcher to compare the perspectives of different interest groups relative to the issue. The media and military study group members represent practically-based interests, primarily reflecting those of their respective institutions. The scholars provide perspectives which, arguably, may tend to be more idealistic as academia often is, but also give an objective and detached view of military-media relations. Therefore, the scholars provide a "conscience" for reconciling opposing points of view about the subject.

As identified in Chapter I, the research questions for the study are:

1. Was the Gulf War media policy effective in allowing the media to fully cover the events leading to and during the war, or did it hinder the newsgathering process? What objectives were implicit in the DoD policy? How well were they met?
2. How well do the current DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations meet the needs of both the military and the media? What are the needs of each in a democratic society?
3. What should the DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations include?
4. What is the outlook for the military-media relationship?

Research Design

Interview questions were developed to address each of the research questions, and some interview questions addressed more than one research question. An interview agenda was designed for each of the three study groups: the media representative study group, the military representative study group, and the communication scholar study group. (See Appendices E-G.) The study necessitated separate interview agendas because, in general, the collective experiences and expertise of the members of each study group relative to the research topic differ. For example, a majority of the media representatives interviewed had covered the Gulf War from the Middle East and could provide first-hand accounts of military-media working relations during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The military representatives could provide insight into the reasons, from the military's perspective, necessitating the Gulf War and present DoD media policies. The communication scholars, on the other hand, have analyzed military-media relations and the case of the Gulf War and could critique how the military and the media performed from the perspective of "how things should be done." In addition, some of the scholars have conducted original research addressing military-media relations. Therefore, the three study groups were designed so the findings of one study group could "check and balance" the findings of the other two.

Research Question #1: The Gulf War Policy

Was the Gulf War media policy effective in allowing the media to fully cover the events leading to and during the war, or did it hinder the newsgathering process? What objectives were implicit in the DoD policy? How well were they met?

While it is evident from the findings of previous studies and critiques, the Gulf War media policy was not satisfactory to most of the media covering the war, it was necessary to access the opinions of the media representatives participating in the study to understand the background for their opinions on current military-media relations. Thus, the Gulf War experience serves as a starting point for the study.

To access how well the Gulf War media policy enabled the media to cover the war and its impact on the war's coverage, the media representatives' opinions about several aspects of the policy were evaluated using responses to the following interview questions:

- Were you or reporters from your organization part of a news pool in the Gulf?
If not, why not?
If so, what were your/their experiences with the pool?
- In your opinion, how useful were the pool reports to news organizations?
- Did you or reporters from your organization attend any of the military press briefings in Riyadh or Washington, DC?
If so, what was your overall impression of the briefings?
- Did the Ground Rules for News Media help you or reporters from your organization assess the sensitivity of information about military operations?
- Were reporters able to gain access to the events they wanted to cover? If not, why not?
- What is your general assessment of the Gulf War media coverage?

Next, the DoD's implicit objectives of the Gulf War media policy are indicated by assessing the military representatives' perspectives about the necessity and utility of specific provisions of the DoD Gulf War media policy and their opinions of the resulting war coverage based responses to the following questions:

- Were there any aspects of the DoD media ground rules or guidelines that worked particularly well or poorly during the Gulf War?
- Are military security reviews of media reports necessary during contingency operations? Why or why not?
- What is your general assessment of media coverage of the Gulf War?

The communication scholars' opinions about the effectiveness and objectives of the military's Gulf War media policy were assessed using responses to the following questions:

- What is your general assessment of media coverage of the Gulf War?

- What is your opinion about the use of media pools to cover front line action during military operations?
- Are military security reviews of media reports needed during contingency operations? Why or why not?
- In addition to the restrictions imposed on the news media by the military during the Gulf War, what factors do you think influenced media coverage of the war?
- What factors do you think influenced the military's Gulf War media policy?

Research Question #2: The Revised Principles

How well do the current DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations meet the needs of both the military and the media? What are the needs of each in a democratic society?

The media representatives' opinions of the revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations were assessed based on the media representatives' responses to the questions below. The first question indicates an institutional characteristic of the media as to whether they formally plan for covering future crises. The second question addresses whether the revised DoD policy has significantly changed the military's media operations during contingencies. Those who participated in post-Gulf War military operations, such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, can compare working relations between the military and the media during and since the Gulf War .

- Does your news organization have established policies or procedures governing the assignment process for covering major news events, such as wars?
- In your opinion, will or have the revised DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations, which were released in May 1992, significantly impact the military's conduct of media relations during military operations?

Further, several of the military representatives interviewed worked with the media in operations subsequent to the Gulf War and could compare military-media working relations during and after the Gulf War. An analysis of the military perspective of how the current DoD media policy may impact military-media relations was based on responses to the following question:

- In your opinion, have the revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations, released in May 1992, made any significant changes in military public affairs media operations during contingency operations?

The communication scholars were also asked:

- Are you familiar with the revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations which were released in May 1992? If so, do you think they have made any significant changes in military public affairs media operations during contingency operations?

Research Question #3: A Policy Compromise

What should the DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations include?

To determine what provisions of a DoD media policy would be most acceptable to members of the media, responses to the following questions were evaluated:

- Do you feel ground rules, specifying the types of information about military operations which should not be published, are necessary during military contingency operations? Why or why not?
- What responsibility, if any, do you think the news media have to prepare to cover future military operations?
- In your opinion, what obligation, if any, does the military have to media covering military operations?

The provisions of a contingency operation media policy which are necessary, from the military's perspective, were assessed based on the responses to the following:

- Are military security reviews of media reports necessary during contingency operations? Why or why not?
- In your opinion, would it be feasible to reinstate a Vietnam War-type of media policy, allowing the media free access without having to submit their reports for security review under the condition they abide by a set of voluntary ground rules, during modern contingency operations?

The communication scholars' assessment of which provisions of a media policy would be acceptable during military operations was indicated by responses to the following questions:

- What is your opinion about the use of media pools to cover front line action during military operations?

- Do you think a military security review of media reports is necessary during wartime?
- In your opinion, would it be feasible to reinstate a Vietnam War-type of media policy, allowing the media free access without having to submit their reports for security review under the condition they abide by a set of voluntary ground rules, during modern contingency operations?
- In your opinion, what responsibility, if any, do the media have to prepare to cover future military operations?
- In your opinion, what is the military's obligation to media covering military operations?

Research Question #4: The Future of Military-Media Relations

What is the outlook for the military-media relationship?

The perspectives of all three study groups regarding the future of military-media relations were evaluated based on responses to the following questions:

- What impact do you think the Gulf War has had on military-media relations?
- What responsibility, if any, do you think the news media have to prepare to cover future military operations?
- What obligation, if any, does the military have to media covering military operations?

Research Procedures

Telephone interviews were conducted with media representatives, communication scholars, and military representatives. The selection of the interview subjects was based on one of the following: (1) personal recommendations, (2) the researcher encountered the person's name in prior research for the study, or (3) the person was a professional colleague of the author. The researcher did not select interview subjects based on their anticipated opinions about the research topic. Interviews were scheduled based on the availability of the interview subjects and averaged 30 minutes. In addition, three interview subjects responded by e-mail.

The Study Groups

The Media Representative Study Group

The media representative study group members' expertise about the military varied from those who were military veterans or had extensive experience covering combat operations to others whose only experience reporting about military operations was during the Gulf War. The study group included: two Pulitzer Prize winners; six military veterans; six combat correspondents who covered conflicts prior to the Gulf War; three military or national security correspondents; four former foreign correspondents, including three specializing in the Middle East; and two reporters with no previous experience covering the military.

Pulitzer Prize winner Malcom Browne of the *New York Times* is a Korean War veteran and an experienced combat correspondent who covered the Vietnam War, the 1971 India-Pakistan War, and the guerrilla campaigns in South America. The *US News & World Report's* Joe Galloway is a veteran battlefield correspondent, with tours in Vietnam, the India-Pakistan War, and the Gulf War. The *Los Angeles Times's* David Lamb is an Army veteran who has covered the military extensively, from the Vietnam War to the Gulf War, and was formerly based in Cairo. Pat Sloyan, a correspondent for *Newsday* who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of the Gulf War, is an Army veteran who has an extensive background covering wars. The *Wall Street Journal's* John Fialka wrote a book, *Hotel Warriors*, about his experiences covering the Gulf War and has covered national security issues since the late 1970s. Charles Lewis, the Washington Bureau Chief for Hearst Newspapers, is a military veteran and a founding architect of the national media pool. Ed Offley, a military reporter for the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, has covered the military since 1982. Russell Carollo, a special projects reporter for the *Dayton Daily News*, was a military beat reporter for three years and has covered the military extensively. Bob Dvorchak, who was with Associated Press during the Gulf War and is now the state editor of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, is an Army

veteran. Stewart Powell, currently the White House correspondent for Hearst Newspapers, was a national security correspondent during the Gulf War. Robert Ruby, deputy foreign editor for the *Baltimore Sun*, was a Middle Eastern correspondent during the Gulf War, has covered defense-related issues overseas, and was a foreign correspondent for 9 years. Richard O'Mara, a former foreign editor who is now a feature writer for the *Baltimore Sun*, has done several stories about the Pentagon. Carol Morello, the West coast correspondent for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, was a Middle East correspondent during the Gulf War. Frank Bruni, who is currently a reporter for the *New York Times* and covered the Gulf War for the *Detroit Free Press*, has no experience covering the military other than during the Gulf War.

The Military Representative Study Group

The collective experience of the military representative study group encompasses the Korean War to the Gulf War. Six members of the study group have at least 16 years of public affairs experience.

Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, a Korean War and Vietnam War veteran with 39 years of service, is the Director of the National Security Program at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is a former military correspondent for the *New York Times* and co-authored a definitive account of the Gulf War with Michael Gordon of the *New York Times* entitled *The General's War*. Retired Army Colonel Harry Summers has 38 years of military service, including tours in Korea and Vietnam, is a syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*, editor of *Vietnam Magazine*, and former General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Military Research at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He participated in 1985 Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the military and the media. During Desert Shield, Summers was a military correspondent for CNN and during Desert Storm was a military analyst for NBC. Air Force Brigadier General Ron Sconyers is director of Air Force Public Affairs. During the Gulf War, he wrote Air

Force public affairs policy for the Gulf theater, facilitated travel of media into the theater, coordinated deploying public affairs officers to the Gulf, and conducted internal information programs for military people stateside and in the Gulf from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Air Force Colonel Michael Gallagher, special assistant to the Chairman for public affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, directed media operations at the Riyadh JIB during the Gulf War. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel-select) Virginia Pribyla is chief of the media relations division for Air Force Public Affairs, the Pentagon. She has 22 years of public affairs experience and worked media relations at the Riyadh JIB during the Gulf War. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Brown is the chief of public affairs for the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. He has 17 years of military service with 16 in public affairs, served as the public affairs officer at Al Kharj Air Base in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and was deployed to support public affairs operations for the military operations in Rwanda and Haiti. Air Force Major (Lieutenant Colonel-select) Jay DeFrank, who is currently completing his doctoral degree at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has 17 years of public affairs experience, 22 years of service, and completed an Education With Industry assignment with the Hill and Knowlton public relations firm in New York. During the Gulf War, DeFrank was the director of public affairs for 17th Air Force at Sembach Air Base, Germany. Air Force Major Joe Davis, the deputy chief of media for Air Mobility Command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, has 18 years of public affairs experience and worked in the Riyadh JIB as a media escort during the Gulf War.

The Communication Scholar Study Group

The communication scholar study group represents a vast collective expertise about military-media relations from a wide range of experiences and backgrounds. The group includes three military veterans, five journalists or former journalists, and one veteran correspondent and military member.

M. David Arant, an Assistant Professor of Journalism at Memphis State University, is a former journalist who studied the constitutionality of the military's restrictions on the media during the Gulf War. Peter Braestrup, the Director of Communications and Senior Editor at the Library of Congress, is a Marine Corps Korean War veteran and former *Washington Post* Bureau Chief at Saigon during the Vietnam War who has authored several books about the military and the media. Garth S. Jowett is a Professor of Communication at the University of Houston who has studied and written about the media and the Gulf War. Douglas Kellner, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, has analyzed and written about the media coverage of the Gulf War. Jacqueline E. Sharkey, Professor of Journalism at the University of Arizona, is an international investigative journalist, former *Washington Post* copy editor and author of *Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media From Grenada to the Persian Gulf*. Leonard Shyles, Associate Professor of Communication at Villanova University, has conducted research on the Gulf War and co-authored *The 1,000 Hour War: Communication in the Gulf*. William J. Small, Felix Larkin Professor of Communications at Fordham University, New York, was a news director, Washington Bureau Chief, the senior vice-president in charge of hard news for CBS News, the president of NBC News, and the president of Radio Television News Director's Association and Society of Professional Journalists. Retired Navy Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll is the deputy director of the Center for Defense Information (CDI), a private, non-government funded organization. Retired Army Colonel Dan Smith is associate director of the CDI and Glenn Baker is one of the producers of CDI's television program, America's Defense Monitor.

The backgrounds of several interview subjects would have allowed them to be placed in more than one of the study groups. For example, Summers is an Army veteran who is now a media representative, Trainor is a retired Marine Corps general who is currently on the faculty of Harvard University. In both cases, they are part of the

military representative study group because their viewpoints reflected a predominately military perspective. On the other hand, retired military officers Carroll and Smith are part of the scholar study group since their perspectives reflected a posture more critical of the military. Therefore, in such cases, the apparent "allegiance" of the interview subject determined the study group he or she was included in. In such cases, where interview subjects could conceivably fit into more than one study group, interview agendas were modified to include questions from other interview agendas to account for the interviewees' knowledge in these areas. Therefore, the background of the interview subject was accounted for in the interview.

Limitations of Research Approaches

The availability of potential interview subjects played a major role in who was interviewed. Some military representatives who were to be included in the study were deployed to Bosnia or otherwise not available for an interview. This was also the case for some media representatives. For example, no one who had covered the Gulf War from the staff of *The Washington Post* was available for an interview. Rick Atkinson, an experienced military reporter, who several of the interview subjects referred to, is now based in Berlin and deployed to Bosnia. Therefore, a reporter from this major national newspaper was not included in the study. Some media representatives could only spare five or 10 minutes for the interview and, therefore, only had time to answer some of the interview agenda questions.

