



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Force Deployment Rock Drill After Action Report

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PREFACE

This report was produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in partial fulfillment of the task titled "Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)," jointly sponsored by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command. The report was prepared for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Transportation School, the Exercise Director of the U.S. Army Force Deployment Rock Drill.

This document was reviewed by the IDA personnel who attended the Rock Drill exercise, and by the Division Director, Mr. Thomas P. Christie.

FORCE DEPLOYMENT ROCK DRILL AFTER ACTION REPORT

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FORCE DEPLOYMENT ROCK DRILL AFTER ACTION REPORT

The first U.S. Army Force Deployment Rock Drill exercise was conducted at the Modisett Recreation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia from 18 to 22 November 1996. The sponsor of the exercise was the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the executing organization was the U.S. Army Transportation School.

The specific objectives of the Force Deployment Rock Drill were as follows:

- Objective 1 – Educate the deployment community on Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)
- Objective 2 – Refine command relationships
- Objective 3 – Demonstrate force structure impacts on time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) flow
- Objective 4 – Refine the strategy for improving force projection.

Exercise participants represented one of three categories: working group members, invited senior officers, and observers. Each category represented a different training audience for the first objective. Working group members were to accomplish the other three objectives and present their results to the senior officers. Observers attended some of the briefings or working group sessions to obtain additional knowledge about RSOI operations. The complete list of attendees is provided in Appendix A and includes representatives from the Joint Staff, selected Unified Combatant Commands and their components, Army, Navy and Marine Corps Doctrine Commands, and a number of U.S. Army Major Commands and troop units.

A. EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

Although called a Rock Drill – the Army term for a detailed rehearsal of a planned tactical operation – the exercise also included a number of other events. Prior to the exercise, a book containing Read Ahead Material was distributed to participants, which they were requested to read before the exercise. The book identified the exercise purpose, concept, and organization; described the scenario, the exercise theater lines of communication (LOC), and the RSOI processes; provided reference material; and listed the issues to be addressed during the exercise.

The exercise events, based on the first 45 days of a notional force deployment to an immature theater in the year 2003, were designed to reinforce and expand on the advance material. The events included a number of briefings, working group discussion periods, and plenary sessions designed to enable individual working groups to share the results of their discussions with the other groups and with the invited senior officers. The detailed schedule of exercise events is provided in Appendix B.

1. Day 1 – Educational Briefings

The target audience for Day 1 was the working group participants. Approximately 12 to 18 people were selected and assigned to each of four working groups prior to their arrival, based both on their current positions and experience, and on the objective of achieving appropriate representation within the groups. Four groups representing organizations that operate portions of the theater LOC were used for the exercise:

- Working Group 1 – Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) Complex
- Working Group 2 – Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) Complex
- Working Group 3 – Other LOC Nodes
- Working Group 4 – Controlling Headquarters for the LOC.

The first day's events were focused on Objective 1 and provided the working group members and observers with a comprehensive overview of the theater LOC and the RSOI processes that it supports. Activities included welcoming and administrative remarks, a series of briefings focused on the RSOI process, a video describing the RSOI process, a step-by-step walk-through of a typical theater LOC and the RSOI operations that occur at the nodes (the actual Rock Drill), and demonstrations of available automated support tools. Finally, the working groups met to introduce members and to organize for the sessions scheduled for the following day.

2. Days 2 and 3 – Working Group Discussions

During Days 2 and 3, working groups met in four half-day periods with two hours set aside for discussion and one hour and 45 minutes for the plenary session briefings. The working groups met in a secure area to facilitate discussions of operational issues. Plenary sessions were conducted in the unsecured area used for the first day's events. The working group sessions were intended to focus on Objectives 2, 3, and 4, and to

address the issues listed in the Read Ahead Material related to the following phases of the force deployment:

- Opening the theater LOC
- RSOI operations for units with prepositioned equipment
- RSOI operations for units with equipment arriving on surge sealift
- Concurrent sustainment and retrograde operations.

3. Day 4 – Issue Refinement and Briefing Preparation

Day 4 of the exercise was scheduled to resolve in plenary session any open issues from the working groups and to develop the working group briefings to be presented to the senior officers during Day 5. All work was accomplished in unsecured areas. During the afternoon, participants were given the opportunity to tour the USNS Gordon (T-AKR 296), one of the Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) vessels to be used for prepositioned Army equipment afloat and to provide surge sealift.

4. Day 5 – Senior Officer Orientation

The target audience for Day 5 was the invited senior officers. They were provided a condensed version of the Day 1 overview briefings, video, and walk-through. They also received summary briefings of the key points covered by the working groups.

B. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF EXERCISE

Without doubt, the exercise was an overwhelming success in accomplishing Objective 1. It educated all participant categories on the complexity of the RSOI operation. The briefings, video, and use of the 20- by 40-foot tarp representing the Theater LOC and sand tables for key nodes to describe the activities during the walk through of the operation was very well done and provided the target audiences with an excellent overview of the time-phasing and magnitude of these operations.

The other three exercise objectives achieved less success, and were perhaps overly ambitious for the first exercise addressing this subject. Working group leaders were responsible both for issue resolution and for contributing to senior officer education on the final day. These objectives competed for attention in the limited time available. The initial discussions during the working group sessions were lively and did an excellent job of broadening the understanding of the RSOI operations for participants. Because of time constraints, however, none of the issues were addressed in sufficient depth to

achieve final resolution. Consequently, little progress was actually accomplished in meeting the other three objectives. This lack of progress, however, is more indicative of systemic problems with planning and executing RSOI operations rather than lack of effort on the part of participants.

Objective 2, to refine command relationships, is an essential step in improving RSOI operations. The command relationships are joint and combined, complicated by the number of organizations operating at these locations and the lack of agreed U.S. joint or Service doctrine for conducting RSOI operations in this environment. Within each working group, these relationships usually involved organizations from the supported and supporting combatant commands, the Service components, and host nations.

Most members of the working groups were carefully selected because they had the necessary expertise to represent the interests of their Army or joint organizations during the discussion. Working group leaders were subject matter experts and, in some cases, serving commanders of U.S. Army organizations with responsibility for conducting some of the activities examined by the working groups. Although the working group members were prepared to address the issues outlined in the Read Ahead Material, the focus of the group leaders from the outset was on their briefings to educate the 37 U.S. Army general officers and 9 members of the Senior Executive Service who were invited to attend the final day of the exercise. Although there was some discussion of command and control issues, none of the working groups recommended specific refinements to existing command relationships.

Objective 3 was to demonstrate the impact of recently programmed Army force structure changes on the TPFDD flows. The working group discussions reaffirmed that the RSOI challenges are not merely concerned with transportation of personnel and materiel between nodes of the LOC, but also include the processing at the nodes to reassemble these arriving parts rapidly into complete and capable units.

Prior to the exercise, a great deal of effort went into building a notional TPFDD for the exercise that showed the magnitude of the accelerated flows into the theater caused by programmed improvements to strategic lift. An automated support tool was developed to calculate the daily workloads imposed by the planned TPFDD flows on the theater LOC; these results were made available to the working groups, providing estimates of the time-phasing and size of the RSOI processing requirements at the LOC nodes as marshaling and staging of forces occur. The results included sustainment parameters such as the number of meals and gallons of fuel consumed at key nodes, the

number of beds that would be needed for overnight accommodation of personnel, and the number and type vehicles processed through or remaining overnight at the various LOC nodes; and operational parameters such as time delays encountered as units were reassembled and prepared for integration into the force.

The working groups experienced difficulty with establishing reliable relationships between the projected workloads they were given and the force structure supporting RSOI. The modular Army organizational capabilities required to perform these functions have not been identified. Host nation support and contracting alternatives also must be evaluated as possible trade-offs, but these capabilities could only be addressed in general terms. The working groups did not have the time or adequate information available to establish the RSOI support modules, much less tailor them to the estimated workloads. Consequently, the impact of future force structure changes on RSOI could not be demonstrated or assessed during the exercise.

Objective 4 of the exercise was to refine the strategy for improving force projection. One significant recommendation was identified during the exercise. The working groups all agreed that the term *force closure* as currently used in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) needs to be revised. As currently used, the term means the specific force has arrived at the port of debarkation in the theater, not that it has necessarily completed any RSOI operations to reassemble the deploying units, or that the capabilities have reached the final destinations where they are needed within the theater. Unless the RSOI requirements are part of the JSCP assessment process, the focus of all force deployment planning and evaluation will be on moving to the theater, not on the timely reassembly and delivery of the capabilities when and where they are required by the supported combatant command. This issue was briefed to the senior officers by the senior Joint Staff working group participant.

