



The DTIC Review

Terrorism, Peacekeeping, and Operations Other Than War

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The DTIC Review

Terrorism, Peacekeeping, and Operations Other Than War

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FOREWORD

As the world's accepted preeminent power, American military strength and leadership are essential around the globe. The world community is under assault from those who deal in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crimes, and drugs. The dangers we face today are more diverse.

"Terrorism, Peacekeeping, and Operations Other than War" is an important and timely topic for this issue of *The DTIC Review*. *The DTIC Review* brings its readers the full text of selected technical reports as well as a bibliography of other references of interest under one cover. This unique format provides our readership with a sampling of documents from our collection dedicated to a particular topic of current interest. The editorial staff hope you find this effort of value and appreciate your comments.



Kurt N. Molholm
Administrator

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INTRODUCTION

Stability of many regions around the world is in question and requires United States intervention in time of crisis. As the world's accepted preeminent power, American military strength and leadership are essential around the globe. The world community is under assault from those who deal in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crimes, and drugs.

In February of 1996, the White House issued a publication entitled "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." The strategy recognized new and old security challenges facing America in this new international context. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Potential threats in the Indian Subcontinent, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and in Mexico, our own hemisphere, corroborates the need for an active American effort and continued peace enforcement operations.

Operations other than war (OOTW) represent any conflict short of war, and there are dozens of activities that fall under OOTW. Increased security, prosperity, and the advancement of democracy are success indicators of the Administration's strategy.

The documents included in this issue of *The DTIC Review* represent viewpoints and theories to counter these emerging threats. **"Terrorism, Peacekeeping, and Operations Other than War"** is an important and timely topic for this issue of *The DTIC Review*. *The DTIC Review* brings its readers the full text of selected technical reports as well as a bibliography of other references of interest under one cover. This unique format provides our readership with a sampling of documents from our collection dedicated to a particular topic of current interest. The editorial staff hope you find this effort of value and appreciate your comments.

DOCUMENT 1

Security Assistance Support: Providing for the National Security or A Cause of Instability: Are We at the Crossroads of Change?

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April 1996

United States Army War College

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UNCLASSIFIED

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Security Assistance Support

Providing for the National Security

or

A Cause of Instability

Are We At the Crossroads of Change?

by

Colonel John J. Weeden

1 April 1996

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"The U.S. conventional arms transfer policy promotes restraint, both by the U.S. and other suppliers, in transfers of weapons systems that may be destabilizing or dangerous to international peace, at the same time, the policy supports transfers that meet legitimate defense requirements of our friends and allies, in support of our national security and foreign policy interests..."

Extracted from Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 34), White House Fact Sheet on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, 17 February 1995.

In a statement before Congress, General Colin Powell spoke about the United States' interests in security assistance policy. His philosophy regarding collective security and international stability was oriented to those countries the United States considers friendly:

"Dollars invested to help friends and allies build indigenous military capabilities and to gain their confidence

bring tremendous returns in helping the U.S. to meet its regional objectives." ¹

He expressed concern, however, for potential problems arising from one country's engagement in policies directed toward another country's need to protect itself from its enemies. It was his opinion that the large diversity of causes of instability would result in greater demands on the United States to provide friendly countries with support to assist them in defending against their regional enemies. He contended that some countries "will be undemocratic; and many will be threatened by internal unrest, terrorism, drug runners, or guerrillas. As a result, they will be natural candidates for many forms of security assistance." ²

A certain rationale regarding the appropriateness of the United States in providing military resources to qualifying countries was evident throughout his testimony. Certainly, questions might arise as to why the United States would employ this tactic since there may be no discernible threat to its own national security. Powell professed that there is a correlation between a support-receiving state and the United States when considering potential conflict within the supported state: "When we nurture the capability of other nations to protect their own national security interests, we are effectively lessening the

potential for greater burdens on our own forces and furthering the cause of regional security cooperation." ³

General Powell saw appreciable value in security assistance programs. However, in that security assistance is comprised of many forms of economic, training, and military assistance, there are differing views concerning the level of ubiquity on the part of the United States in implementing these programs. R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on 1 January 1995. In relation to General Powell's statements, Woolsey debated the value of security assistance. The concern he expressed to Congress was that "[advanced conventional weapons and technology] are a growing military threat... [and] have the potential to significantly alter military balances, and disrupt military operations and cause significant U.S. casualties." ⁴ Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency at the time, in testimony before the same Senate committee on 10 January 1995, voiced similar concern about other countries' acquisition of technology and weapon systems that, if employed, "won't lead to military defeat of U.S. forces, [but] certainly hold out the prospect of casualties." ⁵

These differing views posit questions regarding the rise of security assistance as an effective political, economic, and military tool used to enhance the security of U.S. allies and

friendly nations. The United States is an arms-producing country whose goal is to avoid creating any degree of instability or conflict by the injection of security assistance into what may have otherwise been a stable nation or region.

By definition, "security assistance" is a broad topic which provides for defense articles, military training, and sales of military equipment for the official purpose of "enhancing regional stability of areas of the world facing external rather than internal threats." ⁶ Components of security assistance include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO). The focus of this article will be on Foreign Military Sales and arms sales. "Foreign Military Sales" will be defined as a "nonappropriated program through which governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States." ⁷

As an arms-exporting country, the United States is cognizant of the potential diminution of regional stability resulting from the foreign military sales component of security assistance to a recipient country. All FMS activities are evaluated "in the context of their impact on social and economic development programs and recipient countries, and for their impact on regional arms races." ⁸

The basis for what is now referred to as "security assistance" is found in the principle legislation, The Arms Export Control Act of 1976. It was during President Nixon's administration that new national security doctrine was promulgated, "emphasizing sending arms instead of troops to defend U.S. interests." ⁹ Commonly referred to as the "Nixon Doctrine", it transitioned from a policy providing military aid to a policy encompassing weapons sales. Those sales grew at a prodigious rate. "U.S. foreign arms sales jumped from \$1.4 billion in 1971 to over \$16 billion by 1975." ¹⁰ Congress became alarmed at this rapidly burgeoning policy of marketing arms and thereby positioning the United States for unwanted overseas conflicts.

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 attempted to reform the runaway arms sales policies and to "bring about arrangements to reduce international trade in implements of war and to lessen the danger of outbreak of regional conflict and the burdens of armaments." ¹¹ Presidents since Nixon have tailored their security assistance policies commensurably with their political philosophies and economic interests. By his Presidential Directive 13 (PD 13), President Carter made an ineffective attempt to control the magnitude of foreign military sales and assistance but, like his predecessors, saw arms transfers and security assistance as a foreign policy instrument. He believed

that the use of security assistance as a political tool had value in "shoring up allies like the beleaguered Shah of Iran, maintaining a 'balance of power' in volatile regions of the Middle East, and paving the way for U.S. military intervention..."¹²

The United States is undeniably engaged in the big business of marketing arms and military services. Is there a nexus between being the undisputed reigning purveyor of these articles and services and the national security interests of the United States? The Cold War culminated with the world transitioning from a bipolar international system to one dominated by a single superpower, albeit non-hegemonic. The United States stands as the principle leader of the free world with no serious global rival. In assessing threats to America's security, then, the essence of the discussion must certainly contain comments on the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. "Now that the defense of Saudi Arabia and mastery of its oil resources [has] been duly anointed as a 'vital national security interest' of the United States, the question [is] how to best...secure that interest."¹³

The Gulf War saw many state actors combine their military forces in a coalition to repel the aggression of a rogue state. In evaluating the United States' security assistance to the region following the war, the bond between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has been sealed by the commitment of the former to

maintain regional stability by increasing its assistance by way of arms transfers, although the Bush administration, at the time, sought to curb weapons export to that region. However, "even without a credible enemy to justify the billions of dollars in U.S. transfers to the region...U.S. sales [have] accelerated, accounting for 57 percent of weapons deals in the region from 1989 through 1992." ¹⁴ Ironically, a 1987 U.S. Naval War College statement regarding U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf was less prophetic than most analysts would have desired when that policy contended that "a key element...is security assistance and arms sales programs. U.S. weapons and associated training help our friends in the region address their legitimate defense needs, deter a spillover from the Iran-Iraq war, and reduce the possibility that U.S. forces would have to intervene in a crisis." ¹⁵

The United States has committed to remaining actively engaged militarily around the globe. Policy calls for power projection of U.S. forces and the strengthening of our alliances. President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement requires that U.S. forces be prepared to quickly deploy and fight. The National Military Strategy supports the tenets of Clinton's plan by viewing security assistance in peacetime engagement as a vital element intended to "improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals,

relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability." ¹⁶

Ostensibly, the National Military Strategy calls for "cooperative programs" which focus on coalition designs and commitments with friendly countries. "Providing vital training and U.S.-manufactured weapons systems increases the access and influence of the U.S. military and improves the interoperability of [these] potential coalition members." ¹⁷ This strategy also asserts that security assistance "deters aggression in unstable regions and provides a cost-effective alternative to maintaining larger U.S. forces in the region." ¹⁸

Generally, if one deduces that the United States alone cannot be expected to safeguard the free world's security interests, then security assistance and foreign military financing would call for friendly nations to share the overall burden of collective and regional security. By reducing the likelihood of direct U.S. involvement in unstable regions or potential areas of conflict, this theory becomes most efficacious with the reduced demands on U.S. military resources. However, do U.S. policies on security assistance and the supplying of arms promote stability, or do they increase the likelihood of conflict? Is the commonality of arms truly a hallmark of coalition warfare? Is the United States creating a "forward presence" and resident access to overseas bases, or is it simply fueling the fires of conflict by its security assistance

policies? Are allies and friendly nations being provided assistance and support against discernible enemies, or simply against abstractions like "regional instability" and theoretical uncertainties? Are security assistance policies consistent with the United States' national security interests, or are they primarily only an extension of special interests? These questions fuel the debate on whether national security strategies, policies, and doctrine, as they regard security assistance, are esoteric and irrelevant or legitimate and purposive.

On 17 February 1995, President Clinton promulgated his policy on conventional arms transfers by his Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-34). In that document, he supports the continuum that his predecessors established regarding the relationship security assistance and military sales have with foreign policy and domestic economic considerations. He asserted that "transfers of conventional arms [are] a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy when they enable us to help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional stability, and increase interoperability of U.S. forces and allied forces."¹⁹ On the one hand, the policy adduces an essential relational connection whose characteristics are formed by sophisticated weaponry and military articles and services provided under the provisions of U.S. law to friendly countries

for the ostensible purpose of promoting stability and fostering those political and economic objectives considered worthy and desirable. On the other hand, Clinton's policy fails to identify or even imply "that conventional arms control in general would serve U.S. security interests; nowhere does it acknowledge any connection between the global spread of conventional arms and regional warfare and instability." ²⁰

In 1993, U.S. foreign military sales accounted for \$22.5 billion, or 70 percent of the world market. In that year, over 140 countries received U.S. military articles and services. ²¹ Arguments may be made about providing assistance to U.S. friends and allies in support of future coalition warfare and to create a commonality of weapon systems. However, in that over 50 wars occurred during 1993-94, and in considering the magnitude of the U.S. security assistance effort, there is concern by some over the fact that this assistance is being obtained by Third World, undemocratic regions, and that those activities are in fact fanning the fires of ethnic and territorial conflict. A 1995 report published by the World Policy Institute points out:

- From FY 85 through 94, parties to 45 conflicts have taken delivery of over \$42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry.
- Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts occurring during 1993-94, 90 percent (45 of 50) involved

one or more parties that had received U.S. weapons or military technology in the period leading up to conflict.

- In 18 of 50 [conflicts], the United States has been a major supplier to at least one side in the dispute.
- As of the end of 1994, the United States was providing military goods and services to more than half (26 of 50) of the countries involved in internal or external conflicts.²²

This may be no more than an extension of an American attitude concerning the relative importance of security assistance, arms sales, and military assistance when viewed in terms of economic security within a capitalist state. In today's buyer's market of military articles and services, the United States is a leading competitor in filling the demand. Indeed, President Clinton may see this form of commerce as a vital component in the U.S. equation that provides for the economic well-being of the U.S. arms industry and, in turn, the economy. The perceived international benefit of this would be the promotion of regional stability and balance of power. It appears somewhat paradoxical, though, when assistance is provided to opposing sides of conflict concurrently: Greece/Turkey and Persian Gulf sheikdoms/Israel for example.

Presidential Decision Directive 34 includes the goal of promoting "restraint, both by the United States and other

suppliers, in transfers of weapon systems." Ironically, the "Pentagon forecasts that the U.S. share of the world's arms market will increase from about 50 percent in 1993 to 63 percent by the year 2000."²³ U.S. weapons exported during 1994 by the use of several security assistance programs include 702 battle tanks, 1,036 armored combat vehicles, 127 large caliber artillery, 82 combat aircraft, 5 attack helicopters, and 324 missiles and launchers.²⁴ Mr. Frank Besson, Director of Security Assistance for the Army, has noted that arms sales are "big business for the Army". As of December 1995, the Army was tracking more than 5,000 active foreign military sales cases worth about \$47 billion.

The activity mentioned above is representative of the size and scope of the arms export and sales side of Army security assistance. It is apparent that the technical quality and potential lethality of the items is extremely high. In revisiting Director Woolsey's warnings, weapon systems, technology, and assistance delivered by the United States to countries throughout the world may pose a dilemma for military planners and strategists. The United States has been engaged in military operations in several conflicts since 1990, including those in Somalia, Panama, Haiti, Iraq, and Bosnia. Each of these countries, except Bosnia, had received U.S. security assistance including training, weapon systems, and military technology.

Whether or not the use of this equipment and knowledge obtained from U.S.-provided assistance contributed in any way to an increased threat to U.S. forces is unclear. For example, the fact that Somalia's dictator Mohamed Siad Barre may have been advantaged by the receipt of U.S. small arms, mortars, and artillery, draws attention to the need to further define U.S. national security interest as it relates to peace-keeping operations and support to countries whose political structure is non-democratic.

Surely, the United States has enjoyed technological supremacy and military superiority in recent engagements and will always be faced by opposing forces in a variety of environments over which there is little control. Knowledge of the enemy's weapons and military technology could prove advantageous--on the other hand, those systems, if used against U.S. forces, may pose real and legitimate problems. "I'd much rather go to war against a country that has bought U.S. equipment, than a country that's bought comparable equipment from France, or from Russia, or from Israel, or from any other country." ²⁵ Rear Admiral John Snyder, Deputy Director of the Naval International Programs Office, expressed his opinion about the advantage that planners have when they know the enemy's equipment. "If they got the equipment from the United States, I know damn well what they got in their inventory, I know what their readiness is...I also know what

their tactics are, and I know how to defeat their weapons." ²⁶

Secretary of Defense William Perry echoed this observation last year when he said that "U.S. forces must be prepared to face a wide variety of systems, including some previously produced in the United States." ²⁷

Admiral Snyder raised an interesting example which shows conflict arising from the debate on whether U.S. policy is based on rhetorical derivations as seen in papers and statements, or on the enhancement and sustenance of the U.S. defense industrial base. Clinton's policy on assistance tends to support and maintain the current defense industrial complex. The debate on whether the lives of U.S. service members are put at risk when they are committed to military action in regional conflicts because of this policy appears to wane in the shadow of commercial motivations. The declaratory statements regarding restraint are therefore obfuscated by the rhetoric of politics.

Thorough exploration of the relationship of security assistance and foreign military sales to the domestic economic impact on the United States is appropriate since such assistance has been viewed as "contributing to full employment, serving as an instrument of (domestic and foreign) political influence supporting industrial policies by providing a legitimate venue for the monetary support of high technology industries and sustaining a national autonomy by supporting a national arms

industry." ²⁸ A plausible deduction from this is that security assistance is viewed as a political tool used to link a domestic economy to foreign policy and diplomacy. In turn, the exportation of military technology is limited by the potential of that technology to threaten forces of the exporter or its allies were recipient nations to become adversaries.

The economic reality of President Clinton's arms transfer policy is clearly stated in PDD-34. He directs that "the impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base [will be taken into account] whether [a] sale is approved or not." As with preceding administrations, the Clinton administration evaluates the economic impact of security assistance decisions. The Defense Advisory Group was established by the State Department to offer advice regarding the commercial aspect of weapon sales. Fifty-seven of the Group's 60 members represent the arms industry. Whether the State Department's and President Clinton's decisions are affected by this Group is a reasonable concern; that the Group's recommendations may be based more on being a caretaker for military contractors than on providing an impartial conduit for decision-making is clear. This may be inconsistent with the Group's responsibility to recognize risks to U.S. security interests and armed forces associated with security assistance activities.

What would be the effect of a substantial reduction in U.S. foreign military sales? A 1992 Congressional Budget Office study provides an answer to that question. If there was a substantial cut in sales to the Middle East, for example, it would "affect less than 2 percent of all defense workers and less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the nation's total work force." ²⁹ This hardly represents a grave threat to the U.S. economy. However, politicians at all levels acquiesce to the demands of the defense industry because of the political fallout that would result if jobs--regardless of the number--were affected by their decisions. Industry is then the winner in a favorable economic environment co-created and reinforced by the government sector. This environment is continuously fed by the system that created it. "The U.S. Army [for example] is revamping its system for handling foreign military sales to improve coordination with industry and boost exports of Army-related equipment." ³⁰ Another indicator of the economic side of this business is seen in the charter of The Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM). It calls for training Pentagon bureaucrats and military personnel in the art of arms sales, and administering a multi-billion dollar industry on behalf of U.S. military contractors. It truly is a big business.

Another dimension of arms sales is the offset arrangements associated with foreign military sales which are financed through

the U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF). Offsets are generally deferred as industrial and commercial compensation practices provided to foreign government customers. They are inducements for purchasing military goods and services.

Foreign governments who make large weapons purchases from the United States bring, in some cases, significant financial impact on their countries, which can result in a political downside and domestic displeasure. Therefore, the United States attempts to ameliorate that situation by providing U.S. grant aid (a form of cash assistance) or loans through the FMF program for the purpose of purchasing U.S. weapons and assistance. No other arms supplier provides offsets as large as does the United States.

The Arms Export Control Act directs that FMF loans and grants will not be used for procurements outside the United States. A 1990 policy on offsets has as an exception a provision that U.S. funds may pay for offsets in security assistance transactions in accordance with "currently established policies and procedures." Since that phrase was undefined in the Act, the policy has resulted in providing for no prohibition on U.S. funds used for offsets in security assistance sales.

There are several elements of offset agreements to consider: Coproduction agreements allow foreign countries to produce all or part of a U.S. weapon system overseas. Foreign Military

financing assistance is provided by the U.S.; Buybacks allow foreign countries to produce defense components related to U.S. weapon systems being acquired by that country. The U.S. then purchases these components from the foreign country; Procurements are purchases of foreign-produced components of weapon systems that are not being acquired by the foreign country. There is a quid pro quo factor that requires the U.S. manufacturer to purchase unrelated military components in exchange for a foreign country's purchasing other components or systems from the U.S.; Corporate investment on the part of the U.S. in non-defense firms in foreign countries in exchange for those countries' investment in U.S. companies not engaged in defense-related industries.

Regarding buybacks and procurements, it is clear that the United States not only pays for foreign-made components, but that those components ultimately become part of U.S. weapon systems purchased by the U.S. military as a result of the offset. This may be a questionable business practice to some.

Foreign Military Financing, a component of U.S. security assistance, is a vital part of U.S. foreign policy relevant to national interests and international security. With respect to the discussion on the economic impact of security assistance activity, "offsets reduce the employment, industrial, and other economic benefits that normally accrue to the United States from foreign military sales." ³¹ The net result of offsets can cause

the loss of U.S. employment because of, in some cases, the requirement for U.S. industry to subcontract from foreign countries business that would have normally been performed in the United States. On 6 October 1994, 32,000 Boeing machinists went on strike in several states. Their strike focused on offsets and those agreements that required Boeing to direct production, work, and technology back to the foreign government making the purchase under the provisions of the Defense Procurement Act of 1992 as a condition of the sale.

In recounting the discussion regarding the correlation of foreign military sales to the support and sustenance of U.S. industry, and assuming, correctly or not, that the political claim that U.S. foreign military sales sustain American jobs, it becomes apparent that these decisions actually dilute U.S. employment and cause economic strain and damage to U.S.-based businesses. "Increased international competition allows customers to extract very favorable deals from suppliers. Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis said in 1993 that 'the demand for offsets is growing with practically every arms purchaser demanding some form of offset.'" ³²

Employment concerns and economic impact notwithstanding, "direct" offsets, whereby a foreign country making a purchase receives work and technology directly related to a U.S. weapon system by way of producing the system or its components, may give

rise to serious security considerations. Tacit approval is given by the United States to foreign countries to enhance their own arms industries through this program, one over which the U.S. has little, if any, control.

"While offsets are an integral part of the world marketplace, they are not needed to assure a sale of a U.S. weapon system and may not be appropriate when the purchasing country is using FMF funding."³³ Again, the United States stands alone as an arms supplier who provides security assistance and allows offsets.

The Foreign Assistance Act provides authority to the President to draw down defense articles in certain exigent situations. The purpose of this Act is to provide military assistance to a foreign country with the assumption that the requirement cannot be satisfied in other ways. The military articles come from stocks of The Department of Defense. The President's drawdown authority includes equipment, defense services, and military education and training. The aggregate value of a drawdown is limited to \$75 million. Since 1993, the U.S. Army has been notified to conduct eight drawdowns accounting for \$74 million. During the same period, the U.S. Navy and Air Force drew down \$10.8 and \$11.3 million, respectively. Since 1980, the services have been subject to \$780 million in drawdowns as the result of Presidential authority.³⁴

An alternative to the outright sale of military articles is leasing. Imbedded in the law, the President is given authority to lease articles if "he determines that there are compelling foreign policy and national security reasons for providing such articles on a lease basis rather than on a sales basis..."³⁵ A requirement of the country contracting to lease U.S. equipment is that it pay the United States all costs associated with the lease. Leases are limited to five years and need to be justified by the President to Congress unless an emergency exists which threatens the national security interest of the United States, and therefore requires immediate action on the lease.

A need for international defense cooperation among the United States and countries with whom it is friendly or allied justifies providing U.S.-exported military articles and services. This is especially true in regard to developing countries whose need for defense equipment cannot be met internally, and, if adequately armed, whose armed forces would work cooperatively with those of the United States in defeating or deterring aggression. Sales of such articles are approved when seen as being consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States. Also as a matter of policy, the United States evaluates the recipient country's financial ability to pay for the assistance. It also assesses the social and economic impact produced by the receipt of the articles and assistance.

As a leader in the world community, the United States has always sought to lessen the potential of outbreak of regional conflict. There is a financial side to U.S. endeavors in this area: The Arms Export Control Act requires that all financial obligations to the United States, when collected, be transferred to the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury. A requirement of law is that "sales of defense articles and defense services which could have significant adverse effect on the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be kept to an absolute minimum." ³⁶ The President, therefore, is required to inform Congress of his intent to sell defense articles and services if there is a potential adverse effect on the combat readiness of the armed forces. The law also requires that the President justify sales by certifying that they are important to the security of the United States.

The Congress of the United States was concerned about military readiness and the relationship security assistance has to the security of the U.S. The effect this program has on military readiness is generally immeasurable because of the certification process provided by law and regulations regarding the subject. However, it has always been a command imperative to carefully consider any impact security assistance activity has on military readiness. For example, the decision that the U.S. Army will spend \$1.2 billion over the next three years to upgrade M-1

tanks to the M-1A2 configuration for export only to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia certainly has been subjected to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act that regard readiness and to the scrutiny and opinion of America's military leadership.

With respect to the security of the United States, the provisions of law regarding this issue were extrapolated to various security assistance proposals, including the Clinton administration proposal to sell to Turkey 120 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) which, heretofore, have not been sold to any foreign country. "The administration says the \$130 million deal will further U.S. foreign policy and national security by improving the military capabilities of Turkey while enhancing weapon system standardization and interoperability."³⁷ A formidable weapon system contracted by Loral Corporation of Camden, Arkansas, the ATACMS was quite effective in the Persian Gulf War. "According to the Pentagon's 1992 report... 'During one ATACMS strike, more than 200 unarmored vehicles were destroyed as they attempted to cross a bridge.'" ³⁸

What does the future hold for security assistance programs? Are we at the crossroads of deciding whether to carry on business as usual or to revamp the entire system in order to promote international security and stability and to fully satisfy the intent of the legislation? Congressional purview over just one component of the security assistance system, foreign military

sales, is clearly defined by the fact that it seeks "to initiate multilateral discussions for the purpose of reaching agreements among the principle arms suppliers and arms purchasers and other countries with respect to the control of the international trade of armaments." ³⁹ Congress calls upon the President to keep vigil over the sale of conventional weapons and to seek arms control arrangements in his or her pursuit of restraint. Threaded throughout the Congressional charge is language expressing concern for the "national security interests of the United States", and cautions on overarming nations of the developing world. The rapacity of the less-than-developed world for U.S. military articles and services has continuously challenged the many administrations to remain loyal to the intent of the laws regarding foreign assistance and armed export control.

Policies on security assistance have evolved over time and have been influenced by the also-evolutionary world order. Administrations have consistently sought to justify assistance to countries only after having analyzed 1) their internal tensions, 2) the affect such assistance would have on regional peace, security, and stability, and 3) U.S. national security interests and the capability of the assistance along with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country as it regards its legitimate needs of security and defense. Even so, in light of

this, security assistance still presents itself as a big business enterprise of the United States. The Congressional Research Services (CRS) report, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1987-1994", indicates that the United States "exported more weaponry in 1994 than the rest of the world combined."⁴⁰ The CRS also indicates that the United States is heavily involved in the supply of articles, services, and weapons to developing countries, averaging approximately \$15 billion in sales per year. Since the end of the Cold War, assistance to developing countries from the United States has more than doubled. Furthermore, when analyzing security assistance activity on a near-term basis, and considering the administration's goal of "enlarging democracies," there appears to be a contradiction: "...even when combining developed and developing countries, dictatorial governments received 59 percent of the nearly \$80 billion of U.S. weapons transferred during [1991-1994]."⁴¹

In 1993, ethnic warfare in forty-eight countries was representative of the vicissitudes of international stability and order. The disquieting fact that thirty-six of these countries received assistance and weapons from the United States brings to focus the debate on the value and propriety this topic is given by various sectors of government and the military. Whether it is a "flawed strategic vision, political opportunism, and plain old-fashioned greed [that has produced] an aggressive arms sale

policy on the part of the U.S. government, despite the clear and growing dangers...for the security of the citizenry and the maintenance of a democratic foreign policy", ⁴² or simply a logical and orderly evolution of policy based on historical perspective and international alignment tends to create a dilemma. Those who subscribe to the former theory might use as their example a lesson learned by the United States in Afghanistan. The effort to destroy, or at least recover, Stinger antiaircraft missiles supplied to Afghan rebels in the 1980s because of the perceived threat those weapons may have for the Saudis and other U.S. allies reinforces the "flawed strategic vision" concept in the minds of those who lean that way. However, decision-makers, at the time, may have had indisputable justification for the transaction which has caused current debate.

If the United States is at a juncture in determining which direction to take in its quest to maintain peace and stability while promoting democracy in the world through the use of security assistance as a tool, then now may be an opportune time to look at alternatives. Armed chaos throughout the world has imposed a state of disorder. The infusion of imported military articles and services may contribute to this disorder. With the end of the Cold War, it may now be difficult to justify the sale of arms and services to the Third World in order to arrest

Russian aggrandizement. Ethnic strife, territorial disputes, religious separatism, and economic contests have collectively replaced the conventional Soviet threat experienced during the Cold War.

If there is a so-called policy of restraint in the marketing of U.S. military articles and services, then there should be discernible and verifiable compliance with it. The national security of the United States should be the determinant for any decisions regarding the sale of military items: the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces is superior to all other considerations. The soldier in the "fox hole" should not be affected in his ability to fight and defend himself or herself in any way because of decisions made by the political authority regarding the disposal of military equipment. The military leadership is a hedge against the largess of the military-industrial base and a promoter of peace and security while at the same time serving the Commander-in-Chief in defense of the nation. If the sale of military goods and services is seen as a threat to peace and democracy anywhere, policies should then be revisited and validated. New policies, in that respect, should be derived from lessons learned and applied to the United States' position in the community of nations. If the United States cannot unilaterally control the profusion of security assistance, in all of its forms, it should then be advisable to redress the situation by

the engagement in and expansion of talks designed to ameliorate conditions seen as destabilizing. Moratoria on arms sales may be appropriate; educating recipient countries on the need for negotiation and discourse is essential if we are to achieve change and effect success in this area.

Embedded in the identity of security assistance is a large bureaucracy that has awesome control over policies and programs for which it is responsible. If we are at a crossroads, a turn in the direction of alternative management of the program may be necessary to effect change and adaptation. The economic aspect of the program demands new policy and political conversion. The petitioning and influencing of Congress by well-organized groups may eventually have to become subordinate to the future security of not only this nation, but of all nations of the world. Any person or corporation having an influence on security assistance decisions should be subject to careful review by the executive and legislative branches of government.

Democratization of countries receiving security assistance support from the United States should always be the primary motive behind the program. A loss of a single soldier's life should never result from misplaced security assistance or political misgiving of policy. Other tools should be used by the political leadership to supplant non-democratic governments with democracies and to develop new strategic policies.

The United States cannot accomplish change by itself--in the entrenched business of security assistance, other nations need to fall in behind America's lead in its endeavor for change. All major world powers should show restraint, as the United States professes to do through its Constitutionally-empowered legislative system and executive authority. A quasi-official department, internationally appointed and not affiliated with the United Nations, should be designed and implemented under the auspices of member nations. The United States should take the lead in this consortium in developing new procedures applicable to the world community for all security assistance activity.

In the interim, "In April, experts from 28 countries will meet in Vienna to launch the Warrenaar Arrangements to coordinate exports of conventional arms...and help track potentially destabilizing military buildups around the world."⁴³ This forum may become the new "manifest destiny" of the United States, leading the global community into a newly-defined environment of international relationships whose basis is cooperation and stability for the 21st Century.

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DOCUMENT 2

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

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The White House



A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
FEBRUARY 1996

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Preface

Protecting our nation's security — our people, our territory and our way of life — is my Administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty. America's security imperatives, however, have fundamentally changed. The central security challenge of the past half century — the threat of communist expansion — is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large-scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions. And the threat to our open and free society from the organized forces of terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking is greater as the technological revolution, which holds such promise, also empowers these destructive forces with novel means to challenge our security. These threats to our security have no respect for boundaries and it is clear that American security in the 21st Century will be determined by the success of our response to forces that operate within as well as beyond our borders.

At the same time, we have unprecedented opportunities to make our nation safer and more prosperous. Our military might is unparalleled. We now have a truly global economy linked by an instantaneous communications network, which offers increasing opportunities for American jobs and American investment. The community of democratic nations is growing, enhancing the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution, and greater dignity and hope for the people of the world. The international community is beginning to act together to address pressing global environmental needs.

Never has American leadership been more essential — to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our powerful ideals and, above all, our people. We can and must make the difference through our engagement; but our involvement must be carefully tailored to serve our interests and priorities.

This report, submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, elaborates a national security strategy that is tailored for this new era and builds upon America's unmatched strengths. Focusing on new threats and new opportunities, its central goals are:

- To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad.
- To bolster America's economic revitalization.
- To promote democracy abroad.

Over the past three years, my Administration has worked diligently to pursue these goals. This national security strategy report presents the strategy that has guided this effort. It is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing — that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Free market nations with growing economies and strong and open trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development. These goals are supported by ensuring America remains engaged in the world and by enlarging the community of secure, free market and democratic nations.

As the boundaries between threats that start outside our borders and the challenges from within are diminishing, the problems others face today can more quickly become ours, tomorrow. This is why U.S. leadership and our engagement have never been more important: if we withdraw from this world today, our citizens will have to pay the price of our neglect. We therefore measure the success of our efforts abroad, as at home, by one simple standard: Have we made the lives of the American people safer, today; have we made tomorrow better and more secure for our children?

Since my Administration began, we have been deeply engaged in efforts to realize this measure of success by meeting the goals of our strategy:

- To enhance our security, for example, we have helped achieve peace between Jordan and Israel and an Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East; brokered a comprehensive peace agreement in Bosnia and successfully deterred the spread of conflict to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; established NATO's Partnership for Peace and initiated a process that will lead to NATO's enlargement; concluded an agreement with Russia to detarget ICBMs and SLBMs; secured the accession of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and their agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons from their territory, which in turn opened the door to the ratification and entry into force of the START I Treaty and Senate advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty; led successful international efforts to secure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT; initiated negotiations on

a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), which we hope to conclude in 1996; participated in an unprecedented regional security gathering of the ASEAN countries and others, including Russia and Vietnam; reached an Agreed Framework with North Korea that halted, and will eventually eliminate, its dangerous nuclear program; and used our diplomatic support and the power of our example to give new impetus to the efforts of the people of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments to achieve a just and lasting settlement to the conflict there.

- To bolster prosperity at home and around the world, we have secured the enactment of legislation implementing both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); completed over 80 separate trade agreements; actively engaged China on trade issues through extension of its Most Favored Nation status and vigorous pursuit of China's adherence to the rules-based regime of the World Trade Organization; worked to open Asia-Pacific markets through three leaders meetings of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; lowered export controls; and held a Western Hemisphere Summit in Miami where the 34 democratic nations of this hemisphere committed themselves to negotiate a free-trade agreement by 2005.
- To promote democracy, we have supported South Africa's recent transformation; provided aid to a democratizing Russia and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union as well as Central and Eastern European nations; assisted Cambodia; advocated improvements in human rights globally through the UN urging that the rule of law replace the rule of oppressive regimes; and worked with our Western Hemisphere neighbors restoring the democratically elected government in Haiti and hosting the Summit of the Americas, which reaffirmed and strengthened our mutual commitment to democracy.

Our extraordinary diplomatic leverage to reshape existing security and economic structures and create new ones ultimately relies upon American power. Our economic and military might, as well as the power of our ideals, also makes America's diplomats the first among equals and

enables us to help create the conditions necessary for U.S. interests to thrive. Our economic strength gives us a position of advantage on almost every global issue. For instance, our efforts in South Africa and our negotiations with North Korea demonstrate how the imposition — or the threat — of economic sanctions helps us to achieve our objectives as part of our determined diplomacy. That determined diplomacy also is reflected in our consistent effort to engage in productive relations with China across a broad range of issues, including regional security, nonproliferation, human rights and trade. We seek a strategic relationship with China, advancing our own national interests in key areas. It is this steady approach — asserting America's core national security interests while keeping in mind longer-term goals — that is the hallmark of determined diplomacy.

But military force remains an indispensable element of our nation's power. Our nation must maintain military forces sufficient to deter diverse threats and, when necessary, to fight and win against our adversaries. While many factors ultimately contribute to our nation's safety and well-being, no single component is more important than the men and women who wear America's uniform and stand sentry over our security. Their skill, service and dedication constitute the core of our defenses. Today our military is the best-equipped, best-trained and best-prepared fighting force in the world. Time after time in the last three years, our troops demonstrated their continued readiness and strength: moving with lightning speed to head off another Iraqi threat to Kuwait; helping to save hundreds of thousands of lives in Rwanda; giving freedom and democracy back to the people of Haiti; and helping enforce UN mandates in the former Yugoslavia and subsequently deploying forces under NATO command to help implement the peace agreement in Bosnia. I am committed to ensuring that this military capability is not compromised.

The United States recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a great power and, at times, our global interests and ideals lead us to oppose those who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbors. At the same time, all nations should be able to expect that their borders and their sovereignty will always be secure; however, this does not mean we or the international community must tolerate gross violations of human rights within those borders.

When our national security interests are threatened, we will, as America always has, use diplomacy when we can,

but force if we must. We will act with others when we can, but alone when we must. We recognize, however, that while force can defeat an aggressor, it cannot solve underlying problems. Democracy and economic prosperity can take root in a struggling society only through local solutions carried out by the society itself. We must use military force selectively, recognizing that its use may do no more than provide a window of opportunity for a society — and diplomacy — to work.

We therefore will send American troops abroad only when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake. The courage, loyalty and willingness of our men and women in uniform to put their lives at risk is a national treasure which should never be taken for granted, but neither should we fear to employ U.S. military forces wisely. When we do so, it will be with clear objectives to which we are firmly committed and which — when combat is likely — we have the means to achieve decisively. To do otherwise, risks those objectives and endangers our troops. These requirements are as pertinent for humanitarian and other nontraditional interventions today as they were for previous generations during prolonged world wars. Modern media communications may now bring to our homes both the suffering that exists in many parts of the world and the casualties that may accompany interventions to help. But no deployment of American service members is risk-free, and we must remain clear in our purpose and resolute in its execution. And while we must continue to reassess the costs and benefits of any operation as it unfolds, reflexive calls for withdrawal of our forces when casualties are incurred would simply encourage rogue actors to try to force our departure from areas where there are U.S. interests by attacking American troops.

During the past three years, diplomacy backed by American power has produced impressive results:

- When Iraq moved forces towards Kuwait, we reacted swiftly and dispatched additional, large-scale forces to the region under the authority of the United Nations — but were prepared to act alone, if necessary.
- In Haiti, it was only when the Haitian military learned that the 82nd Airborne Division was en route that we achieved peacefully what we were prepared to do under fire.

- In Bosnia, we achieved a breakthrough when U.S. diplomatic leadership was married to appropriate military power. After the fall of Zepa and Srebrenica, the United States secured an agreement from our NATO allies to meet further assaults on the UN safe areas with a decisive military response. American pilots participated in the NATO bombing campaign following the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace, demonstrating our resolve and helping to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

U.S. leadership then seized the opportunity for peace that these developments created: U.S. diplomats, along with our Contact Group partners, brokered a cease-fire and, after intensive U.S.-led negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, a comprehensive peace agreement. U.S. forces are now working as part of a larger NATO force — joined by forces from members of NATO's Partnership for Peace — to help implement the military aspects of the agreement and create the conditions for peace to take hold.

- In Rwanda and Somalia, only the American military could have accomplished what it did in these humanitarian missions, saving hundreds of thousands of lives. However, over the longer run our interests were served by turning these operations over to multilateral peacekeeping forces once the immediate humanitarian crisis was addressed. No outside force can create a stable and legitimate domestic order for another society — that work can only be accomplished by the society itself.

Our national security strategy reflects both America's interests and our values. Our commitment to freedom, equality and human dignity continues to serve as a beacon of hope to peoples around the world. The vitality, creativity and diversity of American society are important sources of national strength in a global economy increasingly driven by information and ideas.

Our prospects in this new era are promising. The specter of nuclear annihilation has dramatically receded. The historic events of the past three years — including the handshake between Israel and the PLO, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, the transformation of South Africa to a multiracial democracy headed by President Mandela and the peace agreement to end the war in Bosnia — suggest this era's possibilities for achieving security, prosperity and democracy.

Our nation can only address this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs. We are the world's greatest power, and we have global interests as well as responsibilities. As our nation learned after World War I, we can find no security for America in isolationism nor prosperity in protectionism. For the American people to be safer and enjoy expanding opportunities, our nation must work to deter would-be aggressors, open foreign markets, promote the spread of democracy abroad, combat transnational dangers of terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime, encourage sustainable development and pursue new opportunities for peace.

Our national security requires the patient application of American will and resources. We can only sustain that necessary investment with the broad, bipartisan support of the American people and their representatives in Congress. The full participation of Congress is essential to the success of our continuing engagement, and I will consult with members of Congress at every step as we formulate and implement American foreign policy.

The need for American leadership abroad remains as strong as ever. I am committed to forging a new public consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad in pursuit of our cherished goal — a more secure world where democracy and free markets know no borders. This document details that commitment.

William J. Clinton

I. Introduction

When this Administration assumed office, the United States and its allies faced a radically transformed security environment. The primary security imperative of the past half century — containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war — was gone. Instead, we confronted a complex array of new and old security challenges America had to meet as we approached the 21st century.

The Administration outlined a national security strategy that assessed America's role in this new international context and described a strategy to advance our interests at home and abroad.

The strategy recognized that the United States was facing a period of great promise but also great uncertainty. We stand as the world's preeminent power. America's core value of freedom, as embodied in democratic governance and market economics, has gained ground around the world. Hundreds of millions of people have thrown off communism, dictatorship or apartheid. Former adversaries now work with us in diplomacy and global problem solving. Both the threat of a war among great powers and the specter of nuclear annihilation have receded dramatically. The dynamism of the global economy is transforming commerce, culture and global politics, promising greater prosperity for America and greater cooperation among nations.

At the same time, troubling uncertainties and clear threats remain. The new, independent states that replaced the Soviet Union continue to experience wrenching economic and political transitions, while the progress of the many new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe is still

fragile. While our relations with the other great powers are as constructive as at any point in this century, Russia's historic transformation will face difficult challenges, and China maintains an authoritative regime even as that country assumes a more important economic and political role in global affairs. The spread of weapons of mass destruction poses serious threats, and rogue states still threaten regional aggression. Violent extremists threaten fragile peace processes in many parts of the world. Worldwide, there is a resurgence of militant nationalism as well as ethnic and religious conflict. This has been demonstrated by the upheavals in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, where the United States has participated in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

The strategy also recognized that a number of transnational problems which once seemed quite distant, like environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows, now pose threats to our prosperity and have security implications for both present and long-term American policy. In addition, the emergence of the information and technology age presents new challenges to U.S. strategy even as it offers extraordinary opportunities to build a better future. This technology revolution brings our world closer together as information, money and ideas move around the globe at record speed; but it also makes possible for the violence of terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking to challenge the security of our borders and that of our citizens in new ways.

It is a world where clear distinctions between threats to our nation's security from beyond our borders and the challenges to our security from within our borders are

being blurred; where the separation between international problems and domestic ones is evaporating; and where the line between domestic and foreign policy is eroding. The demise of communism not only lifted the lid on age-old conflicts but it opened the door to new dangers, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state, as well as state, forces. And it did so at a time when these forces can now try to threaten our security from within our borders because of their access to modern technology. We must therefore assess these forces for what they are, with our response based on the nature of their threat, not just where they occur.

Because problems that start beyond our borders can now much more easily become problems within them, American leadership and engagement in the world has never been more important. There is also a simple truth about this new world: the same idea that was under attack three times in this century — first by imperialism and then by fascism and communism — remains under attack today, but on many fronts at once. It is an idea that comes under many names — democracy, liberty, civility, pluralism — but which together are the values of a society where leaders and governments preserve individual freedoms and ensure opportunity and human dignity. As the President has said, "We face a contest as old as history — a struggle between freedom and tyranny; between tolerance and isolation. It is a fight between those who would build free societies governed by laws and those who would impose their will by force. Our struggle today, in a world more high-tech, more fast-moving, more chaotically diverse than ever, is the age-old fight between hope and fear." Just as surely as fascism and communism once did, so, too, are our freedom, democracy, security and prosperity now threatened by regional aggressors and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; ethnic, religious and national rivalries; and the forces of terrorism, drug trafficking and international organized crime. Today, addressing these threats demands American leadership.

The victors of World War I squandered their triumph in this age-old struggle when they turned inward, bringing on a global depression and allowing fascism to rise, and reigniting global war. After World War II, we remembered the lessons of the past. In the face of a new totalitarian threat, this great nation did not walk away from the challenge of the moment. Instead, it chose to reach out, to rebuild international security structures and to lead. This determination of previous generations to prevail over

communism by shaping new international structures left us a world stronger, safer and freer. It is this example and its success that now inspire us to continue the difficult task of a new stage in this old struggle: to secure the peace won in the Cold War against those who would still deny people their human rights, terrorists who threaten innocents and pariah states who choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation.

By exerting our leadership abroad, we make America safer and more prosperous — by deterring aggression, by fostering the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts, by opening foreign markets, by helping democratic regimes and by tackling global problems. Without our active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narrow. We seek to be as creative and constructive — in the literal sense of that word — as the generation of the late 1940's. For all its dangers, this new world presents an immense opportunity — the chance to adapt and construct global institutions that will help to provide security and increase economic growth for America and the world.

At issue is whether our efforts at this construction can continue to succeed in the face of shifting threats to the ideals and habits of democracy. It is therefore in our interest that democracy be at once the foundation and the purpose of the international structures we build through this constructive diplomacy: the foundation, because the institutions will be a reflection of their shared values and norms; the purpose, because if political and economic institutions are secure, democracy will flourish.

Promoting democracy does more than foster our ideals. It advances our interests because we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we, and the entire community of nations, will be. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners and are far less likely to wage war on one another. While democracy will not soon take hold everywhere, it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in Central and Eastern Europe and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Our national security strategy is therefore based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our

allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.

To that broad end, the three central components of our strategy of engagement and enlargement are: (1) our efforts to enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and employing effective diplomacy to promote cooperative security measures; (2) our work to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and (3) our promotion of democracy abroad. It also explains how we are pursuing these elements of our strategy in specific regions by adapting and constructing institutions that will help to provide security and increase economic growth throughout the world.

In a democracy, however, the foreign policy and security strategy of the nation must serve the needs of the people. The preamble of the Constitution sets out the basic objectives:

provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

The end of the Cold War does not alter these fundamental purposes. Nor does it reduce the need for active American efforts, here and abroad, to pursue those goals. Our efforts to advance the common good at home depend upon our efforts to advance our interests around the world. Therefore, we must judge the success of our security strategy by its impact on the domestic lives of our citizens: has it made a real difference in the day to day lives of Americans? Consider just a few examples:

Every American today is safer because we are stepping back from the nuclear precipice. Russian missiles are no longer targeted at the United States and we have convinced Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to give up nuclear weapons left on their land when the Soviet Union collapsed. American leadership secured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and we convinced North Korea to freeze its nuclear program. Our strategy also continues to ensure the safeguarding of more nuclear materials so they do not fall into the hands of terrorists or international criminals and endanger our citizens.

In a world where the boundaries between threats outside our borders and the challenges from within are diminishing, Americans are safer because our counterterrorism strategy promoted closer cooperation with foreign governments and sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism, while increasing the resources for our own law enforcement agencies.

Large-scale migration from Haiti has been stemmed because we gave democracy another chance in that nation. In the months before we forced the military rulers to step down, 16,000 Haitians fled their country for our shores and elsewhere in the region. Three months after the intervention, the refugee flow was practically zero.

Our strategy to help the nations of Central Europe consolidate democracy, find lasting security and build strong economics makes it much less likely that Americans might have to fight another war on the battlegrounds of Europe. By supporting democratic reform and the transition to free markets in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and in Central Europe, our strategy promoted stability and prosperity in an area that will become a vast market for the United States, creating jobs in America. In Bosnia, diplomatic determination combined with military muscle to create an opportunity to secure a peace rather than permit instability to undermine this fragile region and U.S. interests.

Our strategy's trade initiatives, from NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT to over 80 separate trade agreements, have created more than two million American jobs. With the Summit of the Americas and the APEC process, U.S. exports — and jobs — will continue to grow. Because of our emergency assistance to Mexico during its financial crisis, economic growth — although fragile — has returned and exports now exceed pre-NAFTA levels. Mexico has begun repaying its debt to the United States ahead of schedule, protecting the nearly 310,000 American jobs NAFTA has already created because of exports to our partners.

From Iraq to Haiti, South Africa to the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East to Northern Ireland, our strategy has stopped or prevented war and brought former adversaries together in peace because it is in our interest. These efforts, combined with assisting developing nations who are fighting overpopulation, AIDS, drug smuggling and environmental degradation, ensure that future generations of

Americans will not have to contend with the consequences of neglecting these threats to our security and prosperity.

Many of these decisions were made in the face of significant disagreement over what needed to be done at the moment. But the alternatives bore unacceptable costs to our citizens: tariffs and barriers would still cripple the world trading system if not for GATT and NAFTA; the Persian Gulf region would be very different today if the rapid response of the United States and its allies had not deterred Iraq's threatened aggression against Kuwait in 1994; the flood of Haitian refugees at our borders would have continued had we not intervened in that country; Latin America would have seen financial and economic chaos affecting its fragile democracies, and U.S. trade would have been harmed, had we not moved to help stabilize Mexico's economy; and the dangers to our people from weapons of mass destruction would be much greater had our strategy not reduced the threat of nuclear arms, curbed the spread of chemical and biological weapons around the world and countered the terrorists and criminals who would endanger us if they possessed these weapons. The money we devoted to development, peace-keeping or disaster relief helped to avert future crises whose cost would have been far greater in terms of lives lost and resources spent.

We can continue to engage actively abroad to achieve these results only if the American people and the Congress are willing to bear the costs of that leadership — in dollars, political energy and, at times, American lives. U.S. security, prosperity and freedom are neither cost- nor risk-free; resources must be spent and casualties may be incurred. One purpose of this report is to help foster the broad, bipartisan understanding and support necessary to sustain our international engagement. A coalition of the center through bipartisan congressional participation is critical to this commitment. Some decisions must be made in the face of opposition; these decisions must ultimately be judged as to whether they benefited the American people by advancing their interests of security, prosperity and democracy in the long run.

During the first three years of this Administration, this strategy has produced the following results with respect to our security requirements:

- At the President's direction, the Pentagon conducted the Bottom Up Review and Nuclear Posture Review,

assessing what defense forces and capabilities our nation needs for this new security era. The Administration's defense strategy, which requires U.S. forces to be able to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression in concert with regional allies in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, has proved realistic. In the late summer of 1994, we faced the very real prospect of near-simultaneous hostilities with North Korea and Iraq. Our rapid reinforcement of U.S. military presence and additional deployments to these theaters deterred potential aggression. Our military's superb performance in responding quickly and effectively when called upon in these crises, as well as in those in Haiti and Rwanda that same year, clearly demonstrates their continued readiness to respond as needed and that we have prudently managed the post-Cold War force drawdown.

The President also set forth a defense budget for Fiscal Years 1996-2001 which fully funds the force structure recommended by the Bottom Up and Nuclear Posture Reviews and which is necessary to carry out the national security strategy. He repeatedly stressed that he will draw the line against further cuts that would undermine that force structure or erode U.S. military readiness. The President also requested Congress to enact supplemental appropriations of \$1.7 billion for FY 1994 and \$ 2.6 billion for FY 1995 to ensure readiness would not be impaired by the costs of unanticipated contingencies. In addition, the President added \$25 billion to the Fiscal Year 1996-2001 defense spending plan to provide more funding for readiness, modernization and quality of life improvements for our military personnel and families. The President also agreed to extra funding in the FY 1996 Defense appropriations bill in order to pay for the troop deployment in Bosnia.