Originally, the three study groups were to be represented equally, with an equal number of people interviewed from each study group. However, the availability of interview subjects and time constraints prevented this.

Finally, time constraints for the research portion of the study did not facilitate the option of completing all the interviews in one study group before completing the interviews in the second and third study groups. Therefore, the interviews were

conducted in no particular order and were determined by the availability of the interview subjects.

Limitations of Research Design

In order to narrow the study, the media representative study group was limited to representatives of the print media. The print media are established and have a history of war coverage as long as American history. Also, the requirements of print and broadcast media covering major events differ. The print media, for the most part, need more context and an overall perspective of events for their reports. On the other hand, the television media, for example, need more immediate visuals, preferably of action, to accompany reports. Therefore, in the case of war coverage, the priority for the print media is to gather background information and get an overview of what is happening from a rear-echelon headquarters. Conversely, the television cameras need to be at the front to capture dramatic, action footage. If the study had included broadcast media, a discussion of real-time coverage and its impact on military-media relations would be imperative. However, this topic deserves independent study. Therefore, the impact of advances in communication technology is not a primary focus of the study.

Ideally, the types of print media organizations included in the study would be proportionally representative of the number of each type of media outlet in the United States. This would mean the number of interviews with media representatives of national daily newspapers, regional daily newspapers, wire services, and news magazines would be proportionally representative of how many media outlets of that type exist in the United States. If this were the case, trends among the types of print media represented could be compared and contrasted. However, in this study, the results of the interviews are considered representative of the print media in general.

Another factor that is not accounted for is the percentage of Washington-based media versus media from other major cities and regions. According to O'Mara of the *Baltimore Sun*, there are two kinds of journalism, Washington journalism and

journalism in general. He asserts that the Washington press is very established and the reporters do not have the sense of independence that distance from the Pentagon and from other defense correspondents would give them.¹ If this is a true assessment, the sampling used in the study will skew the results since six, or almost half, of media representatives interviewed are Washington-based media.

In addition, the media representatives are not demographically representative of the print media in general since only one female reporter was interviewed. However, the sampling may be more representative of reporters who routinely cover the military or defense issues.

In addition, the military representative study group is not representative of the military population. Since the Army is the largest service in the Department of Defense, most of the interview subjects would be Army representatives if the study group was to be representative of the Armed Forces. However, since the author is an Air Force member and the study is intended to benefit the Air Force public affairs program, more Air Force interview subjects are included in the study. In addition, most of the author's professional contacts are Air Force members.

¹ O'Mara, telephone interview, 11 Mar. 1996.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, the information gathered from interviews with media representatives, military representatives, and scholars is compiled and any trends among the collective opinions of each study group are identified. The inputs of individual interview subjects are included without attribution in the first sections, so the perspectives of each study group as a whole can be analyzed without regard to whom said what. Therefore, opinions are given equal weight. For instance, when reviewing the findings of the military representative study group, there may be a tendency to give more credence to a general's viewpoint than a major's, for instance, if they disagree on a point. The findings of each study group are then compared to identify areas of agreement and disagreement among and between the three study groups' perspectives.

The Media Representative Study Group

The Gulf War Policy

The media's general dissatisfaction with the Gulf War media policy, revealed in the research, was not unexpected based on the literature reviewed in Chapter II. The media representatives' major complaint was that there was a lack of or restricted access to the war's events which impeded the war's coverage. Most of the interview subjects felt control was exercised because the military wanted to control it's and the war's images.

Overall, the media representatives interviewed opposed the pool system and would have preferred to establish their own relationships with units and cover the war independently. In general, the media representatives expressed that media pools are not

a rational system to cover events and "reporting by committee" does not work. While two reporters reported the war independently as unilaterals and felt they personally had good access, they criticized the pool system and Gulf War policy for being too confining for the media. The media's satisfaction with the pools also depended upon the amount of support they got from individual public affairs escort officers and unit commanders of the units they covered. Public affairs officers who interfered with the reporting process "completely subverted the system," according to one reporter. Only one reporter said he does not oppose pools. According to him, the pool system was designed by the Washington bureau chiefs to ensure their own access to events.

As a sidebar finding, the media's criticisms of military public affairs operations during the Gulf War were qualified by branch of service. For example, the Marines received positive reviews for their media relations efforts while the Army and Navy did not fare well in the media's evaluation of their performances. The Air Force was usually not mentioned except when media representatives commented about the impracticality of covering an air war.

The pool products, or pools reports, were of little use to most news organizations and, even those which were useful, were not transmitted or received early enough to be incorporated into daily coverage. Only two reporters interviewed thought the pool reports were good or useful, and, of the two one, said they were not timely enough to be contrasted with the information being released by the command. Generally, news organizations are not inclined to use reports written by reporters of other news organizations although they may, for example, pull quotations, which are otherwise not available, to use in their own stories. As such, one reporter criticized his fellow reporters for filing complete stories instead of pool notes for others to use.

Also, for the first time in war reporting, there was a separation between reporters who covered briefings and those who were in the field, and, because of the disconnect, reporters did not have an overview of the situation. Those in the field got one

perspective while those who covered the daily military briefings got another. In addition, most reporters felt the briefings were not overly informative or helpful to the reporters interviewed. Their impression was that the briefings were controlled, information was being withheld, and no real news or an overall picture of what was happening was provided. In general, reporters were suspicious of the accuracy of the information given and felt they were being deceived, although two reporters found the off-the-record portions of the briefings useful.

The military's security review provision was another point of contention for the media. While one reporter thought there will always be a need for security review and did not have a problem with reasonable reviews confined to security matters, most of the media representatives interviewed oppose any type of security review. Most of the reporters thought the reviews during the Gulf War were unnecessary because: reporters were not privy to sensitive information, copy was so delayed it couldn't contain security violations, stories with violations passed the review process without being flagged due to the reviewers' confusion about the rules, and the media self-censored to avoid security violations. The consensus among the media representatives interviewed was that no reporter would knowingly publish information that might compromise military security. In fact, three of the media representatives interviewed said they voluntarily withheld stories to protect military security. In addition, while most of the media representatives interviewed understood the military's rationale for wanting to review reports from the war front, they also felt the system delayed reports and could easily be abused by reviewers who used editorial intervention for image control.

While almost all the media representatives interviewed said reasonable, mutually-agreed upon ground rules are acceptable, and even necessary, several criticisms of the Gulf War ground rules were identified. While the media representatives understand the military's reasons for wanting ground rules during the war, they were sometimes used as a mechanism to control the media. In addition, while ground rules can help reporters

access the sensitivity of information, one reporter thought the Gulf War ground rules were too vague to be helpful, and, if they were strictly enforced, anything could have been prevented from being published. Some of the ground rules were unnecessary, according to one reporter, and another thought they were all unnecessary because the media did not get any sensitive information about the war's operations. Of the media representatives interviewed, only one reporter completely opposes the military imposing any sort of ground rules during contingency operations.

The media's dissatisfaction with the military's Gulf War media policy showed in their criticisms of the war coverage. Some of the media representatives interviewed thought the lapses in the war's coverage were due to the military's control and the media's resulting lack of access to the battlefield. Others blamed poor coverage on reporters' general lack of knowledge about the Middle East or the military. Whatever the reasons for the resulting coverage, several of the media representatives concluded that not all the information about the war's conduct was revealed, and the public got an antiseptic view of the war.

The Revised Principles

In May 1992, the DoD released revised principles for news media covering DoD operations after much discussion between military and media representatives (See Appendix C). However, of the media interviewed who were familiar with the new principles, none give them a lot of credence or think they will significantly impact military-media relations during military operations. For example, one reporter remarked there will always be ground rules which impede news coverage, and energetic reporters will find ways around them. Another reporter observed the media's access during military operations will still ultimately depend upon how sensitive commanders in the field are to the need for media coverage.

First of all, from the interviews conducted it is obvious that most, if not all, media organizations do not have established policies or procedures governing the assignment

process for major news events. Decisions about who will cover what and where are based on the availability of people and resources and what else is happening at the time. The media generally do not formulate plans and policies to govern their operations during major news events. On the other hand the military constantly plans for future operations. This not only indicates a cultural difference between the two institutions, it also indicates the media's propensity for not giving much credence to formal policies of other institutions. After all, although the military and the media worked together to formulate the revised principles, they remain DoD principles.

The revised DoD principles fail to reconcile differences of opinion among the military and the media concerning on-site security reviews—or censorship, as the media call it. This is a sticking point, according to one journalist, and if all the provisions are not agreed upon or are acceptable to both parties, the principles will not work. Among the media representatives interviewed, their opinions of security reviews, in general, ranged from “unconstitutional” to “there will always be a need for security reviews, but they must be reasonable,” so there is no unanimous opinion on the matter.

One editor remarked that the provisions for security review and allowing the media to transmit their own products are incompatible, and advances in technology will make it virtually impossible for the military to control the flow of information during future military operations. In addition, since many of the problems encountered with and complaints about security reviews during the Gulf War stemmed from poor judgment on the part of the reviewers, the revised principles do not fix the former policy's fundamental flaw by leaving too much open for judgment.

A Policy Compromise

For the most part, the provisions of the revised DoD policy do facilitate open coverage of military operations—an important objective for the media. (See Appendix C.) The use of pools are limited to only those conditions which necessitate their use, such as during the initial stages of an operation or when access to events would

otherwise not be possible. As one reporter interviewed indicated, pools are more acceptable to the media if they are used as one of several newsgathering tools, not as the sole means of access.

While media representatives tend to be wary of ground rules and the potential for them to be abused, they also acknowledge that the consequences of security breaches warrant precautions. Some of media representatives interviewed felt the consequences of security violations—the loss of American lives—warranted restrictions on reporting specific information about military operations, especially given that some reporters are inexperienced or unfamiliar with the military. In general, those interviewed were of the opinion that most reporters would be willing to adhere to a reasonable set of ground rules, that are mutually-agreed upon in advance, in exchange for free access to units and operations. Since reporters with front line units are likely to get information, that, if published, could jeopardize military security, practical ground rules are useful. In addition, one reporter expressed his view that unless ground rules were in place, commanders would not be willing to grant the media access to their operations, so he would agree to abide by a reasonable set of ground rules for practical reasons. On the other hand, one reporter said the only rule that should apply is reporters use common sense in assessing what to publish, so ground rules are not needed.

Further, when covering military operations, media representatives incur some risk. One reporter emphasized that the safety of media representatives in the field is not the military's responsibility, and reporters should have access if they are willing to assume the risks involved. According to two reporters interviewed, the military wants to restrict the media's access based on two concerns: reporters could get killed or interfere with military operations unless they are contained.

Most of the media representatives interviewed were of the opinion that the media had a responsibility for ensuring complete coverage of future military operations. Most agreed that, ideally, only reporters familiar with the military should be sent to cover

military operations. However, they recognized practical limitations, such as limited resources of most media organizations, prevent this. One reporter expressed that since the military is the largest institution in the American democracy, the media owe it a little more attention. In addition, one reporter said the media should follow up and make the public aware of their complaints about abuses of the military's control during military operations.

On the other hand, one editor made the point that while the media have an obligation to prepare for covering future military operations, what a newspaper editor considers preparation differs from what the DoD considers it to be. According to another editor, reporters self-educate and, therefore, do not need to have experience covering the military to cover a war. One reporter felt the media had no responsibility to prepare for covering military operations other than for reporters to be the best they can be and get as close to the truth as possible; reporters do not have to become military experts or tell the story from the military perspective.

While one reporter expressed the opinion that the military has made more effort to meet their part of the responsibility than the media have, the military does have a responsibility to facilitate open coverage of military operations. The military is obligated to provide free access for media representatives covering contingency operations based on the governing principles of a democracy. The military serve to protect the liberties of American society, and the media report about its activities to inform American citizens—those whom the military serve.

The Future of Military-Media Relations

The media representatives' perceptions of the impact of the Gulf War on present military-media relations varied from very little to positive. It is clear, however, that the relationship is complex and advances in communication technology will further complicate it.

For several reasons, some of the media representatives interviewed thought the Gulf War experience would have or has had very little impact on military-media relations. First of all, many of the reporters who covered the Gulf War do not routinely cover the military, and, in general, no one followed up on complaints of what happened in the Gulf. Although some reporters learned lessons from their Gulf War experience, a lot of newspapers are run by people who are not concerned about such matters until the next war comes along, according to one reporter. In addition, some media representatives considered conflict models of the Gulf War to be an anomaly since current contingency operations are humanitarian and of a different nature than the Gulf War. In the words of one editor, the Gulf War was a unique set of circumstances that led to horrendous oppression of the media but was limited to that operation. Finally, according to one veteran combat correspondent, the lessons of every war are promptly forgotten, especially in the case of military-media relations.

In addition, some media representatives, think the military learned lessons from the Gulf War which may have a negative impact on military-media relations. For example, the Pentagon learned about news management and how to operate the public relations side of a military operation in a telegenic age. Furthermore, since the military was satisfied with the war's coverage, it will be less likely to ease restrictions and risk getting what is commonly perceived of as the negative Vietnam War-type of coverage. Also, the Gulf War experience created cynicism among a large contingent of the reporters who covered the war.

Most of the media representatives interviewed, however, identified positive influences of the Gulf War experience on military-media relations. By working together in the Gulf, individual military members and reporters got to know each other and develop trust. Army commanders, for instance, realized that media access could result in positive coverage about their units after seeing the positive coverage the Marines got because they were receptive to the media. According to one reporter, there

has been goodwill on both sides to improve relations after the Gulf War, an episode that sensitized both the military and the media as to how bad relations can get. In some aspects the Gulf War prepared the military and the media to better deal with each other and have more realistic expectations of one another. Several media representatives identified the Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia operations, where the military have been more open and willing to give the media access, as positive episodes in military-media relations.

For the most part, the media representatives interviewed expressed an interest in improving military-media relations. They consider it important and in the interests of both institutions to foster positive working relations. However, a gulf between the military and the media remains—and is widening—according to several reporters. There will always be reporters who are suspicious of authority figures. In addition, few media have military service, and some hostility towards reporters remains on the military side from the Vietnam era. Added to this, military beats, as all specialty beats, are becoming less and less common, so experienced military reporters are becoming rare at many publications.

