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THESIS

**COUNTER-ORGANIZATION TARGETING:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR ANALYSIS**

by

Joseph E. Osborne

Daniel C. Daoust

December, 1996

Thesis Advisor:

Gordon McCormick

Second Reader:

Terry Johnson

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A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS**

Joseph E. Osborne
Major, United States Army
B.S., Florida State University, April, 1985

Daniel C. Daoust
Major, United States Army
B.S. (Ed.), Columbus College, May 1989


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
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
Joseph E. Osborne

Author:



Daniel C. Daoust


Approved by:



Gordon McCormick, Thesis Advisor



Terry Johnson, Second Reader



Frank C. Petho, Chairman

Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to present and substantiate a theory of counter-organization targeting. This thesis achieves this objective by creating and testing a framework for analysis which blends the principals of organization theory with classic counterinsurgency theory. The goal of this framework is to provide an analytical tool for operational-level targeting of adversary organizations during war, conflict, and stability and support operations.

This study analyzes the historical precedents of counter-organization targeting to demonstrate its viability as a necessary condition for success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Additionally, by applying the framework against an unresolved case, this study validates its applicability against a broader spectrum of the operational continuum. As a result, this thesis offers an innovative framework allowing for a logical and common sense approach to observing, assessing, targeting, and interdicting adversary organizations.

Finally, this thesis holds both predictive qualities with respect to understanding an organization's future behavior, as well as prescriptive qualities, in the sense of systematically attacking and neutralizing the same organization. This thesis also expands the concepts offered in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*, and bridges the gap between the strategic, and the tactical levels of campaign planning and execution.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Post Cold War events have shown an emerging and increasing tendency toward sub-state conflicts and political violence. As we move to the close of the 20th century, there is no indication of these trends diminishing. In all likelihood, future conflict scenarios will bear greater similarity to the chaos of Mogadishu, than to the battle space characterized by Operation Desert Storm. Potential adversaries in these future scenarios will be highly-diverse in terms of their cultural, societal, ethnic, religious, and linguistic makeups. One of the few characteristics that will remain constant is the adaptation of some form of organizational structure by groups compelled to challenge existing regimes or rival factions.

The purpose of this thesis is to present and substantiate a theory of counter-organization targeting. Simply stated, our theory argues that the structure of the organization will influence its functional methodology, shape its strategic options, and delineate its inherent strengths and weaknesses. Forearmed with this knowledge, the campaign planner can focus on these structural vulnerabilities to effectively exploit, interdict, or neutralize, a hostile organization. We substantiate this theory by creating and testing a framework for analysis against both historical and current cases.

The goal of this framework is to provide an analytical tool for operational-level targeting of adversary organizations during war, conflict, and stability and support operations. It incorporates independent variables principally derived from concepts of

organization theory. These variables, (organizational ideology, organizational personality, mission goals, core technology and environment) are further refined by sub-variables derived from classic counterinsurgency theory. This refinement melds two academic disciplines in a manner particularly germane to this study.

This thesis then analyzes the historical precedents established in previous counterinsurgency campaigns (the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War) to validate infrastructure targeting as a necessary condition for success. Additionally, the factors of systematic targeting, targeting of appropriate nodes, and integration with an overarching campaign, are addressed with respect to their necessity and sufficiency in achieving success. Each case is also analyzed utilizing the framework to validate its applicability as a counter-organization targeting tool.

This thesis also applies the analytic framework against an unresolved case (the Abu Nidal terrorist organization) to demonstrate its applicability against a broader spectrum of the operational continuum. As a result, this thesis offers an innovative framework allowing for a logical and common sense approach to observing, assessing, targeting, and interdicting adversary organizations.

Our conclusions address the efficacy of each of the variables presented in our analysis, and present relevant hypotheses derived from each. Finally, we show that this thesis holds predictive value with respect to understanding an organization's future behavior; as well as prescriptive value, in the sense of providing a framework for systematically attacking and neutralizing the same organization. This thesis also expands

the concepts offered in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*, and bridges the gap between the strategic, and the tactical levels of campaign planning and execution.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

In contrast to former President Bush's vision of a Wilsonian style "new world order," in which enlightened democracies cooperate to eliminate conflict, today's world adds new meaning to the realists' definition of an anarchical system. We find ourselves in the midst of Robert Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy"¹ and Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations."² This is a world where a ravaged environment forces overpopulated nations to migrate toward, or fight for precious natural resources such as water and land (witness the manifestations in Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Brazil, and Pakistan); where fragile third world state regimes are forced to retain control over divided societies through repression and violence (as in Angola, Haiti, Niger, and Cuba). The line between war and crime becomes blurred (the Shining Path in Peru, drug cartels in Colombia, warlords in Somalia), while the line between the "haves" and "have nots" is more distinct. Among the most disturbing and potentially disastrous scenarios is the fracturing of state boundaries along ethnic and religious lines (as we are seeing in the Balkans, Iraq, Turkey, and Chechnya). Clearly, we find ourselves on the cusp of a "new world disorder" rather than a period of democratic enlightenment.

¹Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, (February 1994), pp. 44-76.

²Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

With these developments well under way at the end of the 20th century, and no indication of the trends diminishing, future conflicts will certainly be characterized by more of the same. In all likelihood, conflict environments will bear greater similarity to the chaos of Mogadishu than the set piece conventional battles of Operation Desert Storm. While emerging scenarios are bound to have characteristics that are superficially recognizable and common, the widening array of environments and situations will create the paradoxical characteristic of difference. Stripped of Cold War frames of reference, the reality of sub-state conflicts will emerge from an array of cultural, religious, linguistic, and historical factors, influencing the social anomy and disenfranchisement manifested by the onset of political violence and militant anarchy.

The state, under these circumstances, will find it difficult if not impossible to attack these trends. International boundaries will dissolve under the weight of tribal and ethnic imperatives and the weakness of traditional governments. In an age where we view our concepts of war through a prism of computers and precision-guided weapons, the Shaman and the AK-47 will assume significant roles and the warlord, an anachronistic specter last seen in prerevolutionary China, will take his place among the powerful.

Despite our overwhelming and natural tendencies to revert to Jeffersonian isolationism when exposed to these imbroglios, the overarching impact of vital and important U.S. national interests will compel our involvement in many of these emerging scenarios. The issue of what constitutes national interest, and hence justifies U.S. involvement, remains a topic of vigorous debate. Commentator Michael Mandelbaum

has argued that the United States should not base its foreign policy on trying to fix these seemingly insurmountable problems, but should instead focus on traditional definitions of national interest that are more clearly understood and supported by the American public.³ In contrast, Tony Smith's article "In Defense of Intervention," argues that the United States must be a leader in enforcing international norms of behavior with regard to democratic principles and human rights.⁴

Steven Metz has offered a forward thinking approach to American strategy concerning involvement in counterinsurgency that both addresses the evolving nature of sub-state conflicts and cautions against reckless involvement. Paramount to his argument is the idea that the United States should adopt a rigid selectivity in determining if a threatened state is worth the effort our involvement will require. Metz also argues "insurgency should be considered simply protracted, organized violence which threatens security and requires a government response, whether revolutionary, political or nonpolitical, open or clandestine."⁵

Regardless of the outcome of the current debate on national interests or the relevance of compelling reasons, U.S. involvement and intervention is a certainty, whether prompted by humanitarian ideology, protection of vital resources, or by national

³Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs*, (Jan/Feb 1996), pp.28-32.

⁴Tony Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, (Jan/Feb 96), pp. 34-46.

⁵Steven Metz, *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability*, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA), 1995.

security. Falling within the mission parameters described in FM 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*,⁶ U.S. forces will often find themselves entering situations constrained by both political and military factors. Budget constraints and concerns for maintaining existing alliances with third party states will often restrict both the size and scope of many U.S. interventions. From an operational perspective, mission parameters calling for peace enforcement will require restrictive rules of engagement (ROE's) and nonbelligerence in environments rife with multiple warring factions and halfhearted compliance with negotiated settlements.

These types of constraints have already been observed in the U.S. interventions in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. Politically, both French, and in particular Russian concerns weighed heavily on the development of preconditions for U.S. intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Somalia, the humanitarian intentions that initially prompted U.S. involvement, influenced the decision not to disarm the local populace as a force protection measure.⁷

Of the few characteristics that will remain constant, among the seemingly infinite number of variables and factors present in intrastate conflict scenarios, is the adaptation of some form of organizational structure by groups compelled to challenge existing regimes or rival factions. It is the countering of these organizations by targeting specific

⁶US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, includes in its definition of MOOTW, a myriad of missions which now fall under the parameters as delineated by FM 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*.

⁷While the ROE's in Somalia did permit possession of small arms by the local populace, they also allowed use of deadly force against any individual with a crew-served or anti-armor type weapon.

aspects of their structure that is the focal point of this study. This approach is important and central to any overarching counterinsurgency campaign plan because it allows for both a more judicious use of force and appropriate allocation of assets. Additionally, this work advances and expands many of the ideas offered in the new Army Field Manual 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*. This capstone doctrinal manual goes to great lengths refining many of the concepts previously covered under the broad concept of military operations other than war.⁸

B. THEORY PRESENTATION

In developing our theory of counter-organization targeting we will focus on insurgent warfare and counterinsurgency as a vehicle to demonstrate the veracity and validity of the concept. We have selected insurgency because of the generalizability of many of its characteristics. Counterinsurgency theory recognizes these characteristics as ideology, life-cycle phases, operations, and a variety of signature missions ranging from terrorism and clandestine sabotage in the earliest stages of development, to conventional warfare and popular revolt in the culminating stages. Insurgency also provides many of the worst-case characteristics that can evolve from more benign scenarios; observers of the animosity and belligerence that emerged between political factions following the U.S. intervention in Haiti can attest to this phenomenon. For the purpose of this study, we define insurgency as a struggle by an organized movement or movements against a

⁸Missions included under this blanket term which are germane to this study include: support for counterinsurgency, security assistance, foreign internal defense, support for insurgency, combating terrorism, and others.

standing government in which the former employs political resources, subversion, and armed conflict, to achieve its goals or objectives.⁹

The focus of this study addresses only one aspect of a counterinsurgency campaign, that of counter-organization targeting, and its relevance as a necessary condition for overall success. This study does not however, address the requirements for political reform, civic action, psychological operations, security operations, or conventional military operations. While these aspects represent probabilistic variables in the success of an overarching counterinsurgency campaign, as well as many other operations falling under the broad definition of stability and support operations, their incorporation into this study would result in a primer on counterinsurgency that would not pay adequate attention to any of them.

Why then develop a theory focusing on countering organizations by targeting their structures? Simply stated, our theory argues that the structure of the organization will influence its functional methodology, shape its strategic options, and delineate its inherent strengths and weaknesses. Forearmed with this knowledge, the campaign planner can focus on these structural vulnerabilities to effectively exploit, interdict, or neutralize, a hostile covert organization.

To further refine this theory we offer that embedded within any organization that has evolved beyond the point of conspiracy, is a substructure commonly referred to as the *infrastructure*. This infrastructure, comprising leaders, specialists, functionaries,

⁹This definition is a composite derived from both Steven Metz's *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability*, and from Army Field Manual 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, (1990).

technicians, and a vast array of supporting systems, acts much like a central nervous system in allowing the organization to function. By reducing the effectiveness of this system, we argue the efficiency, hence the overall effectiveness of the organization will be reduced. We further argue that certain related conditions will influence the ultimate outcome of the counter-organization campaign. These conditions, which will be addressed in terms of necessity and sufficiency are: The intuitive or systematic nature of the infrastructure targeting plan; targeting of appropriate nodes within the infrastructure; and finally, the inclusion of infrastructure targeting in an overarching counter-organization campaign plan.

While the significance of the infrastructure has not escaped the notice of experts in the field of counterinsurgency, the preponderance of existing literature has examined this aspect primarily from a strategic perspective. While not denigrating the significance or importance of a strategic perspective on counterinsurgency, this study will focus more on the operational or campaign level of analysis. We intend this approach to allow a more practical application of theory than is currently employed by U.S. forces conducting other than war operations; thus placing into the hands of the practitioners, the necessary tools to accomplish the mission.

C. METHODOLOGY

The methodology we will employ to explain and substantiate this theory is multifaceted and presented sequentially. In Chapter II, we will present an analytic framework that will allow us to develop a structural representation of an insurgent organization. Drawing from organization theory, this framework will apply the principal

analytic variables of the insurgent organization's ideology, organizational personality, mission goals, core technology, and environment (environment being unique as an extrinsic intervening variable). Additionally, we will assign subvariables derived from counterinsurgency theory to each of the principal variables to refine the characteristics in a manner germane to this study.

Standing alone, this framework will serve as a doctrinal template that will allow for characterization of an insurgent organization's structure into one of four pure-case developmental models. These models, representing *simple*, *machine*, *divisional*, and *ad hoc/cellular* configurations can be applied against the full spectrum of insurgency and many other than war scenarios. When placed into practice this doctrinal template, prompted by diagnostic questions requiring inductive, deductive, and empirically-based responses, will evolve into a situational template. This template will depict the actual organizational structure along the continuum represented in our hybrid configuration model with respect to the realistic influences of intervening environmental variables present in a given case.

Again applying concepts of organization theory, we will identify the generic strengths and weaknesses present in any given structure. We will then focus on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities that emerge in the linkages between structural components. These linkages are what we term the *infrastructure lines of communication* (ILOC's), and are where vulnerabilities present themselves within the structure. These ILOC's serve as avenues and systems for passing supplies, intelligence, armaments, personnel, and controlling and coordinating operations. By identifying those ILOC's

most critical to an organization's ability to function, we maximize targeting effect with regard to time constraints, resources, and our own overarching campaign goals.

In Chapters III through V, we will employ case study methodology using historical abstracts (or mini-cases) to show where infrastructure targeting has been an effective mechanism for countering insurgent organizations. These historical cases, the Hukbalahaps in the Phillippines, the MRLA in the Malayan Emergency, and the Viet Cong versus the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, provide a representative group of various insurgent scenarios. They also represent a diverse set of ultimate outcomes, insurgency goals, environments, political influences, and methodologies.¹⁰

In each case, we will provide a brief background followed by an analysis conducted utilizing our framework. Additionally, we will address ILOC functioning and structural characteristics in each organization and compare the theory-derived infrastructure vulnerabilities with those actually targeted in each case. Finally, we will assess the influence of the related conditions, (intuitive vice systematic, ILOC's appropriately targeted, and integration with campaign strategy) with respect to their roles as necessary or sufficient in explaining the case outcome.

¹⁰While recognizing that this case selection may be viewed as somewhat narrow (all post-1945 Asian insurgencies with varying levels of communist influence), we argue that characteristics of these cases are diverse enough to allow for broad generalizations.

In Chapter VI, we will apply our framework in an analysis of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization (ANO) to demonstrate its applicability outside the medium of insurgent warfare.¹¹ While the ANO case will not allow for complete evaluation based on historical resolution, it does provide a demonstration of our theory and framework in practical application on a case in progress.

In Chapter VII, we will conclude our case study analysis by conducting a comparative examination of the overall findings to further validate our theory, process, and the necessity and sufficiency of our initial hypotheses. We will also identify the critical shortfalls in unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaigns and show where failures in both recognizing organization structure and targeting appropriate ILOC's were major contributing factors in the ultimate outcomes.

Having demonstrated the validity of our theory of counter-organization targeting in our case studies (as well as its detailed application against a case currently in progress), we will attempt to draw some generalizable conclusions from our findings. Further, we will discuss shortfalls or weaknesses in the theory and offer possible alternative explanations for anomalies. Finally, we will discuss the theory's predictive and prescriptive qualities and applicability with regard to counterinsurgency and the broader context of Stability and Support Operations.

¹¹This case is germane to this study largely because ANO currently functions as an independent terrorist organization. In many cases, terrorist cells function as a sub-structure within an insurgent organization and may warrant detailed attention within the overarching analysis.

