


United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and  
International Affairs Division

B-276573



April 4, 1997

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence  
Chairman, Committee on National Security  
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) wants to reduce and streamline infrastructure to help pay for the billions of dollars that DOD projects it will need for modern weapon systems. On February 10, 1997, we briefed your staff on infrastructure activities within DOD and our budget and program reviews of those activities. Our briefing was based primarily on data included in DOD's 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) because the 1998 FYDP was not available for our analysis. The information we provided at that briefing is detailed in the sections following this letter.

## Background

An objective of DOD's 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review was to identify potential infrastructure savings and to launch a long-term process to reduce and streamline DOD's infrastructure without harming readiness. The report stated that infrastructure activities accounted for \$160 billion in fiscal year 1994, or about 60 percent of DOD's total obligational authority.

DOD defines infrastructure as those activities that provide support services to mission programs, such as combat forces, and primarily operate from fixed locations. DOD accounts for its infrastructure activities in eight categories: installation support; central training; central medical; central logistics; force management; acquisition infrastructure; central personnel; and central command, control, and communications.

Between fiscal year 1997 and 2001, DOD planned to increase its procurement budget from \$38.9 billion to \$60.1 billion, primarily to buy modern weapon systems and upgrades to existing systems. DOD planned to fund that increase with a combination of increased defense budgets, savings from acquisition reform, and a reallocation of funds from infrastructure activities to procurement.

The FYDP is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure, costs, and personnel levels that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The 1997 FYDP supported the administration's fiscal year 1997 budget and included budget estimates for fiscal years 1997-2001.

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## Results in Brief

The proportion of planned infrastructure funding in DOD's 1997-2001 budgets was projected to remain at about 60 percent, the same proportion it was at the time of the Bottom-Up Review. Costs of infrastructure activities were expected to increase by \$9 billion, from \$146 billion in fiscal year 1997 to \$155 billion in fiscal year 2001. About 50 percent of the infrastructure is in two categories—central logistics and installation support.

About 80 percent of infrastructure activities that can be clearly identified in DOD's FYDP are funded by a combination of the military personnel (30 percent) and operation and maintenance (50 percent) appropriations.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, if DOD is to reduce its infrastructure activities, it must look to these appropriations for the reductions.

Although active military personnel were projected to decline by about 30 percent between fiscal year 1990 and 1997, the salaries and benefits for active duty military personnel were projected to decline by only 13 percent. The budgets were not expected to decrease commensurate with the force because the force that remains has progressively become more expensive. Increases in basic pay and allowances have contributed to the higher costs. Also, by 1999, each service is expected to have a higher percentage of officers in its force than it had in 1990.

Congress has been concerned about whether the drawdown of military personnel may have gone too far and imposed permanent end strength levels in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106). But, our work has shown that smaller end strengths are possible without reducing the number of military personnel assigned to mission forces. Specifically, about 660,000, or 45 percent, of active military personnel for fiscal year 1997 were to be assigned to infrastructure activities. Each service is assessing ways to streamline its operations that could lead to fewer active military personnel needs. DOD could achieve savings in the military personnel accounts by replacing active duty military personnel, who perform infrastructure functions, with less costly civilian personnel.

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<sup>1</sup>In Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996), we stated that there are parts of the total infrastructure funding that cannot be clearly identified in the FYDP, according to DOD officials. These funds pay for goods and services sold by service-specific revolving funds. The officials estimate that this is 20 to 25 percent of DOD's total infrastructure budget and is mostly logistics purchases that cannot be specifically identified.

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Operation and maintenance accounts were projected to increase from \$88.3 billion in fiscal year 1990 to \$95.9 billion in fiscal year 2001. Operation and maintenance funds are often linked with the readiness of U.S. forces; however, those funds also pay for numerous other DOD activities and functions. Although DOD has improved operations and reduced costs, it continues to waste billions of dollars annually on unneeded facilities and inefficient activities. For example, DOD retains billions of dollars of excess inventory for which it spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually to store. Also, 40 percent of the capacity of DOD's 21 major depots was excess to its 1996 workload. We have reported that, as a first step to reduce infrastructure activities, DOD needs to prepare a plan to guide its efforts. This plan should establish time frames and identify organizations and personnel responsible for accomplishing fiscal and operational goals.