Institutional differences will always be present. According to one reporter, the media are not supposed to be the friend or the enemy of any institution, and the military—or any other organization—should not expect to be loved by reporters. As one reporter reflected, the military and the media have entirely different missions and naturally adversarial roles. However, the degree of distrust between the military and the media during the Gulf War was no more or less than that between the media and the White House or Congress. As such, there will always be tension between the two organizations, and there will always be problems. The challenge is to keep the problems small by continuing to communicate and resolve problems as they come up.

The Military Representative Study Group

The Gulf War Policy

All of the military representatives interviewed identified problems with the Gulf War media policy. A majority of the military representatives interviewed identified the pool system as a major failing. While pools are necessary when logistics and security considerations warrant, they should be temporary and replaced by independent reporting as soon as conditions permit. There was one area of disagreement between two of the military representatives interviewed concerning pools. One thought the fact that the pools favored national media while denying members of the local media access was a problem while another said the pool system attempted to treat all news organizations equally when national and international media organizations should have precedence.

While the military representatives agreed that reporters would not willingly divulge information that would compromise security, some potentially serious violations of the ground rules during the Gulf War were identified. However, most of the military representatives interviewed agreed that educating military escorts and media representatives to accomplish security at the source is preferable to adding a formal security review process. One officer, who performed public affairs duties in the Gulf, said it was difficult to learn everything that was sensitive about operations at that location. In addition, there were too few military people trained to perform the review function, and delays in transmission of reports resulted.

Some of the problems encountered with the provisions of the Gulf War media policy stemmed from the fact they were carried out by inexperienced public affairs people who misunderstood their function. Some public affairs people had little to no news sense or appreciation of the needs of the media in the newsgathering process. In some cases, the transmission of media reports were delayed not because of animosity but due to ignorance about the importance of timeliness in the news business. While experienced public affairs personnel appreciate that they should not interfere with or

attempt to influence the outcome of interviews, and they should provide reporters the information needed to get the facts right instead of reading their copy, some media escorts had not been properly trained. This created additional tension between the media and the military.

In wartime, the military hopes to tell its story to American taxpayers, to show them how tax dollars are being spent and, preferably, shed a positive light on the military's operations. For the most part, the military representatives interviewed were pleased with the media coverage of the war. In summary, the war's coverage was described as: very fair; outstanding with isolated cases which showed the ignorance of the reporter; open and honest coverage with some exceptions; and an attempt to keep the public informed with an open and accurate account which resulted in some mistakes and misinformation.

However, one interview subject thought that while the war's coverage was good from a military public affairs perspective, it represented the poorest set-line war reporting of any war which could be attributed to the fact that there were long periods of time without much to cover. One military member added that ignorant journalists could be used and manipulated by the military.

The Revised Principles

Most of the military representatives interviewed were of the opinion that the revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations would have minimal effect on military-media relations or how future military operations will be covered. In one officer's opinion, the military will use the media in future conflicts as a force multiplier or for deception. In addition, the degree of access the media has to military operations is the result of the evolving relationship between the military and the media. Policy changes have little effect on military-media working relations since the basic philosophy of a free flow of information during military operations is already, and has been for some time, encompassed in existing DoD principles and directives. The

primary determinant of the success of any policy is the command's support for it. If commanders recognize the importance of allowing media access to military operations, the media will have access. Otherwise, access will be difficult.

A Policy Compromise

The most difficult policy provision to reconcile between the military and the media is the need for security reviews of media reports during contingency operations. The consensus of the military representatives interviewed is that no reporter would knowingly publish information which could compromise military security. In addition, the media's track record for not committing security breaches is good.

However, considering the consequences of security violations, some military representatives interviewed were not willing to take the risk of giving journalists, who do not have the required knowledge, the responsibility of judging security issues. By the same token, they concede the military must consider the review privilege a sacred trust and not abuse its authority. Security reviews can be accomplished in a manner that is amenable to both the media and military and should be limited to the bare minimum required. For example, if a review process is retained, public affairs personnel will have to be well-trained to efficiently conduct the reviews and not abuse their authority, and enough personnel must be provided to perform reviews in order to prevent bottlenecks in the process.

Some military representatives thought security reviews had limited effect. First, the military's capability to perform security reviews is diminished by advances in communication technology which allow instantaneous transmission of information. Also, the media do not generally witness events that, if reported, would jeopardize security, and according to one military representative, the media self-censor enough to avoid security breaches.

According to one public affairs officer, in contemporary operations, named Operations-Other-Than-War (OOTW) by DoD, free access for media representatives

should be the rule. However, in one military representative's opinion, free access has a peril for journalists; they assume the risk for their personal safety. Three other military representatives interviewed disagreed with this statement and argue the military should be responsible for reporters' safety in a war zone just as it is responsible for the personal safety of any American who has to be there.

The Future of Military-Media Relations

The military representatives' opinions about the impact of the Gulf War on military-media relations varied. Several felt that the Gulf experience taught commanders about the importance of and need for media access to military operations. It educated commanders about how news media can benefit unit morale and provide direct access to the American public to inform people about military operations. Also, while relations were initially strained due to the negative pool experiences and lack of access, the military made an effort to learn about the media which helped erase lingering bitterness from the Vietnam experience, and the media took a more realistic and rational approach to negotiating policy changes with the military. A negative impact of the Gulf War experience, according to one public affairs officer, is that there are some military people who have misinterpreted events and how the media were dealt with during the war. For example, some inaccurately believe the military actively mislead the media to think there would be an amphibious assault and have concluded this is how the media should be used during military operations.

Several military representatives thought media organizations should only send reporters who are knowledgeable about the military to cover a war. One thought the Gulf War demonstrated the vast and pervasive ignorance of most of the media there. In addition, reporters who are sent to cover a war should be physically and mentally prepared to handle the stresses of the battlefield. While several military representatives thought media representatives should make an effort to learn about the military, they recognized there were practical limitations preventing that from happening. Most media

organizations are operating with limited budgets and personnel, military beat reporters are becoming scarce, and journalism is a high-turnover occupation.

The military representatives interviewed agreed the military should give the media as much access to troops and as much insight into the operations as security and logistics restraints permit. Several thought the military should cultivate the media and invite them to participate in exercises and peacetime deployments. In addition, military public affairs officers must be well-trained and prepared to facilitate media access to the action.

According to one interviewee, the military is one of the most trusted institutions in America. In a democracy, the military, and any other institution of public trust, must make itself accessible to the public, through the media. However, it is the opinion of at least one of the military representatives interviewed that the military and the media will always be at odds; there will always be commanders who want total security and media who want complete coverage and total access.

The Communication Scholar Study Group

The Gulf War Policy

In general, the scholars were critical of the military's Gulf War media policy because it gave the military too much control and hindered open coverage of the war. However, one scholar pointed out that this was done with the support and approval of the American public, who is more concerned about the safety of the troops.

Most members of the study group were of the opinion that media pools were used to enable the military to control the flow of information from the battlefield and, therefore, protect its image. There was agreement among the interview subjects that pools are useful in some instances, such as during the initial wave of a military operation or when a pool is the only way to provide the media access. However, advances in communication technology will make it more difficult for the military to retain control,

and pools will be less desirable for media representatives who will want exclusives.

Therefore, there must be a balance between press access and military control.

While most of the communication scholars oppose security reviews of media reports on its face, a few think there was some need for reviews during the Gulf War. One opinion is that the media's ignorance necessitated reviews. On the other hand, the military sometimes abused the provision and made changes to copy not related to security matters and delayed reports. Further, in hindsight, the media in the Gulf were extremely patriotic and would not have printed any information that have would hurt military security.

The scholars were also critical of media coverage of the war. They attributed the failures in the coverage to the media's ignorance about military matters, the media's reliance on press conferences and other sources of official information, high public support for the war effort, and the military's control and subsequent lack of access for the media. The coverage was generalized as "boosterism," lacking critical discourse, sanitized, and overly caught up with the technology of weapons systems. However, one scholar said the Gulf War coverage was better than coverage of any other war in the world.

In addition to the military's restrictions, there were other influences on media coverage of the Gulf War. Changes in technology and the advent of real-time coverage shaped reporting. Because of the predominance of television in American society, dramatic footage, rather than insightful reporting, dominated coverage. Since the Gulf War was a popular war, media organizations were concerned they would be perceived as unpatriotic and ratings would fall if they were critical of the war effort. Journalists also feared they would be denied access to events by the military if they took a critical stance, and media conglomerates had international business interests to protect. Since there was a lack of activity and story material between the initial deployment of troops and the

start of the ground war, the media resorted to using the material provided by the military. There were also cultural limitations on reporters in Saudi Arabia.

The most frequent factor identified as an influence on the military's media policy in the Gulf War was the Vietnam War experience. The military's perception that the media were responsible for its loss of public support in Vietnam and the successes of controlling the media—and media coverage—in Grenada and Panama, along with the British success of press control during the Falkland Islands War, led the military to conclude that if the press is restricted, public opinion can be controlled. Other influences identified in the interviews included: the media have been villainized in American society; the military was shaken by previous bad press and gave it undue credence; advances in communication technology created a desire to use the media to extend the military's advantage; and there was an initial expectation of high U.S. casualties and a desire to limit images which may reduce public support for the war.

The Revised Principles

Those familiar with the revised DoD principles for news media covering military operations agreed they would not significantly change military-media relations. In addition, a disagreement remains between the military and the media regarding security reviews, making them less effective.

A Policy Compromise

Pools and security reviews simply reflect tension between the military and the media that need to be worked out in some satisfactory ground rules, according to one scholar. Most of the scholars interviewed thought that ground rules for media covering military operations could be acceptable to both the military and the media. Rules prohibiting specific information from being published based on genuine security interests are not unreasonable. If the ground rules are mutually-agreed upon ahead of time, the media would be obligated to follow them. While some information needs to be withheld for a certain period of time for security reasons, it should be published as soon

as there is no further threat to security. Media who violate the rules would lose their credentials. The military is also obligated to honor their own rules and not block the release of non-security related information. However, if ground rules are not instituted, the media have an obligation to send people to the battlefield who understand the military.

Some thought a media policy giving the media free access to units and operations under the condition they abide by a set of ground rules without submitting reports to security review could reasonably be reinstated during most modern contingency operations. However, it depends on the situation. It would be feasible to allow free access in minor interventions such as Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia while it was not feasible during the Gulf War, which was a conventional war where surprise and deception were needed for successful military operations. Such a policy also requires the military to trust the media to self-censor.

According to one interview subject, voluntary guidelines for the media would not work because the press have become undisciplined as a result of a decline in respect for authority from the Vietnam era; the media are highly competitive; and the mainstream media have become "tabloidized," so the media will not discipline themselves. Another thought it would not be practical to give free access to the media during military operations, considering the number of existing national and international news organizations. Regardless, advances in communication technology, where live feeds from the battlefield are possible, may be making the issue mute.

There are practical limitations which prevent the media organizations from having military reporters on their staffs. One scholar criticized the media for not taking military reporting as seriously as sports reporting. Several scholars thought the media need to learn more about the military and have a responsibility to send experienced reporters, knowledgeable about the military, to cover military operations. Ignorant reporters compromise security, so there has to be an assurance that field commanders

can count on the reporters being knowledgeable enough not to compromise security. However, the fact that specialized beat reporters are being cut at most news organization and journalism is a high-turnover business preclude this from happening.

The media also have responsibility to ensure their access to future military operations. They should present a unified effort to resist the military's restrictions and negotiate better rules for better access. The media should take the responsibility for making it clear to the Pentagon that full coverage is vital and necessary in a democracy and go public with complaints about restrictions on coverage. In addition, the media should be more critical and in-depth in their war coverage and critically evaluate information provided by the government. Coverage should be accurate and not sanitized.

Most of the scholars' views about the military's obligation to the media covering military operations stemmed from the need for a free flow of information and critical debate in a democratic society. The military operates with permission of the American people who need to be informed. The military should put democratic interests before its own institutional interests. Since a free society demands outside scrutiny of institutions of public trust, the military has an ethical obligation to permit credible coverage of events. The media is the public's surrogate, so the military should allow them to witness its activities.

Within logistical and security constraints, the military should allow maximum access and provide competent public affairs personnel to work with the media. The military owes the media accurate, timely information about the war's execution and should advise them of areas to avoid to help them stay out of danger. Another opinion is that the military has no obligation to provide specific information or opportunities for the media to gather and transmit information and does not have an obligation to protect them if they knowingly go into harm's way.

The Future of Military-Media Relations

There were mixed feelings among the scholars concerning the impact of the Gulf War on military-media relations. One view is that it harmed relations and there has been no real coming to a meeting of the minds between the military and the media.

While the military enjoyed overwhelmingly good press, the media feel like they were had, according to one scholar. As a result the public missed a balanced, critical view of the war. In addition, the Gulf War experience created a blueprint for subsequent conflicts to use the media as a vehicle for government's point of view. The military are pretty well satisfied they can control the press, and the majority of the American public will not object. On the other hand, one scholar thought the Gulf War experience reopened a serious dialogue between military and media representatives, and observed the military has made more strides to ensure access to the battlefield and plan for the next operation than the media have.

Comparison of Study Group Findings

The Gulf War Policy

The general consensus among members of the three study groups is that there were problems with the Gulf War media policy, and the needs of a free press were not fully provided for. The media representatives generally felt that restrictions on their activity resulted from the military's concern with image-control. While they understood the military's reasons for wanting ground rules and security reviews, the provisions were abused. The scholars agree with the media representatives that the military's policy was used to control the media and war coverage. On the other hand, several military representatives attributed many of the failings of the Gulf War media policy to improper execution of the policy's intent by inexperienced public affairs personnel.

The majority of the members of all three study groups agree that the pool system used during the Gulf War did not work well to meet the media's needs. They acknowledge that media pools are useful under limited and certain circumstances but

should not be used as the sole means of access to military operations. In addition, most of the media representatives found the pool products and military briefings were not good sources of information.