II. THEORY DEVELOPMENT, INTEGRATION, AND APPLICATION

A. COUNTER-ORGANIZATION THEORY DEVELOPMENT

1. Background

Organization theory holds that when groups of people come together to accomplish a common goal, they form an organization. The organization will form distinct patterns of architecture based on a multitude of deterministic variables which will result in an organizational structure. How an organization structures itself to accomplish its goals is one of the earliest and most critical decisions facing its founders (be they corporate or revolutionary).

The structural perspective of organization theory is rooted in the early twentieth century works of Frederick W. Taylor and later in the mid-1940's by Max Weber. Taylor is considered "The Father of Scientific Management" and is best-known for his time-in-motion studies which began in 1911. These studies were designed to analyze every part of a factory worker's task in an attempt to identify wasted motions and to show the most efficient way of performing a particular task. Weber was a German sociologist and is best-known for his theories concerning the rational approach to organizational structure and the development and functioning of bureaucracies.

The works of these early researchers led to the development of the structural perspective of organization theory and is based on the following set of assumptions:¹²

¹² Adapted from Lee G. Boleman and Terrance E. Deal, *Reframing Organizations*, (Jossey-Bass Inc., San Francisco), 1991, p. 48. This text offers a concise description of the development of modern organization structural theory.

- Organizations exist to accomplish a primary goal.
- For any organization, a structure can be designed to fit its particular set of circumstances.
- Organizations operate most effectively when environmental turbulence (uncertainty) and personal preferences are constrained by norms of rationality .
- Specialization permits higher levels of individual expertise and performance.
- Coordination and control are essential to effectiveness.
- Organizational problems arise due to inappropriate structure or inadequate systems and can be remedied through restructuring.

Along these lines then, the primary *mission goal* of the organization should be the driving force that shapes an organization's ultimate structure. Classic organization theory assumes that the organizations in question are associated with business, government, or some institution which exists and functions in full view of society. Therefore, the goal is usually associated with producing goods or services for consumption or in service to society. In the classic model, the technology and means an organization utilizes to transform raw materials (inputs) into goods or services (outputs) is termed its *core technology*.

The primary constraint that works to prevent optimizing the core technology to the structure is the *environment*. The environment is considered the market in which goods or services compete in, as well as sources of inputs and any direct competitors or threats. The more stable the environment is, the more the core technology can be standardized for optimum efficiency. The more unstable or volatile the environment, the more the organization must be able to adapt itself to the changing influences. Other factors

influencing organizational structure in the classic model are *size*, *information technology*, and the *nature of the work force*.¹³

2. Departure From the Classic Model

While the classic model of organizational structure theory provides important insights and explanatory power about how businesses, bureaucracies, and private institutions function and grow, the model is not applicable to the covert organizations we are analyzing in this work without significant modification and redefining of operating terms. The covert organization (be it terrorist, guerrilla, revolutionary, etc.) operates and exists in a secretive underworld which lies beneath the mainstream of society. The organization must maintain secrecy (particularly in the early stages) because it is weak in comparison to its opponents. While secrecy (along with other operational security measures) help ensure survival, its price is decreased organizational efficiency and effectiveness. To overcome this liability, new variables must be introduced to function as control measures in light of these security requirements.

The variables that impact on an organization that must rely on secrecy for its very survival dramatically alter the formula for effective organizational structure. What is considered a structural strength in the classic model suddenly becomes a liability in the covert organization. The causal linkage in the classic model holds that the structure of an organization is a direct result of the mission goal (purpose, vision, strategy), which in turn determines the core technology (tasks; transformation of inputs/raw materials into

¹³ For a comprehensive explanation of these factors at work in the classic model, see Boleman and Deal, pp. 65-77. These factors, while important, are addressed later as sub-variables of our framework for analysis and will not be elaborated upon here.

outputs/products). This process is impacted prior to final structure outcome by the intervening variable of the environment (competition, opportunities, threats, etc.) in which the organization exists. This causal logic chain is depicted in Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1. Classic Model Causal Logic Chain

In the covert organization, the logic chain is altered with the introduction of two new independent variables which directly impact the organization's mission goal: that of *ideology*, and what we term *organization personality*. While both of these variables also exist in a normal organization, rarely do they impact on an organization's mission goal and likewise, its ultimate structure, as they do in the covert organization. In normal organizations, these variables are often reflected in managerial styles, or sometimes as byproducts of the organizational functioning itself. But in covert organizations, we see these variables directing and altering mission goals and ultimate organizational structure in non-optimizing and even counter-intuitive ways. While these variables (along with the other independent variables) will be defined and elaborated upon later, for now their relevance lies in the manner in which they alter the causal logic chain for a covert organization, as reflected in Figure 2.2 below.




Figure 2.2. Covert Organization Causal Logic Chain

3. Framework for Covert Organization Structural Analysis

At this point in our theoretical development, we have drawn the independent variables of mission goal and core technology, along with the intervening variable of the environment from the classic organizational structural model; to these we have added two independent variables identified as playing unique roles in the covert organization, i.e., ideology and organizational personality. When added together, we not only have a causal linkage to explain structural formation, but we also have a list of specific design variables that becomes a framework with which we can analyze existing organizations and identify specific structural design and functional characteristics. This framework can be conceptualized as a grouping of lenses through which we view a particular organization; first internally through the design variables the organization itself can control (ideology, organization personality, mission goal, and core technology), then externally through the intervening design variable (environment) which the organization has no direct control (but can influence) over. This framework is depicted by the following visual model.




Figure 2.3. Framework for Covert Organization Structural Analysis.

Note that in this model, mission goal occupies the center triangle of the pyramid. This is not to show primacy of importance between the various design variables. In fact, the relative importance of each design variable will change from case to case. This merely represents the mission goal as a sort of “lynch-pin” variable around which all the other variables rotate.

4. Structural Design Variables

As each major structural design variable is identified for the framework, important subvariables within each variable appear. The subvariables help to define each major variable and put them into the context in which they are used within this study. This process focuses the analytical lenses onto a much finer-grained level of analysis and supplies a consistent measure for comparison between structural models and cases. Because an understanding of the context of each variable, subvariable, and when necessary, sub-subvariable is so important to proper structural analysis, each will be explained in detail. Similarly, it is also important to understand that many of the subvariables and sub-subvariables do, at times, cross-over and become intertwined with others to create an infinite number of possible combinations. However, when analyzing these variants to determine structure, even the most subtle distinctions must be determined, as they can dramatically affect the final product of the analysis.

a. Ideology

The ideology of an organization consists of the core system of values and beliefs of the founding members on which they based their organization. These core beliefs require the member or “believer” to put the values of the ideology before their

own personal beliefs or needs. These core values and beliefs are transferred to the new member through intense training and indoctrination, and are reinforced through loyalty checks.

The subvariables of ideology include *societal*, *political*, *religious*, and *ethnic-based* variations. Societal ideologies can be based either along familial ties or social/class lines. Political ideology sub-subvariables are either considered nationalist movements, populist movements, activist movements (such as environmental protection groups that also utilize terrorism to further their causes), or classic ideologies of the Marxist/Leninist/Maoist persuasion (or their offshoots). Religious ideologies are classified as either fundamentalist movements (such as Islamic and radical Jewish Orthodox movements in the Middle East), cultist/apocalyptic groups, or reformist movements. Ethnic-based ideologies are those based either on racial differences, clan membership, or tribal affiliation (all widely seen from Africa to Eastern Europe). Ideology is one variable in which there is much cross-over between subvariables and sub-subvariables, and many of the distinctions exist within a shade of gray.

b. Personality

The organizational personality incorporates those influences that give the organization consistent patterns to follow for problem-solving, methods of functioning, and planning. The personality provides information about the organization's *modus operandi* or *operational code*, both within itself, and in dealings with its opponents (whether they are the regime or other contending covert organizations). The subvariables of personality include *leadership*, *maturity*, and *culture*.

Leadership refers to the predominant style found among the organization's leaders. These can range from a charismatic style (cult of personality), autocratic style, authoritarian, or democratic style. In many instances, leadership style will be directly related to an ideology subvariable, such as the authoritarian leadership style of a patriarchal-based clan or tribe.

Maturity consists of the sub-subvariables of age and physical size of the organization, along with the current phase of its particular life-cycle. For the purposes of this study, the life-cycle phases of a covert organization include preparatory (planning and organizing), initial violence (latent/incipient and acts of terror), expansion (guerrilla warfare), victorious (open conventional warfare), and consolidation.¹⁴

The subvariable of culture refers to the level of sophistication of a particular people that make up a covert organization. The sub-subvariables include agrarian, industrial, and advanced-technological levels of cultural sophistication. This concept stretches from the actual physical development of technology present in the organization, to the mind-set or paradigm from which the members of an organization approach problem-solving. Because of the speed of technological change, many cases will be presented with paradoxes in which a high level of technological hardware exists within an agrarian culture-based organization. These paradoxes present problems both for the organization itself, as well as for those analyzing it for the purpose of dismantling it.

¹⁴ For a full explanation of this stage model, see Thomas Perry, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," *Internal War-Problems and Approaches*, Harry Eckstein, editor, (The Free Press of Glencoe, London), pp. 90-95.

c. Mission Goal

Mission goal refers to the organization's ultimate objective and desired endstate. It includes what could be termed as the organization's "vision" and the strategy adopted for achieving its vision. This goal is in direct relation to the opposing regime and requires a change in the present status quo. It should be realized that the organization's stated mission goal may be entirely different from its actual mission goal. Also, the actual mission goal may be different from what the organization is ultimately willing to settle for, given lower levels of success than originally anticipated. These goals may actually fluctuate with time and with varying levels of success through time. Correctly identifying the covert organization's mission goal is key to not only dismantling the organization itself, but also to designing an effective overall counterinsurgency campaign as well.

The subvariables for mission goal exist along a continuum in terms of both threat to the regime's power and authority, and in relative control the organization will have with a successful outcome (these parameters show a strong positive correlation). In ascending order of threat and control we have *reformist*, *economic/criminal*, *secessionist*, and *revolutionary*.

A reformist mission goal calls for a change in the status quo within a representative government where one or more groups calls for a greater say in how the government is run. A classic example was the fight for more power between various factions within the Lebanese government during the Lebanese Civil War which started in 1975 and continues to smolder to this day. If the organization faces an authoritarian

regime as an opponent, then the reformist task takes on the proportions of a total revolution.

An economic/criminal mission goal is forwarded by an organization that desires autonomy from the present government to achieve economic benefits either through control of a particular market, or through illegal enterprises. The organization does not wish to overthrow the current regime, merely to either co-opt it or threaten it enough so as to achieve freedom of maneuver and official constraints. Classic examples include the Mafia in the United States, the drug cartels in South America, and the up-and-coming Russian Mafia in the former Soviet Union (FSU).

A secessionist mission goal is the result of a group of people wishing to break away from the regime in power and forming its own autonomous state. In recent years, with the end of the Cold War a wave of secessionist movements raced across Eastern Europe and Asia. Examples of ongoing secessionist struggles include the Balkans, the war in Chechnya, the Kashmiri revolt in India, and the long-fought Tibetan war.

d. Core Technology

The core technology of a covert organization can be thought of in terms of an industrial metaphor: converting the available raw materials through a standardized production process into various outputs or products which will achieve the organizational goal. The concept of applying this industrial metaphor to an insurgency is not new, but incorporating it into the realm of organizational theory manifesting itself as the core

technology of a covert organization is.¹⁵ Likewise, the sub-subvariables of this particular application are unique and require redefinition.

The first subvariable, *inputs*, consists of both *exogenous* and *endogenous* sources of support. Inputs for a covert organization include raw materials such as food, recruits, money, equipment, and weapons. Inputs also can be intangible in the form of popular or political support. During the Cold War years, exogenous support was viewed as the outside support of a local covert organization by either of the superpowers, or by one of their proxies. This exogenous support could range from moral support, through open political support in international forums, to tangible support in raw materials or military aid. However, with the end of the Cold War, the term exogenous must be redefined to include not only outside sponsorship or support, but support garnered from propaganda-driven media campaigns in other countries, contributions from the Diaspora living abroad, and revenues generated from illegal activities conducted both at home or abroad. Conversely, endogenous support for the purposes of this study will include any sources that are within the organization's area of influence or span of control. This would include raw materials provided by members of the organization, any supplies, personnel, or revenue generated or collected by villages or urban areas under control of the organization (through recruiting campaigns, quotas, and taxes), or through any inputs gained as a result of either covert or overt operations such as raids and ambushes against regime targets.

¹⁵ For an in-depth explanation of the theory of insurgency as a production system, see Nathan Leites, and Charles Wolf Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA), 1970.

The subvariable of *production* is defined in terms of descriptive subvariables representing opposite operating relationships including: concentrated or dispersed, simple or complex, rigid or flexible, and efficient or inefficient. The production phase is where recruits are transformed into intelligence operatives, terrorists, or guerrillas. Production also includes transforming information gathered from various sources and turning it into intelligence to be used or exploited against the regime, as well as where foodstuffs are converted into rations and distributed, troops are paid, and future operations are planned. Perhaps most importantly, the production phase includes transforming the decisions made by the leadership along with all types of operational information into messages, and is then communicated to all the other structures within the organization.

Concentrated production means that only a single element exists within the organization that is responsible for a particular functional area and must distribute its support to all parts of the organization from a centralized location. Dispersed production means that each operational division within an organization possesses its own elements responsible for various functional areas and is not highly dependent on the central organization for direct support.

Production is either simple or complex in relation to both processes and final outputs produced. Examples of simple production processes would be the minimal military training given to a basic "freedom fighter" or "vanilla guerrilla," which likewise are examples of simple outputs. Examples of complex production processes and outputs

would be specialized training given to covert intelligence operatives, bomb-making instruction given to demolition teams, and terrorist training given to assassination teams.

Production processes are considered rigid if they cannot adapt quickly to change the types of outputs as dictated to different operating conditions or developments, either positive or negative. Conversely, production is flexible if it can rapidly change either its tempo or outputs to adapt to changing conditions. A flexible production process will allow a perceptive covert organization to capitalize on even the smallest gains and propel the organization into a new growth period or phase of operations.

For the purposes of this study, the concept of production efficiency is directly proportional to output effectiveness, which is measured in terms of quantity of outputs, quality of outputs, or a combination of both, within a given period of time. Thus as production efficiency increases, output effectiveness will also increase in either quantity (number of guerrillas, number of operations, etc.), quality (higher level of training of guerrilla force, operations against more critical targets, etc.), or both (higher number of better-trained guerrillas) within a given time frame (per month, quarter, year).

The final subvariable of core technology is *outputs*. Outputs are the final product of the production phase and include various functionaries such as guerrillas, intelligence operatives, terrorists, auxiliary members, or cadre. Outputs also include operations such as raids, ambushes, acts of terrorism, publicity or propaganda campaigns, or political initiatives. Outputs are considered to be either singular or diversified. Singular type outputs would be generic guerrillas who must conduct a wide range of operations. In contrast, diversified outputs consist of specialized operatives who conduct

a narrow range of operations requiring a higher level of expertise and training. The goal of all outputs is to generate new sources of endogenous support, thus making the covert organization less dependent on exogenous support. Examples of these positive outputs would be a raid in which food or equipment is captured, a propaganda campaign which garners new recruits into the organization, or the assassination of a repressive regime functionary which gains increased support from the population. Conversely, the organization must guard against producing negative outputs that fail to generate more inputs. Examples of negative outputs would include raids in which no resources were recovered, terrorist acts that punish the population as well as the regime, or the assassination of popular public figures that in turn increases the opposition to the organization and its movement.

The concept of the organization's core technology functioning as a production pump may be visualized below in Figure 2.4.




Figure 2.4. The Production Pump
(Adapted from Leites and Wolf, 1970)

e. Environment

The environment is the external context and set of conditions within which the covert organization must survive and operate in. The set of environmental

subvariables join together to form an intervening variable which acts upon the "pre-structure" (which was determined by the set of internal structural design variables) and twists the final structure away from that which would be ideal for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. The environment is ever-changing and highly sensitive to critical actions by both the organization and the regime. It is in no way deterministic; on the contrary, the environment is a stochastic medium in which no matter how closely-held the parameters are between similar confrontations or similar cases, the outcomes will still vary somewhat randomly. The key is to fully understand the impacts of various environmental factors on a covert organizational structure, which will in turn allow the counter-organization practitioner to limit the range of variance between actions and outcomes.