1. APOD Complex Working Group

The working groups did have some success identifying other issues and recommending potential solutions. The discussions of the APOD Complex Working Group addressed factors that would achieve more optimal throughput within the complex to maximize the build-up of combat power. Throughput at an APOD Complex has two components: *reception* provided by Air Force (Air Mobility Command (AMC)) elements and *clearance* normally provided by Army elements. Because these capabilities typically are planned by separate organizations, they often are not deployed in proper balance and backlogs frequently occur. Recommendations included requirements to

develop analytical tools to support planning and execution of complex throughput (both reception and clearance operations), to refine the Army port clearance structure (relate capability modules to workloads), to emphasize joint training for these organizations, and to develop procedures that match reception and clearance capabilities during deployment operations.

2. SPOD Complex Working Group

Because the SPOD complex receives nearly 90 percent of all material deploying to the theater, force closure depends heavily on efficiency of operations here. The SPOD in effect becomes the center of gravity for the entire deployment operation. The discussions of the SPOD Complex Working Group addressed a number of issues that could enhance throughput at these locations. The Port Support Activity (PSA) provides the port operator with the drivers that are essential to keep the large volume of vehicles arriving on surge sealift from congesting the port. These task forces are not currently planned, trained, or included in contingency TPFDDs, but they should be. Other *ad hoc* task groups, such as Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Parties (SLRPs) and unit Advanced Echelons (ADVONs) that receive afloat prepositioned materiel, are also critical to achieving rapid build-up of combat power, but these organizations are not always planned for or identified in current TPFDDs. Army watercraft can facilitate throughput at the port or reduce the overland onward movement requirement in some cases, but they are slow and must deploy early – prior to C-Day – to be available when the surge sealift arrives. Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facilities (RRDF) are needed for in stream discharge and logistics over the shore operations.

The SPOD group's recommendations focused on developing an awareness and a process for ensuring that the necessary enabling organizations are included in the deployment flows. Refinement to Army port clearance structure, including the *ad hoc* task groups, is necessary to minimize port congestion. Port reception capabilities (provided by Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Army's 7th Composite Transportation Group, or other Services) must be planned and time-phased to handle the anticipated workloads and to overcome limitations caused by degraded ports. These capabilities also must be balanced with the port clearance capabilities to achieve the enhanced throughput needed to accomplish effective and efficient build-up of combat power.

The group also recommended that procurement of additional RRDFs should be moved forward in the Army Program Objective Memorandum and that the Rapid

Inflatable Breakwater (RIB) and other sea state 3 enablers be developed and procured to ensure throughput at the water terminals or beachheads. Additionally, the group recommended increases and improvements in joint training for units and *ad hoc* task groups that operate within the SPOD Complex. They also recommended actions to refine existing doctrine for port and water terminal operation.

3. Other LOC Nodes Working Groups

The discussions of the Other LOC Nodes Working Group examined the complex set of nodes and links that form the theater LOC by connecting the ports of debarkation with the tactical assembly areas. These nodes are where the build-up of combat power occurs during RSOI operations, and they must be carefully planned to minimize congestion and bottlenecks so that the rapid build-up of combat power can be achieved. Operation of these nodes presents a significant challenge because of theater security and environmental factors, but also because LOC operators can be a combination of military forces, host nation assets, or contractors. Early support for the units drawing afloat prepositioned materiel will need to rely on military force capabilities because host nation support cannot always be assured and contractors need time to set up.

This working group examined the projected workloads and concluded that automated tools need to be developed to provide RSOI planners and operators with this type of data. These tools must interface with strategic deployment models, address all LOC functions and common item support in joint and combined environments, and be able to predict both the impact of changes in the flow on required RSOI resources and the impact of changes in RSOI resources on the build-up of combat power. During execution, they must be able to track the build-up of combat power within the theater.

The group made three recommendations. They thought that the Army modernization program for its afloat prepositioning materiel should be refined to ensure capabilities that are needed for early operation of the LOC are included. They recommended rapid development of analytical tools to assist staffs with planning and assessing RSOI operations that provide the build-up of combat power. They also recommended early development of Army doctrine that addresses the RSOI process.

4. Controlling Headquarters Working Group

The principal issue addressed by the Controlling Headquarters Working Group was how to achieve unity of command for RSOI operations – an essential ingredient to achieve effective and efficient build-up of combat power. To accelerate the build-up of

combat power, a number of functions such as transportation, personnel, supply, services, distribution, maintenance, medical, finance, construction, real estate management, and rear area security must be coordinated and focused on that task.

The group recommended that the senior logistics commander should control all functions needed to conduct RSOI operations and to produce ready units for the combat commander. Many participants thought that separate functional or Service stovepipes constrain these operations and the Army's proposed Theater Support Command might be one way that unity of command could be achieved for the Army Service Component Commander. Automated decision support systems are not currently available; the group recommended that they be developed to assist with this complex and critical task.

C. SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS' COMMENTS

This section summarizes the observations and comments received from participants during the various exercise events. Additionally, a questionnaire was provided to members of working groups. Approximately 20 responses were received and these have been compiled in Appendix C. This section highlights the more significant comments of the participants.

Overall, the participants generally expressed a positive reaction to the exercise. They thought the discussions and exchanges of ideas on RSOI were useful. They also gained a greater understanding of the RSOI process and its multi-functional dimensions. One participant observed that RSOI is not a logistics process, but is an operations process with heavy logistical implications.

The Read Ahead Material was designed to prepare participants for the exercise. Most received the package in sufficient time to become familiar with it before the start of the exercise. They seemed to find the material useful, but were somewhat frustrated when the issues identified in the package were not addressed during the working group sessions. Some thought the package contained too much material for the exercise, but most plan to use it as a reference document after the exercise.

The plenary sessions may have been the weakest link of the exercise. Although the information presented during these sessions further contributed to participant understanding of the RSOI process, the lengthy sessions were not used to bring any substantive issues to resolution. Many participants noted that the plenary sessions were little more than rehearsals for the last day's briefings to the senior officers. It also

became obvious to working group members very early that they had little control over which issues were to be presented to the senior officers.

1. Day 1 - Orientation, Organizational Briefings, and Demonstrations

Although the majority of participants thought the overview briefings adequately explained the objectives of the exercise, a few considered the briefings somewhat repetitive. Most participants thought the video presentation provided an excellent description of the RSOI process, but some suggested that it was too long. Others believed the film, although very professionally done, was redundant, since much of the information had already been covered by the previous briefings. Several participants suggested that handouts of the briefings would have been useful for taking notes and to reinforce their understanding of the RSOI process.

The organizational briefings also were thought to be somewhat redundant and did not, in many cases, adequately address the command and control relationships at the nodes, a major exercise objective. Some participants thought these briefings would have been more effective if the functions and responsibilities of the various organizations had been projected on the screens during the briefings.

The terrain tarp, sand tables, and other visual aids used for the exercise were exceptionally well done, and were very effective tools for describing and conveying an understanding of both the theater LOC structure and the many functions that take place within the nodes. The visual aids, however, were difficult to see from the bleachers even with the video projection onto the screens.

The demonstrations of the systems were marginally effective and were very difficult for the audience to see. They also portrayed an overly positive view of the potential capabilities of the systems and did not identify any of their current limitations. Many participants thought the systems demonstrations were too short to provide an adequate understanding of the system capabilities. Others thought that these briefings should have included a chart showing how these systems might be linked together to support RSOI planning and execution in the future.

The brigade-level walk-through was interesting and educational for audience members unfamiliar with the deployment process. Unfortunately, it only addressed in detail the reception and integration functions of the RSOI process for the prepositioned and surge sealift forces, and did not discuss at a similar level of detail the activities

involved with staging and onward movement of the forces. Although it mentioned the early arrival of the airborne units, it did not describe any of their RSOI operations.

Although the working groups were not scheduled to meet until Day 2, there was sufficient time for an initial meeting on the afternoon of the first day. This initial meeting was very beneficial in allowing the working group members to get organized for the next day and meet one another, and should be incorporated into the agenda of future exercises.