There was agreement among some members of each study group that a form of security review may sometimes be necessary, and any security review process should be limited and confined to the necessary minimum. The media representatives are most opposed to security reviews and see them as an interference with the reporting process. They would be more amenable to one in which the media was in control. The military representatives generally thought some form of security review is necessary but security at the source, where public affairs personnel and media representatives are educated in order to prevent security violations, is preferable to a formal review process. While most of the scholars oppose security reviews in principle, several thought they may be necessary during wartime.

Therefore, it is evident from the study, as several previous studies have shown, that the Gulf War media policy was fraught with problems. The military's implementation of a security review process and pool system, which limited the media's access and obstructed the reporting process, is of great concern to media representatives. As such, the military is also recognizing, from pitfalls with these provisions during the Gulf War, that such policies must be limited. In addition, the ability of the military to do security reviews will be further limited by available communication technology.

The military representatives were generally more satisfied with media coverage of the war than the other two groups. They are primarily concerned with how well news reports tell their service's story. While several of the media representatives were critical of the war's coverage, they attributed failings primarily to the military's control in the Gulf region and then to the incompetence of some reporters there. The scholars were generally more critical of media coverage of the war than the other two study

groups and identified factors, in addition to the military's restrictions and media's expertise—or lack of expertise—about military matters, which influenced coverage.

The study found that the military is even more aware, in the wake of the Gulf War, of the media's effectiveness as a means of access to the American public. By fostering positive relations with the media, the military can better tell its story to the American public.

The Revised Principles

The consensus among all three study groups is that the revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations will not have a significant impact on military-media relations. The media representatives do not give much credence to the new principles because not all the provisions, namely the one for security review, were agreed to by the media. The scholars' opinion was also that the impact of the new principles is limited by their failure to reconcile differences of opinion between the military and the media. The media representatives also believe the military learned it can control the media from the Gulf War experience and will not relent to open access. One media representative pointed out that media access will ultimately depend on the commander in the field, a point most of the military representatives echoed. A finding of the study, respective to the revised principles, is that the consensus among the military representatives interviewed is that principles, themselves, will not change how media operations are conducted. Rather, the attitudes of commanders will determine the amount of access and cooperation the media get during military operations.

The media are fraught with their own institutional limitations. Lack of personnel and resources do not permit most media organizations to dedicate reporters to reporting military affairs. There is an ever-declining amount of knowledge about the military among reporters due to changing demographics within the field of journalism and cultural changes in American society that creates a demand for certain types of news stories. As such, the media will not formally prepare to cover future military operations.

The problems in the war's coverage stemming from inexperienced journalists who were unfamiliar with the military will, most likely, not be corrected.

A Policy Compromise

While the consensus among all three groups is that there must be mutually-agreed upon ground rules for covering military operations, there is not total agreement on what provisions the ground rules would include. First, the media representatives generally agreed that the use of media pools, if limited to specific conditions which warrant pools, are acceptable during contingency operations. In the opinion of most of the military representatives interviewed, some form of security review is necessary considering the consequences of security breaches, but security at the source is preferable to a formal review process. The members of the scholar study group were divided on whether voluntary guidelines where the media operated under ground rules but did not have to submit reports for review would work in a modern contingency operation.

A point of contention affecting the DoD policy execution is the issue of who is responsible for journalists' safety in the field. Journalists tend to take the position that the military is not responsible for the safety of reporters in the battlefield, and counterarguments are used to deny the media access. Most military representatives argue the military is responsible for the safety of journalists in the field during military operations. Several of the scholars said the military should make the media aware of present dangers but are under no obligation to protect reporters from danger if they knowingly go into harm's way. The implications here concerning the media policy is, if the military feels responsibility for reporters, commanders will want accountability for them, which results in some degree of control over their movements in the field.

There was agreement among a majority of the interview subjects that, under the same democratic principles members of the military are sworn to uphold, the military should ensure maximum possible media access to military operations that security and

logistics considerations will permit. The media have a correlating responsibility. An overall majority of members from all three study groups agreed that, ideally, only reporters who are familiar with the military should be sent to cover wars. However, they also recognized that practical limitations prevent this. Several media representatives added that what the media consider preparation differs from what DoD considers preparation. In general, the scholar study group placed more responsibility on the media for preparing to cover future military operations than the media representatives did. For instance, several scholars argued that the media should negotiate better access and then report on military operations more critically.

The Future of Military-Media Relations

While the general consensus is that there will always be differences between the military and the media, working relations can be improved. Across the board, interview subjects were concerned about the future of the relationship and recognized that it is important for an agreement on policies and procedures to be reached.

Members of each study group were concerned that the military may have learned the wrong lessons from the Gulf War. Some media representatives and scholars believe it taught the military that it can control the media and manipulate news coverage. One military representative is concerned that some military people inaccurately believe the military knowingly deceived the media during the Gulf War to achieve military objectives, and this is an effective method of dealing with the media.

On the other hand, media and military representatives agree that the Gulf War experience made many commanders realize the importance of allowing access for media coverage of military operations. Members of the scholar study group agreed that, as a result of the Gulf War, the military has made an effort to be more open and ensure better media access during military operations. Several members of each study group identified the operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia as examples of positive episodes in military-media relations.

There is also agreement among several members of the media and military representative study groups that the Gulf War experience enabled reporters and military troops to get to know and work with one another which helped ease some existing tension. As a result, each has a more realistic expectation of one another which is helpful when negotiating policies, for example.

Therefore, successful military-media relations in future military operations ultimately depends on the support of military commanders and the competence of military public affairs personnel. The military has made strides in this direction to ensure public affairs people are well-trained and commanders are educated about the importance of media access during contingency operations. Much of the failure of the Gulf War media policy was due to a lack of experience of public affairs personnel who did not carry out the intent of the policy's provisions.

Summary of Major Findings

Based on the research conducted, the major findings of the study are:

- The Gulf War media policy was unsatisfactory to most media representatives and hindered the reporting process.
- Inexperienced public affairs personnel hindered the reporting process by not following the intention of the Gulf War media policy.
- The military is justified in wanting to take precautions to prevent security breaches by the media, but security at the source is preferable to a formal security review process.
- Competent and professional media and military public affairs people can boost the credibility of their organizations.
- Media representatives and military public affairs people must be informed enough to know what types of information will breach security during military operations so they can perform security at the source.

- The Gulf War increased awareness among military commanders about the importance of and need for media access to military operations.
- The objectives of military information policies reflect institutional interests in addition to democratic interests.
- The military can use the media as a vehicle for accomplishing its own objectives.
- Ground rules during military operations are generally acceptable to the media if they are mutually agreed upon and adhered to by both parties.
- A pool system is acceptable to reporters if used under the limited conditions which warrant pools, such as during the initial wave of an operation or when access is otherwise not possible.
- The media are patriotic “citizens” who would not knowingly endanger the lives of American troops.
- Attitudes, especially of military commanders, set the tone for working relations between the military and the media.
- While the military is a unified entity which coordinates policies and continually plans for future operations, the media are not a unified entity. They are highly-competitive organizations with business interests and do not formally plan for covering future events.
- Ideally, only reporters knowledgeable about the military would be sent to cover a war, but there are practical limitations preventing this from happening.
- Reporters specializing in military affairs are not part of most major news organizations’ staffs.
- Members of the military and the media generally are not knowledgeable about the role and importance each other in American society.

- The revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations will have little impact on military-media relations in future military operations.
- There is disagreement between the military and the media as to whether the military is responsible for the safety of journalists in the field during military operations.
- Within logistics and security limitations, maximum media access to military operations should be the rule.
- The “Vietnam legacy,” resulting in the notion among military people that negative media coverage “lost” the war in Vietnam, is unjustifiably damaging military-media relations.
- The military and the media want to improve working relations.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Overview

The end of the Gulf War opened a new chapter in military-media relations. Since the Gulf War, there have been numerous military operations where the media's experience, in terms of access and cooperation from the military, has been more positive. The DoD media policy in the Gulf was dissected, evaluated, critiqued, and debated. Representatives of the military and the media worked together to formulate new principles for news media covering DoD operations. Most significantly, however, there is an awakening among members of the military and the media that relations can, and should, be improved through continued dialogue between military and media representatives. Education and training for military and media representatives, designed to develop mutual understanding of one another, should also be emphasized. Unfortunately, the military has been more receptive to adopting formal programs to support the latter while institutional characteristics prevent the media from doing the same. These factors will shape future military-media relations.

Discussion and Conclusions

The Gulf War Policy

The study's first research question is: Was the Gulf War media policy effective in allowing the media to fully cover the events leading to and during the war, or did it hinder the newsgathering process? What objectives were implicit in the DoD policy? How well were they met?

To answer these questions, several points are addressed. A brief review of some public relations objectives and approaches and the implicit DoD policy objectives are

included. The rationale for the Gulf War media policy and how well the military's objectives were met are briefly discussed. A discussion of how well the media's needs were met follows.

First, public relations strategies are designed to engineer consent for a program of organizations who ultimately depend upon public approval to operate, according to American public relations pioneer Bernays.¹ Communicating a unified theme to different audiences through various media can unify public opinion.² In addition, open and honest press relations results in more positive coverage, while not being open to the media fosters hostility and suspicion.³ Therefore, effective media relations programs are vital to fostering public support for an organization and its activities. The military has long recognized the need for public support, particularly during wartime. After the Vietnam War, the decline in public support for the war during its latter stages was considered a major factor in the conflict's outcome.

As in the case of the Gulf War, the military tends to adopt what Blohowiak calls the "Mother Hen" approach to public relations. The method attempts to retain the organization's control of its public image by presenting a consistent message to the public through the media. In addition, public relations practitioners are "very protective of the corporate image and the company's personnel."⁴ The desire to protect the organization's image can be manifested in practices such as public relations people monitoring media interviews with members of their organization or attempting to restrict access to events which may not promote a positive image of their organization.

Next, several of the objectives implicit in the DoD media policy incorporated the public relations strategies and objectives discussed above. Among them is the desire to

¹ Bernays, Public Relations 159.

² Sauerhaft and Atkins 26-27.

³ Evans xi.

⁴ Blohowiak 78-79.

foster public consent for the war effort since the military can only operate with public approval. There are also political interests in portraying the war effort as justified and, if at all possible, humane. Graphic images of death and destruction, for example, do not promote the war's popularity with the public or help recruit new members for the Armed Forces. The military's credibility as a fighting force must be maintained in order to garner support for funding new weapons systems, and the capability of existing weapons systems must be demonstrated to convince taxpayers their money has been well spent by the Defense Department. Finally, there are real security risks—which can result in the loss of American lives—to giving the media unlimited access. Therefore, the military will want to restrict the media's movements in the theater of operations. The military can also use information warfare to aid the war effort. Deceiving the enemy through disinformation or distorted information and propaganda efforts are some forms of information warfare. The media policy and the subsequent media coverage of the Gulf War supported these objectives, either directly or indirectly.

According to Sconyers, the director of Air Force public affairs, the rationale for the Gulf policy was based on communication and security needs. Military planners believed that the media could jeopardize operations if given free access, and communication was too instantaneous to prevent compromises in security.¹ Planners thought these concerns warranted restrictions on the media's activities. Therefore, a pool system was instituted to facilitate controlled media access to the front lines.

The CDI's Carroll, Smith, and Baker surmise that pools are designed for two purposes. One is to minimize the chances that media representatives will get hurt or killed by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The second reason is to ensure, as best as possible, the media are not in the "right place at the wrong time" to witness

¹ Sconyers, telephone interview, 16 Nov. 1994.

something the military does not want seen.¹ The latter implies pools can be used as a means to control the media's movements based on political rather than security reasons. Whether this was the case during the Gulf War is debatable, but many media representatives argue it was.

The military often uses the media to communicate its message to the American public as was done during the Gulf War. According to Davis, the military is "working with the news media to inform the American public. [The public is] our customer. The [media] can provide us something we [do not have]; they can provide us direct access to the public."² According to Trainor, while there was a spin put on information released by the military, the government's attempt, by policy and action, was to give an open and accurate account of the war to the American public.³

The Gulf War experience, according to Gallagher, has made military commanders more sensitive to the need for media coverage as a means to tell their service's story to the public. Not only can this create positive public opinion about the military, it could encourage additional funding for the service.⁴ The media can also be an asset to the war effort. As Shyles identified, the communications technology capability cultivated a desire and means for the military to use the media to its advantage by targeting messages directly to Saddam Hussein.⁵ A Freedom Forum study concluded that the military used the media "to promulgate its own policies as well as to spread disinformation to the Iraqis."⁶ Similar practices will, most likely, be used in future military operations. The military will continue to use the media as a force

¹ Eugene Carroll, Dan Smith, and Glenn Baker, "Interview Questions on Military-Media Relations," e-mail to the author, 27 Mar. 1996.

² Joe Davis, telephone interview, 25 Mar. 1996.

³ Trainor, telephone interview, 4 Apr. 1996.

⁴ Gallagher, telephone interview, 7 Nov. 1994.

⁵ Shyles, telephone interview, 1 Apr. 1996.

⁶ Dennis et al. xii.

multiplier or as a distraction element during future military operations, as was done in Mogadishu and Haiti, according to Brown.¹

Several interview subjects in the research phase of the study indicated that the military has a propensity for control, especially in a battlefield situation. This is understandable, considering military commanders are responsible for the successful execution of military operations and minimizing the loss of American lives. However, in the Gulf War the military's ability to control the situation extended to controlling the media and, indirectly, the war's coverage. According to Lewis, "The [military's] ability to control coverage was so total and so suffocating, it made the whole experience, in terms of a free press, a total disaster."² Powell added that the military "learned a very valuable lesson in terms of news management and will continue to try to do that."³

The military was generally satisfied with the results of its media relations programs in the Gulf: primarily positive media coverage, overwhelming public support, and increased credibility. Therefore, despite any failings of the media policy, it worked well for the military and met its implicit policy objectives. According to Arant, who has studied military-media relations, the military got exactly the kind of coverage it wanted in the Gulf.⁴

Clearly, the media do not think they had adequate access to fully cover the Gulf War. In their view, the pool system restricted access, and the military's security review process was sometimes abused. In some cases, public affairs escorts interfered with the reporting process by attempting to influence the outcome of interviews or denying interviews with troops.

¹ Jerry Brown, telephone interview, 25 Mar. 1996.