We did not obtain agency comments on a draft of this report because it was based primarily on our prior work, which is noted throughout the report.


We conducted our work between January and March 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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We are providing copies of this report to appropriate Senate and House Committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also provide copies to other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this briefing report.

Sincerely yours,



Richard Davis  
Director, National Security  
Analysis

# Contents

Letter		1
Briefing Section I		6
Background	DOD Wants to Reduce Infrastructure to Help Pay for Modern Weapon Systems	6
Briefing Section II		8
Infrastructure in DOD's Budget	Comparison of Total Planned Obligational Authority to Total Planned Infrastructure Funding, Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001	8
	DOD's Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001 Program	10
	DOD's Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001 Program by Infrastructure Category	12
	Direct Infrastructure Funding by Appropriation, Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001 Program	14
Briefing Section III		16
Military Personnel Accounts	Trends in Military Personnel	16
	Military Personnel in Infrastructure and Mission Programs, Fiscal Year 1997	18
Briefing Section IV		20
Reforming Military Personnel Functions	Military Personnel Staffing—Condition	20
	Military Personnel Staffing—Actions Needed	22
Briefing Section V		24
Operation and Maintenance Accounts	Trends in Operation and Maintenance Accounts	24
	Operation and Maintenance Component: Civilian Personnel in Workforce, Fiscal Year 1997	26
	Operation and Maintenance Component: Civilian Personnel in Infrastructure and Mission Programs, Fiscal Year 1997	28
Briefing Section VI		30
Reforming Operation and Maintenance Functions	Current Infrastructure Condition	30
	Actions Needed to Reform Systems and Processes and Reduce Infrastructure	32

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Appendix I  
Categories of Defense  
Infrastructure

34

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**Abbreviations**

DOD      Department of Defense  
FYDP     Future Years Defense Program

# Background

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## **GAO DOD Wants to Reduce Infrastructure to Help Pay for Modern Weapon Systems**

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- Infrastructure accounted for 60 percent of budget authority at time of Bottom-Up Review
  - DOD wants to increase procurement funding
  - Infrastructure activities support mission activities, such as combat forces, and operate primarily from fixed locations
-

An objective of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review was to identify potential infrastructure savings and to launch a long-term process to reduce and streamline DOD's infrastructure without harming readiness. The report stated that infrastructure activities accounted for \$160 billion in fiscal year 1994, or about 60 percent of DOD's total obligational authority.


Between fiscal year 1997 and 2001, DOD planned to increase procurement funding from \$38.9 billion to \$60.1 billion, primarily to buy modern weapon systems and upgrades to existing systems. DOD planned to fund that increase with a combination of increased defense budgets, savings from acquisition reform, and a reallocation of funds from infrastructure activities to procurement.

DOD's Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) is the most comprehensive source of continuous defense resource data. The FYDP displays the allocation of resources by programs and activities known as program elements. Using the FYDP, DOD has clearly identified program elements that fund infrastructure activities and refer to these as "direct infrastructure." However, there are parts of the total infrastructure funding that cannot be clearly identified in the FYDP. According to DOD officials, these parts account for 20 to 25 percent of DOD's total infrastructure funding. These funds pay mostly for logistics purchases.

DOD, in conjunction with the Institute for Defense Analysis, categorized each of the FYDP program elements as either mission programs or infrastructure programs. Activities and programs that produce the outputs expected of DOD or directly support missions by deploying with the combat forces are classified as mission programs. Activities that provide support services to mission programs, such as combat forces, and primarily operate from fixed locations are classified as infrastructure programs. DOD accounts for its infrastructure activities in eight categories: installation support; central training; central medical; central logistics; force management; acquisition infrastructure; central personnel; and central command, control, and communications. DOD excludes many intelligence, space, and command, control, and communications programs from its infrastructure even though they appear to fit DOD's infrastructure definition. These programs account for about \$25.9 billion, or 26 percent, of mission programs in fiscal year 1997.