2. Days 2 and 3 - Working Group and Plenary Sessions

The greatest number of negative comments about the exercise were related to the working group activities. The working group concept, size, and composition were about right. The participants were concerned that the working groups were asked to discuss issues that were different than those presented in the Read Ahead Material. A majority of working group members felt that two hours was simply not enough time to discuss adequately the issues presented in the Read Ahead Material. In addition, there was a consensus that too many issues were presented, and working group leaders should have selected and prioritized a smaller set of issues.

There also were concerns about the utility of the plenary sessions. A majority of exercise participants considered these sessions too frequent, too long, and not designed to resolve issues. The plenary sessions simply became rehearsals for the Friday briefings. Future exercises should conduct a daily plenary session at the end of each day.

3. Day 4 - Exercise Wrap Up Sessions

Day 4 of the exercise was the most unstructured day. It was initially designed to achieve closure on any unresolved issues from the working groups and to develop the briefings to be presented to the senior officers on the last day. It was actually used to refine and rehearse the working group briefings which started on Day 2. By this point, a number of working group members were frustrated by not being able to address the issues they came to discuss, and were losing interest in the exercise.

The tour of the LMSR ship USNS Gordon was an excellent opportunity for exercise participants to become familiar with the vessel. The tour lasted 2 hours, and covered the entire ship. If possible, future exercises should include similar events.

4. Day 5 - Senior Officer Briefings

The senior officer session on Day 5 was an excellent summary of key points stressed by the exercise. The briefers did an outstanding job of educating the senior officers and observers. Although the attendees were predominantly from the logistics community, the audience also included a few commanders and operators. Future exercises should seek a more balanced representation of Army commanders and operations personnel, who are the principal customers of the RSOI process.

The presentations from Day 1 were tailored for the audience. Very few questions and little open discussion arose from these presentations. When discussions occurred, the audience often had difficulty identifying the speaker. A seating list for the senior officer attendees would have helped other participants identify the speakers. These problems notwithstanding, comments from a few of the senior attendees during the breaks and after the exercise were very positive and suggest that the presentations were effective and accomplished the educational objective.

D. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EXERCISES

This exercise served as a benchmark for Army force deployment training and process improvement. As a result, a number of valuable lessons were learned from this exercise, and these should be considered when planning subsequent exercises. The following discussion provides specific recommendations for future exercises.

1. Exercise Format

Because this was the first Army-wide exercise focused exclusively on the RSOI phase of force deployment, it was important to educate the deployment community on the phasing, magnitude, and complexity of these operations. It was particularly important to provide the invited senior Army officers with an overview of these operations and an appreciation of the issues that need to be resolved. Their continued support for efforts that improve the capabilities to conduct these operations is critical. The first and last days of the exercise provided the forum to accomplish the educational objective for all target audiences.

The exercise format also provided the forum for resolving issues during days 2, 3, and 4. The format brings together a diverse group of subject matter experts representing many organizations that must work together during contingencies, but that otherwise

have little opportunity to plan and train together. Because the senior officer presentations were scheduled immediately following the working group sessions, the focus was more on issue identification and presentation as part of the senior officer education rather than issue resolution. Future exercises should provide a two- to four-week break between the working group sessions and the senior officer session. This time interval will allow the working group leaders to resolve issues while the experts are available, and then prepare presentations for the senior officers after the groups have achieved closure and departed.

2. Additional Exercise Objectives

This type of exercise could be used to meet a number of other objectives. For example, it could directly complement doctrine development. By bringing together experts from organizations with different functional and geographic responsibilities, the authors of doctrine should be able to present specific issues, lead the experts through discussions of the issues, and obtain closure on draft solutions based on the extensive experience of a diverse group of experts.

The exercise format also could be used by combatant commands to evaluate with their subordinate commands the operational concepts for conducting RSOI during contingency operations. As automated tools become available to assist with planning and evaluation of RSOI operations, these events could become computer aided exercises (CAXs) to enable commands to rehearse their plans, to refine the TPFDDs, and to train staffs to respond to problems that might be encountered during execution. Similar exercises could be used to train future staff officers at appropriate Service and joint schools.

In this exercise, the theater LOC and TPFDD were developed prior to the exercise. Another exercise objective that should be considered is to have the working groups plan a theater LOC and RSOI operations for a specific contingency. These activities should include sourcing RSOI and LOC support, and integrating the flow of RSOI and LOC operators into the TPFDD. Because there currently are no supporting tools or doctrine to guide such an effort, exercise planners will need to develop a process to guide the groups and provide them with sufficient information to accomplish the task in the time available. The results obtained from such an exercise could be used to develop supporting tools and the type of data needed by the staffs of combatant commands and Service component organizations to accomplish theater LOC planning.

3. Working Group Composition, Selection, and Preparation

The primary objective of this exercise was to educate the Army deployment community on the entire RSOI process. The configuration of the working groups was established on a geographical basis – APOD Complex, SPOD Complex, and Other LOC Nodes – with a capstone controlling headquarters group to tie the parts of the LOC together. This arrangement was specified so that participating organizations and functional responsibilities could be bounded and discussed by a multi-functional group of experts. This arrangement also related three of the working groups to the terrain of the theater LOC represented by the terrain tarp and the sand tables used for the briefings and the walk-through. For this exercise, this configuration worked well. If the objectives of subsequent exercises are more limited or focused, other working group configurations should be considered.

The working group leaders were carefully selected by the exercise director because they had actual experience with operations to be addressed by the working groups. In some cases, they were commanders of units with RSOI missions. However, this presented two problems. First, the working group leaders were unable to devote sufficient time to prepare for the eight hours of discussions they were to lead because their day-to-day duties often conflicted. This problem was recognized early in the preparations for the exercise, and *Battle Captains*, staff officers who work directly for the group leaders, were designated by each leader. The Battle Captains helped the leaders prepare for the discussion sessions and assisted with the preparation of briefings. This arrangement worked well during the preparation phase when the Battle Captains and group leaders were able to meet frequently, but it was not particularly useful when they could not meet and work together.

The second problem created by the selection process concerns objectivity. Disinterested facilitators rather than potential advocates should be selected to serve as working group leaders. This would encourage more open and frank discussions from all participants and facilitate objective closure on the identified issues.

Most participants in the working groups were in positions that clearly have RSOI-related responsibilities. These personnel were RSOI service providers and clearly understood their roles during the exercise. Other participants were selected and assigned to each working group to represent units that undergo RSOI operations as they transit the theater LOC. These personnel can provide valuable contributions to issue resolution, but they were not always aware of their role in the working groups. Future exercises should

include representation from both supporting and supported organizations, but also should ensure that the representatives of the supported organizations understand their roles.

During this exercise, the working group leaders were tasked both to resolve issues and to educate the senior officers. Subsequent exercises should free the leaders of the education task. They should focus exclusively on issue resolution and brief the results of their deliberations and recommendations to the senior officers.

4. Workloads and RSOI Support Structure

The detailed workloads calculated from the notional TPFDD (circa 2003) and the defined characteristics of the theater LOC (Southwest Asia) provided the context within which the working group discussions were conducted. This appears to be a useful technique that can highlight issues concerning timing and size of the RSOI workloads, and resources needed to build-up combat power effectively and efficiently. Notional TPFDDs have two advantages: they can be prescribed to cause problems that staffs must resolve, and they can address longer term programmatic issues. On the other hand, combatant command TPFDDs that support operation plans are classified, but address the near term and are based on existing structure and theater characteristics. They also have more credibility because they are real-world examples of how a theater deployment will be conducted. Future exercises should consider which type of TPFDD is most suited to support its objectives.

The automated support tool developed for this exercise provides detailed workloads created by Army units transiting the theater LOC. It does not calculate other Service or allied units requirements. If the exercise is conducted for joint or combined operations, additional support tool development will be required to calculate those workloads.

The current tool calculates workload requirements, but cannot assess LOC operating unit capabilities. Before such a capability can be achieved, there is a need for extensive research to identify Army and other Service unit modules that can provide RSOI support and to document these capabilities.

5. Automated Support for Exercises

Originally, the Rock Drill was to be a computer-aided exercise (CAX). While a number of tools such as BRACE, ELIST, KBLPS, and PORTSIM¹ are under various stages of development, these tools address limited portions of the RSOI operation, and they currently have only limited capability to interact and share data. The capabilities of these tools were demonstrated during the exercise, but further work is needed before they can provide the type of support the exercise participants require.