² Charles Lewis, telephone interview, 13 Mar. 1996.

³ Stewart Powell, telephone interview, 21 Mar. 1996.

⁴ Arant, telephone interview, 20 Mar. 1996.

It is apparent that part of the failure of the Gulf War media policy can be attributed to inexperienced military people fulfilling public affairs duties. The training and preparation for junior public affairs personnel to perform their duties were inadequate. This resulted in added tension, frustration, and mistrust between the military and the media. Pribyla, who worked at the Riyadh JIB in the Gulf, agreed that some public affairs personnel were not trained to escort media, were not informed about operational plans so they could effectively perform the security review function, or misunderstood their role and acted as obstructions to the media.¹ DeFrank agrees that too many public affairs people are concerned with strictly military objectives when dealing with the media and do not appreciate the demands of the news business. This results in friction and builds barriers between the military and the media.²

Despite problems in the policy's execution, the provisions of the policy were not intended to obstruct the newsgathering process. Military escort officers for the media were supposed to escort media personnel from one point to another in order to give them access to units in the field and prevent them from being stopped by security forces. The public affairs officers should not have attempted to influence the outcome of interviews or censor information.³ The problems with the policy's execution can and should be corrected through training for public affairs people.

On the other hand, the pool system was ineffective in giving the media access to the front lines and was used throughout the war as the primary means of news gathering. According to Morello of the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, "I have less of a problem with pools used as one of several tools for newsgathering. What caused a lot of the tension was that they were supposed to be the only access we had."⁴ Sharkey

¹ Virginia Pribyla, telephone interview, 6 Apr. 1996.

² Jay DeFrank, personal interview, 21 Mar. 1996.

³ Gallagher, telephone interview, 7 Nov. 1994.

⁴ Carol Morello, telephone interview, 28 Mar. 1996.

agrees. According to her, media pools can be useful. However, they have been overused or used not only as a way to secure operational security and troops safety, but also as a way to achieve defacto censorship to achieve political objectives.”¹

The military recognizes there were problems with the media policy during the Gulf War and has made efforts to overcome the stumbling blocks. While it would be impossible to formulate a policy for covering future operations which unconditionally guarantees First Amendment rights and protects the safety and security of military forces, it was clear after the Gulf War that compromise was needed. The military may have “won” the media war in the Gulf, but it could ultimately suffer a loss in credibility unless there are improvements in military-media relations.

The Revised Principles

The second research question is: How well do the current DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations meet the needs of both the military and the media? What are the needs of each in a democratic society?

As the research results indicated, there is not much faith among either party that the revised DoD principles will have much impact on military-media relations. The increased access journalists have had in military operations since the Gulf War is not the result of the revised principles, in Trainor’s opinion. Rather, it is “simply the formulation of something that has been developing in an evolutionary fashion.”²

However, what is significant is that, for the first time, the military and the media worked together to try to formulate a policy amenable to both institutions. The effort was not completely successful, however, due to the failure to agree on the tenth principle regarding security review.

One of the study’s findings is that attitudes, not principles or policies, influence military-media relations. There is a mutual lack of understanding of each other which

¹ Sharkey, telephone interview.

² Trainor, telephone interview.

can be attributed to a lack of familiarization. Again, it is imperative that both the military and the media take measures to educate their people about the other institution. In order to increase the effectiveness of public affairs programs, education about the media is needed at all grade levels within the military to increase the general awareness among military members about the media's role in American society. Media education programs should not be confined to commanders, senior officers, and public affairs specialists.

On the military side, commanders' attitudes are particularly relevant since they determine how receptive a unit will be to media coverage. Therefore, commanders' support is a prerequisite for successful media relations programs. If commanders do not trust the media, access will be limited and controlled. As *US News & World Report's* Galloway stated: "You get a set of rules that everybody thinks will work. They might work once and then they are not updated or practiced, and the next time they won't work at all. It matters who the commanders are and how sensitive they are to the need for press coverage."¹

According to Braestrup, "The top guys set the tone. If they are clued in to the importance [of media coverage], then that reverberates down the line. If they're not, the public affairs people are always caught in the middle."² Therefore, according to Gallagher, until public affairs people win over the commanders, policy changes will have little effect.³

Pribyla agrees that the impact of the actions and directions of the senior leadership of the individual services, DoD, and the Joint Chief of Staff is much greater than the impact of information principles. The services have had the same information principles for a long time, and their effectiveness waxes and wanes based on the

¹ Joe Galloway, telephone interview, 7 Dec. 1994.

² Braestrup, telephone interview, 25 Mar. 1996.

³ Gallagher, telephone interview, 1 Apr. 1996.

leadership. This was evident in the Gulf War. In his report to the Chief of Staff, retired Navy Captain R.E. Wildermuth, who was the USCENTCOM Public Affairs Officer during the Gulf War, wrote, "the successful execution of the public affairs mission is directly related to the level of support and interest shown by the unit commanders down the chain of command. Where command interest was evident, all phases of the public affairs program worked very well."¹ As such, policies will have little to no impact if commanders do not support their intent and set the precedence for them to be followed.

In addition, public affairs is not a high-status position in the military. This hurts public affairs officers' credibility and effectiveness. Too often in the military, the role of public affairs is not considered equally important as other functions, and few resources are dedicated to the field. As a result, public affairs officers can become more concerned with trying to ingratiate themselves with their commander because they know commanders often distrust public affairs people, according to DeFrank.²

To compound the problem, many junior public affairs officers have never worked directly for senior public affairs officers, so there is little mentoring in the field. When a public affairs officer is placed in charge of the public affairs division at the base level, he or she works directly for the commander. Interaction with senior public affairs officers at the headquarters level is limited. As a result, most public affairs officers learn their job "the hard way" without the benefit of being groomed for future positions of increased responsibility.

The media also have institutional characteristics which make policy changes fairly insignificant. In a telephone interview Summers said:

The media are not a cohesive, unified institution. The media consist of individual, highly-competitive organizations who do not function as a single entity. Therefore, it is difficult, if not virtually impossible, to hold the media to a set of rules or principles. The degree to which any set of rules will be followed by media representatives depends on the media organization, the individual reporter or editors involved, and the given situation. While the military plans for future engagements

¹ R.E. Wildermuth, memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 13 Mar. 1991.

² DeFrank.

extensively and the services work together to ensure national security objectives are met, there is no such organization among the media.¹

In addition, another characteristic of the media that separates them from the military is they are business entities with business interests. In a telephone interview with the author, Kellner explained how this influenced Gulf War coverage. According to him, ratings had a massive influence on war coverage. For example, CBS started out critical of the war effort, whereas CNN was supportive. When CBS ratings started going down, "Dan Rather became the military's biggest booster." Once CBS recognized the Gulf War was a popular war, it did not want to lose the audience, so CBS became more pro-war, pro-military, and less critical. In addition, since CNN is a global media institution with worldwide business interests, it must reflect a broader world opinion, including Middle Eastern opinion. NBC is owned by General Electric, the biggest manufacturer of weapons that were used in the Gulf, so it carried promotions for these weapons systems and was very pro-military during the war.²

Other business interests and limited resources have resulted in specialty beats, including military beats, being scaled back at most news organizations. This means the number of reporters with military expertise is rapidly declining. It appears that military affairs reporting is not a high priority for many news organizations, and general assignments reporters will, most likely, be sent to cover military stories. Therefore, it may be unrealistic for the military to expect reporters to participate in military training exercises or visit military units in order to become more familiar with their mission. The bottom line is the news value of such events will determine whether the media report them.

One editor argues the lack of military "experts" at news organizations will not hurt the media's ability to competently report about the military. According to Lewis:

¹ Summers, telephone interview, 26 Mar. 1996.

² Kellner, telephone interview, 1 Apr. 1996.

There's no way we're going to have a cadre of trained military writers, reporters, correspondents, and camera people that is going to be big enough to handle something like Desert Storm. And the fact is, that should not be a big heartache or headache for the military, and they should get used to the idea that reporters self-educate and somebody who is a greenback on Monday is going to know a heck of a lot more, if she does her job, by Friday.¹

Sharkey disagrees, and, according to her, this can result in less media access to military operations. The media have the responsibility and must:

... ensure that the field commander who is responsible for the lives of the troops and carrying out a military operation in the interest of the United States knows the [reporter] with her or him knows [enough not to breach security]. I do not think the media have lived up to that responsibility in any consistent way.²

Kellner argues that, in the interests of democracy, the media need to negotiate better rules for better access, and they should resist censorship more strenuously. After that, the media are responsible for critically and accurately reporting about the war.³ The Freedom Forum concluded in a 1991 study that the press' consent to follow the rules and guidelines imposed by the military—albeit reluctantly given—may have hurt their ability to challenge restrictions in future military operations.⁴

In a democratic society, media access to witness the activities of institutions of public trust is imperative. There was much agreement on this point among the interview subjects for the research. The military is a “massive national asset” and serves the American people which demands outside scrutiny.⁵ The media are the public's surrogate and act on its behalf. Therefore, in the interest of supporting a democratic social order, the military must make itself accessible for media coverage and public approval.⁶

¹ Lewis, telephone interview, 13 Mar. 1996.

² Sharkey, telephone interview.

³ Kellner, telephone interview.

⁴ Dennis et al. xi.

⁵ Pribyla; Arant; Shyles.

⁶ Small telephone interview, 25 Mar. 1996; Pribyla; Shyles; Arant.; Kellner, telephone interview.

On the other hand, the media's presence on the battlefield, along with the capabilities of modern communications technology, create genuine security concerns for military commanders. As Summers stated: "What we're doing is trying to square two absolutes: the freedom of speech and the people's right to know on one hand and the legitimate demands of military security on the other. How do you balance those two goods? It's difficult. There's a built-in conflict between it, there's no doubt about it."¹

A Policy Compromise

The third research question for the study is: What should the DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations include?

As identified in the previous section, principles and policies, by themselves, have limited impact on military-media working relations during contingency operations. On the other hand, if the military establishes reasonable policies, the media will be less likely to oppose them, and tension between the military and the media will be reduced. Therefore, policies which reflect the institutional needs of the media foster goodwill in military-media relations.

According to Trainor, "the journalist covering a war is interested in two things, access to the action and access to communications in order to get his story back to his organization in a timely fashion." While the media were previously dependent upon the military for the means to transmit reports, technology has eliminated that dependence. However, they still depend upon the military for access.²

Access comes at a price. The military will never be comfortable allowing the media open access to operations unless commanders know reporters have agreed to abide by a set of ground rules prohibiting publication of certain types of information about military operations. Therefore, establishing mutually-agreed upon ground rules is agreeable to a majority of media representatives. If the rules are adhered to by both

¹ Summers, telephone interview.

² Trainor, telephone interview.

parties, media access is facilitated, and the chance that security will be compromised is limited.

“When you’re in a war zone, there’s got to be certain sensitive information a reporter is going to get by being with a military unit. It seems like there should be some [ground rules], but they should be practical and a line drawn, said Carollo of the *Dayton Daily News*.

According to Sharkey, no reporter objects to restrictions on releasing information based on bona fide security reasons. Certain information may be withheld until it is no longer sensitive. “It’s the defacto censorship, where the reporters aren’t even allowed physical access to these activities under any circumstances, that worries me more than anything else,” Sharkey added.¹

As previously discussed, the military’s desire to ensure sensitive information about operations was not published too soon prompted the security review process that was used in the Gulf. Whether the military has the right to conduct security reviews during military operations remains a point of disagreement between the military and the media. However, most military people favor security at the source over a formal security review process. Formulating reasonable and understandable ground rules makes security at the source a more acceptable option. If reporters and escort officers are well-informed about what types of information about operations is sensitive and should not be published, the formal review process will have to be used only as a last resort.

Media access presents another dilemma for the military—ensuring the safety of journalists covering the war. As the *Wall Street Journal*’s Fialka addressed in his book, *Hotel Warriors*, and during a telephone interview, there are two reasons the military does not want the media in the field during contingency operations; the military is absorbed in the fighting, and they do not want to get reporters killed.² Trainor describes the military’s feeling of responsibility for the safety of journalists as its cultural

¹ Sharkey, telephone interview.

tendency to play "Mother Hen" to those put in its care. However, in exchange for unrestricted access, the journalists assume the risk for their personal safety.¹

Morello of the *Philadelphia Inquirer* agrees: "I don't think we are [the military's] responsibility. [The military] should open it up to us if we are willing to assume the dangers of going out. . . . Our lives are not [its] responsibility. We know when we go out in the field that we may get hurt or killed like the soldiers."²

On the other hand, Air Force officers Gallagher and Pribyla think the military does have an obligation to protect the media representatives who are in their care.³ Pribyla is also of the opinion that taking care of media representatives in the field is not as burdensome as some military commanders have indicated. The argument that the media get in the way or otherwise disrupt military operations is, in her opinion, used as an excuse to deny the media access.⁴ However, in order to protect journalists, who feel responsible for their own safety, military commanders will want some type of accountability from journalists traveling with their units.

These points are rapidly becoming moot, however. In the future, there will be more minor interventions like Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia where it is more feasible to allow the media total access.⁵ There has been a major change in U.S. military operations, and the security requirements for these operations are different. During wartime operations, information security is vital. However, in contemporary (Operations-Other-Than-War) operations security requirements are not as stringent.⁶

² Fialka, telephone interview, 8 Mar. 1996.

¹ Trainor, telephone interview.

² Morello, telephone interview.

³ Gallagher, telephone interview, 1 Apr. 1996; Pribyla.

⁴ Pribyla.

⁵ Kellner, telephone interview.

⁶ Gallagher telephone interview, 1 Apr. 1996.

Therefore, the nature of modern contingency operations, along with the lessons of the Gulf War experience, facilitate more open media access.

The Future of Military Media Relations

The final research question for the study is: What is the outlook for the military-media relationship?

There will always be some tension between the military and the media, which is not entirely bad, based on their respective roles in a democratic society. "Each has an entirely different mission. The degree of distrust between the military and journalists, which was indeed very high during the Gulf War, is probably no greater than the distrust between journalists and the White House or journalists and Congress. It's just a naturally adversarial role," Lamb said.¹ If the media do not maintain a distance from the military, objective reporting is compromised. The military, on the other hand, distrust the nature of the media—probing, inquiring, and operating under no tangible set of rules, as opposed to the more rigid, disciplined structure of the military.