# Infrastructure in DOD's Budget

## GAO Comparison of Total Planned Obligational Authority to Total Planned Infrastructure Funding, Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001



The 1997 FYDP supported the administration's fiscal year 1997 budget and included budget estimates for fiscal years 1997-2001. In May 1996, we reported that our analysis of the infrastructure portion of the 1997 FYDP shows that infrastructure costs are projected to increase about \$9 billion, from \$146 billion in fiscal year 1997 to \$155 billion in fiscal year 2001.<sup>1</sup> Although the infrastructure portion of DOD's budget is projected to decrease from about 60 percent in 1997 to about 57 percent in 2001, this is primarily because DOD's total budget is projected to increase at a faster rate than the infrastructure part of that budget.


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<sup>1</sup>Defense Infrastructure: Costs Projected to Increase Between 1997 and 2001 (GAO/NSIAD-96-174, May 31, 1996).

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GAO DOD's Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001 Program

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**Briefing Section II**  
**Infrastructure in DOD's Budget**


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The total projected DOD budget for the 5-year period (1997-2001) included in the 1997 FYDP was about \$1.3 trillion. Infrastructure activities account for about \$744 billion of the \$1.3 trillion total and mission activities account for the remaining \$537 billion.

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**GAO** DOD's Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001 Program by  
Infrastructure Category


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The \$744 billion of infrastructure included in the 1997 FYDP can be subdivided into the eight infrastructure categories, which DOD has defined. These categories are described in appendix I. Since most of the infrastructure that cannot be clearly identified in the FYDP relates to logistics purchases, we included this portion of the infrastructure in the central logistics category.

Central logistics and installation support, the two largest categories, together comprise almost 50 percent of infrastructure costs. As we stated in our May 1996 report on defense infrastructure, funding for all of the categories, except installation support, is projected to increase during the 1997-2001 period. The decline in installation support is absorbed by the increases in the other infrastructure categories.


# GAO Direct Infrastructure Funding by Appropriation, Fiscal Years 1997 to 2001 Program



Although each appropriation funds some direct infrastructure activities, about 80 percent of direct infrastructure costs are funded by military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts, about 30 percent and 50 percent, respectively. Thus, if DOD is to achieve significant infrastructure reductions to fund future force modernization, those reductions must come from these appropriations. However, these appropriations have been closely associated with the readiness and quality-of-life of the force, the Secretary of Defense's priority areas for the last few years.

# Military Personnel Accounts

## GAO Trends in Military Personnel



Between 1990 and 1997, the number of active military personnel was projected to decrease from 2.07 million to 1.46 million, or about 30 percent. During the same period, DOD's annual budgets for active military personnel were projected to decrease by only about 13 percent, from \$70 billion to about \$61 billion. The budgets were not expected to decrease commensurate with the force because the force that remains has progressively become more expensive. Increases in basic pay and allowances have contributed to the higher costs.<sup>1</sup> Also, force reductions left DOD with a more senior and, thus, a more expensive force. For example, our ongoing work shows that by 1999, each service is expected to have a higher percentage of officers in the total forces than was the case in 1990. The projected budgets for active military personnel in the 1997 FYDP reflect DOD's plans for a relatively stable force and pay and benefit increases through 2001.

DOD can reduce costs in the military personnel accounts by (1) reducing the force, (2) changing the compensation package for military personnel, and/or (3) changing the composition of the force. Any of these actions would be difficult and controversial and would require collaboration between Congress and the administration.


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<sup>1</sup>In Defense Budget: Trends in Active Military Personnel Compensation Accounts for 1990-97 (GAO/NSIAD-96-183, July 9, 1996), we present comprehensive data on various pay categories included in the military personnel compensation accounts and trends in those pay categories.

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**GAO** Military Personnel in Infrastructure and Mission Programs, Fiscal Year 1997

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Congress has been concerned about whether the drawdown of military personnel may have gone too far and imposed permanent end strength levels in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106). But, our work has shown that smaller end strengths are possible without reducing the number of military personnel assigned to mission forces. In fiscal year 1997, about 797,000, or 55 percent, of all active duty military personnel are assigned to positions DOD classified as directly related to mission programs. The remaining 660,000, or 45 percent, of active military personnel are assigned to positions that support infrastructure functions. Of the military personnel that support infrastructure functions, 36 percent are in the Air Force, 26 percent are in the Army, 27 percent are in the Navy, and 11 percent are in the Marine Corps. Each service is assessing ways to streamline its operations that could lead to fewer active military personnel needs.