Perhaps the best analogy to help comprehend this relationship between organization and environment would be that of rifle or pistol marksmanship. The marksman knows the distance to his target, the point of aim he must take, the bullet trajectory for a given load, and a theoretical point of impact if he holds all of these variables constant from shot to shot. Yet the slightest breeze, temperature change, or change in barometric pressure or even light conditions can change the point of impact. The objective of the marksman is not to put each successive bullet into the same hole as the first, but to make the smallest overall cluster around that first shot. Only through knowledge of the effects of the environment can the variance be held within predictable limits. In a similar fashion, the counter-organization practitioner must target the covert

organization with a tight cluster of actions which will cause a series of responses that are somewhat predictable.

In an effort to simplify the variable of environment, the sub-variables reflect current military doctrinal terms while the sub-subvariables reflect terms from both military doctrine and organizational theory terminology. The environment is therefore divided into *strategic*, *operational*, and *tactical* subvariables. The strategic environment of the covert organization refers to how the organization and the movement it represents interacts with the regime, the population, and any other opposition groups involved in terms of political relationships, social implications, and the nature of the problem facing the organization. The operational environment refers directly to forces which either facilitate or hamper freedom of maneuver and the conduct of military or political operations. The tactical environment refers to specific factors that will determine where, when, and how a covert organization will both function and conduct operations.

The strategic environment is either stable or dynamic based on the perceived level of uncertainty at work outside the organization. A high degree of uncertainty (a direct product of a lack of information, intelligence, and feedback) leads to an extremely dynamic environment. As more information is acquired, stability increases. The strategic environment is either simple or complex, depending on the scope and the nature of the problem confronting the organization. This can be measured in terms of the number and quality of opponents, social issues at work, and political implications of the organization's actions both during and after hostilities. Finally, the strategic environment includes the level of popular support for both the covert organization and the

regime. For both, the population is either supportive, indifferent, or opposed. In these terms, the covert organization may realize a definite advantage. If a small but equal percentage of the population is both supportive or opposed to the covert organization, while the majority is indifferent, then the organization can retain freedom of maneuver within the sea of indifference. But on the other hand, if the regime faces the same situation posed by this distribution, then it is facing a majority of those who are not considered supportive of the regime. This is not a good situation for the regime, which typically is fighting to maintain and demonstrate its legitimacy through "hearts and minds" programs. Thus, government forces cannot be guaranteed the same freedom of maneuver as that supported by the indifference shown to the covert organization.

The operational environment is a reflection of the hostility directed against the covert organization and is measured in terms of freedom of maneuver the organization has to carry on functional and military operations on a daily basis. Thus the environment is permissive if the covert organization enjoys complete control and freedom of maneuver while maintaining minimal security measures within a given area. The environment is semi-permissive if the covert organization is in contention for control of a given area and has a moderate level of freedom of maneuver to carry out operations with a heightened level of security measures. The environment is non-permissive if the covert organization is attempting to operate in a given area which is under the complete control of the regime and operations are conducted only at great risk to the organization while enforcing maximum security measures.

The tactical environment consists of the sub-subvariables of cover, resources, and targets. Cover refers to the quality and conduciveness of the physical terrain to provide protection and concealment from which the covert organization can survive, function, and operate from. Good cover would provide rugged terrain that is inaccessible to regime forces without considerable effort and early warning. Examples would be dense forest, jungle, or mountainous terrain. However, with the urban sprawl associated with today's largest cities, certain sections of a city such as an old quarter or slum area may provide equally good cover to an urban-based covert organization.

Resources refers to the availability of sources of natural and man-made resources within a covert organization's area of influence. Resources include water, food sources, and populations from which to garner support, recruits, and revenue. Targets refers to the availability, criticality, and accessibility of regime controlled or contested targets within a covert organization's area of operations. These three sub-subvariables are all interdependent and the covert organization must find the best mix that provides sufficient levels of all three. If any particular sub-subvariable is lacking, then the organization is put at increased risk as it must extend itself to compensate for the imbalance and is thus left vulnerable. An example would be a covert organization which enjoys good cover in a remote mountain region and has good resources from nearby streams and villages, but because of its remote location, action units must travel long distances over open terrain to reach concentrated urban areas to find a high density of regime targets.

Thus with all the major structural design variables, subvariables, and sub-subvariables defined, we have developed the framework with which to analyze the structure of covert organizations. These variables are summarized in Table 2.1.

IDEOLOGY

Societal (familial, class)
 Political (nationalist, populist, activist, Marxist/Leninist/Maoist)
 Religious (fundamentalist, cultist, reformist)
 Ethnic (racial, clan, tribe)

PERSONALITY

Leadership (charismatic, democratic, autocratic, authoritarian)
 Maturity (age, size, phase in life-cycle)
 Culture (agrarian, industrial, advanced-technological)

MISSION GOAL

Reformist
 Economic/Criminal
 Secessionist
 Revolutionary (restorational, reactionary)

CORE TECHNOLOGY

Inputs (endogenous/exogenous)
 Production (concentrated/dispersed; simple/complex; efficient/inefficient; rigid/flexible)
 Outputs (singular/diversified)

ENVIRONMENT

Strategic (stable/dynamic; simple/complex; population: supportive/ indifferent/opposed)
 Operational (hostility: permissive/semi-permissive/non-permissive)
 Tactical (cover, resources, targets)

Table 2.1. Structural Design Variables

In the next section, we will integrate this framework for analysis with an organizational doctrinal template to develop pure-case organizational models which can then be situationalized to depict a specific covert organization.

**B. THEORY INTEGRATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DOCTRINAL, PURE -CASE, AND HYBRID MODELS**

1. Development of the Doctrinal Template Model

a. Mintzberg's Conventional Doctrinal Model

Once an organization is conceived and shaped by the principal structural design variables, it begins to take on a form composed of its functional parts. A pioneering researcher in the academic discipline of organizational theory, Dr. Henry Mintzberg, has developed graphically-depicted models to represent the functioning parts of an organization and the various forms an organization can assume based on conventional design parameters.¹⁶ In Mintzberg's conventional doctrinal model, an organization has five basic functional parts: the *strategic apex*, *middle line*, *operating core*, *technostructure*, and *support staff*. His visual model of how these basic parts fit together is depicted in Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.5. Mintzberg's Basic Model of the Organization
(Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives*, 1993, p. 11)

¹⁶ The theoretical structural models, operant terms, and functional concepts for *conventional* organizations adapted to our models, terms, and functional concepts for *covert* organizations are based on those developed by Dr. Mintzberg in his book, *Structure in Fives*, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ), 1993.

In Mintzberg's organization, the strategic apex houses the executives who are chiefly responsible for ensuring that the organization fulfills its mission goals by supervising those managers under them, and by planning, developing, and implementing future strategy to ensure continued success. The middle line joins the strategic apex to the operating core, and houses those middle managers charged with managing operations and supervising production. The middle-line managers extend the formal authority of the strategic apex to ensure that the mission gets accomplished. The operating core consists of those personnel who actually perform the basic work of the organization or provide the services offered by the organization. The technostructure houses those analysts and specialists charged with standardizing the production process. These analysts plan and modify the work flow, as well as train those personnel who are in the work flow. Personnel analysts, such as recruiters and trainers, are also housed in the technostructure. The support staff consists of specialized functional units that support the rest of the organization in fulfilling the mission goal. Examples in a contemporary organization range from legal and payroll departments, to security, cafeteria, and janitorial services. The personnel in the support staff are not considered part of the operating core or any other substructure.

b. Covert Organization Doctrinal Model

While Mintzberg's doctrinal model is applicable to conventional organizations, it is not applicable to covert organizations without some modification. The first modification is to add several essential substructures. The first addition is the *overt political wing*.

The overt political wing may not manifest itself during the early stages of a covert organization's life cycle, but as the organization becomes successful in its fight against the regime, it has an increasing need to gain legitimacy. From the viewpoint of the population as well as the world state system, the true mark of legitimacy stems from open political representation. As the organization becomes more of a contender for power against the regime, the more conventional in operation it must become. Thus the formation of an overt political wing becomes a necessary condition for ultimate success.

The second additional substructure in the covert organization doctrinal model is the *infrastructure*. The infrastructure is not a stand-alone substructure per se; the infrastructure is in fact **embedded within** the structure of the organization. The infrastructure encompasses some substructures entirely, while merely running through a small portion of other substructures. The scope and depth of infrastructure embeddedness will also vary from case to case, as well as through time within the same organization. The infrastructure consists of those people, mechanisms, and sub-substructures within the organization that performs command, control, communications, intelligence, or logistical support functions. The conduits between substructures through which these functions flow, we term as *infrastructure lines of communication (ILOC's)*.

The final process necessary to transform the conventional doctrinal model into a covert organization doctrinal template model is to delineate (in insurgent terms) who will be found within each substructure. The strategic apex incorporates the leadership and core cadre of the covert organization. The middle line houses the mid-level leadership and functional managers of various action arms. The operating core

houses all the operators; the guerrillas, terrorists, underground security and intelligence operators, and any other functionary that interacts with the regime or the population. The technostucture houses all the specialists, functionaries, recruiters, propagandists, and training cadre responsible for the standardization of the operating core, their outputs, and for monitoring progress and planning future operations. The support structure consists of both full time personnel concerned with the support of all organizational functions, as well as part-time support personnel known as the *auxiliary* who provide logistical support, transportation, and security for the covert organization, usually in support of on-going tactical operations. The political wing, once formed, may include members of the strategic apex and is often an offshoot of the shadow government that served as a de facto regime in "liberated" or guerrilla-controlled areas. The political wing often claims no ties to military or terrorist functions within the organization, but this is primarily a public ploy to gain legitimacy and a method of gaining plausible deniability in dealings with the regime. However, in the majority of cases, there is a substantial ILOC connecting the political wing with the rest of the organization. Finally, as stated earlier, the infrastructure can incorporate entire substructures, or just certain key individuals within a specific substructure. In most cases, the infrastructure includes the strategic apex, technostucture, overt political wing, and the middle line in toto. The infrastructure will have ties to the operating core (such as guerrilla formation commanders, terrorist cell leaders, etc.) as well as the support structure (auxiliary liaisons, procurement functionaries, support coordinators, etc.). Thus a graphic representation of our adapted covert organization doctrinal template model is depicted below in Figure 2.6.

lengthy and redundant. In summary, from these five pure-case models, we have adapted aspects from four of them that appear to apply to covert organizations as well. We will now take Mintzberg's basic building blocks and from them construct four covert organization pure-case doctrinal models.

b. Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Models

By applying the five covert organization design variables to Mintzberg's pure-case doctrinal models, we were able to adapt their aspects into four pure-case doctrinal models. The four structural models we have identified are the *simple covert organization*, the *machine-like covert organization*, the *divisional covert organization*, and the *ad hoc/cellular covert organization*. We will now describe each of these pure-case models in general terms of design variables and substructure composition and function.

The *simple covert organization* is usually founded on a socio-political ideology, but may be found at the birth of any ideology or organization. The organization personality demonstrates charismatic or authoritarian-style leadership. The organization is usually very young and very small. Usually this group of true believers forms the core cadre of a larger organization if it survives long enough to grow. This organization can be found in any culture, and is the easiest form to assume during the initial phase. It can also assume any mission goal. Its core technology is highly dependent on exogenous support; its production is concentrated, inefficient, simple and initially rigid. Outputs are usually singular (of the 'vanilla guerrilla' persuasion). The strategic environment is very dynamic but at this point simple; the problem facing the organization appears straightforward. The population is largely indifferent because the organization is so

small. Because it is so small, it is highly vulnerable, thus the operational environment is considered either semi- or non-permissible. The tactical environment requires good cover for protection, but at this early stage resources may be minimal. Due to the remoteness of its location, targets may be accessible but are largely non-critical to the regime (such as security outposts). Substructures consist of a strategic apex and an operating core. The leadership and core cadre are in the apex, while the operators (guerrilla fighters or terrorists) are located in the core. Because of the early stage of development, cadre from the apex may double as leaders in the operating core. Because of the multi-tasked role of the strategic apex, it is considered the key part of the organization. The structure of this organization is graphically portrayed in Figure 2.7.




Figure 2.7. Simple Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model

The Machine-Like Covert Organization is also most-observed with a socio-political mixed ideology. It is the next evolutionary developmental stage in the simple organization's growth if it is successful. The organizational personality is authoritarian or moving towards autocratic leadership and is less dependent on a charismatic leader. The organization is in an expansion phase and has extended its span of control over a particular area or region. It is normally seen in agrarian or industrial-based cultures. This structure lends itself to secessionist or revolutionary mission goals.

The core technology is less dependent on exogenous sources of support, as local sources are developed or acquired. Production is still concentrated, simple, and rigid, but efficiency is increasing as the processes and outputs become more standardized. Outputs are expanding and beginning to get more specialized and diversified. The strategic environment is stabilizing; the problem is still relatively simple, while the population remains indifferent but is moving towards supportive. As the organization expands its areas of influence and control, the operational environment moves towards semi-permissive. The tactical environment retains good cover for the organization's larger size, while adequate resources are available and accessibility to more critical targets increases.

The addition of a technostructure acts to standardize production processes which in turn increases efficiency and overall organizational effectiveness. The expansion of a middle line of leaders and managers decreases the double-tasking burden on the strategic apex, while the development of a support staff increases the level of essential, but non-critical support to the entire organization. Because of the importance of the increased standardization and production efficiency to the organization's continued success, the techno-structure and production middle-line functionaries are considered key parts of this organizational structure. The structure of this organization is graphically depicted in Figure 2.8.




Figure 2.8. Machine-Like Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model

The *divisional covert organization* is the next developmental growth phase of the machine-like covert organization if success is continued and the span of the organization's control is entering new regions previously controlled only by the regime. The ideology is basically unchanged. Leadership has developed along autocratic lines because the organization has been forced to decentralize authority due to time and distance constraints forced by expansion. The organization is well-established, is an open known competitor of the regime, and is primarily found in industrial-based cultures. The mission goal may be revolutionary or purely economic/criminal in nature. The core technology has evolved to the point where each regional division is responsible for providing its own endogenous sources of support. Each division may receive some exogenous support from the headquarters element in the form of funding. Production assets are reproduced and dispersed among the various divisions. Production efficiency

will reach its maximum in this type of structure, even though the production process is becoming more complex.

Because of its assembly-line style of production, it still remains rigid to rapid fluctuation or change in the nature of the problem or the environment. Outputs have become very specialized and diversified. The strategic environment is considered relatively stable and still simple within each division. Popular support is steadily increasing, and the operational environment ranges from semi-permissive in some regions, to permissive in areas where the organization has now become the de facto regime. At this point, cover has become an indifferent factor of the tactical environment. Resources are considered extensive, and there are many critical targets dispersed over a large area. Barring third-party intervention or a change in the regime's approach, this organization at this point of time should prove triumphant. The structure of this organization is depicted in Figure 2.9.




Figure 2.9. Divisional Covert Organization Model

The *adhoc/cellular covert organization* is actually a combination hybrid structure that we are treating as a pure-case model, as it has become a more common structure among covert organizations during this post-modern era (even though its conceptual beginnings and first usage can be traced back to pre-industrial period partisan warfare). The innovations and increasing capabilities of modern technology afforded covert organizations the opportunity to develop sophisticated structures and operating techniques. Concurrently, modern regimes developed equally sophisticated technologies to counter these developments. Ironically, covert organizations have learned that one way to counter modern regimes' technological advantages is to adapt a structure that is decidedly "low-tech," yet still considered sophisticated, such as the *adhoc/cellular* structure.