The Analysis of Mobility Platform (AMP) development effort under the cognizance of USTRANSCOM is attempting to provide a suite of tools to enable planners and operators to address end-to-end mobility requirements from "fort-to-foxhole." This type of exercise affords model developers the opportunity to work directly with the intended model users in a realistic environment to ensure their needs are met. Future exercises should incorporate the evolving tools when possible to provide developers with this important feedback.

¹ BRACE = Base Resource and Capability Estimator (Air Mobility Command); ELIST = Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool (Military Traffic Management Command); KBLPS = Knowledge Based Logistics Planning Shell (Army Materiel Command Logistics Anchor Desk); and PORTSIM = Port Simulation (Military Traffic Management Command).

APPENDIX A

EXERCISE ATTENDEES

APPENDIX A

EXERCISE ATTENDEES

A. WORKING GROUP MEMBERS

1. APOD Working Group

Rank	Name	Organization
LTC	Steadman, Danny	CO, 765th Trans Bn
CPT	Zaras, David	S-3, 765th Trans Bn
COL	Roth, Dale E.	CO, 17th ASG, 9th TAACOM, USARJ
LTC	Diamonti, Paul C.	CASCOM ATCL-Q-C
LTC	Gaddis, Daniel C.	CCJ4/7, USCENTCOM
LTC	Imholte, Dan D.	J4, Joint Staff
MAJ	Gorman, Frank	CCJ4/7, USCENTCOM
MAJ	Hamm, Robert	TCJ3/4, USTRANSCOM
MAJ	Pemberton, David W.	HQ, TUSA
MAJ	Wright, Millicent	S-3, 11th Trans Bn
MAJ	Schoen, John	XO, 330th MCC
Capt	Schubert, Kim	HQ, AMC/XPY
CMSGT	Texier, Michael	HQ, AMC/XPY
MAJ	Toguchi, Robert	DAMO-SSW
GS-13	DeArmond, Lee	LIA
Mr.	Baird, Douglas P.	IDA

2. SPOD Working Group

COL	Kenney, Robert	CO, 7th Trans Gp
MAJ	Prioleau, Carl	7th Trans Gp
LTC	Caldwell, Mike P.	Naval Doctrine Command
LTC	Coddington, Steele C.	J4, Joint Staff
LTC	Coleman, Ron S.	J4, Joint Staff
LTC	Hart, Joe P.	19th TAACOM, USFK
LTC	Heiter, Ron	1323rd MPC, MTMC

CDR	Whelan, Paul	CCJ4/7, USCENTCOM
MAJ	Averill, Mark F.	Marine Corps Combat Developments Command
MAJ	Bowie, James C.	164th Trans
MAJ	Cotter	S-3, 7th Trans Gp
LCDR	Dillendar, John	N413D, CINCLANTFLT
CPT	Boren	7th Trans Gp
GS-13	Zacot, Edward M.	LEA
GS	Bodary, Lee	LSA, USAMC
GM-13	Evenson, Michael J.	Military Sealift Command
GS	Salter, James	Combat Equipment Base Asia
Mr.	Lidy, A. Martin	IDA

3. LOC Nodes Working Group

COL	Doornink, Barb	CO, 507th CSG
CPT	Hardin, Chris	507th CSG
COL	Kenneally, Yerry	J7, Joint Staff
LTC	Champley, Peg	DCSLOG, HQ USAREUR
LTC	Dooley, Michael J	330th Trans Ctr
LTC	Flood, Richard	TCJ5, USTRANSCOM
LTC	Gaddis, Daniel D.	CCJ4/7, USCENTCOM
LTC	Gick, Phil	CASCOM
LTC	Lindsey, Joe	G-4, TUSA
LTC	Pittman, Travis D.	377th TAACOM, TUSA
MAJ	Smith, Stephen	507th CSG
PV2	Hooke, Andrew	507th CSG
GS-14	Ferris, Lou	LIA
GS-12	Oberg, Harry	War Reserve Command, USAMC
GS	Silva, Remingio	Chief, LSE-FE, USAMC
Mr.	Cook, John M.	IDA

4. Command and Control Working Group

COL	Ebertowski, James	CASCOM
CPT	Thewes, Bill	CASCOM
COL	Ennis, Charles	CO, 17th ASG, 9th TAACOM, USARJ
COL	Stafford, Mike	OASAILE-LOG, HQDA
LTC	Gaddis, Daniel D.	CCJ4/7, USCENTCOM

LTC	Malcom, Joe	LSE-C P&O, USAMC
LTC	Manibusan, John T.	143rd TRANSCOM
LTC	Pagano, David J.	DALO
MAJ	Freeman, Michael	ARCENT Engineer
Mr.	Butler, Dan	Cubic Applications (LIA)
GS	Meneghini, Michael A.	MTMC-TEA
GM	Emery, James	CASCOM
GS-13	Hauschild, Tony	AGCCS
Dr.	Sheleski, William J.	IDA

B. INVITED SENIOR OFFICERS

GEN	Bramlett, David A.	CG, FORSCOM
GEN	Hartzog, William W.	CG, TRADOC
GEN	Wilson, Johnny E.	CG, AMC
LTG	Arnold, Steven L.	CG, TUSA
LTG	Benchoff, Dennis L.	Deputy CG, USAMC
LTG (Ret)	Bruen, John D.	Retired
LTG	Coburn, John G.	DCSLOG, HQDA
LTG	Cusick, John J.	Director for Logistics, Joint Staff
LTG (Ret)	Russo, Vincent M.	Retired
LTG	Smith, Hubert G	DCINC, USTRANSCOM
MG	Brown, Daniel G.	CG, US Army Transportation Center/School
MG	Glisson, Henry T.	CG, US Army Quartermaster Center/School
MG	Guest, Robert K.	CG, CASCOM
MG	Hill, James T.	DCSOPS, FORSCOM,
MG	Hopper, John D.	Vice Director Logistics, Joint Staff
MG	Mahan, Charles S.	Director, Supply & Maintenance, DALO
MG	Marquis, Fred	ADCS Mobilization and Training, USAR
MG	Monroe, James W.	CG, Industrial Operations Command, USAMC
MG	Montero, Mario F. Jr.	CG, MTMC
MG	Mooney, Howard T.	HQ, MTMC (IMA)
MG	Plewes, Thomas J.	CG, 310th TSC (Prov)
MG	Shadley, Robert D.	CG, US Army Ordnance Center/School
MG	Waudby, Robert	CG, 377th TAACOM
MG	Whaley, David A.	DCSLOG, FORSCOM
BG	Arbuckle, Joseph W.	DCS, AMCAM, USAMC

BG	Bates, Barry D.	Director for Logistics, USFK
BG	Bilo, William C.	Deputy Director, Army National Guard
BG	Dickinson, Thomas R.	CG, 13th Corps Support Group
BG	Floyd, Robert L. II	Director for Logistics, USACOM
BG	Gaw, Michael T.	CG, 143rd Transportation Command
BG	Harper, Gilbert S.	CG, MTMC Eastern Area
BG	Inge, Joseph R.	Deputy Commandant, CGSC
BG	Kiefer, William N.	Deputy Commander (IMA), Ft. Eustis
BG	King, Boyd E. Jr.	Director, TRETs, DALO
BG	McManus, Wade J. Jr.	Director CG Staff, USAMC
BG	Privratsky, Kenneth	CDR, Defense Distribution Region East, DLA
BG	Scott, Bruce K.	DAMO
SES	Collinsworth, Thomas	Director, MTMC-TEA
SES	Edwards, Thomas J.	Deputy CG, CASCOT
SES	Hunter, Craig	USAMC
SES	Keltz, Robert	Deputy Director, USAMC
SES	Mills, David A.	Asst Dir, Supply Management, DALO
SES	Neal, William P.	DALO
SES	O'Konski, Mark J.	Executive Director, LIA
SES	Orsini, Eric	Deputy Director, Logistics, OASA
SES	Weber, Frank	Deputy J5, USTRANSCOM

