



SOVIET AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF NORTH KOREA

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*Authors: Rodney Katz
Mark Roth*

*Federal Research Division
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PREFACE

This study discusses Soviet and Chinese perceptions of North Korea. It examines materials published in and broadcast by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) within the 1 January to 30 June 1983 time period. Additionally, it examines materials published in or broadcast by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) that provide information useful in understanding North Korea's relationship with the Soviet Union and China. Soviet and Chinese reactions to significant events in South Korea are discussed in order to relate the impact of such events on USSR and Chinese relations with the DPRK.

Only open source materials were used in the preparation of this study.

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SUMMARY

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the object of varying degrees of attention by Soviet and Chinese observers. While there are some areas of similarity in Soviet and Chinese treatment of the North Koreans in official statements and media reports, the views of Moscow and Beijing generally have not coincided in recent times.

The Soviet Union views North Korea as an ostensibly friendly country which does not respond to Soviet aid and friendship with the level of cooperation and recognition expected by Moscow. North Korean leader Kim Il-song is not held in high regard by Moscow's leadership and is mentioned infrequently in the Soviet media. China, on the other hand, can ill afford not to support Pyongyang and thus tends to provide a more positive view of North Korea in official statements and the media. Kim Il-song is thus shown greater deference in the Chinese media.

While the Soviet Union provides technical assistance to North Korea it does so at an exceedingly slow pace, taking as long as 13 years to complete construction of some North Korean industrial plants. Chinese aid is provided more promptly, but Beijing says little publicly about its relations with Pyongyang in the areas of trade and economic, technical, or military assistance. Recent pronouncements generally have been limited to the political realm.

Neither the Chinese nor the Soviet media discuss the conditions under which either nation would aid Korea in the event of another war on the Korean peninsula. Beijing is particularly apprehensive about the possibility of Soviet involvement in North Korea, but cannot afford to provide much military aid of its own. Both China and the Soviet Union comment about the correctness of DPRK statements opposing US military forces in South Korea, however military contacts with North Korea are rarely mentioned by either. It is apparent that China and the Soviet Union are concerned about North Korea primarily because of its strategic geopolitical location and because war on the Korean peninsula would probably involve them. Despite Korea's strategic location, neither China nor the Soviet Union has disclosed a clearly defined military policy toward the peninsula.

SOVIET AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF NORTH KOREA

1. INTRODUCTION

a. Status of Soviet-North Korean Relations

Relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea have been cool for several years. During Leonid Brezhnev's tenure as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), North Korean President Kim Il-song never traveled to Moscow but made two visits to Beijing. Since Yuriy Andropov became CPSU General Secretary in 1982, there have been few significant changes in the DPRK-USSR relationship. While both the USSR and DPRK are concerned about US military relationships with Japan and South Korea, the Soviet Union exhibits little concern about the possibility of an attack on North Korea. The Soviet Union has continued to provide economic and technical assistance to North Korea, but the amount and value of aid has decreased over the last 2 decades. The Soviet Union is concerned that Pyongyang does not inform its citizenry about the types of Soviet technical aid received. Therefore, Radio Moscow frequently broadcast reports to Korea about such aid. Political exchanges have continued at a level noticeably lower than those between the DPRK and China.

b. Status of Chinese-North Korean Relations

The first 6 months of 1983 witnessed a series of events which may prove to be a watershed in Sino-Korean relations. On 5 May six Chinese hijacked a Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) airliner with over 90 passengers to South Korea. In the days following the hijacking, relations between China and South Korea entered an unprecedented stage of development that has had a significant impact on Chinese-North Korean relations. The hijacking resulted in the first official contact between South Korea and China. The two countries have no diplomatic relations and China continues to recognize the DPRK as the sole legal government of the Korean nation. However, shortly after an agreement was reached regarding the hijacking, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Bum-suk told the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee that diplomatic relations should be established with China at the earliest possible date.

Immediately following the Chinese-South Korean contacts and the new stage of bilateral relations, Beijing sent Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian to Pyongyang. When Xinhua announced Wu would visit North Korea, it made no mention of the contacts between China and the ROK. Shortly after Wu's visit to Pyongyang, Kim Chong-il, son of DPRK President Kim Il-song, Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and designated successor to his father, was received in Beijing. The younger Kim's trip to China was supposedly his first foreign visit in his capacity as North Korea's heir apparent. These visits demonstrated Chinese commitment to North Korea following Sino-ROK contact.

The improved nature of Sino-DPRK relations during the first half of 1983 was reflected in Chinese news reporting in that period. For purposes of analysis, China's perceptions of North Korea can be divided into two periods. The first period, prior to the hijacking of the CAAC aircraft to South Korea, was characterized as rather cool. Public statements made standard references to the friendship between the peoples of the two countries, called for the peaceful

reunification of Korea, and endorsed Pyongyang's repeated demands for an American military withdrawal from the Korean peninsula. The second period, following the CAAC hijacking and high-level Sino-DPRK contacts, was characterized by warmer references to bilateral relations and increased coverage of events relating to North Korea.

2. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF NORTH KOREA

a. Military

During the 6-month period 1 January to 30 June 1983, Soviet media gave scant coverage to Soviet-North Korean military relations. They discussed the US-ROK military exercise TEAM SPIRIT-83 and the military threat posed by the United States, South Korea, and Japan to the DPRK and "other socialist countries," that is, the USSR. The Soviet media paid little attention to the 51st anniversary of the Korean People's Army (KPA) in April, and only one Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star] article was relevant.

The following excerpt provides a Soviet reporter's observations on defense preparations at a North Korean Air Force base:

Two uncovered interceptors stood at the end of the runway . . . the remaining equipment was safely hidden away and camouflaged. At the SKDP [expansion unknown] there were control panels, plotting boards, selectors, screens with flashing lights and people working intensively. The radar detectors had just picked up several targets--US fighter-bombers. They were heading north. . . . Unless they turned back within two minutes the guard aircraft would take off to intercept them and the combat alert signal would sound yet again for the entire regiment. The SKDP works this way virtually 24 hours a day. And yet the place where we were, in local terms, was deep in the rear, the heart of the country. However, for the Korean Air Force airmen it is a defense line from where they take off to make interceptions--so small is this country overall.¹

The rhetoric in the Soviet media on TEAM SPIRIT-83 and other US military operations in East Asia was similar regardless of the type of media or the intended audience. Pravda, TASS, broadcasts in Korean to Korea, and Soviet domestic television and radio broadcasts criticized the exercises as provocative and a threat to sovereign states in the region. The primary focus of the Soviet propaganda was invariably the United States, and its influence on the Korean situation. On 14 April Pravda reported:

The US neocolonialist strategy in the Far East, the continuing occupation of South Korea and the buildup of the US military presence there pose a serious threat to peace. The US Armed Forces must be withdrawn from South Korea, as stipulated by the UN General Assembly decisions. This is an essential condition of the country's reunification and the normalization of the situation on the Korean peninsula.²

Soviet reports published between 1 February and 21 April about TEAM SPIRIT-83 neglected to cite any of the many statements by North Korean party and

government leaders on the threat posed to the DPRK by those military exercises, with the exception of Kim Il-song's 1 February order placing Korean military, security, and militia units on alert. Neither were any statements by Soviet leaders on TEAM SPIRIT-83 reported. If Soviet leaders accepted the North Korean position that TEAM SPIRIT-83 represented a "critical situation in which war may break out any moment," the Soviets did so without public acknowledgment. Additionally, the Soviet media did not refer to the 1961 DPRK-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which provides for Soviet military assistance to the DPRK if the DPRK is invaded by another country. These omissions suggest that the USSR's criticism of TEAM SPIRIT-83 was based on the perception of a threat to the USSR rather than a direct military threat to the DPRK.

Senior Col Kan Son-chin, DPRK military attache to the USSR, held a press conference on 21 April at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow to commemorate the KPA's 51st anniversary.³ A Soviet broadcast to Korea on 21 April briefly noted that Kan discussed "exploits displayed by the KPA during the fatherland liberation war" and criticized the United States for "militarist preparations with South Korea and schemes in the Far East."⁴ Krasnaya Zvezda reported that "Soviet Armed Forces generals and officers, Moscow garrison servicemen, and representatives of the capital's public" attended the opening of an exhibit on the KPA at the USSR Armed Forces Central Museum.⁵

Marshal D. F. Ustinov, Soviet Minister of Defense, sent anniversary congratulations to O Chin-u, DPRK Minister of the People's Armed Forces. Ustinov's tersely worded statement expressed confidence that the KPA "will develop and strengthen for the good of our peoples and in the interests of the struggle against the forces of imperialism and reaction and for peace and security in the Far East."⁶

b. Economic

According to the provisions of a 1970 DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement (see appendix B, item 120), the Soviet Union agreed to construct six factories in the DPRK in exchange for goods manufactured at these plants. Three plants have been completed or are nearing completion: a microelectric motor plant in Pyongyang, a motor vehicle battery plant in Pyongyang, and an enameled wire plant at an undisclosed location (see appendix A). Although Pravda and Izvestiya reported in March 1983 that the DPRK will be delivering goods from these factories as payment for Soviet assistance, Soviet broadcasts to Korea were carefully worded to avoid mentioning this Korean obligation. This omission shows deference to the DPRK Government's desire to control dissemination of such information and allows the Soviet Union to represent itself as a benefactor of the Korean people rather than as a calculating business partner to whom the DPRK owes a debt. During the first 6 months of 1983 no information was published in Soviet sources concerning the three other projects mentioned in the 1970 agreement. It is possible that the USSR has withheld assistance to build the calcium carbide, lead slag processing, and railroad car plants until it can evaluate the success of the battery, motor, and wire plants.