The *adhoc/cellular* structure is most commonly seen in covert organizations with ethnic or religious ideologies, however it is also conducive to social or political ideologies as well. The *adhoc* nature of the organization encourages either autocratic or democratic leadership styles. This structure is most often seen in young, small, and mid-sized organizations in their preparatory, initial violence, or on the cusp of their expansion phase. It can be found within any culture, and serves reformist or revolutionary mission goals best. This organization's core technology relies on each cell providing its own endogenous support, yet it is dependent on the overall organization for exogenous operational support. Its production is dispersed, yet inefficient; extremely complex, yet highly flexible to changes. Its outputs are very diversified with personnel outputs displaying a high level of specialization in many cases. The strategic

environment in which the adhoc/cellular covert organization functions in is extremely dynamic and complex. The population could display any level of support. The operational environment is generally non-permissive. The tactical environment typically consists of poor cover, limited resources, but a dense concentration of critical but well-defended regime targets. While this environment may sound somewhat contradictory or unrealistic, this description fits almost any urban area around the world.

The substructural components of the adhoc/cellular covert organization combine the elements of the strategic apex, middle line, technostucture, and support staff under a sort of adhoc umbrella structure. This adhoc structure may be temporary and only come together to plan and coordinate periodically (such as the General Council that provided guidance for the Palestinian intifada from 1987 to 1992), or it may be a permanent structure that acts as a centralized umbrella organization over its various cells (such as the PLO in the 1970's and 80's). The cells are self-contained units that may be general purpose or specialized by function. They can range in size from very small to large (intel cell v. guerrilla cell).

While this structure sounds like an atomized collection of non-integrated, autonomous action cells just following their own course, when overlaid with a lateral-coordinating mechanism (such as a matrix), a regional, functional, or operational division becomes visible. This matrix may be activated only during the conduct of tactical operations, after which time the organization reverts back into atomized cells. This makes the adhoc/cellular organization perhaps the hardest structure to locate, exploit, or penetrate. The structure of this organization is depicted in Figure 2.10.




Figure 2.10. Adhoc/Cellular Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model

With the four covert organization pure-case doctrinal models complete, we can now summarize their design variable characteristics below in Table 2.2.

TYPE OF STRUCTURE	SIMPLE	MACHINE-LIKE	DIVISIONAL	ADHOC/ CELLULAR
DESIGN VARIABLES				
IDEOLOGY	socio-political	socio-political	socio-political	ethnic/religious
PERSONALITY	charismatic authoritarian young; small; early phase; any culture	authoritarian autocratic; established w/in one area; expansion phase; agrarian/ind. secessionist; revolutionary	autocratic; well- established; large; open competitor; industrial;	autocratic or democratic; young; small to mid-sized; early to expansion phase; any culture; revolutionary or reformist
MISSION GOAL	found in all		revolutionary economic/criminal	
CORE TECHNOLOGY Inputs	highly dependent on exogenous support.	less dependent on exogenous; developing own sources of endog.	each division provides endogenous; receives some exogenous from HQ	endogenous within cell; dependent on org. for exogenous operational spt.
Production	concentrated inefficient; simple; rigid	concentrated; incr. efficiency; simple; rigid	dispersed; efficient; complex/rigid	dispersed; inefficient; complex; flexible
Outputs	singular	expanding	diversified	diversified
ENVIRONMENT Strategic	dynamic; simple; pop: indifferent	stabilizing; simple; pop: indifferent	stable; rel. simple; pop: incr. spt.	dynamic; complex; pop: any level
Operational	non-/semi- permissive	semi-permissive	semi-/permissive	generally non- permissive
Tactical	good cover; minimal resources; accessible but non- critical tgts.	good cover; adequate resources; incr. accessibility to critical targets	indifferent cover; extensive resources; many targets over a large area	poor cover; limited resources; targets dense but hard (urban)
KEY PART OF ORG.	strategic apex	technostructure and production	mid-line functionaries & division apexes	strategic apex & support staff

Table 2.2. Summary of Covert Organization Pure-Case Doctrinal Model Design Variables

3. Development of Hybrid Covert Organization Structural Models

As Mintzberg noted in his study of conventional organization structure, in actual practice, some organizations come very close to the pure-case models, while in other cases they do not. Pure-case models are not meant to be interpreted as being mutually exclusive, but should instead be considered as an integrated theory "...to guide us in trying to understand and design complex real-world organizations."¹⁸ So too, our theory and set of pure-case covert organization models should be utilized as the basis for understanding and describing (for the purpose of dismantling, rather than designing) structural hybrids that present a more accurate "snapshot" of covert organization structural reality. For the purpose of this study, the term *hybrid* refers to an organizational structure that exhibits characteristics of more than one of the pure-case models. This may manifest in a combined overall structure, or in some cases where certain forces may favor different structures in different places, as a structure with hybrid substructures.

The causes of structural hybridization are varied. A covert organization may form a *dysfunctional* hybrid due to the dominant influence of one of the intrinsic design parameters, such as personality or ideology. For example, while it may be more efficient for expanding covert organizations to move from a simple to a machine-like structure, because of societal, cultural, and ethnic influences, many of the tribal or clan-based organizations we currently observe operating in Sub-Saharan Africa (such as Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda) retain a simple structure (or aspects thereof). Because of this, the

¹⁸ Mintzberg, p. 291.

organizations are limited in growth and operant inefficiently, thus preventing one from achieving dominance without the complete destruction of its rivals.

Covert organizations may form *functional* hybrids as a response to multiple or contradictory extrinsic design parameters, such as our environmental sub-subvariables of permissiveness, complexity, and stability. For example, while a very dynamic strategic environment would tend to centralize structure and push it towards a simple design, the extreme complexity and low level of permissiveness presented by an urban tactical environment would push structure towards an adhoc/cellular design to deal with the extreme need for operational security. This set of factors would push the organization to form a simple-adhoc/cellular structural hybrid. In a similar fashion, an overall machine-like organizational structure may have hybrids within its various substructures, such as an adhoc strategic apex made up of an elected central committee combined with more permanent "party" leadership. This arrangement was commonly encountered in communist ideology-based covert organizations, and has more recently been seen at work within certain Islamic fundamentalist organizations.

An organization may also form a structural hybrid as a natural development within its own life cycle. This metamorphosis represents a transition phase in the organization and is based on recent setbacks or successes. As a machine-like organization that is dominant within a specific region of a country achieves success against the regime, it will seek to expand its span of control into other regions. This initial exploration may consist of a foray by a core cadre (in the form of a simple organizational structure) into a new region.

As their proselytizing efforts achieve success and the organizational influence expands its control over the region, the overall organization takes on structural and functional characteristics of a divisional structure. This process is repeated until the organization is ready to confront the regime in open conventional warfare. At this point, the organization is operating as a large divisional organization (complete with overt political wing) and is acting as the de facto regime within the regions it controls. The dynamic nature of this “pulling and hauling” between the influences of the structural design variables is graphically illustrated in the hybrid configuration model in Figure 2.11.




Figure 2.11. Hybrid Configuration Model

C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Now that we have identified the four covert organization pure-case doctrinal models, we will delineate ILOC pathways and identify key structural strengths and weaknesses within each pure-case model. Further, based upon these findings, we will suggest *generic* action plans for interdicting these pathways and exploiting their weaknesses on a macro-level.

1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning

To facilitate our effort to delineate ILOC pathways within a covert organization, we will again turn to Mintzberg's outline of five views held throughout the discipline of organizational theory that utilize different flows to describe the functioning of conventional organizations.¹⁹ Various theorists have provided five different views to describe the functioning of conventional organizations. Taken separately, each view describes how certain types of information or work is transmitted or performed within a given organization. While none of the views gives a complete picture by itself, when combined together, certain patterns are clearly evident. These five views are the *flow of formal authority*, *flow of decision making*, *work constellations*, *the flows of regulated activity*, and the *flow of informal communication*.

While each of these views was developed with the conventional business or manufacturing organization in mind, their basic concepts can still be adapted and utilized to describe the functioning of the covert organization's infrastructure. Each one of these flows or relationships is reflected or incorporated within the concept of the ILOC. The one common

¹⁹ Mintzberg, pp. 19-23.

denominator between each of these views is that a message of some sort must be transmitted from a sender to a receiver, and communication takes place.

Within the covert organization, the conduit for all of these forms of communication is the ILOC. By tracing these ILOC's to points that overlap or intersect within a certain structure or substructure, we can then identify critical nodes of communication. Once these nodes are analyzed for vulnerability, then they can be targeted for elimination, thus creating a break in a vital communications link and reducing organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Each of these five functions will be detailed separately, but let us first start with a "fleshed-out" covert organization doctrinal template to use as an example in describing each function. As we add a function, the delineation of specific ILOC's and critical nodes will become clear. Our hypothetical covert organization displays a machine-like structure with a budding overt political wing. It is in the expansion phase, but is only strong in one region. It has concentrated production, but produces diversified outputs. The structure is visible in Figure 2.12.




Figure 2.12. Functional Components of Example Covert Organization

a. Flow of Formal Authority

The flow of formal authority refers to the flow of official decision-making power within the organization. In military-like organizations, these command channels are very formalized and well-defined. This flow will help to identify the power and

information brokers within the covert organization. The diagram in Figure 2.13 indicates that the flow of formal authority in our hypothetical case is fairly rigid along military lines.




Figure 2.13. The Covert Organization Flow of Formal Authority

b. Flow of Decision Making

The next Function we will look at is the flow of decision making. In the covert organization, secrecy and security are of the utmost of priority. It is not surprising that in a militaristic-style organization, the flow of decision making tends to be extremely vertical and in one direction (down).




Figure 2.14. The Flow of Decision Making

In Figure 2.14, we see a decision to carry out a series of terrorist acts being disseminated to a number of different functionaries. The political wing will need to prepare a public statement and prepare to handle the regime's public reaction. The support staff must coordinate auxiliary support for transportation, information, and security. The technical division staff must provide intelligence on possible targets. The military operations staff must begin planning. The decision must finally filter down through command channels to the terrorist cell that will actually perform the mission. From this example, we see that even though security and compartmentation of

information is always necessary, many more people know about the decision besides the senior leaders who decided to authorize the missions, and the operators who will actually perform the missions.

c. System of Regulated Work Flows

The next view looks at the system of regulated work flows occurring within the organization on a daily basis. This system includes such flows as information from the support structures on efficiency and productivity necessary for strategic planning, feedback from the middle line on current operations or any problems arising, the flow of work through the operating core focusing on the production phase from beginning to end, and the flow of commands and decisions from the apex that direct the efforts of the operating core. Figure 2.15 is a view of the system of regulated work flows within our example organization. Here we see information being fed from the support structures into the middle line and up into the strategic apex. There the information is utilized in the decision making process and is then passed down through the middle line to be executed by the operating core. There, a certain amount of work flow is passed laterally from each section of the operating core (in the form of coordinated operations) but the majority of outputs from each section flows down and out of the organization. Remembering that the aim of outputs is to generate new sources of inputs, fresh inputs are fed back into the organization, while bleed-offs are essentially wasted outputs.




Figure 2.15. The System of Regulated Work Flows

d. Flow of Informal Communication

While highly discouraged within covert organizations, informal communication between personnel both inside and between substructures does take place. Even the most rigid training and indoctrination is challenged by the human tendency to both covert and talk about information they are privy to. In Figure 2.16, we see the flow




Figure 2.16. The Flow of Informal Communication

of informal communication within our hypothetical case. In an effort to improve coordination and circumvent design flaws of the structure, various subsections will communicate with each other on an informal basis. While this activity can prove quite productive to a conventional organization, it could prove fatal to members of a covert organization if this ILOC is properly targeted.

e. Work Constellations

The final view of how the covert organization functions is provided by a visual portrayal of work relationships known as work constellations. Work constellations are used to visually group people who routinely work together in a particular area, perform a function, or coordinate with each other on a regular basis. Figure 2.17 illustrates the work constellations in our example organization.




Figure 2.17. Organizational Work Constellations

What emerges from these groupings is a pattern of intra-organization relationships. Once work constellations are identified, it is safe to assume (in most cases) that the members of a particular group know each other and have access to the same body of information. If a particular work constellation can be properly targeted and penetrated, then that entire constellation is subject to exploitation or destruction. When overlaid

upon the other flows previously described, the ILOC's between various constellations within the organization rise to the surface and their vulnerabilities become exposed. A summary of ILOC pathways and infrastructure functioning is summarized in Table 2.3.

2. Structural Strengths and Weaknesses

Based upon the various functional flows that are constantly at work within the covert organization, a pattern of generalizable structural strengths and weaknesses associated with each of the pure-case models emerges. Very rigid, formal structures become vulnerable to anything that might upset the regulated flow of information or work. Conversely, while a very loose, flexible structure would tend to allow the organization to adjust to changing environmental conditions, it becomes vulnerable to penetration at various levels as well as the isolation of various substructures. The tendency common between all the pure-case models is that what is considered a positive attribute of a particular structure has a reverse side to it that can be turned into an exploitable liability. The structural strengths and weaknesses for each of the pure-case models is summarized in Table 2.3.

3. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Once the structural strengths and weaknesses within a given covert organization are identified, the ILOC linkages between the various weaknesses must be micro-analyzed to determine which ones appear most vulnerable to targeting. Again, based on the generic structural strengths and weaknesses inherent to each pure-case model, likewise there are generic infrastructure vulnerabilities associated with each. These vulnerabilities are also summarized in Table 2.3. To reiterate, these vulnerabilities are

generic in nature, and only through further micro-analysis of the given case can the relative level of vulnerability be determined (our format for performing micro-analysis for infrastructure targeting is found in Appendix B).

4. Macro-Level Generic Action Plans

The final step in the targeting process is to determine an action plan to capitalize on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities discovered through the previous analytical steps. Based on the generalizable characteristics of our pure-case models described previously, we can develop generic action plans that address their inherent weaknesses. Again, these action plans are by no means guaranteed recipes for success. Each case is unique and requires the application of the entire analytical process. However, these generic plans can provide a general heading that a counter-organization campaign could follow and if executed properly, have a higher probability of success, rather than simply depending upon intuition or past experiences to provide the correct answers. These generic action plans are summarized in Table 2.3.

TYPE OF STRUCTURE	SIMPLE	MACHINE-LIKE	DIVISIONAL	ADHOC/ CELLULAR
INFRA-STRUCTURE FUNCTIONING				
Flow of Formal Authority	significant from top	significant throughout	decentralized/ significant	insignificant
Flow of Decision-Making	top-down	top-down	differentiated between HQ/div.	mixed at all levels
Flow of Informal Communication	significant	discouraged	moderate between HQ and divisions	significant at apex; eliminated below
Work Constellations	none	moderately significant	insignificant between divisions	significant throughout (matrixing for operations)
STRUCTURAL STRENGTHS	unity of effort; quick commo /response; dedicated; directed; secure	efficient; consistent; self-sustaining (to a degree)	heterogeneous-spreads risk; reach; diversified assets; self-sustaining	innovative; flexible; secure; almost invisible at times
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES	restrictive; limited scope of operations; limited resources	inflexible; supply-side driven;	unity of effort (autonomy between divisions); security	inefficient; slow commo; conflictive; lack of direction; isolated components
INFRA-STRUCTURE VULNERABILITIES	ILOC's from strategic apex and exogenous support	ILOC's from endogenous support; production; techno-structure	C3 ILOC's between HQ and divisions;	inputs and C3 ILOC's; C3 nodes
ACTION PLAN	decapitation or interdiction of apex; isolate from exogenous support sources	interdict endogenous spt; reduce production efficiency; interdict mid-level functionaries and technicians	isolate divisions from HQ and from each other (deny mutual spt); interdict C3; concentrate effort against most vulnerable division	interdict inputs; interdict and intercept C3 (infowar); prioritize HUMINT intel collection efforts

Table 2.3. Summary of ILOC Pathways and Functional Characteristics

III. THE HUKBALAHAPS 1946-1954

A. BACKGROUND

The Hukbalahap (Huk) insurrection in the Philippine Islands was a manifestation of peasant unrest stemming from the long-term oppression of sharecroppers by the landed plantation aristocracy. The Huks had formed one of the largest and most active resistance movements during the Japanese occupation but were largely marginalized at the war's end because of their failure to comply with United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE) directives during the war.²⁰ Additionally, General MacArthur as well as the American Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), maintained a vehement distrust of anything even loosely resembling communism. While it is true that the Huks loosely ascribed to Marxism as an ideology, and the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) ultimately succeeded in coopting the rebellion's leadership, the majority of the Huk rank and file were more strongly motivated by nationalist and reformist ideals.²¹

Initial government response to the Huks was simplistic and targeted destruction of the insurgent bands. The poorly trained and undisciplined Philippine Army committed atrocities which, expectedly, increased popular support for the Huks. Sweeping reforms initiated by the dynamic Secretary of Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, professionalized the military and focused efforts on ameliorating the causes of the insurrection. Notably, both

²⁰Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1977), p. 112.