C. OBSERVERS

	Baldwin, Melvin C.	MPRI
CPT	Banian, Dave CPT	Ft. Eustis
LTC	Barbour, Christopher	USAR
GS	Barbour, Doug	MTMC-TEA
LTC	Barnard, Paul	Mobility Concepts Agency, TRADOC
COL	Baum, Mike	Air Mobility Command
GS	Behn, Jim	TRAC Lee
COL	Bergeron, Scot	Ft. Eustis
LTC	Bierie, Richard	Mobility Concepts Agency, TRADOC
COL	Bird, John	NTC
Civ	Bondanella, John	Rand
LTC	Borneman, Harland	Mobility Concepts Agency, TRADOC

LTC	Bosko, Victor	TRADOC ATCD-L
COL	Brokenburr, Jesse L.	Office of the Chief of Staff, USA
COL	Brown, Tom	Ft. Eustis
LTC	Brunssen, Jochen (GE)	German LNO, CASCOM
LTC	Bublitz, Gary	OASA (IL&E)
COL	Buffington, Edwin L.	HQ, 1st COSCOM
Civ	Butler, Dan	Cubic Applications
COL	Casey	Joint Mobility Control Group, USTRANSCOM
CPT	Catino, John	Ft. Eustis
CPT	Choi	HQ, FORSCOM
CPT	Cole, Russ	Ft. Eustis
LTC	Collins, John	CASCOM CSSCS
COL	Compisi, John	
GS	Cooke, Jack R.	FORSCOM/G-4
GS	Cooper, Bill	MTMC-TEA
SGM	Correy	G-4, FORSCOM
COL	Curry, H.A.	Deputy Dir Logistics, USTRANSCOM
GS	Danser, Mary Ann	CASCOM
LTC	Davis, Dave A.	DCO, 7th Transportation Group
LTC	Demayo, Mike	DAMO-SSW
COL	Drach, Anne	CSA Office, HQDA
MAJ	Dugan, Dennis	XO, 24th Transportation Bn
COL	Engel	HQ, TRADOC
COL	Engelberger, Charles	HQ, MTMC
MAJ	Ferri, Bruce	Ft. Eustis
GS	Fields, Wayne	JTCC, USTRANSCOM
CAPT	Fishburne, Edward	
COL	Fletcher, Charles	CO, 8th Transportation Brigade
GS	Fox, Cecelia	DALO
LTC	Fukumitsu, Keith	NGB-ILE-L-P
COL	Gehri, Mark J.	J-4, Joint Staff
COL	Gentemann	HQ, USAMC
LTC	Gierlak, James E	HQ, 8th US Army
COL	Gingrich, John	DAMO-SSW
MAJ	Gipson	CASCOM

LTC	Gula, Rich	Ft. Eustis
COL	Hall, Clark C.	DALO-TSM
CPT	Hammerlee	HQ, 13th COSCOM
COL	Hamilton, Tedde	JTASC, USACOM
MAJ	Hanna, Johnny E.	G-3, FORSCOM
Civ	Hartline, Richard Y.	MPRI
COL	Hauser, Bob	FKJ4-Trans, USFK
SSG	Hermann, Roberta	Ft. Eustis
MAJ	Herr	CAA
LTC	Holder, Pat	TRADOC ATCD-L
COL	Hooper, John	DALO
MAJ	Hueber, Dale A.	BCTP
GS	Hughes, Melanie	LIA LOIA-LS
LTC	Jamison	HQ, USTRANSCOM
LTC	Jennings	LIA LOIA-LS
COL	Jiminez, Mario	TCJ3/4-LL, USTRANSCOM
GS	Johnson, Michael G.	HQ, USA MEDCOM
LTC	Johnson, Dorothy	HQ, USACOM
Capt	Kachinski, Keven	
GS	Kadesch, Brent L.	JTASC Support Team, USACOM
Civ	Kassing, David	Rand
MAJ	Kinkade, Jim	Ft. Eustis
CPT	Kohler, Chris	SPO, NTC
GS	Kowalski, Sandra	TRADOC ATCD-L
GS	Kramer, Deborah	USAMMA
GS	Lackey, Rodney	Ft. Eustis
MAJ	Laiuppa	HQ, USTRANSCOM
GS	Lane, Bill	HQ, FORSCOM
MAJ	Layer, Brian	G-4 Movements, 18th Airborne Corps
GS	Leaptrott, Bill M.	ODCSOPS, FORSCOM
Civ	Lewis, Matt	Rand
LTC	Lindsay, Steve	Operations Group Delta, BCTP
LTC	Little	G-4, TUSA
COL	Lunasco, Dave K.	HQ, USAMC
GS	Matthews, Ken	MTMC-TEA

LTC	Maurer, Charles	TRADOC ATDO-A
Lt Col	McDonald, Dann	Mobility Concepts Agency, TRADOC
GS	McKeon, Charles	LMI
GS-15	McKie, Franklin	CAA
LTC	McLaire, John	FKJ4, USFK
Civ	McManus, Mike	LMI
GS-12	Metz, Mark	HQ, MTMC
Civ	Moody, James L.	Cubic Applications
COL	Mortenson	HQ, USAMC
LTC	Newton, John	CENTCOM
GS-12	Oberg, Harry	War Reserve Command, USAMC
Civ	Pittman, John	LMI
GS	Poulos, Richard	CAA
LTC	Quinn, Michael M.	TRADOC ATDO-J
MAJ	Rahn, Todd A.	143rd Transportation Command
CSM	Rathmann	Ft. Eustis
2LT	Russell, Lisa	Ft. Eustis
COL	Salisbury, Gary	JTCC, USTRANSCOM
GS	Sartwell, Jim	377th TAACOM
GS-13	Simkins, Hiram	Ft. Eustis
Civ	Sloan, Gary A.	Cubic Applications
COL	Smith, Dean	LESD, NSC, Ft Lee
CPT	Soos, Pat	Ft. Eustis
MAJ	St Cyr, Daniel	USACOM
COL	Stevenson	DALO
LTC	Swaren, Thomas L.	JMC, USACOM
GS	Tendall, Jeanna M	War Reserve Command, USAMC
MAJ	Tepas, Elizabeth	Ft. Eustis
GS	Toler, Larry	CASCOM
GS	Toner, Frank	USAMC
Col	Topliffe, John N.	Director, Mobility Concepts Agency, TRADOC
COL	Tucker, Donald G	USTRANSCOM LNO, USACOM
GS	Vible, Jim	Ft. Eustis
COL	Walker, John S.	G-4, TUSA
	Waterman, Lloyd	

LTC	Weir, Donald G.	CASCOM
Civ	West, William A.	Cubic Applications
GS	Wightman, Richard Jr.	MTMC
Civ	Wren, Kenneth	Cubic Applications
Lt Col	Wright, William	Mobility Concepts Agency, TRADOC

APPENDIX B

SCHEDULE OF EXERCISE EVENTS

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SCHEDULE OF EXERCISE EVENTS

Day 1	(Monday, 18 November 1996)
0800 to 0815	Welcoming and Administrative Remarks
0815 to 0830	Remarks by the Chief of Transportation
0830 to 0915	Overview of Scenario
0915 to 0930	Breaks
0930 to 1200	Unit Briefs on Organizational Arrangements and Responsibilities
1200 to 1300	Lunch
1300 to 1430	Unit Briefs on Organizational Arrangements and Responsibilities (continued)
1430 to 1445	Break
1445 to 1700	Demonstration of Automated Systems
Days 2 and 3	(Tuesday, 19 November 1996 and Wednesday, 20 November 1996)
0800 to 1000	Working Group Session
1000 to 1015	Break
1015 to 1200	Plenary Session Working Group Presentations
1200 to 1300	Lunch
1300 to 1500	Working Group Session
1500 to 1515	Break
1515 to 1700	Plenary Session Working Group Presentations
Day 4	(Thursday, 21 November 1996)
0800 to 1000	Plenary Session/Issue Resolution
1000 to 1015	Break
1015 to 1200	Develop Briefings/Presentations for Day 5
1200 to 1300	Lunch
1300	Optional Tour of LMSR
1300 to 1500	Develop Briefings/Presentations for Day 5 (continued)
1500 to 1515	Break

1515 to 1700

Develop Briefings/Presentations for Day 5 (continued)

Day 5

(Friday, 22 November 1996)

0900 to 0915

Flag Officer Welcome and Exercise Overview

0915 to 0945

Scenario and Exercise Overview/Video of RSOI Process
Briefings/Demonstrations of Automated Systems Brigade
Walk-Through

1200 to 1300

Working Lunch

1300 to 1320

Briefing by APOD Working Group

1320 to 1340

Briefing by SPOD Working Group

1340 to 1400

Briefing by Other LOC Nodes Working Group

1400 to 1420

Briefing by Command and Control Working Group

1420 to 1500

Closing Remarks and Closing of Exercise

APPENDIX C

COMPILATION OF CRITIQUE FORMS

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COMPILATION OF CRITIQUE FORMS

The Rock Drill exercise was followed-up with a questionnaire to solicit opinions on the exercise's utility and success, and to get recommendations for improvement. The opinions presented in the following compilation of answers were incorporated into the analysis found in the main text of this report. The answers are presented in full in this appendix to provide a feel for many of the detailed impressions that resulted from the exercise.