A late 1982 Soviet publication listed various criteria used by Moscow when considering barter agreements with countries such as Korea. Of primary consideration to the Soviets is "stability" in the delivery of goods; a factor

which "helps satisfy the needs of the Soviet national economy" and "also enables our partners to expand the list of export goods, to increase overall foreign trade volume, to improve the country's ability to pay, and to repay indebtedness incurred from Soviet credits." In this context, if the DPRK fulfills its obligations to the USSR according to the provisions of the 1970 technical assistance agreement, and if the Soviets determine that the bartered goods are of a quality that is useful to them, it is likely that the USSR will continue to participate in barter agreements with the DPRK.

Most Soviet publications and broadcasts to Korea portray the DPRK as a progressive Socialist country that has made steady progress in developing its agriculture, industry, and standard of living. The January 1983 issue of Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), however, critically analyzed North Korean economic problems. These Soviet-perceived problems can be summarized as follows. During the Six Year Plan (1971-76) and the first 3 years of the current Seven Year Plan (1978-84) the DPRK tried to develop too many heavy industries simultaneously. The DPRK is presently having difficulty supporting all of these heavy industries. Additionally, excessive central planning, poor organization of the work force, low wages paid to workers, and rationing are causing problems in North Korea. The article suggests that the North Korean Government should provide local industrial enterprises with more independence to manage their own affairs and that North Korea would produce more if the Government would provide more material incentives for workers.

Data presented in table 1 indicates that the percentage of Soviet economic and technical assistance to North Korea has decreased relative to that given other Asian countries over the last 20 years. The volume of Soviet exports of materials and equipment for complete package enterprises constructed in the DPRK for selected years are:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Million of Rubles</u>
1955	1.6
1960	0.8
1970	66.4
1975	43.7
1981	46.5 ⁹

Soviet sources claimed that Socialist and developing countries in Asia receive about 42 percent of all Soviet economic and technical assistance.¹⁰

The Soviets also provided information on the number of Koreans who have received training in Korea from Soviet specialists or in the USSR at Soviet industrial facilities or research institutes. North Korean facilities built with Soviet assistance employ 115,000 Koreans, approximately one-third of whom received Soviet training.¹¹ Not less than 1,000 North Koreans receive practical training each year at industrial enterprises and scientific research institutes in the USSR.¹² A Soviet broadcast to Korea mentioned that more than 3,000 Soviet technicians were assisting various projects in the DPRK.¹³ Many of the Soviet technicians were probably providing on-the-job training in the operation of newly installed Soviet machinery.

c. Political

The Soviet media reported infrequently on North Korea's domestic politics and foreign relations not directly involving the USSR. The Soviet media are not known to have commented at all on Kim Chong-il, President Kim Il-song's son and heir apparent. The 5 May hijacking of a Chinese civil aircraft to South Korea was noted and at least one report of the incident was broadcast to Korea. The most significant DPRK-USSR contact reported in the Soviet media was the 16-18 May meeting of the Soviet-Korean Consultative Commission for Economic and Scientific Questions.

Pravda's reporting concerning the 18-19 February joint meeting of the KWP Central Committee Politburo and the DPRK Government's Central People's Committee (CPC) was neither timely nor informative. A summary of the proceedings of the meeting appeared in a few tersely worded paragraphs nearly 1 week after the event and then on page 5.¹⁴ North Korean President Kim Il-song called the meeting to discuss issues related to North Korea's participation at the March 1983 Nonaligned Movement summit conference in New Delhi. Pravda mentioned that the DPRK is a member of the Nonaligned Movement and praised that organization's opposition to US-led imperialism.

Although the DPRK's media did not mention the 5 May 1983 Chinese aircraft hijacking incident, both China and the USSR produced domestic reports of the visit to Seoul of CAAC Director Shen Tu. On at least one occasion the USSR ignored the DPRK's sensitivity and broadcast to Korea a report of Shen Tu's arrival in Seoul to negotiate for the return of the aircraft, passengers, crew, and hijackers.¹⁵ Izvestiya later presented a straightforward account of the Sino-South Korean negotiations for return of the CAAC aircraft. It referred to the hijackers as terrorists, called the Republic of Korea South Korea or Seoul, and avoided criticizing either China or South Korea for their direct contact. Izvestiya cited Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yao Guang, who said that Shen's negotiations with the South Koreans had no purpose beyond settling the hijacking issue.¹⁶

The Soviet delegation to the 18th Soviet-Korean Consultative Commission for Economic and Scientific Questions was led by Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers N. V. Talyzin, the USSR's permanent representative to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). Talyzin was the only CPSU Central Committee member reported to have visited North Korea in the January-June period. Izvestiya provided an informative account of the agenda:

- o current and future Soviet participation in Korean construction projects;
- o current and future Soviet technical assistance to the DPRK;
- o issues related to the implementation of the 1982 bilateral trade protocol;
- o "tasks" for 1983's bilateral trade, and;
- o preparations for consultations between DPRK and USSR planning agencies on questions of trade and economic cooperation for 1986-90.¹⁷

Talyzin's presence in Pyongyang indicates that the consultations have a connection to Soviet planning involving CEMA. Although the DPRK does not organize its economic planning to coincide with the Soviet system of 5-year plans (1981-85, 1986-90), it appears that Soviet long-range coordination with the DPRK is based on Moscow's 5-year plans. This places the burden of adjusting economic planning on the DPRK if it desires Soviet technical aid.

Table 2 summarizes selected political contacts between the USSR and DPRK that occurred between 1 January and 30 June 1983. Soviet reporting on these exchanges was, in most instances, terse and uninformative. One of the notable visits was A. G. Shumeyko's to North Korea during which he was accorded the privilege of meeting with Hyong Mu-kwang, a candidate member of the KWP Politburo. Shumeyko is a provincial level CPSU secretary from Voronezh. His meeting with Hyon may have been arranged as a courtesy, although few KWP Politburo members meet with visiting Soviet officials.

3. CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF NORTH KOREA

a. The First Period, 1 January-4 May 1983

(1) Exchange of New Year's Greetings

The Xinhua News Agency account of Kim Il-song's New Year's address to the Korean people stressed the themes of economic development and national reunification. According to the Chinese broadcast, Kim called on his people "to energetically speed up socialist economic construction [which] is the most important revolutionary task confronting our party and our people today."¹⁸ Variations of the phrase "to accelerate socialist economic construction" appeared six times in the Xinhua account of Kim's address while the North Korean peaceful reunification scheme was mentioned only twice. The Xinhua account of Kim's address echoed themes that are often proclaimed by China's current leadership: economic growth and reunification of the Chinese nation, that is, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Kim's address was condensed to two themes and all other topics he raised were disregarded by Xinhua in its account. Indeed, the Chinese news agency summarized Kim's over 2,000-word speech in a little more than 200 words. Xinhua's report of Kim's New Year's address was packaged for international distribution so it appeared that Kim's views were¹⁹ consistent with China's thinking on the most important national policy issues.

Pyongyang's 1983 New Year's greeting to the Chinese people was sent by a relatively low-level official, Ho Chong-suk, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly and member of the Secretariat of the KWP Central Committee. In recalling events of 1982, Ho noted Kim Il-song's visit to China in September and the earlier visit to North Korea by Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping in April. The greeting, broadcast in English for international distribution, emphasized the "militant friendship" of the Chinese and Korean peoples, and included a bland endorsement of Beijing's predominant political line that "new changes have taken place in the ideological and mental outlook of the Chinese people" and that the "Chinese people have achieved nationwide unity and stability." The²⁰ greeting made no mention of relations between the two parties or countries.

The New Year's greeting to Korea from China was sent by Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) Chief of General Staff Yang Dezhi.²¹ The greeting did not address substantive issues but generally emphasized the virtues of the Korean people. The Chinese also referred only to relations between the two peoples rather than the two parties or countries. Yang's statement endorsed the peaceful reunification of Korea and called for the United States to remove its armed forces from the south. While his statement called for US military withdrawal from Korea, it appeared in an account intended solely for domestic North Korean consumption. Throughout the first part of the reporting period, the

Table 2
Selected DPRK-USSR Political Visits, January-June 1983

Visitor Name/Title	Person(s) Visited Name/Title	Dates of Visit	Comments
Ho Tam Candidate Mbr, KWP-CC Politburo; Foreign Minister.	Mikhail Kapitsa Dep Min, Foreign Affairs	11 Jan 83	Ho Tam met with Kapitsa during a stopover at the Moscow airport on his return to Pyongyang
N. M. Shubnikov Soviet Ambassador to DPRK	Yi Chong-mok Mbr, KWP-CC; Vice Minister, Foreign Affairs	17 Jan 83	Yi is the first DPRK official reported to have received Shubnikov following his 24 Dec 82 appointment.
Kwon Hyok-pong Vice Dir, DPRK General Bureau of Motion Picture Films, Ministry of Culture and Art	P. K. Kostikov Dep Chmn, Soviet Council of Ministers State Committee for Cinematography	28 Jan 83	1983 Film Protocol signed in Moscow. At the signing Kostikov said that DPRK-USSR film cooperation contributed to the way that ideological and scientific education through cinematography is carried out in the two countries. Kostikov indicated that the USSR had accepted a Korean request to train cinema technicians, directors, cameramen, and playwrights. Kwon mentioned that the 1982 Film Protocol was completed successfully and commented on the CPSU leadership and achievements of the Soviet leaders in his speech.
M. N. Smirnovskiy Dep Chief, CPSU-CC Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries	Kil Chae-kyong Mbr, KWP-CC; Dep Dir, CC International Dept; Vice Minister, Foreign Affairs	21 Feb-1 Mar 83	Before N. M. Shubnikov was appointed Ambassador to DPRK, he was Smirnovskiy's superior. Although Smirnovskiy is a Deputy Chief of a CPSU-CC Department, he is not a full or candidate member of the CPSU-CC. Kil is reported as greeting Smirnovskiy and seeing him off.
	Kim Hwan Mbr, KWP-CC Politburo; Dir, CC Heavy Industry Dept; Mbr, Central People's Committee; Chmn, Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) Budget Committee	28 Feb 83	Kim is the highest level DPRK official reported to have met with Smirnovskiy. An unidentified "personage concerned" an USSR Ambassador Shubnikov attended the meeting.
Hwang Chang-yop Mbr, KWP-CC; Sec, KWP-CC; Chmn, Stgd Cmte, SPA	A. P. Shitokov Mbr, CPSU-CC; Chmn, Council of the Union of Supreme Soviet	29 Mar 83	Stopover in Moscow enroute to Malta.
N. V. Talyzin Mbr, CPSU-CC; Dep Chmn, Presidium of Council of Ministers; USSR Permanent Representative to CEMA	Yi Chong-ok Mbr, KWP-CC Politburo; Mbr, Central People's Committee; Premier, State Administration Council	19 May 83	N. V. Talyzin led the USSR delegation to the 1983 meeting of the Soviet-Korean Consultative Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Questions. Talyzin met with Yi Chong-ok the day he left Pyongyang.