However, to overcome some of the adversity and build good working relations, education of members of the military and the media about each other is essential. Few media representatives have military service as part of their background, so they do not appreciate how the military operates.² Trainor's opinion is that "there are too few in the media who understand the military or know anything about it."³

The Gulf War experience, according to some journalists, helped the military and the media foster better understanding of each other. According to Lamb, many reporters in the Gulf War who had never covered the military before were impressed by the quality of the troops.⁴ Reporters came into contact with a different generation of

¹ David Lamb, telephone interview, 8 Mar. 1996.

² Fialka, telephone interview.

³ Trainor, telephone interview.

⁴ Lamb.

military people, according to Ruby.¹ Dvorchak, of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, who reported the war for Associated Press, said he established friendships with members of the unit he covered, and getting to know each other eased a lot of existing tension that is normally present between military and media representatives.²

The Gulf War may have ameliorated some of the lingering animosity between the military and the media that resulted from the Vietnam War experience. According to Trainor, the military has "gone through great extents to learn about the media and how to deal with them."³ Galloway observed that the military gained sensitivity and awareness of the media's role during the Gulf War.⁴

Several media representatives identified the on-going Bosnia operation as an example of good military-media working relations. In Bosnia, reporters are able to join units, travel with them, and report on them.⁵ In Haiti, commanders were a lot more willing to permit on-scene coverage, and now understand they cannot operate without media being present.⁶

However, the military still has a lot of work to do to educate its people about the media. The Air Force is heading in the right direction on this measure. There has been a recognition among the military public affairs community that more education and training for public affairs people is needed.⁷

Still, both sides share a responsibility for ensuring coverage of military operations is not hindered by incompetence or institutional agendas. In a telephone interview, Galloway said he had heard complaints about reporters showing up in

¹ Robert Ruby, telephone interview, 13 Mar. 1996.

² Bob Dvorchak, telephone interview, 29 Mar. 1996.

³ Trainor, telephone interview.

⁴ Galloway, telephone interview, 18 Mar. 1996.

⁵ Ruby; Lewis, telephone interview, 13 Mar. 1996.

⁶ Galloway, telephone interview, 7 Dec. 1994.

⁷ DeFrank.

baseball caps and three Samsonites to cover the Haiti operation when they were told in advance what to bring.¹ According to Sharkey, while the military tried hard to ensure access when it thought the invasion of Haiti would occur, the media sent totally ignorant reporters to cover the operation, once again.²

Therefore, Browne may be justified in reserving some pessimism about the future of military-media relations: "Every war is considered by all concerned to be the last, and all the lessons, whatever they may have been, are promptly forgotten, and I would say that is particularly true of military-press relations."³

Summary of Conclusions

Based on the findings of the study, the researcher concludes the following:

- In order to increase the effectiveness of public affairs programs, education about the media is needed at all grade levels within the military to increase awareness among all military members, not just public affairs people, of the importance of a free press in American society.
- The support by military commanders is a prerequisite for successful media relations programs.
- The existing training and preparation for junior public affairs personnel to perform their duties in contingency operations are inadequate.
- While the media also have a responsibility to learn more about the military before covering contingency operations, it is unrealistic to expect reporters to regularly participate in military training exercises or visit military units in order to become more familiar with their mission. The news value of such events will determine whether the media participate.

¹ Galloway, telephone interview, 7 Dec. 1994.

² Sharkey, telephone interview.

³ Browne, telephone interview, 19 Mar. 1996.

- Military affairs reporting is not a high priority for most news organizations, except in times of war or other major military operations. Therefore, general assignment reporters may be sent to cover military stories.

- The military and the media should continue to work together to solve problems of mutual interest.

Recommendations

It is evident to the author that the military and the media need to be better educated about one another. In this case, ignorance fuels animosity. While some distance is necessary in order for the media to fairly report about the military, mutual respect would foster a more positive and professional working relationship.

Embedded in the military culture is a distrust of the media. The only way to change that perception is through an education process that fosters an understanding about the role and importance of media in a democratic society. Patriotism is a value most military people cherish. However, they tend to believe that patriotism can only be expressed in certain ways. For example, serving one's country in the military is patriotic. Fighting for one's country is patriotic. Reporting about the deficiencies in the supply system at the war front is unpatriotic, as is any criticism of the war effort, regardless of its impact on the well-being of the troops. Military people need to recognize that the media's role of bringing taxpayers' attention to the wrongdoings of their government or deficiencies in the system is an important service to their country. The media also preserve democracy by empowering citizens to make informed decisions and by not allowing abuses of the system to go unchecked. There is no "monolithic patriotism." The military and the media both serve their country in honorable and important ways. This is a simple point. However, it is one that is much too often not recognized among the military.

In *The Odd Couple*, Colonel Joseph W. Purka, director of public affairs at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, tells how negative attitudes

towards the media develop among cadets at the academy. The local newspaper, the *Gazette Telegraph*, in their opinion, tends to run a lot of negative stories about the academy—to the point of being biased and inaccurate in some cases. While Purka points out this is not totally true, the newspaper does run positive stories as well, but the negative stories more often make the front page. When the cadets invited the reporter who generally writes negative reports about the academy to come and talk to their class, the reporter declined. According to Purka, “Situations like this are where cadets develop a distrust of the news media. This, and a perceived attitude of the news media that ‘I don’t have to defend what I’m doing.’” This contributes to hostility, which stems from a lack of understanding of each other, concludes Purka.¹

Therefore, in order to change ingrained perceptions, media awareness training at all levels of military instruction is needed. It is imperative that such instruction begins with individuals’ indoctrination into the military. At the commissioning level, for example, interaction between journalism students and military students on campuses where Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) units are located, should be included in the curricula of both programs. Service academies should also include media topics in military education classes. Media training, emphasizing the role of the media in democratic societies, should also be included in basic training instruction. Media representatives should be invited to participate in appropriate portions of the training programs.

The Air Force is in the process of adopting a plan that has a “four-tier approach to education for officers and equivalent-grade civilians on the one hand and enlisted people on the other.” Topics to be taught at each level are identified and taught progressively, so topics in the first phases are included in later phases of instruction. As students progress through the training phases their “awareness of media-military

¹ Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America’s Team; The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military. (Memphis: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995) 153.

matters grows deeper.”¹ The purpose of increasing media-military education is “to prepare officers and civilians to participate in interaction with the media.” The group who studied the issue recommend that “education on the military’s relationship with the media be mandatory at all levels and not an elective in which only a relatively few students participate.” The Air Force study recommends addressing issues such as the media’s role in American society, the First Amendment, the American tradition of a free press, the DoD Principles of Information, and military members’ responsibility to the media at the basic levels of officer and enlisted training.²

There have been significant steps taken to better prepare public affairs personnel to conduct media relations programs, and programs along these lines must be developed and continued. The 1996 Air Force Strategic Plan for Public Affairs identifies professional development, which includes additional training for public affairs people, as a critical issue. Improving awareness in the Air Force about public affairs roles and capabilities is a component of another critical issue, customer awareness.³ Aspects of public affairs training include establishing a Public Affairs Center for Professional Development at Air University and benchmark with academia, business, and government organizations.⁴ To improve general awareness about public affairs within the service, the role of public affairs will be included in military training at all levels, commander and senior executive orientation briefings and officer entry level courses.⁵

¹ United States, Department of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Media-Military Education in the U.S. Air Force, Mar. 1996, 3.

² Media-Military Education in the U.S. Air Force 4, 8.

³ United States, Department of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, 1996 Air Force Strategic Plan 9.

⁴ Air Force Strategic Plan 14

⁵ Air Force Strategic Plan 16.

In addition to the programs described above, the public affairs community must examine existing Air Force programs, which are often overlooked, and better use them to accomplish its training goals. Programs such as the Air Force Institute of Technology's civilian institution masters' program or Education With Industry provide officers a rewarding experience that also benefits the career field. By working with non-Air Force institutions, public affairs officers participating in these programs can critically examine their profession from an outsider's perspective. This analysis results in a better understanding of how the public affairs policies and activities impact external audiences. Therefore, planners should look outward when seeking better ways to accomplish the mission.

In sum, this study supports some of the findings and recommendations of previous studies such as: the Sidle Panel; the 1985 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media; Sharkey's study and recommendations in, *Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf*; the recommendations of The Freedom Forum in *The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict*; and the most recent study by Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team; The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military*.

In 1984 the Sidle Panel recommended that: public affairs planning be included in contingency planning; the leadership of the military and the media meet regularly to improve understanding between them and discuss mutual problems; public affairs instruction at service schools be increased and include media representatives; and visits by commanders and line officers to news organizations be arranged.¹

The recommendations of The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media (Braestrup and Summers were part of the task force) concluded that "to ensure the maximum flow of information to the public and the

¹ Sidle 4-6.

government . . . the secretary of defense should reemphasize the importance of DoD public affairs officers, both civilian and military.”¹ In addition, public affairs officers should be treated as “insiders” and included in contingency planning.² To educate both journalists and military members about the respective roles of each institution, the task force recommended that directors of mid-career training programs for journalists and heads of schools of journalism hold seminars and other functions with military people.³ In addition, the military should increase awareness and understanding among its people about “the First Amendment, the role of a free press in American society, journalistic processes, and the limitations and strengths of American journalism generally.”⁴

Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf included several recommendations for improving military-media relations. They are: military and media representatives should set up joint top-level working groups to discuss information policies; the military should continue training public affairs officers; journalism schools should offer military-affairs reporting classes; the media should establish more military beats; and the military should provide training for inexperienced reporters.⁵ The Freedom Forum, in their study, *The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict*, recommends that students at the elementary and high school level learn about First Amendment freedoms.⁶

Among the recommendations made by Aukofer and Lawrence are: the military services should continue to enhance the effectiveness, prestige and career attractiveness

¹ Braestrup, *Battles Lines* 7.

² Braestrup, *Battles Lines* 7

³ Braestrup, *Battles Lines* 10.

⁴ Braestrup, *Battles Lines* 10.

⁵ Sharkey, *Under Fire* 169-171.

⁶ Dennis et al. 97.

of public affairs officers; the Armed Forces should continue to expand news media training as part of military exercises and invite the media to participate; and where journalism schools and ROTC units are at the same campus, they should interact to increase knowledge and understanding of each other.¹

As far as DoD media policies are concerned, it is evident from the previous discussion that revisions were needed from those established in the Gulf War. Many of these revisions are included in the revised principles which were released in May 1992. For instance, the use of media pools will be limited, and open and independent reporting will be the principle means of newsgathering. It is also in the best interest of the military and the media to replace formal security reviews with security at the source. The military and the media should also continue to work together before and during military operations to formulate reasonable ground rules which are acceptable to both.

Summary of Recommendations

Training

- Media training should be instituted at all levels of professional training for all military personnel.
- Media training should include instruction on the tradition, role, and importance of the media in American society to develop an appreciation among military members about the significance of a free press in a democratic society.
- Conferences and discussion panels between ROTC cadets and journalism students should be instituted at universities where there are ROTC detachments or near other universities with ROTC detachments.
- Media representatives should be included in media education for military people. They should be invited to join seminars or be guest speakers at public affairs conferences and workshops, all levels of professional military training, and basic training, Officers Training School, ROTC, and service academy classes.

¹ Aukofer and Lawrence 7.

- Commanders should be encouraged to discuss media relations activities and policies at staff meetings, in editorials in base newspapers, and with professional development organizations such as the Company Grade Officers' Council.

- A mentoring program should be developed in the public affairs community so junior public affairs personnel can benefit from the experiences of more senior personnel.

- Additional formal training programs, in which media representatives participate, must be established for public affairs people. These programs should be available to all people in the career field.

- Existing programs, such as AFIT and EWI, should be examined for ways to better use them not only for the professional development of public affairs officers but also as a means to achieve public affairs training objectives.

- Members of the military and the media should continue to work together and keep communication open by participating in military-media conferences, working groups, and exchange programs.

- The military should continue to invite reporters to participate in military training exercises in order for the media to familiarize themselves with the military. However, the military needs to abandon the notion that most media representatives will be able to take advantage of such opportunities due to media organizations' limited personnel and budgets.

Policy

- Security at the source should replace formal security reviews of media reports.

- Pools should only be used under limited conditions such as during the initial phase of a military operation or when access is otherwise not possible for the media.

- Military and media representatives should work together to formulate and agree upon ground rules for military operations. Once established, the ground rules should be adhered to by both parties.

- A panel of military and media representatives should meet regularly to discuss issues of mutual interest. The panel should not include the same participants at every meeting in order to include as many perspectives as possible.

Recommendations for Further Research

The general topic of military-media relations offers a vast array of topics for further examination. The issues surrounding military-media relations have serious implications for the ability of the Armed Forces to conduct operations, the ability of policy-makers to use the military to achieve policy objectives, the ability to the media to fully inform the American people about the activities of the U.S. government and the military, and the ability of Americans to make informed political decisions.

First, the need for real-time broadcasts is a topic which warrants further exploration. Does the viewing public really need live reports from the battlefield, considering the risk it introduces for military security? Does real-time coverage give taxpayers a valuable perspective of the overall operation, or does it simply contribute to sensational reporting? What are the implications for military operational concerns and media policies?

Further, the rapid advances in communication technology almost negate the military's ability to control the information flow from the battlefield. This has implications for the feasibility of the military imposing any security review provision. Only, and only if, the media are willing to adhere to the military's request for a security review of media reports, will such a provision be accomplished. With instant communication capability, if the media can gain access to the battlefield, they can freely report about it. Will this concern motivate the military to restrict access or will it prompt a recognition that education and trust are the only means to ensure operational security?

How can the Defense Department's policy adequately incorporate the concerns generated by technological advances in the media's communication capability?