1. When were you notified that you would be participating in the exercise?

- a. Mid October
- b. 4 weeks before
- c. 18 October
- d. 4 days before departure
- e. August 96
- f. 1 month
- g. 3 weeks prior
- h. August
- i. September 96
- j. Mid October
- k. October 96
- l. Never. Not on distribution for message.
- m. September 96
- n. September
- o. July 96
- p. August 96
- q. Mid October

2. *Was the Read Ahead Package a useful document? Was is organized logically? Did it provide enough information on the exercise? On the scenario? On the theater LOC? If not, what should have been included?*
- a. No. Scenario was not followed. Bounced from generic scenario to SWA to Korea.
 - b. Yes, but did not necessarily stay with what was outlined in it.
 - c. Yes.
 - d. Read Ahead was excellent. Also can be future reference/smart book. Organized well with adequate information in all areas.
 - e. Very good document. Not able to read ahead because it was not distributed to my MAJCOM HQ – USAMEDCOM.
 - f. Complete.
 - g. Unable to receive a Read Ahead Package because of my late registration.
 - h. Outstanding document. I will use it for a desk reference. Wish it wasn't a goofy size.
 - i. Was useful – probably had too much information.
 - j. Excellent document.
 - k. Excellent packet but exercise took a different turn once it started.
 - l. Yes to all of the above, but many of the working group issues listed per day were not addressed in the SPOD working group sessions. A lot of the open discussion was great professional development.
 - m. Excellent reference. It's a shame that after Monday all working groups forgot about the exercise scenario and guidance in the Read Ahead.
 - n. Detailed characteristics of transportation assets were nice to know, but not at the macro level for this exercise.
 - o. Well done, but it wasn't followed during working groups.
 - p. Scenario weak. Anticipated issues too generic. Too much stuff on ships, not needed in any working group.
 - q. Yes, very informative. It's a good baseline on RSOI.
 - r. Yes.
3. *Were the Working Group Issues presented in the Read Ahead Package realistic?*
- a. Yes.
 - b. Probably too ambitious for the initial symposium. Did not have enough time to work issues in that level of detail.
 - c. Too many for the time allotted.
 - d. Yes; however, all questions within Read Ahead were not addressed in detail. Issues in working group were similar or related.

- e. Yes, but they were presented as finished products in early sessions and gave participants a feel of blessing agents only.
- f. Good starting point.
- g. Starting point, but not followed.
- h. No. Too many, most weren't used.
- i. Yes.
- j. Yes.
- k. Yes, very much, but so many were not discussed at all and so many were touched on but were not discussed to closure or group consensus. After each brief back the working group was directed in another direction.
- l. Yes, but they were not covered in the actual working groups. The issues were forgotten and the transportation/reception agenda was put forward.
- m. Yes.
- n. Yes, but not applied.
- o. Led to development of issues too broad and ill defined, not analytically based.
- p. Yes.
- q. Did not see the first group Read Ahead until the first group meeting.

4. *Were you provided with sufficient information as to your role in the exercise prior to arriving at Ft. Eustis?*

- a. No.
- b. Yes.
- c. Yes.
- d. Not really. Not necessarily required as my OPTEMPO prior to arrival would have prevented any additional preparation. Specific role as a Division/Corps representatives in APOD Working Group not articulated.
- e. No. Would like to have known intent of exercise and real expected outcome.
- f. Yes.
- g. Yes.
- h. Yes.
- i. No.
- j. Yes.
- k. NA. I was not placed in a working group until arrival.
- l. No, other than I'd probably be a part of a working group. That's an internal situation. I received the packet, went TDY for 18 days, back for a week and then TDY again enroute to this Rock Drill.
- m. No.
- n. Yes.

- o. Yes.
 - p. No.
 - q. Yes.
 - r. Not fully.
5. *Did you arrive at Ft Eustis with an understanding of the objectives of the exercise?*
- a. No.
 - b. Yes.
 - c. Partially.
 - d. Yes. Read Ahead was well written and provided objectives.
 - e. No. I knew purpose and broad scenario.
 - f. Yes.
 - g. No.
 - h. Yes, but there were several background objectives I wasn't aware of.
 - i. Yes.
 - j. Yes.
 - k. Yes.
 - l. Yes, but not sure of the level of details. Just made assumptions based on General Officers being the audience on Day 5.
 - m. Yes.
 - n. Yes.
 - o. Yes.
 - p. I thought we would arrive at very specific recommendations, not generic.
 - q. Yes.
 - r. Not fully.
6. *Did the exercise overview adequately explain the objectives of the exercise?*
- a. Borderline. Went from macro to micro to macro.
 - b. Overview gave a good laydown of RSOI, but objectives of the exercise seemed to change a little after each central briefing.
 - c. Yes.
 - d. Although the Read Ahead outlined the Rock Drill objectives, I do not recall them being covered up front in the overview presented on Day 1.
 - e. Yes and No. Tell what the deliverables will be used for past exercise.
 - f. Very well, excellent presentation.
 - g. Yes.
 - h. Yes.

- i. Yes.
- j. Yes.
- k. Yes for initial session.
- l. Yes.
- m. Yes, excellent presentation.
- n. Yes.
- o. Well done, but repetitive. (CGs overview - 28 minute video - detailed walk through)
- p. An example of an issue and recommendation would have been helpful. Excellent, professional presentation; perhaps overkill.
- q. Yes.
- r. Yes.

7. *Were the briefings useful? Should there have been more or less of them? More or less detailed?*

- a. Yes. More on commander's intent with assumptions.
- b. Initially yes, but twice-a-day briefings took too much time away from group work. Recommend once a day.
- c. Yes.
- d. Excellent series of briefings/presentations. Film should be exported to educate major commands/schools in our Army.
- e. Great briefs. Section briefs got better on Tuesday.
- f. Excellent. About right.
- g. Briefings were great, but need to be expanded to two days.
- h. Useful. C-Day vs activity handout would have been good. Briefings were too shallow and too broad.
- i. Useful. Should have had handouts to enable us to remember more of what was said.
- j. Yes.
- k. Useful, yes. Could have been more detailed.
- l. Very useful, especially the role play of functions and responsibilities.
- m. Good mix, good length. Recommend a SME be on-hand/on-site when specific systems (automation) are briefed to allow questions to be answered. Please provide hard copy of each brief to the audience.
- n. Many of the organization briefings were so redundant. An outsider could not determine the difference. Everybody did it all.
- o. Either the CG overview or 28 minute video should be cut.
- p. More detail.
- q. Useful, but too long.

- r. Some of the information was redundant.
8. *Were the tarps and the sand tables useful visual aids in understanding the structure of the theater LOC?*
- a. Yes. Had visual representation of areas working.
 - b. Yes, initially, for visual orientation.
 - c. Yes.
 - d. Absolutely, well done. Will be excellent models for future school and Rock Drill use.
 - e. Exceptional.
 - f. Would have been if I had a center seat.
 - g. Yes. Great job.
 - h. Yes.
 - i. Nice window dressing, but not necessary.
 - j. Excellent.
 - k. Yes.
 - l. Yes, pictures are the way of today.
 - m. Absolutely, excellent tools.
 - n. Yes.
 - o. Yes.
 - p. Yes, but should have been able to reconfigure the tables within Working Groups.
 - q. Yes.
 - r. Very much so.
9. *What was your impression of the system demos? Did they contribute to your understanding of the exercise?*
- a. OK. No.
 - b. Yes, but need to show how they all relate/link together. Maybe provide a consolidated review of all systems.
 - c. Yes.
 - d. I would rather observe one or two slides which articulate the system (software) capabilities. I do not get much out of watching an operator pull up screens and select systems.
 - e. Helpful.
 - f. System demos were not helpful. Too quick. Simply projecting a computer screen. Require a more detailed explanation.
 - g. Yes.
 - h. Not much.