- The United States initiated an intense diplomatic effort that forged a Bosnia-wide cease-fire and then brokered a comprehensive peace agreement among the parties. We contributed a substantial share of the NATO-led peace implementation force to help implement the military aspects of the peace agreement and create the conditions for peace to take hold.

- At President Clinton's initiative, a NATO Summit in January 1994 approved the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program and initiated a process that will lead to NATO's gradual enlargement to ensure that the alliance is prepared to meet the European and transatlantic security challenges of this era, and to provide the security relationships that will buttress the underpinnings for the democratic and market economic gains in Europe since 1989. Since the Summit, 27 countries, including Russia, agreed to join the Partnership for Peace, and Partner countries are now working with NATO in Bosnia. In 1995, NATO completed work on its enlargement study and presented it to the Partners. This year, in the second phase of the enlargement process, NATO will begin intensive bilateral consultations with all the PFP members who wish to participate, aimed at helping them prepare for possible NATO membership.
- The United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan exchanged instruments of ratification for the START I Treaty at the December 1994 summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), culminating two years of intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts to bring the Treaty into force and paving the way for ratification of the 1993 START II Treaty. START I requires the permanent elimination of bombers, ICBM silos and ballistic missile submarine launch tubes that carried over 9,000 of the 21,000 total accountable warheads the United States and the former Soviet Union declared when the Treaty was signed — a reduction of 40 percent. START II, which the Senate voted 87-4 to give its advice and consent to ratification on January 26, 1996, will eliminate additional U.S. and Russian strategic launchers and will effectively remove an additional 5,000 deployed warheads, leaving each side with no more than 3,500. These actions will reduce the deployed strategic force arsenals of the United States and Russia by two-thirds. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed that once START II is ratified by both countries, the United States and Russia will begin immediately to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to take them out of combat status, thus removing thousands of warheads from alert status years ahead of schedule. The two Presidents also directed an intensification of dialogue regarding the possibility of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces.
- The 30-nation Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty's reduction period came to an end this past November, resulting in the elimination of over 50,000 pieces of heavy military equipment and capping conventional forces in Europe at their lowest levels in decades. Together with our allies, the Administration will continue to pursue full implementation of this agreement.
- The President launched a comprehensive policy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. The United States has secured landmark commitments to eliminate all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, and in December 1994, Ukraine formally acceded to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, as Kazakstan and Belarus had done previously. By the end of 1995, all nuclear weapons had been removed from Kazakstan, most were out of Belarus and a significant number had been transferred from Ukraine. The United States led the successful international effort to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions by consensus of Treaty parties at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The President's August 1995 initiative to support a true zero yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) provided a significant boost to the CTBT negotiations and has opened the door to completing and signing a CTBT in 1996.
- We also made significant progress during the past year in negotiations to establish an agreed demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missiles that will update the ABM Treaty and advance our goal of deploying advanced theater missile defenses. The Administration also submitted the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification and supported the development of new measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.
- The Administration reached an important Agreed Framework with North Korea that has halted and, when fully implemented, will eventually eliminate that country's existing, dangerous nuclear program, greatly enhancing regional stability and advancing

our nonproliferation goals. The Administration reached agreements with Russia, Ukraine and South Africa to control missile-related technology, brought Russia, Brazil and South Africa into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and secured China's commitment not to transfer MTCR-controlled, ground-to-ground missiles. The United States has also led international efforts to create the multilateral "Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technology" — the successor to the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade (COCOM) — to provide a regime for transparency and restraint on dangerous transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technologies.

- The President's efforts helped bring about many historic firsts in the Middle East peace process — the handshake of peace between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on the White House lawn has been followed by the Jordan-Israel peace treaty, the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement, progress on eliminating the Arab boycott of Israel and the establishment of ties between Israel and an increasing number of its Arab neighbors.
- In 1995, the President proposed legislation to provide law enforcement officials with increased tools to combat terrorism. These include additional manpower and training, methods to mark and trace explosives and legal mobile wiretaps. The President also directed new initiatives against money-laundering, for seizing the assets of drug rings and for new legislation to respond more effectively to organized crime activity. In October, the President also announced at the United Nations an invitation to every country to join in negotiating an international declaration on citizens' security that would include: a no-sanctuary pledge for organized criminals, terrorists, drug traffickers and smugglers; a counterterrorism pact; a pledge to end the trafficking of illegal arms and of lethal nuclear, biological and chemical materials; an antinarcotics pledge; and an effective police force partnership to help combat these forces of violence and destruction. Progress has been made, with the apprehension of leaders of the most influential South American drug cartels.

- In March 1995, the President obtained Senate advice and consent to ratification of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which constrains the use of certain weapons, including landmines. The Administration is also pursuing a comprehensive set of initiatives to address the global landmine crisis, such as strengthening the CCW provisions governing landmine use, placing international controls on export, production and stockpiles, and developing new equipment for more effective demining.
- On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive establishing 'U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.' This policy represented the first comprehensive framework for U.S. decisionmaking on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement suited to the realities of the new international era.
- In October 1994, President Clinton transmitted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. This was the culmination of years of negotiations to ensure an equitable balance between the rights of coastal states to control activities in adjacent, offshore areas to protect their economic, security and environmental interests and the rights of maritime states to free and unimpeded navigation and overflight of the oceans of the world. This included an acceptable regime to administer the mineral resources of the deep seabed, thereby protecting U.S. interests.
- In March 1995, President Clinton ordered a sweeping reexamination of the U.S. Government's approach to putting science and technology to the service of national security and global stability in light of the changed security environment, increasing global economic competition and growing budgetary pressures. The resulting National Security Science and Technology Strategy is the country's first comprehensive Presidential statement of national security science and technology priorities.

On the economic front, Administration policies have created nearly 7.5 million American jobs and established the foundation for the global economy of the 21st Century:

- The President worked with the Congress on effective measures to reduce the federal budget deficit and restore economic growth. These measures help increase our competitiveness and strengthen our position in negotiations with other nations. Two million of the 7.5 million new jobs created in the last three years are a result of our efforts to expand market access for American products overseas. These efforts have also led to the creation of over 3 million new small businesses and the lowest combined rates of unemployment and inflation in 25 years. The federal budget deficit has dropped three years in a row, from \$290 billion to \$164 billion a year.
- The President secured approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which creates the world's largest free trade zone and has already created nearly 310,000 American jobs. The vote for NAFTA marked a decisive U.S. affirmation of its international engagement. Through NAFTA's environmental and labor side agreements, we are working actively to protect the rights of workers and to reduce air and water pollution that crosses national boundaries. When Mexico came under short-term financial pressures in December 1994, the United States took the lead in marshaling international support to assist the country in meeting this challenge. NAFTA helped to protect and increase U.S. exports to that country — and the jobs they support — during the financial crisis and the subsequent adjustment period. We have also begun negotiations with Chile to join NAFTA.
- The Administration stood at the forefront of a multi-lateral effort to achieve history's most extensive market-opening agreements in the GATT Uruguay-round negotiations on world trade. Working with a bipartisan coalition in the Congress, the President secured approval of this path-breaking agreement and the resulting World Trade Organization, which will add \$150 billion annually to the U.S. economy once fully phased in and create hundreds of thousands of jobs.
- The President convened the first meeting of leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and took steps to expand our ties with the economies of the Asia-Pacific region, the fastest growing area in the world. At their second forum, APEC leaders embraced the goal of free trade within the region by 2020, and at their third meeting in Osaka in 1995, they formulated a positive action plan to facilitate and measure progress toward achieving that goal. This past year, we successfully negotiated historic trade agreements with our Asian trading partners, including China, Japan and Korea, all of which promote substantial new access for American products and which will foster new attitudes of openness toward our exports.
- The President hosted the Summit of the Americas in December 1994, a historic gathering where the 34 democratic nations of the hemisphere committed themselves to completing negotiations by 2005 on a regional free-trade agreement. In June 1995, the United States hosted the Denver Trade Ministerial and Commerce Forum to promote trade liberalization and business facilitation throughout the Western Hemisphere.
- At President Clinton's initiative, the G-7 Leaders put forth at the Halifax Economic Summit extensive proposals to prepare our international financial institutions for the 21st Century, including institutional reforms to prevent and respond to financial crises, to promote sustainable development and to support the Middle East peace process. At the December 1995 U.S.-European Union Summit in Madrid, the President announced the New Transatlantic Agenda, including a Transatlantic Marketplace that will deepen our cooperation on economic issues.
- The President developed a Climate Change Action Plan to help reduce greenhouse emissions at home and launched the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation to help reduce emissions abroad. The United States also takes a leading role at the international level in phasing out ozone-depleting substances. In June 1993, the United States signed the Biodiversity Treaty and one year later, the Desertification Convention.
- With strong U.S. leadership, the United Nations successfully concluded negotiations on a multilateral agreement designed to reverse the global trend of declining fish stocks. The agreement complements the UN Law of the Sea Convention, giving direction

to countries for implementing their obligation under the Convention to cooperate in conserving and managing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.

- The Administration has asserted world leadership on population issues. We played a key role during the Cairo Conference on Population and Development in developing a consensus Program of Action, including increased availability of voluntary family planning and reproductive health services, sustainable economic development, strengthening of family ties, the empowerment of women including enhanced educational opportunities and a reduction in infant and child mortality through immunizations and other programs.

Finally, the President has demonstrated a firm commitment to expanding the global realm of democracy to advance the interests of our citizens:

- The Administration substantially expanded U.S. support for democratic and market reform in Russia, Ukraine and the other new independent states of the former Soviet Union, including a comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine.
- The United States launched a series of initiatives to bolster the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, including the White House Trade and Investment Conference for Central and Eastern Europe held in Cleveland in January 1995. We affirmed our concern for their security and market economic transformation, recognizing that such assurances would play a key role in promoting democratic developments.
- Working with the international community under the auspices of the UN, we succeeded in reversing the coup in Haiti and restoring the democratically elected president and government. We are now helping the Haitian people rebuild their country and consolidate their hard-won democracy through free and fair elections at all levels — local, parliamentary and presidential.
- The President's visit to Northern Ireland in November 1995, the first ever by an American President, drew an unprecedented response from the people of both the Catholic and Protestant communities and sent an

unmistakable signal of their support for peace. In 1994, U.S. engagement in Northern Ireland contributed to the establishment of a cease-fire, first by the IRA and subsequently by loyalist paramilitaries. U.S. economic and trade initiatives, including the White House Conference on Trade and Investment in May 1995, are aimed at promoting economic revitalization and job creation in Northern Ireland.

- At the Summit of the Americas, the 34 democratic nations of the hemisphere agreed to a detailed plan of cooperative action in such diverse fields as health, education, science and technology, counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, environmental protection, information infrastructure and the strengthening and safeguarding of democratic institutions, in addition to mutual prosperity and sustainable development. The Summit ushered in a new era of hemispheric cooperation that would not have been possible without U.S. leadership and commitment. In the time since the Summit, progress on strengthening democratic institutions, thwarting international criminals and terrorists and preserving natural resources have helped improve the lives of the hemisphere's residents.
- The United States has increased support for South Africa as it conducted elections and became a multiracial democracy. During the state visit of Nelson Mandela in October 1994, we announced formation of a bilateral commission to foster new cooperation between our nations and an assistance package to support housing, health, education, trade and investment.
- The United States, working with the Organization of American States, helped reverse an antidemocratic coup in Guatemala.
- In Mozambique and Angola, the United States played a leading role in galvanizing the international community to help bring an end to two decades of civil war and to promote national reconciliation. For the first time, there is the prospect that all of southern Africa will enjoy the fruits of peace and prosperity.
- At the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights, the United States successfully argued for improved inter-

national mechanisms for the promotion of basic human rights on a global basis. The President signed the international convention on the rights of the child and supports Senate consent to ratification for the convention prohibiting discrimination against women. The United States also played a major role in promoting women's — and children's — international rights at the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing.

The national security strategy has reaped significant accomplishments for the betterment of the American people. It continues to take advantage of remarkable opportunities to shape a world conducive to U.S. interests and consistent with American values — a world of open societies and open markets. Its tangible results were based on the belief that if we withdraw U.S. leadership from the world today, we will have to contend with the consequences of our neglect tomorrow. The progress the strategy has enabled us to make toward increased security, prosperity and advancement of democracy was not inevitable; nor will it proceed easily in an even, uninterrupted way — there is a price for our leadership. Because of this, we know that there must be limits to America's involvement in the world — limits imposed by careful evaluation of our fundamental interests and frank assess-

ment of the costs and benefits of possible actions. We cannot become involved in every problem, but the choices we make must be always guided by our objectives of a more secure, prosperous and free America and remain rooted in the conviction that America cannot walk away from its global interests or responsibilities, or our citizens' security and prosperity will surely suffer.

As the distinction between domestic problems and international ones is increasingly blurred, we each have a very direct interest in ensuring the future success of this strategy: we cannot solve our own problems at home unless we are also operating in a world that is more peaceful, more democratic and more prosperous. If we can help lead the dozens of nations, the billions of producers and consumers who are trying to adapt to democracy and free markets, we help to create the conditions for the greatest expansion of prosperity and security the world has ever witnessed. This is what this strategy portends by reaffirming America's leadership in the world.

This report has two major sections. The first part of the report explains our strategy of engagement and enlargement. The second part describes briefly how the Administration continues to apply this strategy to the world's major regions.

II. Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement

A new international era presents the United States with many distinct dangers, but also with a generally improved security environment and a range of opportunities to improve it further. The preeminent threat that dominated our engagement during the Cold War has been replaced by a complex set of challenges. Our nation's strategy for defining and addressing those challenges has several core principles that guide our policies to safeguard American security, prosperity and fundamental values. First and foremost, we must exercise global leadership. We are not the world's policeman, but as the world's premier economic and military power, and with the strength of our democratic values, U.S. engagement is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade to advance our interests.

Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy — through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere — in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost.

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most important our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use the right tools — being willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our

interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community.

In all cases, the nature of our response must depend on what best serves our own long-term national interests. Those interests are ultimately defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical defense and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as well as the security of our values achieved through expansion of the community of democratic nations.

Our national security strategy draws upon a range of political, military and economic instruments, and focuses on the primary objectives that President Clinton has stressed throughout his Administration:

- **Enhancing Our Security.** Taking account of the realities of the new international era with its array of new threats, a military capability appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy, including the ability, in concert with regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. We will continue to pursue a combination of diplomatic, economic and defense efforts, including arms control agreements, to reduce the danger of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional conflict and to promote stability.
- **Promoting Prosperity at Home.** A vigorous and integrated economic policy designed to put our own economic house in order, work toward free and open markets abroad and promote sustainable development.

- **Promoting Democracy.** A framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on strengthening democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

In order to advance these objectives, we must remain engaged in the world through U.S. leadership, with our national security strategy based on enlarging the world community of secure, democratic and free market nations. Overall, this makes the world a safer and more prosperous place and in so doing directly advances our interests. Nations that feel secure due to our engagement overseas are more likely to support free trade and democratic institutions, thereby enhancing U.S. security and prosperity; nations with growing and open economies and strong ties to the United States are more likely to feel secure and to be unafraid of freedom, thereby not threatening us or others; and democratic states with similar values are less likely to threaten one another's interests, and are more likely to cooperate in confronting mutual security threats and in promoting free and open trade and economic development.

The three basic objectives of our national security strategy will also guide the allocation of our limited national security resources. Because deficit reduction is also central to the long-term health and competitiveness of the American economy, we have made it, along with efficient and environmentally sound use of our resources, a major priority. Under the Clinton economic plan, the federal budget deficit has been lowered as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product from 4.9 percent in Fiscal Year 1992 to 2.4 percent in Fiscal Year 1995 — the lowest since 1979.

Enhancing our Security

The U.S. government is responsible for protecting the lives and personal safety of Americans, maintaining our political freedom and independence as a nation and promoting the well-being and prosperity of our nation. No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot always secure these basic goals unilaterally. Whether the problem is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in the former Soviet empire, international crime and

terrorism, or unfair trade practices, the threats and challenges we face frequently demand cooperative, multinational solutions. Therefore, the only responsible U.S. strategy is one that seeks to ensure U.S. influence over and participation in collective decisionmaking in a wide and growing range of circumstances.

An important element of our security preparedness depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy of engagement is to sustain and adapt the security relationships we have with key nations around the world. These ties constitute an important part of an international framework that will be essential to ensuring cooperation across a broad range of issues. Within the realm of security issues, our cooperation with allies and friendly nations includes such activities as: conducting combined training and exercises, coordinating military plans and preparations, sharing intelligence — particularly in support of multilateral peacekeeping efforts or initiatives to contain the inimical behavior of rogue states — jointly developing new systems to include cooperative research and development programs and controlling exports of sensitive technologies according to common standards.

The new era presents a different set of threats to our security. In this new period, enhancing American security requires, first and foremost, developing and maintaining a strong defense capability of forces ready to fight. We are developing integrated approaches for dealing with threats arising from the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by other nations. Our security also requires a vigorous arms control effort and a strong intelligence capability. We have implemented a strategy for multilateral peace operations. We have clarified rigorous guidelines for when and how to use military force in this era.

We also face security risks that are not solely military in nature. An emerging class of transnational environmental and natural resource issues, and rapid population growth and refugee flows, are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present new challenges to U.S. strategy. Other increasingly interconnected, transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking and organized crime also have security implications both for present and long-term American policy: the destructive forces we face inside our borders often have their origins overseas in rogue nations that breed and harbor terrorists,

in countries where drugs are produced and in international organized crime cartels, which are principally headquartered outside our borders; and free and open societies, in a world brought closer together by a technology revolution where information, money and people can move rapidly and easily, are inherently more challenged by these kinds of forces.

We cannot protect ourselves against drug-related crime, track down terrorists, seize international criminals or stop the flow of illegal arms or weapons-related materials without both cooperation among the agencies within our government and the help of countries that are the origin of these forces and whose peace and freedoms are also jeopardized. That is why the President proposed new legislation and initiatives for the U.S. government last year, while also unveiling a new international proposal to work more closely with foreign governments in order to respond more effectively in fighting these forces that challenge our security from within and without.

Finally, the threat of intrusions to our military and commercial information systems poses a significant risk to national security and is being addressed.

Maintaining a Strong Defense Capability

U.S. military forces are critical to the success of our strategy. This nation has unparalleled military capabilities: the United States is the only nation able to conduct large-scale and effective military operations far beyond its borders. This fact, coupled with our unique position as the security partner of choice in many regions, provides a foundation for regional stability through mutually beneficial security partnerships. Our willingness and ability to play a leading role in defending common interests also help ensure that the United States will remain an influential voice in international affairs — political, military and economic — that affect our well-being, so long as we retain the military wherewithal to underwrite our commitments credibly.

To protect and advance U.S. interests in the face of the dangers and opportunities outlined earlier, the United States must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks:

- **Detering and Defeating Aggression in Major Regional Conflicts.** Our forces must be able to help offset the military power of regional states with interests opposed to those of the United States and its allies. To do this, we must be able to credibly deter and defeat aggression by projecting and sustaining U.S. power in more than one region if necessary.
- **Providing a Credible Overseas Presence.** U.S. forces must also be forward deployed or stationed in key overseas regions in peacetime to deter aggression and advance U.S. strategic interests. Such overseas presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, ensures familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries and provides timely initial response capabilities.
- **Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.** We are devoting greater efforts to stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, limiting the spread of weapons-related materials and technology, and strengthening accounting and security procedures for global stocks of fissile materials. At the same time, we must improve our capabilities to deter, defend against and prevent the use of such weapons and protect ourselves against their effects.
- **Contributing to Multilateral Peace Operations.** When our interests call for it, the United States must also be prepared to participate in multilateral efforts to resolve regional conflicts and bolster new democratic governments. Thus, our forces must be ready to participate in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other operations in support of these objectives.
- **Supporting Counterterrorism Efforts, Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other National Security Objectives.** A number of other tasks remain that U.S. forces have typically carried out with both general purpose and specialized units. These missions include: counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation, counter-narcotics operations, special forces assistance to nations and humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

To meet all of these requirements successfully, our forces must be capable of responding quickly and operating

effectively as a joint team. That is, they must be ready to fight and win. This imperative demands highly qualified and motivated people; modern, well-maintained equipment; realistic training; strategic mobility; sufficient support and sustainment capabilities; timely intelligence; and a healthy investment in science and technology.

Major Regional Contingencies

The focus of our planning for major theater conflict is on deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq. Such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces which can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States, with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a potentially aggressive neighbor. To deter aggression, prevent coercion of allied or friendly governments and, ultimately, defeat aggression should it occur, we must prepare our forces to confront this scale of threat, preferably in concert with our allies and friends, but unilaterally if necessary. To do this, we must have forces that can deploy quickly and supplement U.S. forward-based and forward-deployed forces, along with regional allies, in halting an invasion and defeating the aggressor, just as we demonstrated by our rapid response in October 1994 when Iraq threatened aggression against Kuwait.

The forces the Administration fields today are sufficient, in concert with regional allies, to defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Programmed enhancements will sustain and strengthen that capability to meet future threats. As a nation with global interests, it is important that the United States maintain forces with aggregate capabilities on this scale. Obviously, we seek to avoid a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere. More basically, maintaining a 'two war' force helps ensure that the United States will have sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by a coalition of hostile powers or by a larger, more capable adversary than we foresee today. The need to deter or defeat aggression in two theaters was demonstrated by the real prospect of near simultaneous hostilities with Iraq and North Korea in the late summer of 1994. The threat of such near simultaneous hostilities and our rapid response in reinforcing our presence and deploying additional forces showed we have a correct and realistic defense strategy. And because tomorrow's threats are less

clear, a strategy for deterring and defeating aggression in more than one theater ensures we maintain the flexibility to meet unknown future threats, while our continued engagement represented by that strategy helps preclude such threats from developing in the first place.

We will never know with certainty how an enemy might fight or precisely what demands might be placed on our own forces in the future. The contributions of allies or coalition partners will vary from place to place and over time. Thus, balanced U.S. forces are needed in order to provide a wide range of complementary capabilities and to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected. Our forces must remain ready and modern to meet future, as well as present, threats or challenges. Integral to these efforts is the development of new systems and capabilities, incorporating state-of-the-art technology and new and more effective combat organizations.

Overseas Presence

The need to deploy U.S. military forces abroad in peacetime is also an important factor in determining our overall force structure. We will maintain robust overseas presence in several forms, such as permanently stationed forces and pre-positioned equipment, deployments and combined exercises, port calls and other force visits, as well as military-to-military contacts. These activities provide several benefits. Specifically they:

- Give form and substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments.
- Demonstrate our determination to defend U.S. and allied interests in critical regions, deterring hostile nations from acting contrary to those interests.
- Provide forward elements for rapid response in crises as well as the bases, ports and other infrastructure essential for deployment of U.S.-based forces by air, sea and land.
- Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operations, by improving our ability to operate with other nations.
- Allow the United States to use its position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums and

dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to regional security.

- Facilitate regional integration, since nations that may not be willing to work together in our absence may be willing to coalesce around us in a crisis.
- Promote an international security environment of trust, cooperation, peace and stability, which is fundamental to the vitality of developing democracies and free-market economies for America's own economic well-being and security.

Through training programs, combined exercises, military contacts, interoperability and shared defense with potential coalition partners, as well as security assistance programs that include judicious foreign military sales, we can strengthen the local self-defense capabilities of our friends and allies. Through active participation in regional security dialogues, we can reduce regional tensions, increase transparency in armaments and improve our bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

By improving the defense capabilities of our friends and demonstrating our commitment to defend common interests, these activities enhance deterrence, encourage responsibility-sharing on the part of friends and allies, decrease the likelihood that U.S. forces will be necessary if conflict arises and raise the odds that U.S. forces will find a relatively favorable situation should a U.S. response be required. U.S. overseas presence visibly supports our strategy of engagement, and we must continually assess the best approaches to achieving its objectives.

Counterterrorism, Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other Missions

While the missions outlined above will remain the primary determinants of our general purpose and nuclear force structure, U.S. military forces and assets will also be called upon to perform a wide range of other important missions as well. Some of these can be accomplished by conventional forces fielded primarily for theater operations. Often, however, these missions call for specialized units and capabilities.

At the same time, the challenges to the security of our citizens, our borders and our democratic institutions from destructive forces such as terrorists and drug traffickers is

greater today because of access to modern technology. Cooperation, both within our government and with other nations, is vital in combating these groups that traffic in organized violence.

In October 1995, the President announced a new initiative to work more closely with foreign governments to fight these forces that threaten our security from without and within. Along with other provisions, it includes an invitation to join in the negotiation and endorsement of a declaration on citizen security, which would include a no-sanctuary pledge to terrorists and drug traffickers; a counterterrorism pact; an antinarcotics offensive; and a pledge to end the trafficking of illegal arms and of lethal nuclear, biological and chemical materials. We will continue to share intelligence in anticorruption and money-laundering programs to fight drug trafficking at its source; seek legislation that would prevent arms traders from fueling regional conflicts and subverting international embargoes; and provide increased manpower and funding, strengthened legislation and additional sanctions on states that sponsor terrorism to help protect our citizens.

Combating Terrorism

As long as terrorist groups continue to target American citizens and interests, the United States will need to have specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to time, we might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.

Our policy in countering international terrorists is to make no concessions to terrorists, continue to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.

Countering terrorism effectively requires close, day-to-day coordination among Executive Branch agencies. Under the Clinton Administration, the efforts of the Departments of State, Justice and Defense, the FBI and CIA have been coordinated, with increased funding and manpower focused on the problem. Positive results will come from integration of intelligence, diplomatic and rule-of-law activities, and through close cooperation with other governments and international counterterrorist organizations.

Improving U.S. intelligence capabilities is a significant part of the U.S. response, as the evolving nature of the threat presents new challenges to the intelligence community. Terrorists, whether from well-organized groups or the kind of more loosely organized group responsible for the World Trade Center bombing, have the advantage of being able to take the initiative in the timing and choice of targets. Terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction represents a particularly dangerous potential threat that must be countered.

The United States has made concerted efforts to punish and deter terrorists. On June 26, 1993, following a determination that Iraq had plotted an assassination attempt against former President Bush, President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against the headquarters of Iraq's intelligence service in order to send a firm response and deter further threats. Similarly, the United States obtained convictions against defendants in the bombing of the World Trade Center. In the last three years, more terrorists have been arrested and extradited to the United States than during the totality of the previous three Administrations. We are still determined to apprehend many others, including the suspected perpetrators of the Pan Am 103 bombing who are being sheltered in Libya, and those involved in the deadly attack on U.S. Government employees at CIA Headquarters in 1994.

A growing number of nations have responded to the Administration's message urging international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Our success in hunting down terrorists is in large measure due to a growth of international intelligence sharing and increased international law enforcement efforts. At the Halifax Summit in 1995, the heads of state from the G-7 and Russia agreed to work more closely in combating terrorism. This led to the December 1995 ministerial in Ottawa, which announced a P-8 pledge to adopt all current counterterrorism treaties by the year 2000, to cooperate more closely in detecting forged documents and strengthening border surveillance, to share information more fully and effectively and to work together in preventing the use by terrorists of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Iran's support of terrorism is a primary threat to peace in the Middle East and a major threat to innocent citizens everywhere. The President is determined to step up U.S. efforts bringing international pressure to bear on Iran for its support of terrorism. President Clinton imposed an

embargo against Iran, depriving it of the benefits of trade and investment with the United States. The embargo's immediate effect was to further disrupt an Iranian economy already reeling from mismanagement, corruption and stagnant oil prices. The United States also has sought the support of our friends and allies to adopt policies to limit Teheran's threatening behavior. The G-7 has joined us in condemning Iran's support for terrorism, and we have secured commitments from Russia and other members of the post-COCOM "Wassenaar Arrangement" export control regime not to sell weapons to Iran that have sensitive, dual-use technologies with military end-uses.

U.S. leadership and close coordination with other governments and international bodies will continue, as also demonstrated by the UN Security Council sanctions against Libya for the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, an international convention dealing with detecting and controlling plastic explosives, and two important counterterrorism treaties — the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

Fighting Drug Trafficking

The Administration has undertaken a new approach to the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking that will better integrate domestic and international activities to reduce both the demand and the supply of drugs. Ultimate success will depend on concerted efforts and partnerships by the public, all levels of government and the American private sector with other governments, private groups and international bodies.

The U.S. shift in strategy from the past emphasis on transit interdiction to a more evenly balanced effort with source countries to build institutions, destroy trafficking organizations and stop supplies of illicit drugs is showing positive results. The leaders of the most influential South American drug mafias, the Medellin and Cali Cartels, have been apprehended. The President also has invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to undercut their financial underpinnings, freezing their assets in the United States and barring U.S. persons from doing business with them. He has announced a major initiative to combat money laundering throughout the globe, and at his direction, the government has identified the front compa-

nies and frozen the assets of the Cali Cartel to cut off its economic lifelines and to stop people from dealing unknowingly with its companies.

In addition, the United States, in cooperation with key producing countries, has undertaken initiatives to reinforce its interdiction activities near the source of production. To help root out the corruption in which narcotics trafficking thrives, we are working to support and strengthen democratic institutions abroad. We are also cooperating with governments that demonstrate political will to confront the narcotics threat.

Two comprehensive strategies have been developed, one to deal with the problem of cocaine and another to address the growing threat from high-purity heroin entering this country. We will engage more aggressively with international organizations, financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations in counternarcotics cooperation.

At home and in the international arena, prevention, treatment and economic alternatives must work hand-in-hand with law enforcement and interdiction activities. Long-term efforts will be maintained to help nations develop healthy economies with fewer market incentives for producing narcotics. The United States has increased efforts abroad to foster public awareness and support for governmental cooperation on a broad range of activities to reduce the incidence of drug abuse. Public awareness of a demand problem in producing or trafficking countries can be converted into public support and increased governmental law enforcement to reduce trafficking and production. There has been a significant attitudinal change and awareness in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly as producer and transit nations themselves become plagued with the ill effects of consumption.

Other Missions

The United States government is also responsible for protecting the lives and safety of Americans abroad. In order to carry out this responsibility, selected U.S. military forces are trained and equipped to evacuate Americans from such situations as the outbreak of civil or international conflict and natural or man-made disasters. For example, U.S. Marines evacuated Americans from Monrovia, Liberia, in August of 1990, and from Mogadishu, Somalia, in December of that year. In 1991, U.S. forces evacuated nearly 20,000 Americans from the Philippines over a three-

week period following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. In 1994, U.S. Marines, coupled with U.S. airlift, deployed to Burundi to help ensure the safe evacuation of U.S. citizens from ethnic fighting in Rwanda.

U.S. forces also provide invaluable training and advice to friendly governments threatened by subversion, lawlessness or insurgency. At any given time, we have small teams of military experts deployed in roughly 25 countries helping host governments cope with such challenges.

U.S. military forces and assets are frequently called upon to provide assistance to victims of floods, storms, drought and other humanitarian disasters. Both at home and abroad, U.S. forces provide emergency food, shelter, medical care and security to those in need.

Finally, the United States will continue as a world leader in space through its technical expertise and innovation. Over the past 30 years, as more and more nations have ventured into space, the United States has steadfastly recognized space as an international region. Since all nations are immediately accessible from space, the maintenance of an international legal regime for space, similar to the concept of freedom of the high seas, is especially important. Numerous attempts have been made in the past to impose legal limitations on access to space by countries that are unable, either technologically or economically, to join space-faring nations. As the commercial importance of space is developed, the United States can expect further pressure from nonparticipants to redefine the status of space, similar to what has been attempted with exclusive economic zones constraining the high seas.

Retaining the current international character of space will remain critical to achieving U.S. national security goals. Our main objectives in this area include:

- Continued freedom of access to and use of space;
- Maintaining the U.S. position as the major economic, political, military and technological power in space;
- Deterring threats to U.S. interests in space and defeating aggressive or hostile acts against U.S. space assets if deterrence fails;

- Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to space;
- Enhancing global partnerships with other space-faring nations across the spectrum of economic, political and security issues.

Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces

Our strategy calls for the preparation and deployment of American military forces in the United States and abroad to support U.S. diplomacy in responding to key dangers — those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression and threats to the stability of states.

Although there may be many demands for U.S. involvement, the need to husband limited resources requires that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation in particular military operations. And while it is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force, we must be as clear as possible about when and how we will use it.

There are three basic categories of national interests that can merit the use of our armed forces. The first involves America's vital interests, that is, interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity — the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being. We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including — when necessary — the unilateral and decisive use of military power. This was demonstrated clearly in the Persian Gulf through Desert Storm and, more recently, Vigilant Warrior, when Iraq threatened aggression against Kuwait in October 1994.

The second category includes cases in which important, but not vital, U.S. interests are threatened. That is, the interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests; they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve our objectives. Such uses of force should also be selective and limited,

reflecting the relative saliency of the interests we have at stake. Haiti and Bosnia are the most recent examples in this category.

The third category involves primarily humanitarian interests. Here, our decisions focus on the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of military force. Generally, the military is not the best tool to address humanitarian concerns. But under certain conditions, the use of our armed forces may be appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires resources unique to the military; and when the risk to American troops is minimal. The relief operation in Rwanda is a good case in point. U.S. military forces performed unique and essential roles, stabilized the situation and then got out, turning the operation over to the international relief community.

The decision on *whether and when* to use force is therefore dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital or survival interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. In other situations posing a less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests — for instance, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies'.

Second, in all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved. We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. On the other hand, our involvement will be more circumscribed when other regional or multilateral actors are better positioned to act than we are. Even in these cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged at the diplomatic level. But in every case, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force: Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the environment of risk we are entering? What is needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costs — both human and financial

— of the engagement? Do we have a reasonable likelihood of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and in either case, do we have an exit strategy?

The decision on *how* we use force has a similar set of derived guidelines:

First, when we send American troops abroad, we will send them with a clear mission and, for those operations that are likely to involve combat, the means to achieve their objectives decisively, having answered the questions: What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives?

Second, as much as possible, we will seek the help of our allies and friends or of relevant international institutions. If our most important national interests are at stake, we are prepared to act alone. But especially on those matters touching directly the interests of our allies, there should be a proportionate commitment from them. Working together increases the effectiveness of each nation's actions, and sharing the responsibilities lessens everyone's load.

These, then, are the calculations of interest and cost that have influenced our past uses of military power and will guide us in the future. Every time this Administration has used force, it has balanced interests against costs. And in each case, the use of our military has put power behind our diplomacy, allowing us to make progress we would not otherwise have achieved.

One final consideration regards the central role the American people rightfully play in how the United States wields its power abroad: the United States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of the public, and close consultations with Congress are important to this effort. This is true for humanitarian and other nontraditional interventions, as well as war. Modern media communications confront every American with images that both stir the impulse to intervene and raise the question of an operation's costs and risks. When it is judged in America's interest to intervene, we must use force with an unwavering commitment to our objective. While we must continue to reassess any operation's costs and benefits as it unfolds and the full range of our options, reflexive calls for early withdrawal of our forces as soon as casualties arise

endangers our objectives as well as our troops. Doing so invites any rogue actor to attack our troops to try to force our departure from areas where our interests lie.

Combating the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles

Weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, biological and chemical — along with their associated delivery systems, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations. Thus, a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats. We also need to maintain robust strategic nuclear forces and to implement existing strategic arms agreements.

Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation

A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their missile delivery systems. Countries' weapons programs, and their levels of cooperation with our nonproliferation efforts, will be among our most important criteria in judging the nature of our bilateral relations.

Through programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction effort and other denuclearization initiatives, important progress has been made to build a more secure international environment by combating the threat posed by the possible theft or diversion of nuclear warheads or their components. One striking example was the successful transfer in 1994 of nearly six hundred kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material from Kazakhstan to safe storage in the United States. Kazakhstan was concerned about the security of the material and requested U.S. assistance in removing it to safe storage. The Departments of Defense and Energy undertook a joint mission to retrieve the uranium. At the direction of the President, the two Departments have intensified their cooperative programs with Russia and other new independent states to enhance the security of nuclear material. These programs encompass both efforts to improve overall systems for nuclear material protection, control and accounting and targeted efforts to address specific proliferation risks. Under an agreement we secured with Russia, it is converting tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons into

commercial reactor fuel and has begun delivering that fuel to the United States. With the United States and Russia, Ukraine is implementing the Trilateral Statement, which provides for the transfer of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement in return for fair compensation. Three-quarters of the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine at the beginning of 1994 have now been transferred to Russia for dismantlement. All the nuclear warheads in Kazakhstan have been removed, and most are out of Belarus.

A key objective of our nonproliferation strategy was realized in May 1995 when a consensus of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extended the Treaty indefinitely and without conditions. That result ensured that all Americans today, as well as all succeeding generations, can count on the continuation of the Treaty that serves as the bedrock of all global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Achieving a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible, achieving a cut-off of fissile material production for nuclear weapons purposes and strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are important goals. They complement our comprehensive efforts to discourage the accumulation of fissile materials, to seek to strengthen controls and constraints on those materials, and over time, to reduce worldwide stocks.

To combat missile proliferation, the United States seeks prudently to broaden membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Administration supports the earliest possible ratification and entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as new measures to deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). We also support improved export controls for nonproliferation purposes both domestically and multilaterally.

The proliferation problem is global, but we must tailor our approaches to specific regional contexts. We have concluded an Agreed Framework to bring North Korea into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, including the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The agreement also requires North Korea to freeze and eventually dismantle its indigenous nuclear program under IAEA monitoring. We will continue efforts to prevent Iran from

advancing its weapons of mass destruction objectives and to thwart Iraq from reconstituting its previous programs. The United States seeks to cap, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities of India and Pakistan. In the Middle East and elsewhere, we encourage regional arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties. These tasks are being pursued with other states that share our concern for the enormous challenge of stemming the proliferation of such weapons.

The United States has signed bilateral agreements with Russia, Ukraine and South Africa, which commit these countries to adhere to the guidelines of the MTCR. We also secured China's commitment to observe the MTCR guidelines and its agreement not to transfer MTCR-controlled, ground-to-ground missiles. Russia has agreed not to transfer space-launch vehicle technology with potential military applications to India. South Africa has agreed to dismantle its Category I (500 kilogram payload, 300 kilometer range) missile systems and has joined the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards. Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovakia Republic, Poland and Romania have joined the Australia Group (which controls the transfer of items that could be used to make chemical or biological weapons). Hungary, Argentina, Russia, Brazil and South Africa have joined the MTCR. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have brought the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force. There has been major progress on the dismantlement and removal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) located in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Our Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has made a significant contribution to this effort.

Thus, the United States seeks to prevent additional countries from acquiring chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, and will use the full range of its intelligence capabilities to detect such activities. However, should such efforts fail, U.S. forces must be prepared to deter, prevent and defend against their use. As agreed at the January 1994 NATO Summit, we are working with our Allies to develop a policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.

The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction so that the costs of such use will be

seen as outweighing the gains. However, to minimize the impact of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our interests, we will need the capability not only to deter their use against either ourselves or our allies and friends but also, where necessary and feasible, to prevent it.

This will require improved defensive and offensive capabilities. To minimize the vulnerability of our forces abroad to weapons of mass destruction, we are placing a high priority on improving our ability to locate, identify and disable arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, production and storage facilities for such weapons and their delivery systems. We also have vigorous and highly effective theater missile defense development programs designed to protect against conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Although the intelligence community does not believe that an intercontinental-range missile threat to our homeland is likely to emerge from rogue states in the foreseeable future, we are developing a national missile defense deployable readiness program so we can respond quickly (within 2-3 years) should a sooner-than-expected threat materialize.

Nuclear Forces

In September 1994, the President approved the recommendations of the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A key conclusion of this review is that the United States will retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders. The President approved the NPR's recommended strategic nuclear force posture as the U.S. START II force. The forces are: 500 Minuteman ICBMs, 14 Trident submarines all with D-5 missiles, 20 B-2 and 66 B-52 strategic bombers, and a non-nuclear role for the B-1s. This force posture allows us the flexibility to reconstitute or reduce further, as conditions warrant. The NPR also reaffirmed the current posture and deployment of nonstrategic nuclear forces, and the United States has eliminated carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability.

Arms Control

Arms control is an integral part of our national security strategy. Arms control can help reduce incentives to initiate attack; enhance predictability regarding the size and structure of forces, thus reducing fear of aggressive intent; reduce the size of national defense industry establishments and thus permit the growth of more vital, nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence in compliance through effective monitoring and verification; and, ultimately, contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of power.

In the area of strategic arms control, prescribed reductions in strategic offensive arms and the steady shift toward less destabilizing systems remain indispensable. Ukraine's December 1994 accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty — joining Belarus and Kazakhstan's decision to be non-nuclear weapon states — was followed immediately by the exchange of instruments of ratification and brought the START I treaty into force at the December 1994 CSCE summit, paving the way for the Senate's advice and consent for ratification of the 1993 START II Treaty on January 26, 1996. Under START II, the United States and Russia will each be left with between 3,000 and 3,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which is a two-thirds reduction from the Cold War peak. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed that once START II is ratified by both countries, both nations will immediately begin to deactivate or otherwise remove from combat status, those systems whose elimination will be required by that treaty, rather than waiting for the treaty to run its course through the year 2003. START II ratification will also open the door to the next round of strategic arms control, in which we will consider what further reductions in, or limitations on, remaining U.S. and Russian nuclear forces should be carried out. We will also explore strategic confidence-building measures and mutual understandings that reduce the risk of accidental war.

The full and faithful implementation of other existing arms control agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I (START I), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, several nuclear testing agreements, the 1994 Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), Open Skies, the Environmental Modification Convention (EnMod), Incidents at Sea and many others will remain an important element

of national security policy. The ongoing negotiation initiated by the United States to clarify the ABM Treaty by establishing an agreed demarcation between strategic and theater ballistic missiles, and updating the Treaty to reflect the break-up of the Soviet Union as well as the Administration's efforts to resolve the CFE flank issue on the basis of a map realignment, reflects the Administration's commitment to maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of crucial arms control agreements.

Future arms control efforts may become more regional and multilateral. Regional arrangements can add predictability and openness to security relations, advance the rule of international law and promote cooperation among participants. They help maintain deterrence and a stable military balance at regional levels. The United States is prepared to promote, help negotiate, monitor and participate in regional arms control undertakings compatible with American national security interests. We will generally support such undertakings but will not seek to impose regional arms control accords against the wishes of affected states. In this regard, the United States, United Kingdom and France announced they would sign the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in the first half of 1996.

As arms control, whether regional or global, becomes increasingly multilateral, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva will play an even more important role. The United States will support measures to increase the effectiveness and relevance of the CD. Arms control agreements can head off potential arms races in certain weapons categories or in some environments. We will continue to seek greater transparency, responsibility and, where appropriate, restraint in the transfer of conventional weapons and global military spending. The UN register of conventional arms transfers is a start in promoting greater transparency of weapons transfers and buildups, but more needs to be done.

In February 1995, the President approved a comprehensive policy on transfers of conventional arms that balances legitimate arms sales to support the national security of U.S. allies and friends and the need for multilateral restraint in transferring arms that would undermine stability. The United States has also led international efforts to create the multilateral "Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technology" — the successor to the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade (COCOM) — to provide a

regime for transparency and restraint on dangerous transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technologies. Measures to reduce over-sized defense industrial establishments, especially those parts involved with weapons of mass destruction, will also contribute to stability in the post-Cold War world. The Administration has pursued defense conversion agreements with the former Soviet Union states, and defense conversion is also on the agenda with China. The United States has also proposed a regime to reduce the number and availability of the world's long-lived antipersonnel mines whose indiscriminate and irresponsible use has reached crisis proportions. In addition, the Administration is leading the international effort to strengthen the laws governing landmine use in the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons. The Administration obtained Senate consent to ratification of this Convention in March 1995.

Peace Operations

In addition to preparing for major regional contingencies and overseas presence, we must prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution. The United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response. U.S. support capabilities such as airlift, intelligence and global communications have often contributed to the success of multilateral peace operations, and they will continue to do so. U.S. combat units are less likely to be used for most peace operations, but in some cases their use will be necessary or desirable and justified by U.S. national interests as guided by the Presidential Decision Directive, 'U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,' and outlined below.

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.

Peace operations often have served, and continue to serve, important U.S. national interests. In some cases, they have helped preserve peace between nations, as in Cyprus and the Golan Heights. In others, peacekeepers have provided breathing room for fledgling democracies, as in Cambodia, El Salvador and Namibia. And in Latin America, the United States, along with fellow Guarantors of the 1942

Rio Protocol Argentina, Brazil and Chile, has contributed to a border monitoring effort to stop fighting between Peru and Ecuador and help achieve a lasting resolution of their border dispute.

At the same time, however, we must recognize that some types of peace operations make demands on the UN that exceed the organization's capabilities. The United States is working with the UN headquarters and other member states to ensure that the UN embarks only on peace operations that make political and military sense and that the UN is able to manage effectively those peace operations it does undertake. We support the creation of a professional UN peace operations headquarters with a planning staff, access to timely intelligence, a logistics unit that can be rapidly deployed and a modern operations center with global communications. The United States has reduced our peacekeeping payments to 25 percent while working to ensure that other nations pay their fair share. We are also working to ensure that peacekeeping operations by appropriate regional organizations such as NATO and the OSCE can be carried out effectively.

In order to maximize the benefits of UN peace operations, the United States must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in them. The need to exercise such discipline is at the heart of President Clinton's policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The President's policy review on peace operations — the most thorough ever undertaken by an Administration — requires the United States to undertake a rigorous analysis of requirements and capabilities before voting to support or participate in peace operations. The United States has not hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to ensure that the UN authorizes only those peace operations that meet these standards.

Most UN peacekeeping operations do not involve U.S. forces. On those occasions when we consider contributing U.S. forces to a UN peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that would guide any decision to employ U.S. forces. In addition, we will ensure that the risks to U.S. personnel and the command and control arrangements governing the participation of American and foreign forces are acceptable to the United States.

The question of command and control is particularly critical. There may be times when it is in our interest to place

U.S. troops under the temporary operational control of a competent UN or allied commander. The United States has done so many times in the past — from the siege of Yorktown in the Revolutionary War to the battles of Desert Storm. However, under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his command authority over U.S. forces.

Improving the ways the United States and the UN decide upon and conduct peace operations will not make the decision to engage any easier. The lesson we must take away from our first ventures in peace operations is not that we should forswear such operations but that we should employ this tool selectively and more effectively. In short, the United States views peace operations as a means to support our national security strategy, not as a strategy unto itself.

The President is firmly committed to securing the active support of the Congress for U.S. participation in peace operations. The Administration has set forth a detailed blueprint to guide consultations with Congress. With respect to particular operations, the Administration will undertake consultations on questions such as the nature of expected U.S. military participation, the mission parameters of the operation, the expected duration and budgetary implications. In addition to such operation-specific consultations, the Administration has also conducted regular monthly briefings for congressional staff and will deliver an Annual Comprehensive Report to Congress on Peace Operations. Congress is critical to the institutional development of a successful U.S. policy on peace operations, including the resolution of funding issues that have an impact on military readiness.

Two other points deserve emphasis. First, the primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened. Second, while the international community can create conditions for peace, the responsibility for peace ultimately rests with the people of the country in question.

Strong Intelligence Capabilities

U.S. intelligence capabilities are critical instruments of our national power and integral to implementing our national security strategy. Strong intelligence capabilities are needed to protect our nation by providing warning of

threats to U.S. national security, by providing support to the policy and military communities to prevail over these threats and by identifying opportunities for advancing our national interests through support to diplomacy. Decisionmakers, military commanders and policy analysts at all levels rely on the intelligence community to collect information unavailable from other sources and to provide strategic and tactical analysis to help surmount challenges to our national interests and security.

Because of the change in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, intelligence must address a wider range of threats and policy needs. In this demanding environment, the intelligence community must maintain its global reach, refine and further focus its collection efforts and work even more closely with the policy departments. Moreover, its analytic effort must provide a coherent framework to help senior U.S. officials manage a complex range of military, political and economic issues. Intelligence emphasis must be placed on preserving and enhancing those collection and analytic capabilities that provide unique information against those states and groups that pose the most serious threats to U.S. security.

To build greater focus, direction and responsiveness into these intelligence activities, the President last year signed a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on intelligence priorities. This Directive established for the first time a series of categories of intelligence needs. This PDD is a flexible document designed to accommodate shifting priorities within the categories. Current Presidential priorities include:

- Warning and management of threats that pose a direct or immediate threat to U.S. interests.
- "Rogue states" whose policies are consistently hostile to the United States.
- Countries that possess strategic nuclear forces that can pose a threat to the United States and its allies.
- Command and control of nuclear weapons and control of nuclear fissile materials.
- Transnational threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international narcotics trafficking, international terrorism and international organized crime.

- Ongoing or potential major regional conflicts where the United States has national security interests.
- Intensified counterintelligence against hostile foreign intelligence services.

U.S. intelligence must not only monitor traditional threats but also assist the policy community to forestall new and emerging threats, especially those of a transnational nature. In carrying out these responsibilities, the intelligence community must:

- Support U.S. military operations worldwide. Whenever U.S. forces are deployed, the highest priority is to ensure that our military commanders receive the timely information required to execute successfully their mission while minimizing the loss of American lives.
- Support diplomatic efforts in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives by providing policymakers and diplomats timely intelligence on political developments in key areas such as the Middle East, the Balkans and North Korea.
- Provide worldwide capabilities to detect, identify and deter efforts of foreign nations to develop weapons of mass destruction and ancillary delivery systems.
- Gather information on terrorist activities aimed at U.S. persons or interests and help thwart such activities whether conducted by well-organized groups or loose associations of disaffected individuals intent on striking at the United States.
- Provide worldwide capabilities to gather timely intelligence on current and emerging information technologies or infrastructure that may potentially threaten U.S. interests at home or abroad.
- Contribute where appropriate to policy efforts aimed at bolstering our economic prosperity.
- Provide the timely information necessary to monitor treaties, promote democracy and free markets, forge alliances and track emerging threats.