²¹*Ibid.* p.227.

Magsaysay and the Joint U.S. Advisory Group, cautioned against commitment of U.S. forces to bolster the Philippine Army.²²

In the end, a combination of low profile military operations, high profile land reforms, and civic action programs, curtailed popular support for the insurgents.²³ By 1953 some 15,000 insurgents had surrendered and an additional 4,000 had been captured. Louis Taruc, the Huk's most prominent military leader, surrendered in 1954 bringing to a close an organized insurrection that had cost more than 9,000 lives.²⁴

B. ANALYSIS

1. Ideology

Societally, class division played an important role in pitting a disenfranchised class of peasant farmers against a class of landlord elites. Predictably, this class distinction created a political environment particularly vulnerable to Marxist proselytization and influence. Religious fractiousness did not play a significant role despite the seeming incompatibility of Marxist and Catholic doctrines. Fractiousness along ethnic lines was evident with Spanish descent and Mestizo elites generally siding with the government, while the Huks derived the majority of their support from the indigenously pure population.

²²Larry Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*, (New York University Press, New York and London, 1986), p.52.

²³Kerkvliet, pg. 238-240.

²⁴Cable, p. 62.

2. Organizational Personality

The leadership style of the Huks can be characterized as a combination of charismatic and autocratic. This combined distinction is derived from the vitality and influence of their military leader, Luis Taruc, and the adherence to Marxist ideology which called for leadership through a central committee and politburo. In retrospect, this dysfunctional hybridization at the strategic apex of the organization, is seen as a contributing factor in the insurrection's demise.

The Huk insurrection evolved through an extensive maturation process reaching its high water mark of 12,000 combatants and approximately 100,000 active supporters in 1949. Despite fielding nine active Regional Committees (RC's), each with multiple battalion sized Field Commands (FC's), the Huk insurrection generally remained a Phase II insurgency retracting to Phase I as Magsaysay's campaign gained momentum. Culturally, the Huks reflected an agrarian-based movement with close ties to the land and the rural community. Power within the movement was formalized but also wielded indirectly.

3. Mission Goal

As the Philippines gained independence the Huks were active participants in the early, and often fumbling democratic legacy emplaced by the departing Americans. However, their exclusion from active participation in the governmental process shattered any misperceptions about reformist goals and prompted the adoption of an espoused reactionary, revolutionary objective. This espoused goal, while at times seemingly within reach, may have been a best case outcome with an actual goal more along the lines of

secession or radical reformation. Unfortunately for the Huks, circumstances changed far too rapidly for them to realign their goals relative to realistic outcomes. As a result, they reverted to a struggle for survival before they could apply any of the leverage they had gained in earlier successes to achieve a negotiated settlement.

4. Core Technology

While loosely affiliated with other emerging Marxist/Nationalist movements in Asia, the Huk insurrection was almost entirely reliant on endogenous inputs for the duration of the insurrection. Although geography played a small role in their reliance on endogenous inputs (an island is far easier to isolate from exogenous forms of support), a robust support base within Huk controlled areas was the most significant factor. Production to convert inputs into outputs is best described as in the middle of the concentrated/dispersed continuum. While production nodes were generally dispersed to the Regional Committees, the inability of five of the nine RC's to self-sustain forced some degree of centralization so resources could be redistributed.²⁵ Production was also relatively complex to meet the needs of the multiple systems that were competing for resources. The dispersion of production assets, while preferred from a security standpoint when functioning in a stable and permissive environment, became a hindrance following the onset of Magsaysay's counterinsurgency campaign. The impact of Magsaysay's campaign is also true regarding the efficiency of production; as long as the government forces were inept, the production efficiency allowed both a quantitative and qualitative level of outputs appropriate to maintain the initiative. Huk outputs were diversified in the

²⁵Kerkvliet, p. 213.

sense that they included mechanisms for propaganda, civil administration, and public education, as well as a broad scope of military operations.

5. Environment

The strategic environment for the Huks remained stable prior to Magsaysay's appointment as Secretary of Defense in 1950. Following the onset of his reforms, which included professionalizing the Officer Corps, increasing civil/military operations, psychological operations, and a more appropriate application of military force, the environment became less predictable and more dynamic for the Huks. In one respect the limited number of active belligerents (not discounting U.S. support for the Philippine government), tended to simplify the environment. However, more complex social issues compounded by the potentially chaotic political implications of Huk success, served to increase the complexity of the overall strategic environment. The support of the population, critical to the Huk's success with regard to their overwhelming reliance on endogenous support, was generally supportive or indifferent prior to 1950. Magsaysay's intuitive knowledge of the criticality of popular support, was a key factor in his overall campaign plan. His civil military operations, political reforms, land redistribution, and psychological operations, all focused on marginalizing the Huks and diminishing their popular support.

The operational environment for the Huks can also be considered in terms of pre and post Magsaysay. By 1949 large areas of three provinces were under Huk control and could be characterized as permissive to semi-permissive environments. In some areas the Huks were so well established that they functioned as a defacto government with an

active administration. Post Magsaysay, resurgent government forces challenged the Huk domain and forced a transition to a generally semi-permissive environment. As Magsaysay's campaign matured, much of what was once considered "Huklandia" became a non-permissive environment with the Huk stronghold of Mount Arayat remaining their only viable (albeit contested) sanctuary.

The tactical environment was a paradox in regard to early Huk success, offering generally poor cover. Much of the three provinces that once comprised the area generally considered as Huklandia was easily accessible by road and agriculturally developed. These two factors, which should have allowed easy government incursions as well as interdiction of Huk formations, were largely neutralized by the early ineptitude of the government forces. These vulnerabilities became all too evident for the Huks after Magsaysay's reforms. Resources and targets were another environmental factor that remained relative to government ineptitude and Huk initiative. While the Huks controlled vast territories, their access to resources and targets remained high. Correspondingly, as government intervention increased, resources diminished with a predictable effect on the Huk's ability to maintain the military initiative.

C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Critical to the positive outcome achieved by the Philippine government in dealing with the Huk insurrection of 1946-1954 was the intuitive knowledge and vision of its principal architect, Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay was able, through observation and an understanding borne of familiarity, to identify the support of the population as the Huk's center of gravity. Accordingly, he changed the venue from a purely military effort, to one

competing for the trust and confidence of the people who comprised this decisive terrain.²⁶ While his efforts superficially appeared defensive, assigning security forces to each village and limiting offensive operations, he actually laid the groundwork for a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. Within the auspices of this campaign, which included confidence building measures, civic and psychological operations, and ultimately comprehensive land reform programs, a number of Huk ILOC's became vulnerable to government military operations.

1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning

Within the Huk organizational structure the flow of *formal authority* was significant for the duration of the insurrection. *Decision making* within the organization followed a top down flow but also delegated authority to subordinate leaders. This is indicative of a hybrid comprising characteristics of both machine and divisional structures. However, as government pressure increased, latent factionalism surfaced between the Nationalists and Marxists within the organization's strategic apex and impacted the efficiency of decision execution. This factionalism further reveals the dysfunctional nature of the hybrid structure at the strategic apex. Luis Taruc, whose charismatic leadership probably served as a great stabilizing force at the organization's apex, further complicates the characterization of formal authority and decision making in the organization by incorporating features more commonly associated with a simple structure.

²⁶Cable, pp. 54-55.

The *flow of regulated systems* such as logistics, communications, and propaganda, were significant prior to Magsaysay's campaign but were hindered by a rigidity that became apparent as the environment destabilized. This further substantiates the characterization of the organization's structure as a machine/divisional hybrid. *Informal communications* between structural components, while discouraged, did exist between the strategic apex and various subordinate headquarters. It is also safe to assume that informal communications were routine between various elements of the Nationalist and Marxist factions within the overall organization.

2. Structural Strengths

The structural strengths found within the Huk organization are generally consistent with those indicated in Table 2.3. Encompassing characteristics of both machine and divisional pure case models, the Huk hybrid, prior to the impact of Magsaysay's reforms, was generally efficient, self-sustaining, and dispersed. These strengths were exemplified by the ability of the organization to redistribute resources such as money and weapons to bolster fledgling RC's trying to expand Huk influence.²⁷ These newer RC's, while not self-sustaining, served to tie down government forces and reduce the pressure on more established RC's.

Another strength derived from the machine structure aspect of the Huk hybrid can be seen in their consistency. High ranking PKP members headed national departments charged with oversight of finances, communications, education, and organization. These

²⁷Kerkvliet, pp. 214-215.

departments established and enforced national guidelines pertaining to their specific area of responsibility.²⁸

3. Structural Weaknesses

Weaknesses within the Huk organizational structure, which became readily apparent during Magsaysay's campaign, are also consistent with those indicated in Table 2.3. Inflexibility, demonstrated by their inability to react to government initiatives, was evident throughout the organization. As systems for procuring food and other types of support were neutralized, the organization proved incapable of responding with secondary or alternate means of support. As expected, FC's relying on established nodes for support were forced to improvise and dedicate increasing amounts of time and energy to sustainment efforts vice operations.

Unity of effort was another manifestation of the inherent weakness evident in the Huk structure. Despite the PKP's public claims of sovereign authority over the Huk movement, their own internal assessments depicted a much bleaker situation. Subordinate FC leaders frequently ignored party directives and chose not to attend party meetings where directives were issued.²⁹ This apparent lack of discipline, compounded by the PKP's inability to enforce directives, could only serve to diminish overall effectiveness.

A critical structural weakness existed in the organizations security mechanism. This became clearly evident in October 1950 when an operation targeting twenty-two

²⁸Ibid. pp. 222-223.

²⁹Ibid. p. 223.

separate residences resulted in the loss of the organizations entire urban apparatus in Manila.³⁰ The psychological effect of this operation was significant; Magsaysay achieved his first major success against the Huks, and the level of paranoia and mistrust among the Huks multiplied.

4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Presented as vulnerabilities within the Huk organizational structure are a number of ILOC's consistent with a machine/divisional hybrid. ILOC's from endogenous sources of support were particularly vulnerable for the Huks. A 1951 report from FC 45 to headquarters at RC-4 indicated that virtually all routes to and from their supply points were being controlled by government forces.³¹ Another vulnerable ILOC was the training apparatus that indoctrinated new guerrillas and proselytized the PKP's Marxist tenets. The increasing encroachment of government forces either forced cancellation of planned training sessions or prompted their early conclusion.³²

The C3 ILOC's, particularly the Huks archaic communication system, was particularly vulnerable to interdiction and compromise. Relying on a complex system of couriers, the communication system was never adequately staffed and painfully slow.³³ Much of the early success against the Manila organization came about as a result of

³⁰Eduardo Lachica, *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt*, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971), p. 131.

³¹Kerkvliet, p. 241.

³²Ibid. p. 242.

³³Ibid. p. 216.

government surveillance of Huk couriers. Later attempts by the Huks to upgrade their communications system by incorporating a wireless radio system were unsuccessful and resulted in the loss of expensive equipment that they could ill afford to replace.

5. Action Plan

Consistent with the pure case generic action plans shown in Table 2.3, the Huk case would call for an action plan that both recognized the hybridized machine/divisional nature of the organization and adapted the appropriate portions of the pure-case plan. As history shows us in the action plan employed by Magsaysay, even an inadvertent or intuitively developed action plan that adequately addresses infrastructure vulnerabilities will contribute to success.

Interdicting endogenous support and reducing production efficiency were important aspects of the action plan against the Huks. Magsaysay took significant steps to isolate the Huks from the population, and force them into a reactive role. Simultaneously, ambushes and small unit patrols succeeded in interdicting the Huk C3 ILOC's and denying mutual support between elements.

One aspect not addressed by Magsaysay, but considered significant within our analysis, is the interdiction of midlevel functionaries and technicians. While Magsaysay's security forces had early success in Manila, no concerted follow-up to isolate and neutralize these nodes outside of Manila was forthcoming. As a result, a number of supporting systems like propaganda and finance remained viable and active until the death knell of the insurgency and surely prolonged the end.

4. Conclusion

What then can we conclude from the Huk case? First is the recognition of the Huk hybrid as a function of an organization trying to expand beyond its means and span of control. At a point where retrenchment and reinforcement of success may have sealed some form of victory, over-extension prompted a loss of control and an inevitable spiraling effect that sealed the fate of the Huk insurrection.

Secondly, we can't denigrate the significance of the dysfunctional hybridization at the strategic apex of the Huk organization. The competing substructures within the apex, Taruc as patriarch, the PKP committees, and various nationalists, all contributed greatly to their problems with effective command and control.

Finally, with respect to those factors considered necessary and sufficient in explaining success in a counter-organization campaign, we can make some informed observations and conclusions. Perhaps the most significant conclusion resultant from our analysis, is that this case demonstrates the efficacy of targeting appropriate infrastructure nodes as a necessary condition for success. This case also demonstrates that a systematic methodology for developing an infrastructure targeting plan was neither a necessary or sufficient condition to explain success in this instance. Magsaysay's recognition of Huk vulnerabilities was clearly a result of his intuitive knowledge rather than the product of an analytic system.

With respect to appropriate ILOC targeting, this case lends credibility to this factor as a necessary condition for success. While not sufficient to explain success in and of itself, the fact that Magsaysay targeted the appropriate vulnerabilities to achieve

maximum effect is significant. This case also underscores the necessity of integrating infrastructure targeting within an overarching counter-organization campaign. Magsaysay effectively balanced his efforts to achieve positive results from the governments strategic interaction with the Huks.

IV. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948-1960

A. BACKGROUND

The Malayan insurrection was an attempt by the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), to force the British out of Malaya and establish a Communist Republic. Like the Huks, the MRLA had evolved from a sizable, although fairly quiescent, anti-Japanese guerrilla army. However, unlike the Huks, the MRLA held little appeal to the indigenous Malay population and was comprised almost entirely of immigrant Chinese. Additionally, the organization received virtually all of its support from the Malayan Chinese community; a politically disenfranchised element existing on the periphery of Malayan society.

Commencing in 1948 the MRLA initiated the insurgency with a broad leap into what Mao would have called the "protracted warfare" stage. Operating from the fringe of the Malayan jungle, MRLA formations conducted raids and acts of terror against remote police posts and civilian plantations. Constrained by an obvious lack of jungle training, the MRLA functioned in large units, suffered disproportionate casualties, and never achieved their primary objective of establishing a sanctuary area.

The initial British response, designed to buy time, was predominantly military and, while achieving very little in terms of civic action or political reform, was on the cusp of defeating the MRLA in the first nine months of the conflict.³³ Not realizing how

³³O'Ballance, Edgar, *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960*, (Archon Books, Hamden, CT, 1966), pp. 86-88. O'Ballance cites the death of Lau Yew, one of

close they were to destroying the MRLA, the British authorities let the opportunity pass and settled in for a protracted campaign. Instituting the Briggs Plan, so named for its author, General Sir Harold Briggs, the British incorporated virtually all assets available to the government in a comprehensive and ambitious strategy for defeating the insurgency.

Crafted by an experienced jungle fighter in his own right and partially based on a study by Michael Calvert, the former Chindit 77th Brigade Commander, the Briggs Plan included policies to separate the MRLA from their primary means of support, the Chinese population. Of particular importance, in this respect, were the Chinese “squatters” living in illegal settlements near the edge of the jungle.³⁴ Relocating the squatters into government-controlled communities, the British sought to minimize the effects of their dislocation by giving them title to the new land they occupied.³⁵ Additionally, the presence of a government infrastructure in the new communities initiated the process of incorporating the Chinese into the greater Malayan society.