The proportion of active duty military personnel that support infrastructure functions varies by service. For fiscal year 1997, 63 percent of Air Force personnel, 34 percent of Army personnel, 44 percent of Navy personnel, and 40 percent of Marine Corps personnel are assigned to infrastructure functions.

# Reforming Military Personnel Functions

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## GAO Military Personnel Staffing--Condition

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- Requirements for many noncombat positions are not based on sound strategy
- Thousands of positions staffed by military personnel could be staffed by less costly civilians

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Our work has shown that DOD requirements for many noncombat positions are not based on sound strategy and that thousands of positions staffed by military personnel could be staffed by less costly civilians. We reported in 1997 that the Army's efforts to make its institutional force (which provides generally nondeployable support, including training, doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance) more efficient and potentially smaller are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its

process to determine institutional force requirements.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, many of the Army's institutional requirements are not determined through an analysis of workload that includes analyzing what work needs to be done based on mission and assessing how processes can be improved. Such an analysis, when combined with the Army's efforts to reengineer its overall organization through functional assessments, would help the Army determine how big its force needs to be and allocate resources efficiently toward its highest priority institutional needs. In ongoing work, we found that the Navy does not have an effective program for determining personnel requirements for its shore establishment and, therefore, has little assurance that these resources are being used efficiently and that its shore establishment is appropriately sized.

We reported in 1994 that, although DOD policy is to use civilians wherever possible, large numbers of military personnel perform technical, management, administrative, and other functions that civilians typically perform.<sup>2</sup> DOD's and the services' policies allow service managers wide latitude in filling positions with military personnel. No single directive explains how DOD's policy should be implemented or the specific criteria to use in determining the appropriate mix of personnel. Therefore, because of the broad nature of the guidance, tradition, and cultural preferences for military incumbency, DOD and the services often merely maintain the status quo on military incumbency. We identified opportunities for the services to achieve operational efficiencies and budget savings through greater use of civilian personnel in support positions. We reported that, on average, each civilian support employee in the United States costs about \$15,000 less per year than a comparable graded military person.

In 1996, we reported that about 9,500 military officers were staffed to administrative and support positions in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force that civilians might be able to fill at lower costs and with greater productivity due to the civilians' much less frequent rotations.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two-Conflict Strategy With Some Risks (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997).

<sup>2</sup>DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994).

<sup>3</sup>DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996).

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**GAO Military Personnel Staffing--Actions Needed**

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- Improve processes for determining number and composition of noncombat positions
- Fill positions with military personnel only when essential

DOD needs to improve its processes for determining the number and composition of noncombat positions and to fill positions with military personnel only when essential. In our 1997 report on the Army's force structure, we recommended that the Secretary of the Army improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the institutional Army. Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of the Army report to the Secretary of Defense the Army's long-standing problems with implementing a workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue. DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Army will look at relationships and potential of new workload-based management tools in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

In our 1994 report on DOD's force mix, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish a joint review board and provide it with a mandate to work with the services to ensure a thorough and consistent review of military support positions that may have potential for conversion to civilian positions. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to identify military positions that should be replaced with civilians and eliminate, to the extent possible, impediments to using civilians when they would be less costly. Although DOD concurred with our recommendations, it converted no positions based on this work. In a congressionally mandated report,<sup>4</sup> DOD explained that large-scale conversions of military positions would not be undertaken until its civilian workforce stabilized at the conclusion of the drawdown.


In our October 1996 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense overcome the impediments to conversion, develop a plan to convert officer positions in support activities that are not military essential, and require that the services implement the plan and report back to the Secretary on the progress in implementing the plan. We also recommended that the Secretary develop a process to ensure that the need for military staffing in support positions is reassessed when major changes or reorganizations occur. DOD generally concurred with our report and acknowledged that support positions could be converted by the services and that cost savings and other advantages can be obtained through such conversions. DOD indicated that it would convene a series of meetings to develop approaches to facilitate conversions.

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<sup>4</sup>Department of Defense Report on the Civilian and Military Mix in Support Occupations, Report to the House Committee on National Security and Senate Committee on Armed Services, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), April 1995.