The collection and analysis of economic intelligence will play an increasingly important role in helping policy-

makers understand economic trends. Economic intelligence can help by identifying threats to private U.S. economic enterprises from foreign intelligence services as well as unfair trading practices. Intelligence must also identify emerging threats that could affect the international economy and the stability of some nation states, such as the upsurge in international organized crime and illegal trafficking in narcotics.

The development and implementation of U.S. policies to promote democracy abroad relies on sound intelligence support. In order to forecast adequately dangers to democracy abroad, the intelligence community and policy departments must track political, economic, social and military developments in those parts of the world where U.S. interests are most heavily engaged and where collection of information from open sources is inadequate. This often leads to early warning of potential crises and facilitates preventive diplomacy.

Improving the management of intelligence resources and focusing on the principal concerns of policymakers and military commanders enhances the value of intelligence and contributes to our national well-being. The establishment, for example, of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency will provide a more integrated imagery capability that will be especially important in providing warning of threats to U.S. and allied interests and in supporting crisis management and military operations. Intelligence producers must develop closer relationships with the users of intelligence to make products more responsive to current consumer needs. This includes identifying emerging threats to modern information systems and supporting the development of protection strategies. The continuous availability of intelligence, especially during crises, is of crucial importance. Also underlying all intelligence activities must be an increased awareness of, and enhanced capabilities in, counterintelligence. Finally, to enhance the study and support of worldwide environmental, humanitarian and disaster relief activities, technical intelligence assets — especially imagery — must be directed to a greater degree toward collection of data on these subjects.

Fighting International Organized Crime

International organized crime jeopardizes the global trend toward peace and freedom, undermines fragile new democracies, saps the strength from developing countries

and threatens our efforts to build a safer, more prosperous world. The rise of organized crime in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe weakens new democracies and poses a direct threat to U.S. interests, particularly in light of the potential for the theft and smuggling by organized criminals of nuclear materials left within some of these nations.

The Administration has launched a major initiative to combat international organized crime. Criminal enterprises are presently moving vast sums of illegal gains through the international financial system with impunity. In addition to invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to undercut the financial underpinnings of criminal enterprises, the President has ordered an action plan to combat money laundering throughout the globe by directing the government to identify and put on notice nations that tolerate money laundering. We intend to work with these nations to bring their banks and financial systems into conformity with the international standards against moneylaundering — or we will consider sanctions. The Justice Department is also drafting legislation, which will be submitted to Congress, to provide U.S. agencies with the tools they need to respond to organized criminal activity.

Because the threat of organized crime comes from abroad as well as at home, we will work with other nations to keep our citizens safe. The President's invitation at the United Nations to all countries to join the United States in fighting international organized crime by measures of their own and by negotiating and endorsing an international declaration on citizens' safety — a declaration which would include a "no-sanctuary for organized criminals" pledge — is an effort to enhance our international cooperative efforts to protect our people.

International crime organizations target nations whose law enforcement agencies lack the experience and capacity to stop them. To help police in the new democracies of Central Europe, Hungary and the United States established an international law enforcement academy in Budapest. The President also proposed last year at the United Nations an effective police partnership that would establish a network of such centers around the world to share the latest crime-fighting techniques and technology.

The President's initiative also targeted the criminal or quasi-legal enterprises that have begun to develop an enor-

mous gray-market trade in illegal weapons. By forging documents or diverting deliveries of armaments, these networks have been able to move weapons to areas of conflict or instability. The graymarket continues to fuel insurgencies and subvert international arms embargoes. These networks serve criminals and terrorists alike, and parasitically feed off and ultimately threaten, the open markets and open societies that we have worked so hard to advance.

National Security Emergency Preparedness

We will do all we can to prevent destructive forces such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to our information systems and catastrophes from within such as natural disasters, from endangering our citizens. But we must also be prepared to respond effectively if an emergency does occur in order to ensure the survivability of our institutions and national infrastructure, protect lives and property and preserve our way of life. National security emergency preparedness is imperative, and we must continue to work aggressively to ensure appropriate threat mitigation and response capabilities, including the ability to restore to normalcy elements of our society affected by national security emergencies or disasters resulting in widespread disruption, destruction, injury or death. To this end, comprehensive, all-hazard emergency preparedness planning by all Federal departments and agencies continues to be a crucial national security requirement.

The Environment and Sustainable Development

The more clearly we understand the complex interrelationships between the different parts of our world's environment, the better we can understand the regional and even global consequences of local changes to the environment. Increasing competition for the dwindling reserves of uncontaminated air, arable land, fisheries and other food sources and water, once considered 'free' goods, is already a very real risk to regional stability around the world. The range of environmental risks serious enough to jeopardize international stability extends to massive population flight from man-made or natural catastrophes, such as Chernobyl or the East African drought, and to large-scale ecosystem damage caused by industrial pollution, deforestation, loss

of biodiversity, ozone depletion, desertification, ocean pollution and, ultimately, climate change. Strategies dealing with environmental issues of this magnitude will require partnerships between governments and nongovernmental organizations, cooperation between nations and regions, sustained scientific research and a commitment to a strategically focused, long-term policy for emerging environmental risks.

The decisions we make today regarding military force structures typically influence our ability to respond to threats 20 to 30 years in the future. Similarly, our current decisions regarding the environment and natural resources will affect the magnitude of their security risks over at least a comparable period of time, if not longer. The measure of our difficulties in the future will be settled by the steps we take in the present.

As a priority initiative, the U.S. successfully led efforts at the Cairo Conference to develop a consensus Program of Action to address the continuous climb in global population, including increased availability of family planning and reproductive health services, sustainable economic development, the empowerment of women to include enhanced educational opportunities and a reduction in infant and child mortality. Rapid population growth in the developing world and unsustainable consumption patterns in industrialized nations are the root of both present and potentially even greater forms of environmental degradation and resource depletion. A conservative estimate of the globe's population projects 8.5 billion people on the planet by the year 2025. Even when making the most generous allowances for advances in science and technology, one cannot help but conclude that population growth and environmental pressures will feed into immense social unrest and make the world substantially more vulnerable to serious international frictions.

Promoting Prosperity at Home

A central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America's prosperity through efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable. Our prosperity at home depends on engaging actively abroad. The strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values abroad — all these depend in part on the strength of our economy.

Enhancing American Competitiveness

Our primary economic goal is to strengthen the American economy. The first step toward that goal was reducing the federal deficit and the burden it imposes on the economy and future generations. The economic program passed in 1993 has restored investor confidence in the United States and strengthened our position in international economic negotiations. Under the Clinton economic plan, the federal budget deficit as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product was lowered from 4.9 percent in Fiscal Year 1992 to 2.4 percent in Fiscal Year 1995 — the lowest since 1979. And Fiscal Year 1995 was the first time that the deficit has been reduced three years in a row since the Truman Administration. We are building on this deficit reduction effort with other steps to improve American competitiveness: investing in science and technology; assisting integration of the commercial and military industrial sectors; improving information networks and other vital infrastructure; and improving education and training programs for America's workforce. We are structuring our defense R&D effort to place greater emphasis on dual-use technologies that allow the military to capitalize on commercial-sector innovation for lower cost, higher quality and increased performance. We are also reforming the defense acquisition system so that we can develop and procure weapons and materiel more efficiently.

Strengthening Macroeconomic Coordination

As national economies become more integrated internationally, the United States cannot thrive in isolation from developments abroad. International economic expansion is benefiting from G-7 macroeconomic policy coordination. Our work to strengthen an effective, cooperative G-7 dialogue has led to better economic growth in the G-7 countries. In the United States, economic trends point to continued economic strength and sustained expansion. Conditions for growth among our G-7 partners appear to be in place for most countries, and inflation is well under control.

Enhancing Access to Foreign Markets

The success of American business and our ability to create quality jobs for our workers is more than ever dependent

upon success in exporting to international markets. The ability to compete internationally also assures that our companies will continue to innovate and increase productivity, which in turn will lead to improvements in our own living standards. But to compete abroad, our firms need access to foreign markets, just as foreign industries have access to our open market. We vigorously pursue measures to increase access for our goods and services — through bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangements.

Export Strategy and Advocacy Program

In 1993, the Administration published a report creating America's first national export strategy and making 65 specific recommendations for reforming the way government works with the private sector to expand exports. Among the recommendations were significant improvements in advocacy, export financing, market information systems and product standards education. Our objective is to expand U.S. exports to over \$1.2 trillion by the year 2000, which would mean some 5 million new American jobs and a total of some 16 million jobs supported by exports by the turn of the century.

Our export strategy is working. Since this Administration took office, the United States has regained its position from Germany as the world's largest exporter. We have designed and begun implementing new approaches to promoting exports, notably our strategy of focusing upon the ten "Big Emerging Markets" that will take more than a quarter of the world's imports by the year 2010. Our strong export performance has supported as many as 2 million new, export-related jobs since January 1993. But we know that we need to export more in the years ahead if we are to reduce further our trade deficit and raise living standards with high-wage jobs.

Export Controls

Another critical element in boosting U.S. exports is reforming the outdated export licensing system. In September 1993, we liberalized controls on more than \$30 billion of computer exports, and in March 1994, we eliminated controls on virtually all civilian telecommunications equipment to the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and China. The Administration is also seeking comprehensive reform of the Export Administration Act, which governs the process of export

licensing. The goal of this reform is to strengthen our ability to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and protect other national interests, while removing unnecessarily burdensome licensing requirements left over from the Cold War. In 1995, we eliminated controls on the export of computers to our closest allies and liberalized controls on other computer exports consistent with our national security interests.

Expanding the Realm of Open Markets

The conclusion of NAFTA, the Uruguay Round of GATT, the Bogor Declaration of the 1994 APEC leaders meeting and 1995 Osaka Action Plan, the Summit of the Americas' Action Plan and the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Marketplace represent unprecedented progress toward more open markets both at the regional and global levels. The Administration intends to continue its efforts in further enhancing U.S. access to foreign markets. The World Trade Organization (WTO) will provide a new institutional lever for securing such access. Emerging markets, particularly along the Pacific Rim, present vast opportunities for American enterprise, and APEC now provides a suitable vehicle for the exploration of such opportunities. Similarly, the United States convened the Summit of the Americas to seize the opportunities created by the movement toward open markets throughout the hemisphere. The Transatlantic Marketplace launched with the European Union in Madrid in December 1995, will further expand our economic ties. All such steps in the direction of expanded trading relationships will be undertaken in a way consistent with protection of the international environment and towards the goal of sustainable development here and abroad.

The North American Free Trade Agreement

On December 3, 1993, President Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), which creates a free trade zone among the United States, Canada and Mexico. NAFTA has already created nearly 310,000 American jobs because of exports to our NAFTA partners. NAFTA has also increased Mexico's capacity to cooperate with our nation on a wide range of issues that cross our 2,000 mile border — including the environment, narcotics trafficking and illegal immigration. This Free Trade Act helped insulate our trade relationship with Mexico and protect and increase U.S. exports to that country — and the jobs they support

— during the 1995 Mexican financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession and adjustment period. We have also begun negotiations with Chile on expanding NAFTA's membership.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

Our economic relations depend vitally on our ties with the Asia Pacific region, which is the world's fastest-growing economic area. In November 1993, President Clinton convened the first-ever summit of the leaders of the economies that constitute the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. U.S. initiatives in the APEC forum will open new opportunities for economic cooperation and permit U.S. companies to expand their involvement in substantial infrastructure planning and construction throughout the region. The trade and investment framework agreed to in 1993 provided the basis for enhancing the 'open regionalism' that defines APEC. At the second leaders meeting in November 1994, APEC leaders embraced the goal of free and open trade and investment throughout the region by 2020. A third meeting in Osaka, Japan, in 1995 adopted an action agenda for facilitating and measuring progress toward that goal.

Uruguay Round of GATT

The successful conclusion in December 1993 of the Uruguay Round of the negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), after seven years and three "final" deadlines, significantly strengthened the world trading system. The Uruguay Round accord is the largest, most comprehensive trade agreement in history. It will reduce tariffs by 40 percent and extend trade rules to agriculture, services and international property rights. The U.S. economy is expected to gain \$150 billion per year in GNP once the Uruguay Round is fully phased in, which will create hundreds of thousands of new U.S. jobs and expand opportunities for U.S. businesses. Working with Congress, the President secured U.S. approval of this path-breaking agreement and the resulting World Trade Organization, which provides a forum to resolve disputes openly. The President remains committed to ensuring that the commitments in the Uruguay Round agreement are fulfilled.

U.S. - Japan Framework Agreement

The Administration continues to make progress with Asia's largest economy and America's second largest trading partner in increasing market access and strengthening sustainable economic growth internationally. Since the U.S.-Japan Framework for Economic Partnership was established by President Clinton and Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1993, we have reached 20 market access agreements with Japan covering a range of key sectors, such as medical technologies, telecommunications, insurance, flat glass, financial services and intellectual property rights. Our merchandise exports to Japan in the sectors covered by these agreements have expanded at a rate that is more than double that of export growth to Japan in the noncovered sectors. In August 1995, we concluded a landmark agreement in automobile and auto parts trade, the largest sector of our bilateral trade deficit, and last summer we took steps to support market access for U.S. transport services.

The Administration is committed to ensuring that competitive American goods and services have fair access to the Japanese market. In addition, the Administration is working with Japan to address common challenges to sustainable economic development through the Framework's Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective. Partnerships have been strengthened in the environment, human health and advanced technology development, and new initiatives were launched this year that address education, food security, counter-terrorism, natural disaster mitigation, combating emerging infectious diseases and nation-building. This Administration will continue to seek partnerships that help both nations fulfill our international responsibilities as the world's two largest economies.

Summit of the Americas

America's economy benefits enormously from the opportunity offered by the commitment of the 34 democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere to negotiate by 2005 a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The Western Hemisphere is our largest export market, constituting over 35 percent of all U.S. sales abroad. The action plan will accelerate progress toward free, integrated markets that will create new, high-wage jobs and sustain economic growth for America. The June 1995 Trade Ministerial created seven working groups to begin preparations for the negotiation of the FTAA.

U.S.-EU Transatlantic Marketplace

On December 3, 1995, President Clinton launched the New Transatlantic Agenda at the U.S.-EU Summit in Madrid, Spain. As part of this agenda, the United States and the European Union (EU) agreed to take concrete steps to reduce barriers to trade and investment through the creation of a New Transatlantic Marketplace. The United States and the EU also will explore the possibility of agreeing on further tariff reductions and accelerated reductions in tariffs already agreed to in the Uruguay Round; negotiate agreements on mutual recognition of certification and testing procedures; conclude a customs cooperation and mutual assistance agreement; carry out a joint study of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and options for their elimination; and work together in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the WTO to achieve agreements on foreign investment and telecommunications services.

OECD Multilateral Investment Agreement

In May 1995, the United States helped launch OECD negotiations of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which will be a state-of-the-art investment agreement. The negotiations are intended to conclude by 1996. There is already broad consensus that the agreement will be based on high standards, including national and most-favored-nation treatment, and that exceptions would be limited and narrowly drawn. We are seeking to establish clear legal standards on expropriation, access to binding international arbitration for disputes and unrestricted investment-related transfers across borders. If successful, these negotiations would help further our efforts on investment issues in Asia and in the WTO.

Preparing International Economic Institutions for the 21st Century

At the initiative of President Clinton at the Naples Economic Summit in 1994, the G-7 undertook an intensive review of the international financial and economic institutions to consider how to prepare them for the 21st Century. At the following year's summit in Halifax, Canada, the G-7 proposed a number of important reforms and initiatives. These include measures to improve our capacity to prevent and mitigate international financial crises; the creation of a more effective early warning and

prevention system with an emphasis on improved disclosure of financial and economic data; the establishment of a new Emergency Financing Mechanism to provide the means for a quick and surgical international response to crises with systemic implications; a doubling of the resources available under the General Arrangement to Borrow, including from new participants with a stake in the system; and instituting a review of procedures that might facilitate the orderly resolution of international debt crises in a financial environment characterized by a greater diversity of creditors and financial instruments. Another important area considered at Halifax concerns international financial regulation. The G-7 leaders committed to intensify cooperation among financial authorities to limit systemic risk and pledged to develop and enhance safeguards, standards, transparency and systems to reduce risk.

At Halifax, the G-7 leaders also endorsed a blueprint for reforms of the World Bank and the regional development banks — reforms that the United States has been promoting for two and a half years. Key elements include: substantially increasing the share of resources devoted to basic social programs that invest in people and are a powerful force for poverty reduction, such as primary education for girls and basic health care; focus on safeguarding the environment; support for development of the private sector and the use of more innovative financial instruments to catalyze private capital flows; and internal reforms of the multilateral development banks, including consolidation, decentralization, increased transparency and cost reduction.

Providing for Energy Security

The United States depends on oil for more than 40% of its primary energy needs. Roughly half of our oil needs are met with imports, and a large share of these imports come from the Persian Gulf area. The experiences of the two oil shocks and the Gulf War show that an interruption of oil supplies can have a significant impact on the economies of the United States and its allies. Appropriate economic responses can substantially mitigate the balance of payments and inflationary impacts of an oil shock; appropriate security policy responses to events such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait can limit the magnitude of the crisis.

Over the longer term, the United States' dependence on access to foreign oil sources will be increasingly important as our resources are depleted. The U.S. economy has

grown roughly 75% since the first oil shock; yet during that time our oil consumption has remained virtually stable and oil production has declined. High oil prices did not generate enough new oil exploration and discovery to sustain production levels from our depleted resource base. These facts show the need for continued and extended reliance on energy efficiency and conservation and development of alternative energy sources. Conservation measures notwithstanding, the United States has a vital interest in unrestricted access to this critical resource.

Promoting Sustainable Development Abroad

Broad-based economic development not only improves the prospects for democratic development in developing countries but also expands the demands for U.S. exports. Economic growth abroad can alleviate pressure on the global environment, reduce the attraction of illegal narcotics trade and improve the health and economic productivity of global populations.

The environmental consequences of ill-designed economic growth are clear. Environmental damage will ultimately block economic growth. Rapid urbanization is outstripping the ability of nations to provide jobs, education and other services to new citizens. The continuing poverty of a quarter of the world's people leads to hunger, malnutrition, economic migration and political unrest. Widespread illiteracy and lack of technical skills hinder employment opportunities and drive entire populations to support themselves on increasingly fragile and damaged resource bases. New diseases, such as AIDS, and other epidemics which can be spread through environmental degradation, threaten to overwhelm the health facilities of developing countries, disrupt societies and stop economic growth. Developing countries must address these realities with national sustainable development policies that offer viable alternatives. U.S. leadership is of the essence to facilitate that process. If such alternatives are not developed, the consequences for the planet's future will be grave indeed.

Domestically, the United States is working hard to halt local and cross-border environmental degradation. In addition, the United States is fostering environmental technology that targets pollution prevention, control and cleanup. Companies that invest in energy efficiency, clean manufacturing and environmental services today will

create the high-quality, high-wage jobs of tomorrow. By providing access to these types of technologies, our exports can also provide the means for other nations to achieve environmentally sustainable economic growth. At the same time, we are taking ambitious steps at home to better manage our natural resources and reduce energy and other consumption, decrease waste generation and increase our recycling efforts.

Internationally, the Administration's foreign assistance program focuses on four key elements of sustainable development: broad-based economic growth; the environment; population and health; and democracy. We will continue to advocate environmentally sound private investment and responsible approaches by international lenders. As mentioned above, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDB's) are now placing increased emphasis upon sustainable development in their funding decisions, to include a commitment to perform environmental assessments on projects for both internal and public scrutiny. In particular, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), established in 1994, provides a source of financial assistance to the developing world for climate change, biodiversity and oceans initiatives that will benefit all the world's citizens, including Americans.

The United States is taking specific steps in all of these areas:

- In June 1993, the United States signed the Convention on Biological Diversity, which aims to protect and utilize the world's genetic inheritance. The Interior Department created a National Biological Service to help protect species and to help the agricultural and biotechnical industries identify new sources of food, fiber and medications.
- New policies are being implemented to ensure the sustainable management of U.S. forests by the year 2000, as pledged internationally. In addition, U.S. bilateral forest assistance programs are being expanded, and the United States is promoting sustainable management of tropical forests.
- In the wake of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the United States has undertaken initiatives to reduce land-based sources of marine pollution, maintain populations of marine species at healthy and productive levels and protect endangered marine mammals and coral reefs:

- The United States has focused technical assistance and encouraged nongovernmental environmental groups to provide expertise to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European nations that have suffered the most acute environmental crises. The Agency for International Development, the Environmental Protection Agency and other U.S. agencies are engaged in technical cooperation with many countries around the world to advance these goals. The United States has also been working bilaterally with a number of developing countries to promote their sustainable development and to work jointly on global environmental issues.
- The Administration is leading a renewed global effort to address population problems and promote international consensus for stabilizing world population growth. Our comprehensive approach stresses family planning and reproductive health care, maternal and child health, education and improving the status of women. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo, endorsed these approaches as important strategies in achieving our global population goals. At the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing, the United States promoted women's — and children's — international rights.
- With regard to the United Nations, the G-7 leaders at the Halifax Summit in 1995 endorsed an ambitious effort to modernize the organization's economic and social functions through better coordination, consolidation of related agencies, rethinking agency mandates and creating an effective management culture in a smaller and more focused Secretariat. Following President Clinton's call for a UN reform commission, the UN General Assembly established the High Level Working Group on Strengthening the UN System in September 1995.
- In April 1993, President Clinton pledged that the United States would reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, in accordance with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. In March 1995, we and other parties to the Convention agreed to negotiate steps to be taken beyond the year 2000. We are resolved to deal forcefully with this threat to our planet while preserving U.S. economic competitiveness.

- The United States and other countries have agreed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out use of the major ozone-depleting substances. In 1995, we also agreed with other nations to decrease use of additional ozone-depleting chemicals.

Promoting Democracy

All of America's strategic interests — from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory — are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy.

One of the most gratifying and encouraging developments of the past 15 years is the explosion in the number of states moving away from repressive governance and toward democracy. Since the success of many of those experiments is by no means assured, our strategy of enlargement must focus on the consolidation of those regimes and the broadening of their commitment to democracy. At the same time, we seek to increase respect for fundamental human rights in all states and encourage an evolution to democracy where that is possible.

The enlargement of the community of market democracies respecting human rights and the environment is manifest in a number of ways:

- More than 30 nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa and East Asia have, over the past 10 years, adopted the structures of a constitutional democracy and held free elections;
- The nations of the Western Hemisphere have proclaimed their commitment to democratic regimes and to the collective responsibility of the nations of the OAS to respond to threats to democracy.
- In the Western Hemisphere, only Cuba is not a democratic state.
- Nations as diverse as South Africa and Cambodia have resolved bitter internal disputes with agreement on the creation of constitutional democracies.

The first element of our enlargement strategy is to work with the other democracies of the world and to improve our cooperation with them on security and economic issues. We also seek their support in enlarging the realm of democratic nations.

The core of our strategy is to help democracy and free-markets expand and survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most. Thus, we must target our effort to assist states that affect our strategic interests, such as those with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons or the potential to generate refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies. We must focus our efforts where we have the most leverage. And our efforts must be demand-driven — they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.

Russia is a key state in this regard. If we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia — and in the other new independent states — we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partnership. Our intensified interaction with Ukraine has helped move that country onto the path of economic reform, which is critical to its long-term stability. In addition, our efforts in Russia, Ukraine and the other states support and facilitate our efforts to achieve continued reductions in nuclear arms and compliance with international nonproliferation accords.

The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are another clear example, given their proximity to the great democratic powers of Western Europe, their importance to our security and their potential markets. Eventual integration into European security and economic organizations, such as NATO and the EU, will help lock in and preserve the impressive progress in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms that these nations have made.

Since our ties across the Pacific are no less important than those across the Atlantic, pursuing enlargement in the Asia Pacific theater is a third example. We will work to support the emerging democracies of the region and to encourage other states along the same path.

Continuing the great strides toward democracy and markets in our hemisphere is also a key concern and was behind the President's decision to host the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. As we continue such efforts, we should be on the lookout for states whose entry into the camp of market democracies may influence the future direction of an entire region; South Africa now holds that potential with regard to sub-Saharan Africa.

How should the United States help consolidate and enlarge democracy and markets in these states? The answers are as varied as the nations involved, but there are common elements. We must continue to help lead the effort to mobilize international resources, as we have with Russia, Ukraine and the other new independent states. We must be willing to take immediate public positions to help staunch democratic reversals, as we have in Haiti and Guatemala. We must give democratic nations the fullest benefits of integration into foreign markets, which is part of why NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT ranked so high on our agenda. And we must help these nations strengthen the pillars of civil society, improve their market institutions and fight corruption and political discontent through practices of good governance.

At the same time as we work to ensure the success of emerging democracies, we must also redouble our efforts to guarantee basic human rights on a global basis. At the 1993 United Nations Conference on Human Rights, the United States forcefully and successfully argued for a reaffirmation of the universality of such rights and improved international mechanisms for their promotion. In the wake of this gathering, the UN has named a High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the rights of women have been afforded a new international precedence. The United States has taken the lead in assisting the UN to set up international tribunals to enforce accountability for the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. And the President has endorsed the creation of a Permanent Criminal Court to address violations of international humanitarian law.

The United States also continues to work for the protection of human rights on a bilateral basis. To demonstrate our own willingness to adhere to international human rights standards, the United States ratified the international convention prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and the President signed the international convention on the rights of the child. The Administration is seeking Senate

consent to ratification for the convention prohibiting discrimination against women. The United States played a major role in promoting women's rights internationally at the UN Women's Conference in September.

In all these efforts, a policy of engagement and enlargement should take on a second meaning: we should pursue our goals through an enlarged circle not only of government officials but also of private and nongovernmental groups. Private firms are natural allies in our efforts to strengthen market economies. Similarly, our goal of strengthening democracy and civil society has a natural ally in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, chambers of commerce and election monitors. Just as we rely on force multipliers in defense, we should welcome these diplomacy multipliers, such as the National Endowment for Democracy.

Supporting the global movement toward democracy requires a pragmatic and long-term effort focused on both values and institutions. The United States must build on the opportunities achieved through the successful conclusion of the Cold War. Our long-term goal is a world in which each of the major powers is democratic, with many other nations joining the community of market democracies as well.

Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian assistance programs which are designed to alleviate human suffering and to pave the way for progress towards establishing democratic regimes with a commitment to respect for human rights and appropriate strategies for economic development. We are encouraging ideas such as the suggestion of Argentina's President Menem for the creation of an international civilian rapid response capability for humanitarian crises, including a school and training for humanitarian operations.

Through humanitarian assistance and policy initiatives aimed at the sources of disruption, we seek to mitigate the contemporary migration and refugee crises, foster long-term global cooperation and strengthen involved international institutions. The United States will provide appropriate financial support and will work with other nations and international bodies, such as the International Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in seeking voluntary repatriation of refugees — taking into full consideration human rights concerns as well as the

economic conditions that may have driven them out in the first place. Helping refugees return to their homes in Mozambique, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia and Guatemala, for example, is a high priority.

Relief efforts will continue for people displaced by the conflict in Bosnia and other republics of the former Yugoslavia. We will act in concert with other nations and

the UN against the illegal smuggling of aliens into this country. In concert with the tools of diplomatic, economic and military power, our humanitarian and refugee policies can bear results, as was evident in Haiti. We provided temporary safe haven at Guantanamo Naval Base for those Haitians who feared for their safety and left by sea until we helped restore democracy.

III. Integrated Regional Approaches

The United States is a genuinely global power. Our policy toward each of the world's regions reflects our overall strategy tailored to their unique challenges and opportunities. This section highlights the application of our strategy to each of the world's regions; our broad objectives and thrust, rather than an exhaustive list of all our policies and interests. It illustrates how we integrate our commitment to the promotion of democracy and the enhancement of American prosperity with our security requirements to produce a mutually reinforcing policy.

Europe and Eurasia

Our strategy of engagement and enlargement is central to U.S. policy toward Europe. European stability is vital to our own security, a lesson we have learned twice at great cost this century. Vibrant European economies mean more jobs for Americans at home and investment opportunities abroad. With the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of many new democratizing states in its wake, the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to contribute toward a free and undivided Europe. Our goal is an integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity.

The first and most important element of our strategy in Europe must be security through military strength and cooperation. The Cold War is over, but war itself is not over.

We must work with our allies to ensure that the hard-won peace in the former Yugoslavia will survive and flourish after four years of war. U.S. policy is focused on five goals:

sustaining a political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for all its peoples; preventing the spread of the conflict into a broader Balkan war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe; stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict; halting the slaughter of innocents; and helping to support NATO's central role in Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture.

Our leadership paved the way to NATO's February 1994 ultimatum that ended the heavy Serb bombardment of Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital. Our diplomatic leadership then brought an end to the fighting between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and helped establish a bicomunal Bosnian-Croat Federation. In April 1994, we began working with the warring parties through the Contact Group (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and Germany) to help the parties reach a negotiated settlement.

This past summer, following Bosnian Serb attacks on the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa and in response to the brutal shelling of Sarajevo, the United States led NATO's heavy and continuous air strikes. At the same time, President Clinton launched a new diplomatic initiative aimed at ending the conflict for good. Intensive diplomatic efforts by our negotiators forged a Bosnia-wide cease-fire and got the parties to agree to the basic principles of peace. Three dedicated American diplomats — Robert Frasure, Joseph Kruzel and Nelson Drew — lost their lives in that effort.

Three intensive weeks of negotiations, led by the United States last November, produced the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the agreement, the parties committed to put down their guns; to preserve Bosnia as a single state; to investigate and prosecute war criminals; to protect the human rights of all citizens; and to try to build a peaceful, democratic future. And they asked for help from the United States and the international community in implementing the peace agreement.

Following the signature of the peace agreement in Paris on December 14, U.S. forces deployed to Bosnia as part of a NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR). These forces, along with those of some 25 other nations, including all of our NATO allies, are working to ensure a stable and secure environment so that the parties have the confidence to carry out their obligations under the Dayton agreement. IFOR's task is limited to assisting the parties in implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement, including monitoring the cease-fire, monitoring and enforcing the withdrawal of forces and establishing and manning the zone of separation.

We anticipate a one-year mission for IFOR in Bosnia. The parties to the agreement have specific dates by which each stage of their obligations must be carried out, which started with the separation of forces within 30 days after IFOR assumed authority from UNPROFOR, and continuing with the removal of forces and heavy weapons to garrisons within 120 days.

During the second six months, IFOR will continue to maintain a stable and secure environment and prepare for and undertake an orderly drawdown of forces, while the parties themselves will continue to work with the international community to carry out the nonmilitary activities called for by the agreement. We believe that by the end of the first year we will have helped create a secure environment so that the people of Bosnia can travel freely throughout the country, vote in free elections and begin to rebuild their lives.

Civilian tasks of rebuilding, reconstruction, return of refugees and human rights monitoring, which are absolutely essential to making the peace endure, have been undertaken by the entire international community under civilian coordination. International aid agencies are helping the people of Bosnia rebuild to meet the immediate needs of survival. There also is a long-term interna-

tional reconstruction effort to repair the devastation brought about by years of war. This broad civilian effort is helping the people of Bosnia to rebuild, reuniting children with their parents and families with their homes and will allow the Bosnian people to choose freely their own leaders. It will give them a much greater stake in peace than war, so that peace takes on a life and a logic of its own.

We expect to contribute some \$600 million over the next 3-4 years to reconstruction and relief funding. In view of the large role that U.S. forces are playing in implementing the military aspects of the agreement, we believe it is appropriate for Europe to contribute the largest share of the funds for reconstruction. The European Union has taken the lead in these efforts in tandem with the international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank. The Japanese and Islamic countries also are prepared to make significant contributions.

An important element of our exit strategy for IFOR is our commitment to achieving a stable military balance within Bosnia and among the states of the former Yugoslavia by the time IFOR withdraws. This balance will help reduce the incentives of the parties to return to war. This balance should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions, and the Dayton agreement contains significant measures in this regard.

But even with the implementation of the arms control provisions, the armed forces of the Federation, which have been the most severely constrained by the arms embargo, will still be at a disadvantage. Accordingly, we have made a commitment to the Bosnian government that we will play a leadership role in ensuring that the Federation receives the assistance necessary to adequately defend itself when IFOR leaves. However, because we want to assure the impartiality of IFOR, providing arms and training to Federation forces will not be done by either IFOR or U.S. military forces. The approach we intend to pursue for the United States is to coordinate the efforts of third countries and to lead an international effort, with U.S. involvement in the execution of the program to be done by contractors.

Our efforts in this connection already have begun. An assessment team to evaluate the needs of the Federation visited Bosnia in November 1995 and made recommendations regarding the Federation's defense requirements. A

special task force has been established at the Department of State to work with other interested states and to identify the best sources of essential equipment and training. We will proceed with this effort in a manner that is consistent with the UN resolution lifting the arms embargo, which allows planning and training to proceed immediately but prohibits the introduction of weapons to the region for three months and the transfer of heavy weapons for six months.

As we work to resolve the tragedy of Bosnia and ease the suffering of its victims, we also need to transform European and transatlantic institutions so they can better address such conflicts and advance Europe's integration. Many institutions will play a role, including the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe (CE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. But NATO, history's greatest political-military alliance, must be central to that process.

The NATO alliance will remain the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. That is why we must keep it strong, vital and relevant. For the United States and its allies, NATO has always been far more than a transitory response to a temporary threat. It has been a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability. That is why its mission endures even though the Cold War has receded into the past. And that is why its benefits are so clear to Europe's new democracies.

Only NATO has the military forces, the integrated command structure, the broad legitimacy and the habits of cooperation that are essential to draw in new participants and respond to new challenges. One of the deepest transformations within the transatlantic community over the past half-century occurred because the armed forces of our respective nations trained, studied and marched through their careers together. It is not only the compatibility of our weapons but the camaraderie of our warriors that provide the sinews behind our mutual security guarantees and our best hope for peace. In this regard, we applaud France's decision to resume its participation in NATO's defense councils.

The United States has significantly reduced the level of U.S. military forces stationed in Europe. We have determined that a force of roughly 100,000 U.S. military

personnel assigned to the U.S. European Command will preserve U.S. influence and leadership in NATO and provide a deterrent posture that is visible to all Europeans. While we continue to examine the proper mix of forces, this level of permanent presence, augmented by forward deployed naval forces and reinforcements available from the United States, is sufficient to respond to plausible crises and contributes to stability in the region. Such a force level also provides a sound basis for U.S. participation in multinational training and preserves the capability to deter or respond to larger threats in Europe and to support limited NATO operations out of area.

NATO's mission is evolving, and the Alliance will continue to adapt to the many changes brought about in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Today, NATO plays a crucial role helping to manage ethnic and national conflict in Europe. With U.S. leadership, NATO has provided the muscle behind efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia. NATO air power enforced the UN-mandated no-fly zone and provided support to UN peacekeepers. NATO is now helping to implement the peace after the parties reached an agreement.

With the adoption of the U.S. initiative, Partnership for Peace, at the January 1994 summit, NATO is playing an increasingly important role in our strategy of European integration, extending the scope of our security cooperation to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 27 nations, including Russia, have already joined the Partnership, which will pave the way for a growing program of military cooperation and political consultation. Partner countries are sending representatives to NATO headquarters near Brussels and to a military coordination cell at Mons — the site of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Combined exercises have taken place in virtually all of the Partners' countries and NATO nations. In keeping with our strategy of enlargement, PFP is open to all former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as other European states. Each partner will set the scope and pace of its cooperation with NATO. To facilitate progress toward PFP objectives, the U.S. Warsaw Initiative Program is directing \$100 million to Partner nations this year.

The success of NATO's Partnership for Peace process and the increasing links developed between NATO and Partner nations have also begun to lay the foundation for the

Partners to contribute to real-world NATO missions such as the IFOR operation, Joint Endeavor. The participation of over a dozen Partner nations in IFOR demonstrates the value of our efforts to date and will contribute to the further integration of Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty has always been open to the addition of members who shared the Alliance's purposes and its values, its commitment to respect borders and international law and who could add to its strength; indeed, NATO has expanded three times since its creation. In January 1994, President Clinton made it plain that "the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how we will do so." The following December, we and our Allies began a steady, measured and transparent process that will lead to NATO enlargement. During 1995, the Alliance carried out the first phase in this process, by conducting a study of the process and principles that would guide the bringing in of new members. This enlargement study was completed in September 1995 and presented to interested members of the Partnership for Peace (PFP).

At its December 1995 foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, NATO announced the launching of the second phase of the enlargement process. All interested members of the Partnership for Peace will be invited, beginning in early 1996, to participate in intensive bilateral consultations with NATO aimed at helping them prepare for possible NATO membership. Participation will not guarantee that a participant will be invited to begin accession talks with NATO. Any such decision will be taken by NATO at a time of its own choosing, based on an overall assessment of Alliance security and interests. As part of this phase, NATO will also expand and deepen the Partnership for Peace, both as a means to further the enlargement process, but also to intensify relations between NATO and all members of the PFP. The second phase in the enlargement process will continue through 1996 and be reviewed and assessed by NATO foreign ministers at their December 1996 meeting.

Enlarging the Alliance will promote our interests by reducing the risk of instability or conflict in Europe's eastern half — the region where two world wars and the Cold War began. It will help assure that no part of Europe will revert to a zone of great power competition or a sphere of influence. It will build confidence and give new democracies a powerful incentive to consolidate their reforms. And each potential member will be judged

according to the strength of its democratic institutions and its capacity to contribute to the goals of the Alliance. As the President has made clear, NATO enlargement will not be aimed at replacing one division of Europe with a new one; rather, its purpose is to enhance the security of all European states, members and nonmembers alike. In this regard, we have a major stake in ensuring that Russia is engaged as a vital participant in European security affairs. We are committed to a growing, healthy NATO-Russia relationship, including a mechanism for regular consultations on common concerns. The current NATO-Russia cooperation on Bosnia is a great stride forward. Also, we want to see Russia closely involved in the Partnership for Peace. Recognizing that no single institution can meet every challenge to peace and stability in Europe, we have begun a process that will strengthen the OSCE and enhance its conflict prevention and peace-keeping capabilities.

The second element of the new strategy for Europe is economic. The United States seeks to build on vibrant and open-market economies, the engines that have given us the greatest prosperity in human history over the last several decades in Europe and in the United States. To this end, we strongly support the process of European integration embodied in the European Union and seek to deepen our partnership with the EU in support of our economic goals, but also commit ourselves to the encouragement of bilateral trade and investment in countries not part of the EU. The United States supports appropriate enlargement of the European Union and welcomes the European Union's Customs Union with Turkey.

The nations of the European Union face particularly significant economic challenges with nearly 20 million people unemployed and, in Germany's case, the extraordinarily high costs of unification. Among the Atlantic nations, economic stagnation has clearly eroded public support in finances for outward-looking foreign policies and for greater integration. We are working closely with our West European partners to expand employment and promote long-term growth, building on the results of the Detroit Jobs Conference and the Naples G-7 Summit in 1994. In December 1995, the U.S. and EU launched the New Transatlantic Agenda, which moves the U.S.-EU relationship from consultation to joint action on a range of shared interests, including promoting peace, stability, democracy and development; responding to global challenges; and contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations.

In Northern Ireland, the Administration is implementing a package of initiatives to promote the peace process, including a successful trade mission, a management intern exchange program and cooperation to promote tourism. The White House Conference on Trade and Investment, held in May 1995, has led to new partnerships between firms in the United States and Northern Ireland that benefit both economies. The President's visit to Northern Ireland in November 1995, the first ever by an American President, drew an unprecedented wave of popular support for peace. We are continuing our support for investment and trade in Northern Ireland to create jobs that will underpin hopes for peace and reconciliation.

As we work to strengthen our own economies, we must know that we serve our own prosperity and our security by helping the new market reforms in the new democracies in Europe's East, which will help to deflate the region's demagogues. It will help ease ethnic tensions; it will help new democracies take root.

In Russia, Ukraine and the other new independent states of the former Soviet Union, the economic transformation they are undertaking is historical. The Russian Government has made substantial progress toward privatizing the economy (over 60 percent of the Russian Gross Domestic Product is now generated by the private sector) and reducing inflation, and Ukraine has taken bold steps of its own to institute much-needed economic reforms. But much remains to be done to build on the reform momentum to assure durable economic recovery and social protection. President Clinton has given strong and consistent support to this unprecedented reform effort and has mobilized the international community to provide structural economic assistance; for example, by securing agreement by the G-7 to make available four billion dollars in grants and loans as Ukraine has implemented economic reform. Through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the United States is working closely with Russia in priority areas, including defense, trade and science and technology.

The short-term difficulties of taking Central and Eastern Europe into Western economic institutions will be more than rewarded if they succeed and if they are customers for America's and Western Europe's goods and services tomorrow. That is why this Administration has been committed to increase support substantially for market reforms in the new states of the former Soviet Union and why we have continued our support for economic transi-

tion in Central and Eastern Europe, while also paying attention to measures that can overcome the social dislocations which have resulted largely from the collapse of the Soviet-dominated regional trading system. One step was a White House sponsored Trade and Investment Conference for Central and Eastern Europe, which took place in Cleveland in January, 1995.

Ultimately, the success of market reforms to the East will depend more on trade and investment than official aid. No one nation has enough resources to markedly change the future of those countries as they move to free market systems. One of our priorities, therefore, is to reduce trade barriers with the former communist states.

The third and final imperative of this new strategy is to support the growth of democracy and individual freedoms that has begun in Russia, the nations of the former Soviet Union and Europe's former communist states. The success of these democratic reforms makes us all more secure; they are the best answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds unleashed by the end of the Cold War. Nowhere is democracy's success more important to us all than in these countries.

This will be the work of generations. There will be wrong turns and even reversals, as there have been in all countries throughout history. But as long as these states continue their progress toward democracy and respect the rights of their own and other people, and they understand the rights of their minorities and their neighbors, we will support their progress with a steady patience.

East Asia and the Pacific

East Asia is a region of growing importance for U.S. security and prosperity; nowhere are the strands of our three-pronged strategy more intertwined nor is the need for continued U.S. engagement more evident. Now more than ever, security, open markets and democracy go hand in hand in our approach to this dynamic region. In 1993, President Clinton laid out an integrated strategy — a New Pacific Community — which links security requirements with economic realities and our concern for democracy and human rights.

In thinking about Asia, we must remember that security is the first pillar of our new Pacific community. The United

States is a Pacific nation. We have fought three wars there in this century. To deter regional aggression and secure our own interests, we will maintain an active presence, and we will continue to lead. Our deep, bilateral ties with such allies as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, and a continued American military presence will serve as the foundation for America's security role in the region. Currently, our forces number nearly 100,000 personnel in East Asia. In addition to performing the general forward deployment functions outlined above, they contribute to regional stability by deterring aggression and adventurism.

As a key element of our strategic commitment to the region, we are pursuing stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean Peninsula. In October 1994, we reached an important Agreed Framework committing North Korea to halt and eventually eliminate its existing, dangerous nuclear program — and an agreement with China, restricting the transfer of ballistic missiles.

Another example of our security commitment to the Asia Pacific region in this decade is our effort to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities. We have supported new regional dialogues — such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) — on the full range of common security challenges. The second ARF Ministerial, held in August 1995, made significant progress in addressing key security issues such as the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea. It also agreed to inter-essional meetings on confidence-building measures such as search and rescue cooperation and peacekeeping. Such regional arrangements can enhance regional security and understanding through improved confidence and transparency. These regional exchanges are grounded on the strong network of bilateral relationships that exist today.

The continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the principal threat to the peace and stability of the Asian region. We have worked diligently with our South Korean and Japanese allies, with the People's Republic of China and with Russia, and with various UN organizations to resolve the problem of North Korea's nuclear program. Throughout 1995, we successfully took the initial steps to implement the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement, beginning with IAEA monitoring of the North Korean nuclear freeze of its plutonium reprocessing plant and of its construction of two larger plants and an expanded repro-

cessing facility. In March 1995, a U.S.-led effort with Japan and the Republic of Korea successfully established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which will finance and supply the light-water reactor project to North Korea. The reactor will, over a ten-year period, replace North Korea's more dangerous, plutonium producing reactors. In December 1995, KEDO and North Korea reached agreement on a comprehensive supply contract for the light-water reactor project as part of the overall plan to replace North Korea's existing, dangerous nuclear program. KEDO also supplied heavy fuel oil to offset the energy from the frozen reactor projects and took measures to safely store spent nuclear fuel in North Korea, pending its final removal under the terms of the Agreed Framework. That effort will be accompanied by a willingness to improve bilateral political and economic ties with the North, commensurate with their continued cooperation to resolve the nuclear issue and to make progress on other issues of concern, such as improved North-South Korean relations and missile proliferation. Our goal remains a non-nuclear, peacefully reunified Korean Peninsula. Our strong and active commitment to our South Korean allies and to the region is the foundation of this effort.

A stable, open, prosperous and strong China is important to the United States and to our friends and allies in the region. A stable and open China is more likely to work cooperatively with others and to contribute positively to peace in the region and to respect the rights and interests of its people. A prosperous China will provide an expanding market for American goods and services. We have a profound stake in helping to ensure that China pursues its modernization in ways that contribute to the overall security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. To that end, we strongly promote China's participation in regional security mechanisms to reassure its neighbors and assuage its own security concerns.

In support of these objectives, we have adopted a policy of comprehensive engagement designed to integrate China into the international community as a responsible member and to foster bilateral cooperation in areas of common interest. At the same time, we are seeking to resolve important differences in areas of concern to the United States, such as human rights, proliferation and trade. The United States continues to follow its long-standing "one China" policy; at the same time, we maintain fruitful unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan, a policy that

contributes to regional security and economic dynamism. We have made clear that the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC should be peaceful.

On July 11, 1995, the President normalized relations with Vietnam. This step was taken in recognition of the progress that had been made in accounting for missing Americans from the Vietnam war and to encourage continued progress by Vietnam in the accounting process. This action also served to help bring Vietnam into the community of nations. Vietnam's strategic position in Southeast Asia makes it a pivotal player in ensuring a stable and peaceful region. In expanding dialogue with Vietnam, the United States will continue to encourage it along the path toward economic reform and democracy, with its entry into ASEAN a move along this path.

The second pillar of our engagement in Asia is our commitment to continuing and enhancing the economic prosperity that has characterized the region. Opportunities for economic progress continue to abound in Asia and underlie our strong commitment to multilateral economic cooperation, principally through APEC. Today, the 18 member states of APEC — comprising about one-third of the world's population, including Mexico and Canada — produce \$13 trillion and export \$1.7 trillion of goods annually, about one-half of the world's totals. U.S. exports to Asian economies reached \$150 billion in 1994, supporting nearly 2.9 million American jobs. U.S. direct investments in Asia totaled over \$108 billion — about one-fifth of total U.S. direct foreign investment. A prosperous and open Asia Pacific is key to the economic health of the United States. Annual APEC leaders meetings, initiated in 1993 by President Clinton, are vivid testimonies to the possibilities of stimulating regional economic cooperation. As confidence in APEC's potential grows, it will pay additional dividends in enhancing political and security ties within the region.

We are also working with our major bilateral trade partners to improve trade relations. The U.S. and Japan have successfully completed 20 bilateral trade agreements in the wake of the 1993 Framework Agreement, designed to open Japan's markets more to competitive U.S. goods and reduce the U.S. trade deficit. As U.S.-China trade continues to grow significantly, we must work closely with Beijing to resolve remaining bilateral and multilateral trade problems, such as intellectual property rights and market access. In February 1995, the United States reached a

bilateral agreement with China on intellectual property rights, potentially saving U.S. companies billions of dollars in revenues lost because of piracy. China's accession to the WTO is also an important objective for the United States. The United States and other WTO members have made it clear that China must join the WTO on commercial terms.

The third pillar of our policy in building a new Pacific community is to support democratic reform in the region. The new democratic states of Asia will have our strong support as they move forward to consolidate and expand democratic reforms.

Some have argued that democracy is somehow unsuited for Asia or at least for some Asian nations — that human rights are relative and that they simply mask Western cultural imperialism. These arguments are wrong. It is not Western imperialism but the aspirations of Asian peoples themselves that explain the growing number of democracies and the growing strength of democracy movements everywhere in Asia. We support those aspirations and those movements.

Each nation must find its own form of democracy, and we respect the variety of democratic institutions that have grown in Asia. But there is no cultural justification for torture or tyranny. Nor do we accept repression cloaked in moral relativism. Democracy and human rights are universal yearnings and universal norms, just as powerful in Asia as elsewhere. We will continue to press for improved respect for human rights in such countries as China, Vietnam and Burma.

The Western Hemisphere

The Western Hemisphere, too, is a fertile field for a strategy of engagement and enlargement. Sustained improvements in the security situation there, including the resolution of border tensions, control of insurgencies and containment of pressures for arms proliferation, will be an essential underpinning of political and economic progress in the hemisphere.

The unprecedented triumph of democracy and market economies throughout the region offers an unparalleled opportunity to secure the benefits of peace and stability and to promote economic growth and trade. At the

Summit of the Americas, which President Clinton hosted in December 1994, the 34 democratic nations of the hemisphere committed themselves for the first time to the goal of free trade in the region by 2005. They also agreed to a detailed plan of cooperative action in such diverse fields as health, education, science and technology, environmental protection and the strengthening of democratic institutions. A series of follow-on ministerial meetings have already begun the important work of implementing an action plan, with the active participation of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. Over the last year Summit partners have worked together to improve regional security, block the activities of international criminals, counter corruption and increase opportunities for health, education and prosperity for residents of the hemisphere. The Summit ushered in a new era of hemispheric cooperation that would not have been possible without U.S. leadership and commitment.

NAFTA, ratified in December 1994, has strengthened economic ties, with substantial increases in U.S. exports to both Mexico and Canada, creating new jobs and new opportunities for American workers and business. We have also begun negotiations with Chile to join NAFTA. And in the security sphere, negotiations with Canada will extend the North American Air Defense (NORAD) Agreement through 2001.