Applying a patient but constant pressure on the MRLA, the British were able to declare vast areas of the country secure and reduce government presence and controls to near normal levels. Simultaneously, they went forward with the plan to grant autonomy and eventual independence to Malaya. Segregated from any means of support, the MRLA continuously decreased in strength and effectiveness with final mopping up

the few competent leaders in the MRLA, as well as poor morale, desertions, and tactical ineptitude, as reasons for this belief.

³⁴McMichael, Scott R. *A Historical Perspective On Light Infantry*, (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1987), p. 97.

³⁵Cable, p. 79.

completed by the independent Malayan government in 1960. The British policy during the Malayan emergency (judicious use of force, segregation, coercion, and appeasement), as well as their employment of vast institutional experience in Chinese-Malayan affairs has become a primer in counterinsurgency studies.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Ideology

Maoism dominated the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and influenced every aspect of life within the MRLA. Mao's own success against the Kuomintang and later the U.N. forces in Korea, provided validation for the doctrine. Ethnically, a clear distinction existed between ethnic Malays and the Chinese subculture. This distinction carried over into the MRLA which was almost an exclusively Chinese organization. Religious differences mirrored ethnic division with the indigenous Malay population being almost entirely Moslem, and the Chinese subscribing to either Confucianism, Buddhism, or in the case of the Communists, atheism. Religious diversity, while notable for the distinct dividing lines extant in this case, did not play a significant role in the insurgency.

2. Organizational Personality

Typical of most communist insurgencies, the leadership of the MRLA comprised both autocratic, and authoritarian aspects. Chen Ping, the Secretary General of the MCP held near-total control over both the Politburo and the MRLA. In terms of maturity, the

MRLA could trace its roots to early 1942 as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army.³⁶ However, the apparent continuity implied by this seemingly robust level of institutional knowledge was significantly degraded by a general stand down from 1945 to 1948. Additionally, the MRLA's leadership was in a state of disequilibrium following the scandalous departure of their long time General Secretary, Lai Teck.³⁷ Accordingly, the MRLA should be considered a relatively immature organization.

The pervasive culture-type subsumed by the MRLA was predominantly agrarian with a strong commercial bent. Factors which influence this classification includes the temporary resident status assumed by the majority of the Chinese who originally came to Malaya to fill a labor void in the agriculture and mining industries. As this population expanded, a subculture of businesses and commercial enterprises tailored to the Chinese consumer market emerged in virtually every concentration of Chinese residents.

3. Mission Goal

The ultimate goal of the MCP was to establish a Communist Republic in Malaya.³⁸ Their willingness to achieve this goal through armed insurrection is indicative of an insurgent organization with reactionary, revolutionary objectives. For the MCP this espoused goal was generally in line with their actual goals and remarkably, remained so for the duration of the insurgency. Even as the curtain was closing on the MCP and the

³⁶O'Ballance, p.42.

³⁷Lai Teck absconded with the bulk of the MCP's treasury in 1947. He was later accused of being both a collaborator and double agent.

³⁸Ibid., p. 78.

MRLA in the final days of the emergency, their leadership attempted to negotiate cease-fires as a ploy to rearm and regroup. Unfortunately for the Communists, the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, saw through what was clearly an amateurish ploy and declined to negotiate.

4. Core Technology

Although the inputs for the MRLA came almost exclusively from the Malayan Chinese community, these inputs must be considered as coming principally from an exogenous source. This assessment is based on the tight controls imposed by the government which effectively removed this community from the MRLA span of control. Additionally, the MRLA never succeeded in establishing a sanctuary area free from government intrusion. Accordingly, what endogenous input sources that did exist, were constantly at risk. Production to convert inputs into outputs was highly dispersed and delegated out to separate regiments within the MRLA. These production nodes were fairly simplistic, producing "vanilla guerrillas" with limited military training, capable of performing simple tasks. The overarching headquarters at the MPC was slightly more complex given the need to control propaganda, intelligence, and the underground auxiliary or "Min Yuen."

Production efficiency for the MRLA was adequate during the early stages of the emergency but was closely related to the availability of exogenous inputs. As population and resource control measures were instituted and guerrilla units were forced deeper into the jungle, production efficiency dropped below adequate levels. While demonstrating some flexibility in trying to establish alternate endogenous inputs, such as clandestine

jungle gardens, the MRLA production system was simply too rigid to respond to the changing environment.

The outputs of the overall MPC organization can be characterized as closer to singular if measured against the singular to diversified continuum. The outputs for the MRLA were very straightforward if not totally singular in practice. In the early days they moved as large units (200 to 400 guerrillas), overwhelmed small police posts, farms, or mines, and escaped to the bush. Typically, they suffered disproportionate casualties and succeeded only because of sheer numbers. The Min Yuen, or underground, was slightly more diverse than the MRLA in that they provided support to guerrilla units, recruited new members, and performed acts of terror, sabotage, and extortion, as needed.

5. Environment

The strategic environment for the MRLA was at its most stable point early in the insurgency before government forces had adequate time to react to the emergency. As government reaction to the insurgency, particularly the Briggs plan, took effect, the strategic environment became increasingly dynamic. This environment was also fairly complex given the transition of MRLA's opponent from British Colonial government to Independent Malayan Federation. The potentially divisive social issue of an ethnically defined insurgency as well as the possibly chaotic political ramifications resultant from insurgent success, further contributed to overall strategic complexity.

The support of the population was generally divided along ethnic lines with native Malaysians being clearly opposed to the insurgency. Among Chinese Malaysians the majority of the community was indifferent, but easily intimidated by Min Yuen operatives

living in their midst. The presence of the Min Yuen, and the ease in which they extorted support from the population, created a perception of mass support which was largely inaccurate. As relocation into "new villages" became a reality, the villagers were all too happy to anonymously identify the Min Yuen living among them.

The operational environment for the MPC, and its subordinate organizations, ranged from semi-permissive to non-permissive for the duration of the emergency. The MRLA never established a much sought after sanctuary area and as a result, had to maintain varying levels of heightened security as a standard operating procedure. For the Min Yuen, aggressive police work by the "Special Branch" kept them under a constant threat of compromise and arrest. As a result, they had to function in a non-permissive environment with extremely high levels of internal security.

An analysis of the tactical environment reveals some interesting peculiarities that are unique to the Malayan case. On the surface, the foreboding jungle of the Malayan interior would appear to have provided excellent cover for MRLA units. However, the British and Commonwealth Units in Malaya were led by seasoned veterans who had defeated the Japanese in the jungles of Burma. In fact, it is arguable that never before in its history was a British Army so well prepared for jungle warfare as the one that responded to the Malayan Emergency. Accordingly, the cover of the jungle never afforded the protection the MRLA desired or needed.

The availability of resources for the MRLA diminished in conjunction with the enactment of the Briggs Plan. As the MRLA formations were segregated from the population, and forced deeper into the jungle, resources became exceedingly scarce. The

availability of targets on the other hand, remained high but were of diminishing qualitative significance and typically related to replacing lost foodstuffs and equipment.

C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Critical to understanding the defeat of the communist insurgency is an appreciation of the effect of the Briggs Plan. Instituted in 1950 and effectively carried out by both its principal architect and his successors, the Briggs plan neutralized the MRLA's initiative and forced them into a reactive mode of operations. Calling for a systematic clearing of the Malay peninsula, segregation of the MRLA from the populace, and forcing the insurgents to battle, the plan required close cooperation and coordination among all facets of the government.³⁹ As a result of the consistent, if not persistent, application of the Briggs Plan, MRLA ILOC's were identified, targeted, attacked, and neutralized.

1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning

Within the MRLA organizational structure the flow of *formal authority* was highly significant for the duration of the emergency. *Decision making* within the organization was a top down, highly militarized, and vertical system. Typical of communist influenced organizations, political officers held equal if not superior status over their military counterparts and influenced decisions accordingly.⁴⁰ This dual structure of political and military leaders, which reached from the organization's apex down to the squad level, lent itself to dysfunction in the form of internal conflict and divisiveness.

³⁹O'Ballance, p.107.

⁴⁰Ibid., p.103.

The flow of *regulated systems* in the MRLA was significant at the Regimental level and below. Well-established relationships between insurgent units and the local Min Yuen were considered the most reliable sources of support and intelligence. Following the displacement of most of the Chinese population into secure villages, these work flows were severely hindered. *Informal communication* within the MRLA was strongly discouraged. Despite the ineffectiveness of existing formal communication systems, such as couriers and "jungle mailboxes," the MRLA demonstrated distinct machine-like characteristics by maintaining a strict control of communications. As a result of adhering to this highly structured system, some MRLA units were effectively functioning without guidance toward the end of the emergency.

2. Structural Strengths

The structural strengths found within the MRLA are consistent with a hybrid organization predominantly characterized by simple and machine-like attributes. These strengths could be observed in the unity of effort and genuine dedication at least in part motivated by adherence to Maoist doctrine. MRLA Regiments were largely self-sustaining prior to the Briggs plan and managed to eke out an existence for years after its inception. Consistency was another machine like attribute demonstrated by the MRLA. This could be seen at the unit level where highly regimented daily activities, uniforms, and strict field discipline, were the norms.⁴¹

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 104-105.

3. Structural Weaknesses

Some of the weaknesses within the MRLA structure were evident at the onset of the insurrection while others became apparent as a result of government initiatives. These weaknesses are consistent with a simple/machine-like hybrid with some anomalies. Simple case model attributes include a limited scope of operations, as demonstrated by their early need to move and fight as large formations, and limited resources. Inflexibility and sensitivity to supply side operational constraints, were manifestations of the machine-like attributes of the MRLA. Their reliance on a near sole source of support, and their inability to react positively when that source was neutralized, fully exemplify these attributes.

An anomalous attribute, normally associated with Adhoc/Cellular organizations, but present as a weakness in the MRLA, was a slow and inefficient communication system. This system was constrained by heightened security requirements and had limited adaptability because of both technology shortfalls and isolation. Accordingly, the MRLA committed to a system of runners and dead letter drops first instituted during the Japanese occupation and reliant on a percolating effect that sometimes took months to pass a message.⁴² Government forces quickly identified this weakness as a result of the high number of couriers intercepted by check points and ambushes.

4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities within the MRLA are ILOC's consistent with a simple/machine-like hybrid. Most notably, the support ILOC's from both exogenous and endogenous

⁴²Ibid., p. 114.

sources are present. As history has demonstrated, these ILOC's were highly vulnerable when subjected to the concerted interdiction efforts encompassed in the Briggs plan. Additional vulnerabilities present in this hybrid case include the ILOC's from the strategic apex, and the techno-structure. Aggressive patrolling and population and resource control measures on the part of the government forces, isolated various MRLA Regiments from their headquarters and allowed for their subsequent defeat in detail.

5. Action Plan

As with the Huk case, the Malaya case would require an action plan formulated by blending the appropriate aspects of the pure case plans shown in Table 2.3. With the Briggs Plan, the British systematically designed and executed a counterinsurgency campaign, that addressed specific critical nodes within the MRLA organization.

Consistent with the pure case plans we offer in Chapter II, interdiction of support from both endogenous and exogenous sources was a critical aspect of the Briggs plan. Perhaps the most significant element of this interdiction was the displacement and segregation of the Chinese community away from the MRLA areas of operation. As a result of this forced segregation an artificial change in the operational environment ensued with negative results for the MRLA, and corresponding positive results for the government. Decapitation or interdiction of the strategic apex was also attempted with mixed results. Interdiction was generally successful at isolating the apex from subordinate units, but less successful at decapitating the structure outright. The ongoing

hunt for the MPC Politburo did have the positive effect of driving them across the border into Thailand and degrading their overall effectiveness.⁴³

The final aspect of the generic action plan that was paralleled by the Briggs Plan was the interdiction of mid-level functionaries and technicians. Specifically targeted in the Malayan case were couriers, and any groups traveling on jungle trails. These were particularly high payoff targets given the MRLA rule that only allowed special couriers and politburo members unrestricted movement around the country.⁴⁴

D. CONCLUSION

In the Malayan case we see a clear example of an insurgent organization whose level of influence was far less than the sum of its parts. For the MRLA, the decision to initiate a protracted struggle from the outset of the insurgency is indicative of an organization without a firm grasp of its own capabilities. Superficially, the MRLA mobilized as an impressive guerrilla army with years of experience against the Japanese and a sound ideology. In reality, the early MRLA was fairly inept in the jungle and burdened by an inferior strategic objective and wishful thinking. Five years into the insurgency, when MRLA units had evolved into formidable jungle fighters, the overall organization was too weak to do much more than survive.

The MRLA also paid dearly for sacrificing preparation time in pursuit of early success against what they perceived as an unprepared British Colonial Government. This trade-off pitted an immature organization with minimal structural depth and little

⁴³Ibid., pp. 132-133.

⁴⁴Ibid., p.140.

sustainment capacity, against a small but professional garrison of British and Colonial troops and the potential strength of any reinforcements arriving on scene. Accordingly, when the anticipated and rapid collapse of the British regime failed to happen, the MRLA found themselves in a poorly timed conflict which they had both started, and which they were ill prepared to execute.

With respect to our theory of counter-organization targeting, the Malayan Emergency provides one of the strongest examples of the effectiveness of targeting an insurgent organization's infrastructure. The fact that the Briggs Plan specifically and logically addressed critical ILOC's consistent with our analysis, further substantiates infrastructure targeting as a necessary condition for success.

This case also demonstrates the value of systematic targeting as opposed to reliance on the intuitive sense of the practitioner. To be certain, the Briggs Plan came from the intuitive and experiential backgrounds of its principal authors. However, the manner in which it was institutionalized allowed for its continued and effective execution long after the departure of General Briggs.

Regarding appropriate ILOC targeting, the Malayan case offers a strong argument supporting this condition as necessary for success. The British use of segregation and resource denial were highly effective against an ethnically distinct insurgency, in a rice poor region. Similarly, integration with an overarching campaign plan gains considerable credibility as a necessary condition for success. The British effectively mobilized every resource available to the government to conduct a consolidated offensive against the

MRLA. Infrastructure targeting was only one aspect (albeit a critical one) of this offensive.

V. VIETNAM, THE VC, AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

A. BACKGROUND

The Viet Cong (VC) represented the insurgency aspect of a long term struggle by Vietnamese Communists to discard the "yoke of foreign rule" and unify the country under one central government. Like the Huks and the MRLA, the VC achieved their earliest credibility fighting against the Japanese as the Viet Minh. Following World War II, the Viet Minh under the political leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his gifted military leader, Vo Nguyen Giap, succeeded in driving the French out of Vietnam. As a result of the political settlement achieved at the 1954 Geneva Conference, Vietnam was divided with the Viet Minh controlling the North and a government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem controlling the South.

From the onset, both Ho in the North and Diem in the South consolidated their power and strengthened their relative political positions. In the North, Ho instituted brutal land reforms that prompted the executions of thousands of landowners.⁴⁵ Diem initiated a massive campaign to destroy any remaining Viet Minh forces still in the South and ousted the last emperor in a well-orchestrated referendum.⁴⁶ As a result of these powerful machinations, Diem had effectively driven the remaining Viet Minh into the swamps of the Mekong by 1958. It was at this "low water mark" for the Southern Viet

⁴⁵Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam, A History*, (The Viking Press, New York, N.Y. 1983), p. 212.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 223.

Minh that saw the Northern Communists institute a deliberate and methodological resurgence of guerrilla activity in the South. While the North's sponsorship initially included a trickle of logistics and personnel, political direction and guidance were its mainstays. Hanoi's announcement of the formation of the National Liberation Front was the final step in this return to an active insurgency.

Relying on the cadres who had successfully evaded the government's security sweeps, along with returning Viet Minh who had gone north for education and training, the insurgency soon presented an open challenge to the government's authority. The Viet Minh, now called "Viet Cong" (VC) by the Diem Government, began to wrest control of the countryside from the government and even achieved some notable successes in direct confrontations against government troops (ARVN).⁴⁷ The resurgent VC, as well as increased infiltration of NVA formations into the south, prompted the commitment of U.S. ground forces to bolster the wavering South Vietnamese Government.