Table 2
Selected DPRK-USSR Political Visits, January-June 1983 (continued)

Visitor Name/Title	Person(s) Visited Name/Title	Dates of Visit	Comments
I. T. Grishin Dep Min, Foreign Trade	Yi Song-nok Vice Min, Foreign Trade	18 May 83	Grishin led a trade delegation to the D. during which a protocol for mutual delivery of commodities was signed on 18 May.
Pak Song-chol Mbr, KWP-CC Politburo; DPRK Vice President	M. A. Yasnov Mbr, CPSU-CC; Dep Chmn, Presidium of Supreme Soviet	20 & 25 May 83	Stopover in Moscow on these dates while going to and from Libya. Yasnov met Pak at the airport both times.
A. A. Shramov Deputy Chief, Freight Bureau, Ministry of Railways	Unknown	21 May 83	Shramov attended the DPRK-USSR meeting for agreement on the trade cargo transport plan for 1983.
A. G. Shumeyko Second Sec, Voronezh Provincial CPSU Cmte	Kim Pyong-pae Vice Dir, unidentified KWP-CC Dept	23-31 May	Kim Pyong-pae greeted Shumeyko on his arrival, attended the 30 May meeting with Hyon Mu-kwang (see below), and saw Shumeyko off when he departed.
	Hyon Mu-kwang Candidate Mbr, KWP-CC Politburo; Sec, KWP-CC; Mbr, Central People's Cmte	30 May	Highest level DPRK official reported to have met with Shumeyko. Kim Pyong-pae, USSR Ambassador Shubnikov also attended the meeting. Pravda reported that Shumeyko visited the DPRK to promote interparty contacts in the chemical industry.
U Chong-hak Vice Chmn, Central Committee, General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea	K. Y. Matskyavichyus Sec, All Union Central Council of Trade Unions; Chmn, Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Society	15-23 Jun	U Chong-hak's activities while in the U were not reported but he was greeted and seen off by Matskyavichyus. (Matskyavichyus's assignment as U Chonghak's host may have no special significance, but it is unusual.)

only Chinese statements that contain an unqualified demand for a US troop removal from the Korean peninsula are those intended for a strictly North Korean audience.

(2) Commentary on United States-ROK Military Exercises TEAM SPIRIT-83

On 1 February, US and ROK Armed Forces began their joint military exercises TEAM SPIRIT-83. The annual maneuvers ended in mid-April and involved over 180,000 troops from both countries. Chinese commentary criticized the maneuvers as "aggravating tension in Korea" and a war provocation. The Chinese cited the presence of US troops in South Korea as the major impediment to Korean unification. However, it was possible to distinguish Chinese criticism of the US role in TEAM SPIRIT-83 from the long-term US military presence in South Korea. In commentary intended for domestic Chinese consumption, Beijing never distinctly called for a withdrawal of American troops from the ROK. Instead, they asked for an end to the military exercises. In commentary intended for international or North Korean consumption, however, the Chinese either called for a US withdrawal or expressed support for North Korea's demand for a US withdrawal.

A member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Hao Deqing, made a strong criticism in a domestic Chinese news account of the US troop presence in South Korea on the first day of TEAM SPIRIT-83 maneuvers. Hao condemned the continued American military presence and claimed it was the "root cause of the national separation in Korea," but stopped short of demanding a US withdrawal. Hao, however, "expressed resolute support" for a statement issued by a group of 21 North Korean political parties (including the KWP) that called for the removal of US troops from South Korea.²² Hao's comments were typical of Chinese public statements which appeared in the domestic Chinese news media during the first part of the reporting period. When commenting on the American military presence in South Korea the Chinese employed a formula of endorsing a North Korean demand for a withdrawal rather than voicing an independent and unqualified demand.

A 2 February Renmin Ribao [People's Daily] commentary called the joint military maneuvers a "war provocation" and demanded that the United States stop the exercises immediately. It argued that the joint exercises "gravely endangered stability in the Korean peninsula." The commentary contained no reference to the US troop withdrawal issue. In terms of China's security concerns with respect to North Korea, it was consistent for Beijing to denounce the military exercises but not to demand a complete US troop withdrawal.²³

Beijing's primary security concern has been to avert another war on the Korean peninsula. This concern was expressed in China's domestic news reporting. The Chinese do not want a resumption of hostilities in Korea since a war probably would involve China and precipitate Soviet involvement. In response to the military maneuvers of the American and South Korean Armed Forces, North Korea was noted to have placed its own Armed Forces in a "semi-war state" of readiness.²⁴ In this volatile atmosphere, the Chinese feared the increased potential for some form of military incident between the two Koreas. Chinese commentary cited an incident of 31 January when South Korean artillery fired on North Korean aircraft, and warned that a single incident may evolve into something larger. Whenever the Chinese demanded that the United States immediately stop the joint military exercises, they were concurrently giving North Korea propaganda support and expressing their own concern that war may break out on the Korean peninsula.

Although Beijing does not want a war on the Korean peninsula, it benefits from the continued US military presence in Asia which serves as an effective counterweight to the Soviet Union and inhibits military provocations in Korea. Since the 1970s, China has publicly insisted that "Soviet hegemonism" is the principal threat and has formed closer relations with the United States, its Western allies, and Japan, to counter this threat. The Chinese value stability on the Korean peninsula and the US presence contributes to the status quo in Korea.

In Chinese commentary on TEAM SPIRIT-83, broadcast in Korean to North Korea, the Chinese did not make an unqualified call for an American withdrawal from South Korea. In a 16 March account of a speech made by Yun Ki-pok, Secretary of the KWP Central Committee, at a Pyongyang rally, Beijing radio reported that Yun "stressed that the United States should withdraw from South Korea, taking along its military forces and equipment."²⁵ On 1 April in another broadcast intended for a North Korean audience, Beijing radio again called for a United States withdrawal, citing a United Nations resolution with the same goal.²⁶ An account of a Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] article, broadcast on 22 April after the conclusion of the maneuvers, did not call for an American withdrawal in any manner.²⁷

(3) Korean People's Army Day

In commemoration of the 51st anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army (KPA) on 25 April, the Chinese Minister of National Defense and the Chief of General Staff sent messages to their North Korean counterparts. Xinhua broadcast these messages to North Korea in Korean on 24 April. Defense Minister Zhang Aiping spoke of the "revolutionary friendship and the militant unity" of the Korean and Chinese people. Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi generally spoke in platitudes about the KPA, referring to its "repeated victories in the struggle to oppose the imperialists' armed aggression," and how the People's Army had "created immortal feats for the fatherland and people." Both statements avoided any specific details, and neither mentioned the participation of the Chinese in the Korean War of 1950-53. Both statements also sidestepped the topic of Korean unification. Perhaps the Chinese preferred to avoid a potentially difficult rhetorical position of raising the topic of reunification in statements praising the Korean People's Army. It would be difficult to separate the Chinese objective of a peaceful Korean reunification from a commemoration of the role of the KPA.²⁸

To the international community, the Chinese reported on a celebration held in Beijing for the 51st anniversary of the founding of the KPA. Both the celebration and coverage were minimal. The most senior Chinese official present at the celebration, according to Xinhua, was Yuan Jie, Deputy Commander of the Beijing Military Region. The topic of Korean reunification was raised, but the Chinese explicitly supported a peaceful reunification. No mention was made of Chinese participation in the Korean War by either the Chinese or the Korean participants in the event. As Korean spokesman, the military attache of the Korean Embassy in Beijing, Senior Col Kim Pyong-ho said that the two countries would "fight shoulder to shoulder" in any future struggle against an unnamed common enemy.²⁹ The Chinese spokesman at the event, Liu Xueyi, a political commissar of the Beijing Military Region, spoke, according to pattern, of the militant friendship forged between the peoples and armies of China and North Korea but did not mention any possibility of the two countries fighting together in the future.

b. The Second Period, 5 May to 30 June 1983

(1) Hijacking to South Korea

On 5 May a Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) airliner en route from Shenyang to Shanghai was hijacked by a group of six Chinese and flown to the Chunchon military airport near Seoul, South Korea. Following the hijacking, South Korean-Chinese relations entered an unprecedented stage. Any change in relations between China and the ROK has an impact on relations between China and North Korea. A change in China's reporting on the DPRK can be detected in the immediate aftermath of the settlement of the CAAC airliner hijacking incident.