We remain committed to extending democracy to all of the region's people still blocked from controlling their own destinies. Our overarching objective is to preserve and defend civilian-elected governments and strengthen democratic practices respectful of human rights. Working with the international community, we succeeded in reversing the coup in Haiti and restoring the democratically elected president and government. Over the past year, the United States and the international community have helped the people of Haiti consolidate their hard-won democracy and organize free and fair elections at all levels. Haitians were able to choose their representatives in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and at the local level. And, for the first time in its history, Haiti experienced a peaceful transition between two democratically elected presidents.

With the restoration of democracy in Haiti, Cuba is the only country in the hemisphere still ruled by a dictator. The Cuban Democracy Act remains the framework for our policy toward Cuba; our goal is the peaceful establishment of democratic governance for the people of Cuba. In

October, the United States took steps to invigorate our efforts to promote the cause of peaceful change in Cuba. These measures tighten the enforcement of our economic embargo against the Cuban regime and enhance our contacts with the Cuban people through an increase in the free flow of information and ideas. By reaching out to nongovernmental organizations, churches, human rights groups and other elements of Cuba's civil society, we will strengthen the agents of peaceful change.

We are working with our neighbors through various hemispheric organizations, including the OAS, to invigorate regional cooperation. Both bilaterally and regionally, we seek to eliminate the scourge of drug trafficking, which poses a serious threat to democracy and security. We also seek to strengthen norms for defense establishments that are supportive of democracy, respect for human rights and civilian control in defense matters. The Defense Ministerial of the Americas hosted by the United States in July 1995, and "The Williamsburg Principles" which resulted from it, were a significant step in this effort. Working with our Latin American partners who make up the "guarantor countries", we also began to move toward a permanent resolution of the Peru-Ecuador border dispute. In addition, a highly successful Organization of American States conference on regional Confidence and Security Building Measures was held in Santiago, Chile.

Protecting the region's precious environmental resources is also an important priority.

The Middle East, Southwest and South Asia

The United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, especially in pursuing a lasting and comprehensive Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and our Arab friends and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. Our strategy is harnessed to the unique characteristics of the region and our vital interests there, as we work to extend the range of peace and stability.

We have made solid progress in the past three years. The President's efforts helped bring about many historic firsts — the handshake of peace between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on the White House lawn has been followed by the Jordan-Israel peace treaty, the Israeli-

Palestinian Interim Agreement, progress on eliminating the Arab boycott of Israel and the establishment of ties between Israel and an increasing number of its Arab neighbors. But our efforts have not stopped there; on other bilateral tracks and through regional dialogue we are working to foster a durable peace and a comprehensive settlement, while our support for economic development can bring hope to all the peoples of the region.

In Southwest Asia, the United States remains focused on deterring threats to regional stability, particularly from Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region and to their own citizens. We have in place a dual containment strategy aimed at these two states and will maintain our long-standing presence, which has been centered on naval vessels in and near the Persian Gulf and prepositioned combat equipment. Since Operation Desert Storm, temporary deployments of land-based aviation forces, ground forces and amphibious units have supplemented our posture in the Gulf region. The October 1994 deployment for Operation Vigilant Warrior demonstrated again our ability to rapidly reinforce the region in time of crisis and respond quickly to threats to our allies.

We have made clear that Iraq must comply with all the relevant Security Council resolutions. We also remain committed to preventing the oppression of Iraq's people through Operations Provide Comfort and Southern Watch. Our policy is directed not against the people of Iraq but against the aggressive behavior of the government.

Our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the behavior of the Iranian government in several key areas, including Iran's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that oppose the peace process, its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the region and its dismal human rights record. We remain willing to enter into an authoritative dialogue with Iran to discuss the differences between us.

A key objective of our policy in the Gulf is to reduce the chances that another aggressor will emerge who would threaten the independence of existing states. Therefore, we will continue to encourage members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to work closely on collective defense and security arrangements, help individual GCC states meet their appropriate defense requirements and maintain our bilateral defense agreements.

South Asia has experienced an important expansion of

democracy and economic reform, and our strategy is designed to help the peoples of that region enjoy the fruits of democracy and greater stability through efforts aimed at resolving long-standing conflict and implementing confidence-building measures. The United States has engaged India and Pakistan in seeking agreement on steps to cap, reduce and ultimately eliminate their capabilities for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Regional stability and improved bilateral ties are also important for America's economic interest in a region that contains a quarter of the world's population and one of its most important emerging markets.

In both the Middle East and South Asia, the pressure of expanding populations on natural resources is enormous. Growing desertification in the Middle East has strained relations over arable land. Pollution of the coastal areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba has degraded fish catches and hindered development. Water shortages stemming from overuse, contaminated water aquifers and riparian disputes threaten regional relations. In South Asia, high population densities and rampant pollution have exacted a tremendous toll on forests, biodiversity and the local environment.

Africa

Africa poses one of our greatest challenges and opportunities to enlarge the community of market democracies. Significant changes have been made in Africa in recent years: multi-party systems have become more common; new constitutions have been promulgated; elections have become more open; the press generally has more freedom today; and the need for budgetary and financial discipline is better understood. Throughout Africa, U.S. policies have supported these developments. Specifically, our policies have promoted democracy, respect for human rights, sustainable economic development and resolution of conflicts through negotiation, diplomacy and peace-keeping. New policies will strengthen civil societies and mechanisms for conflict resolution, particularly where ethnic, religious and political tensions are acute. In particular, we will seek to identify and address the root causes of conflicts and disasters before they erupt.

The compounding of economic, political, social, ethnic and environmental challenges facing Africa can lead to a sense of 'Afro-pessimism.' However, if we can simultane-

ously address these challenges, we create a synergy that can stimulate development, resurrect societies and build hope. We encourage democratic reform in nations like Zaire and Sudan to allow the people of these countries to enjoy responsive government. In Nigeria, we have strongly condemned the government's brutal human rights violations and support efforts to help encourage a return to democratic rule. In Mozambique and Angola, we have played a leading role in bringing an end to two decades of civil war and promoting national reconciliation. For the first time, there is the prospect that all of southern Africa could enjoy the fruits of peace and prosperity. Throughout the continent — in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan and elsewhere — we work with the UN and regional organizations to encourage peaceful resolution of internal disputes.

In 1994, South Africa held its first non-racial elections and created a Government of National Unity. Local government elections throughout most of the country in November 1995 marked the near-end of the process of political transformation. The adoption of a final constitution now remains.

Vice President Gore recently completed his second trip to the African continent and to South Africa, where he conducted the first formal meeting of the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission formed during the October 1994 state visit of President Mandela. We remain committed to addressing the socio-economic legacies of apartheid, and we view U.S. support for economic advancement and democratization in South Africa as mutually reinforcing.

It is not just in South Africa that we are witnessing democratization. In quieter but no less dramatic ways in countries like Benin, Congo, Malawi, Mali, Namibia and Zambia, we are seeing democratic revolutions in need of our support. We want to encourage the creation of cultures of tolerance, flowering of civil society and the protection of human rights and dignity.

Our humanitarian interventions, along with the international community, will address the grave circumstances in several nations on the continent. USAID's new "Greater Horn of Africa" Initiative is building a foundation for food security and crisis prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa. This initiative has now moved beyond relief to support reconstruction and sustainable development. In Somalia, our forces broke through the chaos that prevented the introduction of relief supplies. U.S. forces prevented the

death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis and then turned over the mission to UN peacekeepers from over a score of nations. In Rwanda, Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, we have taken an active role in providing humanitarian relief to those displaced by violence.

Such efforts by the United States and the international community must be limited in duration and designed to give the peoples of a nation the opportunity to put their own house in order. In the final analysis, the responsibility for the fate of a nation rests with its own people.

We are also working with international financial institutions, regional organizations, private volunteer and nongovernmental organizations and governments throughout Africa to address the urgent issues of population growth, spreading disease (including AIDS), environmental decline, enhancing the role of women in development, eliminating support for terrorism, demobilization of bloated militaries, relieving burdensome debt and expanding trade and investment ties to the countries of Africa. The United States is working closely with other donors to implement wide ranging management and policy reforms at the African Development Bank (AfDB). The AfDB plays a key role in promoting sustainable development and poverty alleviation.

Central to all these efforts will be strengthening the American constituency for Africa, drawing on the knowledge, experience and commitment of millions of Americans to enhance our nation's support for positive political, economic and social change in Africa. For example, the 1994 White House Conference on Africa, the first such gathering of regional experts ever sponsored by the White House, drew together more than 200 Americans from the Administration, Congress, business, labor, academia, religious groups, relief and development agencies, human rights groups and others to discuss Africa's future and the role that the United States can play in it. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor all participated in the conference, which produced a wealth of new ideas and new commitment to Africa.

DOCUMENT 3

Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Statement for the Record

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February 1996

**John Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence**

Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Statement for the Record
22 February 1996

John Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Chairman, I am here today to outline the threats to the United States and its interests now and into the next century.

We still call this the post-Cold War world. Among the opportunities and challenges of our time, there is not yet one dominant enough to define the era on its own terms and give it a name. Looking beyond our borders, we see much that is uncertain:

- The stability of many regions of the world is threatened by ethnic turmoil and humanitarian crises.
- Two great powers, Russia and China, are in the process of metamorphosis and their final shape is still very much in question.
- Free nations of the world are threatened by rogue nations -
- Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, that have built up significant military forces and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
- The world community is under assault from those who deal in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs and crime.

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--And the interdependence of the world economy has made us more vulnerable to economic shocks beyond our borders.

The strategic threat to our continent is reduced, but the potential for surprise is greater than it was in the days when we could focus our energies on the well-recognized instruments of Soviet power.

No one challenge today is yet as formidable as the threat from the former Soviet Union. If nurtured by neglect on our part, these new challenges could expand to threaten the growth of democracy and free markets. All the tools of national security -- diplomacy, the military, and intelligence -- must remain sharp.

It is the task of the Intelligence Community to provide policymakers and military commanders with early warning of emerging problems -- warning that can allow us to avoid crisis or military conflict. We must continuously monitor and assess the threats so that our leaders can manage them wisely. It is also our responsibility, as the nation's first line of defense, to help counter emerging threats so that the next generation does not confront them in a vastly more dangerous and intractable form. Mr. Chairman, the mission of intelligence is clear.

World Survey

I would like to highlight some countries of the world that are currently of concern to the United States. Because of limited time and the unclassified nature of this briefing, this is not meant to be a comprehensive list.

The Indian Subcontinent. The relationship between India and Pakistan continues to be unsatisfactory and the potential

for conflict is high. Each of these nations possess nuclear capability, so every effort must be made to avoid military confrontation. India is making preparation for a nuclear test, and we assume that if one nation conducts a test, the other will follow. We are especially concerned about Pakistani efforts, some in cooperation with China, to acquire nuclear technology.

China. China is emerging as a major economic, political, and military actor in East Asia and the world in the next decade; but, we still know very little about Beijing's future leadership and intentions.

Deng Xiaoping, at the age of 91, is in frail health and no longer involved in daily decisionmaking. Power has largely passed to a new generation of leaders in their sixties. No single leader, however, including President and party chief Jiang Zemin, appears in a position to dominate the Chinese political scene as Deng has for the last 15 years.

Beijing is proceeding with economic reform without moving toward democratization or increasing respect for human rights. China has one of the world's most rapidly expanding economies, although Beijing has taken steps to control economic overheating and dampen inflation. These measures slowed the increase in Gross Domestic Product from nearly 14 percent in 1993 to under 10 percent in 1995. The regime still faces tough policy choices, such as how far to push reform of deficit-ridden state enterprises, and how to extract and retain more taxes from the reluctant localities.

Economic expansion has facilitated Beijing's military modernization drive, allowing the purchase of foreign armaments. Since 1992, for example, Beijing has purchased from Russia 26 SU-27 fighters, two Kilo attack submarines and

several battalions of Patriot-class SA-10 SAMS. Meanwhile, China continues to provide inappropriate weapons and military technology assistance to other countries.

This new military strength is changing the region's security environment. Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait have increased tensions and raised serious questions about Beijing's intentions.

North Korea. Under Kim Chong-il, North Korea remains isolated, xenophobic, militaristic, and resistant to reform and its hostility toward the South is unabated. Since the early 1980s, P'yongyang has devoted perhaps a quarter of its Gross National Product to building a 1.1 million-man military machine. The army's force structure, deployment, and training emphasize offensive operations and it is positioned and equipped to launch an aggressive attack southward with little or no warning. Late last year North Korea deployed numerous combat aircraft to bases near the DMZ, and since the early 1990s, it has deployed long-range artillery and rockets near the DMZ, threatening Seoul and reducing allied warning time.

While the military buildup continues, North Korea's economy is in a downward spiral that will be difficult to reverse. The best harvests fall far short of needs and food shortages are widespread. China continues to provide vital commodities such as oil and food on concessionary terms, despite P'yongyang's large and growing trade debt. Nevertheless, last year for the first time P'yongyang was forced to accept food aid from traditional enemies, including Japan and South Korea, to fill nearly half of its estimated food shortfall of more than 2 million tons.

The regime is thus far unwilling to take the steps necessary to improve economic conditions. P'yongyang

continues to reject economic reform and is likewise unwilling to divert resources away from the military. Indeed, North Korea's large conventional force is a organ of internal security that is critical to the survival of the Kim Chong-il regime.

Without deep cuts in military outlays, market-based reform, or significant new economic aid, the economy will probably continue to deteriorate and the decline in living standards will further undermine social stability. The North will find it harder to maintain military capabilities, and to insulate the armed forces from worsening economic problems. If food shortages should spread to front-line military units, it could undermine regime stability.

Russia. Free elections are becoming the ultimate arbiter of political power in Russia. The Russian people now have the right to worship, to seek information, and to assemble for political purposes without fear. Increasingly, more Russians have a stake in the growth of a market economy. Russia is slowly entering the community of free nations. We believe that most Russians want to hold onto these gains.

Nevertheless, Russia's new democratic institutions are fragile; market reforms have brought hardships that have disillusioned many Russians; and, new-found freedoms are not secure. With reformers divided among themselves, December's parliamentary elections put Communists and extreme nationalists in charge of the Duma.

We are concerned by the course of events in Chechnya. In that troubled part of Russia, Moscow is becoming mired in a bloody counterinsurgency that could spread to other parts of the Caucasus.

We are concerned also that Russia last year agreed to supply nuclear reactors to Iran, and that Moscow is now pressing the United Nations to lift sanctions against Iraq. Russia also appears to be moving toward closer relations with China. President Yel'tsin has announced that he will visit China early this year, and Moscow appears to have expanded its sale of weapons and military technologies to Beijing.

The June presidential election will be an important juncture in the brief history of democratic Russia. Should the Russian people choose a Communist or hard-line nationalist, further progress toward democracy and economic reform would be in question. Even if a hard-line government takes power, however, Russia is not likely to be transformed back into the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the Russian military, struggling to cope with numerous problems, is not likely to regain its former strength. All Russian services are experiencing cutbacks in manpower, training, resources, and readiness, and they are uncertain about their future organization and missions. Overall manpower has declined to well under its authorized 1.7 million and current military production is a fraction of what it was under Soviet power. Much needed reforms languish. The morale of Russian soldiers and junior officers is bad and getting worse.

We cannot forget, however, that Russia still possesses a formidable nuclear arsenal. Moscow maintains high levels of readiness throughout its strategic forces, and it continues modernization programs, including a follow on missile for the SS-25 ICBM. Political instability, weak civilian control over the military, economic deterioration, corruption, and a general pervasiveness of crime, raise concerns about the control, security, and accountability of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal.

The Middle East is the second region of the world that is most unstable and presents the greatest threats to US security.

Five years after the Gulf war, Saddam Husayn is unrepentant over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, determined to regain regional dominance, and bent on preserving elements of his special weapons programs. While his army has been diminished by the Gulf war and UN sanctions, and hobbled by deteriorating equipment and a shortage of spare parts, it remains the largest force in the Gulf region, with 2,000 tanks and 300 combat aircraft. It was brutally effective in suppressing the small Shia insurgency in southern Iraq. Baghdad is determined to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction programs and to deceive the rest of the world about its activities. In the wake of the defection of Husayn Kamel last August, Iraq turned over some 147 crates of documents, previously withheld from the UN, that revealed substantial new information on Iraq's intentions, including a crash effort in 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon using safeguarded enriched uranium. The return of Husayn Kamel to Iraq on Tuesday does nothing to mitigate the damage he has inflicted on Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and his exposure of Iraq's blatant disregard for United Nations resolutions and weapons inspections.

Baghdad recently announced a series of drastic austerity measures intended in part to create more revenue for a government weakened by UN sanctions and heavily burdened by the lavish lifestyles of its inner circle and perks for its vast security services. The pressures on Saddam's regime (list) could bring about its sudden and violent collapse.

Iran continues to divert scarce economic resources to its military buildup and to flout accepted standards of

international behavior. Tehran actively supports terrorism and political violence, opposes the Middle East peace process, and abuses human rights at home. Since 1989, Iran has murdered at least 48 regime opponents abroad, provided up to \$100 million annually to the Lebanese Hizballah--a group responsible for the killing of over 250 Americans--and refused to repeal the religious judgment condemning British author Salman Rushdie to death.

We see no indication that Iran will moderate its behavior following the coming parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively scheduled for March 1996 and mid-1997. The Iranian leadership is attempting to paper over its crisis of performance -- falling living standards, pervasive corruption, and lack of political reform -- and to rally an increasingly apathetic, restive population by blaming 'outside forces', chiefly the United States -- a strategy that could lead to a more aggressive foreign policy.

Bosnia. Let me turn now to Europe and the conflict in Bosnia. Over the last few years, the Intelligence Community has compiled a tremendous record in supplying our policymakers with vital information on the situation in Bosnia. Today, our main task is force protection for US and allied troops that compose IFOR as they implement the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. Here in Washington, we have drawn experts from across the Intelligence Community to work on the Balkan Task Force, which is on duty round-the-clock to collect and analyze information, and to answer questions from policymakers and the military. The Intelligence Community provides information that informs policy decisions and has helped to uncover war crimes. In Europe, National Intelligence Support Teams are deployed with our troops, to put at their immediate disposal all of the expertise and technical resources of the Intelligence Community. Intelligence officers provide accurate, detailed

maps and information on the terrain, the location of mines and potentially hostile forces, including outside forces that could pose a danger. All of this material is tailored to the needs of individual commanders and it is shared, as appropriate, with allied forces. Intelligence has been instrumental in helping this operation to run smoothly, despite the weather, the complex mix of ethnic groups, and the need to coordinate actions with forces from a number of other countries.

At the same time, the Intelligence Community is working to assess the long-term challenges to a durable peace in Bosnia, including political, economic, and demographic factors, as well as the influence of outside forces.

In the Mediterranean, tensions are high between Greece and Turkey. The crisis two weeks ago over ownership of two small islets between the two countries reminds us how volatile the situation is between these two members of NATO.

Africa. Moving on to Africa, there are two countries cause us particular concern.

Libya has steadfastly refused to abide by the terms of UN sanctions imposed on Tripoli in the wake of its involvement in the downing of Pan Am 103. Qadhafi has a firm hold on power but relies heavily on his security forces to suppress sporadic violent unrest by a growing Islamic opposition and rival tribes.

Sudan has emerged as a clear threat to the stability of nearby African and Middle Eastern states because of its support for subversive activities of regional opposition groups. This threat is likely to remain as long as the National Islamic Front (NIF) is the dominant political force

in the country. In its effort to spread its version of Islamic fundamentalism beyond Sudan and destabilize regional moderate governments friendly to the United States, the NIF supports insurgent and terrorist groups opposed to the governments of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Sudan also provides safehaven and limited material support to other radical groups such as Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the armed Algerian extremist groups. The Ethiopian government has publicly accused Sudan of providing refuge to three of the suspects wanted for the June 1995 assassination attempt against Egyptian President Mubarak in Addis Ababa. The Khartoum regime's repressive internal policies against the Sudanese people, particularly non-Muslim southerners, adds fuel to the 13-year-old civil war in southern Sudan, which has displaced millions of people.

Let me turn now to our own hemisphere.

Mexico is in a process of political and economic transition. The peso crisis has abated, but Mexico is still experiencing a deep economic slowdown that has lowered living standards and magnified growing public frustration with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). With 50 percent inflation, economic contraction, and the loss of 1 million jobs in the formal economy, the ruling party lost considerable ground to the opposition in elections held last year. Recurrent allegations of complicity by officials of the previous administration in several political assassinations as well as ongoing revelations of corruption by former government officials have marred efforts by President Zedillo to rebuild confidence.

In Haiti, former President Jean Bertrand Aristide has turned over the reins of power to President Rene Preval, marking the first transition of power between democratically elected leaders in the country's 192-year history. Haiti's

nascent democracy remains vulnerable in the years ahead. The Haitian economy is in dismal shape and much of the populace is unemployed and living in extreme poverty. The government will be sorely tested on both the economic and security fronts. It faces difficult and unpopular economic decisions to get the country back on its feet, and has a new and inexperienced police force to control crime and potential political violence from both the extreme right and the extreme left.

In Cuba, the Castro regime has used a mix of austerity and economic reform to arrest the decline brought on by the loss of Soviet and East European assistance, but the potential for instability remains. Havana's own reforms have caused new economic strains, including wider income disparities and the prospect of greatly increased unemployment. Cubans are expected to do more for themselves, slightly loosening the government's hold on their lives and fostering more independent thought that could produce a stronger constituency for change. The death or departure of Fidel Castro, now 69, would place the system he created on new and possibly unstable ground. Even with Castro, the potential for greater strains exists, either among elites who differ over the pace and scope of reform or between the security forces and a population weary of austerity.

Latin America. A variety of developments in Latin America could pose difficult challenges and choices for Washington, particularly in the long run. Despite recent setbacks in Colombia, narcotics traffickers show no signs of scaling down their level of activity. Their use of payoffs and intimidation will continue to give them significant leverage over governmental leaders at the national and local levels. Additionally, although the region has made great economic strides over the past several years, income disparities remain immense, and the United States will remain

a magnet for illegal migrants, especially from nearby Caribbean Basin nations.

Transnational Issues. Now I would like to turn to the transnational challenges that we face. Terrorists, organized criminals, and traffickers in drugs and weapons cross easily over international borders and blur the lines that once divided domestic and international threats. To meet these new challenges, we must find the most effective way to harmonize the unique talents and resources of law enforcement and intelligence. The law enforcement community has tremendous investigative skills and techniques. The Intelligence Community has a vast foreign collection effort that includes advanced technical systems and human sources of intelligence. By emphasizing cooperation and coordination of efforts, we can bring all of our skills to bear against transnational threats and minimize costly and time-consuming duplication of effort. Effective, extensive, and routine cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement will profoundly improve our nation's security in the post-Cold War world. Recent experience has proven that when intelligence and law enforcement cooperate effectively, we can be spectacularly successful.

Proliferation. Of the transnational issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons systems pose the gravest threat to national security and to world stability. At least 20 countries have or may be developing nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missile systems to deliver them.

- The nuclear weapons programs of several countries cause us great concern. For example, Iran is now developing its nuclear infrastructure and the means to hide nuclear

weapons development. Cooperation with Russia and China -- even carried out legally under international safeguards -- could substantially aid Iran's nuclear weapons efforts. Iran remains years away from producing a nuclear weapon, but extensive foreign assistance could shorten the timeframe. We are also monitoring a potential nuclear arms race in South Asia. India appears to be planning an underground nuclear test. Last month it test-fired an improved short-range ballistic missile. Prime Minister Bhutto has hinted that Pakistan might conduct a nuclear test in response to an Indian test.

- Chemical Weapons programs are active in eighteen countries, including most major states of the Middle East. Libya, for example, is now building the world's largest underground chemical weapons plant in a mountain near Tarhunnah. Chemical weapons countries are also developing more and longer range delivery systems, including ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs.
- Biological Weapons, often called the poor man's atomic bombs, are also on the rise. Small, less developed countries are often eager to acquire such weapons to compensate on the cheap for shortcomings in conventional arms. Small quantities of precursors, available on the open market, can produce a deadly chemical or biological weapon.
- Ballistic missile systems that can deliver nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads are available to more countries. China, North Korea, the industrialized states in Europe and South America, several Third World countries, and private consortiums, supply ballistic missile technology -- and in some cases entire missile systems -- to developing countries around the world. North Korea, for

example, has sold its SCUD B's and C's -- with a range of 300 and 500-km respectively -- to Iran, Libya, Syria and other countries. P'yongyang is now developing a 1,000-km No Dong missile that could be deployed in the near future. A Taepo Dong missile, which could reach as far as Alaska, is in development and could be operational after the turn of the century.

- Advanced Conventional Weapons and technologies such as stealth, propulsion, and sensors are allowing countries such as North Korea and Iran to accelerate their military modernization. Such weapons could inflict significant casualties on US forces or regional allies in future conflicts.

All of these programs are aided through the illegal export of controlled equipment, technology, and materials, including dual-use items, and through indigenous research and development.

In confronting proliferation, the first task of intelligence is to discover the hidden plans and intentions of countries of concern well before we have to confront the devastating power of the weapons themselves. The Intelligence Community, for example, was instrumental in uncovering North Korea's nuclear ambitions, its violation of safeguards, and its production of enough plutonium for at least one and possibly two nuclear weapons. We are now monitoring North Korea's compliance with the October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, freezing P'yongyang's nuclear program. Fifteen months after the agreement, North Korea has not refueled its 5 Mwe reactor at Yongbyon or operated its reprocessing plant and it has halted construction on two larger reactors.

Once weapons of mass destruction programs have come to light, then it is the task of intelligence to support arms control negotiations, to monitor compliance with treaties and control regimes, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to uncover violations of sanctions. For example, sanctions imposed by the UN have done much to contain Saddam and steadily weaken his regime. The Intelligence Community has been very active in the effort to assure that these sanctions continue to be effective. Without an effective, long-term monitoring program by the UN, however, Baghdad could use its large pool of scientific expertise, as well as hidden materials and components, to reconstitute its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs.

The Intelligence Community has been aggressive in its efforts to uncover hidden supply lines and stop key materials and technologies from reaching countries of proliferation concern. The US Government, in cooperation with other governments, has been able to halt the transfer of a large amount of equipment that could be used in developing nuclear weapons programs, including mass spectrometers, custom-made cable equipment, graphite materials, aluminum melting furnaces, arc-welding equipment, and a gas jet atomizer. Now is the time to prevent countries of proliferation concern from obtaining the materials and technology they need to advance their weapons of mass destruction programs. We must prevent North Korea, for example, from obtaining the guidance and control technology that could make its long range missiles accurate, as well as deadly. We must keep Iran from obtaining the foreign assistance it needs to complete a nuclear weapon. We have to keep Iraq from obtaining equipment and materials that would enhance its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. We cannot relax our efforts.

Terrorism. Let me move on now to the problem of terrorism. In the post-Cold War era, terrorists have become increasingly capable, lethal, and wide-ranging. Their operating methods and technical expertise--in bomb-making and other skills--are more sophisticated. The US Government recorded 440 international terrorism incidents in 1995, the highest total since 1991.

Terrorists attacks today are more deadly than in the past. Where once terrorists undertook relatively small operations aimed at attaining specific political objectives, today they are more likely to inflict mass casualties as a form of punishment or revenge. The bombing of the World Trade Center is an example.

We are concerned that terrorists will push this trend to its most awful extreme by employing weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the prospects for chemical and biological terrorism will increase with the spread of dual-use technologies and expertise. Many of the technologies and materials associated with these programs have legitimate civilian or military applications. Trade in such materials cannot be banned. For example, chemicals used to make nerve agents are also used to make plastics and process foodstuffs. And any modern pharmaceutical facility can produce biological warfare agents as easily as vaccines or antibiotics. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo was able to legally obtain all components needed to build the massive chemical infrastructure that produced the poison gas released in the Tokyo subway. The use of nuclear materials is less likely, but in December we saw terrorists employ radioactive material for the first time, when Chechen rebels planted radioactive material in a public park in Moscow.

The most active terrorist groups have greatly expanded the geographic scope of their operations over the last two

years. Organizations such as Lebanese Hizballah and the Egyptian group al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya have developed transnational infrastructures that they use for fund-raising, logistical support, and cooperation with other terrorist groups. These operations enable them to strike when and where they choose. For example, Egyptian extremists, who until recently had confined their major activities to Egypt, have over the past eight months attempted to assassinate President Mubarak in Ethiopia, set off a car bomb in Croatia, and bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan.

In the Philippines, radical Muslim insurgents, including Abu Sayyaf Group and the larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front, have threatened to disrupt APEC meetings. These elements may be cultivating ties with foreign terrorists, who in January 1995 attempted to bomb US air carriers flying through Manila and elsewhere in East Asia.

In Turkey, terrorism and drugs combine to pose a major threat to the security and territorial integrity of this key ally. Through front organizations and drug trafficking, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) receives help for its terrorist and counterinsurgency activities from rogue states, other terrorist groups, and historical Turkish rivals.

State sponsorship remains an important part of the international terrorist threat and Iran is by far the most active and capable sponsor. Tehran appears to consider terrorism a legitimate instrument of statecraft, whether practiced by Iranian state agents or by heavily supported surrogates such as Hizballah.

We have made a concerted effort to apply human and technical intelligence to the problem of terrorism. In cooperation with friendly security services, we have had success in breaking up some terrorist cells overseas and

exploiting these opportunities to learn more about the methods and techniques being used by today's terrorists. The Intelligence Community also works closely with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to support their efforts to investigate and prosecute terrorist crimes. We use our overseas resources to develop and follow up investigatory leads, and to help locate and facilitate the apprehension of individual terrorists. There have been several notable successes of this type over the past year, including the arrest of Ramzi Yousef, the alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing.

Drug Trafficking. Like terrorism, the drug trade is becoming increasingly international and sophisticated. Drug traffickers are taking advantage of rising worldwide demand for cocaine and heroin. They are exploiting the removal of trade barriers, and finding room to operate in societies that are in the process of political or economic transition. These mafias are becoming increasingly sophisticated and flexible in their operations, using modern technology and business practices.

Cocaine supplies continue to meet the demands of the US and worldwide market. In 1995, enough coca leaf was grown to produce nearly 800 metric tons of cocaine. Despite the disruptions caused by the arrests and surrender last summer of seven of its eight top leaders, the infrastructure and operations of the Colombian Cali drug mafia remain formidable. Meanwhile, the Mexican drug lords whose organizations traffic in cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine are becoming more powerful and a greater threat to stability in Mexico.

Illicit worldwide opium production exceeded 4,000 metric tons in 1995, enough to produce nearly 400 metric tons of heroin. Burma is the source of most of the heroin available

in the United States, but opium production in Afghanistan has skyrocketed since 1990 and Colombia has surpassed Mexico as the largest producer of opium in the Western Hemisphere. The states of the former Soviet Union are becoming a major conduit for heroin.

The production and trafficking of new drugs is also growing. Already, Mexican trafficking organizations are gaining dominance in the methamphetamine trade and Southeast Asian heroin organizations are turning to the production of methamphetamine. Drug gangs in some Central European countries are major suppliers of amphetamine to Western markets. Drug traffickers, meanwhile, are expanding their international connections, including cooperation with other criminal organizations.

Intelligence plays an important role in US counternarcotics policy. Intelligence support facilitated the arrests of Cali drug mafia chieftains last summer and aided efforts to disrupt the flow of coca products along the "Andean Airbridge" from Peru to cocaine processing laboratories in Colombia. We support US counternarcotics efforts in Thailand that disrupted the heroin trafficking operations of the notorious Burma drug lord Khun Sa. The Intelligence Community also developed an Aerial Imagery Reconnaissance Tracking and Plotting System to help the US government better manage aerial reconnaissance collection against drug traffickers.

Organized Crime. Transnational organized criminal activities are growing rapidly in every region of the world, undermining political and economic development in many countries. In Russia, organized crime is a challenge for the national leadership. Criminal groups have significant influence in strategic sectors of the economy -- including the banking sector -- and have high-level political

connections. The increasing power of organized crime threatens political stability, undermines popular confidence in government at all levels, and encourages support for hard-line politicians. The increasing sophistication, flexibility, and worldwide connections of organized crime groups help them to expand their activities and thwart law enforcement.

Intelligence is aiding law enforcement in the fight against other transnational criminal threats. US intelligence, for example, contributed to the arrest of Gloria Canales, who headed a major alien smuggling network in Latin America.

Economic Security. Earlier I spoke of the interdependence of the world economy. Economic security has become an integral part of our national security. Accordingly we increasingly focus economic intelligence efforts on warning of key risks to American economic interests. We monitor threats to international financial stability and US interests. We alert policymakers when foreign firms use questionable business practices, such as bribery, to disadvantage US firms. Economic intelligence reporting helps us expose activities that may support terrorism, narcotics trafficking, proliferation, and grey arms dealing. Finally, as I mentioned earlier, we also monitor compliance with economic sanctions. In all of these areas, there is a tremendous demand from senior policymakers for the information we provide.

Security of Information systems. Allow me to turn now to a transnational threat that is, at present, difficult to measure -- the threat of attack against our information systems and information-based infrastructures. Hackers, criminal groups, and foreign intelligence services consider these systems lucrative targets, as evidenced by the growing

number of intrusions into corporate and financial information systems. While intelligence sources have only identified a handful of countries that have instituted formal information warfare programs, I am concerned that the threat to our information systems will grow in coming years as the enabling technologies to attack these systems proliferate and more countries and groups develop new strategies that incorporate such attacks.

Our efforts to identify and characterize the threat are continuing. I am encouraged by our progress over the past year. We are developing cooperative efforts within the community, and establishing valuable links with other agencies outside the Community and outside government. We have a lot more to do, however. We must identify sufficient resources to work on this problem and work through many of the legal and regulatory obstacles to collecting needed intelligence.

Environment. Now I would like to turn to the growing threat of environmental degradation. A deteriorating environment can not only affect the political and economic stability of nations, it can also pose global threats to the well-being of mankind. Intelligence has an important role to play in our efforts to deal with these threats. We support the negotiation and implementation of environmental agreements and we use imagery from existing systems to support the work of the scientific community and other government agencies in their efforts to understand global environmental phenomena.

For example, intelligence analysis, drawing on imagery and signals intelligence, has played a critical role in curbing a black market in ozone-depleting CFCs. This and other intelligence support has contributed to the successful

negotiation and implementation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

In 1992, at the urging of then Senator, now Vice President Gore, the CIA established an Environmental Task Force (ETF) to pursue opportunities for exploiting the technical assets of the Intelligence Community to address environmental problems. To support this task force, we set up a group of about 60 cleared US scientists, known as MEDEA. MEDEA found that a relatively modest commitment of resources, combined with information collected from technical intelligence assets already in place, could yield dividends for environmental scientists. MEDEA also found that historical imagery from our early satellite systems could provide a more accurate picture of climate change over time.

Environmental intelligence also supports our military forces when they are employed in humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping situations. In the Gulf War, for example, analysis of intelligence imagery helped our forces avoid the toxic fumes generated by Iraqi-set oil fires in Kuwait. The Intelligence Community also addresses environmental damage associated with past Soviet military activities, the implications of regional resource changes, and the environmental consequences of foreign economic development.

We also provide valuable information to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Maps and other information from intelligence assets allow FEMA to cope faster and more effectively with natural disasters.

Conclusion. What I have just given you is an abbreviated list of the threats to our national security today.

I would like to conclude by saying that intelligence is an integral part of an effective national security structure. It does not and should not work in isolation. In recent years the Intelligence Community has strongly emphasized the need to know our intelligence consumers better so that we can provide information that makes a difference to policy, to diplomacy, to the conduct of military operations, and, ultimately, to the security of the American people. I believe that intelligence is especially critical now. Policymakers, dealing with a shifting menu of international crises, need fast and reliable information on current conflicts, and advance warning of emerging problems. A smaller US military, required to take on new challenges in remote and unfamiliar areas of the world, needs detailed and accurate intelligence on the ground and at the highest levels of decision-making. Law enforcement, which must increasingly deal with foreign-based threats to American cities, needs our analytical and collection support more than ever. Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community is determined to meet these needs and to earn and keep the trust of the Congress and the American people. Thank you.

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
**School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College**

FORCE PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCES IN THE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ENVIRONMENT

A Monograph

By

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

FORCE PROTECTION OF STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCES IN THE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ENVIRONMENT by MAJ James N. Hanley

This monograph examines the U. S. military capability to defend strategic airlift aircraft against current and projected threats in an humanitarian assistance operations. The size of the Joint Task Force (JTF) is frequently restricted by political, material, and environmental considerations. Consequently, the JTF commander must consider developing a Time Phased Force Deployment Data List that provides force protection for the airlift force that meets the possible threats and responds to mission constraints. Recent studies suggest two trends: (1) the military airlift aircraft are not equipped to handle the threat, and (2) the JTF must also provide protection to those aircraft flown by Non-Governmental Relief Organizations (NGOs) and the CRAF.

This monograph is divided into five sections. Section one, the introduction, establishes the purpose of the study and the significance of the research question to the US military: Are planned air defense measures adequate to defend airlift forces against hostile threats during OOTW? Section two examines the present threat to strategic airlift aircraft in the OOTW environment and concludes that the man-portable surface-to-air missile is the ideal weapon to attack the airlift bridge at the airfields. Section three analyzes current National, Service and Joint doctrines for their force protection requirements and responsibilities of the airlift force in the humanitarian assistance environment. Doctrine recognizes the importance of airlift, but does not provide air defense to the entire airlift force, civilian aircraft are not included in this protection. Section four reviews recent military experiences during Operations RESTORE HOPE, in Somalia, and SUPPORT HOPE, in Rwanda. The force protection lessons learned during Somalia were ignored in Rwanda. Relying on only self-defense assets of strategic airlift aircraft is not the correct approach during humanitarian assistance missions. The final section answers the research question and offers recommendations for improving protection for airlift forces for future humanitarian relief operations.

The U.S. currently does not provide adequate measures to defend all the airlift forces against man-portable surface-to-air missiles during humanitarian relief missions. Each service views the threat differently and offers separate approaches to handle the threat. Joint doctrine provides guidance to the Joint Task Force but explains neither how to follow the doctrine with the constraints and limitations imposed on the force during a relief mission nor how to protect the NGO's aircraft.

However, there are available some reasonable means to correct this situation. The Air Force must create an integrated electronic warfare master plan, to include airlift forces for relief missions. JTFs should employ unmanned aerial vehicles with EW pods to provide continuous protection for all airlift forces in the theater. And Joint doctrine should be followed in establishing base defense operations centers and patrols to secure the APODs and their air LOCS from attack.

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I. Introduction

20 December 199x, RELIEF AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

AP/UPI/Reuters// A United States cargo plane was shot down while on final approach to Bujumbura, the capital city of Burundi. The aircraft was on a UN mission delivering personnel and equipment for Operation SHARE HOPE, to help end the famine and disease in this region. None of the factions involved in the civil war has claimed responsibility for the attack.

Although the situation above is hypothetical, it is probable. Armed conflict such as occurred in Rwanda continues in Sub-Sahara Africa and Burundi could be next.¹ The threat to relief aircraft will also remain. The greatest threat to aircraft is the man-portable surface-to-air missile (MANPAD SAMs). MANPAD SAMs are simple to operate, easy to hide, and available throughout the world. Consequently, even humanitarian assistance missions must address force protection. However, Service and Joint doctrine treat force protection differently. Air Force and Joint Doctrine address aircraft survivability and force protection. Army Doctrine does not cover this area. Despite the Army's reliance on strategic airlift to deliver personnel and equipment, FM 100-5, Operations, does not mention force protection concerning the OOTW environment.

The force protection needs of humanitarian missions are predictable. Most humanitarian crises unfold in a similar manner. Strategic airlift transports the initial forces to a theater; follow-on forces travel by sea.² The initial airlift force must be large enough to deliver rapidly both humanitarian aid and the assistance forces. Usually, the United States cannot deploy a sizeable force to a country without producing some

noticeable effect on the domestic political situation. Consequently, the United States frequently keeps its assistance forces small.

U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) strategic airlift capability is limited by two factors. First, USTRANSCOM uses both military and Civilian Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) aircraft to move personnel and equipment. Not all these aircraft have self-defense capabilities and will fly into threatened areas.³ The available aircraft are the C-5, C-17, C-141, and various commercial aircraft in the CRAF.⁴ Even in peacetime Air Mobility Command (AMC) regularly charts civilian airlines as part of CRAF to move passengers and cargo for humanitarian assistance missions.⁵ CRAF contributes 72% of the projected passenger need, and 41% of the cargo requirement for AMC.⁶ These assets must transport aid and assistance forces in a crisis and they require protection.

The second factor limiting USTRANSCOM's airlift capability is the limited number of airfields in an undeveloped theater. The number and type of airfields determine the method by which the air bridge is established. During a humanitarian assistance mission airlift usually transports the personnel and equipment using the steady flow method. The steady flow method flies aircraft at specific intervals over a dedicated flight corridor into the aerial ports of debarkation (APODs). Coordination of this type of air bridge is the simplest, in regards to diplomatic clearances, Maximum On the Ground (MOG)⁷ limitations, and flow control restrictions through international airspace. This type of simple coordination is especially required when there is little time available to prepare and plan for a humanitarian assistance mission. The steady flow method also

delivers the most cargo over an extended period.⁸ Because there are only a few aircraft and airfields, they are easily targeted by warring indigenous factions in an undeveloped environment.

The Service staffs and Joint Task Forces (JTF) make certain assumptions concerning a humanitarian assistance mission that differ from wartime planning assumptions. These assumptions make the strategic aircraft vulnerable to attack by MANPAD SAMs. First, the JTF commander and the Services are restrained by political, material, and environmental factors that limit the size and type of combat force used in the theater. The United States' government usually demands quick efficient operations directed to resolve immediate crises. The United States usually limits the objective to bringing relief to the disaster area, and then quickly turning operations over to UN or non-governmental organizations. Consequently, the United States deploys only a small force with limited combat power to handle the crisis.

Secondly, planning assumes there is no threat of attack from air-to-air missiles exists or the United States has air superiority in the area of operations (AOR). Only strategic airlift assets deploy because it is not a wartime mission. No combat or specialized electronic warfare assets, SEAD aircraft, are sent to the theater.⁹ Lastly, it is assumed that the areas around the airfields are protected from crew-served antiaircraft guns and missiles by the JTF ground forces.

The planning assumptions lead directly to other planning considerations. Because the United States limits the size of the deployed force, experience teaches us that the few combat forces will be barely large enough to secure the APODs.

Additionally, portions of the airlift will include NGOs.¹⁰ The NGOs' aircraft operate from the same APODs. The JTF commander is responsible for ensuring the delivery of the humanitarian aid they are transporting. Therefore, the civilian aircraft fall under the protection of the US base commander. NGO aircraft are usually chartered commercial planes, similar to those flown by CRAF airlines. They do not have aircraft defensive systems (ADS) to protect them from the MANPAD SAM threat. Therefore, because civilian aircraft operate in the theater they too must be protected from MANPAD SAM attacks.

To meet the need for force protection it is necessary to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures that address the vulnerabilities of cargo aircraft and the constraints and limitations US Joint Task Force commanders face in performing humanitarian assistance missions. The best way to develop the tactics and techniques is to explore current air defense doctrine to determine whether the established tactics can be readily adapted to the humanitarian assistance environment. In particular, we must explore the MANPAD SAM threat and possible responses to it. Next, we must examine existing force protection requirements and doctrine to determine whether current procedures inadvertently impede protection of airlift or dictate methods unsuitable for humanitarian missions. This inquiry must also consider recent military experience to discover any operational guidance issued in humanitarian crises that might make force protection difficult, or field expedient practices that were effective but which doctrine has not captured. Lastly, we must consider how best to provide force protection in future humanitarian assistance missions using lessons learned from previous operations and any

other tactics, techniques, and procedures available to the JTF.

II. The Threat

As previously stated the greatest threat to strategic airlift aircraft during humanitarian missions is the man-portable surface-to-air missile. According to Joint Pub 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense MANPAD SAM attacks by agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, and terrorists are a Level I threat. This weapon threatens the airlift bridge because they must be defeated by base self-defense measures.¹¹ The MANPAD SAM threat to strategic airlift aircraft has already been recorded in numerous DOD studies. The C-17 Defensive Study, the Military Airlift Survivability Study, the Military Airlift Command Electronic Warfare Study, and the Joint Airlift Combat Operations Study all cite the MANPAD SAM threat as a hazard to strategic airlift forces.¹² The best means to understand the MANPAD SAM threat is to understand first how the weapon is used to attack aircraft. In particular, knowledge of the weapon's basic system, characteristics and capabilities explains the MANPAD SAM's ability to acquire, track and strike the aircraft. Next, we must examine the airlift aircraft's mission and design to observe how these hamper the ability to defend the aircraft from the threat. Lastly, an examination of the proliferation of MANPAD SAMs details how the increased use of this weapon in the humanitarian relief environment presents a threat to airlift aircraft.

A MANPAD SAM consists of three subsystems. These are the propulsion, warhead, and guidance/seeker subsystems. The propulsion design is a simple, self-

propelled, solid rocket fuel. It provides both rapid fire and a quick accelerating boost to the missile. The missile reaches the target in less than fifteen seconds, even when the aircraft is at the maximum range of the missile. The brief flight time, combined with a rapid reload time, also allows the launcher to fire another MANPAD SAM at the aircraft and escape before discovery of the launch site. The MANPAD SAMs short time of flight allows the missile to reach the target virtually undetected by the human eye. Hence, the aircraft's crew cannot detect and avoid the missile without an automatic detection and suppression device.

The warhead is the second subsystem of the MANPAD SAM. Most warheads are high explosive types with time-, proximity-, or contact-fusing mechanisms used to detonate the warhead to damage the aircraft. If the MANPAD SAM has not reached its target in fifteen seconds it will self-destruct. Another type of warhead combines the kinetic energy of the propulsion system with a high explosive warhead. The high speed warhead(4+ MACH) first penetrates and damages the target then the warhead detonates, destroying the aircraft.¹³ Since most airlift aircraft are thin-skinned, lacking armor protection, even proximity-fused warheads easily can damage the aircraft.

Of all the subsystems in the MANPAD SAM weapon the guidance/seeker mechanism is the most important. It produces the capability to acquire, track and guide the missile to the target. The guidance mechanism is the first major part of this subsystem. It acquires the target and provides initial aircraft position to the seeker mechanism for final tracking to the target. The guidance mechanism has two radar systems: acquisition and tracking. Acquisition radars acquire and monitor the aircraft's

initial movements. This radar does not directly threaten the aircraft, but should be jammed to block information used to acquire the aircraft.¹⁴ If the acquisition radar does not locate the aircraft, the missile will not realize an aircraft is near its location.

Tracking radars provide initial guidance information to the missile's seeker mechanism. The missile must have this data before it can successfully engage and launch. Therefore, this radar is a high-priority threat to the aircraft. If the aircraft can lose or break the radar's contact, either by evasive tactics or jamming the radar signal, the missile cannot effectively attack the aircraft.

The second major part of the guidance/seeker subsystem is the seeker mechanism. The seeker mechanism provides final guidance to the missile to track and strike the aircraft. Seeker mechanisms use one of three basic modes to track the target: IR, anti-radiation, or laser. First is the IR seeker mechanism. They are the most prevalent form of seeker used in MANPAD SAMs. IR seekers close on a heat source, either engine emissions or air-conditioning units. It is possible to reduce the aircraft's heat signature by shielding or retarding engine power, and turning off the air-conditioning units. However, strategic airlift aircraft carry their engines outboard and are not readily shielded like fighter type aircraft. Also, the air-conditioning units provide life sustaining power to the passengers and cannot be completely shut down. IR seekers are passive devices and do not radiate a warning signature.¹⁵ Consequently, the aircraft's crew cannot detect the missile until after its launch. The other two seeker modes are not as common but are just as great a threat to strategic airlift aircraft.

The second tracking mode uses an anti-radiation seeker. Anti-radiation seekers

home on radar navigation, radar altimeters, or jamming signals. Transport aircraft operate both radar navigation and radar altimeters during landing and takeoff phases. These systems are necessary, especially in the Third World's regions, because ground control systems at these airfields lack radar systems capable of guiding the aircraft to the APODs. Therefore, MANPAD SAMs with anti-radiation seekers are potentially effective in the humanitarian assistance environment.

The last type of seeker is the newest one, the laser seeker. It has the shortest range of all the MANPAD SAMs' seekers. However, currently the laser seeker cannot be effectively jammed. So, once a MANPAD SAM with a laser seeker has launched, it will track directly to the target. The disadvantage is that the attacker must use his laser to continuously illuminate the target aircraft.

The guidance/seeker mechanism combined with the other systems are all elements of the MANPAD SAM threat to the strategic airlift fleet. First, the weapon provides no warning until the missile is launched on its short flight to the target. Second, it is not possible or practicable to reduce or eliminate the aircraft's heat and electromagnetic signature that MANPAD SAM guides on. Lastly, the crew has little or no room to maneuver to evade the missile in the takeoff and landing phases. To be effective an ADS must overcome the human and physical obstacles to provide an effective MANPAD SAM defense.

MANPAD SAM capabilities and characteristics enable them to attack the airlift bridge where it is most vulnerable, the takeoff and landing phases. The weapons are easily transportable. Because they are small, mobile, and numerous, MANPAD SAMs

may be fired from anywhere. General capabilities and characteristics of the MANPAD SAMs are shown in Table 1. These were drawn from a compilation of specific MANPAD SAM weapons' data, listed in Appendix B.

Table 1.
MANPAD SAM Capabilities and Characteristics

Range: minimum	300 meters
maximum	7,000 meters
Altitude: minimum	0 meters
maximum	6,000 meters
Sensor type:	Infrared
Speed:	1.7 to 4+ MACH (580m/s @ sea level)
Time to Target:	<15 seconds to maximum range
Time to Reload:	6 seconds
Time to Acquire Target:	60 seconds maximum due to battery life
Weight:	13 to 176 lbs.
Length:	1.3 meters

Newer MANPAD SAM capabilities are more difficult to defeat by tactics or equipment. They use laser seekers to track and guide the missile to the target. The guidance/seeker system allows front and rear shots on the target. This permits the missile to fire as the aircraft approaches the launching position, rather than wait for the aircraft to pass the launch site first. The newest MANPAD SAM also has an infrared signal processor to defeat the aircraft's flare suppression system. The flare suppression system is meant to defeat rear attacks from IR seeker missiles.¹⁶ In comparison many

older developed MANPAD SAM's guidance/seeker systems only permit rear attacks on the aircraft. This is because the missile's IR seeker closes on the aircraft's heat sources. The combined elements of the MANPAD SAM enable the weapon to effectively engage the strategic airlift aircraft during humanitarian relief operations.