Next, a topic currently being discussed in the Defense Department is Information Warfare, which includes using information to change the enemy's perception of the United States' capabilities or their own capabilities. For example, repeatedly broadcasting footage of direct hits on enemy targets by U.S. weapons systems may be used to make it seem that more damage is being inflicted on the enemy than actually is. Disinformation can be used to deceive the enemy. This poses grave ethical questions for military public affairs personnel as well as the media. Public affairs personnel cannot knowingly participate in deliberate deception of the media and the American public. If the media know information warfare is an endorsed tactic, how can they trust the information given to them by public affairs personnel. A public affairs officer cannot be effective in his or her job unless the media think he or she is credible. By the same token, the media cannot be expected to participate in disinformation tactics. The media cannot deceive the enemy without deceiving the American public, which undermines the function of media in a democracy. This issue would make a fascinating and relevant research project.

Another relevant topic to examine is military-media relations after the Gulf War. What has changed? Are relations better? Is there more open access? Has there been an earnest effort by both the military and the media to improve working relations? The Bosnia operation, which is a more protracted operation than other post-Gulf War military operations, would be an excellent case study for examining military-media relations.

Finally, the demise of military reporting as a specialty has an impact on how the military is covered. Offley estimates that military reporters have decreased by more than fifty percent in the last 10 to 15 years.¹ What are the implications for military coverage?

¹ Ed Offley, telephone interview, 19 Mar. 1996.

Will the structure of military reporting change? Braestrup implies it already has, that human interest and social issue stories about the military have replaced institutional stories because of changing demographics within the field of journalism which results in a lack of familiarity, or interest, in the military.¹ This would be an interesting subject that invites a quantitative analysis of coverage of the military.

¹ Braestrup, telephone interview.

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APPENDIX A

Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules: January 14, 1991

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g. artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," multibattalion, "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.

(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.

(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or Coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC.

APPENDIX B

Guidelines for News Media: January 14, 1991

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations -- Light discipline restriction will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. This problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical center will be in strict compliance with the instruction of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not member of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs excerpt officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issues will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC.

APPENDIX C

Statement of DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations: May 21, 1992

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principle means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity -- within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.
7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever possible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military supply public affairs officers with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing Department of Defense National Media Pool system.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC.

APPENDIX D

Principles of Information

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out this policy, the following principles of information will apply:

1. Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

2. A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

3. Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

4. Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

5. The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs.

Source: DoD Directive 5122.5, December 2, 1993, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC.

APPENDIX E

Interview Agenda for Media Representatives

1. Name/Title.
2. Organization/Location.
3. What is your background, particularly in covering defense-related issues and military operations?
4. Does your news organization have established policies or procedures governing the assignment process for covering major news events, such as wars?
5. From what location did you cover the Gulf War?
6. Were you or reporters from your organization part of a news pool in the Gulf?

 If not, why not?

 If so, what were your/their experiences with the pool?
7. In your opinion, how useful were the pool reports to news organizations?
8. Did you or reporters from your organization attend any of the military press briefings in Riyadh or Washington, DC?

 If so, what was your overall impression of the briefings?
9. Did the Ground Rules for News Media help you assess the sensitivity of information about military operations? Do you feel the ground rules, specifying the types of information about military operations which should not be published, are necessary during military operations? Why or why not?
10. Were reporters able to gain access to the events you/they wanted to cover? If not, why not?
11. What is your general assessment of the Gulf War media coverage?
12. What impact do you think the Gulf War has had on present military-media relations?
13. In your opinion, will or have the revised DoD principles for news media coverage of DoD operations, which were released in May 1992, significantly impact the military's conduct of media relations during military operations?
14. What responsibility, if any, do you think the news media have to prepare to cover future military operations?
15. In your opinion, what obligation, if any, does the military have to media covering military operations?
16. Do you have any other comments about military-media relations?

APPENDIX F

Interview Agenda for Military Representatives

1. Name/Duty Title.
2. Organization/Location.
3. What is your military background (years of military service/years of public affairs experience)?
4. What was your duty assignment during the Gulf War (title/location)?
5. Were there any aspects of the DoD media ground rules or guidelines that worked particularly well or poorly during the Gulf War?
6. Are military security reviews of media reports necessary during contingency operations? Why or why not?
7. What is your general assessment of media coverage of the Gulf War?
8. What impact do you think the Gulf War has had on military-media relations?
9. In your opinion, would it be feasible to reinstate a Vietnam War-type of media policy, allowing the media free access without having to submit reports for security review under the condition they abide by a set of voluntary ground rules, during modern contingency operations?
10. In your opinion, have the revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations, released in May 1992, made any significant changes in military public affairs media operations during contingency operations?
11. In your opinion, what responsibility, if any do the media have to prepare themselves for covering future military operations?
12. What obligation, if any, does the military have to media covering military operations?
13. Would you like to add any other comments about military-media relations?

APPENDIX G

Interview Agenda for Communication Scholars

1. Name/Title.
2. Organization/Location.
3. What is your general assessment of media coverage of the Gulf War?
4. What is your opinion about the use of media pools to cover front line action during military operations?
5. Do you think military security reviews of media reports needed during contingency operations? Why or why not?
6. In addition to the restrictions imposed on the news media by the military during the Gulf War, what other factors do you think influenced media coverage of the war?
7. What factors do you think influenced the military's Gulf War media policy?
8. What effect do you think the Gulf War experience has had on current military-media relations?
9. Do you think media representatives would voluntarily follow specific restrictions on reporting sensitive information about military operations without submitting reports to a security review?
10. Are you familiar with the revised DoD principles for news media covering DoD operations which were released in May 1992? If so, do you think they have made any significant changes in military public affairs media operations during contingency operations?
11. In your opinion, what responsibility, if any, do the media have to prepare themselves for covering future military operations?
12. In your opinion, what obligation, if any, does the military have to media covering military operations?
13. Would you like to make any other comments about military-media relations or the case of the Gulf War?

APPENDIX H

Interview Subjects

Media Representatives

Malcom W. Browne, science writer, *New York Times*
Frank Bruni, *New York Times*
Russell Carollo, special projects reporter, *Dayton Daily News*
Bob Dvorchak, state editor, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*
John Fialka, *Wall Street Journal*, Washington Bureau
Joe Galloway, senior writer, *US News & World Report*
David Lamb, *Los Angeles Times*, Washington Bureau
Charles Lewis, Washington Bureau Chief, Hearst Newspapers
Carol Morello, West Coast correspondent, *Philadelphia Inquirer*
Ed Offley, military reporter, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*
Richard O'Mara, feature writer, *The Baltimore Sun*
Stewart Powell, White House correspondent, Hearst Newspapers
Robert Ruby, deputy foreign editor, *The Baltimore Sun*
Pat Sloyan, *Newsday*

Military Representatives

Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Brown, chief of public affairs, 3rd Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska
Major Joe Davis, deputy chief of media, Headquarters, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
Major (Lieutenant Colonel-Select) Jay DeFrank, USAF, PhD candidate, University of Colorado at Boulder
Colonel Michael Gallagher, USAF, special assistant to the Chairman for public affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon
Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel-Select) Virginia Pribyla, USAF, chief, media relations division, Air Force public affairs, the Pentagon
Chief Master Sgt. (Ret.) David Smith, USAF, chief of community relations, McChord Air Force Base, Washington.
Brigadier General Ronald Sconyers, USAF, Director of Air Force Public Affairs, the Pentagon
Colonel Harry Summers, USA (Ret.), syndicated columnist, *Los Angeles Times*, and editor, *Vietnam Magazine*
Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.), Director of the National Security Program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Scholars

M. David Arant, Assistant Professor of Journalism, Memphis State University
Glenn Baker, producer, America's Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information
Peter Braestrup, senior editor and Director of Communications, Library of Congress
Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret.), Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information
Garth Jowett, Professor of Communication, University of Houston
Douglas Kellner, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
Jacqueline Sharkey, Professor of Journalism, University of Arizona
Leonard Shyles, Associate Professor of communication, Villanova University
William J. Small, Felix Larkin Professor of Communications and director of the Center for Communications, Fordham University, New York
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Associate Director, Center for Defense Information

APPENDIX I

Excerpts of Interviews

M. David Arant, Assistant Professor of Journalism, Memphis State University:

The military are the people's servants, and they operate only with the permission of the American people. The American people get the final authority and need the information to understand and to support, as well as perhaps critique, the role of the military when they [must] kill people on our behalf. We need to know what they're doing and why they're doing it. . . . We must understand the basic operations that are going on and be able to reflect and debate that in our political arena.

Peter Braestrup, Senior Editor and Director of Communications, Library of Congress:

Today's journalists are . . . people who haven't served in the military. They are not interested in general military stories. Page one stories are social issue stories—stories about women or gays in the military. People go for these type of stories because they are more interesting to them. [As a result] there is superficial coverage. Many media don't understand [military] operations, what the plan is. There is not a bias against the military, but ignorance against the military. . . . The media are a cultural phenomena, they're not an institutional or professional phenomena. They are an expression of the culture. We do certain stories now that we wouldn't have done 20 years ago. We don't do certain kinds of stories that we did 20 years ago. The generational change that everybody talks about with baby boomers has affected journalism. . . . We've gotten into a kind of soap opera coverage of everything. . . . Within the logistical and security considerations, the military has an obligation to allow the maximum feasible access to the media to be there to bear witness to the efforts of America's sons and daughters in combat or noncombat.

Major Jerry Brown, USAF chief of public affairs, 3rd Wing, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska:

One of the public affairs officer's biggest problems out in the field is knowing every single thing that is classified or off limits. We don't always know that. It took almost a week of orientation [in the Gulf] to know when to turn the media away. One of the problems during the war was there were very few reporters who knew about the military. The learning curve was so great. That's why it's critical to have a public affairs specialist along. What you try to do is encourage them to get their facts right or help [them], not necessarily [review] stories.

Malcom W. Browne, science writer, *New York Times*:

Every war is considered by all concerned to be the last, and all the lessons, whatever they may, are promptly forgotten. I would say that is particularly true of military-press relations. . . . [The revised principles] will make no difference. In any case, whatever the next war, it will be business as usual. There will be various ground rules that will impede the coverage of news, and energetic correspondents will find ways to get around them.

Frank Bruni, *New York Times*:

The ground rules were pretty clear, and there weren't that many of them. They were pretty simple and pretty easy to abide by. I don't think anybody had a problem with the ground rules or abiding by them. The problem gets back to the whole "giddy/proud thing," the problem is that once the military, for all the right reasons and all the perfectly understandably reasons, have set up mechanisms by which they could control us, they invariably ended up going overboard.

Russell Carollo, special projects reporter, *Dayton Daily News*:

Some of the problems in a war zone are our own. A lot of media sent reporters who are not equipped to be out there. They aren't equipped mentally and physically, so we all have to suffer to a degree. . . . You lose a lot with pool reporting, and individual reporters suffer for the group. . . . When you're in a war zone, there's got to be certain information a reporter is going to get by being with a military unit that is going to be sensitive. It seems like there should be some [ground rules], but they should be practical and a line drawn. The reporter should be aware of [the ground rules] before he goes out into the field.

Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret.), Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information, Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Associate Director, Center for Defense Information, and Glenn Baker, producer, America's Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information:

In wartime, certain information—attack plans, attack times, extent of casualties, weapons counts, ammunition and other supply levels, and unit identifications tied to geographic locations—must be protected from early publication in the expectation that pre-attack secrecy will reduce casualties. In this regard, the military can follow one of two courses. It can require security reviews for all dispatches from the war theatre. Alternatively, it can lay down specific rules to which all reporters must adhere under the pain of losing their accreditation. The latter bespeaks of trust in the media to conduct self-censorship—to do what is obviously in their individual best interest as well as that of the fighting forces. The caveat, in terms of information not specifically delineated to be suppressed until after an attack or the start of a campaign, is for the reporters to check with the relevant public affairs officer before sending back their reports. The military, in turn, must abide by their own guidelines and not block the release of non-security related information.

Major Joe Davis, USAF, deputy chief of media, Headquarters, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois:

[Commanders] realized that good media relations can be a force provider because it informs people at home what their troops, loved ones, brothers, sisters, whatever, are doing over there. It also informs the American public [about] our military forces—what the defense budget is buying. . . . The Gulf War was extremely visible and covered extensively in the news media. The Gulf War educated our commanders about how the news media can benefit morale or just get information back home. We're working with the news media to inform the American public; they are our customer. The [media] provide us something we [don't have]; they can provide us direct access to the public. We can do that through base tours and open houses, but you won't get the bang you get through the news.

**Major (Lieutenant Colonel-Select) Jay DeFrank, USAF, PhD candidate,
University of Colorado at Boulder:**

The biggest problem [in the Gulf] was the lack of experience of many of the public affairs officers there in dealing with national media. I think that is a significant failing with public affairs people. Many of them have not had experience as journalists or working closely with journalists, so they have not developed a sense of what the requirements of the industry are: what is news, what isn't news and what the structural demands of the news business are. Too often, the concern is that "you're structural concerns are not my concerns. My concerns are strictly military objectives in dealing with the media." And that's not realistic. It provides friction, it sets up barriers, it wastes a lot of people's time, and, even more so, it harms the credibility of the public affairs community with the media. . . . If you help the [media] get news, your credibility is boosted, and if your credibility is boosted, the Air Force's credibility is boosted. . . . Too often public affairs people are just concerned about keeping the commander off their back, staying out of trouble with the commander, and trying to ingratiate themselves with the commander because they know that commanders often immediately distrust public affairs people. The unfortunate thing is having good credibility with the media helps public affairs people establish their credibility with the commander too.

Bob Dvorchak, state editor, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*:

If [the military and the media] worked together more, it would ease some of the fears and some of the friction. There was a lot of leftover baggage from Vietnam and military people continue to be suspicious of us. Until we work together more, it will continue to stay that way. . . . When it gets down to it, we both have the same end in mind. [Military people] serve their country, we serve our readers. It's a lot more middle ground than either side likes to admit. It's a shame that no one is trying to reach what [we] have in common rather than trying to be at arm's length so much.

John Fialka, *Wall Street Journal*, Washington Bureau:

In Riyadh the briefings were controlled, and the military had all the information. Unlike Vietnam, where reporters were in the field, a lot of reporters remained in Riyadh. Reporters who went out in the field saw more. For the first time, there was a separation between those who covered the briefings and those who went out in the field. . . . There will always be reporters who are suspicious of authority figures. Few media have military service as part of their background, and with the all volunteer force, there are professional soldiers now. Due to these factors the gap [between the military and the media] is widening.