For the first time in an official capacity, the Chinese referred to the government in South Korea as the Republic of Korea in the agreement reached on the airliner hijacking.³⁰ The full name of both countries appeared beneath the name of the signatories, although the text of the memorandum referred only to the two "sides." This was not tantamount to official diplomatic recognition of the ROK by the Chinese, but it was a positive gesture indicating that Beijing and Seoul have made some movement in the direction of official relations. It appears that China may have taken one of the first steps in the direction of PRC/ROK mutual recognition.

Shen Tu, the CAAC Director who headed the Chinese delegation to Seoul immediately after the hijacking, was asked during a press conference at Kimpo International Airport whether China would continue to use the official government name of the Republic of Korea. Shen replied, "If similar incidents should occur in the future we will deal with them in the same spirit of cooperation as we did this time."³¹ In his reply, Shen kept all options open for China. China was not committed to calling South Korea by its official name but it remained open to that possibility if circumstances dictated. Pyongyang could certainly be apprehensive that its status in Beijing may be subject to change.

China's use of South Korea's designation as the Republic of Korea was carefully limited. While the memorandum between China and South Korea settling the hijacking situation was reported by Xinhua domestically and to Korea, the verbatim text which contained the unprecedented inclusion of South Korea's official name was not prominently reported, or possibly not reported at all, in either domestic or international Xinhua accounts. The first Xinhua report of the hijacking transmitted to North Korea came 14 days after the passengers and crew returned to China.³² South Korean news reports contained the reference in the memorandum to the ROK as well as Shen Tu's statement that China could, in similar circumstances, use ROK as South Korea's appellation.

Before the passengers and crew of the hijacked CAAC airliner were returned to China, Shen held a press conference in Seoul highlighting the points of agreement between the ROK and China on the hijacking settlement. In response to a question concerning handling the six hijackers Shen said, "although there was a difference of opinion in dealing with the hijackers, both parties agreed that the criminals should be severely punished."³³ In the course of the press conference he made no explicit call for the return of the hijackers to Chinese authorities. Once the passengers, crew and airliner were returned to China, demands for the return of the hijackers to China became more insistent.

In an account of an internationally broadcast press conference in Beijing held after the return of the passengers and crew of the hijacked Chinese airliner, Shen Tu insisted that the "hijackers should be handed over and punished according to Chinese law."³⁴ Xinhua later transmitted to North Korea another Shen Tu press conference, in which he said that "because the two sides did not reach agreement on the handling of the six hijackers, [China] retained the right to continue negotiations."³⁵ In both of these later press conferences, Shen criticized Taiwanese authorities who tried to influence the South Korean Government's decision on handling the hijackers. Referring to attempts by Taiwan to pressure South Korea into allowing the hijackers to go to Taiwan, Shen said that "any move which allowed the hijackers to evade responsibility for their actions, or even to go free, would be intolerable."³⁶

While negotiating a settlement of the hijacking situation in South Korea, public statements made by Shen Tu were positive in tone and emphasized the points of agreement. Once negotiations were concluded, an agreement signed, and the passengers, crew, and airliner returned to China, the Chinese commenced a propaganda campaign critical of the South Koreans and the settlement. The harsh rhetoric served a dual purpose. It expressed China's real sentiment that the hijackers should be punished by Chinese judicial organizations and sent a signal to the North Koreans that despite the first official contacts between Seoul and Beijing, China had not forsaken North Korea.

Chinese sensitivity to North Korean concerns following the hijacking settlement may have prompted Beijing to dispatch Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian to Pyongyang. (Table 3 lists other exchanges between China and North Korea during the reporting period.) One week after the passengers and crew of the hijacked CAAC airliner returned to China, the Foreign Ministry announced that Wu would "pay a goodwill visit" to the DPRK.³⁷ The announcement did not imply that the visit was in response to China's recently concluded agreement with South Korea. Neither the Chinese nor the North Koreans publicly stated the reason for Wu's trip other than it was an official goodwill visit at the invitation of the DPRK Government. China's decision to send its foreign minister to Pyongyang immediately after the settlement with South Korea demonstrated China's continued commitment to North Korea.

Statements made by the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian in Pyongyang characterized Chinese-North Korean relations as more amicable than earlier statements in the reporting period. At a welcoming banquet in Pyongyang, Wu said that the Chinese people valued their traditional friendship with the Korean people but did not go beyond referring to relations between "peoples." Wu's statement was more cordial than China's New Year's greeting to North Korea, which contained no reference to the level of Chinese-North Korean ties.³⁸ Also, Wu called for the United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea.³⁸ This was especially significant for this reporting period since Wu's speech also was distributed for domestic Chinese consumption.

During Wu's visit North Korea described relations with the Chinese as extremely cordial, much more so than had Chinese statements. Differences between the Chinese and the Korean news agency versions of Wu Xueqian's speech at his welcoming banquet demonstrate that each nation described the events that transpired during the visit differently, each with a different audience in mind.³⁹ The Chinese wanted to assure the North Koreans that they had not been abandoned and to inform the South Koreans that China is still committed to the

Table 3
Selected DPRK-PRC Political Visits, January-June 1983

Visitor Name/Title	Person(s) Visited Name/Title	Dates of Visit	Comments
Yi Tae-paek Vice Chmn, Machine Industry Commission	Zhou Jiannan Min, Machine-Building Industry	11 Jan-1 Feb 83	Talks on technical cooperation in machine-building.
	Chen Muhua State Councilor		
Yi Song-yong Chmn, Hamhung City People's Cmte	Wang Daohan Mayor, Shanghai City	24 Feb-2 Mar 83	A goodwill tour as part of a sister cities agreement.
	Wan Li Vice Premier, State Council		
Kim Pyong-pae Dep Dir, unidentified dept, KWP-CC	Ji Pengfei State Councilor Mbr, Stdg Cmte, Central Advisory Commission	22 Mar-3 Apr 83	Visitors were identified as a Korean Workers Party workers delegation. Neither the Chinese nor Korean news agency noted the nature of the visit.
Chon In-chol Vice Min, Foreign Affairs	Ji Pengfei State Councilor Mbr, Stdg Cmte, Central Advisory Commission	29 Mar-6 Apr 83	Visitors were identified as a goodwill delegation from the DPRK Foreign Ministry but the substance of the visit was not noted.
	Wu Xueqian Min, Foreign Affairs		
	Yang Zhenya Dep Dir, Asian Affairs Dept, Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
Tan Qilong Chmn, Sichuan Provincial CCP Advisory Cmte; Mbr, CCP-CC	An Sung-hak Dir, unidentified dept, KWP-CC	8-11 Apr 83	Visitors were identified as a goodwill delegation of the CCP. Addressing a banquet, the Korean host An Sung-hak said, "The Chinese people are our closest comrades in arms and China is our reliable rear area."
	Kim Il-song Gen Sec, KWP-CC President of DRPK		
So Yun-sok Leading Sec, Pyongyang City KWP Cmte; Mbr, KWP Politburo	Xi Zhongxun Mbr, CCP Politburo Mbr, CCP Secretariat	19 Apr-3 May 83	Visitors were identified as a visiting friendship delegation of the KWP. Hu Yaobang told the visitors that the "two parties, the two countries, and the two peoples have forged close relations in their common struggles."
	Hu Yaobang Gen Sec, CCP-CC		

Table 3
 Selected DPRK-PRC Political Visits, January-June 1983 (continued)

Visitor Name/Title	Person(s) Visited Name/Title	Dates of Visit	Comments
Yi Chang-son Min, Culture and Art	Zhu Muzhi Min, Ministry of Culture Hu Qili Mbr, CCP Secretariat Hu Yaobang Gen Sec, CCP-CC	17-27 May 83	1983-84 cultural exchange agreement signed.
Chu Hyon-ok Dir, Korean Central News Agency	Mu Qing Dir, Xinhua News Agency Hu Yaobang Gen Sec, CCP-CC Deng Liqun Dir, Propaganda Dept, CCP-CC	17-31 May 83	The visiting delegation toured six cities and met officials at each stop. The visiting journalists were also briefed by their Chinese counterparts on conditions in China.
Wu Xueqian Min, Foreign Affairs	Ho Tam Min, Foreign Affairs Kim Il-song Gen Sec, KWP-CC President of DPRK	20-25 May 83	Within days after the Chinese reached a settlement with the Republic of Korea over a Chinese civil airliner that was hijacked to South Korea, the Chinese announced that the foreign minister would visit the DPRK. Wu Xueqian's rhetoric during his visit to Pyongyang framed Sino-North Korean relations in a warmer setting than previous public statements made by Chinese officials in the reporting period.
Kim Chong-il Sec, KWP-CC Secretariat	Hu Yaobang Gen Sec, CCP-CC Zhao Ziyang Premier, State Council Deng Xiaoping Chmn, Central Advisory Commission	June 83	By allowing Kim Chong-il to visit Beijing, the Chinese tacitly accepted Kim's designation as heir apparent to his father, Kim Il-song.

DPRK and recognizes Pyongyang as the legal government of Korea. The North Koreans apparently tried to enhance the significance of Wu's visit. For example, the Korean version of Wu's speech included a passage concerning the reciprocal visits of Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping to North Korea and Kim Il-song to China which claimed:

The mutual visits between the supreme leaders of the two countries brought the friendly relations between the two parties and two countries of China and Korea to a new, higher plane and opened up a more beautiful and broad prospect.⁴⁰

Chinese sources were not as sanguine about Chinese-North Korean relations. Another area of wide discrepancy between the North Korean version and the Xinhua account was a reference in the Korean account where Wu was quoted as saying, "I deem it a great honor to visit Korea, the country of heroic brothers, as my first foreign trip in the capacity of foreign minister." This statement was not found in the Chinese version and was inaccurate. Wu became foreign minister in November 1982 and traveled to Africa in December 1982 and to New Zealand in April 1983.