# Operation and Maintenance Accounts

## GAO Trends in Operation and Maintenance Accounts



While the number of active military personnel were projected to decline by about 30 percent between fiscal year 1990 and 1997, operation and maintenance budgets were projected to stay relatively constant, except for the increase in 1991 due to the Persian Gulf War. From fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001, the operation and maintenance budgets are projected to increase by 8 percent while active military personnel remain relatively unchanged. Although the operation and maintenance appropriations do not fund military pay and allowances, the accounts support many readiness activities and quality-of-life programs that are affected by the number of military personnel.

Since fiscal year 1987, the operation and maintenance accounts have been the largest appropriation group in DOD's budget, and they are expected to remain the largest through fiscal year 2001. When compared with the federal budget, DOD's fiscal year 1997 operation and maintenance budget request represents about 18 percent of total federal discretionary spending and is larger than most federal agencies' fiscal year 1997 budget requests.<sup>1</sup> This is larger than the combined budgets of the Departments of Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and State and the Environmental Protection Agency. Operation and maintenance appropriations fund a diverse range of programs and activities that include salaries and benefits for most civilian DOD employees; depot maintenance activities; base operations; consumable supplies; and health care for active duty service personnel, dependents of active duty personnel, and retirees and their dependents.


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<sup>1</sup>Discretionary programs are funded through annual appropriations acts and include such programs as national defense, education, and law enforcement.

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**GAO** Operation and Maintenance Component: Civilian  
Personnel in Workforce, Fiscal Year 1997

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Total: 798,300

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**Briefing Section V  
Operation and Maintenance Accounts**


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According to DOD, over 40 percent of annual operation and maintenance appropriations fund civilian salaries and benefits. In fiscal year 1997, DOD was projected to have 798,300 civilian personnel. Of these, about 252,000 were assigned to Army programs, 227,000 to Navy and Marine Corps programs, 178,000 to Air Force programs, and 142,000 to defense agencies and DOD-wide programs.

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**GAO** Operation and Maintenance Component: Civilian  
Personnel in Infrastructure and Mission Programs,  
Fiscal Year 1997

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Civilian personnel have historically provided important support to military combat forces in peacetime and in war. Civilian personnel maintain military installations, repair and maintain weapon systems, and provide communications and logistical support. In some instances, civilians fill combat-essential functions and deploy with combat troops. For example, during the Persian Gulf War, DOD employed over 14,000 civilian employees and contractor personnel to support its military forces. Civilians served in a wide variety of support positions, including transportation, maintenance and repair, and weapon systems support roles.<sup>2</sup> In fiscal year 1997, about 648,000 of DOD's civilian employees (81 percent) were projected to fill positions that relate to infrastructure programs, while 150,000 (19 percent) were projected to fill positions related to mission programs.

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<sup>2</sup>DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994).

# Reforming Operation and Maintenance Functions

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## GAO Current Infrastructure Condition

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- Many unneeded facilities exist
  - Billions of dollars of excess inventory on hand
  - Billions of dollars wasted on inefficient operations
-

Although DOD has made progress in improving key operations and reducing costs, it continues to waste billions of dollars annually on unneeded facilities, excess inventory, and inefficient activities. DOD has acknowledged that it has more infrastructure than needed for the downsized force.

We have identified potential areas where DOD could achieve savings by reducing unneeded facilities. For example, at the time of the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure process, DOD's overall depot system had 40 percent excess capacity (i.e., fiscal year 1996 program workload compared to maximum potential capacity). DOD currently has 21 major depots—7 depots have 50 percent or more excess capacity and 3 have between 40 and 50 percent excess capacity. After all base closure actions are completed, DOD's research and development laboratory infrastructure still will have about 35 percent excess capacity, according to DOD officials. Further, DOD is spending \$51 million in military construction funds on accounting facilities that are unneeded.

We also pointed out that maintaining inventory that is not needed is expensive and does not contribute to an effective, efficient, and responsive supply system. In 1996, we found that \$2.7 billion of DOD's \$8.3 billion in inventory at nonmajor locations was not needed to meet the services' current operating and war reserve requirements. We estimated the services could save about \$382 million annually in inventory holding costs by eliminating the excess inventory.<sup>1</sup>

We also found instances where more efficient operations could achieve savings. For example, to cover excessively high overhead costs, DOD frequently charges customers double or triple the cost of basic transportation. The high overhead costs stem in part from an outdated and inefficient organizational structure and separate billing systems that could be streamlined. DOD estimates its processing costs for temporary duty travel—about \$3.5 billion in fiscal year 1993—are as much as 30 percent of the direct travel cost. This percentage is well above the 10-percent average reported for private companies and the 6-percent rate that industry considers an efficient operation. Other examples can be found in our March 14, 1997, report, Addressing the Deficit: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 1998 (GAO/OGC-97-2).