- i. Excellent.
- j. Good information; didn't help with specific issues but provided excellent overview of capabilities.
- k. Great, but too quick. Yes.
- l. Yes, but a written summary of the system name and function should be provided to the audience before all these "new" systems are briefed.
- m. No. Videotaped demos do not give a realistic description of intentions, planned capability, limitations and actual status of the systems. They promise the world and lie a lot.
- n. Yes, but they implied fully functioning systems when they are mostly prototype.
- o. No.
- p. Yes.
- q. Demos too short to provide any understanding of system capabilities. In some instances the demos begged more questions than answers.

10. *Was the Working Group "focus" correct? (i.e., Aerial Port, Water Port, Other Theater LOC Nodes, Controlling HQ)*

- a. Yes.
- b. Yes, but "Other LOC Nodes" was almost too broad to get our arms around one or two specific issues.
- c. Scope was too large for time allotted. Some confusion on what the final product should be.
- d. Initially, digressed frequently; however, soon became focused.
- e. Yes.
- f. About right.
- g. No. Recommend Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and possibly Integration plus C2.
- h. Yes, but C2 too broad to properly address issues.
- i. Yes.
- j. Yes.
- k. Yes, initially; made many focus changes during exercise though.
- l. Yes, but some port(s) and LOC discussions could have met closure if we had results of some C2 HQ's issues. SPOD Work group said he'll pass on some of our issues that depended on C2 response, but we never heard or discussed again.
- m. No, it was obvious specific agendas were being worked. This prevented full participation by all in attendance. The facilitators required additional training on how to work these groups - how to guide, pull in commentary, stay on the exercise focus. (Most - the "Other LOC Nodes" Working Group was excellent, well run, well organized, well focused.)
- n. Yes, as far as it went. How do you integrate these LOCs, nodes and C2 into a viable theater transportation system?

- o. A reasonable break-out, but missed the linkage piece between nodes. Maybe could have redirected C2 group to specifically focus on inter-node interaction.
- p. Yes.
- q. Other LOC nodes needed more definition before the operation.
- r. The C2 group missed the focus of coordinating the hand-off between each of the other groups, i.e. success, of the APOD should not be measured by port clearance but delivering units to the TAA by the RDD.

11. *Were the appropriate organizations represented in your Working Group? If not, who was missing?*

- a. No. Trans Group, RTOC (theater level), personnel GP, ASG, Joint Log Cmds, EAC involvement.
- b. Yes.
- c. Yes.
- d. Had a good mix of military, civilian (Army/Air Force) personnel with diverse experience/background. Facilitated the group discussions over issues very well.
- e. Good balance.
- f. Missing Signal Command.
- g. Yes.
- h. Yes.
- i. Yes.
- j. Yes, I guess. I'm not sure how organizations were determined. But the SPOD work group problem was lacking a plan of attack to keep us focused, getting us back on track when we got off so we could come to group closure or consensus on questions in packet.
- k. If you are going to talk future systems and the requirement for TAV and ITV, you need representatives from the DoD JTAV PM office. No one here had a "Big Picture" (view or awareness of JTAV intent, planning and implementation).
- l. Command and control - needed representatives from deploying unit. All groups probably needed that.
- m. Good mix.

12. *Did your background and experience allow you to contribute to your Working Group discussions?*

- a. Yes.
- b. Yes.
- c. Yes.
- d. I am a combat arms officer with limited logistics experience; however was a planner for deployment and "customer" on many occasions. Hopefully I contributed as an element transitioning through RSOI.

- e. Yes.
- f. Yes.
- g. Yes.
- h. No. If I had known more about what issues were going to be discussed, I would have found out I was better suited for another group.
- i. Yes.
- j. Yes.
- k. Minimum background and experience in seaport operations, but was able to contribute. Been in SPOD business for 3 months.
- l. Yes.
- m. I hope it did. It didn't help having unplanned issues discussed.
- n. Yes.
- o. Yes.
- p. Yes.
- q. I hope so. I felt that I had information that was valuable to the group.

13. *Was there sufficient time allotted to resolving the issues presented in the Read Ahead Package?*

- a. Yes.
- b. No. Read Ahead issues were much too ambitious for 2-hour work group sessions, especially since it took time to develop a common group understanding of the focus.
- c. No.
- d. Although issues in Read Ahead were somewhat modified (evolved) through discussion, most of all topics in Read Ahead were covered.
- e. Difficult to work effectively with time allotted. Seemed that we were moving toward predetermined findings.
- f. No.
- g. Not even close. Too many issues listed in the Read Ahead.
- h. Yes.
- i. No. Issues were not "easy" and required more time.
- j. Sufficient time was planned, but we spent so much time in other areas that we didn't touch most of the issues in the packet.
- k. Yes, but it might have been nice to get it a week or two earlier. There was no resolution of issues at the Rock Drill.
- l. Yes.
- m. No. Couldn't pursue an issue to completion and stay with the brief back schedule.

- n. Read Ahead Package was good for just that - read ahead. Should not have been used after arrival.
- o. No. Too much crammed into too small time.
- p. The APOD group never looked at the Read Ahead Package. The mission very quickly became build the Friday briefing.

14. *Was the size of your Working Group about right? (Too many/too few members?)*

- a. Yes.
- b. Yes.
- c. Too many.
- d. Yes. Was not too small. More than one or two additional would have made it too large.
- e. Yes.
- f. OK.
- g. Correct.
- h. About right, but room too small.
- i. About right.
- j. Just right.
- k. Yes.
- l. Yes, small is better.
- m. Yes.
- n. About right. Only 20 percent really participated.
- o. Acceptable.
- p. Too many.
- q. Yes. Good makeup.
- r. Size was OK. Any more would have been too many.

15. *Were the plenary sessions following each Working Group session useful? Were they long enough? Too long?*

- a. Yes, at times far too far into weeds.
- b. Yes, but need only one per day.
- c. Too frequent. Groups spent one hour discussing, one hour preparing for presentation at plenary session. Plenary sessions often dragged on. Dialog was not as fruitful. Should have only had one brief back per day.
- d. Yes.
- e. Tuesday afternoon session too long.
- f. CG dominated them. Many people felt he was trying to reshape work group issues into his own.

- g. Yes.
- h. Too long.
- i. Yes, useful and long enough.
- j. Very useful to allow everyone to see what the other work groups were doing. However, it was most obvious here that what would be presented was CG view of the world.
- k. They were rehearsals for the final brief, or a rehash of old discussions by new people.
- l. CG should not run them. He stifled group initiative by dragging each presenter into the style of presentation/train of thought that he would use if he were the briefer.
- m. NO! CG presence was the #1 detriment to the Rock Drill.
- n. We should brief at end of day. Also it seemed we abandoned the flow for that.
- o. The focus in these sessions was clearly building the briefings and not resolving issues.

16. *What lessons did you learn? What lessons did you see "re-learned"?*

- a. Education of Army structure as to what RSOI is and what it involves.
- b. I have a better understanding of all the players in RSOI and the complexity of coordinating all aspects of it. We must get away from looking at RSOI as deployments and therefore a transportation issue. RSOI is very much a multi-functional operation.
- c. Some of our plans have not addressed RSOI issued as fully as they need to.
- d. The deployment process has not significantly changed. Our awareness of activities, enablers, programs to enhance throughput, etc., have come a long way over the past 8 to 10 years. We (Army) continue to do it better as these initiatives develop and come on line.
- e. We need automation programs written as integrated RSOI; we are Joint going into theater.
- f. Believe C2 group would have benefitted by some C2.
- g. Excellent.
- h. Better understanding of RSOI.
- i. Successful, rewarding, but need to continue after collection and organization of all work group results. Became more familiar with seaport operations and functions of the key units/agencies responsible for making SPOD and RSOI work.
- j. We re-learn the same lessons each exercise and deployment. When will solutions be implemented? Will they be supported by the leadership? Will they be supported (funded) by Congress?
- k. RSOI is not logistics. It is operations with heavy logistical implications.
- l. That the Transportation Corps' purpose was to protect Army watercraft, a useless piece of inventory.