Existing on the periphery of U.S. initiatives, which largely focused on finding and destroying guerrilla and NVA formations, the Phoenix Program targeted the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Phoenix, and its Vietnamese counterpart "Phung Hoang," evolved from existing counter-infrastructure programs like the early Counter Terror Teams (CTT) and its immediate forerunner, the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX). Phoenix was part of a rejuvenated pacification program falling under the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program (CORDS). The

⁴⁷Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986), pp. 78-79.

program itself was headed by Johnson appointee Robert Komer, and largely financed with CIA funds.

The Phoenix Program acted as a central clearing house for all intelligence and activities directed against the VCI. The program made use of existing assets such as the Provisional Reconnaissance Units (PRU's), National Police, Regional and Popular Forces (RFPF), as well as recognized military units like U.S. Navy SEALs. The program, officially instituted in December 1967, was unquestionably successful at identifying, capturing, or killing, members of the VCI. By 1968, the VCI adapted their security measures in response to the anti-infrastructure activities of the various action arms falling under Phoenix.⁴⁸

The year 1968 was also significant for the Communist Tet Offensive which marked a turning point in the conflict. Although militarily a disaster for the Communists, Tet proved a political victory and prompted U.S. efforts to disengage from the conflict. As "Vietnamization" gained momentum, the U.S. role in Phoenix was also reduced, with the program becoming an entirely Vietnamese operation by late 1972.

The effectiveness of Phoenix up to this point has been partially blamed for the NVA's attempted invasion of the South in April 1972. The VCI had suffered horrible losses and many of the survivors were forced to flee into Cambodia to evade the grasp of Phoenix. The corresponding degradation in effectiveness of the ongoing guerrilla war prompted political leaders in Hanoi to launch a conventional invasion. The intervention

⁴⁸From *The Viet Cong Infrastructure: Modus Operandi of Selected Political Cadres*, Published as a handbook for Phoenix Advisors; hereafter referred to as the VCI Handbook, (Saigon, 1968), p. 16.

of U.S. air power, and the surprisingly good performance of ARVN ground forces, are credited with defeating the 1972 Easter Offensive.

Bolstered by the apparent ability of the ARVN to deter Northern aggression, the U.S. completed its withdrawal following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973. As a result of the strategic vacuum left by the departing Americans, there was little to stand in the way of North Vietnamese ambitions to unite the country. In 1975 regular units of the NVA invaded the South and succeeded in capturing the South Vietnamese Capital of Saigon. A conflict notable for its enduring guerrilla characteristics, was finally decided by a conventional invasion.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Ideology

Communism dominated the political constructs of the Viet Cong Infrastructure from the leadership down to the operating core of functionaries at the village level. However, the VCI should not be misconstrued as a purely "Red menace" surging forth from the ideological loins of Lenin, Mao, and Marx. While this sort of ideological extremism was no doubt present at higher levels, the VCI political ideology was just as influenced by other sub-variables, nationalism being the most pervasive.

Societally, the role of the family and familial responsibility was significant in the ideological make up of the VCI. Additionally, class division between landowners and peasants established rifts which were vulnerable to exploitation. Ethnicity played a subtle role in the inner workings of the VCI with respect to the differences between Northern and Southern Vietnamese. These differences included language, dialects, mannerisms,

and the long-held resentment and mistrust on the part of Southerners toward any outsiders.

2. Organizational Personality

The leadership style found within the Viet Cong organization is best classified as authoritarian. This designation is consistent with Communist organizations which maintain a facade of democracy with committees and politburos, but suffer no quibbling when it comes to following orders. The VC, to an even greater extent than the Huks and MRLA, had evolved through a maturation process that created a seasoned and resilient organization. It is a testament to this resiliency that the VC generally maintained themselves in an expansion phase from the formation of the National Liberation Front in 1960, until the disastrous Tet Offensive in 1968.

3. Mission Goal

The Viet Cong aspired to a revolutionary goal as their ultimate objective. Their espoused goal was liberation of the South from foreign interlopers and the Saigon regime, and unification of Vietnam under a communist central government. While this espoused goal was ultimately achieved, the reality for many of the rank and file VC was a goal more aligned with nationalist or even rational choice motivations. While they certainly held no love for the various Saigon regimes (and some may have become VC as a way of settling personal grievances), to say they adopted the communist goals as a matter of principle would simply be inaccurate.

4. Core Technology

The VC had a varying mix of both endogenous and exogenous inputs at different points in its life cycle. In contrast to some strategists who held that the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail was the lifeblood of the VC, as well as to others who felt the trail was insignificant to the insurgents, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. By late 1964 the trail began to provide a fair percentage of weapons and other logistics to the VC, but prior to that time the VC received the bulk of its support from within South Vietnam proper.⁴⁹

Production to convert inputs into outputs within the VC organization was, as may be expected in a more mature organization, fairly sophisticated. Production was highly dispersed with redundancies planned and built into the system. While these redundancies were effective for some nodes, the VCI had to adapt a system of having higher echelons assume the role of lower echelons that had been neutralized by anti-infrastructure operations.⁵⁰ Production was also complex with respect to the broad spectrum of outputs generated. These outputs ranged from the simple VC guerrilla to the deep cover agent collecting intelligence from the inner sanctums of Saigon. Despite the apparent strengths of the VC production nodes, they functioned in a fairly rigid manner as dictated by their extensively developed bureaucracy.

Viet Cong outputs must be characterized as highly diversified with a production efficiency that was generally adequate to meet the demands of the organization. The VCI,

⁴⁹Cable, p. 225.

⁵⁰VCI Handbook, p. 18.

as a subset of the VC was much more diversified than typical guerrilla units in much the same manner as the Min Yuen in Malaya. It simply had more parts, performed more tasks, and maintained a higher level of activity than the guerrilla units.

5. Environment

The strategic environment for the VC was at its most stable in the early 1960's prior to the commitment of U.S. ground forces. As U.S. forces established a tactical superiority in the countryside, the Phoenix Program became institutionalized and the strategic environment for both the guerrillas and the VCI became much more dynamic. Played against the backdrop of Cold War alliances and interests, the strategic environment for the VC, supported by North Vietnam, in turn supported by China and the USSR, was highly complex. This is particularly true considering their opposition, the Saigon Government, was supported by the Americans and the SEATO alliance.

The support of the population was overshadowed by a predominantly indifferent majority. As indicated in Chapter II, this indifference generally played to the VC's advantage. However, in many instances this indifference was easily swayed by the perceived ebb and flow of the conflict. Correspondingly, as the Phoenix Program achieved successes, the population adopted a slightly more pro-government stance, and the VC suffered accordingly.

The operational environment for the VC ranged from permissive in "liberated areas" and cross-border sanctuaries, to non-permissive in government controlled or contested areas. For the VCI working at the district and village level, the constant risk of compromise and capture by Phoenix units prompted extreme internal security measures.

These included measures such as remaining hidden during daylight hours, sleeping in a different location each day, and never returning to a home village.

The VC tactical environment generally offered good cover with vast areas of the country covered by some combination of heavy forest, jungles, and mountains. Resources and available targets remained an ever-present concern for the VC, but rarely an issue in terms of forcing a suspension of operations. Perhaps the most viable effect resource control had on VC units was to force a change in operational tempo, or prompt a withdrawal to a sanctuary area. Resource control also prompted increased activity on the part of supporting VCI members who would have to scramble to find and supply rice to local VC units. This increased activity, particularly in violation of curfews, made the VCI vulnerable to identification and interdiction.

C. ILOC FUNCTIONING AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

The Phoenix Program was unique in that it formalized the significance of the infrastructure to the overall functioning of the insurgent organization. The use of lessons learned from the Huk, and particularly the Malayan insurgencies, allowed for development of a systematic and deliberate methodology for targeting what was for the first time recognized as a critical target. The program's use of extensive intelligence resources, U.S. advisors, and indigenous units created vast opportunities for exploitation and neutralization of VC ILOC's.

1. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning

Within the VC organizational structure the flow of formal authority was significant. In a similar pattern, the flow of decision making followed a top-down flow

consistent with military organizations, but also allowed for delegation of routine decision making authority to the lowest practical level. This use of delegation should not, however be misconstrued as a freedom of action on the part of subordinate elements, but rather as a control mechanism that clearly defined what decision could be made at what level. These characteristics are consistent with a machine/divisional hybrid.

The flow of regulated systems was significant for the duration of the insurgency but lacked flexibility and redundancy in areas like communications and logistics. These weaknesses became evident to Phoenix advisors who learned to focus on clandestine communications activity and illicit logistics traffic as both local activity indicators and lucrative target sets.⁵¹ Informal communication between structural components was strongly discouraged. However, at the village and district level informal communication and the associated familiarity with the local organization could not be avoided and was a significant threat to internal security. Phoenix units, like the PRU's, successfully exploited this familiarity by creating a "mini-domino effect" based on the knowledge of the first VCI suspect they would detain.

2. Structural Strengths

The structural strengths of the VC organization reflect characteristics consistent with a machine/divisional hybrid. These strengths are seen in the VC's organizational consistency, with respect to their ability to control national programs with a grassroots style of organization, and their ability to generally self-sustain. The organization's

⁵¹From an interview conducted at Ft. Bragg, N.C. with a former Phoenix Advisor (a retired Army LTC) who asked to remain anonymous (September, 1995).

extended reach, ranging from Saigon streets to the Mekong Delta rice paddies, as well as its operational diversity, are also strengths consistent with those indicated in Table 2.3.

3. Structural Weaknesses

Many of the structural weaknesses of the VC organization didn't become readily apparent until interaction with the Phoenix Program stripped away the VC mystique of invincibility that had become pervasive by 1965. Internal security, particularly at the village and district level, was the most glaring of these weaknesses. While adequate for warning VCI members of pending government sweeps, the VCI were ill-prepared to deal with specific targeting directed against individuals. As noted earlier, the familiarity with local organization members allowed for a synergistic effect as suspects informed on their comrades, who in turn informed on others. This phenomenon became so common that by 1968 the Phoenix Program was able to provide its advisors with a handbook that was essentially a generic "who's who" in the VCI and perhaps more important, who should know whom within a given VCI substructure.⁵²

Additional weakness evident in the VC organization was their supply-side dependency in order to maintain operational outputs. Another weakness, normally associated with an adhoc/cellular structure, was slow communications. This slowness is attributable to the VC reliance on nontechnical systems like couriers and letter drops when communicating at subordinate levels. This weakness was demonstrated during the TET Offensive when VC units in two separate corps tactical zones didn't receive word to

⁵²VCI Handbook, Section III.

delay their attack for 24 hours.⁵³ The resultant attacks provided the most significant early warning to MACV that a general offensive was in the offing.

4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities present in the VC organizational structure can be gleaned from those offered in Table 2.3. Arguably the most critical vulnerability present within the VCI were the C3 ILOC's between headquarters at Regional and Province level, and the operating cells and committees at District and the village level. Phoenix's effectiveness at interdicting these ILOC's, once a criticism of the program because it focused too much energy at low-level cadres, was one of its greatest strengths. As the VCI in a local area were neutralized, higher echelons were stymied in their attempts to project influence back into the area.

The VCI techno-structure was another vulnerability that became particularly susceptible to interdiction and neutralization. By the early 1970's, aggressive action on the part of Phoenix operating elements had effectively crippled the VCI at a cost of thousands arrested or killed. The survivors, many of them featured prominently on Phoenix wanted posters, were driven across the border into Cambodia for sanctuary.⁵⁴ These losses, principally among low to mid-level cadres like tax collectors, proselytizers, recruiters, and other party functionaries could not be readily replaced and left a void between the higher-level VCI and the population.

⁵³James J. Wirtz, *The Tet Offensive, Intelligence Failure in War*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1991), p.219.

⁵⁴Dale Andrade, *Ashes to Ashes, The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War*, (Lexington Books, Lexington and Toronto, 1990), p. 278.

5. Action Plan

The pure-case generic action plans offered in Table 2.3 offer an appropriate macro-level targeting strategy for the machine/divisional hybrid encountered in the VC organization. We know from history that efforts against mid-level functionaries and technicians took a damaging toll on the VCI. We also know that these efforts had a synergistic effect and served to isolate entire locales from further VC proselytizing efforts, and effectively segregated them from VC influence. This effect was also consistent with the generic action plan's call for isolating C3 ILOC's and denying mutual support between elements.

Another aspect of the generic action plan that was not adequately addressed by Phoenix was the interdiction of endogenous sources of support. An effort in this regard, generally recognized as a population segregation scheme, was attempted under the Strategic Hamlet Program. This program, loosely modeled on the Malayan "New Village" concept, was badly managed and alienated countless peasants who were herded from their ancestral homes and into government compounds.⁵⁵ It also had little effect on denying rice to the VC, who were functioning in an area once considered Vietnam's "Rice Bowl."

D. CONCLUSION

The ultimate resolution of the Vietnam conflict provides a very useful contrast to the outcomes in the other cases. The Phoenix case provides the strongest evidence yet to substantiate the premise that infrastructure targeting is a necessary condition for success,

⁵⁵Karnow, p. 256.

but not sufficient in and of itself to cause success. This may seem counter-intuitive when one considers that Phoenix was undeniably effective at interdicting the Viet Cong Infrastructure, yet South Vietnam ultimately fell to Communist control. Or is it? We must remember that Saigon did not fall to a VC led popular uprising, but rather to a conventional invasion from the North. The role of VC, or what remained of them, had been reduced to insignificance.

Even though the goals of Phoenix increased in perceived importance as the conflict evolved, the reality was that no real integration between anti-infrastructure activities and an overarching campaign plan existed. Given the ultimate resolution of the conflict, replete with an armor-led conventional invasion, this lack of integration assumes a critical significance as a condition that was not achieved. When integration did occur, as best exemplified by the Marines' Combined Action Platoons, the results were extremely positive.⁵⁶

Another condition not achieved within the parameters of the Phoenix Program was centralized guidance or planning for targeting ILOC's within the VCI structure. As early as 1968, the defining characteristics of a VCI member had been crafted into the same presidential decree that gave Phoenix its charter.⁵⁷ Despite later refinements of the definition, no further prioritization was placed on targets within the VCI with the exception of rank ordering. As a result, Phoenix Advisors were faced with a target-rich

⁵⁶Krepinevich, p. 172. The Marine CAP's comprised a detachment of U.S. Marines and a local militia unit permanently assigned to a hamlet to deny access to the VC.

⁵⁷Andrade, p. 84.

environment and generally allowed to expend their efforts as they saw fit. The results were predictably mixed; as one former Phoenix adviser recalled, "some guys got it, others never did, and you could tell who belonged in what group by looking at the VC activity in their area."⁵⁸ While targeting appropriate subgroups within the VCI may have shown promise, no appreciable effect could be discerned at a national level because subgroup data was lost in the overall tally of VCI.

Ultimately, Phoenix's success, which came as a result of a systematic approach to targeting, contributed to its downfall. This approach was subject to statistical interpretation using systems analysis correlation techniques. As a result, the measure of effectiveness for districts, provinces, and regions became a statistical drill to satisfy a numbers-based unit of measure. This emphasis on numbers fueled a quota system which all but ignored the qualitative nuances of selecting targets, and limited exploitation options for the advisors in the field; in effect defeating the concept of systematic targeting.

In the final assessment, Phoenix must be considered a success with respect to its interaction with the VC. However, the failure to achieve the related and necessary conditions for overall success effectively negated the program's achievements. With respect to final resolution of the conflict, although ultimately achieving the mission goal of the VC, the final conquest of Vietnam was much less about the VC and much more

⁵⁸From a series of discussions on Phoenix with LTC (Ret.) Terry Johnson, A former Phoenix Advisor, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 1995).

about the strategic aspirations of the North Vietnamese. Ironically, much the same could be said about the role of Phoenix and the many masters it strived to serve.

E. EPILOGUE TO THE HISTORICAL CASES

A brief review of the historical cases allows us to make some preliminary conclusions about various aspects of these cases and discuss the necessity and sufficiency of what we earlier termed, "related and influencing conditions for success."

1. Initial Observations

As offered in the introductory chapter, all three historical cases substantiate infrastructure targeting as a necessary condition for success in a counter-organization campaign. However, the outcome of the Phoenix case also demonstrates that this condition is not sufficient, in and of itself, to explain success.