<sup>1</sup>Defense Inventory: Spare and Repair Parts Inventory Costs Can Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-97-47, Jan. 17, 1997).

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**GAO**    **Actions Needed to Reform Systems and Processes  
and Reduce Infrastructure**

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- Prepare a strategic plan to reduce unneeded infrastructure
  - Consolidate facilities to eliminate excess capacity
  - Shift commercial-type activities to the private sector
  - Reengineer functions based on best practices
  - Improve inventory practices and dispose of excess inventory
-

DOD has substantial opportunities to reduce its infrastructure costs and realize the significant savings it needs to support modernization. In March 1997, we reported on opportunities to reform key DOD business practices.<sup>2</sup> We have previously reported that, to take best advantage of these opportunities, DOD needs to develop an overall strategic plan to guide efforts to reduce infrastructure activities. This plan should establish time frames and identify organizations and personnel responsible for accomplishing fiscal and operational goals. In developing this plan, DOD should consider using a variety of means to achieve reductions, including consolidations, closings, reengineering, and privatizing facilities and operations. It should also consider the need and timing for future base closure rounds, as suggested by the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission and others.

Numerous opportunities exist for DOD to eliminate excess capacity by consolidating workloads and closing facilities, especially in the areas of depot maintenance, training, research, and financial accounting. Greater efficiency could also be achieved by consolidating and eliminating duplicate support services where military bases are located close to one another or where similar functions are performed at multiple locations. DOD needs to apply private industry's best practices to reengineer key processes, such as transportation, travel, and pay, which currently cost much more than industry standards.

DOD needs to reform its inventory management system by adapting best business practices to ensure that its supply system is effective, efficient, and responsive. For example, DOD should improve its requirements determination system and storage practices.

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<sup>2</sup>Defense Programs: Opportunities to Reform Key Business Practices (GAO/NSIAD-97-99R, Mar. 5, 1997).

# Categories of Defense Infrastructure

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Installation support consists of activities that furnish funding, equipment, and personnel to provide facilities from which defense forces operate. Activities include construction planning and design, real property maintenance, base operating support, real estate management for active and reserve bases, family and bachelor housing, supply operations, base closure activities, and environmental programs.

Acquisition infrastructure consists of all program elements that support program management, program offices, and production support, including acquisition headquarters, science and technology, and test and evaluation resources. This category includes earlier levels of research and development, including basic research, exploratory development, and advanced development.

Central logistics consists of programs that provide support to centrally managed logistics organizations, including the management of material, operation of supply systems, maintenance activities, material transportation, base operations and support, communications, and minor construction. This category also includes program elements that provide resources for commissaries and military exchange operations.

Central training consists of program elements that provide resources for virtually all non-unit training, including training for new personnel, aviation and flight training, military academies, officer training corps, other college commissioning programs, and officer and enlisted training schools.

Central medical consists of programs that furnish funding, equipment, and personnel that provide medical care to active military personnel, dependents, and retirees. Activities provide for all patient care, except for that provided by medical units that are part of direct support units. Activities include medical training, management of the medical system, and support of medical installations.

Central personnel consists of all programs that provide for the recruiting of new personnel and the management and support of dependent schools, community, youth, and family centers, and child development activities. Other programs supporting personnel include permanent change-of-station costs, personnel in transit, civilian disability compensation, veterans education assistance, and other miscellaneous personnel support activities.

Command, control, and communications consists of programs that manage all aspects of the command, control, and communications infrastructure for Department of Defense facilities; information support services; mapping and charting products; and security support. This category includes program elements that provide nontactical telephone services, the General Defense Intelligence Program and cryptological activities, the Global Positioning System, and support of air traffic control facilities.

Force management consists of all programs that provide funding, equipment, and personnel for the management and operation of all the major military command headquarters activities. Force management also includes program elements that provide resources for Defense-wide departmental headquarters, management of international programs, support to other defense organizations and federal government agencies, security investigative services, public affairs activities, and criminal and judicial activities.