Wu was received by Kim Il-song on the 3d day of his visit to Pyongyang. The Xinhua account of their meeting simply said they held "cordial talks."⁴¹ The news account also noted that Kim had high regard for the visit just completed by CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang to Romania and Yugoslavia.⁴² By this remark, Beijing apparently wanted to advertise North Korea's approval of China's good relations with Communist states that follow an independent path from Moscow. The purpose of Wu's visit to Pyongyang may have been to ensure that North Korea would refrain from tilting toward Moscow and continue to lean toward Beijing despite the recently concluded contacts between China and South Korea.

At the conclusion of his visit to the DPRK, Wu and his North Korean counterpart Ho Tam exchanged speeches at a banquet; both avoided public discussion of the substance of their talks. Wu's speech centered on the "friendly relations between the two countries." It was significant that he referred to relations between "countries," a higher level of bilateral relations than "peoples" which he made reference to in his welcoming speech. Wu ended his speech by saying:

Both sides will make still greater efforts to consolidate and develop the friendly relations between the two countries and pledge closer cooperation in international struggle. We are very satisfied with the outcome of this visit.⁴³

By characterizing the level of bilateral relations as those between the two "countries," Wu indicated that the Chinese were, in fact, satisfied with the visit. Wu's speeches with references to relations between "countries" and a call for an American military withdrawal from South Korea were published within China and can be considered more authoritative than if they had been only disseminated to a North Korean audience.

(2) Chinese Perceptions of Kim Chong-il

Chinese perceptions of North Korea made a distinguishable shift for the better in the period beginning with Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's visit to the DPRK. On Wu's arrival in Pyongyang on 20 May, the Chinese published (for

both domestic and international dissemination) excerpts of a thesis on communism by Kim Chong-il, the son and designated successor of Kim Il-song.⁴⁴ During the Sixth Congress of the KWP in October 1980, the elder Kim engineered the naming of his son Kim Chong-il to be his successor. The Chinese initially expressed their disapproval of this dynastic practice by their public silence on the issue. By publishing Kim Chong-il's thesis, Beijing apparently has given its approval to this succession scheme.

The Chinese subsequently demonstrated more strongly their approval of Kim Chong-il's status when they allowed him to visit China in June. Xinhua did not report on Kim's visit until after the fact. It was during a July visit by a Korean delegation that Hu Yaobang acknowledged that Kim had made an "invited but unannounced visit" to China. In publicly acknowledging the younger Kim's visit to China, Hu said, "His China visit has further enhanced the amity between the two parties, two countries, and two peoples of China and Korea."⁴⁵ Hu made reference to the full range of bilateral relations by acknowledging both parties and countries. The combination of publishing Kim's thesis and granting him a visit to China provided a further gesture of support for Sino-North Korean ties and also helped the younger Kim consolidate his position as designated successor by enhancing his international stature.

(3) Perceptions of North Korea

Immediately following the agreement between China and South Korea settling the hijacking, the extent of coverage of events in North Korea in the Chinese media increased. In both May and June, around the time of the anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the number of articles pertaining to North Korea published or transmitted by Xinhua more than doubled compared to any other month in the reporting period. The increased news coverage included items about visiting delegations, cultural exchanges, statements of various North Korean committees, and various anniversary celebrations. Significantly, news items relating to North Korea were more prominent after the Chinese-South Korean contact than before. The increased coverage of events in North Korea can be regarded as an attempt by the Chinese to give Pyongyang propaganda support and to ease North Korean concerns in the aftermath of the first official contacts between China and the ROK.

On 23 June, the 10th anniversary of a speech by Kim Il-song entitled "Prevent National Division, Reunify the Fatherland," Renmin Ribao published a commentary that typified the renewed level of support that Beijing gave Pyongyang in this reporting period. While insisting that reunification of South and North Korea be peaceful, the commentary also clearly called for a US military withdrawal from the peninsula.

For the sake of the cause of Korea's independent peaceful reunification, the United States must immediately withdraw its forces from South Korea and stop all unwarranted interference on the Korean peninsula.⁴⁶

This statement confirmed the disclosure in the domestic Chinese news media of Chinese Foreign Minister Wu's remarks in Pyongyang during May calling for an unqualified US military withdrawal from South Korea. The Chinese seem to be willing to make additional efforts to demonstrate their commitment to the DPRK in view of the newest phase of Sino-South Korean relations.

4. CONCLUSIONS

a. The Soviet View

The Soviet Union continues to be North Korea's principal trade partner and one of its most important suppliers of technical aid. North Korean sources recognize the Soviet Union as a trade partner, but do not mention Soviet assistance to various industrial facilities or the significance of such aid in North Korea's industrial modernization plans. The Soviet Union is clearly disturbed by North Korea's failure to acknowledge such support and, for this reason, permits the media to publicize details of Soviet-North Korean economic relations. It appears that the Soviet Union not only seeks greater recognition for its technical aid to North Korea, but also wants North Korea to coordinate its economic planning with CEMA.

Political and military relations between the two countries do not appear to be close at this time. President Kim Il-song has failed to obtain the Soviets' acknowledgement of heir apparent Kim Chong-il. Although the Soviet media have not criticized this choice of successor, they have refrained from mentioning his name. Improved DPRK-USSR political relations appear unlikely unless the Soviet Union makes concessions on this issue. North Korean and Soviet sources have not disclosed ongoing military cooperation between the two countries, and the Soviet Union has not publicized the conditions under which it would support North Korea in a military confrontation on the Korean peninsula.

b. The Chinese View

Prior to the hijacking of the CAAC airliner to South Korea in May 1983, China's public statements regarding North Korea may be described as perfunctory; they conveyed a minimum of support. Beijing endorsed without enthusiasm Pyongyang's positions on reunification and the US military presence on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese spoke of bilateral relations on a level no higher than from people-to-people as in the New Year's greeting sent to the Korean people by China. China framed its ties with North Korea in unenthusiastic terms with vague references to the past and future while avoiding any discussion of the present status of relations.

Regarding the issue of the US military presence on the Korean peninsula, the Chinese concerned themselves more with their own interests in Korea rather than with threats to the DPRK. Throughout the TEAM SPIRIT-83 joint US-ROK military exercises, the Chinese called for an immediate cessation of the maneuvers, fearing that they created a volatile atmosphere that "gravely endangered stability in the Korean peninsula." On those occasions when China demanded a US military withdrawal it did so only in statements intended exclusively for a North Korean audience. Normally, Beijing merely endorsed Pyongyang's call for a US troop withdrawal rather than making its own unqualified demand. It remains in China's security interest that the American military maintain a presence in Asia as an effective counterweight to the Soviet Union.

After the Chinese hijacking incident, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian described China/DPRK bilateral relations with more warmth than had been expressed previously during the reporting period. Hu Yaobang employed even more cordial terms when he spoke about Sino-North Korean relations after Kim Chong-il's visit to China. Foreign Minister Wu's call for an American military withdrawal from

South Korea was unprecedented for the reporting period since it was published in the domestic Chinese news media. Wu's remarks were later reaffirmed in a Renmin Ribao commentary published in June. During the latter part of the reporting period, the Chinese broke their nearly 3-year silence on the topic of North Korea's succession scheme. China gave its tacit approval of Kim Chong-il's designation as heir apparent by publishing a thesis on communism written by the younger Kim and allowing him to visit China. Further monitoring of Chinese public statements may determine whether the trends which evolved in the reporting period concerning China's perceptions of North Korea are long-term or short-term developments.

Appendix A

Technical Assistance to Specific North Korean
Facilities Publicized in Soviet Sources

Facility	Description of Soviet Assistance
Anju Coal Mine	A Soviet broadcast on 18 February 1983 discussed Soviet support for the DPRK coal industry and mentioned the Anju Coal Mine as one of the facilities that receives Soviet equipment. The broadcast also mentioned that new coal cutting machines, conveyor belts, loading machines, communications equipment, and automation facilities were being provided to the DPRK, but did not indicate the specific types of equipment being delivered to Anju.
Aoji Ammonia Plant	DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreements signed in 1966 and 1976 [see Appendix B, items 107 and 153] mentioned an ammonia plant to be built in North Korea with Soviet assistance. The commentary section at the end of this source mentioned Soviet assistance for the construction of an ammonia plant at Aoji. A 30 December 1982 Soviet broadcast reported that the Aoji Ammonia Plant was completed in 1982. The plant is equipped with automated production machinery produced in the USSR.
Chongjin Power Plant	DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreements signed in 1966 and 1976 [see Appendix B, item 153] included provisions for the Soviet Union to provide equipment and materials in the 1977-79 time period for the construction of a 150,000-kilowatt thermoelectric powerplant at Chongjin. A Soviet broadcast on 22 March 1983 indicated that the first generator of a powerplant under construction at Chongjin would be completed in the summer of 1983. The same source mentioned that the Chongjin Thermoelectric Powerplant is "the fourth of its kind built with Soviet cooperation."
Hamhung Chemicals Complex	According to <u>Pravda</u> (31 March 83) the ammonium nitrate plant at the Hamhung Chemicals Complex was built with Soviet assistance. <u>Pravda</u> implied that the modernization of various facilities at the complex (coal gas shop, concentrated sulfuric acid shop, and other shops) was taking place with Soviet assistance.

Kimchaek Steel Complex

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1976 [Appendix B, item 153] provided for Soviet assistance to increase Kimchaek's steel output from 1 million tons a year to 2.4 million tons a year. The commentary section at the end of this source said that two Soviet-assisted facilities at the complex have been completed: a hot rolling shop with a capacity of 850,000 tons a year and an oxygen converter shop with a capacity of 1 million tons a year. A 30 December 1982 Soviet broadcast said that the completion of these two shops increased steel production at Kimchaek by 1.2 million tons a year. In 1982 a cold rolling shop was completed at Kimchaek with Soviet assistance. The cold rolling shop has a capacity of 400,000 tons a year. Machinery and equipment delivered to Kimchaek originated from the following cities or installations: Odessa, Uralmash, Zhdanov, Cherepovets, Novolipetsk, and Chelyabinsk. Soviet sources do not mention the number of Soviet specialists working at Kimchaek; however, information in Soviet sources indicate that the number could be as high as 750.