During the humanitarian assistance mission strategic airlift aircraft are very vulnerable to the MANPAD SAM threat for three reasons. The first two reasons are derived from the aircraft's mission, the last reason stems from the aircraft's design. First, the aircraft cannot avoid flying into the APODs to deliver the JTF troops and relief supplies. The aircraft must land to download their cargo. Unlike tactical airlift aircraft they cannot land on unimproved runways. The strategic transports are tied to the major airfields in the AOR. Since there are few airfields in the AOR enemies can concentrate MANPAD SAMs at these points. With a limited number of personnel the JTF cannot secure the APODs from these attacks. Therefore, the aircraft are always open to MANPAD SAMs attack.

The second reason strategic airlift aircraft are vulnerable to the MANPAD SAM threat is the airlift bridge follows a predictable pattern. The airlift aircraft maintain a set schedule, using the steady flow method, to maximize the cargo throughput to the AOR. Strategic transports fly specific routes into and out of the airfields based on the runway pattern. Consequently, this predictability makes it easier for the MANPAD SAM to acquire and track the aircraft.

The third, and last reason strategic airlift aircraft are vulnerable to MANPAD SAM attack is the aircraft's design. These aircraft require full power during the takeoff

phase. This provides the MANPAD SAM an excellent IR source for their missile's seeker. Next, the aircraft's flight configuration removes the possibility of evasive action during takeoff and landing. The aircraft cannot maneuver during these phases to avoid the missile, if detected. Their flight path takes them easily within the MANPAD SAMs range and altitude of fire. At any other phase of flight the aircraft are outside the MANPAD SAM's capability to attack. Because of their mission, design and lack of onboard defensive systems, neither threat warning or threat suppression systems, strategic airlift aircraft are very vulnerable to MANPAD SAM attacks.

International arms sales have helped to increase the MANPAD SAM threat. Since the end of World War II the United States has sent more than \$100 billion worth of arms and associated support overseas to Third World nations. Between 1974 and 1977, the Soviet union shipped 1,100 MANPAD SAMs to Sub-Sahara Africa, and an additional 1,075 MANPAD SAMs from 1978 to 1981. This is exactly where we can expect further humanitarian assistance missions to go.¹⁷ It was estimated in the mid-1980s the Soviets had one tactical MANPAD SAM system for each NATO aircraft!¹⁸ Countries such as the United States, Russia, China, Egypt, Ukraine, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden and other Western states continue to build sophisticated Air Defense (AD) and MANPAD SAM systems and export them on the international market.¹⁹ Third World nations, where humanitarian assistance missions are sent, can be expected to acquire MANPAD SAMs.

The proliferation of the MANPAD SAM weapon has led to many successful attacks on transport aircraft. Most of these attacks occurred during civil wars in Third

World countries. During the Vietnam War, although MANPAD SAMs were relatively new and unsophisticated, the missile destroyed aircraft flying as low as 25 meters, and as high as 2,600 meters.²⁰ Since 1978 the skies over Angola and Sudan have been the scene of 11 MANPAD SAM attacks on civilian aircraft.²¹ Other successful attacks include those on Rhodesian and Georgian airliners during their civil wars.²² Most recently, on 6 April 1994, a transport aircraft carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed while on final approach to Kigali airport, Rwanda. The probable cause of the crash was a MANPAD SAM.²³ Civilian aircraft markings provide no immunity from attack. What this means is relief organizations cannot depend on their neutrality to protect them from attack during a relief mission. Because MANPAD SAMs have proliferated and have been used to attack transport aircraft in the past similar attacks can be expected in the future.

In summary, the threat to strategic airlift aircraft operating in the humanitarian assistance environment is the MANPAD SAM. The subsystems, characteristics, capabilities, and numbers of MANPAD SAMs available make it an ideal weapon to attack the aircraft in their most vulnerable phases--takeoff and landing. The weapon has been used many times during civil wars. This is the same environment the United States sent its previous two humanitarian relief missions and should expect to go in the future. The JTF must provide force protection from the MANPAD SAM threat for all the strategic airlift aircraft during humanitarian missions. National, Service and Joint doctrine should provide force protection guidance to defeat the threat. At this point the question is whether doctrine provides adequate guidance for force protection.

III. Force Protection Requirement

Although the manportable surface-to-air missile has some unique characteristics, air defense is not a new concept. Existing policy and doctrine recognizes the need to protect the airlift force. Strategic airlift has a vital role in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy (NMS). Strategic airlift is viewed as a limited resource that must be protected at the national level.²⁴ The strategic airlift force requires force protection in times of war and peace to ensure the United States achieves its goals. By analyzing National, Service, and Joint doctrine requirements for airlift protection we can decide whether doctrine adequately addresses the MANPAD SAM threat in the humanitarian assistance environment.

National Requirements

The National Military Strategy considers airlift protection in its discussion of Crisis Response.²⁵ Regarding the area of Crisis Response, the Secretary of Defense (SEC DEF) said the "capability to respond to regional crises is one of the key demands of our NMS."²⁶ The Secretary of the Air Force concurred and said

our national security strategy calls on us to be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where prepositioning equipment may not always be feasible. . . .²⁷

Offering humanitarian assistance is in the national interest of the United States.

Humanitarian assistance preserves the survival of large populations and global economics that, if destroyed, would have an immense impact for decades to come.²⁸ In any crisis strategic airlift delivers the initial combat force and relief supplies.

Consequently, protecting the airlift bridge is an early and essential element of crisis response.

National policy guidance recognizes the importance of strategic airlift, but does not recognize the parallel need for air defense. In the 1995 annual report to the President and Congress the SEC DEF said the use of armed forces to provide humanitarian assistance is appropriate when "the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to respond quickly" with its unique capabilities, and with least risk to American troops. And the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated recently "we should do all we can to protect our people and to avoid civilian casualties, (NGOs and host nation)."²⁹ These statements clearly show strategic airlift will bring equipment and personnel to areas requiring humanitarian assistance, and that force protection is a requirement for this mission. Without this protection American troops and civilians are put at risk, and this is not the goal of US national strategy.

The most basic goal of the United States is "to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad."³⁰ Hostile forces in a potential crisis areas have a significant MANPAD SAM capability. Airlift forces must be capable of countering a broad range of threats throughout their operating envelope.³¹ Therefore, to achieve the basic goal of the United States, and satisfy the national requirements, force protection must be provided to the airlift forces.

There is nothing at the national level that impedes the Services from developing force protection for airlift aircraft. In fact, protection is required to carry out the NMS. The Air Force, Army and Joint doctrine each developed their own means to provide force

protection to airlift assets during relief missions. These are the next areas to examine for any obstacles to this requirement.

Service's Requirements

The Air Force's capstone doctrine contained in AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace

Doctrine of the United States Air Force states:

Air Force units should be organized to enhance self-defense capabilities and self-sufficient operations . . . The range, endurance, payload, precision, and survivability of AF platforms are key factors in the ability to project power effectively. [Emphasis mine]³²

The Air Force achieves force protection primarily through Electronic Warfare (EW) means, both active and passive measures.³³ Active means of force protection includes: Anti-Radiation Missiles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic jamming and deception, expendables, and tactics. EW passive means of force protection includes: Emission control (EMCON), camouflage, IR shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.³⁴ The Air Force attempts to place a self-defense capability in all of its aircraft, including strategic airlift aircraft.

Survivability via self-defense is required in all Air Force aircraft. Recently, AMC designed ADS into the newest airlift aircraft, the C-17. AMC also started to add ADS to older military strategic airlift aircraft, the C-5 and C-141 to include missile warning receivers and chaff/flare dispensers. However, these aircraft are not receiving ADS equipment at a pace equivalent to the amount of work they accomplish in the airlift mission.

The ADS aboard the current military strategic airfleet consists of the AN/AAR-

47 missile warning receiver integrated with the AN/ALE-40 decoy dispenser. The AN/AAR-47 warns the aircrew of missiles launched against the aircraft. It processes the aircraft's movement and missile's flight path in real time and informs the aircrew of the type and location of the threat. This allows the aircrew to avoid the threat and ensure that the decoy dispenser is operating.

The AN/ALE-40 dispenses chaff or flares to decoy the missile away from the aircraft. It consists of four dispensers. Each dispenser holds either thirty chaff cartridges or fifteen flares. Normally, transport aircraft use flares. The AN/ALE-40 has three modes of operation, automatic, semiautomatic and manual. In the automatic mode the ADS evaluates the threat, selects an appropriate response, and initiates the countermeasure with no action required by the aircrew. In the semiautomatic mode the evaluation and selection are the same as the automatic mode, but the aircrew must activate the countermeasure. The manual mode has six preprogrammed, aircrew-selectable responses, that the aircrew can choose once the warning system detects a threat.³⁵ Additional specifics on the ADS aboard strategic airlift aircraft is listed in Appendices C and D.

None of the CRAF aircraft have any ADS equipment, even though a 1982 Science Board Study recommended that Radar homing and warning (RHAW) receivers be placed on all strategic airlifters to reduce the effectiveness of MANPAD SAM attacks.³⁶ The CRAF Enhancement Program (CEP) allows the CRAF aircraft to have ADS installed but no contract has been allocated for this additional capability.³⁷ This means the Air Force has failed to equip the strategic airlift aircraft with any means of self-defense.

Therefore, airlift aircraft must use means, other than technology, to defeat the MANPAD SAM threat in the humanitarian assistance environment.

Strategic airlift aircraft must use tactics as the primary means of self-defense since ADS equipment is not available. Airlift can reduce their vulnerability by flying the most secure routes into and out of the threat areas. Air routes are normally secured by achieving air superiority. However in humanitarian assistance missions, air superiority is assumed, not achieved. Consequently, fighter aircraft or specialized SEAD planes are not sent to secure the airlift bridge from the air. What this means is aircraft, without any ADS equipment, fly into unsecured APODs on predictable routes. These procedures increase the threat of MANPAD SAM attacks in the humanitarian relief environment.

To summarize, Air Force doctrine requires the strategic airlift aircraft to avoid the threat as the primary means of self-defense during a relief mission. Clearly, this is not practicable since the MANPAD SAM threat to the air bridge is concentrated at the APODs, and the aircraft must fly into the airfields. The Air Force's assumption of air superiority and its shortage of ADS for military and CRAF aircraft hinder the protection of the transport aircraft. Because air superiority is assumed, the Air Force relies on the Army to secure the routes into the APODs.

The Chief of Staff of the US Army said that in the "1990s and beyond, the United States will have to rely even more heavily on the rapid deployment of Army forces from the United States to guarantee its security."³⁸ His Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics confirmed this in saying, "Army's airlift requirements . . . are crucial to a stateside-based power projection Army."³⁹ Because strategic airlift is crucial to the Army for rapid force

projection the Army has the implied mission to protect the airlift aircraft at the APODs.

Unfortunately, force protection to the Army does not directly correlate with the Air Force's concepts of survivability and protection of the strategic airlift fleet. The only mention of force protection in the capstone document, FM 100-5, is under "Combat Functions, Air Defense." This part of Army doctrine is primarily concerned with defending Army units from air-to-ground threats. There is no mention of providing protection for any air assets from ground threats. Also, no mention is made for protecting airlift aircraft in the OOTW environment. The Army is responsible for Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) but it does not recognize the need in the humanitarian environment because SHORAD is oriented at air threats.⁴⁰ Although the Army does not emphasize a requirement to protect the air bridge, it relies on this means of transportation to deploy from CONUS to the crisis region. Joint Doctrine provides the guidance for force protection to the Services.

In review, both Air Force and Army doctrine fail to address the need to protect the strategic airlift force in the humanitarian assistance environment. The Air Force does not provide the needed equipment, and the Army does not directly recognize the protection requirement in this type of environment. The Air Force and Army do not deploy all of their assets during a humanitarian relief mission to provide adequate protection to the airlift forces. Therefore, both Services rely on Joint doctrine to provide a connection for force protection in this type of environment.

Joint Requirements

Joint doctrine specifies how the Army can support the Air Force to increase the survivability of the transport aircraft. Joint publications details specific responsibilities for force protection, starting with the JTF commander and continuing down to the tenant commanders. Joint doctrine recognizes the component directly affected by the threat has assumed the immediate responsibility for providing force protection and suppression of enemy AD. However, during humanitarian assistance missions the Air Force does not deploy any SEAD aircraft. Also, the Air Force security forces deployed are not large enough to provide force protection in the theater.⁴¹ Since it is not possible to avoid flying into the APODs during a crisis, and not all aircraft have an ADS capability, the Air Force relies on the Army to provide this capability.

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, warns, "JTF commanders should not be lulled into believing that the nonhostile intent of their mission does not put the force at risk."⁴² The forces must be able to rapidly change from peace to combat operations. Any future JTF commander should recognize that previous humanitarian relief missions were accomplished in regions of civil war. The risk to the strategic airlift aircraft can be avoided by providing a large force in theater early via airlift. Meanwhile, the combat force must be protected from disruption as it deploys into the theater, and it must meet the force limitations imposed on it. The JTF commander must plan on airlift assets avoiding potential threats. Considerable intelligence support concentrated on the potential enemy's antiaircraft systems and political circumstances in which the airlift force will be required to operate in is essential according to Joint Pub 4-01.1, Airlift Support to Joint Operations.⁴³ This concurs with Air Force doctrine. However, in a crisis

region, with limited APODs available, this is not possible. This causes the JTF commander to reduce the risk of the MANPAD SAM threat by these three options: employing only airlift aircraft with ADS, securing an area around the APODs, or bringing in specialized SEAD or fighter aircraft.

The first option is not possible since there are not enough strategic airlift aircraft equipped with ADS equipment to accomplish the task. Additionally Joint Pub 3-10.1 directs the JTF commander to protect civilian aircraft. Joint doctrine states:

The commander must establish command and control measures to integrate the defensive capabilities and defense requirements of civilian agencies of the US and host nation governments. Private contractors, (NGOs), also may require security.⁴⁴

This means the security and force protection, during the humanitarian assistance mission, for the NGOs are the responsibility of the JTF commander. To meet this force protection requirement, the JTF commander might need to reduce the overall effectiveness of the disaster relief operation to bring in more combat forces to provide the necessary security.⁴⁵ Unfortunately providing greater security conflicts with the urge to mitigate the suffering, the humanitarian assistance goal and the force limitation imposed on the JTF. Therefore, this option is not practicable.

The second option for securing the APODs is also not feasible. To eliminate the MANPAD SAM threat, the JTF commander could establish a wide security area. The secure area would need to extend to seven kilometers from the APOD. With the constant flow of aircraft through the APODs the patrols would need to remain in place constantly to protect the airlift bridge. Securing such an area, however, requires more troops than

are usually available to the JTF. Hence, establishing a wide security zone is not practicable.

The third option of bringing in specialized SEAD or fighter aircraft is possible, but cannot be relied on for all humanitarian missions. Fighter aircraft equipped with anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) or electronic jammers can defeat the MANPAD SAM threat. Fighter aircraft cannot, however, continuously cover the APODs. They must periodically leave to refuel from tanker aircraft or return to another secure base. The fighter and tanker aircraft cannot operate from the same APODs used by the cargo aircraft. If they did, these aircraft would decrease the number of transport aircraft operating from the airfield, reducing the relief cargo throughput. Fighter aircraft might also send the wrong message during a humanitarian relief mission. Fighter aircraft are only readily available for use in a humanitarian crisis when they launch from an aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier is a secure operating platform and does not decrease the MOG at the APODs. But, aircraft carriers can only be used when the crisis area and APODs adjoin the sea. Therefore, carriers are only a partial solution. Another means must be found to provide the JTF commander with force protection for the airlift fleet operations.

The JTF commander's subordinates also have force protection responsibilities for the strategic airlift aircraft. The Joint Rear Area (JRA) Commander is responsible for maintaining secure lines of communication (LOCs) with active participation and coordination by the respective component commanders. Component commanders, with area responsibilities, are responsible for the defense of bases located in their area.⁴⁶ In a humanitarian assistance mission there is no rear area. The front is the entire AOR.

Therefore, it falls on the base commander specifically to provide the required force protection for the airlift bridge.

It is the base commander's responsibility to provide force protection for the strategic airlift aircraft. They are responsible for base defense. Base defense includes the air LOCS leading into the bases. Protecting the LOCS connecting the military forces with the theater base of operations is part of the security requirement. The base commander is responsible for establishing the Base Defense Operations Center as the focal point for security operations. These facts mean that Joint doctrine assigned additional duties to the base commander during humanitarian assistance missions. To meet these responsibilities the base commander must rely on the tenant unit commanders for assistance.

Tenant unit commanders have the responsibility to advise the base commander on defense matters peculiar to their units.⁴⁷ For strategic airlift, the Airlift Mobility Element (AME) commander is the responsible tenant commander. To support the base commander the AME commander needs to know the intent of the local factions. This information is difficult to acquire in the time allotted for planning the humanitarian mission. With reduced forces, AMC has drawn down the number of station managers operating overseas. Thus, it has fewer direct contacts to obtain this critical data. Therefore, to avoid losing vital strategic airlift assets, the AME commander should insist that only those aircraft with an ADS capability initially deploying to the theater. After a thorough analysis of the threat and the different factions' intents, other aircraft may be fitted into the flow dependent on the situation. Overall, this provides the best

survivability too only the US strategic military airlift aircraft in the humanitarian relief environment. Unfortunately, it may not be feasible to avoid using the CRAF in a crisis, and these aircraft do not have any ADS. Also, it does not address the JTF commander and base commanders' responsibility to protect the civilian aircraft flown by relief agencies.

In summary, National, Service and Joint doctrine all recognize the importance of strategic airlift. Strategic airlift has a vital role in the United States' forward projection strategy, both in times of war and peace. However, current doctrine does not recognize the requirement to provide air defense to the entire airlift force, civilian aircraft included, during humanitarian relief missions, though there is a potential threat of a MANPAD SAM attack. By examining two recent humanitarian relief missions we can observe how the JTF commanders used doctrine or developed their own methods to provide protection to the strategic airlift aircraft.

IV. Current Responses

Before Service or Joint doctrine can be changed to protect the strategic airlift forces better, we should consider how recent JTF's have managed this problem. Some guidance in our current doctrine might have worked in the humanitarian assistance environment and need not change. Some techniques used by the JTFs and Services during Operations RESTORE HOPE and SUPPORT HOPE might need to be added to current doctrine. First, we will review the operational environment and the actual vice potential threats to the airlift bridge during these operations. Then we will analyze how

each JTF addressed the force protection requirement. This may reveal what parts of Service and Joint doctrine were adequate and what needs altering. The Air Force, Army and Joint doctrines must all work together to provide protection to the airlift forces.

Operation RESTORE HOPE

Operation RESTORE HOPE was conducted under UN authority in Somalia between 3 December 1992 and 4 May 1993. It was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation involving more than 38,000 troops; twenty-one coalition nations with nine more nations participating in some other type of aid; and over forty-nine NGOs.⁴⁸ According to the International Community of the Red Cross, Somalia was the largest relief operation since the end of World War II. The United States delivered over 20,000 tons of food per month to Somalia. Twenty-six percent of these supplies came via the extensive air bridge to Mogadishu airfield.⁴⁹ During the operation the JTF commander planned to receive 28 aircraft per day to deploy and sustain his force. Because of limited United States' interest, and the threat in Somalia, the operation only received 12 aircraft per day.⁵⁰ The MOG restricted the APOD to only narrow-body aircraft. This was quickly enlarged to allow wide-body aircraft into the APOD.⁵¹ Security remained a major concern through out the year as fifteen clans and sub-clans vied for power in multifactional civil war with constantly changing sides.

Clans obstructed the movement of relief supplies as an extension of internal power struggle, and interfered with the relief flights.⁵² Food in Somalia was more valuable than money and relief work was hazardous. Assaults on the food supply became

a key military strategy in Africa's civil wars.⁵³ Therefore, anyone who guarded the food was an enemy to those who were making money from the food shortage. The JTF providing security at Mogadishu airfield was the enemy to these factions.

Security at the APOD was difficult. The nature of the APOD precluded the establishment of a tight perimeter. It was extremely difficult to deny penetration of the base since host nation assets were assisting in the humanitarian relief mission. Completely securing the airfields with the JTF's limited forces was not possible.⁵⁴ Just outside the airfield, bands of clan fighters armed with AK-47s and crew-served weapons posed a threat to airlift security. Numerous buildings within 300 meters of the airport offered excellent concealment and cover. These buildings were well within MANPAD SAM range. The terrain surrounding the airport was higher than the airfield, allowing good observation and a clear field of fire for a MANPAD SAM. Armed men infiltrated the airfield perimeter almost every night. The JTF base commander could not even secure the perimeter, let alone an effective patrol outside the APOD.⁵⁵

Security was made more difficult because there was an ineffective chain of command. The base commander had not established a clear, defined chain of command for security in the APOD.⁵⁶ Base security was confused because numerous nations and relief agencies shared the airfield. Each organization had its own agenda and national interests. This meant the force protection of the airlift operation was done separately, instead of a combined effort. Unity of effort was never obtained. The JTF followed Joint doctrine and combined its assets to provide this protection.

The JTF recognized the threat to the airlift bridge and used the forces available to

protect it. On the ground, the base commander used patrols as suggested by Joint Pub 3-01.4. These patrols consisted of scouts sent out fifteen minutes before each takeoff and landing of the military strategic airlift aircraft. No patrols went out prior to NGO aircraft flights. Bandits closely observed the force movements to identify any patrol patterns and timing. Nevertheless, the commander did not vary the fifteen minute patrol pattern!⁵⁷ The base commander disregarded both Joint doctrine for air defense and the requirement to protect civilian aircraft in the AOR. Tactical patrols, as suggested under Security in Joint Pub 3-10.1, are necessary to collect information, confirm or deny accuracy of previous information, and provide security. Patrols can also provide force protection to strategic airlift aircraft by denying terrain to the enemy. This doctrine stresses that patrols should avoid daily routines and times. This is because a set pattern can be detected and defeated.⁵⁸ By maintaining a routine patrol the commander made it easier for a MANPAD SAM to attack the airlift bridge. Only by using air patrols in conjunction with JTF ground patrols was the air bridge kept open.

Two methods of airborne force protection were used. First, the military strategic airlift aircraft adhered to their primary defense procedure--threat avoidance. They avoided the land and city approaches as much as possible. The aircraft approached and departed the APOD from over the water. This was possible in Mogadishu because the APOD bordered the ocean. This will not be the case for an inland APOD. Strategic airlift aircraft developed their own predictable patterns that made them very vulnerable. This was similar to the routine patrols established by the base commander. Humanitarian aid received the priority. Therefore, AMC used the steady flow method for the airlift. It

brought the most relief to the region in the shortest amount of time, but made the airlift bridge vulnerable to interdiction.

The second airborne method was defensive air patrol. Attack helicopters patrolled the APOD area fifteen minutes before the strategic airlift aircraft's arrival and departure. Again, this set a routine that was learned and attacked by the enemy. The base commander had to raise the altitude of hovering helicopters to over 1,000 feet to avoid ground fire. The adjustment was needed because the enemy fired RPGs at the helicopters when they patrolled at lower altitudes. The enemy could just as easily have used a MANPAD SAM and made the helicopters targets as well.⁵⁹

The After Action Report (AAR) for Operation RESTORE HOPE cites two lessons learned regarding force protection from this operation. Lesson one, the CINC and transportation planners should consider the safety requirements of large aircraft. They are not capable of effective evasive action, and they are vulnerable to small arms and MANPAD SAMs while taking off and landing. Second lesson they learned it is necessary to provide force protection during a humanitarian assistance mission, though it means using strategic airlift less efficiently and not keeping to a routine.⁶⁰ The AAR concluded that US doctrine was not adequate nor were there sufficient forces to defend airlift forces against hostile threats. Military transport aircraft remained vulnerable to attack and civilian, CRAF and NGO, aircraft were not protected by any means. Now, by examining Operation SUPPORT HOPE we can see if these lessons were applied in the next humanitarian relief mission or whether other means for providing protection were found.

Operation SUPPORT HOPE

The crisis in Rwanda was the inevitable result of 50 years of misrule, repression, and violence. On 6 April 1994, a transport plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down. The probable cause was a MANPAD SAM fired from Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda. These deaths resulted in a rampage by the government and militia forces that killed the Tutsi and moderate Hutus castes.

To alleviate the crisis both the United Nations and United States responded. The United Nations deployed 2,500 peacekeepers to Rwanda to stop the most recent genocide. Chapter VI of the UN Charter constrained the forces because it did not authorize the use force during the mission, except in self-defense.⁶¹ After the Tutsi led Rwanda Patriotic Front declared victory and established a new government, over a million Hutus fled to Tanzania and Zaire. Death by cholera, dysentery, and exhaustion came to the refugee camps there. This humanitarian crisis led to the US response.

Shortly after the deaths were reported in the refugee camps, SEC DEF Perry said US forces would go to Rwanda to deliver emergency humanitarian assistance and the forces would leave as soon as the aid was established. The American public was not interested in intervening to stop Rwandan ethnic violence. There was no vital US security interest. The JTF task was directed solely to provide humanitarian assistance. It was not to provide a nation-building or peacekeeping force in the AOR. The JTF's ROE allowed self-defense, defense of other relief agencies, and protection of "mission essential" property. This clearly defined the JTF's responsibilities to provide force

protection for all the aircraft entering the theater, not just the military aircraft.⁶²

The sudden humanitarian crisis forced the United States to rush forces to the theater with little time for organizing and planning the coordination with other agencies. The JTF for Operation SUPPORT HOPE was organized on very short notice, in some cases as the elements were deploying. At no time did the JTF exceed 3,000 troops in the theater, too small a force to secure the APODs.⁶³ There were already over seventy relief groups in the theater before the JTF arrived. Each had its own agenda. Not all agencies were willing to cooperate with the JTF and receive force protection, though the JTF was responsible for this task. Confusion was not limited to the JTF ground forces it also included the airlift forces.

Strategic airlift aircraft carried out two different missions in the AOR. It provided emergency humanitarian supplies for the JTF, and airlift for the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. This contributed to the chaos and confusion as to the United State's role in the AOR. JTF Support Hope was a humanitarian assistance mission, in the CINC's words to "stop the dying." According to the Secretary of the Air Force over 15,000 tons of relief supplies were flown to the Rwandan AOR via the strategic airlift bridge.⁶⁴ The JTF was not part of the UN forces in Rwanda, as it had been in Somalia. The JTF could not take sides or cooperate with UNAMIR, the UN military command with a peacekeeping mission, though the US transport aircraft did do this for the United Nations.

The second mission assigned to the strategic airlift force was airlift in support of UN forces. US airlift transported Ethiopian troops to Rwanda and took French forces

from the theater for UNAMIR. The United Nations and relief agencies assumed that the deployment of United States forces meant security and protection for both the UN forces and the NGOs.⁶⁵ Because the United States transported the UN forces, it assumed responsibility for their protection while deploying into the AOR. Force protection for the airlift forces was a constant concern. The AOR was chaotic; local troops were undisciplined; and no Status of Forces Agreement existed with the local government.⁶⁶ The JTF had to overcome all these constraints and limitations to provide protection to the airlift bridge. This protection was handled differently in Rwanda than in Somalia.⁶⁷

The threat in the Rwanda AOR was met by sending a Humanitarian Assessment Survey Team (HAST) to the area first. The HAST's mission was to assess the situation in the AOR for the commander's initial estimate of the situation before the JTF commander arrived. According to the AAR for the operation this analysis was not complete before the forces deployed to the theater. The HAST should have looked harder at the political situation. The area was a war zone and the refugee situation deliberately orchestrated and each APOD had its own peculiarities.⁶⁸ The dispute between the Tutsi and Hutu clans had been going on for years, and the previous government had not agreed to the cease fire. The HAST assessment was probably effective for the humanitarian mission, but it did not include an assessment related to the protection of the airlift aircraft. The HAST therefore, did not adequately address the protection for all the aircraft operating in the AOR.

The JTF relied exclusively on the strategic airlift aircraft to protect themselves. Other than the HAST examination of the environment there was little else the JTF did to

provide protection for any of the aircraft in the AOR, although the MANPAD SAM threat was there.⁶⁹ Also, the United States transported other national forces for the UN peacekeeping mission. Normally, a peacekeeping mission requires all parties to agree to the cease-fire. This was not the case in Rwanda, and should have been considered in terms of providing protection to the airlift aircraft. Only an armistice was in effect. The United States was fortunate no further aircraft were downed by MANPAD SAMs. Consequently, force protection was left to the transport aircraft, or ignored.

Obviously, the lessons learned during Operation RESTORE HOPE were ignored in Operation SUPPORT HOPE. Relying on only the self-defense assets of strategic airlift aircraft is not the correct approach in the humanitarian assistance environment. Most aircraft lacked ADS equipment. These aircraft also cannot use avoidance tactics since they must fly into the APODs to deliver their cargo. Adequate air defense coverage is not currently provided to the strategic airlift aircraft. Doctrine provides guidance to protect the APODs, but with the constraints and limitations imposed on the JTF during humanitarian relief operations, other options must be found for future operations.

V. Future Responses

Joint doctrine provides guidance for force protection in the humanitarian assistance environment. The doctrine is currently inadequate to provide protection for all strategic airlift aircraft operating in the AOR during a humanitarian relief mission. The AAR for Operation RESTORE HOPE made this observation. The lessons of Somalia

were ignored in Operation SUPPORT HOPE. The doctrinal and operational shortfall in airlift protection stems in large part from the assumption of air superiority.

Assuming air superiority is clearly valid, but irrelevant. While there is no air-to-air threat, a significant ground threat exists. The MANPAD SAM denies the freedom of action to all aircraft operating from the APODs. Since Air Force doctrine requires its aircraft to have a self-defense capability, it should equip the strategic airlift aircraft with ADS. This includes the CRAF aircraft. Therefore, force protection capability will not depend on whether SEAD aircraft are available. The ADS equipment will alleviate a large portion of the JTF's concern for force protection in the humanitarian assistance environment.

The self-defense equipment the strategic airlift aircraft require consists of an integrated, automatic ADS. A relatively small amount of EW equipment will produce a proportionally larger effect on the aircraft's survivability, but doubling or trebling the systems will not provide twice or thrice the protection. Therefore, the transport aircraft can use a single automated system for the aircraft's self-defense capability. The three major ADS subsystems are the warning receiver, chaff/flare dispenser, and the jamming system.

The warning receiver subsystem is the first system of the ADS affected by the MANPAD SAM threat. A warning receiver provides information to the ADS that determines the radar type, range and bearing to the radar, and status of the threat, whether the radar is searching, tracking, illuminating or actively guiding a missile.⁷⁰ The warning receiver also notifies the aircrew by displaying the threat as a strobe line or a

position of the aircraft's radar scope. When possible, the crew can then avoid flying near the threat. In the event it cannot, the integrated ADS will automatically trigger the chaff/flare dispenser and jamming subsystems.

After the chaff/flare dispenser subsystem receives information on the threat from the warning receiver it discharges either a chaff or flare cartridge. Most dispensers hold thirty chaff or fifteen IR flare cartridges. Normally, chaff drops present spurious targets to the threat that can last from 24 to 48 hours at distances up to hundreds of miles from the original drop site.⁷¹ This is extremely hazardous in an airport area when the ground controller relies on radar to safely guide the aircraft. Therefore, transport aircraft usually do not use chaff, and flare cartridges are loaded in the dispenser.

Flares saturate the missiles' IR sensors with so much energy that the target becomes invisible to the missile and the flare decoys them away from the aircraft. Flares mimic the actual engine IR signature and are effective when fired at the appropriate time and in large amounts.⁷² Therefore, this system must be automated to fire the flares at the correct intervals and amounts to defeat the threat. Both flares and chaff are very effective when used with the jammer subsystem.

Jamming systems mimic the missiles' radar and seeker electronic emissions. This induces the missile to track the false targets created by the chaff and flares.⁷³ Jamming exploits the weakness in the electronic circuitry of the MANPAD SAM. As the aircraft moves the jammer determines the radar emitters which represent the greatest threats to the aircraft. It then assigns priorities to these threats, and selects the optimum jamming techniques and electronic power level needed to counter these threats.⁷⁴ The jamming

system with the other systems of the integrated ADS provides airlift aircraft adequate self-defense capability to airlift aircraft.

The Air Force has already developed these integrated aircraft defensive systems for transport aircraft. The Air Force's Advanced Defense Avionics Response Strategy (ADARS) features a data base managed system that has all the SAM threats programmed in the data base. This includes the threats' susceptibilities and vulnerabilities, as well as onboard countermeasures that could be employed automatically. The ADARS onboard processor assigns threat priorities and develops response strategies according to the available countermeasures, based on the aircraft's EW equipment and phase of flight.⁷⁵

An ADS specifically designed for large aircraft is the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure system (ATIRCM). It protects transports from the MANPAD SAM threat and includes a passive missile warning subsystem, a chaff/flare dispenser, and a directable IR jammer. The E-4A Airborne Command Post, E-8 Joint Stars, and VC-25A Air Force One aircraft all have these aircraft defensive systems, and these planes are military versions of commercial aircraft.⁷⁶ Therefore, ADS equipment is already available for commercial aircraft and no further development is needed. Only one obstacle remains to prevent the CRAF from receiving ADS equipment.

The principal obstacle to achieving this force protection for the United States' transport aircraft is lack of money for EW in the current military budgets.⁷⁷ The Air Force sees no urgent need to equip the CRAF aircraft with ADS equipment. This is mostly due to the cost of onboard electronic protection equipment when individual systems are installed. The Air Force must complete the installation of ADS on AMC's

aircraft. These include both the military and CRAF aircraft used in the humanitarian assistance mission. It is not feasible to equip all the CRAF aircraft because the composition of this fleet changes monthly. However the long-range, wide-body CRAF aircraft are the first aircraft used in a crisis and therefore, should receive ADS equipment. These aircraft are crucial for crisis response, and they are the most difficult aircraft to replace.

Another reason ADS is neglected is the small amount of money DOD budgets for humanitarian missions and no money is budgeted for force protection. This is because it is not a combat environment. Electronic Warfare weapons are not lethal weapons. The General Accounting Office criticized the DOD in 1992 for not developing an effective EW master plan to achieve the intended commonality of equipment and tactics.⁷⁸ SEAD aircraft are retiring because the newest fighter and bomber aircraft come with built-in stealth and EW technology. The newest military airlift aircraft comes equipped with ADS equipment. Consequently, no one foresees the need to apply the SEAD role in the humanitarian relief missions.

As the world's major contributor of strategic airlift the United States must take the leading role in providing force protection for the airlift aircraft. The United States can manage this task by its technical capabilities and current doctrine. The BUR stated that the United States should plan on faster incorporation of technologies into weapons to provide significant advantages to US forces.⁷⁹ The technical capabilities related to force protection are EW and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) assets are available today. This equipment has not yet been assessed for its ability to contribute to the humanitarian

assistance mission.

To provide force protection to all aircraft operating through the APODs the JTF can employ UAVs with EW pods. These vehicles are replacing the SEAD aircraft on the battlefield in the EW role. They can just as easily do this mission in the humanitarian assistance environment. UAVs require the same airspace requirements as a low performance aircraft. The UAVs do not give off a clear radar signature and are difficult to acquire visually. This both helps and hinders the JTF.

A small radar signature helps the UAVs by making them difficult to acquire and track by the MANPAD SAM. Therefore, UAVs are harder to shoot down. The lack of a radar signature can also adversely affect the air bridge. This is because the UAV could present a potential hazard to high performance aircraft operating near the APODs. The UAVs need to coordinate their flight plans with the approaching transport aircraft. This is not difficult to resolve since the UAV operators will locate at the APODs, collocated with the tower controllers.⁸⁰ The UAV can assist the force protection of all aircraft over the APOD, and not disrupt the flow of relief forces into the theater.

UAVs equipped with jamming pods can deceive and degrade the tracking and guidance systems of the MANPAD SAMs. By using several UAVs, in the same APOD area, it is possible to present the MANPAD SAM from locating the aircraft. The technique of employing several jammers in the same area is referred to as the "n squared rule." Two UAVs with jammers presents four possible targets to the threat radar. Three UAVs present nine targets, etc. to the threat radar. This prevents the tracking radar from acquiring the aircraft, and thus the missile cannot fire effectively at the target. Jamming

equipment aboard transport aircraft has only power enough to protect the individual aircraft. Only SEAD aircraft or UAV jamming pods can accomplish this mission.⁸¹ Because SEAD aircraft are not available for this mission the JTF commander must consider how to include UAVs into the Time Phased Force Development Data List (TPFDDL) early in the deployment.

The personnel and equipment necessary to operate the UAVs will not interfere with the requirement to deliver assistance to the AOR. The UAV teams can break down into force packages that allow 24-hour coverage for the APODs in the AOR. The force packages can fit on three to eight C-141s, depending on the number of APODs covered. UAVs can assist the other air and ground assets in providing force protection for the air bridge into the theater. This is especially true for those aircraft without an ADS--the CRAF and NGO commercial aircraft. Current UAV characteristics, sensors, and equipment is listed in Appendix E. Technical equipment is not a panacea for the force protection requirement. It is just one aspect of the joint package needed to defeat the threat. Doctrine also has an important role.

The last part of the force protection package is the tactics and techniques provided in doctrine and learned in the field. The best method of conducting an analysis of the "battlefield" in the relief AOR is by getting ahead of the time limitation. One method to obtain the initial estimate of the AOR is the HAST. This survey team is a good technique that provides the latest update of the threat to the JTF commander as he puts the final touches on the TPFDDL. The analysis provided by the HAST on the intentions of the various factions in the AOR is invaluable to the JTF commander. It

allows the JTF commander to decide the size of combat force needed to reduce the risk to the US forces.

Once in theater the JTF must rely on other tactics to defeat the threat. At the APODs securing an entire MANPAD SAM free zone is not possible with the limit placed on the force size in theater. Therefore, the JTF must rely on correctly executed tactics to provide this protection. These tactics include patrols, both air and ground, to deny the terrain to the enemy, and establishing a base defense operations center as required by Joint doctrine. These tactics had positive effects during Operation RESTORE HOPE. Whenever a threat is found by the patrols, the location and type of threat must be passed to all aircraft flying into the APOD, not just the military aircraft. This warning will allow the aircraft to avoid the threat. It will also allow them to focus their ADS at the critical time and location to safely enter and exit the APODs.

Establishing a base defense operations center allows for unity of effort in securing the APOD. It ensures all agencies, US, UN, host nation, and relief organizations assume responsibility for base security. Together these technical capabilities, tactics, and techniques will meet the force protection requirement in the future.

Conclusion

During a relief mission the greatest threat to transport aircraft is the MANPAD SAM. The characteristics, capabilities, and numbers of MANPAD SAM available make it an ideal weapon to attack the aircraft in their most vulnerable phases--takeoff and landing. Relying on only self-defense tactics of strategic airlift aircraft is not the correct approach in the humanitarian assistance environment. Transport aircraft require air

defense to protect them in this environment.

Current air defense doctrine is adequate to provide force protection when the JTF commander when there are no limits on combat forces. However, during a humanitarian assistance mission, with its force limitations, doctrine only covers military transport aircraft. Doctrine does not extend to the CRAF and commercial aircraft operating in the relief AOR. The Air Force assumes air superiority, therefore, it does not deploy any SEAD aircraft to support the air bridge. Meanwhile, the Army deploys its forces expecting the Air Force to defend the air bridge because the Air Force is the Service most effected by the threat. Hence, there are not enough ground assets available to provide adequate defense against the MANPAD SAM threat during the relief missions. The AAR for Operation RESTORE HOPE made this clear, and the lessons of Somalia were ignored in Operation SUPPORT HOPE. Tactics, techniques, and procedures are necessary to provide force protection to the strategic airlift aircraft in the humanitarian assistance environment.

Force protection is required during humanitarian assistance missions, as well as during war, for the strategic airlift aircraft based on the potential threat. However, doctrine does not yet recognize this air defense requirement for relief operations. This air defense must not only cover the United States' military aircraft, but also the CRAF and civilian aircraft aiding the relief effort. There is not just one solution to protecting the strategic airlift fleet during humanitarian assistance missions. Technology is not the ultimate solution. An integrated EW master plan to include airlift forces, ADS for transport's self-protection, and tactics to provide force protection in the AOR is required.

The direction and guidance provided in Joint doctrine provides adequate air defense measures for the protection of the military transport aircraft. They do not currently protect all the airlift aircraft operating in this environment.

A sense of urgency to equip the CRAF with ADS capability as part of the CEP is needed. At least, as a minimum, the most crucial part of the CRAF, the long-range international aircraft should receive this self-defense capability. These will be the first aircraft used to deploy troops overseas in a crisis. If these aircraft are destroyed, their loss would significantly reduce the cargo capability of the air bridge. The JTF should insist on these aircraft to deploy his initial forces to the crisis area. These initial forces should consist of HASTs and UAVs with EW pods.

Next, the United States should continue the development of UAVs and their payloads. The UAVs can provide continuous force protection, when integrated with the ground forces, for all aircraft flying into the APODs. The number of aircraft used, and personnel deployed with the UAVs, are small. Hence, UAV deployments will not interfere with the mission to provide rapid humanitarian assistance, nor will they threaten to exceed the force limits for the mission. Since the UAVs have interchangeable payloads they can adapt to the changing threat technology. UAVs should deploy early to the AOR to assist in the force protection of all the airlift aircraft in the theater.

Lastly, the JTF commander should follow Joint doctrine in establishing base defense operations centers and patrol standards. Sending in a HAST early to analyze the situation will allow time for the commander to bring the right forces to the theater to provide the APOD security with these operations centers and patrols. Close coordination

between the air and ground patrols will ensure the LOCs are covered during the critical times when aircraft are flying through the APODs. By applying these recommendations, with current doctrine and military capabilities, it will be possible to provide adequate force protection to the strategic airlift aircraft.

GLOSSARY

AD	Air Defense
ADS	Aircraft Defensive System
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AME	Airlift Mobility Element
AOR	Area of Operations
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
ARM	Anti-Radiation Missile
BUR	Bottom Up Review
CEP	CRAF Enhancement Program
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DOD	Department of Defense
EW	Electronic Warfare
HAST	Humanitarian Assessment Survey Team
IR	Infrared
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRA	Joint Rear Area
JTF	Joint Task Force
LO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOS	Line-of-Sight
MANPAD SAM	Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile
MOG	Maximum on the Ground
MRC	Major Regional Conflict
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
RHAW	Radar Homing and Warning
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPG	Rocked Propelled Grenade
SACLOS	Semi-Automatic Line-of-Sight
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SEC DEF	Secretary of Defense
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
TPFDDL	Time Phased Force Deployment Data List
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

Appendix B
MANPAD SAMS⁸²

SAMs	SA-14 Strela 2	SA-16A Strela 3	SA-16B Igla	BOFORS RBS70
Code Name	Grail (NATO)	Gremlin (NATO)	Needle (NATO)	Rayrider
Range (meters) minimum	500	600	600	not revealed
Range (meters) maximum	3600	6000	7000	5000
Altitude (meters) minimum	45	10	10	0
Altitude (meters) maximum	4800	5500	6000	3000
Speed, maximum (m/s)	580	600	600	not revealed
MACH	1.7	1.8	1.8	not revealed
Guidance	IR/IFF	IR	IR	Laser
Weight (lbs)	20	21	176	not revealed
Remarks	-battery good for 11 to 60 seconds -limited to pursuit course -defeated by flares in large amounts -missiles cost \$45,000 on black market	-good for side and front shots at 4000 m -IR signal processor defeats flares	-good for side and front shots at 4000 m -IR signal processor defeats flares	-30 seconds to erect and fire -requires clear weather

SAMS	BOFORS RBS 90	SHORTS	SHORTS
Code Name	Rayrider 2	Blowpipe	Javelin
Range (meters) minimum	not revealed	300	300
Range (meters) maximum	5000	4025+	5485
Altitude (meters) minimum	0	0	0
Altitude (meters) maximum	3000	2010	1985+
Speed, maximum (m/s)	not revealed	not revealed	not revealed
Guidance	TV/IR/Laser	Radio/IFF	IR/SACLOS
Weight (lbs)	unknown	13	66
Remarks	-can use in any weather -can use remote control		-Thorn EMI ADAD device installed -Shows 4 targets at one time

SAMS	Shorts	GD FIM-43A	GD FIM-92A
Code name	Starstreak	Redeye	Stinger-Post
Range (meters) minimum	300	unknown	unknown
Range (meters) maximum	6995	3700	5030
Altitude (meters) minimum	not revealed	not revealed	unknown
Altitude (meters) maximum	not revealed	not revealed	4800
Speed, maximum (m/s)	not revealed	not revealed	not revealed
MACH	4.0+		
Guidance	IR/SACLOS	IR	IR/IFF
Weight (lbs)	unknown	13	30
Remarks	- Warhead is Kinetic Energy and High Explosive type	- limited to pursuit chase - early model, 1960s	- cannot fire down on target

Appendix C⁸³
Strategic Airlift Aircraft

Aircraft	C-5	C-17	C-141	KC-10
Name	Galaxy	Globemaster III	Starlifter	Extender
Range, (NM) maximum unrefueled	2958	2400	2500	4400
Payload, maximum (1,000 lbs)	216	171	94.5	170
ACL ⁸⁴ (1000 lbs)	150	120	50	100
Cargo Capability ⁸⁵	outsize	outsize	oversize	oversize
Pallets ⁸⁶	37	18	13	27
Troops, max for overwater flight	73 ¹	102	160	69
Air refuelable	yes	yes	yes	yes
Total PAI ⁸⁷ in 1995	104	199	54	12
ADS (planned or in place)	AN/AAR-47 AN/ALE-40	AN/AAR-47 AN/ALE-40	AN/AAR-47 AN/ALE-40	AN/AAR-47 AN/ALE-40
Unit cost (\$ millions)	168 (1992)	534 (1994)	8.1 (1992)	86.3 (1992)

¹Troop seating in the overhead troop compartment in the tail of the aircraft. 267 additional seats can be configured in the cargo compartment. Field Manual 55-9, p. 2-3.

Aircraft	B-747	DC-8	DC-10	B-707
Range, (NM) maximum	3500+	3500+	3500+	3500+
Payload, maximum (1,000 lbs)	250	110	176	90
ACL (1000 lbs)	180	90	150	73
Cargo Capability	oversize	bulk	oversize	oversize
Pallets	42	18	30	13
Troops, maximum for overwater flight	492	235	354	142
Air refuelable	no	no	no	no

Appendix D⁸⁸
Aircraft Defensive Systems

<u>Warning Systems</u> ⁸⁹	<u>Characteristics</u>
AN/AAR-44	missile launch warning system
AN/AAR-47	missile warning receiver
AN/ALQ-153	detects missile launch, warns crew, and directs optional flare launch
AN/ALQ-156	detects missile launch, warns crew, and directs optional flare launch
AN/ALR-56M	RHAW
AN/ALR-69	RHAW
AN/AVR-2	laser energy detector, warns crew of beam-riding weapon lock-on

Suppression Systems

Consumables⁹⁰ / Decoys (Flares⁹¹ and Chaff⁹²)

<u>System</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
AN/ALE-40	decoy dispenser: set of 4 dispensers of 30 RR-170 chaff cartridges or 15 MJU-7 IR flares
AN/ALE-47	replacing the AN/ALE-40
AN/ALQ-131	combines AN/ALQ-153 and decoy dispensers
AGM 136A	ARM
ATIRCM	RHAW, jammer, decoy dispenser, used on large aircraft to protect against MANPAD SAMs, on E-8 J-STARS
V-Chaff	presents <u>temporary</u> numerous false targets ⁹³

Non-Consumables⁹⁴

<u>System</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
AN/ALQ-144	continuously generates pulses of IR "noise" to produce erroneous guidance signals
AN/ALQ-157	continuously generates pulses of IR "noise" to produce erroneous guidance signals
AN/ALQ-172	detector and jammer
AN/ALQ-178	jammer
Exhaust Extensions	shields engine emissions
MODIR	IR jammer
AN/ALQ-202	autonomous jammer

Appendix E⁹⁵
UAVs⁹⁶

Type	Tactica	Short	Meduim	High Altitude Long Endurance
Sensor	EW	EW and anti-radar	EW	EW
Radius (KM)	30	150	650	classified
Speed (kts)	not specified	90	550<20,000'	not specified
Phase	Demonstration	Test	Operational	Dormant
Payload (lbs)	<50	200	not stated	not stated

Equipment Baseline⁹⁷

- 8 UAVs
- 1 Launch/Recovery Station
- 1 Payload Transporter
- 4 UAV Transporters
- 14 Personnel

Endnotes

1. Steven Metz, Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, specializing in transregional security issues and OOTW, Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. 20.
2. Strategic Airlift is defined as airlift between theaters or CONUS to a theater.
3. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm many CRAF airlines would not fly into fields threatened by chemical warfare attack because they did not have any means to combat this threat. Mark Pires & Darrell K. Williams, "Strategic Lift: Can the United States Conduct Two Nearly-Simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies," (Monograph submitted to the School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995), p. 24.
4. These aircraft: C-5, C-17, C-141, L-100, B 707, MD DC-10, KC-10 are the aircraft examined in this paper and are the primarily strategic aircraft used during humanitarian assistance missions.
5. For example, just recently AMC coordinated three Humanitarian assistance missions to the African nations of Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia between July to September 1995. These DC-8 aircraft carried 120 tons of medical supplies for Americares Foundation Inc. and Dutch HRA, Schiphol Triport. Both of these are NGOs. Also, AMC contracted Evergreen International Airlines B-747 and Air Transport International DC-8 aircraft to transport cargo and medical supplies to Kigali, Rwanda and Zagreb, Croatia respectively in September 1995. This information was obtained from AMC's Internet Homepage under the following links: AMC/Press/Release # 950706/ 25 Jul 95 and AMC/Press/Release # 950902/ 5 Sep 95/ Scott AFB, Ill, HQ AMC.
6. The CRAF program uses commercial aircraft to rapidly augment organic military airlift during crises. CRAF combines both cargo and passenger airlift capabilities to meet emergency airlift requests. CRAF provides aircraft without the outlay of purchasing aircraft, personnel costs and maintenance costs. In the CRAF Enhancement Program (CEP) DOD pays for the ability to transport bulk and oversize cargo on the commercial aircraft by strengthening the floor, cargo door, and roller and rail system. The actual number of aircraft in the CRAF program changes monthly based on the three-year contract negotiations. As of April 1995, 536 commercial aircraft were committed to CRAF throughout its three stages. The long-range international aircraft, capable of overwater flight, are the most crucial to CRAF. USTRANSCOM wants the equivalent of 136 wide-body B-747 aircraft for passengers and 120 for cargo capability. As of mid-1995 they have committed 133 and 110 respectively. CRAF has the capability of transporting 20 Million Ton Miles/Day.
Stage I Carriers have 24 hours to make aircraft available for missions. With the Secretary of Defense's approval the commander of USTRANSCOM can activate this stage of CRAF, as of

February 1992. Previously, the commander of AMC could activate Stage I without this approval. The minimum numbers of aircraft desired for this stage are 30 cargo and 30 passenger planes. It is possible to only activate some of the aircraft available in each stage. Stage I contributes 9% of the passenger capacity in the long-range US commercial fleet and 19% of the cargo capacity.