- m. Nobody knows about the LOC as a whole.
- n. RSOI is a very complex business. Most participants understood portions of the process, but very few understood the whole process.

17. *What were the three best aspects of the exercise? Three worst aspects of the exercise?*

- a. Best – Discussions. Cross-theater interactions. Identified Theater unique items.
Worst – Lack of objectives. Changes to objectives. Lack of scenario TPFDD. Going from weed to macro to weed.
- b. Best – Interaction of the different organizations represented.
Worst – Objectives too broad to really analyze and resolve issues.
- c. Best – Exchange of ideas on RSOI. This is the most detailed information on RSOI I have heard to date.
Worst – Too many issues to solve during time allowed. Confusion on desired outcome of groups.
- d. Best – Initial day (overview) presentations (video, group discussions, general officer feedback).
Worst – Plenary sessions, presentation preparation (too much time waiting while not maximizing expertise and dialog opportunity).
- e. Best – First day, demos, tables and visual aids.
Worst – Wasted afternoon (Thursday), CG was too detailed, Transportation Group Commanders in briefs seemed personal.
- f. Best – Professional exchanges, openness, structure.
Worst – Time for discussion too limited, ability to scope issues not workable, bleacher seating - poor screen view.
- g. Best – Subject Matter Experts from different organizations with numerous input; exercise expressed complexity of RSOI; defined issues for resolution at the general officer level.
- h. Best – Working with other organizations; demonstrations; presentation of issues to general officers if they work them.
Worst – Changed focus too often, too many issues initially.
- i. Best – RSOI overview by COL Fletcher, small group session set up, back briefs twice daily.
Worst – Work group didn't cover Read Ahead Packet work group daily questions; initial conference opened a lot of issues that still need to be worked before doctrine is written.
- j. Best – Demos/brief Monday was a “good once over the world,” excellent opportunity to cross-walk with other branches, Services, agencies; problems yet to be resolved are now obvious.
Worst – Focus was too much on transportation, the “R” in “RSOI”; still no clear view of required structure responsible for staging operations (matching troops and equipment); no handouts, nothing to take back to show outcome of week.

- k. Best – It educated a lot of these folks; hopefully it made them think.
Worst – Not joint; variance from the script was not rewarded. Too bad, because it limited discussion.
- l. Best – Good collection of expertise in narrow areas helped educate all of us. 28 minute video and walk through were well rehearsed and beneficial.
Worst – All group leaders and briefers were Transportation Corps officers, giving the appearance of parochialism. Session 1 was wasted; group leaders had predetermined what the outcome was going to be.
- m. Best – Key personnel involvement. Discussion.
Worst – CG. Emphasis on Transportation Corps. Pre-canned issues and answers.
- n. Best – Good support. Excellent info. Informative.
Worst – Throwing out the Read Ahead Packet. Not allowing group to go their own way.
- o. Best – Read Ahead and overview briefing by COL Fletcher were excellent looks at RSOI.
Worst – The group sessions did not allow enough time to drill down into an issue and get ready for the briefing.

18. *Did the exercise give you a better understanding of theater LOC operations? of the RSOI process?*

- a. No. Yes.
- b. Yes.
- c. Yes.
- d. Absolutely. Will use materials for future use and duty position.
- e. Yes.
- f. Yes, Yes.
- g. Yes.
- h. Yes, to include the RSOI process.
- i. Yes to both. Will be useful in my current assignment.
- j. Yes to both.
- k. No, LOC operations were totally glossed over. Entire focus was transportation, not supply.
- l. No. It added confusion because participants didn't seem to be able to operate at a conceptual level, reverting to fixed scenario, details, parochial roles, and "the way we did it way back when."
- m. No, because of my background; I had a reasonable understanding before arrival. But it was a good educational tool for those who only understand pieces of it.
- n. Yes.
- o. Yes.

p. Yes.

19. *Based on the exercise, do you have any suggestions for additions to or modifications of the Draft FM 100-17-3 (RSOI)?*

- a. Address personnel accountability.
- b. Yes – get a draft out ASAP throughout the Army for input and comments. Many units and higher HQ have lots of good input, but they need to see the draft FM so they can provide input based on their experiences.
- c. Medical Early Entry Modules (MRI TAAAOs) will fall under ASCC not TSC/CSG. Medical LNO at TSG/TSC/CSG a must.
- d. Believe the combatant command relationships should be shown on all charts – some confusion.
- e. Include input from Combat Support branches.
- f. Need to identify responsibilities of each node.
- g. Publish soon.
- h. I haven't seen or read it yet.
- i. Doctrine must not be written by transportation alone – all Combat Service Support must review and add to doctrine. Army doctrine must include/influence Joint doctrine.
- j. 100-17-3 needs a lot of help as a standalone document, but more importantly – why even develop Army RSOI doctrine? The Army will never do it in anything other than a Joint environment.
- k. No.
- l. Haven't seen the draft.
- m. The LOC must be addressed, i.e. how one is set up - the variables.

20. *How would you improve the exercise?*

- a. Better developed scenario, actually look at how TPFDD is really developed.
- b. Focus the next exercise on the details of RSOI. One work group for reception, one for staging, one for onward movement, one for integration. Provide a specific TPFDD to work through the process; must have specifics in order to help define issues.
- c. Need more exercises to resolve all the issues, or need to limit the number of issued during the exercise.
- d. Increase group discussion session, decrease plenary sessions, limit time on brief backs.
- e. Lay real objectives out and how deliverables will be used.
- f. Focus work groups better and set out issue format.
- g. Incorporate OPLAN briefing and do a walk through of RSOI.

- h. If plan is to always brief general officers then real data (TPFDD, etc.) must be available to fully develop issues.
- i. Conference needs to be continued to ensure resolution of all work group questions. Some work group questions dependent on responses from other work group, e.g. C2.
- j. Prevent control/over-control of work groups by one individual/organization to allow honest, "global" view of RSOI from all players perspectives.
- k. Make it Joint, let the working groups loose to brainstorm, come up with real community issues.
- l. Really Rock Drill the process on the tarp board and sand tables. Have a knowledgeable deploying brigade representative try to move through the process and interact with real players at each node. Then you can see the data requirements and information flow requirements in order to accelerate the throughput.
- m. No general officers until Friday. Reduce Working Group to 8 persons. No strap hangers, no rovers.
- n. Put it in smaller pieces.
- o. Limit the focus to one issue per group and really work that issue.

21. *Do you have any suggestions for topics or themes for future Rock Drill Exercises?*

- a. Sustainment operations at early phase of deployment more important; sustainment requirements for total theater, not just Army.
- b. Use the next Rock Drill to help model/outline the detailed operations in each stage of RSOI.
- c. We need a practical exercise to train our CPT, MAJ, E-8, E-9s.
- d. Need to walk through an OPLAN.
- e. Topics proposed in Read Ahead look good.
- f. At times during daily back briefs, it seemed that Rock Drill outcome was determined regardless of what we agreed on during work group sessions.
- g. Make it Joint.
- h. The installation as a forces projection platform.
- i. LOC Operations.
- j. Narrow the focus to one part of RSOI and fully develop issues and solutions.

APPENDIX D
ACRONYMS

APPENDIX D

ACRONYMS

ADVONS	Advanced Echelons
AMC	Air Mobility Command
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
BRACE	Base Resource and Capability Estimator
ELIST	Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
KBLPS	Knowledge Based Logistics Planning Shell
LMSR	Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off
LOC	Lines of Communication
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
PORTISM	Port Simulation
PSA	Port Support Activity
RIB	Rapid Inflatable Breakwater
RRDF	Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facilities
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
SLRP	Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party
SPOD	Sea Port of Debarkation
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data

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The Force Deployment Rock Drill exercise was conducted at Fort Eustis, Virginia from 18 to 22 November 1996. The sponsor of the exercise was the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Headquarters, U.S. Army; the executing organization was the U.S. Army Transportation School. The objectives of the exercise were to educate the deployment community on Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI); refine command relationships; demonstrate force structure impacts on time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) flow; and refine the strategy for improving force projection. The Institute for Defense Analyses assisted the Transportation School in planning and conducting the exercise. This document is the After Action Report containing an assessment of the exercise and recommendations for future exercises.

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