Pukchang Aluminum Plant

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1976 [Appendix B, item 153] provided for Soviet assistance to construct an aluminum plant. The same source [commentary section] said that the Pukchang Aluminum Plant was under construction in 1979. In March 1983 a Soviet broadcast said that the first stage of the Pukchang Aluminum Plant was to begin operations in April 1983.

Pukchang Powerplant

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1966 [Appendix B, item 107] provided for Soviet assistance in the construction of a thermoelectric powerplant at Pukchang. Two Soviet broadcasts (30 December 1982 and 22 March 1983) reporting on the Pukchang Thermoelectric Powerplant said that: the first stage was completed in 1972 and "that stage is supplying 45 percent of the total electricity generated in the Republic." One generator at the plant became operational in 1982. The 16th and final generator is being assembled now by Soviet technicians, "along with their Korean comrades." With the completion of the 16th generator the Pukchang Thermoelectric Powerplant will be capable of generating 1.6 million kilowatts of electricity. "Several score of Soviet enterprises have produced various facilities necessary for this important power industrial plant."

Pyongyang Microelectric
Motor Plant

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1970 [Appendix B, item 120] provided for Soviet assistance to construct a microelectric motor plant. According to the provisions of this agreement, the DPRK agreed to deliver to the USSR 60 percent of the motors produced at the plant for 5 years. These shipments are to begin the year after the plant is completed and be accepted by the USSR as payment for its assistance to the DPRK. Two Soviet broadcasts (30 December 1982 and 22 March 1983) reporting on the Pyongyang "small-sized" Motor Plant said that: assembly and preparation work at the plant have been completed and operations are scheduled to begin soon. According to one broadcast, the plant will produce motors for refrigerators and washing machines. The other broadcast said that refrigerators and washing machines were to be produced at the plant.

Pyongyang Motor Vehicle
Battery Plant

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1970 [Appendix B, item 120] provided for Soviet assistance to construct an "automotive battery" plant. The provisions of the agreement are the same as those for the Pyongyang Microelectric Motor Plant except that the DPRK agreed to deliver to the USSR 80 percent of the batteries produced at the plant for 5 years. A 30 December 1982 Soviet broadcast called it the "Pyongyang Truck and Tractor Battery Manufacturing Plant." The same source said the plant can produce 1.2 million batteries each year.

Unggi Oil Refinery

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1966 [Appendix B, item 107] provided for Soviet assistance to construct a refinery. The commentary section at the end of this source said that the Unggi Oil Refinery is capable of processing 2 million tons of oil.

Yonghung Coal Mine

The information is the same as reported for Anju Coal Mine. Anju and Yonghung were the only coal mines mentioned by name in the Soviet broadcast.

Yongsong (or Chongsong)
Bearings Plant

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1976 [Appendix B, item 153] provided for Soviet assistance to construct a bearings plant. The commentary section at the end of this source reported that the plant was under construction in 1979. A 30 December 1982 Soviet broadcast said that construction was in

the final stages, mentioned that it would produce bearings ranging from 10-mm to 680-mm in diameter, and gave Yongsong as the location of the plant. Thirty Soviet manufactured machines have been installed at the plant. According to a 22 March 1983 Soviet broadcast, the "(Chongsong) Bearings Plant" has been completed and Soviet engineers are in the process of teaching North Koreans how to operate Soviet-produced machinery at the plant.

Calcium Carbide Plant

DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement signed in 1970 [Appendix B, item 120] provided for Soviet assistance to construct a calcium carbide plant. According to the provisions of the agreement, the DPRK agreed to deliver 50 percent of the plant's production to the USSR for 5 years. These shipments are to begin the year after the plant is completed and are to be accepted by the USSR as payment for its assistance to the DPRK.

Enameled Wire Plant

This plant is included in the 1970 DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement. The terms of payment are the same except that the DPRK agreed to deliver to the USSR 80 percent of the enameled wire produced at the plant for 5 years. According to Izvestiya (17 March 1983), the plant is in the final stage of construction.

Lead Slag Processing Plant

This plant is included in the 1970 DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement. The terms of payment are the same as for the calcium carbide and enameled wire plants, but the percentage amount of lead slag to be shipped to the USSR is not mentioned in the agreement.

Railroad Car Plant

This plant is included in the 1970 DPRK-USSR technical assistance agreement. According to the provisions of the agreement, the DPRK agreed to deliver 60 percent of the railroad cars produced at the plant to the USSR for 7 years. The 60 percent must include at least 5,000 units.

APPENDIX B

ABSTRACT FROM BOOK ON USSR-DPRK FOREIGN RELATIONS

Soviet Relations With the Korean People's Democratic Republic, 1945-1980
[Otnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza s Narodnoy Koreyey]

This book is a collection of documents and materials concerning the role of the Soviet Army in liberating Korea from the Japanese occupation, rebuilding the economy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, and combating American aggression. It also discusses Soviet efforts to reunite Korea and a variety of other topics dealing with Soviet-Korean relations. The book includes the most important documents typifying the relationship of the USSR with Korea: treaties, agreements, joint communiques, reports on discussions between party and governmental delegations from the two countries, speeches of prominent party and governmental figures, letters, telegrams, documents from social organizations, etc. Some of these documents are published here for the first time; they were taken from central depositories of the Soviet State Archives, the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and the Archives of Foreign Policy of the USSR. As a rule, the documents are presented in their complete form. They are presented in chronological sequence and are accompanied with notes and observations. Each document is numbered according to this chronological sequence.

No. 81. Treaty on trade and navigation between the USSR and Korea. 22 Jun 1960. Both countries agree to take all necessary measures to develop and strengthen trade in a spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual assistance and on a basis of equality and mutual benefit. Ratified 19 Nov 1960 by the Supreme Soviet of USSR.

No. 82. From a speech by Kim Il-song on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Korean liberation from the Japanese occupation. Kim expresses his thanks to the "great Soviet people who liberated our country from the yoke of Japanese imperialism and who have constantly offered us enormous material and moral support." Later, he states: "The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic are not only our great brothers, but also our nearest neighbors. The monolithic solidarity with the peoples of these two countries is the most important condition for all the victories of our nation." 14 Aug 1960.

No. 83. Statement of the Soviet Government on the peaceful unification of Korea. 7 Dec 1960. Expression of the Soviet Union's full support for North Korea's initiative to reunify the country, attacking the obstinacy of the Americans and their imperialist allies.

No. 85. Agreement on cooperation between the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Society of Soviet-Korean Friendship with the Society of Korean-Soviet Friendship. 10 April 1961. Among the goals is the promotion of tourism between the two countries. Mentions exchanges of leaders in industry, agriculture, etc.

No. 86. From a communique on A. N. Kosygin's visit to Korea. 5 Jun 1961. During his time in Korea, Kosygin and the Soviet delegation visited Pyongyang. Sonnim, Khamkhyn [these are straight transliterations of the Russian version of these place names], where a number of plants and factories, agricultural cooperatives, and cultural institutions were toured "with great interest." Intimate

talks were conducted with Kim Il-song in an atmosphere of amity and friendship and the two sides came to a complete congruence of views on the issues discussed. The Koreans noted with appreciation the material and moral support of the Soviet people in the building of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Both sides recognized that the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries will continue to develop and strengthen.

No. 87. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between USSR and Korea. 6 Jul 1961. Purpose is to develop further and strengthen friendly relations between the two countries. Provides for military assistance to other signatory in case of armed attack. Ratified by USSR 31 Dec 1961.

No. 89. Joint Soviet-Korean communique on occasion of the visit of a Korean party and governmental delegation to the USSR. 11 Jul 1961. Among the things discussed were economic topics, including Soviet economic and technical assistance to Korea. As a result of the talks, the USSR agreed to provide additional assistance to the development of the Korean metallurgical and mining industries. The USSR agreed to speed up delivery of equipment for electric power plants being built with Soviet assistance. The Soviets also promised to help in the construction of a television center. In accordance with Korean wishes, the Soviets extended long-term credits under favorable terms. An agreement was also signed for additional deliveries of goods for the development of the Korean chemical industry.

No. 90. From Kim Il-song's "Report from the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Korea, 4th Party Congress." 11 Sep 1961. He calls the USSR "the liberator and best friend of our nation." Says that friendship with all socialist countries grows stronger with each passing day.

No. 92. From Kim Il-song's speech on the first anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Korea. 6 Jul 1962. He mentions that the Soviet Union has given Korea great economic and technical assistance, but does not specify how much and where.

No. 93. Telegram from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, etc. on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the formation of the Korean PDR. 8 Sep 1963. A message of congratulations and a pledge for better relations between the two countries.

No. 96. Speech by Kim Il-song at a reception for a Soviet delegation. 11 Feb 1965. Kim says the Korean and Soviet peoples are bound by unbreakable ties of friendship. "The Soviet people freed our people from the colonial rule of the Japanese and give us great material assistance and moral support."

No. 97. From Kosygin's speech at a meeting in Pyongyang. 12 Feb 1965. Purpose of the Soviet visit was to strengthen cooperation between the two countries. Praises Korea's rapid industrial development.

No. 98. Pravda article on Soviet visit to Korea. Mentions Soviet support for Kim Il-song's initiative for the peaceful reunification of Korea, 8 Jan 1965.