Stage II Carriers have 24 hours to make aircraft available for missions. With the Secretary of Defense's approval the commander of USTRANSCOM can activate this stage of CRAF. An additional 30 cargo and 30 passenger planes are available for Stage II. CRAF's capacity now rises to 28% of the passenger capacity and 47% of the cargo capacity.

Stage III Carriers have 48 hours to make aircraft available for missions. The SEC DEF can activate this stage during military national emergencies declared by the President or by Congress. All remaining aircraft in CRAF are available in Stage III. "Pentagon Pursues Additional Commitments from Airlines to Boost U.S. Airlift Capability," Aviation Week and Space Technology, (30 January 1989), p. 24. Field Manual 55-9, p. 3-1. Military Airlift Changes Underway to Ensure Continued Success of Civil Reserve Air Fleet, pps. 2-19. Peter Grier, "The Comeback of CRAF," Air Force Magazine, (July 1995), p. 13. AFLINK/Fact Sheet/95-07/CRAF (internet). Clifton F. Berry, "The Civil Reserve Air Fleet--National Airlift Asset," Air Force Magazine, (February 1980), p. 59. Perry, p. 219.

7. A MOG restricts the number of aircraft on the ground at an airfield. Normally, this restriction is due to the size of the airfield and the amount of space available to park the aircraft. A MOG can also be due to the number of: emergency vehicles capable of responding to an accident, refueling trucks available, maintenance personnel and equipment on hand, or material handling equipment (MHE) available to download the aircraft.

8. Joint Pub 4-01.1, Airlift Support to Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1991), pps. I-6, IV-17.

9. SEAD is an activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy surface based AD. One category of SEAD is local suppression. This type of SEAD normally operates for a specified time and location in the theater. This is the type of force protection required for strategic airlift in the humanitarian assistance environment. Joint Pub 3-01.4, JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (J-SEAD), (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1993), pps. 1,6. There are only two types of SEAD aircraft on active duty in the US military, the AF's EF-111 and Navy's EA-6B. Only 24 EF-111s are on active duty, most of them are employed in the air operations over Iraq and Bosnia. The EF-111 is retiring based on 1992 recommendation of the Senate Armed Services Committee. All will be retired by 1998. The replacement for the EF-111 is the EA-6B. The EA-6B is also limited in numbers while undergoing refitting to take over the EF-111 role for all the services. The Pentagon was in favor of retiring the EF-111 as a way to save money and increase joint efforts. The Air Force is trying to delay the retirement of the EF-111 until 1998 when enough EA-6Bs will be available. The plan is to retire 12 EF-111s in 1997 and 12 in 1998. Steven Watkins, "EF-111's Future Remains Unclear," Air Force Times, (25 September 1995), p. 41.

10. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional Protocols of 1977 set out the rights of victims of armed conflict to receive humanitarian assistance. A symposium organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in 1992 came to the conclusion that authorized organizations must be allowed access to victims and have the right to offer and provide humanitarian assistance. International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report, (1992), pps. 162, 163.
11. Joint Pub 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1993), p. I-4.
12. Routine airlift and airlift supporting MRCs and lesser regional conflict were areas reviewed by a 1982 Summer Study for the USAF Scientific Advisory Board done by Hughes Aircraft Company and Tracor Corporation and by the C-17 Defensive Systems Study performed by HQ Military Airlift Command. John A. Skorupa, Self-Protective Measures to Enhance Airlift Operations in Hostile Environments, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air University Press, 1989), pps. 19, 24, 27.
13. Robert E. Ball, The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, (New York, New York, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1985), p. 77.
14. Doug Richardson, "Jam the Geese and Dissolve the Paint," Armada International, (February-March 1995), p. 46.
15. Ball, pps. 103, 104, 255.
16. Expendables are used as a last resort to defeat the tracking and seeker systems of the MANPAD SAM and includes chaff and flares for transport aircraft. Chaff is not widely used for airlift aircraft due to the radar environment the aircraft operate in. Radar controlled airfields require radar contact to maintain the safe and continuous flow of aircraft into the fields. If chaff was used in the APOD area the aircraft would be lost in the clutter and could not be controlled safely. In a mountainous environment the aircraft could fly into the ground because its own radar would also be affected by the chaff. Therefore, flares are used to mimic the aircraft's emission signature.
17. This was in 1986 before Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM sent more weapons to the Third World. David R. Mets, Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crisis, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air University Press, 1986), pps. 20, 22.
18. Chris Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare, (New York, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 135.

19. Surface-to-Air Missiles are sold via primary sales to the following countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Algeria, Bulgaria, CIS, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Poland, South Yeman, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and the UK. Secondary sales are to guerrilla groups including the PLO and IRA. The only two continents missing were Australia and Antartica. Report of the Bottom-Up Review, (Washington, D.C., October 1993), p. 36. Christopher Chant, Air Defense Systems and Weapons World AAA and SAM Systems in the 1990s, pps. 25-133. Steven Zaloga, Soviet Air Defense Missiles, (Jane's Information Group Limited, Surrey, UK, 1989) pps. 243, 308.
20. Zaloga, p. 239.
21. Don Herkovitz, "Elements of EW Expendables," Journal of Electronic Defense, (December 1993), p. 42.
22. Zaloga, pps. 240, 241. Herkovitz, p. 42.
23. Metz, p. 7.
24. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) stated that there would be a shortfall in strategic airlift mobility capability until after the year 2000. This report also found the assumptions concerning strategica airlift as too optimistic. The MRS assumed that 80 C-17s would be available in 1999. Actually, only 53 might be available according to the Air Force, based on current C-17 production schedules. Details of the MRS and its assumptions are classified and are not included in this paper. U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD's Mobility Requirements Alternative Assumptions Could Affect Recommended Acquisition Plan, (Washington, D.C., 22 April 1992), p. 1.
25. Of the four pillars on which the NMS is built, strategic airlift plays a vital role in three of them--to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), Forward Presence, and Crisis Response. Airlift does not have a role in Strategic Nuclear Deterrence.
26. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, (February 1993), p. III-5.
27. John L. Cirafici, Airhead Operations--Where AMC Delivers The Linchpin of Rapid Force Projection, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air University Press, March 1995), p. 3.
28. Samuel W. Lewis, President of the US Institute of Peace, "Enhancing Stability: Peacemaking and Peecekeeping," Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era, (Ft. Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1993), pps. 39-40.

29. William Matthews, "Shali's Warning: Casualties are Inevitable," Air Force Times, (16 October 1995), p. 27.
30. Report of the Bottom-Up Review, (October 1993), p. 2.
31. Ibid., pps. 16, 198.
32. AF Manual 1-1, Volumes I and II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Air Force, 1992), pps. Vol I 7, 14, 15. Vol II 4.
33. Electronic Warfare consists of three subcomponents: electronic attack (EA), electronic warfare support (ES), and electronic protection (EP). EA was formerly known as electronic countermeasures (ECM). EA involves actions taken to prevent or reduce effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum by the enemy; for example, jamming. ES was formerly known as electronic support measures (ESM). ES involves actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, and identify sources of enemy electromagnetic emissions for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. EP was formerly known as electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). EP involves actions taken to retain effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Field Manual 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1992), p. Glossary-2. Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1994), p. Glossary-6.
34. Joint Pub 3-01.4, p. I-4.
35. Herkovitz, p. 45.
36. Skorupa, p. 258.
37. The CEP was authorized under Public Law 97-86, 1 December 1981. In 1989 Congress expanded the CEP to allow for incorporation of various defense features with the other structural conversions funded by the CEP. However, no contract has been awarded for this newest CEP addition. U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Airlift Changes Underway to Ensure Continued Success of Civil Reserve Air Fleet, (Washington, D.C., 31 December 1992), p. 19.
38. Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, US Army, special assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army, "Force Projection in Short Wars," Military Review, (March 1991), p. 28.
39. Patrick Swan, "Army Cites Importance of C-17," Army News Service, (9 August 1995), p. 2.
40. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1993), p. 2-13.

41. SEAD is any activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy surface based AD. One category of SEAD is local suppression. This type of SEAD normally operates for a specified time and location in the theater. This is the type of force protection required for strategic airlift in the humanitarian assistance environment. Joint Pub 3-01.4, pps. 1, 6.
42. Ibid., p. 7.
43. Joint Pub 4-01.1, p. 3.
44. Joint Pub 3-10.1, p. 10. Security is defined as never permitting hostile factions to acquire and unexpected advantage. It deals primarily with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to US interests according to Joint Pub 3-0, p. 6.
45. Joint Pub 3-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations (Draft), (Washington, D.C., National University Press, 1991), p. 10.
46. Rear area installations, which includes all bases during a humanitarian assistance mission, may be targets for factions using the full spectrum of unconventional operations ranging from crime, sabotage, and terrorism. Joint Pub 3-10.1, p. 1. Joint Pub 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations, (Washington, D.C., National University Press, 1993), pps. 5, 7.
47. Joint Pub 3-10, p. 6. and Joint Pub 3-10.1, pps. 8, 9.
48. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US Combined Arms Command, 15 November 1993), p. Introduction. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C., 1993), p. V-15.
49. International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report, (1992), pps. 14, 46.
50. With a limited interest in the AOR the United States did not want to risk losing its valuable strategic airlift aircraft. A C-5 cost \$168 million, and a C-141 cost \$8.1 million, to replace in 1992 dollars, if their production lines were still open. A C-17 is estimated to cost about \$534 million in 1994 dollars. And the replacement costs estimate for the CRAF aircraft used during Operation Desert Shield/Storm is 15 to 50 billion dollars. This is the replacement cost for 31 cargo and 21 passenger aircraft. These costs do not include the crew, cargo, and passengers that would also be lost. AF LINK/Fact Sheet/C-5A/B Number 92-35 and AF LINK/Fact Sheet/C-141/ Number 92-19. U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Airlift C-17 Settlement Is Not a Good Deal, (Washington, D.C., 15 April 1994), p. 3. AF LINK/Fact Sheet/C-17/ Number 95-06. U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Airlift Changes Underway to Ensure Continued Success of Civil Reserve Air Fleet, p. 7. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, p. 5.
51. The first task Air Force personnel accomplished in Mogadishu, Somalia was increasing the MOG for the strategic airlift aircraft to increase the cargo throughput. Cirafici, p. 35.

52. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, p. 2.
53. David Keen, "In Africa, Planned Suffering," New York Times, (15 August 1994), p. A-15.
54. Joint Pub 3-10.1, p. 13.
55. Center for Army lessons Learned, U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Combined Arms Command, 1994), pps. I-8-15, I-8-16.
56. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, p. VII-2.
57. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, p. III-6. U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II, p. I-8-16.
58. Joint Pub 3-10.1, pps. F-1 to F-3.
59. U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II, pps I-8-8, I-8-17.
60. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, p. I-5. U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II, p. II-11-12.
61. Chapter VI of the UN Charter only allows for peaceful settlement of disputes between parties. This chapter restricts US forces from using any force, except in self-defense. Bringing a large force to the theater would violate the intent of the UN Charter, and thus places a constraint on US forces. The other chapter humanitarian relief missions fall under is Chapter VII. Chapter VII allows the United Nations, or nations assigned to its operations, to "take such action . . . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. This removes most restrictions on the use of force. But the United Nations still controls what force is allowed and when it must be reduced. Operating under Chapter VII allows the United States to bring its superior combat forces to the theater to help end the crisis. Leleand M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, (Boston, Massachusetts, World Peace Foundation, 1949), pps. 237-259, 276-278.
62. Metz, pps. v, 7, 8, 10. Operation Support Hope Lessons Learned DRAFT Report, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US Combined Arms Command, 1995), pps. 2, 12.
63. Lt. General Daniel Schroeder, USA, Commander JTF Support Hope, "Lessons of Rwanda Joint Warfighting doctrine Works in Operations Other Than War," Armed Forces Journal, (December 1994), p. 33.
64. Perry, p. 293.

65. Ibid., pps. 31, 33.
66. SOFAs establish the legal status of the force. As a minimum SOFAs include: the right to carry arms, freedom of movement in the performance of service, use of the airports, and matters of jurisdiction. SOFAs must have the appearance of total neutrality of the force. Consequently, this neutrality makes the JTF vulnerable to attack from all sides, as were the cases in Somalia and Rwanda. Operational law for Commanders (Study Guide), (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), pps. 295-6.
67. Operation Support Hope Lessons Learned DRAFT Report, pps. 3, 5-7, 13, 19, 46. Perry; p. 293.
68. Goma was on the brink of lawlessness. Random firing after dark was common and crowds milled at all hours, including many armed paramilitary types. Kigali was virtually a ghost town and US forces were restricted to the airport and not allowed to even use patrols like those used in Somalia. The terrain around Bakavu is rolling, steep hills, well compartmented and difficult to patrol and secure. Ibid., pps. 21, 31.
69. Operation Support Hope Lessons Learned DRAFT Report, pps. 3, 6.
70. Ball, p. 273.
71. Herskovitz, p. 43.
72. Skorupa, pps. 81, 116.
73. Ibid., p. 68.
74. Richardson, pps. 48, 52.
75. "Airborne Electronic Warfare Changes Vex Planners, Pilots and Aggressors," pps. 46, 47.
76. "Electronic Combat Simulation Blunts Diverse Threat Growth," p.55. Francillon, p. 360.
77. "Airborne Electronic Warfare Changes Vex Planners, Pilots and Aggressors," p. 46. "Airborne Self-Protection thwarts Infrared Missiles," Signal, (July 1994), p. 56.
78. Richardson, p. 54.
79. Report on the Bottom-Up Review, p. iv.
80. Joint Pub 3-55.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1993), pps II-4 to II-6.

81. Richardson, p.48. Skorupa, pps. 70-71.
82. Information obtained from numerous sources: Ball, p. 112. Chant, pps. 25-133. Modern Warfare, (New York, New York, ARCO Publishing, Inc., 1985), pps. 124-126. Skorupa, p. 32. Zaloga, pps. 232-316.
83. The information for these aircraft came from the following sources: Chapman, pps. 23-62. Mary Chenoweth, The Civil Reserve Air Fleet: An Example of the Use of Commercial Assets to Expand Military Capabilities During Contingencies, (Santa Monica, California, RAND Corp., 1990), p. 29. Swan, "Army Cites Importance of C-17." Field Manual 55-9, Unit Air Movement Planning, (Washington, D.C., Headquarters US Army, 5 April 1993), pps. 2-1 to 2-38, 3-2-3-13. Military Airlift Changes Underway to Ensure Continued Success of Civil Reserve Air Fleet, pps. 8-10. Carol Reed, Nick Cook, John Boatman, & J.A.C. Lewis, "Market Survey Airlifters," Jane's Defense Weekly, (23 May 1992), p. 901. Perry, pps. 219, D-3. Rene J. Francillon, The Naval Institute Guide to World Military Aviation 1995, (Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1995), pps. 360, 361, 516-518, 524, 525, 555-557, 565-567. AFLINK/Fact Sheet/92-19/C-141. AFLINK/Fact Sheet/92-35/C-5A/B. AF LINK/Fact Sheet/C-17/ Number 95-06. AF LINK/Fact Sheet/KC-10/ Number 93-14. U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Airlift C-17 Settlement Is Not a Good Deal, p. 3.
84. ACL is the amount of cargo and passengers, determined by weight cubic displacement, and distance to be flown, that may be transported by specified aircraft. Field Manual 55-9, p. Glossary-3.
85. Bulk cargo is cargo that fits the dimensions of a 463L pallet. Oversize cargo is equipment and material too large to fit on a 463L pallet. Outsize cargo is the largest and heaviest equipment such as M1 main battle tanks, Patriot air defense batteries, bridging equipment, self-propelled guns, or equipment in combat-ready configuration and can only be carried on the C-5 or C-17.
86. The 463L pallet is a flat base used for combining cargo, equipment, or a single load item to facilitate the storing, handling, and air transporting of these items with the AF 463L MHE system. Dimensions are 104" x 84" x 96". Field Manual 55-9, p. Glossary-4.
87. PAI is for active and reserve components. The numbers reflect only combat support and industrial funded aircraft and not development or test aircraft.
88. The information in this appendix came from the following sources: "Airborne Electronic Warfare Changes Vex Planners, Pilots and Aggressors," Signal, (July 1994), pps. 47, 48. Ray Braybrook, "New Wings for Airlift," Armada International, (October-November 1993), p. 10. "Electronic Combat Simulation Blunts Diverse Threat Growth," Signal, (July 1994), pps. 53, 56. Herkovitz, pps. 44, 45. Reed, Cook, Boatman, & Lewis, p. 901. Richardson, p. 56. Francillon,

pps. 518, 524, 525. Skorupa, pps. 137, 140.

89. Passive warning systems notify the crew of: the type of radar; location of the tracking systems, not necessarily the actual firing weapon; and the status of the weapon system--searching, tracking, illuminating or actively guiding a missile. Ball, p. 273.

90. Consumables provide a screen or decoy to the radar operator. These items are designed to be ejected from the aircraft to deny or deceive the threat tracking systems for a limited period of time.

91. Flares emit a large amount of radiation in the sensor bandwidth associated with the engine exhaust temperature range (1,300 to 2,000 degrees Kelvin) making it a more attractive target. Some SAMs with dual spectral sensors are able to detect and discriminate between a flare and the aircraft target. The new "smart" flares depict a more accurate flight trajectory similar to the aircraft to draw the missile away from the target. Herskovitz, p. 43.

92. Chaff is most effective in decoying the SAM in its terminal phase, after it has fired. Chaff causes the missile seeker to lock-on to a false target reflector. There are 14 chaff dispersion variables which include: the radar cross section of the chaff, bloom time, dispensing methods, environmental effects, and fall rate. Chaff may also produce radar reflections over a 48-hour period at distances of hundreds of miles from the original drop site. This may not occur when dropping chaff from lower altitudes, but chaff will inhibit the airport radar from depicting actual aircraft from false targets. A dangerous side effect. Increasing sophistication of moving target indicators processing, i.e. Doppler radar, and other EP measures are making chaff less effective. Ball, p. 297. Herskovitz, p. 42, 44.

93. The "V" stands for vanishing. This newest chaff has its radar-reflecting properties neutralized within three to five minutes after dispersal and their false targets disappear from radar screens. This type of chaff would be more useful on airlifters operating within the airport traffic area than the older, more persistent chaff. Herskovitz, p. 44.

94. "Noise" jammers are used to deceive radars to prevent tracking or to send out false targets to the radars. It is described as "brute force" jamming to simply shout or mask the echo from the target aircraft. Continuous noise jamming obscures the target echo by showing the radar operator a large area of clutter. The deception part of noise jamming transmits false signals to confuse the threat radar by appearing as one or more false targets. Ibid. p. 277.

95. Information for this appendix came from the following sources: Stephen M. Hardy, "Finding a Place on Board EW Payloads for UAVs," Journal of Electronic Defense, (February 1992), pps. 30, 31. James C. Massaro, "UAVs and EW: The Perfect Marriage," Journal of Electronic Defense, (December 1993), pps. 34, 35. Michael Taverna & Jean Dupont, "Euro UAVs on the Move," Interavia Business & Technology, (April 1995), pps. 40-42. Joint Pub 3-55.1, pps. I-2, I-3, II-16.

96. UAVs are defined as "powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered UAVs. Joint Pub3-55.1, p. Glossary-4.

97. This is the basic equipment payload and takes between 3 to 8 C-141 load equivalents to deploy to the theater depending on equipment taken. For the HA mission not all the UAVs will be needed for 24-hour operation at 2 to 3 airfields in the theater. Ibid., pps. II-18 to II-20.

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Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum

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**RESPONDING TO TERRORISM
ACROSS THE TECHNOLOGICAL SPECTRUM**

Bruce Hoffman

U.S. Army War College

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**The Revolution in Military Affairs:
Defining an Army for the 21st Century**

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The author examines the changing nature of terrorism. In comparison to "professional" terrorists pursuing specific political or ideological objectives, today's "amateurs" often act from religious or racial convictions. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of people. They are less predictable and, therefore, more difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, and have lethal devices ranging from the relatively simple fertilizer bomb to biologically-altered viruses. Since the United States will remain an attractive target, we need to understand and prepare for this new kind of terrorism.

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**RESPONDING TO TERRORISM
ACROSS THE TECHNOLOGICAL
SPECTRUM**

Bruce Hoffman

July 15, 1994

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the Conference Organizer, Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., by calling commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.

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
FOREWORD

In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented this paper as part of a panel examining "New Technologies and New Threats."

Terrorism, of course, is not new. Hoffman warns, however, of the changing nature of terrorism. In the past, terrorists have been motivated by limited political and ideological objectives. Popular images fostered by terrorist events like the bombing of PAN AM Flight 103 and the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut notwithstanding, in the past the preponderance of terrorist attacks targeted specific individuals or small groups. The weapons of choice were the pistol, knife, and, on occasion, dynamite. Often the terrorist was a highly-trained individual, a "professional" in pursuit of specific political or ideological objectives.

Hoffman warns that, by comparison, the terrorists of today and tomorrow are amateurs. Furthermore, they are likely to act from religious and racial convictions rather than radical political or ideological motivations. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of people. Indeed, they may want to annihilate an entire race or religious group. Not only are these amateurs less predictable and, therefore, more difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, they have at their disposal lethal devices that range from the relatively simple fertilizer bomb to biologically-altered viruses.

Military professionals and civilian planners must contend with warfare at every level. The threat posed by the changing nature of terrorism falls very much within their purview. For that reason, I commend to you the following monograph.


JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

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RESPONDING TO TERRORISM ACROSS THE TECHNOLOGICAL SPECTRUM

The "revolution in military affairs," it is argued, heralds a new era of warfare dominated by the American military's mastery of the conventional battlefield. "Just as gunpowder, the mechanization of battle, and atomic weapons previously changed the fundamental conduct and nature of warfare, so will a combination of technological progress, doctrinal sophistication, and innovative force employment in turn render . . . existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete." The assumption that U.S. armed forces alone will have the capability to harness all the elements of this revolution is in large measure derived from the demonstrated superiority of American combined arms over the much larger Iraqi forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.¹ The effect, according to one analysis, will be profound:

In any conventional conflict in which the United States or any of the major Western powers is pitted against a Third World adversary, the outcome is preordained. In effect, the change is so significant that we have returned to the military equation of the 19th century, when colonial wars pitted small numbers of disciplined, well-trained Western troops with rifles against hordes of tribal warriors armed only with shields and spears.²

Equally significant, however, is that the revolution in military affairs remains largely confined to the conventional battlefield only. Indeed, as many observers of this phenomenon themselves concede, the revolution will have little, if any, impact on American military capabilities so far as countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare.³ Hence, while Operation DESERT STORM may be a model for the revolution in military affairs occurring at the mid and high ends of the conflict spectrum, the problems that U.S. forces encountered in Somalia, for example, may be a more accurate and telling model for the types of conflict at the low end of the spectrum

that U.S. military forces are more likely to find themselves involved. As our frustrating and increasingly forgotten experiences in Vietnam more than a quarter of a century ago demonstrate, this is by no means a new lesson. Indeed, in no realm of conflict today is the asymmetry between American capability and sophistication on the one hand and the crude, even primitive, ability of an adversary to inflict pain on the other perhaps as salient or possibly portentous as with terrorism.

Trends in Terrorist Tactics.

The contrast between the means and methods of modern warfare and the tactics and techniques of contemporary terrorism is striking. Whereas technological progress has produced successively more complex, lethally effective and destructively accurate weapons systems that are deployed from a variety of air, land, and sea platforms, terrorism has functioned largely in a technological vacuum, aloof or averse to the continual refinement and growing sophistication of modern warfare.

Terrorists continue to rely, as they have for more than a century, on the same two basic "weapons systems": the gun and the bomb. Admittedly, the guns used by terrorists today have larger ammunition capacities and more rapid rates of fire than the simple revolver the Russian revolutionary Vera Zasulich used in 1878 to assassinate the governor general of St. Petersburg.⁴ Similarly, bombs today require smaller amounts of explosives that are exponentially more powerful and more easily concealed than the sticks of TNT with which the Fenian dynamiters terrorized London more than a century ago.⁵

The implication of terrorist reliance on these two weapons, however, goes far beyond mere tactical convenience. It also suggests an a priori reluctance or aversion to killing en masse given the comparatively discrete numbers of casualties that can be inflicted with even self-loading, rapid fire automatic weapons or powerful plastic explosives. Despite its popularity as a fictional theme, terrorists in fact have rarely contemplated—much less actively attempted—the infliction of

mass, indiscriminate casualties through the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Indeed, of more than 8,000 incidents recorded in *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism* since 1968, only 52 evidence any indication of terrorists plotting such attacks, attempting to use chemical or biological agents or to steal, or otherwise fabricate on their own nuclear devices.⁶ Thus, terrorists seem almost inherently content with the limited killing potential of their handguns and machine guns and the slightly higher rates that their bombs have at times achieved.

This self-imposed restraint is most clearly reflected in the risk-averse tactical repertoire embraced by most terrorist groups. Bombings, for example, account for nearly half (46 percent) of all international terrorist attacks carried out since 1968: a proportion that annually has rarely fallen below 40 percent or exceeded 50 percent.⁷ The reliance on bombing by terrorists is not surprising given that bombs provide a dramatic, yet fairly easy and often risk-free means of drawing attention to the terrorists and their causes. Few skills are required to manufacture a crude bomb, surreptitiously plant it, and then be miles away when it explodes. Bombings are usually only one or two or three person jobs and therefore do not require the same organizational expertise, logistics, and knowledge required of more complicated or sophisticated operations, such as kidnapping, barricade and hostage situations, assassination, and assaults against defended targets.

Attacks on installations (including attacks with automatic weapons as well as hand grenades, bazookas, and rocket-propelled grenades, drive-by shootings, arson, vandalism, and sabotage other than bombing) are a distant second to bombing, accounting for 22 percent of all terrorist operations since 1968.⁸ Not surprisingly, perhaps, the frequency of various types of terrorist attacks tends to decrease in direct proportion to the complexity or sophistication required. Accordingly, hijackings are the third most common tactic, accounting for only 12 percent;⁹ followed by assassination (6 percent);¹⁰ and, kidnapping (1 percent).¹¹

The fact that these percentages have remained largely unchanged for more than a quarter of a century (with one

exception¹²) also provides compelling evidence that the vast majority of terrorist organizations are not tactically innovative. Radical in their politics, these groups are equally conservative in their operations, rarely deviating from the familiar and adhering to an established modus operandi that, to their minds at least, minimizes failure and maximizes success. What innovation does occur is mostly in the methods used to conceal and detonate explosive devices, not in their tactics or in their use of nonconventional weapons (i.e., chemical, biological, or nuclear).

Terrorists, therefore, seem to prefer the assurance of modest success to more complicated and complex—but potentially higher pay-off (in terms of casualties and publicity)—operations. Indeed, this explanation possibly accounts for the overall paucity of terrorist "spectaculars" and the mostly limited number of casualties historically inflicted in terrorist attacks (i.e., more often in the tens and twenties, if at all, than in the low hundreds). Indeed, since the beginning of the century fewer than a dozen terrorist incidents have occurred that have resulted in the deaths of more than a 100 persons at one time.¹³ The recent spate of suicide bombings in Israel by Palestinians opposed to negotiations to resolve that long-standing conflict underscores this point. Even when a terrorist deliberately sacrifices himself in the course of the attack, seldom does the death toll reach double figures: only seven persons, for example, tragically lost their lives in the incident on April 6; five perished in the following week's attack. The massive car bomb that exploded on Sunday, April 24, 1994, in Johannesburg, South Africa, is another case in point: despite the bombers' obvious intention to inflict mass indiscriminate casualties, only nine persons were killed.

These proclivities, therefore, directly affect, if not limit, the weapons technology that terrorists can and will use. Accordingly, based on the historical record, future terrorist employment of either high-tech weapons systems or weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological or nuclear) would appear unlikely. However, both the longevity of this trend and the self-imposed stasis of terrorist technology could change

dramatically as a result of three emerging trends in terrorist activity:

- The resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative and the implications that it has to trigger future acts of mass, indiscriminate violence;
- The increasing "amateurization" of terrorism—a reflection, in part, of the growth of religious terrorism but which also may contribute to the loosening of previous self-imposed constraints on operations and lethality; and,
- The increasing sophistication and evident growing tactical and technological competence of certain veteran terrorist organizations across the technological spectrum.

The Resurgence of Religious Terrorism.

One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism during the past 15 years has been the resurgence and proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative.¹⁴ In 1968, for example, none of the 11 identifiable terrorist groups active throughout the world could be classified as religious, that is, having aims and motivations reflecting a salient religious character or influence.¹⁵ Not until 1980, as a result of the repercussions from the revolution in Iran the previous year,¹⁶ do the first "modern"¹⁷ religious terrorist groups appear. Even so, despite the large increase in the total number of identifiable international terrorist groups and concomitant increase of ethnic separatist organizations (from 3 to 32), only 2 of the 64 groups are predominantly religious in character and motivation (al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution). Twelve years later, however, the number of religious terrorist groups has increased nearly six-fold while—at a time of increasingly strident assertions of ethnic, national, and cultural uniqueness—the number of ethnic-separatist terrorist groups has declined and—withstanding the end of the cold war—the number of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (or some idiosyncratic interpretation of those dicta) has remained unchanged.

The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative for higher levels of lethality is evidenced by the violent record of various Shi'a Islamic groups. Although these organizations committed only 8 percent of all international terrorist incidents since 1982, they are nonetheless responsible for 28 percent of the total number of deaths.¹⁸ Moreover, contrary to its depiction and discussion in Western news accounts, terrorism motivated by religion is by no means a phenomenon restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the Middle East. Many of the characteristics of Shi'a terrorist groups, such as the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of "enemies," are also apparent among militant Christian white supremacists in the United States, in at least some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in Israel, and among some radical Sikh movements in India.¹⁹

The fact that for many of these groups the elimination of whole segments of society is a major objective of their terrorist campaigns implies an almost axiomatic attempt to use weapons of mass destruction, including chemical or biological warfare agents or radioactive materials. During the past decade, for example, religious terrorists or members of various "cults" have come closest to crossing the threshold of terrorist use of bona fide weapons of mass destruction. They have, for example, either attempted or at least pursued the idea of:

- Poisoning the water supplies of major American urban centers;²⁰
- Dispersing toxic chemicals through internal building ventilation systems;²¹
- Blowing up a religious shrine in hopes of provoking a cataclysmic "holy war";²²
- Staging indiscriminate, wanton simultaneous bombings of crowded, busy urban centers;²³ and,
- Contaminating food in public restaurants.²⁴

That terrorists motivated by a religious imperative can contemplate such massive acts of death and destruction is a reflection of their belief that violence is a sacramental act or a divine duty. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension,²⁵ and its perpetrators are seemingly unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that affect other terrorists. Whereas secular terrorists generally consider indiscriminate violence immoral and counterproductive,²⁶ religious terrorists regard such violence as both morally justified and a necessary expedient for the attainment of their goals. Religious and secular terrorists also have different perceptions of themselves and their violent acts. Secular terrorists regard violence as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or to foment the creation of a new system. Religious terrorists, on the other hand, regard themselves not as components of a system, but as "outsiders" seeking vast changes in the existing order.²⁷ This sense of alienation enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists and indeed to embrace a far more open-ended category of "enemies" for attack: basically anyone who is not a member of their particular sect or religious movement.

Given this constellation of characteristics and convergence of motives and capabilities, religious terrorists therefore appear as the most likely terrorist entity to eventually succeed in affecting some dramatic act of violence using a weapon of mass destruction.

The "Amateurization" of Terrorism.

A series of terrorist incidents that occurred in the United States during 1993 suggest that we may have to revise our notions of the stereotypical terrorist organization.²⁸

In the past, terrorist groups were recognizable as a group of individuals belonging to an organization with a well-defined command and control apparatus, who had been previously trained (however rudimentarily) in the technique and tactics of terrorism, were engaged in conspiracy

avocation, living underground and constantly planning or plotting terrorist attacks at times under the direct control, or operating at the express behest, of a foreign government. The amateurish World Trade Center bombers, however, may be the model of a new kind of terrorist group: a more or less ad hoc amalgamation of like-minded individuals sharing a common religion, the same friends and frustrations, perhaps having family ties as well, who simply gravitate toward one another for specific, perhaps even one-time, operations.²⁹ Rather than being tightly controlled from abroad, these new part-time terrorists and independent free-lance groups are more likely to be only indirectly connected to a central command authority or a foreign government.

Moreover, since this more amorphous and perhaps even transitory type of group will lack the "footprints" or modus operandi of an actual, existing terrorist organization, it is likely to prove more difficult for law enforcement to get a firm idea or build a complete picture of the dimensions of their intentions and capabilities.³⁰ Indeed, as one New York City police officer only too presciently observed two months before the Trade Center attack: it wasn't the established terrorist groups—with known or suspected members and patterns—that worried him, but the hitherto unknown "splinter groups," composed of new or marginal members from an older group, that suddenly surface out of nowhere to attack.³¹

Essentially part-time terrorists, such loose groups of individuals may be—as the World Trade Center bombers themselves appear to have been—*indirectly* influenced or remotely controlled by some foreign government or nongovernmental entity. The suspicious transfer of funds from banks in Iran and Germany to a joint account maintained by the accused bombers in New Jersey just before the Trade Center blast may illustrate this more indirect or circuitous foreign connection.³² Moreover, the fact that two Iraqi nationals—Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Abdul Rahman Yasin—implicated in the Trade Center conspiracy, fled the United States (presumably to Iraq),³³ in one instance just before the bombing and in the other shortly after the first arrests, increases suspicion that the incident may not only have been

orchestrated from abroad but may in fact have been an act of state-sponsored terrorism.³⁴ Thus, in contrast to its depiction in the press as an incident of terrorism perpetrated by a group of "amateurs" acting either entirely on their own or, as one of the bomber's defense attorneys portrayed his client as being manipulated by a "devious, evil . . . genius"³⁵ (Yousef), the genesis of the Trade Center attack may be far more complex.

This use of amateur terrorists as "dupes" or "cut-outs" to mask the involvement of some foreign patron or government could therefore greatly benefit terrorist state sponsors who could more effectively conceal their involvement and thus avoid potential military retaliation by the victim country and diplomatic or economic sanctions from the international community. Moreover, the prospective state sponsor's connection could be further obscured by the fact that much of the "amateur" terrorists equipment, resources and even some funding could be self-generating. The explosive device used in the World Trade Center bomb—constructed out of ordinary, commercially-available materials, including lawn fertilizer (urea nitrate) and diesel fuel and costing less than \$400 to construct—illustrates this potential.³⁶ Indeed, despite the Trade Center bombers' almost comical ineptitude in avoiding capture, they were still able to shake an entire city's—if not country's—complacency. Moreover, the single bomb used by these "amateurs" proved just as deadly and destructive as the more "high-tech" bombs constructed out of military ordnance, with timing devices powered by computer micro chips and detonated by sophisticated timing mechanisms used by their "professional" counterparts. It killed six persons, injured more than a 1,000 others, gouged out a 180-ft wide crater six stories deep, and caused an estimated \$550 million in both damages to the twin towers and in lost revenue to the businesses housed there.³⁷

In this respect, this new breed of terrorists may represent even more of a threat than their predecessors.³⁸ While less control from some central command authority may indeed be exerted, this may also result in fewer constraints on the terrorists' operations and targets and fewer inhibitions on their desire to inflict indiscriminate casualties.³⁹ It is suspected that

the bombers' intent in attacking the World Trade Center was to bring down one of the twin towers.⁴⁰ Significant also is that rather than having been deterred or otherwise affected by the rapidity with which the FBI and other authorities "cracked" the Trade Center case, the 15 individuals implicated in the follow-on plot, uncovered in June 1993, to obtain the release of the Trade Center bombers, had plotted even more egregious acts of violence. These included the simultaneous bombing of the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and George Washington Bridge used daily by thousands of commuters between New Jersey and Manhattan; a car-bomb attack in the United Nations building underground garage; a forced entry machine-gun and hand grenade assault on the Federal Building in lower Manhattan housing the FBI New York headquarters; and the assassinations of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato, and Brooklyn assemblyman Dov Hilkind.⁴¹

The characteristics and attendant applications of this "amateurization" of terrorism was further demonstrated by the rash of independent, unconnected acts of "teenage" terrorism that occurred in California and Washington State last summer. The first incident involved the 20-year-old leader of a self-styled terrorist group calling itself the "Fourth Reich Skinheads" and his 17-year-old co-conspirator, who were arrested in Los Angeles and charged with planning a series of bombings against a variety of Jewish targets that would culminate in a machine-gun and hand grenade assault against a South Central Los Angeles church as its worshippers emerged from Sunday services.⁴² The operation had to be postponed, however, after one of the conspirators was refused permission by his parents to borrow the family car for the attack.⁴³

That same month, in an unrelated incident, a 19-year-old was arrested and charged with bombing a Tacoma, Washington, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) meeting hall as the opening salvo in a terrorist campaign directed against rap stars, synagogues and military installations throughout the Pacific Northwest.⁴⁴ Finally, in November, the putative leader of another teen-age white supremacist group, the "Aryan Liberation Front," was

arrested in Northern California and charged with five fire bombings of a synagogue, local office of the NAACP, the home of an Asian-American local politician, and the state office that handles discrimination claims in Sacramento.⁴⁵ The youth—who turned 18 the day after his arrest—had called a television station after one attack to announce that, "The A.L.F. takes full responsibility for the attack and promises to contribute to armed struggles whether it be by rocks, Molotov cocktails, bombs, guns, to effect the change in Jew capitalism and America politically."⁴⁶

In the past, terrorism was not just a matter of having the will and motivation to act, but of having the capability to do so, the requisite training, access to weaponry, and operational knowledge. Today, however, it is clear that the means and methods of terrorism are readily available and accessible to anyone with a grievance, agenda or purpose or any idiosyncratic combination of the above. Whether abetted tacitly or actively by a foreign patron or facilitated by commercially obtainable published bomb-making manuals and operational guidebooks, the "amateur" terrorist can be just as—and perhaps even more—deadly and destructive than his more "professional" counterpart. Given the inherent difficulty in tracking and anticipating this category of adversary—as opposed to the often more established modus operandi and patterns of existing terrorist groups—this new breed of terrorist may pose a greater threat in the future.⁴⁷

Improved "Professionalism" of Terrorists.

Paradoxically, while on the one hand terrorism frequently attracts "amateurs," on the other, the sophistication and operational competence of "professional" terrorists is also increasing. The professionals are becoming demonstrably more adept in their trade craft of death and destruction; more formidable in terms of their abilities of tactical modification, adjustment and innovation; and able to operate for sustained periods of time while avoiding detection, interception and arrest or capture. More disquieting, these "professional" terrorists seem to be considerably more ruthless as well.

An almost Darwinian principle of natural selection appears to distinguish subsequent generations of existing terrorist groups, whereby every new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors, becoming smarter, tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate.⁴⁸ For terrorists, intelligence is not only an essential prerequisite for a successful operation, but a *sine qua non* for survival. Successor generations, therefore, routinely study the "lessons" from mistakes made by former comrades who have been either killed or apprehended. Press accounts, judicial indictments, courtroom testimony, and trial transcripts are meticulously culled for information on security force tactics and methods and are absorbed by surviving group members.

According to one German government official, terrorists belonging to the Red Army Faction (RAF), for example, "closely study every court case against them to discover their weak spots." Whereas, in the past, German police could usually obtain fingerprints from the bottom of toilet seats or the inside of refrigerators, RAF terrorists today apply a special ointment to their fingers that, after drying, prevents fingerprints and thus thwarts identification and incrimination.⁴⁹ As a spokesperson for the *Bundeskriminalamt* lamented, "The 'Third Generation' learnt a lot from the mistakes of its predecessors and about how the police works . . . they now know how to operate very carefully."⁵⁰ Indeed, according to a former member of the organization, Peter Juergen Brock, currently serving the seventh year of a life sentence for murder, the group "has reached maximum efficiency."⁵¹

Similar accolades have also been bestowed on the latest generation of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) fighters. The former General Officer Commanding British Forces in Northern Ireland, General Sir John Wilsey, has described the PIRA as "an absolutely formidable enemy. The essential attributes of their leaders are better than ever before. Some of their operations are brilliant in terrorist terms."⁵² Even the PIRA's comparatively unsophisticated Loyalist terrorist counterparts are on such a "learning curve as well." As one Royal Ulster Constabulary police officer has noted, the Protestant groups "[m]ore and more . . . are running their

operations from small cells, on a need to know basis. They have cracked down on loose talk. They have learned how to destroy forensic evidence. And if you bring them in for questioning, they say nothing."⁵³

Not only are successor generations often smarter than their predecessors, but they also tend to be both more sophisticated and ruthless as well as less idealistic. For some, in fact, violence becomes almost an end in itself--cathartic release, a self-satisfying blow struck against the hated "system"--rather than being regarded as the deliberate means to a specific political end embraced by previous generations.⁵⁴ A dedicated "hard core" of some 20 to 30 terrorists today, for example, compose a third generation of Germany's RAF. In contrast to the group's first generation, who more than 20 years ago embarked on an anti-establishment campaign of nonlethal bombings and arson attacks, the present generation has pursued a strategy of cold-blooded assassination.⁵⁵

During the past 7 years the RAF has murdered six prominent, heavily guarded, Germans. Indeed, the group's almost relentless targeting of well-protected individuals sets it apart from the vast majority of terrorist organizations who typically aim for the "softer" (i.e., easily accessed) rather than "harder" target.⁵⁶ The RAF's last victim was Detlev Rohwedder, a wealthy industrialist and chairman of the *Treuhandanstalt*, or Public Trustee, the government agency charged with overseeing the economic transition of eastern Germany. Rohwedder was killed in April 1991 while he sat in his study with a shot fired from a high-powered rifle.⁵⁷ In December 1989, financier and Deutsche Bank president Alfred Herrhausen was assassinated when a state-of-the-art remote control bomb concealed in a parked bicycle and triggered by a light beam was detonated just as Herrhausen's car passed.⁵⁸ A similar device was used the following July in an attempt to assassinate Germany's top government counterterrorist official, Hans Neusel.⁵⁹ Almost as disturbing as the assassinations themselves is the fact that, until this past summer, the perpetrators--and their fellow conspirators--had eluded what is perhaps the most sophisticated antiterrorist machinery in the world.⁶⁰

The PIRA's relentless quest to pierce the armor protecting both the security forces in Northern Ireland and the most senior government officials in England illustrates the professional evolution and increasing operational sophistication of a terrorist group. The first generation of early 1970s' PIRA devices were often little more than crude antipersonnel bombs, consisting of a handful of roofing nails, wrapped around a lump of plastic explosive and detonated simply by lighting a fuse. Time-bombs from the same era were hardly more sophisticated. They typically were constructed from a few sticks of dynamite and commercial detonators stolen from construction sites or rock quarries and attached to ordinary battery powered alarm clocks. Neither device was very reliable and often put the bomber at considerable risk. The process of placing and actually lighting the first type of device carried with it the inherent potential to attract undesired attention while affording the bomber little time to effect the attack and make good his or her escape. Although the second type of device was designed to mitigate precisely this danger, its timing and detonation mechanism was often so crude that accidental or premature explosions were not infrequent, thus causing some terrorists inadvertently to kill themselves.⁶¹

In hopes of obviating, or at least reducing, these risks, the PIRA's bombmakers invented a means of detonating bombs from a safe distance using the radio controls for model aircraft purchased at hobby shops. Scientists and engineers working in the British Ministry of Defence's (MoD) scientific research and development (R&D) division in turn developed a system of electronic countermeasures and jamming techniques for the Army that effectively thwarted this means of attack.⁶² However, rather than abandon this tactic completely, the PIRA began to search for a solution. In contrast to the state-of-the-art laboratories, huge budgets, and academic credentials of their government counterparts, PIRA's own R&D department toiled in cellars beneath cross-border safe houses and backrooms of urban tenements for 5 years before devising a network of sophisticated electronic switches for their bombs that would ignore or bypass the Army's electronic countermeasure.⁶³

Once again, the MoD scientists returned to their laboratories. They emerged with a new system of electronic scanners able to detect radio emissions the moment the radio is switched on, just tens of seconds before the bomber can actually transmit the detonation signal. The almost infinitesimal window of time provided by this "early warning" of impending attack is just sufficient to allow Army technicians to activate a series of additional electronic measures to neutralize the transmission signal and render detonation impossible.

For a time, this countermeasure proved effective as well. But within the past 2 years the PIRA has discovered a means to outwit even this countermeasure. Utilizing radar detectors, such as those employed by motorists in the United States, in 1991 the group's bombmakers fabricated a detonating system that can be triggered by the same type of hand-held radar gun used by police throughout the world to catch speeding motorists. Since the radar gun can be aimed at its target before being switched on, and the signal that it transmits is nearly instantaneous, no practical means currently exists that allows the time needed either to detect or intercept the transmission signal.⁶⁴ More recently, PIRA R&D units have developed yet another means to detonate bombs using a photo flash "slave" unit that can be triggered from a distance of up to 800 meters by a flash of light. The device, which sells for between 60 and 70 English pounds, is used by commercial photographers to produce simultaneous flashes during photo shoots. The PIRA bombers attach the unit to the detonating system on a bomb and then simply activate it with a commercially-available, ordinary flashgun.⁶⁵

As with the new "photo flash" means of detonation, the sophistication of a device is often its very simplicity. In recent years, for example, the PIRA has mounted a highly effective campaign of "economic warfare" using simple incendiary devices left in Belfast and London department stores. These use a plastic cassette tape container, a miniature detonator, a timing device powered by a radio battery, a small amount of plastic explosive or explosive power, two or three capsules of lighter fuel and some paper to ensure combustion. The devices are small, highly portable, easily constructed and planted. They

are nearly risk-free to the bomber as the timer can usually be set for up to 12 hours. The cost is less than 5 pounds to produce.⁶⁶ Thus far these bombs have caused more than \$15 million in property damage.⁶⁷ The process of planting the devices is typically a one person job, but allows that person potentially to operate without detection over a wide area and thus create an impression "of a concerted attack involving a large team."⁶⁸

On a larger scale, bombs constructed out of ordinary, commercially-available fertilizer (such as was used in the World Trade Center bombing) have devastated commercial districts both in Northern Ireland and in England. In April 1992, in what was described "as the most powerful explosion in London since World War II," a bomb constructed with up to a ton of fertilizer exploded outside the Baltic Exchange building in the heart of the city's financial center, killing three persons, wounding 90 others, and leaving a 12-foot wide crater. It caused \$1.25 billion in damage.⁶⁹ Exactly a year later, a similar bomb devastated the nearby Bishops Gate district, killing one person and injuring 40 others. Initial estimates put the damage at \$1.5 billion.⁷⁰ Long a staple of PIRA operations, fertilizer costs on average 1 percent of a comparable amount of plastic explosive. However, after adulteration, fertilizer is far less powerful than plastic explosive. Semtex explodes at about 8,000 yards a second and has a high explosive rating of 1.3; improvised explosives explode at only about 3,000 yards a second and range between 0.25 and 0.8 in rating. It also tends to cause more damage than plastic explosives because the energy of the blast is sustained and less controlled.⁷¹ Not surprisingly, therefore, the PIRA bombers have earned a reputation for their innovative expertise, adaptability, and cunning. "There are some very bright people around," the British Army's Chief Ammunitions Technical Officer (CATO) in Northern Ireland recently remarked. "I would rate them very highly for improvisation. PIRA bombs are very well made."⁷² A similar accolade is offered by the staff officer of the British Army's 321 Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Company: "We are dealing with the first division," he said. "I don't think there is any organisation in the world as cunning as the IRA. They have had 20 years at it and they have learned from their

experience. We have a great deal of respect for their skills . . . not as individuals, but their skills."⁷³ While not yet nearly as good as the PIRA, the province's Loyalist terrorist groups are themselves reportedly on a "learning curve": becoming increasing adept in the construction, concealment and surreptitious placement of bombs.⁷⁴

Even attacks that are not successful in conventionally-understood military terms of casualties inflicted or assets destroyed can still be a success for the terrorists provided that they are technologically daring enough to garner media and public attention. Indeed, the terrorist group's fundamental organizational imperative is to act even if their action is not completely successful, but still brings them publicity. This imperative also drives the persistent search for new ways to overcome, circumvent or defeat governmental security and countermeasures. Thus, while the PIRA failed to kill then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative Party's 1984 conference in Brighton, the technological ingenuity involving the bomb's placement at the conference site weeks before the event and its detonation timing device powered by a computer microchip nonetheless succeeded in capturing the world's headlines and providing the PIRA with a platform from which to warn Mrs. Thatcher and all other British leaders: "Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once—you will have to be lucky always."⁷⁵ Similarly, although the remote control mortar attack staged by the PIRA on No. 10 Downing Street—as Prime Minister John Major and his Cabinet met at the height of the 1991 Gulf War—failed to hit its intended target, the attack nonetheless successfully elbowed the war out of the limelight and shone renewed media attention on the terrorists, their cause and their impressive ability to strike at the nerve center of the British government even at a time of heightened security.⁷⁶ The PIRA's impressive ability to capture headlines with daring, clever operations was most recently demonstrated by the series of remote control mortar attacks on London's Heathrow Airport in March. Three attacks in five days nearly paralyzed all air traffic⁷⁷ and provided the terrorists with an ideal propaganda vehicle demonstrating terrorism's ineluctable paradox: that terrorists can attack anywhere at

anytime while the government's security forces are powerless and unable to protect every conceivable target all the time.⁷⁸

Conclusion.