Colonel Michael Gallagher, USAF, special assistant to the Chairman for public affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon:

I think we should try to limit the security review process to the bare minimum. I think that, if at all possible, we should educate the media so mistakes are not made and reviews are not required. If we have to continue a security review process during major operations, the public affairs community needs to be physically able to handle the problem. By that, I mean we have to have enough people available to perform the security review process. So few people were looking at the material [in the Gulf] that it slowed up the process. Finding enough people competent to do security reviews is also difficult. . . . Unless we (public affairs people) have won over the commanders and convince them, policy changes will have little effect.

Joe Galloway, senior writer, *US News & World Report*:

I think the largest changes (in military-media relations after the Gulf War) were specifically among the Army commanders, and the results of that can be seen in the Haiti operation. They are a lot more willing to permit on-scene coverage. They understand now you can't lock the press out and operate in a vacuum. . . . This is serious business; it's life and death. I think that any company, any newspaper, broadcast outlet, magazine, or whatever, who just picks somebody up off a beat and throws them into a war situation is looking for trouble—looking for worse than trouble. The reporter who knows nothing about the situation can get into a lot of trouble, can get hurt, get killed. If they have no understanding of military operations and what's sensitive and what's not, they can get other people killed. . . . The trouble with this business is we have a short focus, a short attention span. . . . The military is the largest institution in our country, in this democracy. The budget is huge, and the stakes are greater. So I think we owe it a little more attention than we pay it.

Garth Jowett, Professor of Communication, University of Houston:

. . . on the whole, the Gulf War must be seen in context of the failure of the Vietnam conflict and that it was a working up of the American psyche . . . So I think we are caught up here in a very interesting phenomenon of not only national pride, but, if you read the documentation and the evolution of the war, it's clear that Bush was going to go to war no matter what happened. The deliberate attempts made to insult Saddam Hussein and any meaningful dialogue that would have led to a more peaceful solution was, in some ways, almost deliberately distorted by the American government in order to force an armed conflict.

Douglas Kellner, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin:

That's the curious thing about the Gulf War. It appeared it would create a militarization of American society, or it would create a more interventionist, militarist foreign policy where the United States would try to be the number one geopolitical power . . . but it turned out Bush lost the election . . . so it hasn't had much impact. . . . It's a democratic society, so the military, like every institution, has an obligation to support a democratic social order, which means the citizens have to get information so they can make a rational judgment as to what is going on. [The military] ha[s] to put democratic interests in front of its own institutional interests. The military and the population have to understand that a democracy has complexity. Critical debate is necessary, and the public should participate . . .

David Lamb, *Los Angeles Times*, Washington Bureau:

Ground rules are always a hindrance, but they are something you have to have in war since lives are at stake. I don't think that any sensible journalist objects to reasonable ground rules. . . . You have to hope journalists are going to have enough common decency and sensitivity and use some common sense in reporting. . . . (Concerning military-media relations in the Gulf) I think you realize you're not there to be best friends. You are coming at the situation from opposite angles. The military is there to present a particular story and put a spin on the story, and journalists are there to look at the spin and then dissect it and see if there is anything

else that should be incorporated in the story. But the relationship worked, and it doesn't have to be buddy buddy. There was no more animosity (during the Gulf War) than at a briefing here at the Pentagon or a briefing at the White House. It was a workable relationship.

Charles Lewis, Washington Bureau Chief, Hearst Newspapers:

Each side has to keep an open mind and try to understand the other side. We have to understand there is a built-in tension in the two sides, and, as long as that built in tension exists, which it always will, there's going to be friction. There will always be problems, but what we need to do is keep the problems small and keep talking to each other, so, when the problems come up, we can resolve them in a somewhat intelligent way.

Carol Morello, West Coast correspondent, *Philadelphia Inquirer*:

Journalism 101 is never get in bed with the people you cover, and that's what we did, and I never want to be part of a pool system again. . . . There were still a large contingent in the military who kept repeating over and over like a mantra, "The media lost the war in Vietnam." . . . The history of American reporting in American conflicts shows the media erring on the other side of not being hard enough in judging its own troops. . . It's true with a pool, when you agree to censorship, there are certain things you see upclose that you wouldn't have a chance to see otherwise. I would have preferred if those of us out there would have been free to go and establish our own relationships with various units and then a trust could have developed. . . . My philosophy is that when Americans go off to war the basic principles they are supposed to be fighting for include the First Amendment and freedom of the press. . . . It is not our responsibility to go out and become military experts when most of us are writing for general circulation newspapers. . . . It is not our, quote, responsibility to give the military perspective. Our responsibility is to our readers, and our responsibility is to try to tell some version and get as close to the truth as we see it. I don't think we owe a responsibility to the military, and I don't think any responsible journalist will report things that people will die over.

Ed Offley, military reporter, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*:

All specialty beats in journalism are under pressure because of costs. Nobody has time to go beyond the lofty generalities of "we ought to cover the military better." As soon as they get past that, they realize it involves commitment and personnel staffing decisions that go against the grain and cost a lot of money. . . . My theory is that we have a lot of work to do together. The key thing that needs to be done is to realize you can't have a relationship without two parties and without honesty. In the on-going operations we're seeing now there has been a lot of progress. However, both sides are very tight on resources, and that has an effect.

Richard O'Mara, feature writer, *The Baltimore Sun*:

The Pentagon, like an other military organization, is dedicated to control. If you put the zeal for control the Pentagon tends to have within a [country] like Saudi Arabia, where control is everything, you are the closest you can be to total control. So it wasn't just the Army or the Pentagon, it was just as much the Saudis.

Stewart Powell, White House correspondent, Hearst Newspapers:

In order for the press to have this kind of upclose and personal access to the military, ground rules are going to have to be in place because the military is not going to permit us to get close and intimately involved with the units unless we operate under some sort of ground rules which are mutually agreed upon. So it is not a philosophic issue, it is a matter of realism from my point of view. We are not going to get in with the units unless we abide by some sort of ground rules we work out with the military. . . . I think the Pentagon learned how to operate the public relations side of a military operation in this sort of telegenic age during the Gulf War. It knows that if you dominate the story in televised briefings, which are readily available no thanks to modern day technology, you can shape the coverage of the war. And if the pool reports are not timely, which they weren't, the kind of first hand information you need from the field to contrast with the command briefing, is not available. They were able to structure the coverage in a very proactive way with televised briefings, and the rest of us who were trying to report and blend together the pool reports, the command briefings, and any other information we could get together, were corralled by that structure. [The military] learned a very valuable lesson in terms of news management, and I think they continue to try to do that.

Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel-Select) Virginia Pribyla, USAF, chief of media relations branch, Air Force Public Affairs, the Pentagon:

I believe education of the public affairs officers and enlisted folks and sharing operational information with the media with clear and explicit instructions as to what should not be let out is a much more effective means of keeping classified information from being printed than security review is. If the media can be brought in and the situation explained to them, they can be trusted to protect the information. On the flip side of that, the escorts need to be well enough informed so they know what they need to protect at all costs. . . . I think military-media relations is a work in progress. Much more important to the military-media relationship is the senior leadership of the individual services, of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those senior leaders have impact by their actions and by their directions much more vividly than principles and information. We have had that guidance for a long time, and it waxes and wanes based on the leadership. We already have what we need in terms of policy, but what really impacts the relationship and how well the services follow the rules is the leadership.

Robert Ruby, deputy foreign editor, *The Baltimore Sun*:

I don't think all of the (Gulf War) ground rules were necessary. I think they did help sensitize me and other journalists to the military's task and needs. I don't think the ground rules were presented as a pentagonal tool. They were simply a "here are the rules" and not for us to ask why we have the rules. . . . I don't think the press is supposed to be the friend or the enemy of anybody. I don't think the press should expect it's going to love the military. I don't think the military, or any other organization, thinks it should be loved by reporters. . . . I think the circus in Saudi Arabia did better prepare the Department of Defense and the press for dealing with each other . . . I think the relations that they seem to have in Bosnia is proof of that. Each side has more realistic expectations of the other.

Pat Sloyan, *Newsday*:

Not only was I opposed to the pool because of previous encounters with it in Panama, but I predicted in writing that our reporters would see none of [the war], and, at the end of the war, no one saw anything. That was because of a calculated effort by President Bush and Secretary Cheney, because of the political drawbacks of watching Americans, one, get killed, and, two, cause killing, politically doesn't work out. If [the military] could control the pictures . . . [it could] control the perception of what war the war was. . . . You'll find in my journalism very little criticism of the military. The military is doing what it's told to do and it's doing the best it can, and, most of the time, they do a tremendous job.

Brigadier General Ronald Sconyers, USAF, Director of Air Force Public Affairs, the Pentagon:

Pools have some value for the first 24 to 36 hours [of an operation], but, after that, we break our promise to the media in enabling them to report the war. . . . The military and the media will always be at odds. There will always be commanders who want total security and those media who want complete coverage and total access.

Jacqueline Sharkey, Professor of Journalism, University of Arizona:

There's a real question as to whether we really need real time coverage from the battlefield at all. That is still very open to debate. The important thing is that the American public receive information about military operations that will help them evaluate the decision of policy-makers to send U.S. troops overseas into these kinds of activities. That does not necessarily mean they have to have that information the same day. I'm much more concerned that there be reporters on the scene even if they can't print the information for a day, a week, a month, or a year, as long as the public does have access to it eventually. It's the defacto censorship, where the reporters aren't even allowed physical access to these activities, under any circumstances, that worries me more than anything else. . . . The good old days of Vietnam are misremembered by both sides, and both sides are in danger of forgetting the real lessons that come out of Vietnam while clinging to the myths that exist about the coverage of that war.

Leonard Shyles, Associate Professor of communication, Villanova University, Pennsylvania:

The idea of a free society comes at a price. There is an inherent ethical obligation of the military to permit some way for there to be credible coverage of events. Grenada taught us that no one will believe just Pentagon photographers. There is a conflict of interest; they're a self-interested party. You must allow access for neutral journalistic coverage to maintain government credibility. . . . In the truest sense of a free society and a democracy, the press plays the role of a proxy, a midwife, that stands in, in our place, to give us information. If we did not have a free society, where we didn't have a government that represented the will of the people, it wouldn't matter not to allow the press access. It is absolutely incumbent on the press and the military to tell the people what is going on. By the same token, security review is fine. It's a benefit for the [military], but it deserves some benefits during this period. It comes back to the notion of balance.

William J. Small, Felix Larkin Professor of Communications and Director of the Center for Communications, Fordham University, New York:

The fervor of patriotism that ran all through the country had a sobering influence on some elements of the press. It certainly didn't help their popularity. Some of the best reporting was done after the fact and revealed some of the things the military did that weren't so popular. . . . I don't know that you can prepare because here on in every situation is a different type of military operation. [During peacetime] I think the press has to make clear to the Pentagon and the White House that full coverage is vital no matter how it irritates the military. [During wartime] whenever there are restrictions, such as the many we saw in the Gulf, the press has to go public with its complaints and use the media to let the public know that they're being restricted. . . . The media is the public's surrogate. The military, after all, is there because our elected officials have used them, and, it seems to me, they have a responsibility to everyone in this country in terms of their behavior and allowing people to witness what they are doing.

Chief Master Sgt. (Ret.) David Smith, USAF, chief of community relations, McChord Air Force Base, Washington:

When you granting someone access to your troops and your facilities, you've got to have a set of ground rules so they know where they stand and you know where you stand and you can establish a relationship. Without a relationship based on trust and based on mutual understanding, you really can't do anything. That works with the media very well. They just have to know what we're up to, and it's imperative that we explain to them what is going on. . . . I think the military is better prepared to talk to the media and is more open to the media than prior to the Gulf War. The media has not done enough self-education to prepare themselves to report on the military. They don't stay in place long enough, so when we get someone familiar with what we're doing [he or she] get[s] a different beat and different job, and we get somebody new. [The military reporters] we're training, we're not able to retain. . . . I think it's imperative that we make ourselves, our commanders, and our troops available to explain to the media what we're doing. I think it's imperative that we help them understand what we're up to.

Colonel Harry Summers, USA (Ret.), syndicated columnist, *Los Angeles Times*, and editor, *Vietnam Magazine*:

One of the great ironies for me as a Vietnam War veteran is the news people talk about Vietnam as the good 'ole days. There were no general restrictions on the media. They could go wherever they wanted, and they usually flew on military aircraft. The very peculiar fact is, for Vietnam veterans, myself included, we hated the media in general but liked them in the particular. But the follow-on generation heard all of the war stories and just hate the media. A gulf developed between the military and the media, so that there was an awful lot of animosity from people who had gotten it second-hand, if you will. . . . One recommendation was for the military to build bridges to the media, but the problem is that the military is a very concrete organization and the media is an abstraction. There's no such thing as a media. . . . There's no way you can decree that the media is going to do anything. They'll do it if they please, and, if they don't please, they won't do it. . . . The media serve a very important function most military people don't realize. One is they are the connector between the military and the American people, and another is the glue that holds this remarkable trinity together. So the military has an enormous interest in furthering better military-media relations.

Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.), Director of the National Security Program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University:

Whereas the military was stung by the media and held a grudge against the media as a result of the Vietnam War, the reverse is true in the Gulf War. The media felt they were completely hostage to the military, and, in many instances, the military tried to co-opt and use them—and legitimately so and not surprisingly so. I think the media now feel the military has the upper hand—or certainly did in the Gulf War—and it strained the relationship which is normally created in conflict under the best of circumstances. But in terms of the bitterness between the two institutions, particularly on the part of the military that existed in the post-Vietnam period, I think a great deal of that has been ameliorated. The military has gone through great extents to learn about the media and how to deal with them, and I think they are ahead in this relationship with the media because I don't think the media fully understand the nature of the military. . . . The First Amendment does not ordain the media to be the watchdog of the military. It simply says there can be no restriction on a free press. But by custom and history [the media] have become the watchdog, and it is generally expected. In a free democratic society it is legitimate to consider the media the fourth branch of government in a system of checks and balances. An intrusive media, to look at what's going in the military, is perfectly legitimate. The people have a right to know how their tax money is being spent and how the blood of their sons and daughters are being put at risk—or expended—in times of war.