No. 99. Kosygin's speech to Soviet people over central television. 26 Feb 1965. He describes his trip to Korea and Vietnam. In Korea, he observed great economic progress in the heavy industries, chemistry, power engineering, and agriculture. He expresses his deep appreciation for the friendly reception given the delegation by Kim Il-song, Tsoy Yen Gen 'straight transliteration of the Russian version of the name' and other Korean leaders.

No. 107. Agreement between the USSR and the Korean PDR on economic and technical cooperation in the construction and expansion of industrial installations. 20 Jun 1966. The agreement has 14 articles, some of which are listed below.

1. The Soviet Government, in accordance with Korean wishes, extends economic and technical assistance in the period 1966-72 in the fields of metallurgy, power engineering, oil, and chemicals.

2. The Soviets agree to do design and development work; supply equipment and materials manufactured in the USSR; send teams of Soviet specialists to help in the construction of installations and the assembly, adjustment, and start-up of equipment supplied by the USSR; and receive Korean specialists for industrial training.

3. The Soviets offer the Korean Government credit in the amount of up to 160 million rubles (1 ruble will contain 0.987412 g of pure gold) at 2% per annum interest to pay for the design/development work, the equipment and materials supplied by the USSR, and expenses incurred by the teams of specialists detailed to Korea.

4. The credits provided by this agreement will be paid back by the Korean Government within 10 years in equal yearly amounts, beginning with the year following the delivery of complete sets of equipment and materials and completion of work at the respective installations. The date of the credit for purchase of equipment and materials will be the date stamped on the shipment at the railroad station on the border. For other types of technical assistance, the date will be that of the account's writing.

5. If the cost of services or equipment/materials supplied by the Soviets exceeds the amount provided for by this agreement, the excess will be paid by the Koreans by delivery of goods in accordance with existing Soviet-Korean trade agreements.

6. In accordance with Korean wishes, the Soviets agree to a postponement of all debt repayments due to the Soviet Government in the period 1966-70 under the terms of long-term credits extended to the Koreans on 17 March 1949, 6 July 1961, and 31 May 1965, on the condition that the said loans be paid back within 14 years, beginning on 1 January 1971, in equal yearly amounts.

7. The present agreement nullifies previous obligations as to the time-frame and amounts of technical assistance to be provided in the construction of the Kim Chak Metallurgical Plant, the Pukchan thermo-electric powerplant, an oil refinery and an ammonia plant, which were provided for in Soviet-Korean agreements of 17 March 1959, 24 December 1960, 6 July 1961, and in a Soviet-Korean protocol of 5 August 1963.

No. 108. From a communique on negotiations between governmental economic delegations from the USSR and the Korean PDR. The USSR agrees to assist the Koreans in the expansion of the Kim Chak Metallurgical Plant (with the installation of cold and hot-rolling machinery), the construction of the Pukchan thermo-electric powerplant, and a refinery and ammonia plant as well as other industrial installations. Trade between the two countries is to be increased substantially in the next 4 years. USSR will increase shipments of machinery, equipment, fuels, cotton, materials for industry, rolled steel and nonferrous metals, and chemical products. Koreans will supply more rolled ferrous metals, alloyed steel, minerals, construction materials, chemical products, textiles, etc. Both sides agree to cooperate in fishing industry. 22 Jun 1966.

No. 111. Agreement between Soviet and Korean Governments on formation of a Soviet-Korean consultation committee on economic and scientific-technical questions. 16 Oct 1967. Agreement has eight articles, some of which are listed below.

1. Purposes are to: a) systematically examine relations between the two countries, fostering further bonds; b) propose ways to increase mutual goods exchange; c) examine issues associated with cooperation in the delivery of complete sets of equipment; d) develop measures to expand and deepen scientific-technical cooperation between the two countries; e) implement and monitor decisions and agreements in the area of economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

2. This agreement supersedes that of 5 Feb 1955.

3. The agreement goes into effect on its signing and has no suspense date. The committee meets at least once a year. Expenses for the sessions are born by the host country.

No. 116. Agreement between USSR and Korean PDR on setting up radio-relay communications and cooperating in the construction of radio-relay lines in the territory of the Korean PDR. 24 Oct 1968. Soviets agree to do the design/development work, supply equipment of the "Voskhod" type and auxiliary equipment and materials, send teams of specialists to Korea to assist in the assembly, start up, and operation of the equipment supplied by the USSR, receive Korean specialists for training on operation and repair of this equipment.

No. 117. Agreement on cooperation between Soviet and Korean Academies of Sciences. 4 Feb 1969. To foster exchange of information and expertise, to promote acquisition of literature, materials, instruments, etc., necessary for conducting scientific research. Agreement will automatically be renewed every 5 years unless suspended by one of the signatories.

No. 118. Joint communique on the visit of N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to the Korean PDR, 19 May 1969. During his visit, Podgorny spent time at industrial, agricultural, and cultural-educational establishments in Pyongyang and Khamkhyn. Meetings between Podgorny and Kim Il-song were very friendly. Both sides acknowledged that in recent years, political, economic, and scientific-technical relations between the countries have grown even stronger, especially with the establishment of the standing intergovernmental committee on economic and scientific-technical issues. Soviets express their total support for Korean efforts to reunify the country and to resist American interference, spying, etc.

No. 120. Agreement between USSR and Korean PDR on economic and technical cooperation. 15 Sep 1970. Repeats the language of No. 107, but provides Korean guarantee to complete and start up a RR car construction plant within 18 months and other industrial installations within 12 months of the date of delivery of plant outfitting from the USSR. Korean Government pledges to pay for equipment and materials for the RR car plant within 7 years, and for the other plants included in the agreement to repay within 5 years beginning with the year after plant start-up. Interest of 2 percent will be charged on all unpaid principal at the end of each year. When the plants are in operation, the Koreans pledge to sell for a lengthy period at least 80 percent of the automotive batteries and enameled conductors, 60 percent of the microelectric motors, 50 percent of the calcium carbide, at least 60 percent of the freight RR cars (no less than 5,000 units per year). Output from a lead slag processing plant will be delivered to the USSR for 5 years after start-up; this will be in repayment for the technical assistance rendered by the USSR. This agreement supersedes one drawn up earlier for the automatic batteries and enameled conductors plants (21 Oct 1967). [This agreement is supposed to have a supplement, which presumably details the plants, the materials to be supplied, and the like. It is not included in the book, however.]¹

No. 122. Agreement between USSR and Korean PDR on mutual delivery of goods and payments for the period of 1971-1975. 3 Feb 1971. Prices of goods traded between the two countries are to be based on the world market prices.

No. 129. Agreement on cooperation in the area of radio and television broadcasting. Provides for regular exchange of radio and television programs. 13 Dec 1971.

No. 131. Article on visit of Korean officials to USSR. Discussion on issues of mutual interest. Stress placed on continuing the bonds of friendship and cooperation.

No. 132. Congratulations telegram to Kim Il-song on occasion of his 60th birthday. Most glowing in tone. Notes his historic role in creation of the Korean PDK. Final paragraph: "We wish you good health and new successes in your work for the good of the Korean people in the name of further development of Soviet-Korean cooperation, in the interests of strengthening the unity and solidarity of socialist friendship and the world communist movement." Signed by Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin.

No. 133. Decree on the awarding of the Order of Lenin to Kim Il-song, 14 Apr 1972. "Noting his services in the joint struggle for freedom and independence, his significant contribution to the development and strengthening of friendship and cooperation of the peoples of the USSR and the Korean PDR, and in connection with his 60th birthday, it is decreed to award General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean PDR, Comrade Kim Il-song, the Order of Lenin."

No. 134. Joint communique on visit of a delegation of the CPSU in Korea. 13 Sep 1972. The delegation, headed by K. F. Katushev, paid a visit to the cities of Khamkhyn and Vonsan, the Teanskiy electro-mechanical plant, and Khyn-namskiy chemical fertilizers plant and the Ryonsonskiy machine-building plant.

No. 140. Agreement between Governments of USSR and Korea on cooperation in fishing. 18 Jan 1974. Two parties agree to exchange expertise and information, etc. Agree to assist each other in cases of emergency. Gives each country right to put into port for fuel, food, water, etc. Lists the ports where such services are available: USSR--Ust'Bolsheretsk, Kirovskiy, Nakhodka, Nogliki, Mgachi, Oktyabr'skiy (Sakhalin), Bukhta Krabovaya, Severo-Kuril'sk, Kholmsk, Poronaysk, Khoe, Yuzhno-Kuril'sk; Korean PDK--Nampkho, Gumipkho, Mongympko, Chkhondzhin, Khynnam, Vonsan. At the following ports ships are permitted to deposit fish on shore: USSR--Kirovskiy, Noglinki, Bukhta Krabovaya, Severo-Kuril'sk, Kholmsk; Korean PDK--Nampkho, Mongympkho, Chkhondzhin, Vonsan.

No. 141. Protocol on opening civil aviation service on the Khabarovsk--Pyongyang route in both directions. 19 Aug 1974. Sets number of flights, etc.

No. 145. Agreement between USSR and Korea on cooperation in the area of electrical and mail communications. Lists the types of telegrams which can be exchanged, the rates for the service, etc. Likewise with telephone communications and postal service. 30 May 1975.

No. 149. Telegram of congratulations to Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party on occasion of 30th anniversary of the party's formation. Professions of solidarity and respect for the Korean Communist movement.