What do these trends suggest for the future? First, terrorists will continue to rely on the same two basic weapons that they have used successfully for more than a century: the gun and the bomb. What changes we will see will be more in the realm of clever adaptations or modifications to existing "off the shelf" technology (such as the PIRA is so accomplished at) or the continued utilization of readily-available, commercially-purchased materials that can be fabricated into crude-but lethally effective and damaging-weapons (such as the explosive device used by the World Trade Center bombers). Their preference for this traditional arsenal is a reflection of an operational conservatism imposed by the terrorist organizational imperative to succeed. For this reason, terrorists must always keep ahead of the technology curve. Thus, when confronted by new security measures, terrorists will seek to find and exploit new vulnerabilities or else simply change their tactics accordingly.

Second, the sophistication of these devices will be in their simplicity. Unlike military ordnance, such as plastic explosive, for example, the materials used in "home-made" bombs are both readily- and commercially-available, thus they are perfectly legal to possess until actually concocted or assembled into a bomb. These materials are also far more difficult to trace or for experts to obtain a "signature." For example, the type of explosive used in the 1988 in-flight bombing of Pan Am 103 was Semtex H, a plastic explosive manufactured in Czechoslovakia and sold primarily to other former-Warsaw Pact countries during the cold war as well as to such well-known state sponsors of terrorism as Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea. Thus, for foreign governments seeking to commission terrorist attacks or use terrorists as surrogate warriors, the terrorists' use of such "home-made" materials carries with it both advantage and appeal in possibly enabling the state sponsor to avoid military retaliation or international sanction.

Third, a combination of the resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative, the proliferation of "amateur" terrorist groups, and the growing sophistication of established, more "professional" groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and destruction than in the past. The erosion of the self-imposed constraints that have hitherto inhibited the infliction of mass, indiscriminate casualties by terrorists is evident in each of these categories. Indeed, terrorism today increasingly reflects a deadly mixture of all three: it is perpetrated by "amateurs"; motivated by religious enmity, blind hatred or a mix of individually idiosyncratic motivations; and conceivably exploited or manipulated by terrorist "professionals" and their state sponsors. In this respect, the availability of relatively sophisticated, off-the-shelf weaponry such as hand-held, precision-guided surface-to-air missiles, or the relative ease with which chemical or biological warfare agents can be manufactured, suggests that terrorists possessing this constellation of characteristics would have little trouble crossing into the domain of either "high tech" weaponry or weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁹

Moreover, the post-cold war new world order and attendant possibilities and payoffs of independence, sovereignty, and power may entice both new and would-be nations along with the perpetually disenfranchised to embrace terrorism as a solution to, or vehicle for the realization of their dreams. Today, when old empires and countries are crumbling and new ones are being built, the possession of a nuclear bomb or the development of a chemical or biological warfare capability may thus become increasingly attractive either to new nations seeking to preserve their sovereignty or to would-be nations seeking to attain their independence. In both instances, terrorists may find new roles for their skills and expertise. Terrorists may be employed by countries either to steal nuclear weapons or strategic material from another country, or they may be paid to stage a covert nuclear, chemical, or biological attack to conceal the involvement or complicity of their state patron. In this respect, the lessons of Iraq's overt invasion of Kuwait loom large. In the future, terrorists may become the "ultimate fifth column": a clandestine, cost-effective force used

to wage war covertly against more powerful rivals or to subvert neighboring countries or hostile regimes.

By the same token, ethnic/religious fanaticism—as previously noted—could more easily allow terrorists to overcome the psychological barriers to mass murder than could a radical political agenda. A terrorist group of religious zealots, with state support, in a context of ongoing violence (i.e., the civil wars occurring in the former Yugoslavia or some new internecine conflict in one of the former Soviet Union's republics) could see the acquisition and use of a chemical, biological, or nuclear capability as a viable option. State sponsorship, in particular, could provide terrorists with the incentives, capabilities, and resources they previously lacked for undertaking an ambitious operation in any of these domains. Combined with intense ethnic enmity or a strong religious imperative, this could prove deadly.⁶⁰

One final observation seems in order: while the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year, one enduring feature is that Americans remain favored targets of terrorists abroad. Since 1968, the United States has annually headed the list of countries whose nationals and property are most frequently attacked by terrorists.⁶¹ This is a phenomenon attributable as much to the geographical scope and diversity of America's overseas commercial interests and the large number of its military bases on foreign soil as to U.S. stature as a superpower and leader of the free world. Terrorists, therefore, are attracted to American interests and citizens abroad precisely because of the plethora of readily available targets. Many terrorists believe that it is easier to operate against Americans overseas than it is to strike at targets in the United States. Furthermore, there is the symbolic value inherent in any blow struck against U.S. "imperialism," "expansionism," or "economic exploitation." Almost obligingly, the American press can be counted upon to provide publicity and exposure for any attack on an American target, especially if there are civilian casualties. These reasons suggest that, despite the end of both the cold war and the ideological polarization that divided the world, the United States will nonetheless remain an attractive target for terrorists seeking

to call attention to themselves and their causes. Moreover, as the only superpower, the United States may likely be blamed for more of the world's ills, and therefore could be the focus of more terrorist attacks than before.⁸²

ENDNOTES

1. Michael J. Mazarr, et al., *Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1993, p. 15. See also, Antulio J. Echevarria and John M. Shaw, "The New Military Revolution: Post Industrial Change," *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, pp. 70-79.

2. Wayne K. Maynard, "Spears vs. Rifles: The New Equation of Military Power," *Parameters*, Spring 1993, p. 149.

3. See, for example, *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56; and, Mazarr, et al., *Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework*, pp. 16-17.

4. This act was the opening salvo in the Marodnaya Volya's short-lived terrorist campaign against Tsarist rule. See Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977, pp. 11-12.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13; and, Tom Pat Coogan, *The IRA: A History*, Niwot, CO: Roberts Rhinehart, 1993, p. 12.

6. Among the more noteworthy exceptions are: reports that in 1979 German Red Army Faction terrorists were being trained at Palestinian camps in Lebanon in the use of bacteriological weapons; the poisoning with mercury that same year of Israeli Jaffa oranges exported to Europe by Palestinian terrorists; a police raid of an RAF safe-house in Paris that uncovered a miniature laboratory containing a culture of *Clostridium botulinum*, used to create a botulinum toxin and earlier threats by the group to poison water supplies in 20 German towns if three radical lawyers were not permitted to defend an imprisoned RAF member; the 1984 meeting of white supremacists in Mountain Home, Arkansas, who, according to a Federal grand jury indictment, plotted and began to stockpile cyanide with which to poison the water supplies of Chicago and Washington, DC; suspicions that in 1986 terrorists in India may have contemplated poisoning drinking water tanks there; the letters sent to Western embassies by Tamil guerrillas claiming to have poisoned Sri Lankan tea with potassium cyanide; and the minute traces of cyanide discovered in Chilean grapes exported to the United States following threats made by a left wing Chilean group. Source: *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism*. See also, Jeffrey D. Simon, *Terrorists and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons: A Discussion of Possibilities*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1989, R-3771 AFMIC, *passim*. Also, it has been reported that various terrorist groups,

including the RAF, Italy's Red Brigades and some Palestinian organizations, reputedly "have recruited microbiologists, purchased bacteriological experimentation equipment and dabbled in sending toxins such as anthrax to potential victims." See "Violence: A Buyer's Market," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, May 12, 1990, pp. 909-911.

7. Forty-four percent of all terrorist attacks between 1968/69 involved bombings; 53 percent in the 1970s; 49 percent in the 1980s, and 39.5 percent between 1990/93. Source: *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism*.

8. Eighteen percent both between 1968/69 and during the 1970s; 19 percent in the 1980s; and, 32 percent between 1990/93. Source: *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism*.

9. Hijackings accounted for 33 percent of all terrorist attacks between 1968/69; 7 percent in the 1970s; 4 percent of the incidents in the 1980s; and, 12 percent between 1990/93.

10. Three percent between 1968/69; 9 percent in the 1970s; 13 percent in the 1980s; and 13 percent between 1990/93.

11. Kidnappings accounted for just .01 percent of all terrorist attacks between 1968/69; 9 percent in the 1970s; 10 percent in the 1980s; and, 6 percent between 1990/93. There were no barricade and hostage situations recorded between 1968/69; though they accounted for 3 percent of all terrorist incidents during the 1970s; and just 1 percent in both the 1980s and between 1990/93.

12. This is the dramatic rise between 1990/93 of attacks on installations to 32 percent from the 19 percent recorded during the 1980s.

13. A bombing in Bessarabia in 1921; a 1925 bombing of a crowded cathedral in Sofia, Bulgaria; a largely unrecorded attempt to poison imprisoned German SS concentration camp guards shortly after World War II; the crash of a hijacked Malaysian passenger plane in 1977; the arson attack at a Teheran movie theater in 1979 that killed more than 400; the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed 241; the 1985 in-flight bombing of an Air India passenger jet that killed all 328 persons on board; the simultaneous explosions that rocked an ammunition dump in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1988; the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 that killed 278 persons; the 1989 in-flight bombing of a French UTA flight that killed 171; and the in-flight bombing, as in 1989, of a Colombian Avianca aircraft in which 107 persons perished. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins noted in 1985 of the list upon which the preceding is an expanded version: "Lowering the criterion to 50 deaths produces a dozen or more additional incidents. To get even a meaningful sample, the criterion has to be lowered to 25. This in itself suggests that it is either very hard to kill large

numbers of persons or very rarely tried." Brian M. Jenkins, *The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, P-7119, July 1985, p. 7.

14. Numbers derived from the analysis of incidents recorded in *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism*.

15. Admittedly, many "secular" terrorist groups have a strong religious element: the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the various Armenian groups that were active throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and perhaps the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well. However, the political aspect is the predominant characteristic of these groups, as evinced by their nationalist or irredentist aims.

16. For a detailed analysis of these repercussions and indeed Iran's sponsorship of international terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman, "Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism," in Yonah Alexander, ed., *Middle Eastern Terrorism: Current Threats and Future Prospects*, New York and Toronto: G.K. Hall, 1994, or the *RAND Report*, R-3783-USDP, March 1990, in which this analysis was first published.

17. This form of terrorism has, of course, occurred throughout history, although in recent decades it has largely been overshadowed by nationalist/separatist or ideologically motivated terrorism. Indeed, as David C. Rapoport points out in his seminal study of what he terms "holy terror," the relationship between terrorism and religion is not new and until the 19th century "religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror." See David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3, September 1984, p. 659.

18. According to *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism*, between 1982 and 1992 Shi'a terrorist groups committed 295 terrorist incidents but were responsible for 1,134 deaths.

19. For a more detailed analysis of the phenomena and implications of religious terrorism see Bruce Hoffman, *"Holy Terror": The Implications of Religion Motivated By A Religious Imperative*, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1993, p. 6450.

20. According to a 1987 Federal grand jury indictment, 14 white supremacists met at a rural so-called "survivalist" compound in Mountain Home, Arkansas, in 1984 where they plotted to poison reservoirs in Chicago, Illinois, and Washington, DC, and began stockpiling 30 gallons of cyanide.

21. In 1987, the "Confederate Hammer Skins," a white supremacist "skinhead" group planned to place cyanide crystals in the air conditioning unit of a Dallas Jewish synagogue.

22. In 1984, two groups of Israeli Jewish fanatics plotted to blow up Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock, Islam's third holiest shrine, in hope of igniting a final battle between Moslems and Jews. Information provided to the author by an American law enforcement official. See also, Thomas L. Friedman, "Jewish Terrorists Freed By Israeli," *The New York Times*, December 9, 1984; Grace Halsell, "Why Bobby Brown of Brooklyn Wants To Blow Up Al Aqsa," *Arabia*, August 1984; Martin Merzer, "Justice for all in Israel?", *Miami Herald*, May 17, 1985; and, "Jail Term of Jewish Terrorist Reduced," *Jerusalem Post* (International Edition), October 12, 1985. The information pertaining to the terrorists' desire to provoke a cataclysmic holy war between Moslems and Jews was verified by an American law enforcement officer, involved with the investigation of Jewish terrorist incidents in the United States and knowledgeable of the Jerusalem incident. For a detailed account of both the Temple Mount "plot" and Jewish terrorist attacks on Arab targets in Israel during 1983 and 1984, see Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

23. In February and March 1993, Muslim terrorists allegedly unleashed a massive bombing campaign in downtown Bombay, India, that killed more than 400 persons and injured over a 1,000 others.

24. In 1984, followers of the Bagwhan Shre Rajneesh attempted to poison with salmonella the salad bars of a small Oregon town in hopes of influencing the outcome of a local election. Secular terrorists, it should be noted, have also attempted to poison food supplies, such as the Palestinian terrorists who poisoned Israeli oranges with mercury in 1979; the Tamil guerrillas who claimed to have contaminated Sri Lankan tea shipments in 1986; and, Chilean terrorists who claimed to have poisoned grapes exported from that country in 1988.

25. See, for example, Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," p. 674.

26. Brian M. Jenkins, *The Likelihood Of Nuclear Terrorism*, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, July 1985, P 7119, pp. 4-5.

27. See, for example, Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism*, London: Sphere Books, Ltd., 1987, pp. 7-8.

28. These included the bombing of New York City's World Trade Center in February; the uncovering in June of a plot to free the terrorists arrested for the Trade Center blast by destroying two commuter tunnels and a bridge linking New Jersey to Manhattan, blowing up the United Nations building,

staging a forced entry attack on the downtown Federal building housing the FBI's New York field office, and assassinating various public officials; the unmasking the following month of a conspiracy to carry out a machine gun and hand grenade attack against a prominent African American church in Los Angeles as Sunday services concluded; and the chain of bombings against a variety of Asian, Jewish, and African-American targets in the Sacramento, California, area last spring and summer.

29. In the case of the World Trade Center, the four bombers appear to have jointed forces based on their attendance at the same place of worship (a Jersey City, New Jersey, mosque). In one case as well, family ties existed. (Irbahim A. Elgabrownny, who although not charged with the Trade Center bombing specifically, was nonetheless implicated in the crime and has been charged in the subsequent plot to free the bombers, is the cousin of El Sayyid A. Nosair, who was also implicated in the bombing, is among the 15 persons indicted in the follow-on plans to obtain the bombers' release, and is already serving a prison sentence in connection with the November 1990 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane). See Jim Mcgee and Rachel Stassen-Berger, "5th Suspect Arrested in Bombing," *The Washington Post*, March 26, 1993; and, Alison Mitchell, "Fingerprint Evidence Grows in World Trade Center Blast," *The New York Times*, May 20, 1993.

30. For example, the arrests made in connection with the World Trade Center bombing brought to light further evidence that, since 1985, at least two other worshippers of the same Jersey City mosque that two of the convicted bombers attended had been previously implicated in terrorist acts in the New York metropolitan area. The first incident involves the arrest, in December 1985, of Sultan Irahim El Gawli, an Egyptian-born travel agent, by U.S. Customs Service officers. El Gawli was convicted of attempting to export 150 pounds of C-4 plastic explosives, 100 blasting caps, remote detonators and a 9-mm. silencer-equipped pistol to Palestinian terrorists in Israel and the Occupied Territories. He served 18 months in prison and has since been released. The second is the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane by El Sayyid A. Nosair, who also was born in Egypt and like El Gawli and the two World Trade Center bombing suspects--Mohammed Salameh and Nidal Ayyad--worshipped at the Masjid al-Salam Mosque in Jersey City. A search of Nosair's home following his arrest uncovered bomb making manuals, 1,440 rounds of 7.62 ammunition used in AK-47 assault rifles, manuals on the use of listening devices and explosive traps. See John Kifner, "Kahane Suspect Is a Muslim With a Series of Addresses," *The New York Times*, November 7, 1990; Mary B.W. Tabor, "Kahane Suspect Remains Focal Point in Bomb Plots," *The New York Times*, May 23, 1993; and, John J. Goldman, *et al.*, "N.Y. Trial in Rabbi's Death Planted an Explosive Seed," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 4, 1993.

31. Interview with RAND research staff, November 1992.

32. Federal authorities reported that they had traced nearly \$100,000 in funds that had been wired to some of the suspects from abroad, including transfers made from Iran. An additional \$8,000 had been transferred from Germany into a joint bank account maintained by two of the bombers. Ralph Blumenthal, "\$100,000 From Abroad Is Linked to Suspects in the Trade Center Explosion," *The New York Times*, February 15, 1993. According to one of the other convicted bombers, Mahmud Abouhalima, funds had also been routed through the militant Egyptian Islamic group, Gamat al-Islamiya, whose spiritual leader is Shiekh Omar Abdel Rahman, now awaiting trial in connection with the June 1993 plot, and by the radical transnational Muslim Brotherhood organization. Additional financing reputedly was provided by and via Iranian businesses and Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia and Europe. Mary B.W. Tabor, "Lingering Questions on Bombing," *The New York Times*, September 14, 1994.

33. Ralph Blumenthal, "Missing Bombing Case Figure Reported to Be Staying in Iraq," *The New York Times*, June 10, 1993.

34. According to Egyptian officials who interrogated Mahmud Abouhalima, who had fled the United States to his native Egypt following the bombing, the plan to attack the Trade Center was conceived in Afghanistan by veterans of the "holy war" waged against Soviet occupation of that country during the 1980s. Two "self-described Iranian intelligence agents" and the two Iraqi fugitives noted above had participated in the planning as well (Mary B.W. Tabor, "Lingering Questions on Bombing," *The New York Times*, September 14, 1994). Another of the convicted Trade Center bombers, Ahmad M. Ajaj, a Palestinian, had worked in a Houston pizzeria until he was arrested upon entering the United States from Pakistan on September 1, 1992. U.S. Customs agents found in his possession four false passports, six volumes of bomb-making manuals (that, according to prosecutors, contained formulas most likely used to construct the Trade Center bomb), as well as two videotapes demonstrating how to mix chemicals into explosives and how to stage a bombing attack against a U.S. Embassy (Richard Bernstein, "Trade Center Trial Nearing Close As Defense Team Rests Its Case," *The New York Times*, February 15, 1993). See also, Mary B.W. Tabor, "Terrorism in New York: Looking for Links," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1993; Richard Bernstein, "Trial Deepens the Mysteries Of the Trade Center Blast," *The New York Times*, November 15, 1993; Richard Bernstein, "4 Are Convicted In Bombing At The World Trade Center That Killed 6, Stunned U.S.," *The New York Times*, March 5, 1994; and, Richard Bernstein, "The Missing Piece," *The New York Times*, March 5, 1994.

35. Richard Bernstein, "Lawyer in Trade Center Blast Case Contends that Clert Was a Dupe," *The New York Times*, February 16, 1994. See also, Tom Morganthau, "A Terrorist Plot Without a Story," *Newsweek*, February 28, 1994.

36. The Trade Center bomb was composed of some 1,200 lbs. of "common sulfuric and nitric acids used in dozens of household products and urea used to fertilize lawns." The detonating device was a more complex and extremely volatile mixture of nitroglycerine enhanced by tanks of compressed hydrogen gases that were designed to increase the force of the blast. Richard Bernstein, "Lingering Questions on Bombing: Powerful Device, Simple Design," *The New York Times*, September 14, 1994. See also, Richard Bernstein, "Expert Can't Be Certain of Bomb Contents at Trial," *The New York Times*, January 21, 1994. Richard Bernstein, "Nitroglycerin and Shoe at Center of Blast Trial Testimony," *The New York Times*, January 27, 1994; Richard Bernstein, "Witness Sums Up Bombing Evidence," *The New York Times*, February 7, 1994; Edward Barnes, *et al.*, "The \$400 Bomb," *Time*, March 22, 1993; and, Tom Morganthau, "A Terrorist Plot Without a Story," *Newsweek*, February 28, 1994.

Similarly, in April 1988 a Japanese Red Army terrorist, Yu Kikumura, was arrested on the New Jersey Turnpike while en route to New York City on a bombing mission. Kikumura's mission was to carry out a bombing attack against a U.S. Navy recruiting station in lower Manhattan on April 15 to commemorate the second anniversary of the 1986 U.S. airstrike against Libya. He is believed to have undertaken this operation at the behest of Libya's Colonel Qaddafi. Between his arrival in the United States on March 14 and his arrest a month later, Kikumura traveled some 7,000 miles by car from New York to Chicago, through Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania purchasing materials for his bomb along the way. Found in his possession were gunpowder, hollowed-out fire extinguishers in which to place the explosive materials and roofing nails as crude anti-personnel weapons. Kikumura was sentenced to 30 years in prison. See Robert Hanley, "Suspected Japanese Terrorist Convicted in Bomb Case in New Jersey," *The New York Times*, November 29, 1988; and, Business Risks International, *Risk Assessment Weekly*, Vol. 5, No. 29, July 22, 1988.

37. N.R. Kleinfeld, "Legacy of Tower Explosion: Security Improved, and Lost," *The New York Times*, February 20, 1993; and, Richard Bernstein, "Lingering Questions on Bombing: Powerful Device, Simple Design," *The New York Times*, September 14, 1994.

38. See, for example, William M. Carley and Timothy L. O'Brien, "Web of Fear: New Kind of Terrorist, Amateur and Ad Hoc, Worried Authorities," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 17, 1993; and, Robin Wright, "New Breed of Terrorist Worries U.S. Officials," *Los Angeles Times*, June 27, 1993.

39. Israeli authorities have noted this same pattern has emerged among terrorists belonging to the Hamas organization currently active in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in contrast to the more professional, centrally controlled members of the mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization terrorist groups. As one senior Israeli security official noted of a particularly vicious band of Hamas terrorists: they "were a surprisingly unprofessional

bunch . . . they had no preliminary training and acted without specific instructions." See Joel Greenberg, "Israel Arrests 4 In Police Death," *The New York Times*, June 7, 1993; and Eric Silver, "The Shin Bet's 'Winning' Battle," *The Jewish Journal* (Los Angeles), June 11-17, 1993.

40. Matthew L. Wald, "Figuring What It Would Take to Take Down a Tower," *The New York Times*, March 21, 1993.

41. United States of America v. Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, *et al.*, Complaint Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 844 (i) June 23, 1993; United States District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, *et al.*, Indictment S3 Cr. 181, August 25, 1993. See also, Robert D. McFadden, "F.B.I. Seizes 8, Citing A Plot To Bomb New York Targets And Kill Political Figures," *The New York Times*, June 25, 1993; William C. Rempel and Ronald J. Ostrow, "Bomb Plot Reportedly Hinged on U.N. Link," *Los Angeles Times*, June 26, 1993; Robert D. McFadden, "U.S. Says More Bomb-Plot Suspects Are at Large," *The New York Times*, June 26, 1993; Susan Sachs, "Egypt Links Trade Center Blast to International Plot," *Los Angeles Times*, July 16, 1993; Mary B.W. Tabor, "Second Bombing Plot Casts Shadow as First Nears Trial," *The New York Times*, July 19, 1993; and, Mary B.W. Tabor, "U.S. Plotters Discussed Kidnapping and Hostage Taking," *The New York Times*, August 5, 1993.

42. Jim Newton, "Skinhead Leader Pleads Guilty to Violence, Plot," *Los Angeles Times*, October 9, 1993.

43. Information provided to author by one of the arresting police officers, August 1993.

44. Associated Press, "Blast Called Part of Plot," *Baltimore Sun*, July 31, 1993.

45. Associated Press, "California Teen Ager Is Arrested In Bombings Aimed at Minorities," *The New York Times*, November 8, 1993. See also, "White Supremacists Investigated In 4 Firebombings in Sacramento," *The New York Times*, October 6, 1993.

46. Quoted in Associated Press, "California Agency Hit In Hate Crime Attack," *The New York Times*, October 15, 1993.

47. The lethal simplicity of bomb-making was graphically demonstrated in a series of bombings carried out in upstate New York just after Christmas 1993 by an aggrieved boyfriend against his lover's family (who allegedly did not like him). Five persons were killed and two others wounded by booby-trapped plastic toolboxes manufactured by the boyfriend, a 53-year-old ex-convict, con-man and drifter, and a 56-year-old male accomplice. The bomber built prototypes of the explosive devices at his

mother's house, before storing the real bombs in his accomplice's hotel room. The explosives used in the bombs had been obtained by the accomplice who was able to purchase a case of dynamite and 50 blasting caps in Kentucky using an alias. Jacques Steinberg, "Motive in Fatal Bombings Is Unclear, Authorities Say," *The New York Times*, December 31, 1993; and, Associated Press, "Judge Denies Bail for Two Men Suspected in Upstate Bombings," *The New York Times*, January 4, 1994.

48. See, for example, the discussion of Germany's Red Army Faction in Peter Schere, "RAF Concentrates on New Target Spectrum," *Die Welt*, December 18, 1991.

49. See Frederick Kempe, "Deadly Survivors: The Cold War Is Over But Leftist Terrorists In Germany Fight On," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 27, 1991.

50. Quoted in Adrian Bridge, "German police search for Red Army Faction killers," *The Independent* (London), April 6, 1991.

51. Kempe, "Deadly Survivors: The Cold War Is Over But Leftist Terrorists In Germany Fight On."

52. Quoted in Edward Gorman, "How to stop the IRA," *The Times* (London), January 11, 1992.

53. Quoted in William E. Schmidt, "Protestant Gunmen Are Stepping Up the Violence in Northern Ireland," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1991.

54. *Ibid.*

55. In April and June 1992 the RAF issued communiques offering to suspend its terrorist campaign provided various conditions—involving mostly the release of imprisoned RAF terrorists—were met by the German government. For a detailed analysis of both the RAF and the two communiques, see Dennis A. Pluchinsky, "Germany's Red Army Faction: An Obituary," *Studies In Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 16, No. 2, forthcoming.

56. For a detailed analysis of the Herrhausen attack and the RAF modus operandi in attacking protected persons see Dennis Pluchinsky, "The RAF and the Herrhausen Assassination," in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, DOS 10099, February 1994, pp. 3-12.

57. Adrian Bridge, "German police search for Red Army Faction killers," *The Independent* (London), April 6, 1991; Stephen Kinzer, "Red Army Faction Is Suspected in German Killing," *The New York Times*, April 3, 1991;

and, Bernard Adamczewski, "United Germany Divided by Terror," *Conflict International*, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 1.

58. Pluchinsky, "The RAF and the Herrhausen Assassination," pp. 3-12.

59. "Bonn's Top Terror Expert Survives Bomb," *The Independent* (London), July 28, 1990; and Ian Murray, "German Police Chief Survives Car Bomb," *The Times* (London), July 28, 1990. As one German federal investigator observed: "When the RAF kills, it usually gets the sort of people who are impossible to replace." Quoted in Kempe, "Deadly Survivors: The Cold War Is Over But Leftist Terrorists in Germany Fight On."

60. In a July 1993 shootout at a rural railway station in the former East Germany, RAF terrorist Wolfgang Grams and a member of the crack German GSG-9 counterterrorist unit were shot dead and another RAF terrorist, Birgit Hogefeld, was captured. Until that incident, not one member of the group's "Third Generation" been either killed or apprehended. See Stephen Kinzer, "Germany's Anti-Terror Unit Buffs Its Image," *The New York Times*, August 18, 1993; and, Stephen Kinzer, "German Terrorist's Death Is Called a Suicide," *The New York Times*, January 14, 1994.

61. David Rose, "Devices Reveal IRA Know-How," *The Guardian* (London), May 18, 1990.

62. Michael Smith, "IRA Use of Radar Guns in Bombings Described," *Daily Telegraph* (London), May 20, 1991.

63. See also, David Hearst, "IRA Mines Gap in Army Security," *The Guardian* (London), April 10, 1990; David Hearst, "'Human Bomb' Fails to Explode," *The Guardian* (London), November 24, 1990; Jamie Dettmer and Edward Gorman, "Seven Dead in IRA 'Human' Bomb Attacks," *The Times* (London), October 25, 1990; Will Bennett, "Terrorists Keep Changing Tactics To Elude Security Forces," *Independent* (London), December 17, 1991.

64. *Ibid.*

65. Nicholas Watt, "IRA's Russian Roulette Detonator," *The Times* (London), March 16, 1994; and, "Photoflash Bomb Threat To the Public," *The Scotsman* (Edinburgh), March 16, 1994.

66. Duncan Campbell, "Video Clue to IRA Store Blitz: Simplicity of Incendiary Device Makes Disruption Easy," *The Guardian* (London), December 24, 1991.

67. James F. Clarity, "On Ulster Border, Grim Days For Grenadier Guards," *The New York Times*, February 23, 1994.

68. Campbell, "Video Clue to IRA Store Blitz: Simplicity of Incendiary Device Makes Disruption Easy."

69. William E. Schmidt, "One Dead, 40 Hurt as Blast Rips Central London," *The New York Times*, April 25, 1993. See also, William E. Schmidt, "With London Still in Bomb Shock, Major Appoints His New Cabinet" *The New York Times*, April 12, 1992; "Delays Seen in London," *The New York Times*, April 13, 1992; Peter Rodgers, "City Bomb Claims May Reach 1bn," *The Independent* (London), April 14, 1992; and David Connett, "IRA City Bomb was Fertilizer," *The Independent* (London), May 28, 1992.

70. William E. Schmidt, "One Dead, 40 Hurt as Blast Rips Central London," *The New York Times*, April 25, 1993; and Richard W. Stevenson, "I.R.A. Says It Placed Fatal Bomb; London Markets Rush to Reopen," *The New York Times*, April 26, 1993.

71. Roger Highfield, "Explosion Could Have Wrecked City Centre," *Daily Telegraph* (London), August 13, 1993.

72. Ian Graham, "Official: IRA Using 'Bigger, Better,' Bombs," London Press Association, January 23, 1992.

73. Edward Gorman, "Bomb Disposers Mark 21 Years in Ulster," *The Times* (London), November 7, 1992.

74. Graham, "Official: IRA Using 'Bigger, Better' Bombs."

75. Quoted in "Outrage Not a Reason for Inaction," *Manchester Guardian International Edition*, October 21, 1984.

76. Stewart Tendler, "A Crude and Lethal Weapon to Thwart the Security Forces," *The Times* (London), February 8, 1991; and, Will Bennett, "Simple Bombs Improved But Lack Accuracy," *Independent* (London), February 8, 1991.

77. "I.R.A. Fires 5 Mortars at a London Airport," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1994; John Darnton, "2d Mortar Attack on Heathrow," *The New York Times*, March 12, 1994; and, John Darnton, "I.R.A. Attacks and Threats Close London Airports," *The New York Times*, March 14, 1994.

78. Aphorism originally coined by Brian Jenkins.

79. According to a 1990 report, for example, "Canberra bombers, Rapier missiles and tube artillery" can be readily obtained on the international black market. It similarly notes that while terrorist groups as diverse as Germany's Red Army Faction, Italy's Red Brigades and various Palestinian organizations reputedly "have recruited microbiologists, purchased bacteriological experimentation equipment and dabbled in

sending toxins such as anthrax to potential victims"; they have to date not done so. See "Violence: A Buyer's Market," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, May 12, 1990, pp. 909-911. See also, "Guns: Buyer's Market," *The Economist*, May 16, 1992.

80. Thesis originally advanced by the author in collaboration with Peter deLeon in *The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, N-2706, January 1988.

81. Followed by Israel, France, Great Britain, West Germany, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Cuba, Spain, and Iran. Source: *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism*.

82. One can envision ethnic, nationalist, and irredentist minorities turning to the United States for support and intervention which, if not provided, could act as a catalyst for increased anti-American terrorism designed to coerce the United States to intervene on their behalf or to punish it for not intervening. Of course, terrorism designed to protest or reverse U.S. intervention in local conflicts (such as was the case in Lebanon during the 1980s) is likely to continue as well.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Major General William A. Stofft
Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Electronic References

Internet Locations

Note: The following URLs are current as of the date of publication

MILNET: Open Source Military Information Database - <http://www.onestep.com:80/milnet/> -

Topic areas include Terrorism, Conflicts. Find US Travel Warnings, Intelligence Sites, Military Topic Web Pages, information about Terrorism in the US, Terrorist Groups, and Terrorist Weapons. Under other Terrorism sites, find the Terrorism Page, the International Relations and Security Network (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch>) sponsored by the Swiss Government.

Counter terrorism Home Page - <http://www.counterterrorism.com/> -

Includes a graph of bombing incidents

Peacekeeping Institute - <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/pki/> -

Contains basic information about Peacekeeping, Related Peacekeeping Sites, Peacekeeping Publications, Peacekeeping Operations, Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations, and Human Rights.

Infomanage Conflict Resolution - <http://www.infomanage.com/ConflictResolution/> -

Links to sites on topics including Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Potential or Current Civil Strife and/or Ethnic Warfare by Country.

Peacekeeping - <http://www.pitt.edu/~ian/resource/peacekp.htm> -

WWW Virtual Library on Peacekeeping

Center for Democracy and Technology - <http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism> -

Congressional documents, analyses, testimony, and Clinton Administration's documents.

Counter-Terrorism Page - <http://www.emergency.com/cntrterr.htm> -

Summary of world wide terrorist events, groups, strategies and tactics.

Yahoo - http://www.yahoo.com/Society_and_Culture/Crime/Crimes/Terrorism/ -

Listing of relevant sites including US Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism. There are also listing of terrorist attacks including everything from the bombing at Olympic Park to the Tokyo Subway Gassing.

National Security Institute - <http://nsi.org/terrorism.html> -

Provides legislation, executive orders, facts, profiles, commentary and related sites on terrorism.

System Planning Corporations Page - <http://www.sysplan.com/Expertise/armslinks.html> -

Contains links to US and International sites on counter terrorism, intelligence, non-proliferation, institutes, peacekeeping organizations, related journals and publications.

International Peacekeeping News - <http://csf.colorado.edu/dfax/ipn/index.htm> -

A cooperative project to track specific topics of interest using online information technology to provide a bimonthly update on the state of peacekeeping worldwide.

Pathway Services Browse Topic: Terrorism - http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/topics/terror.html -

The Government Printing Office provides a link to Government Internet Sites arranged by topic. This one is on the topic, terrorism. Included are links to the intelligence community, FBI, Travel Warnings, and FEMA.

Heritage Foundation - <http://www.lead-inst.org/heritage/library/categories/natsec/bg1005.html> -

Full text of a Heritage Foundation Paper entitled: "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism".

*Visit DTIC on the Internet at:
<http://www.dtic.mil>*

Additional References

Note: Refer to the order form following the bibliographies for ordering information.

AD-A319 503

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Reexamining the Legislative Restrictions on the
Domestic Use of the United States Military to Combat
Domestic Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis.

SEP 96 102P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: Johnson, Troy A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This thesis is an attempt to compare the current legislative and military posture of the United States, in its effort to deal with a potentially growing domestic terrorist threat, with that of Great Britain. The introductory chapter presents the argument that the United States may learn valuable lessons by examining the British response to domestic terrorism. The second chapter takes a historical look at the development of U.S. legislation that defined the President's authority to call forth the militia and federal troops for domestic use. The third chapter examines the British use of emergency legislation as well as their decision to employ the army in an effort to curtail domestic terrorism posed by the Irish Republican Army when local police efforts failed. The fourth chapter concludes with a discussion on current U.S. legislation dealing with domestic terrorism and on the lessons the United States may learn from the British experience as the U.S. continuously adjusts to a changing domestic security environment.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *COUNTERTERRORISM,
*TERRORISM, *PUBLIC SAFETY, TERRORISTS,
NATIONAL SECURITY, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, CIVIL
DEFENSE, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), THREATS,
THESES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, GREAT BRITAIN,
NATURAL HISTORY, FEDERAL LAW, CIVIL
DISTURBANCES.

AD-A315 975

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(SPECIAL OPERATIONS LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT)
WASHINGTON DC COUNTERTERRORISM

(U) DoD Combating Terrorism Program.

SEP 96 15P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: Smith, S.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This Directive updates DoD policies and responsibilities for implementing the DoD Combating Terrorism Program, pursuant to U.S. Government Printing Office Number 040-000-00494-7, 'Public Report to the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism,' February 1986; assigns responsibilities for the protection of DoD personnel and their families, facilities, and other material resources from terrorist acts; continues to authorize the publication of 0-2000.12-H, 'Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence'; establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal advisor and focal point responsible to the Secretary of Defense for all DoD force protection issues; and expands the responsibilities of the Combatant Commanders to ensure the force protection of all DoD activities in their geographic area of responsibility.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
*DIRECTIVES, *PERSONNEL RETENTION,
*TERRORISM, MILITARY PERSONNEL, MILITARY
FACILITIES, POLICIES, TASK FORCES, FAMILY
MEMBERS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES,
PROTECTION, RESOURCES, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS,
MILITARY COMMANDERS, UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE, POLITICAL REVOLUTION.

AD-A314 585

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE , WASHINGTON DC
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS DIV

(U) Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for
Detecting Explosives and Narcotics.

SEP 96 29P

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: Report to Congressional
Requesters.

ABSTRACT: (U) The ability to detect explosives and narcotics is increasingly important to U.S. national security. Explosives are the terrorist's weapon of choice. Their use against commercial aircraft have led to loss of lives and weakened confidence in the security of air travel. Likewise, narcotics trafficking ruins lives, drains billions of dollars from the economy, and spawns violence that threatens U.S. communities. As you requested, we have developed information on explosives and narcotics detection technologies that are available or under development. More specifically, this report discusses (1) funding for those technologies, (2) characteristics and limitations of available and planned technologies, and (3) deployment of technologies by the United States and foreign countries. The appendixes provide detailed information on the most significant types of technologies available and under development including brief summaries of their characteristics, their current status in terms of development or deployment, the estimated range of prices for the technologies, and the amount of federal funds spent on the technologies between fiscal years 1978 and 1996. This report is one of a series you requested on the role of technology in explosives and narcotics detection.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *NATIONAL SECURITY,
*EXPLOSIVES, *DRUGS, *TERRORISM, *NARCOTICS,
WEAPONS, TERRORISTS, DEPLOYMENT NATIONS,
UNITED STATES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
DETECTION, COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, FOREIGN,
COMMUNITIES, TRAFFIC, AIR, SECURITY,
ESTIMATES, COSTS, TRAVEL, MONEY.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) TRAFFICKING.

*AD-A313 256

ARMY WAR COLL
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) Security Assistance Support: Providing for the National
Security or A Cause of Instability. Are We at the Crossroads
of Change?

APR 96 34P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Weeden, John J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In a statement before Congress, General Colin Powell spoke about the United States' interests in security assistance policy. His philosophy regarding collective security and international stability was oriented to those countries the United States considers friendly: "Dollars invested to help friends and allies build indigenous military capabilities and to gain their confidence bring tremendous returns in helping the U.S. to meet its regional objectives. He expressed concern, however, for potential problems arising from one country's engagement in policies directed toward another country's need to protect itself from its enemies. It was his opinion that the large diversity of causes of instability would result in greater demands on the United States to provide friendly countries with support to assist them in defending against their regional enemies. He contended that some countries will be undemocratic; and many will be threatened by internal unrest, terrorism drug runners, or guerrillas. As a result, they will be natural candidates for many forms of security assistance.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *NATIONAL
SECURITY *MILITARY ASSISTANCE, *MILITARY
CAPABILITIES, *FOREIGN AID, *LIMITED WARFARE,
STABILITY, CONGRESS, UNITED STATES, POLITICAL
SCIENCE, EXPORTS, ECONOMICS, THREATS, ARMS
CONTROL, ENEMY, MILITARY TRAINING,
INTERVENTION TERRORISM, DETERRENCE,
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, GUERRILLA WARFARE,
INDIGENOUS POPULATION, PEACEKEEPING.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) *SECURITY ASSISTANCE, FMF
(FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING), IMET
(INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND
TRAINING).

AD-A312 853

AD-A312 204

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

NAVAL WAR COLL
NEWPORT RI

(U) Turning the Tables: U.S. Strategy to Cope with Enemies
Who Are Not Governments.

(U) Applying Operational Art to Counterinsurgency
Campaign Planning.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis 2 Aug 95-7 Jun 96.

JUN 96 109P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Haskins, Casey P.

JUN 96 23P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Lueking, Richard W.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This study examines American strategy to deal with revolutionaries, terrorist organizations, and international criminal organizations. It first examines the current strategic environment. Of the many significant factors shaping that environment, two predominate. These are the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the rapid expansion of information technology. By then examining the United States and each type of enemy within that strategic context, it identifies strategic strengths, weaknesses, and likely actions. The various enemies' differing aims and situations lead to mixed conclusions. Opposing revolutionaries, the United States can, with difficulty, use the advantages of government to gain the strategic offensive. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, will continue to operate on the strategic offensive. Finally, against international criminal organizations, the United States can gain strategic advantages. However, it must fight on the strategic defensive unless it can act decisively to reduce public demand for criminals goods and services. It is beyond the study to advocate legalization of criminal activities, especially drugs, but it concludes that without such a step, the United States is likely to fight indefinitely on the strategic defensive against these criminal organizations.

ABSTRACT: (U) The challenge facing a UTF commander, on often more difficult and complex than conventional combat operations, is counterinsurgency planning and execution. His responsibility to plan and accomplish the strategic objective includes defeat or neutralization of any insurgency in his AOR. Counterinsurgency operations will complicate campaign planning and affect how the political economic, cultural, and military objectives are approached and integrated. The commander must understand the tenets, conduct an accurate analysis, develop a competent plan and build a tailored force to defeat the threat. All while coordinating with the diplomatic, economic, and social actions by the U.S. and the host country. The joint commander must plan for and be prepared to execute an effective counterinsurgency plan that applies the proper forces at the right time against the correct insurgency center of gravity. Achievement of the strategic objective and operational mission success hinge on it.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY STRATEGY, *UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, *ENEMY, *TERRORISM, *CRIMES, USSR, ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENT (FOREIGN), GROWTH (GENERAL), THESES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, ETHNIC GROUPS, STRATEGIC WARFARE, POLITICAL REVOLUTION, MASS MEDIA, INFORMATION SCIENCES, DRUG INTERDICTION, INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, CENTER OF GRAVITY, WARFARE, MILITARY STRATEGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, NEUTRALIZATION ACCURACY, TIME, CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, PLANNING, MISSIONS MILITARY PLANNING, CULTURE, HINGES, INSURGENCY.

*AD-A312 173

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON DC(U) Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Statement for the Record.FEB 96 24P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: Deutch, John.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This report outlines the threats to the United States and its interests now and into the next century. We still call this the post-cold war world. Among the opportunities and challenges of our time, there is not yet one dominant enough to define the era on its own terms and give it a name. Looking beyond our borders we see much that is uncertain. The stability of many regions of the world is threatened by ethnic turmoil and humanitarian crises. Two great powers, Russia and China, are in the process of metamorphosis and their final shape is still very much in question. Free nations of the world are threatened by rogue nations - - Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya-- that have built up significant military forces and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The world community is under assault from those who deal in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs and crime. The interdependence of the world economy has made us more vulnerable to economic shocks beyond our borders. The strategic threat to our continent is reduced, but the potential for surprise is greater than it was in the days when we could focus our energies on the well-recognized instruments of Soviet power. No one challenge today is yet as formidable as the threat from the former Soviet Union. If nurtured by neglect on our part, these new challenges could expand to threaten the growth of democracy and free markets. All the tools of national security, diplomacy, the military, and intelligence must remain sharp. It is the task of the Intelligence Community to provide policymakers and military commanders with early warning of emerging problems - - warning that can allow us to avoid crisis or military conflict. We must continuously monitor and assess the threats so that our leaders can manage these wisely.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *GLOBAL, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *THREAT EVALUATION, *STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, WEAPONS, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, USSR, WARFARE, IRAQ, UNITED STATES, EMERGENCIES, MARKETING, COMMUNITIES, ECONOMICS, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, THREATS, TOOLS, GROWTH (GENERAL), DESTRUCTION RUSSIA, DRUGS, MILITARY COMMANDERS', IRAN, TERRORISM, CHINA, DEMOCRACY.

AD-A311 682

NAVAL WAR COLL
NEWPORT RI(U) The Iranian Threat: Key Concerns for the Combatant
Commander in Response.MAR 96 27P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: Jasper, Scott.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In the aftermath of the Gulf War with Iraq the Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as the greatest long-term threat to peace and stability in the Central Region. Through purchase of a wide range of high-tech weapons, Iran now has a formidable military force capable of influencing Gulf economic policy. However, in the event of Iranian aggression, the United States Central Command stands ready to defend vital U.S. interests in the Middle East. The national strategy of Iran is bound by the religious tenets of Islam and an oil based economy struggling to support a population which has exploded over the past sixteen years. Iran seeks to build global alliances for export of oil and liquid petroleum gas while continuing support for Islamic communities under attack. Iran perceives the U.S. and the emerging regional order to be the greatest threat to the republic's existence and, in response, has bought fast attack missile patrol boats, diesel electric submarines, ballistic missiles and long range strike aircraft. Iran is now capable of conducting terrorist activities, denying international access to the Gulf and threatening the region with chemical/biological weapons. The Combatant Commander's theater strategy must be tailored to respond rapidly and decisively to the growing Iranian threat.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *RESPONSE, *THREAT EVALUATION, *MILITARY COMMANDERS, *IRAN, *POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, GUIDED MISSILES, DIESEL ENGINES, STABILITY, IRAQ MILITARY STRATEGY, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, POLICIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, EXPORTS, MILITARY AIRCRAFT, ECONOMICS, GOVERNMENT (FOREIGN), ISLAM, MILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN), ATTACK, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, POPULATION, AIR STRIKES, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, ACCESS, ELECTRIC POWER, CHEMICAL ORDNANCE, OILS, SUBMARINES, TERRORISM, RELIGION, ADVANCED WEAPONS, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, LIQUIFIED GASES, STRATEGIC AREAS, MILITARY ART.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) OPERATIONAL ART, REARMAMENT.

*AD-A311 525

AD-A310 930

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC

NAVAL WAR COLL
NEWPORT RI

(U) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement.

(U) A Systems Approach to Assessing the Vulnerabilities of
U.S. Domestic Sea Ports to Acts of Sabotage and Terrorism.

FEB 96 49P

MAY 96 68P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: Grohoski, David C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Partial Contents include: Enhancing Our Security; Maintaining a Strong Defense Capability; Major Regional Contingencies; Overseas Presence; Counterterrorism, Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other Missions; Combating Terrorism; Fighting Drug Trafficking; Other Missions Deciding When and How to Employ U.S. Forces; Combating the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles; Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation; Nuclear Forces; Arms Control; Peace Operations; Strong Intelligence Capabilities; Fighting International Organized Crime; National Security Emergency Preparedness; The Environment and Sustainable Development; Promoting Prosperity at Home; Enhancing American Competitiveness; Strengthening Macroeconomic Coordination; Enhancing Access to Foreign Markets; Export Strategy and Advocacy Program; Export Controls; Expanding the Realm of Open Markets, The North American Free Trade Agreement; Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; Uruguay Round of GATT; U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement; Summit of the Americas; U.S.-EU Transatlantic Marketplace; OECD Multilateral Investment Agreement; Preparing International Economic Institutions for the 21st Century; Providing for Energy Security; Promoting Sustainable Development Abroad; Promoting Democracy; Europe and Eurasia; East Asian and the Pacific; The Western Hemisphere; The Middle East, Southwest and South Asia; Africa.

ABSTRACT: (U) A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Advanced Research. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *AREA SECURITY, *TERRORISM, *PORTS (FACILITIES), *SABOTAGE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, RISK, THREATS, SYSTEMS APPROACH, NAVAL WARFARE, DOMESTIC, HARBORS.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), *FOREIGN POLICY, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *NATIONAL SECURITY, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR FORCES (MILITARY), COMPETITION, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, EMERGENCIES, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MACROECONOMICS, PERSONNEL RETENTION, DEFENSE PLANNING, COUNTERTERRORISM, PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, DRUG SMUGGLING, STRATEGIC AREAS, PEACEKEEPING.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) ORGANIZED CRIME, MILITARY PRESENCE.

* Included in *The DTIC Review*, March 1997

AD-A309 983

UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIV OF THE HEALTH
SCIENCES BETHESDA MD DEPT OF PSYCHIATRY(U) Gender, Stress, and Coping in the U.S. Military. Volume
3. Performance.

OCT 95 260P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Ursano, Robert J.; Norwood, Ann
E.; Fullerton, Carol S.; Sutton, Loree K.; Levinson, Catherine.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: AD-A309 980, AD-A309 981,
AD-A309 982.

ABSTRACT: (U) Military leaders have long recognized that mission readiness requires both the absence of disease and the presence of mental, physical, and spiritual health. However, little is presently known about the health of military women, particularly as it may be uniquely affected by trauma and war. Such knowledge is essential to meeting the health needs of military women for all mission contingencies. These missions include: peacekeeping and peacemaking activities (e.g., the Sinai MFO Treaty, Somalia); humanitarian aid (care of civilian refugees following the Persian Gulf War; natural and human-made disasters including assistance in Hurricane Andrew, the Los Angeles riots, threats of chemical terrorist attack, and the Oklahoma City bombing); and potential combat. As the number of active duty women increases (approximately 10% in 1995), women are assuming critical positions of responsibility which fully expose them to the hazards of combat and war. The systematic study of the effects of trauma on women's health is important for women in all branches of service. There is a close interplay between performance, health and psychosocial factors in responding to trauma, disaster, and combat. Understanding the gender-specific responses associated with traumatic stress is important for the development of command policy, training scenarios, and medical care procedures. However, little is presently known about how the health of military women may be uniquely affected by trauma and war.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *STRESS (PSYCHOLOGY), *MILITARY MEDICINE, *TRAUMATIC SHOCK, SCENARIOS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, HAZARDS TRAINING, PERSIAN GULF, OPERATIONAL READINESS, HEALTH, STRESS (PHYSIOLOGY), CHEMICAL WARFARE, ACTIVE DUTY, SOMALIA, MEDICAL SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, MILITARY COMMANDERS, WOMEN, TERRORISM, URBAN AREAS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, BOMBING, OKLAHOMA, SINAI, PEACEKEEPING.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) *POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, GENDER.