No. 153. Agreement between USSR and Korea on economic and technical cooperation, 9 Feb 1976. Provides for Soviet assistance in the expansion of a converter shop and a hot-rolling shop at the Kim Chak Metallurgical Plant to increase the output of smelted steel from 1.0 to 2.4 million tons per year and to process it into hot-rolled sheets. Soviets agree to supply equipment and materials in the 1978-83 period. Also agree to participate in the construction of the Chongdinskaya thermoelectric powerplant (150,000 kW), supplying equipment and materials in the 1977-79 period. Soviets extend to the Koreans credit in the amount of up to 45 million rubles at 2 percent per annum to finance this assistance. Koreans agree to repay in equal annual sums, beginning one year after start-up of the given plant. Soviets also to assist in the construction of an antifriction bearings plant, an ammonia plant, and an aluminum plant. Loans of up to 20 million rubles at 2 percent per annum were extended to finance these projects. The Koreans agree to repay within 10 years in equal yearly payments. The debts will be paid in deliveries of goods under the conditions of the Soviet-Korean trade agreement now in force. Article 5 of this agreement reads:

"The government of the USSR extends to the government of the Korean PDR credit in the amount of up to 400 million rubles at 2 percent per annum to cover debts coming due in the 1976-1980 period to pay for the basic debt and interest from earlier loans agreed to on 17 March 1949, 6 July 1961, 31 May 1965, 20 June 1966, 2 March 1967, 15 Sept 1970, 4 Dec 1970, and 23 Feb 1973. . . . Repayment will be made within 10 years in equal yearly amounts beginning in 1981 in the form of Korean goods now sold to the USSR under Soviet-Korean trade agreements."

No. 154. Trade agreements for the 1976-80 period. Sets categories of goods to be traded, prices, etc.

No. 158. Telegram from Central Committee of Korean Workers' Party to CC CPSU on occasion of 15th anniversary of signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between USSR and Korean PDR. 7 Jul 1976. Expressions of pleasure with each other's wonderfulness.

No. 161. Pravda reports that Kim Il-song has issued a decree awarding the Order of the "State Banner" of the First Degree to L. I. Brezhnev on the occasion of his 70th birthday. 20 Dec 1976.

No. 172. On the visit of a Soviet delegation to the Korean PDR. 23 Jan 1978. Headed by D. A. Kunayev, the first secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. A letter was hand delivered to Kim Il-song along with the Order of Lenin medal from L. I. Brezhnev.

No. 185. Report on the friendly meeting of L. I. Brezhnev and Kim Il-song in Belgrade, 8 May 1980. The leaders exchanged opinions on topics of mutual interest.

No. 189. Kim Il-song sends a telegram to the CC CPSU on occasion of 35th anniversary of liberation of Korea. Observes that Korea and the USSR have always enjoyed warm, brotherly relations.

p. 400. A chart showing the growth of Soviet-Korean trade from 1946 to 1979.

A footnote in the "Commentary" section, no. 33, gives the following information on Soviet economic assistance to the Korean PDR.

At the end of 1979, a total of 59 industrial installations had been renovated, constructed, or expanded with Soviet assistance to the Korean PDR, and another 11 installations were in the design or construction stage. In particular, during the 1954-60 period, the Soviets gave help (for free) in the renovation or reconstruction of the Supkhunskaya hydroelectric plant, the Sondzhinskiy steel smelting plant, the Chkhondzhinskiy metallurgical plant, the Nampkho non-ferrous metals plant, the Khynnam nitrogen fertilizers plant (100,000 tons of ammonia and 400,000 tons of fertilizers per year), the Pongun hydrochloric acid plant, the Madonskiy cement plant (400,000 tons of cement per year), the shale shop at the Chkhonneri cement plant, a tractor repair shop in Sarivon (300 tractors per year), a plywood shop in Kil'dzhu, a furniture factory in Pyongyang, two electrical traction substations, a RR bridge over the Tumangan River, a textile combine (65 million meters of cloth per year), a silk spinning and weaving combine (10 million meters per year) and dyeing/bleaching plants in Pyongyang, a fish-canning plant in Sinpkho, a meat processing plant in Pyongyang, a radio center and municipal hospital in Pyongyang with 600 beds.

In the 1960s and 1970s, using long-term loan arrangements, the Soviets delivered to the Koreans assistance in the construction or reconstruction of an oxygen-converter shop with a capacity of 1 million tons of steel per year and a hot-rolling steel sheet shop with a capacity of 850,000 tons per year at the Kim Chak Metallurgical Plant, the Pukchkhan thermoelectric plant (1,200 mW), the Pyongyang thermoelectric power plant (400 mW), the oil refinery in Ungi (processing 2 million tons of oil), the Yenkhyn open-pit coal mine, yielding 1.5 million tons of coal per year, a middle-wave radio station (1,000 kW), a large diesel locomotive repair plant, an enamel conductors plant, a radio-relay communications line from Pyongyang to the Soviet border, an automated RR station in

Pyongyang for classifying up to 3,500 cars per day. In 1979, an aluminum plant in Pukchkhan, an ammonium plant in Aodzhi, a cold-rolling shop with a capacity of 400,000 tons of sheet per year at the Kim Chak Metallurgical Plant were all under construction, and work was under way to build the thermoelectric plant in Chkhondzhin (150,000 kW), a bearings plant (10 million units yearly), and several other installations.

NOTES

¹Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 23 April 1983, in USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs, JPRS 83603, June 1983, pp. 11-13.

²Pravda (Moscow), 14 April 1983, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS/Soviet Union), 21 April 1983, pp. C5-8.

³Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 April 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 27 April 1983, p. C1.

⁴Soviet broadcast in Korean, 21 April 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 22 April 1983, p. C3.

⁵Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 April 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 27 April 1983, p. C1.

⁶Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 April 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 27 April 1983, p. C1.

⁷Narody Asii i Afrika (Moscow), November-December 1982, in USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs, JPRS 83883, 14 July 1983, p. 32.

⁸"Some Aspects of Economic Developments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), January 1983, pp. 88-97.

⁹Narody-Asii i Afrika, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 30.

¹¹Ibid., p. 40.

¹²Izvestiya (Moscow), in USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs, JPRS 83330, 25 April 1983, p. 14.

¹³Soviet broadcast in Korean, 17 March 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 18 March 1983, p. C7.

¹⁴Pravda, 26 February 1983, FBIS/Soviet Union, 1 March 1983, p. C6.

¹⁵Soviet broadcast in Korean, 7 May 1983, FBIS/Soviet Union, 9 May 1983, p. B1.

¹⁶Izvestiya, 15 May 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 18 May 1983, pp. C1-2.

¹⁷Izvestiya, 20 May 1983, in FBIS/Soviet Union, 20 May 1983, p. C1.

¹⁸Beijing Xinhua, 1 January 1983, in FBIS/China, 4 January 1983, p. D1.

¹⁹For the Korean Central News Agency account of Kim's New Year's speech see Pyongyang KCNA, 1 January 1983, FBIS/AP, 3 January 1983, pp. D1-5.

²⁰Beijing Xinhua, 1 January 1983, in FBIS/China, 4 January 1983, p. D2.

²¹Beijing broadcast in Korean to Korea, 31 December 1982, in FBIS/China, 7 January 1983, p. D1.

- ²²Beijing Xinhua, 1 February 1983, in FBIS/China, 1 February 1983, p. D2.
- ²³"Stop the War Provocation Immediately," Renmin Ribao, 2 February 1983, p. 6, in FBIS/China, 2 February 1983, pp. D1-2.
- ²⁴Beijing Xinhua, 1 February 1983, in FBIS/China, 1 February 1983, p. D1.
- ²⁵Beijing broadcast in Korean to Korea, 16 March 1983, in FBIS/China, 17 March 1983, p. D2.
- ²⁶Beijing broadcast in Korean to Korea, 1 April 1983, in FBIS/China, 5 April 1983, pp. D3-4.
- ²⁷"Dirty Military Racket Hostile to the Korean People," Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing), no date, reported by Beijing in Korean to Korea, 22 April 1983, in FBIS/China, 26 April 1983, p. D4.
- ²⁸Beijing broadcast in Korean to Korea, 24 April 1983, in FBIS/China, 27 April 1983, p. D1.
- ²⁹Beijing Xinhua, 22 April 1983, in FBIS/China, 26 April 1983, p. D2.
- ³⁰Seoul Domestic Service, 10 May 1983, in FBIS/AP, 10 May 1983, pp. E1-2.
- ³¹Seoul Domestic Service, 10 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 10 May 1983, p. D2.
- ³²Beijing broadcast in Korean to Korea, 24 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 26 May 1983, pp. D1-2.
- ³³Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, 10 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 10 May 1983, p. D2.
- ³⁴Beijing Xinhua, 16 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 16 May 1983, p. D1.
- ³⁵Beijing broadcast in Korean to Korea, 24 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 26 May 1983, p. D1.
- ³⁶Beijing Xinhua, 16 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 16 May 1983, p. D1.
- ³⁷Beijing Xinhua, 17 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 18 May 1983, p. D2.
- ³⁸Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 21 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 23 May 1983, pp. D1-2.
- ³⁹Pyongyang Domestic Service, 20 May 1983, in FBIS/AP, 23 May 1983, pp. D3-5.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. D3.
- ⁴¹Beijing Xinhua, 23 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 23 May 1983, p. D2.
- ⁴²Hu was in Romania and Yugoslavia from 5 May to 15 May 1983.
- ⁴³Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 24 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 25 May 1983, p. D1.

⁴⁴Beijing Xinhua, 20 May 1983, in FBIS/China, 25 May 1983, pp. D3-4; and Korea Herald (New York), 24 May 1983, p. 3.

⁴⁵Beijing Xinhua, 7 July 1983, in FBIS/China, 7 July 1983, p. D15; and Beijing Xinhua, 7 July 1983, in FBIS/China, 8 July 1983, p. D1.

⁴⁶"The Historical Tide of Korean Independent Peaceful Reunification is Irresistible," Renmin Ribao, 23 June 1983, p. 6, in FBIS/China, 23 June 1983, pp. D2-3.