*AD-A309 934

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES(U) Force Protection of Strategic Airlift Forces in the
Operations Other Than War Environment.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Monograph.

DEC 95 71P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Hanley, James N.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This monograph examines the U.S. military capability to defend strategic airlift aircraft against current and projected threats in an humanitarian assistance operation. The size of the Joint Task Force (JTF) is frequently restricted by political, material and environmental considerations. Consequently, the JTF commander must consider developing a Time Phased Force Deployment Data List that provides force protection for the airlift force that meets the possible threats and responds to mission constraints. Recent studies suggest two trends: (1) the military airlift aircraft are not equipped to handle the threat, and (2) the JTF must also provide protection to those aircraft flown by NonGovernmental Relief Organizations (NGOs) and the CRAF.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *AIR DEFENSE, *SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES *STRATEGIC WARFARE, * AIRLIFT OPERATIONS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, POLICIES, LESSONS LEARNED, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY AIRCRAFT, THREATS, MILITARY DOCTRINE, TASK FORCES, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, LANDING FIELDS, SOMALIA, MILITARY PLANNING, MANPORTABLE EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, MILITARY TACTICS, COMBAT FORCES, REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, PEACEKEEPING.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, RESTORE HOPE OPERATION, SUPPORT HOPE OPERATION, OOTW (OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR), RWANDA, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES.

AD-A309 692

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

(U) Force Protection Through Security of the Ground Lines
of Communication (GLOC).

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Monograph.

DEC 95 59P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Kolleda, David J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This monograph discusses the importance of understanding the impact that a failure to provide for security of the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) can have on the successful execution of tactical operations. The problem facing military planners is a lack of knowledge and guidance to provide for deliberately establishing conditions to protect against threat actions upon the GLOC and enable the service support forces to provide continuous support. There is no single reference in the common professional soldier's library that addresses and analyzes methods of conducting defensive techniques to protect the ground, and specifically highway, lines of communication during times of conflict. This monograph first identifies the theoretical applications of GLOC security as presented by the early military theorists, then provides analysis of the occurrences and outcomes of pertinent events in past conflicts, analyzing the relevance of ensured sustainment support. It further addresses GLOC security operations in the U.S. Army Force XXI concept and during more contemporary Operations Other Than War (OOTW) deployments. This monograph concludes by identifying what U.S. Army doctrine states relative to GLOC security guidance and operations, what history demonstrates as true, what is lacking between the two, and recommendations on how to bring the doctrinal base and historical knowledge in line in an attempt to provide appropriate planning guidance for the operation and security of ground lines of communication during military operations.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *PROTECTION, *GROUND BASED, *ELECTRONIC SECURITY, *TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPLOYMENT, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, SURVIVABILITY, THREATS, ARMY PERSONNEL, MILITARY DOCTRINE, GUIDANCE, ARMY PLANNING, TACTICAL WARFARE, LIBRARIES, TACTICAL WEAPONS COMBAT AREAS, COUNTERMINING.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) GLOC (GROUND LINES OF COMMUNICATION), FORCE 21, OOTW (OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR).

AD-A309 460

UNIVERSITY COLL CORK (IRELAND)
DEPT OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY

(U) Discriminative Environmental Properties in Terrorist
Environments--A Basis for Training.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept. Nov 87-Dec 91.

MAR 96 53P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Taylor, Maxwell.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This final report describes a series of three interrelated studies addressing the nature of cues predictive of ambush or terrorist threat available to security force personnel in terrorist environments. The studies were as follows: (1) Eighty four actual or attempted ambush situations were reconstructed through interviews with police participants, analysis of records, etc., in Northern Ireland. (2) One single incident involving the eventual arrest of two RAF terrorists in the Netherlands was reconstructed and analyzed in detail through interviews with police participants, records, etc. (3) A series of observational analyses and experimental simulations were undertaken of selected examples of police patrol work in the Republic of Ireland. The studies are analyzed, presented and discussed within a behavioral framework, drawing of the conceptual approach known as the rationale choice perspective. Police behavior in hostile environments is characterized as being under the discriminative control of critical environment cues, and the studies presented are analyzed in terms of the availability of cues to participants. Contrasts are made in terms of the process of control between rule governance vs. immediate contingency control.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *BEHAVIOR, *TERRORISM, *AMBUSH, TERRORISTS, FOREIGN POLICY, NETHERLANDS, PATROLLING, MILITARY TRAINING, IRELAND, SPECIAL FORCES, SECURITY PERSONNEL.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) NORTHERN IRELAND.

AD-A309 427

ARMY WAR COLL
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) Force XXI and Peace Operations.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Strategy research rept.

APR 96 34P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Shambach, Stephen A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The purpose of this paper is to answer the question: How well does Force XXI, the Army's guiding doctrine for the Army for the 21st Century, prepare us to accomplish the missions we are most likely to face? Force XXI is best suited for future conflict at the high end of the spectrum (War) which is the most dangerous threat, but has serious shortcomings when applied to peace operations, the most likely threat we face. This paper first discusses a vision of future armed conflict. Then, peace operations requirements are defined and described. Force XXI characteristics and principles are reviewed. Force XXI principles when compared with peace operations requirements identify shortfalls and weaknesses. Solutions are recommended to address the identified weaknesses of Force XXI for peace operations.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *ARMY PLANNING, *PEACEKEEPING, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, MILITARY DOCTRINE, SOLUTIONS (GENERAL), LIMITATIONS, MISSIONS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, THREAT EVALUATION, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) FORCE XXI, ARMED CONFLICT, TIER I THREAT, OOTW (OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR).

AD-A309 043

ARMY WAR COLL
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) The Role of the U.S. Civilian Authorities and Military Forces in the Battle Against Terrorism.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Research rept.

APR 96 26P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Giancarlo, Guy A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Terrorism is increasingly in the news. The United States, as the preeminent world power, will become increasingly a target of terrorist acts. This paper analyzes the role of the U.S. Civilian Authorities and Military Forces in the battle against terrorism. It reviews U.S. policy and lead agency responsibilities as well as the impact on international law and American civil liberties. It reviews current and possible future threats and makes recommendations regarding proactive measures the U.S. should be taking now to prevent successful terrorist attacks.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), *UNITED STATES, *CIVIL DEFENSE, *DEFENSE PLANNING, *COUNTERTERRORISM, GLOBAL, IMPACT, ATTACK, TARGETS, POWER, TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW.

AD-A309 021

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC
INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

(U) Strategic Forum. Number 74. International Organized
Crime. A Growing National Security Threat.

MAY 96 4P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Sullivan, Brian.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Organized crime (as opposed to ordinary gangs, terrorist groups or guerrilla organizations): (1) lacks ideology; (2) has an organized hierarchy; (3) has continuity over time; (4) has willingness to threaten or use force; (5) has restrictive membership; (6) gains profits through criminal activity; (7) provides illegal goods/services desired by segments of the general population; (8) neutralizes some public officials and politicians by corruption or intimidation; (9) seeks monopolies of specific goods or services; (10) assigns specialized activities to gang members; (11) has a code of secrecy; (12) carefully plans for long-term goals. The most important factor in the growth of organized crime has been the development of a global network for illegal drug trafficking that produces multi-billion dollar profits. Other developments also have an impact. The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the growth of capitalism in China removed barriers to both legitimate business and criminal activity. The worldwide financial system now involves so many transactions that they cannot be monitored adequately. The establishment of a North American free trade area and the lowering of European customs and passport controls provides unintended opportunities for criminals. And, the weakening of state authority in former Communist countries and in so-called failing states has weakened their police agencies and judicial systems.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *GLOBAL, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *THREATS, *CRIMINOLOGY, *LIMITED WARFARE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, ECONOMIC IMPACT, COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CONTINUITY, HIERARCHIES, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS INTERVENTION, PROFITS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, POLICE, TERRORISM, FINANCE, FACTOR ANALYSIS, DRUG SMUGGLING, CRIMES, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) *ORGANIZED CRIME.

AD-A308 596

ARMY WAR COLL
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) A Chaordic Threat: Right Wing Terrorism in the United States.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Strategy research rept.

FEB 96 40P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Driscoll, John B.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Future war is emerging in our own culture and language. The threat is chaordic and possesses unity of effort with little visible unity of command. Our nation is at risk but doesn't fully comprehend an enemy that is elusive, global, serious, survivable and effective. This paper focuses on the traits endemic to a threat that purposefully avoids definition, and is strategically targeting the United States Government portion of Clausewitz's remarkable trinity as an intermediate objective. Because its shared strategic purpose is global, this chaordic threat conducts superterrorism. This threat poses a learning opportunity about full dimension war, and suggests that points of departure to the new paradigm are flattening hierarchical organizations and redefining doctrinal battlespace as battlesystem awareness. Strategic success will depend on linking security battlesystems in real battlespace.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *THREATS, *TERRORISM, WARFARE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, RISK, TARGETING, HIERARCHIES, BATTLES, AWARENESS.

AD-A307 554

NAVAL WAR COLL
NEWPORT RI

(U) The Vulnerabilities of U.S. Strategic Ports to Acts of Sabotage.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

FEB 96 37P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Grohoski, David C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) In an era where war is a 'come as you are' affair, the ramifications of arriving too late, or with insufficient forces could prove to be devastating. The recent bombings of the World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City shattered the myth that the United States is exempt from the effects of terrorism. The changing global security environment demands increase vigilance in guarding our vital institutions. The U.S. deterrent policy relies on power projection and the ability to get forces to areas of crisis in a timely manner. The U.S. deploys 95% of its supplies and equipment by sea. We can no longer assume that our domestic seaports are free from the effects of sabotage and terrorism. The U.S. seaports present an exposed target whose attack would serve to enhance the aims of any terrorist organization. It is conceivable that a single, violent act could shatter the balanced, time-sensitive U.S. deployment schedule. The vulnerabilities of our strategic seaports, which deploy and sustain our forces, demands a new sense of awareness on the part of the Department of Defense.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *VULNERABILITY, *TARGETS, *TERRORISM, *PORTS (FACILITIES), *STRATEGIC AREAS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPLOYMENT, UNITED STATES, NATIONAL SECURITY, ENVIRONMENTS, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, EXPOSURE(GENERAL), VIGILANCE, THESES, AREA SECURITY, AIRPORTS, URBAN AREAS, DETERRENCE, BOMBING, SABOTAGE.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) DOMESTIC POLICY.

AD-A306 783

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) How Men Rebel. An Organizational Model for Insurgency.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

DEC 95 246P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Bender, William; Johnson, Craig L.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Internal conflict is steadily increasing in importance. Whether it is called low intensity conflict or operations other than war, current conflict theories do not adequately explain the dynamics of internal conflict nor provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This thesis serves two purposes. The first is to provide a model to analyze and describe internal conflict dynamics. The second is to provide decision makers with a strategic, systemic framework to successfully conduct internal war. The thesis is divided into four sections. The first examines internal conflict theories and develops a model. The second tests the model in 3 case studies demonstrating the explanatory effectiveness of the model. The third looks at the theoretical and practical implications of the model for an external actor such as the United States. The fourth section concludes the study and highlights policy prescriptions. A systemic approach to internal war provides policy makers at the NSC, DOD and DOS with a useful and objective decision making tool.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *ORGANIZATION THEORY, *POLITICAL REVOLUTION, *INSURGENCY, FOREIGN POLICIES, ALGERIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, DECISION MAKING, ISLAM, MILITARY DOCTRINE, DYNAMICS, THESES, OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, INTERNAL CONFLICT, SYSTEMS APPROACH, STRATEGIC WARFARE, MILITARY PLANNING, INTERVENTION, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, SOCIAL SCIENCES, COUNTERINSURGENCY.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) *INTERNAL CONFLICT, MALAYAN EMERGENCY, IRA (IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY), FUNDAMENTALISM, POWELL DOCTRINE, WEINBERGER DOCTRINE, NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY.

AD-A306 243

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Information Age Terrorism: Toward Cyberterror.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

DEC 95 150P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Littleton, Matthew J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The growing ubiquity of computers and their associated networks is propelling the world into the information age. Computers may revolutionize terrorism in the same manner that they have revolutionized everyday life. Terrorism in the information age will consist of conventional terrorism, in which classic weapons (explosives, guns, etc.) will be used to destroy property and kill victims in the physical world; technoterrorism, in which classic weapons will be used to destroy infrastructure targets and cause a disruption in cyberspace; and cyberterrorism, where new weapons (malicious software, electromagnetic and microwave weapons) will operate to destroy data in cyberspace to cause a disruption in the physical world. The advent of cyberterrorism may force a shift in the definition of terrorism to include both disruption and violence in cyberspace in the same manner as physical destruction and violence. Through the use of new technology, terrorist groups may have fewer members, yet still have a global reach. The increasing power of computers may lower the threshold of state sponsorship to a point where poor states can become sponsors and rich states are no longer necessary for terrorist groups to carry out complex attacks. This thesis explores the shift toward information warfare across the conflict spectrum and its implications for terrorism. By examining the similarities and differences with past conventional terrorism, policymakers will be able to place information age terrorism into a known framework and begin to address the problem.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *DATA PROCESSING SECURITY, *TERRORISM, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, WEAPONS, WARFARE, GLOBAL, KILL PROBABILITIES, COMPUTERS, PHYSICAL PROPERTIES, THRESHOLD EFFECTS, ATTACK, DESTRUCTION, THESES, EXPLOSIVES, CASUALTIES, POWER, GUNS, COUNTERTERRORISM.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) *CYBERTERRORISM, INFORMATION WARFARE.

AD-A305 891

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Microviolence at Sea, 1975-1995: A Data Analysis.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

DEC 95 90P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Lumpkin, Michael D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The traditional definitional constraints of terrorism have resulted in the failure to effectively categorize all political acts of violence in the maritime environment. This thesis offers the more practical and useful paradigm of 'Microviolence' for viewing this phenomenon. The intent of developing this paradigm was to create a framework which permits the creation of a databased investigation of all recorded incidents of illegitimate political violence in the maritime environment. The database itself is focused on the period from 1975 to 1995 and was designed to permit rigorous statistical analysis. The database includes 374 reported cases of microviolence and each was dissected into 98 separate variables to permit a comprehensive quantitative and statistical picture of the trends and characteristics of microviolence for the past 20 years to be developed. The ultimate goal has been to create a comprehensive tool to determine and analyze the characteristics of illegitimate political violent incidents and its perpetrators.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *DATA BASES, *STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, *OCEAN ENVIRONMENTS, *TERRORISM, DATA PROCESSING, SHIPS, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, THESES, VARIABLES, PATTERNS.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) MICROVIOLENCE, MAS (MICROVIOLENCE AT SEA).

AD-A303 791

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON DC OFFICE OF AVIATION RESEARCH

(U) Dupe Checklist System. Resolution Procedures Manual.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

DEC 95 29P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Fobes, J. L.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: Prepared in cooperation with
DCS, Inc., Egg Harbor Twp, NJ.

ABSTRACT: (U) The Resolution Procedures Manual is one of five security reference handbooks providing background information, guidelines and procedures regarding passenger questioning and resolutions in conjunction with the Dupe Checklist (DCS) Program. It is intended to be used for operational guidance and/or training activities. A passenger may be duped into carrying a bomb on board an aircraft under the following circumstances: (1) A bomb is placed in an unsuspecting passenger's unattended baggage; (2) An unsuspecting passenger is given a bag to transport on his/her flight. A bomb is concealed inside the bag; (3) An unsuspecting passenger is given an item or a package to transport on his/her flight. The item/package contains a bomb; (4) An unsuspecting passenger is given a 'gift' just prior to the flight. The gift contains a bomb; (5) A passenger may believe that he/she is involved in some type of illegal activity. Such a passenger may believe that his/her bag contains contraband (e.g., drugs, gold, cash, or diamonds). The passenger is not aware of the true contents of his/her bag (a bomb); (6) A passenger who is a terrorist, or a terrorist group sympathizer, may believe he/she is transferring confidential material or an explosive to his/her destination. In reality the passenger is carrying a bomb set up to go off on his/her flight.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *INTERROGATION, *AVIATION SAFETY, *HANDBOOKS, *SECURITY PERSONNEL, *PASSENGERS, *DECEPTION, TRAINING, RESOLUTION, DIAMONDS, TERMINAL FLIGHT FACILITIES, TRANSPORT, GUIDANCE, AREA SECURITY, DRUGS, GOLD, PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, BOMBS, TERRORISM, INSTRUCTION MANUALS, BAGS.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) *AVIATION SECURITY, OCS (WIPE CHECKLIST PROGRAM), RPM (RESOLUTION PROCEDURES MANUAL), FCA (FAILED CHECKLIST ANSWERS), AVSEC (AVIATION SECURITY).

AD-A302 854

AIR FORCE INST OF TECH
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

(U) An Analysis of the Terrorist Threat and its Implications for a Free America.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

DEC 95 83P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Bannister, Kevin E.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *THREAT EVALUATION, *TERRORISM, POLICIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, COMBAT READINESS, VULNERABILITY, THESES, COUNTERTERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, STATE GOVERNMENT, CRIMES, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL DISTURBANCES.

AD-A300 106

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

(U) A Model of Insurgency: Reflections of Clausewitz's
'Paradoxical Trinity' Lessons for Operational Planners
Considering Conventional Forces in Unconventional
Operations.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Monograph.

MAY 95 56P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Buckley, John C., II

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This monograph addresses the employment of conventional military force against insurgency. First, it provides a model to analyze insurgency in terms of Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity." Secondly, the monograph assesses this model's validity by applying it to the Vietnam War and the conflict in Northern Ireland. The paper concludes with implications for future planners considering conventional forces in unconventional operations. Although the two world powers failed to direct military operations properly in their respective insurgent environments, this study provides some unique operational planning considerations. These considerations are important since the end of the Cold War has simultaneously caused a reduction in U.S. military forces and compelled the U.S. to increase its global commitments in a hostile strategic environment.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *CONVENTIONAL WARFARE,
*UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, *INSURGENCY,
MILITARY OPERATIONS, ENVIRONMENT,
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, MILITARY FORCES
(FOREIGN), VALIDATION PLANNING, COLD WAR,
ENEMY, NORTH(DIRECTION), IRELAND, VIETNAM.

AD-A298 595

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON DC

(U) The Persian Gulf Hostages: A Case Study in Terrorism,
Diplomacy, and Strategy.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

APR 95 87P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Murdoch, Christopher P.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Persian Gulf Hostage Crisis began on 09 August 1990, one week after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, with the Iraqi announcement that thousands of Americans and other foreigners stranded in Iraq would not be permitted to leave. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait caught most U.S. policy makers and other international political observers by surprise and marked the beginning of the pre-crisis phase. The hostage crisis continued through 06 December 1990, when Saddam announced the release of all foreigners. The post-crisis phase, consisting of the Persian Gulf War cease-fire, and ongoing attempts to force Iraq to fully comply with all United Nations resolutions, has provided the setting for the next hostage crisis, given the willingness of the Iraqi government, again last month, to take Americans hostage.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
*HOSTAGES, *TERRORISM, OBSERVERS, WARFARE,
KUWAIT, POLITICAL SCIENCE, CRISIS
MANAGEMENT, PERSIAN GULF, CASE STUDIES,
UNITED NATIONS, IRAN.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) SADDAM HUSSEIN.

AD-A298 118

NAVAL WAR COLL
NEWPORT RI
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

(U) Islamic Fundamentalism. Considerations for the
Operational Commander.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

MAY 95 25P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Rosbolt, P. K.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) With the removal of Cold War restraints, the world is entering insurgency and revolution. Current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is codified in Joint Pub 3-07 Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. This doctrine grew out of lessons learned in Vietnam, where the communist opposition generally followed a Maoist pattern of revolution. Many of the new insurgencies, however, may be "Islamic Fundamentalist" in character. Based on examination of the Iranian Revolution and the ongoing Algerian uprising, it appears that Islamic insurgencies represent a significant threat to U.S. security and are substantially different in nature from the Maoist model. The key to a successful Islamic revolution is the ability of the radical clergy to first harness a mass revolt of the urban lower class, and then gain the support of the secular opposition. This may occur very quickly, as the existing religious infrastructure becomes the revolutionary organization. Patterns of operation may include use of religious symbolism as cover for revolutionary activities and use of suicide/high risk attacks on regime and western targets. The CINC may exploit these differences by attacking the cohesiveness of anti-government forces and minimizing cultural antagonism. Additionally, he must be prepared to conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) on short notice, and institute effective anti-terrorism measures.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *ISLAM, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *INSURGENCY, LESSONS LEARNED, MILITARY DOCTRINE, TARGETS, COLD WAR, RESTRAINT, MILITARY COMMANDERS, IRAN, TERRORISM, POLITICAL REVOLUTION, EVACUATION, VIETNAM, URBAN AREAS, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, NONCOMBATANT.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) FUNDAMENTALISM.

AD-A297 950

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Responses to Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism (1980 - 1994):
A Comparative Analysis.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

DEC 94 101P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Voigt, Bradley D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This thesis examines four responses to Libyan-sponsored terrorism: the 1982 American Embargo, the 1984 American request to Europe for economic sanctions, the 1986 American bombing raid on Tripoli, and the 1992 United Nations economic sanctions. The rationale leading up to each response is analyzed from American political, diplomatic and security points of view. Two measures are developed to judge the effectiveness of each response: an economic indicator which determines the impact of each response on Libyan exports, and the rise or fall in Libyan-sponsored terrorist incidents before and after each response. Five hypotheses are introduced which attempt to explain the interaction of states in the international system when faced with alleged state-sponsored terrorism. Each response is critiqued using the five hypotheses and also the measures of effectiveness. Following this critique the thesis concludes that a firm military and flexible diplomatic response is the most effective response to state-sponsored terrorism.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *LIBYA, *RESPONSE, *COUNTERTERRORISM, *TERRORISM, EUROPE, ECONOMICS, THESES, CASE STUDIES, HYPOTHESES, INDICATORS, IMPORTS.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) UNILATERAL RESPONSE,
MULTILATERAL RESPONSE.

AD-A297 942

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Towards Understanding Terrorism: A Theoretical Examination of Internal Cohesion in Terrorist Groups and the Negative Dynamic of Violence.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

MAR 95 134P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Sper, Mary K.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Terrorism, like other forms of political violence, has an organizational context. Few studies, however, have considered the influence of organizational life upon the outward behavior of the terrorist group. This thesis explores the possibility that terrorism, in addition to its political context reflects the internal dynamics of the terrorist group. Assuming that action is what binds the terrorist group together, the use of violence may oftentimes be dictated more by the need to satisfy the internal goal of group survival than to directly further the group's external political agenda. Focusing upon internal cohesion as the critical mediating variable for group survival, this paper examines how the terrorist group's efforts to maintain itself drives violent behavior that transcends political considerations and operational prudence. When external and internal requirements become contradictory, the terrorist group faces a dilemma. Caught in a vicious cycle of reacting to strategic failure with more violent action in order to maintain itself, the terrorist group generates a negative dynamic of violence that not only undermines its chances of achieving stated long-term goals but also accelerates its decline.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *GROUP DYNAMICS, *TERRORISM, ORGANIZATIONS, THESES, INTERNAL, COHESION.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

AD-A296 307

LONDON UNIV (UNITED KINGDOM)
INST OF PSYCHIATRY

(U) Psychological Approaches to Organized Aggression: Second Final Report.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept. Jun 85-Jun 87

JAN 95 45P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Rachman, Stanley J.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The purpose of this paper was to consider whether psychologists are in a position to improve our understanding of and ability to deal with terrorism and its effects. The psychological aspects of terrorism are divided into six categories. The six categories of psychological terrorism are (1) psychological analyses of the terrorist; (2) the nature, timing, and effects of terrorist acts; (3) the behavior during acts of terrorism of terrorists, victims, and negotiators; (4) the prediction and prevention of acts of terrorism; (5) the effects of such acts on victims; and (6) psychological assistance for victims.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *PSYCHOLOGY, *TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, SECURITY, REPORTS, BEHAVIOR, POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

AD-A295 870

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

MAY 95 98P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Pelletiere, Stephen C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City has highlighted the complexity of political extremism. Until then, the United States focused its attention on foreign terrorists, particularly the so called Islamic fundamentalists. Undue emphasis on this "foreign connection" can make it appear that only Middle Eastern terror is of consequence. This report resulted from a November 1994 conference cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute; the Institute for National Security Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy; and the Georgia Institute of Technology. A number of terrorist-related issues were considered. The emphasis was on international terror, but the threat of domestic extremism was also examined.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, UNITED STATES, POLICIES, FOREIGN, ATTENTION, URBAN AREAS, GEORGIA, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY, OKLAHOMA.

AD-A295 465

ARMY WAR COLL LIBRARY
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) Operations other than War. A Selected Bibliography.

MAY 95 45P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Shope, Virginia C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Military operations other than war encompass the use of military capabilities for any purpose other than war. These operations range from peacetime operations such as providing assistance to civil authorities, to combat operations associated with short-duration interventions, to postcombat restoration operations. This bibliography covers materials that address the subject in a general manner, as well as readings that focus specifically on recent operations like RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE COMFORT, and the Hurricane Andrew restoration.

CONTENTS: General Information; Support to Counterdrug Operations; Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies; Domestic Disaster Response; International Humanitarian Assistance; Combating Terrorism; Support to Domestic Civil Authorities; Noncombatant Evacuation; Nation Assistance; Peace Operations; and Related Bibliographies.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *CRISIS MANAGEMENT, *PEACETIME, *BIBLIOGRAPHIES, *NONCOMBATANT, WARFARE, DISASTERS, RESPONSE, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, DOMESTIC, TERRORISM, EVACUATION, COUNTERINSURGENCY, DRUG INTERDICTION, INSURGENCY.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) RESTORE HOPE OPERATION, PROVIDE COMFORT OPERATION.

AD-A291 383

ARMY WAR COLL
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA(U) Parameters. U.S. Army War College Quarterly. Volume
25. Number 1. Spring 1995.

95 163P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Madigan, John J., III

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This periodical is the quarterly journal of the U.S. Army War College. Partial Contents of the Spring 1995 issue include: Dealing Realistically with Fratricide; Challenges of Ethnic Strife and Humanitarian Relief; Ethnic Conflict--The Perils of Military Intervention; New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision Making Institutions; Threat Parameters to Operations Other Than War; The International Humanitarian Response System; Does China Threaten Asia Pacific Stability?; MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War Against Japan. Includes Book Reviews. Parameters is a journal of ideas and issues, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, *LAND WARFARE, *GEOPOLITICS, *MILITARY TRAINING, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), MILITARY HISTORY, MILITARY PERSONNEL, MILITARY STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY, DECISION MAKING, LEADERSHIP, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, THREATS, PARAMETERS, JAPAN, THREAT EVALUATION, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, ETHNIC GROUPS, CONFLICT, UNIVERSITIES, ETHICS, OFFICER PERSONNEL ARMY, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, CATALYTIC CONFLICT (WARFARE), NATIONAL DEFENSE, PERIODICALS, CHINA, FRATRICIDE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) JOURNALS, ETHNIC CONFLICT, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, OOTW (OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR), PEACEKEEPING, PEACEMAKING, PACIFICATION, MILITARY INTERVENTION, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ASIA PACIFIC REGION, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, OPERATIONAL ART, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, MACARTHUR DOUGLAS.

AD-A288 911

INDUSTRIAL COLL OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON DC

(U) The Post-Cold War Era and the Weinberger Doctrine.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Research rept. Aug 93-Apr 94.
APR 94 27P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Johnson, Kathy L.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) At the height of the Cold War, in 1984, then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger developed six criteria for deciding when to use United States combat forces abroad. These criteria which became known as the Weinberger Doctrine, outlined specific tests which should be met before deploying United States combat forces. The criteria were developed at a time when some members of the Reagan Administration appeared eager to use combat force as the instrument of choice for influencing world events. Secretary Weinberger on the other hand, believed that military force is just one of many tools of national power, and certainly not the preferred tool in every situation. Thus, he sought to restrict use of combat forces to specific situations where they could be most effective. In the ten years since Secretary Weinberger first enunciated his tests for the use of combat forces, the world political environment has changed tremendously -- the Berlin wall is down, soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has ended, and the Soviet leadership has renounced its communist doctrine. The Cold War is over. Yet, our troops are still actively engaged in a number of countries. And at home, we are in the midst of a public debate concerning the use of United States military forces abroad. Because of this changed (and changing) world political environment, now is an appropriate time to examine the relevance of the Weinberger Doctrine to the post-cold war world. This paper will describe the background of the Weinberger Doctrine, and discuss each of the six criteria, with emphasis on how the criteria relate to the post-cold war environment. After examining two significant changes--the shifting balance of power and the increased threat of regional conflicts, this paper will demonstrate that the Weinberger Doctrine is no longer needed.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *MILITARY PLANNING, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), FOREIGN POLICY, USSR, DEPLOYMENT, GLOBAL, POLITICAL SCIENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS, DECISION MAKING, LEADERSHIP, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, THREAT EVALUATION, COLD WAR, POWER, COMBAT FORCES, COMMUNISM, PUBLIC OPINION, EASTERN EUROPE, BALANCE OF POWER.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) POST COLD WAR ERA, WEINBERGER CASPER, WEINBERGER DOCTRINE, NEW WORLD ORDER, CRITERIA, BERLIN WALL.

AD-A288 849

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

NOV 94 73P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Pelletiere, Stephen C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The author argues that two Arab religious organizations--Hamas, operating in Israel-occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and Hizbollah, operating in southern Lebanon--are more dangerous to U.S. interests than heretofore has been thought. They are not mere terrorist groups, but part of a universal movement that has succeeded in mobilizing elements previously suppressed throughout the Middle East, and is attempting to radicalize the whole Arab world. This study seeks to alert U.S. policy makers and military leaders to the larger potential danger posed by Hamas and Hizbollah.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MIDDLE EAST, *TERRORISM, *RELIGION, LEBANON, ISRAEL, GLOBAL, ARABS, MILITARY COMMANDERS, PALESTINIANS.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) HAMAS, HIZBOLLAH, JIHAD, GAZA, WEST BANK, SHIAS.

AD-A288 676

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV
WASHINGTON DC

(U) Is Islam a Threat to the West? Maybe (Maybe Not).

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Research rept. Aug 93-Apr 94.

APR 94 42P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Frahler, Donald A.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Khomeini's revolution, terrorism, and oil have all caused the West to look with concern to the East. Academics have fueled this concern with numerous articles describing the problem as an Islamic threat or a "clash of civilizations." The author provides a review of Islam and Muslim revivals, and asserts that Islam is not the next threat to replace the Soviet Red Menace. He suggests that Western policy makers should only view the Eastern concern for Western secularism as a warning to the West to return to its heritage. America will survive the Muslim "onslaught" much as it has assimilated other cultures over the past two hundred years.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *ISLAM, *GEOPOLITICS, USSR, EUROPE, NATIONAL SECURITY, CROSS CULTURE (SOCIOLOGY), THREATS RUSSIA, ETHNIC GROUPS, WESTERN SECURITY (INTERNATIONAL), CULTURE, TERRORISM, CATALYTIC CONFLICT (WARFARE), RELIGION, POLITICAL REVOLUTION.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) KHOMEINI (AYATTOLAH), POST COLD WAR ERA, CLASH OF CULTURES, HUNTINGTON SAMUEL P.

AD-A288 625

RAND CORP
SANTA MONICA CA(U) Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids:
Current Shortfalls.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Research rept.

94 94P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Pirnie, Bruce; Harrell, Margaret C.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, analytic agencies supporting the Service staffs, and military educational institutions support the defense planning, programming, and budgeting process with a variety of automated decision aids. Based on a survey of these organizations, we conclude that currently used decision aids cover Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions inadequately: counter terrorism is not covered. Special reconnaissance is partially covered by some models, except that beach reconnaissance is only scripted. Direct action is partially covered by some models, except that recovery of personnel and material is not covered. Unconventional warfare is not covered. Foreign internal defense is partially covered by two models offering extremely different perspectives.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, *DEFENSE PLANNING, RECOVERY, AUTOMATION, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, FOREIGN, INTERNAL, PERSONNEL, BUDGETS, DECISION AIDS, SPECIAL FORCES, RECONNAISSANCE, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, BEACHES, COUNTERTERRORISM, SHORTAGES.

AD-A286 802

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA(U) Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of
American Capability.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

FEB 95 46P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Metz, Steven.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The author argues that insurgency is mutating in response to changes in the global security environment, thus making much of U.S. strategy and doctrine obsolete. Even though counterinsurgency is not currently a high priority in U.S. national security policy, the military must keep abreast of such changes and preserve some expertise so that American capability could be reconstituted should policymakers again opt for active counterinsurgency support. He states that if the military ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *COUNTERINSURGENCY, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, *MILITARY PLANNING, *WESTERN SECURITY (INTERNATIONAL), LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, INSURGENCY, GUERRILLA WARFARE, POLITICAL REVOLUTION MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), NATIONAL SECURITY, MILITARY STRATEGY, MILITARY DOCTRINE, MILITARY .

AD-A284 632

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS(U) An Analysis of the Twenty-One Missions of the Marine
Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable).DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis 2 Aug 93-3 Jun 94.
JUN 94 173P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Nicholson, Lawrence D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This study examines and analyzes the current status of the Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable, or MEU (SOC) program. A detailed analysis was conducted of each of the 21 missions for validity and relevance as MEU (SOC) missions. The methodology used in conducting the research included the issuing of 125 survey questionnaires to Marine Corps field grade officers. This survey asked the respondents to rank each mission in order of importance to the Marine Corps, and comment on its inclusion as a MEU (SOC) mission. The study found that only four of the 21 missions warranted inclusion as truly special operations missions. The study recommended that the remaining 17 missions be deleted from the list of MEU (SOC) missions and be renamed as MAGTF capabilities. This recommendation was based upon their not meeting a series of four established criteria. The missions that were recommended to be retained as MEU (SOC) missions were: (1) in-extremis hostage rescue, (2) tactical and clandestine recovery operations, (3) maritime interdiction operations, and (4) gas and oil platform seizure operations.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY RESEARCH, *COVERT OPERATIONS, *MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, FIELD GRADE OFFICERS, HOSTAGES, INTERDICTION, MARINE CORPS, METHODOLOGY, MISSIONS, OPERATION, QUESTIONNAIRES, RAIDS, RECOVERY, RESCUES, SURVEYS, AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) MEUSOC (MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE), SPECIAL OPERATIONS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, MAGTF (MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE), CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

AD-A284 509

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS(U) Airborne Forcible Entry Operations: USAF Airlift
Requirements.DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's Thesis 2 Aug 93-3 Jun 94.
JUN 94 141P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Schatz, Rowayne A., Jr.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) As the United States transitions towards a national military strategy based on power projection instead of forward deployed armed forces, contingency forces and their capabilities will become increasingly more important. A key capability required to successfully implement a force projection defense strategy is the ability to conduct a forcible entry. In a forcible entry situation, either airborne or amphibious forces could secure a lodgment and prepare for the introduction of follow-on combat forces. This study investigates the requirements USAF airlift forces must meet to successfully support airborne forcible entry operations. It reviews airlift contributions to past airborne operations in World War II, Grenada, and Panama. Then this study surveys the current world situation to determine what distances airlift forces must cover and the threat environments they must penetrate to successfully deliver airborne forces to potential target areas. Potential airborne forcible entry targets are developed by listing countries involved in armed conflict, drug trafficking, or state-sponsored terrorism, and removing littoral areas. This study then determines lift, distance, threat survivability, and training requirements for USAF airlift forces to successfully support airborne forcible entry operations.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY STRATEGY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, AIRBORNE, COMBAT FORCES, CONFLICT, DRUGS, GRENADA, LANDING FIELDS, PANAMA, PARACHUTES, REQUIREMENTS, STRATEGY, SURVEYS, SURVIVABILITY, TARGETS, TERRORISM, THREATS, TRAINING TRANSITIONS, UNITED STATES, WARFARE, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, THREATS, THREAT EVALUATION, LESSONS LEARNED, FORECASTING, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS, AIR FORCE PLANNING, AIRBORNE, TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AIRLIFT OPERATIONS, COVERT OPERATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, GRENADA, PANAMA.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) POST COLD WAR ERA, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY, POWER PROJECTION, FORWARD DEPLOYMENT, *CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, CONTINGENCY FORCES, *FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS, *AIRBORNE FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS, PARACHUTE SEIZURES.

AD-A284 177

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Terrorism As a Psychological Operation: A Comparative Analysis of the Zionist and the Palestinian Terrorist Campaigns.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

MAR 94 281P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Boyd, Curtis D.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Terrorism is a quintessential psychological operation involving the use of violence to convey a message to multiple audiences. As a psychological operation, terrorism produces two effects; one propaganda and the other psychological warfare. The propaganda effects are informative, persuasive, or compelling among neutral, friendly or potentially friendly target audiences. The psychological warfare effects are provocative, disruptive, and coercive among enemy or hostile target audiences. By comparing the Zionist and the Palestinian terrorist campaigns, this thesis demonstrates how terrorism produces psychological warfare and propaganda effects on multiple audiences and the consequences of each. The success of the Jewish resistance resulted from a strategy of terrorism that identified the psychological vulnerabilities of certain audiences, controlled for the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on those audiences, and anticipated audience response. By comparison, the Palestinian resistance did not control for the psychological warfare and propaganda effects on multiple audiences. Palestinian terrorism was exclusively psychological warfare, which failed to propagandize the cause beyond their national constituency. In either case, the success or failure of terrorism should be understood in part by viewing their campaigns of terror through the prism of psychological operations.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *ZIONISM, *PALESTINIANS, *TERRORISM, COMPARISON, CONTROL, ENEMY, FAILURE, NEUTRAL, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, PROPAGANDA, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, PUBLIC OPINION, RESISTANCE, RESPONSE, GUERRILLA WARFARE, STRATEGY TARGETS, TERRORISTS, THESES, UNDERGROUND, VULNERABILITY, WARFARE, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, ISRAEL, ARABS, ARAB GUERRILLAS, JEWS, MILITARY OPERATIONS, INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, PALESTINE, POLITICAL RESISTANCE, UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC WILL, VIOLENCE, TARGET AUDIENCES, JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, CONSTITUENCY.

AD-A284 142

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Guerrilla Violence in Colombia: Examining Causes and Consequences.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

JUN 94 150P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Roman, Juan F.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Colombia's history is replete with acts of political violence. Guerrilla violence has been of major historical significance in the country, where guerrilla groups have operated without interruption since the mid-1940s. This thesis investigates the causes and consequences of guerrilla violence in Colombia. The research begins with an examination of the country's political history, in which the constant oscillation between two traditional parties and their ideologies has often resulted in violent conflict. There is also a discussion of the various stakeholders in guerrilla violence; from the guerrilla groups and political parties, to the Catholic Church, to various economic and social groups, each has had its own motivations and methods in reacting to and/or encouraging the phenomenon of violence for political ends. Due to the recent shift of focus by some guerrilla elements from political to economic objectives, an analysis of the economic causes and consequences of guerrilla violence is also undertaken. Finally, there is a review of the constitutional reform process that has led to an opportunity for the country to resolve political issues through nonviolent means.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *GUERRILLA WARFARE, *DISTRIBUTION (ECONOMICS), CHURCHES, COLOMBIA, CONFLICT, ECONOMICS, FINANCE, HISTORY, INSURGENCY, POLITICAL PARTIES, THESES, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, POLITICAL REVOLUTION, SOCIOLOGY, ETHNIC GROUPS.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) VIOLENCE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, POLITICAL HISTORY, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, CONSTITUTIONS (POLITICAL), POLITICAL REFORMS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, ECONOMIC CONFLICT.

AD-A284 088

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL
FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

(U) Intelligence Preparation of the Future Operational
Battlefield.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Monograph.

MAY 94 57P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Grimsley, William F.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact left the United States with no single identifiable threat. The 'victory' of the Cold War has not provided the U.S. with a significant 'peace dividend' as predicted, but instead presents an unstable and uncertain world. Future conflicts may present U.S. forces with enemies which do not represent traditional nation states but are instead formed from ethnic, religious, tribal, criminal, or corporate based groups. The current intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process provides a useful framework for organizing information required by future commanders. What is lacking, however, is an appreciation for all of the intangible factors which may influence that battlefield based on the potential disparity of actors involved.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *FORECASTING, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, BATTLEFIELDS, COLD WAR, CONFLICT, ENEMY, INTELLIGENCE, ARMY PLANNING, NATIONS, PREPARATION, THREATS, USSR, UNITED STATES, MILITARY DOCTRINE, INSTABILITY, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, ARMY OPERATIONS, THREAT EVALUATION, ETHNIC GROUPS, RELIGION, CRIMES, ECONOMIC WARFARE, CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) POST COLD WAR, IPB (INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD), RUSSIA, TRIBAL CONFLICT, TRIBES, ORGANIZED CRIME, CRIMINALS, CORPORATE BASED GROUPS, POLITICAL GROUPS, *OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR.

AD-A284 066

ARMY RESEARCH INST FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES
ALEXANDRIA VA

(U) Peacekeeping in Somalia.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept. Dec 92-Dec 94.

JUL 94 59P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Harman, Joan

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992. The Resolution states that 'the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace security' and authorized Member States to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief. During the same month, the United States deployed troops assigned to the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) to Somalia. This report describes findings from questionnaires and interviews involving 518 Somalia veterans at Fort Drum, New York. The Somalia peacekeeping mission is unique because it started as a humanitarian mission and evolved into combat. Information gathered about the mission may afford valuable opportunities to improve the effectiveness of future peacekeeping doctrine, force development and training. Results of individual interviews and questionnaires show general discontent with the mission, although most soldiers expressed the opinion that the U.S. Army performed well in Somalia. The soldiers gave high ratings to the performance of their leaders, from battalion levels to unit levels.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY OPERATIONS, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), ARMY PERSONNEL, UNITED NATIONS, JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, SOMALIA, MISSIONS, THREAT EVALUATION, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, QUESTIONNAIRES, DEPLOYMENT, SURVEYS, ARMY RESEARCH, WARFARE, GUERRILLA WARFARE.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, *PEACEKEEPING, PEACE ENFORCING.

♦AD-A283 936

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA(U) Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological
Spectrum.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

JUL 94 41P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Hoffmanan, Bruce

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The author examines the changing nature of terrorism. In comparison to professional terrorists pursuing specific political or ideological objectives, today's amateurs often act from religious or racial convictions. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of people. They are less predictable and, therefore, more difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, and have lethal devices ranging from the relatively simple fertilizer bomb to biologically-altered viruses. Since the United States will remain an attractive target, we need to understand and prepare for this new kind of terrorism.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *TERRORISM,
*UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, BOMBS,
CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, FERTILIZERS,
ADVANCED WEAPONS, GUERRILLA WARFARE,
INSURGENCY, TARGETS, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT,
TERRORISTS, UNITED STATES, VIRUSES, WARFARE,
NUCLEAR WARFARE, CHEMICAL WARFARE,
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, VULNERABILITY, THREAT
EVALUATION, VIRUS DISEASES.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) RMA (REVOLUTION IN MILITARY
AFFAIRS), TECHNOLOGICAL WARFARE, AMATEUR
TERRORISTS, PROFESSIONAL TERRORISTS,
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES,
FERTILIZER BOMBS.

AD-A283 836

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA(U) The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of
War.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

JUL 94 48P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Metz, Steven; Kievit, James

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Many American strategic thinkers believe that we are in the beginning stages of a historical revolution in military affairs (RMA). This will not only change the nature of warfare, but also alter the global geopolitical balance. To date, most attention has fallen on the opportunities provided by the RMA rather than its risks, costs, and unintended consequences. In the arena of conflict short of war, these risks, costs, and unintended consequences may outweigh the potential benefits. The Cold War notion of conflict short of war is obsolete. Politically and militarily, the Third World of the future will be full of danger. The future will most likely be dominated by peace enforcement in failed states, new forms of insurgency and terrorism, and 'gray area phenomena.' Many if not most Third World states will fragment into smaller units. Ungovernability and instability will be the norm with power dispersed among warlords, primal militias, and well-organized politico-criminal organizations. U.S. policy in the Third World is likely to be more selective and the U.S. homeland may no longer provide sanctuary. Renewed external support will restore the lagging proficiency of insurgents and terrorists. Emerging technology will have less impact on conflict short of war than on conventional, combined-arms warfare. It will, however, have some role.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY STRATEGY,
*MILITARY DOCTRINE, *WARFARE, *FORECASTING,
GEOPOLITICS, NATIONAL SECURITY, MILITARY
FORCES (UNITED STATES), TERRORISM, LOW
INTENSITY CONFLICT, UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE, ADVANCED WEAPONS, COUNTERFORCES
(MILITARY), CRIMES, DRUG INTERDICTION,
TECHNOLOGY FORECASTING.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) RMA (REVOLUTION IN MILITARY
AFFAIRS), POST COLD WAR ERA, FUTURE WARS,
OOTW (OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR),
PEACEMAKING, PEACEKEEPING, NONLETHAL
WEAPONS, DETECTORS, POLITICAL CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME, COUNTER
NARCOTICS.

AD-A280 569

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) Precipitating the Decline of Terrorist Groups: A Systems Analysis.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

MAR 94 92P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: DeGhetto, Todd H.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) This thesis shows how a government actor can use systems theory to hasten the decline of a terrorist group. The author assumes terrorist groups are social organizations; therefore, terrorist groups come to value organizational survival over ideological or programmatic achievements. The same determinants that cause social organizations to decline will cause terrorist organizations to decline. Using systems theory to model terrorism as a system, it is possible to show how to influence these determinants to increase the terrorist group's rate of decline. The systems model allows a government actor to build intervention strategies tailored to counter a specific terrorist organization. The government actor can use the model to identify and then target the terrorist's weak points. It also enables the government actor to determine its own strengths and to use them against the terrorist system weak points. Finally, the analysis tests the model against case studies of the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Front De Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in Canada. A case study of Abu Nidal tests the proposition that terrorist groups, like other social organizations, eventually come to value organizational survival over ideological or programmatic achievements.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *TERRORISM, *MILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN), CANADA, CASE STUDIES, COUNTERS, ENTROPY, ERRORS, INTERVENTION, ITALY, MEDIA, MODELS, ORGANIZATIONS, QUEBEC, RATES, RESPONSE, STRATEGY, TARGETS, TERRORISTS, TEST AND EVALUATION, THEORY, THESES, VALUE, POLICIES, COUNTERMEASURES, MILITARY APPLICATIONS, MILITARY STRATEGY, SECURITY.

AD-A280 394

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA

(U) We Bomb, Therefore We Are: The Evolution of Terrorist Group Life Cycles.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis.

MAR 94 174P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Lockett, Charles E.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The potential for conflict between the United States and terrorist groups is higher than in the recent past. This thesis attempts to understand the underlying causes for the rise and fall of terrorist groups by developing a theory that explains the evolution of their life cycles. This thesis argues that once organizational issues take priority over instrumental ones terrorism becomes self-defeating and survival threatening for the terrorist group. Since this priority shift occurs as a natural consequence of their internal dynamics, the seeds of a terrorist group's destruction exist within the group itself. Factors external to the terrorist group, however, can suppress the germination of those seeds and allow the group to survive. The dynamic interaction of these internal and external influences shapes a terrorist group's life cycle. Understanding the nature of this process is important for the design of counter-terrorist policy.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *TERRORISM, CONFLICT, CYCLES, DESTRUCTION, DYNAMICS, EXTERNAL, GERMINATION, INTERACTIONS, INTERNAL, LIFE CYCLES, POLICIES, SEEDS, SHAPE, TERRORISTS, THEORY, THESES, TILES, UNITED STATES.

AD-A279 584

NAVAL WAR COLL
NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS

(U) America's Military Crisis-Response Capability: Is
'Anytime-Anyplace' A Realistic Expectation?

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.

FEB 94 38P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: O'Boyle, Thomas R.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disenfranchisement of its former surrogates, may increase the need for an effective military deterrent to combat terrorism. A review of Rogers Rangers during the French & Indian War (the first use of crisis-response type forces in 'America') is used for historical reflection. Rogers interdicted 'terrorists' with great strategic success. The key to their operational success was: the flexibility, special training, precise planning and excellent leadership. A comparison of the Mayaguez Incident in 1975 and the Achille Lauro Hijacking in 1985, is used to chart the direction of U.S. crisis response after Desert One. The Mayaguez, represented an ad hoc approach using theater based forces. The Achille Lauro, represented a relatively mature approach following lessons-learned from Desert One. Both the Mayaguez and Achille Lauro incidents required such a rapid response that positioning a military force (regardless of training or location) proved nearly impossible. Complications include host nations sensitivities, lack of flexible transportation, and the avowing sophistication of terrorists. Intelligence remains the key limiting factor. Crisis-response forces must continue to develop fast, flexible transportation, access to timely intelligence and concise detailed planning. The historical window for success is the 5 to 7 day point--not the 48-60 hour window of the Mayaguez or Achille Lauro. U.S. policy should look towards the interdiction of such terrorists as Rogers Rangers did on the American Frontier.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *INTELLIGENCE, *LEADERSHIP, *LESSONS LEARNED, *CRISIS MANAGEMENT, *MILITARY PLANNING, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *TERRORISM, *COUNTERMEASURES, *RAPID DEPLOYMENT, INTERDICTION, PLANNING, POLICIES, REFLECTION, RESPONSE, TERRORISTS, TRAINING, TRANSPORTATION, USSR, WARFARE, WINDOWS, DETERRENCE, MILITARY HISTORY.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, MILITARY RESPONSIVENESS, FLEXIBILITY, FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR, MAYAGUEZ CRISIS, ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING.

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