The cases offer mixed results with regard to the systematic or intuitive nature of the infrastructure targeting plan. In the Huk case, Magsaysay's intuitive planning achieved exemplary results, while the Malayan and Phoenix cases show the virtue of systematic targeting. Given these results it is apparent, at least from the historical examples, that neither systematic or intuitive targeting were necessary or sufficient to achieve success in a campaign. This does not consider the questions of efficiency in developing a targeting plan, or the luck of having the right leader in the right place at the right time. We argue that either of these considerations would give greater credibility to the systematic approach for targeting.

The cases offer strong support to the condition of appropriate targeting of nodes as necessary for success. Both the Huk and Malaya cases demonstrate a discriminating application of effort against nodes within the infrastructure that had a lynch-pin effect. In contrast, the Phoenix case shows an uncoordinated effort in this regard with results, either positive or negative, restricted to the local level.

2. Preliminary Conclusions

Finally, these cases also offer historical validation for the inclusion of infrastructure targeting in an overarching counter-organization campaign plan as necessary for success.

The role of the police provides an excellent illustration of this point. In the two cases (Huks and Malaya), where the ultimate outcome favored the government, police agencies were tasked with critical roles in concert with both military operations and civic actions. These cases also demonstrated an ability to work around weaknesses in the police organizations, while optimizing their strengths in investigative techniques and urban intelligence. Divergently, the Phoenix case shows a National Police that was poorly trained, staffed with the least qualified recruits, and outside of Saigon, poorly controlled in terms of integration with national level efforts. Efforts to increase the organization's viability in a counterinsurgency role, where simply too little, too late.

Both the Huk and Malaya case showed the counterinsurgency effort as diverse endeavors encompassing an enormous commitment of resources in a highly coordinated manner. In contrast, Phoenix was a program distinct from other pacification programs

and largely disassociated from the greater military and national objectives sought by MACV and the governments of South Vietnam and the United States.

VI. TERROR, INC. - THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will apply our framework in a detailed analysis of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization (ANO). By doing so, we intend to demonstrate our theory's applicability outside of the general, overarching medium of insurgent warfare, as well as provide an example of the level of detailed analysis attainable through the use of our framework. Given these goals, we will therefore present a much more detailed case background, representing a realistic level of information available to an analyst prior to the beginning of the process. We will also present a number of visual pictograms, representing the types of finished products produced as a result of the analytical process. While the ANO case does not allow for complete evaluation based on historical resolution, it does provide a demonstration of our theory and framework in practical application on a case, as of yet, still left unresolved.

B. THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

1. General

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) has long been considered one of the most dangerous state-sponsored terrorist organization in existence.⁵⁹ While the trend in recent years had been moving away from state-sponsored international terrorist acts, we are now

⁵⁹For the purpose of this case study, state-sponsored terrorism is defined as the use of violence by states through surrogate organizations, who in-turn derive political, financial, organizational, and operational assistance from the sponsor, to achieve political or strategic objectives. This form of violence is an alternative to direct conflict, with all its attending risks and costs.

beginning to see a re-emergence of the phenomenon as a form of surrogate warfare waged by weaker states that dare not challenge the major powers in open conventional warfare. Nowhere else is this trend more active than in the Middle East. The rise of groups like Iranian-backed Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad, as well as the continuing re-emergence of ANO, attest to this fact.⁶⁰

ANO is a radical Palestinian Rejectionist group that contends both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to precipitate an all-embracing Arab revolution that alone can lead to the liberation of "Zionist-occupied Palestine" (i.e., Israel). ANO's continued success and longevity is inexorably linked to the zeal and purposefulness of its founder, Sabri al-Banna (alias Abu Nidal).

From its beginning as a splinter faction of the PLO in 1974, ANO aligned itself with a succession of notorious state sponsors. Today ANO has evolved into an organization with financial assets worth an estimated 200-400 million dollars.⁶¹ It has survived internal purges that eliminated over 600 ANO personnel. Likewise, it was able to avoid destruction even as Operation Desert Storm was raging nearby. These achievements, as well as the fact that ANO has foiled all attempts at neutralization by some of the best counter-terrorist organizations in the world (all while continuing to

⁶⁰ While individual and group-sponsored acts were predominant in 1995, a re-emergence of both direct and indirect state-sponsorship has been observed. From: U.S. Department of State, *1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism*, (April, 1996).

⁶¹ Jeffrey Builta, *Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist Organizations, Violent Political Groups, and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements*, (eds. John Murray and Richard H. Ward, Chicago, Ill: OICJ, 1996), p. 733.

mount some of the most spectacular terrorist operations ever), indeed earns ANO the title of "Terror, Incorporated."

2. Historical Background

The Abu Nidal Organization was formed, has evolved, and continues to survive entirely under the direction of its founder, Sabri al-Banna, who has evolved terrorism into an entrepreneurial enterprise of enormous proportions.⁶² Born in Jaffa in May of 1937, the youngest child by his father's eighth wife, al-Banna lived a relative life of luxury during his earliest years. However, following the death of his father in 1945, al-Banna and his mother (who had at one time been the family maid) were forced out of the household.

In November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly resolved to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. As a result of the fighting between the Arab armies and the emergent Jewish state, al-Banna's family lost all of their property and holdings. As the family took up residence in a U.N. refugee camp, their former home in Jaffa became quarters for Israeli army units.

After spending nine months in the refugee camp, the family moved from the Gaza Strip to Nablus, the largest city in the West Bank area of Jordan. Here, al-Banna entered a government-run school and after graduating in 1955, enrolled as an engineering student

⁶² Portions of ANO historical background information provided to the authors courtesy CPT Lane Lance (USA), LT Michael McGuire (USN), and LT Carl Bush (USN) from their research paper "State Sponsored Terrorism: The Abu Nidal Organization," (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1995), pp.12-17.

at Cairo University. While he attended school for several years, he never graduated, in spite of his claims of having earned an engineering degree.

In 1960, on the advice of his brother, al-Banna traveled to Saudi Arabia seeking work as an electrician's assistant. He soon joined the underground Ba'ath political party, which was outlawed in Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter, he joined al-Fatah, the guerrilla arm of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by Yasser Arafat. Al-Banna's political activities soon drew the attention of his Saudi employers and the Saudi secret police; he was soon fired from his job, arrested and imprisoned (and tortured), and then expelled from the country. Al-Banna's feelings of persecution multiplied, and he soon added Saudi Arabia to the list of states (which at the time consisted of Great Britain and Israel) at which he directed his hatred.⁶³

As a result of his experiences in Saudi Arabia, along with the Israeli victory in the 1967 War, al-Banna plunged further underground and became heavily-involved with the al-Fatah movement. As the Israeli occupational forces uncovered Fatah members, al-Banna fled Nablus to join several of his older brothers in Amman, Jordan. It was during this period that al-Banna chose his underground name, Abu Nidal.

As al-Banna made connections with prominent al-Fatah leaders, his power and influence within the organization grew. PLO Chairman Arafat assigned al-Banna first as PLO representative to the Sudan. After the Sudanese discovered that al-Banna was forming underground Fatah cells within their country, Arafat recalled him and gave him a new posting as PLO representative to Iraq.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 13.

3. Organizational Life-Cycle Phases

a. *The Iraqi Phase (1970 - 1983)*

Sabri al-Banna's previous ties to the Ba'ath Party proved useful to him in Iraq, as the ruling family were also members of the Ba'ath Party. Ba'athist movement ideology proclaims the party as "...a popular and nationalist revolutionary party which is struggling for Arab unity, freedom, and socialism."⁶⁴ While neighboring Syria's ruling party also subscribed to Ba'athist ideology, the Iraqi's felt that Syria had betrayed the movement by accepting UN Resolution 242, which called for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraqi leaders decided to sponsor a terrorist organization known as the Arab Liberation Front, which had been formed in 1969 to clandestinely serve the interests of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq, while simultaneously opposing the Syrian movement through its underground operations inside Syria.

During this time, al-Banna used his growing power and influence with the ruling family to consolidate his personal power base and soon became the most influential Palestinian in Iraq. He maintained close ties with Iraqi Intelligence, and was afforded the opportunity to receive extensive guerrilla training and instruction (as well as an introduction to Marxist ideology and organization) in Communist China and North Korea.

After the crushing defeat of the al-Fatah guerrillas in Jordan by the Royal Army in 1970, the PLO decided to shift its strategy of open opposition against Israel directly, and instead embarked upon a campaign of international terrorism to call

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

attention to the Palestinian cause. The first such incident was the hostage seizure and subsequent gun battle when the terrorist group Black September (the PLO's terrorist arm) seized the Israeli Olympic Team at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. A series of high-visibility terrorist acts followed, but instead of support, the Palestinians received only condemnation. After the hard-fought Israeli victory over an Egyptian/Syrian coalition (along with small contingents from both Iraq and Jordan) in the 1973 October War, the PLO began to moderate its position towards Israel and move away from terrorism.

Throughout 1973, al-Banna began to build the infrastructure of an organization that would eventually become ANO. With Iraqi help, al-Banna began recruiting personnel and acquiring equipment. He began to openly oppose the PLO leadership's political moderation towards dealing with Israel. His conviction meshed perfectly with the Iraqi Ba'athist rejection of a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict as accepted by Syria, and would become the foundation for the growth of ANO in Iraq.

In 1974, al-Banna was stripped of his positions within al-Fatah, primarily due to his open criticism of Fatah's leadership, as well as his known complicity with Iraqi authorities. While losing all ties with the PLO, al-Banna gained extensive support from Iraq - ANO was given all assets belonging to the PLO within Iraq to include weapons, equipment, offices, training bases, and even the PLO radio station and tower. Additionally, ANO was given political and operational support by the Ba'athist regime. All told, ANO started out with an "investment capital" totaling approximately forty million dollars.

ANO, along with several other Palestinian terrorist organizations that did not agree with the PLO's moderate stance, splintered off to form "The Rejectionist Front." Al-Banna immediately set ANO on a course to strike out against the PLO leadership for their "traitorous" rejection of terrorism. As the number of attacks against the PLO grew, cooperation within the Front began to unravel. The other members did not agree with the PLO, but they could not see the efficacy of starting what amounted to a "civil war" among the various Palestinian factions. In response to this lack of support, al-Banna formally pulled ANO out of the Rejectionist Front and continued with his campaign (with complete Iraqi backing) against the PLO. In retaliation, a PLO court tried al-Banna in-absentia for treason against the PLO and sentenced him to death. Al-Banna responded in kind with his own death sentence passed on Arafat.

Iraq stepped-up its direct support to ANO in the form of training and financial backing and in return, ANO was aimed against the Iraqi's primary enemies: Syria, Israel, and the PLO. However, after the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979 and the rise of Shia-inspired Islamic Fundamentalism, war broke out between Iran and Iraq and at this point Iraqi and ANO interests began to diverge. ANO launched a series of bloody attacks throughout Europe, and these attacks subsequently interfered with Iraq's attempts to garner European support for its war against Iran. Similarly, al-Banna's private extortion operations against several wealthy Gulf States interfered with Iraq's initiatives for regional support. In 1982 al-Banna was informed that ANO would no longer receive Iraqi backing and would have to relocate its base of operations to another country. Consequently, in response to this development, the United States removed Iraq from the

list of state sponsors of terrorism (even though the U.S. knew full well that Iraq continued to sponsor terrorism).

b. The Syrian Phase (1983 - 1985)

As al-Banna detached from Iraq, Syrian intelligence officers facilitated ANO operations to expand both in the Middle East and Europe. Like Iraq previously, Syria had plans to utilize ANO in their internal wars as well as their external wars. They considered a notorious figure such as Abu Nidal an asset that could be used to pressure the likes of Yasser Arafat and Saddam Hussein into compliance with their own agenda.

While ANO was never given the political legitimacy it enjoyed in Iraq (President Assad continuously refused to meet al-Banna face-to-face), they were allowed to set up a series of legitimate travel and real estate agencies throughout the country. During this phase, ANO waged a bloody campaign on Syria's behalf against Jordan, in an attempt to prevent peace between King Hussein and Israel. Al-Banna was also allowed to continue his extortion against the rich Gulf States. Both UAE and Kuwait paid ANO huge sums of money to prevent attacks on their countries.

Also during this phase, with Syrian consent, ANO filtered agents into Lebanon and began to build the People's Army, the guerrilla arm of ANO. In late 1983 when Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to crush the PLO, al-Banna uncharacteristically sent 130 of his best guerrilla fighters to join with al-Fatah guerrillas in the fight against Israel. When Yasser Arafat heard of this development, he had all the

ANO fighters arrested as possible spies. When al-Banna found out, he was supposedly "enraged," and vowed to destroy the PLO himself.⁶⁵

In response to increased international pressure regarding Syrian-sponsored terrorism, ANO was placed under an ever-tightening set of restrictions for operating both inside and outside Syria. Al-Banna did not appreciate this further constriction and began to make overtures to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. By 1985, ANO began conducting operations for Libya, even though it had not fully transitioned out of Syria.

c. Libyan Phase (1985-Present?)

Under Libyan sponsorship, ANO enjoyed immense support and enormous freedom of maneuver. The years 1985 and 1986 proved to be peak years in international terrorist incidents for ANO. Two of the most violent acts, the simultaneous attacks against El Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna, occurred during this period. However, after the late-1986 bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque in Berlin resulted in the killing and wounding of U.S. servicemen (for which ANO involvement was indicated), U.S. retaliation against Libya (in the form of aerial bombing) brought about an almost instantaneous halt to ANO activities.

This temporary lull only served to focus al-Banna's attention on his own organization. From 1987 - 1989, he undertook a most violent "corporate down-sizing" in which over 600 of his own members were executed in an attempt to purge the system of suspected traitors and to return the organization to a smaller, more covert operation.

⁶⁵ Patrick Seale, *Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire*, (Random House, New York, 1992), pp.113-116.

Emerging from this purge, ANO found itself on the verge of the beginning of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was a direct challenge to the Gulf's oil reserves and the West's concept of the state system. In response, a massive coalition was arrayed against Iraq, ANO's former sponsor. Allied with Iraq was Yasser Arafat and the PLO. Sensing that this situation would prove tempting for al-Banna, Qaddaffi again shut ANO down for the duration of the Gulf War. After the war, al-Banna was apparently tired of being so tightly-controlled by his state sponsors and again set ANO off in a new direction.

d. Recent/Current Operations

Starting in 1993, ANO almost exclusively directed its operations against senior al-Fatah commanders and representatives in Lebanon, and began to re-expand the People's Army. This apparent strategic shift would enable ANO to become the predominant secular Palestinian group operating in Lebanon and would allow ANO to conduct operations in a much less constrained fashion.⁶⁶ During the past two years, apparent ANO operations have been sharply focused on both attempting to assassinate Yasser Arafat and the infiltration of Palestinian Authority (PA)-controlled territory in an effort to derail the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Accords.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ This interpretation of events, as well as *all* analytical content within this chapter is derived entirely from open source documents. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of classified information might lead to different conclusions, but the distribution and hence, the usefulness of this work would be restricted.

⁶⁷ FBIS Report: NC1909141095, "New Group Accuses Abu Nidal of August Killing," (19 Sept 95); FBIS Report: NC1401100696, "Palestinian Police Reportedly Foil Abu Nidal Terror Campaign," (14 Jan 96); FBIS Report: TA141102096, "PA, IDF Prevent Terrorist Infiltration, Seize Weapons," (14 Jan 96).

C. ANALYSIS

1. Ideology

ANO's espoused political ideology is an offshoot of the radical Rejectionist Front which rejects the idea of a peaceful or negotiated settlement with Israel. Violence is viewed as the only appropriate means in dealing with Israel. Anyone who is seen as supporting or negotiating with Israel (i.e. the U.S. or Arafat) is considered an enemy as well. While al-Banna has espoused his beliefs as supporting those of Marx and Mao, in practice he has adapted the ideological rhetoric of whomever happens to be sponsoring him at the moment.

2. Organizational Personality

While the internal leadership structure of ANO is modeled loosely along Marxist/Maoist lines, in function it is much more like a sheikdom (with al-Banna at the head). An elaborate hierarchy of telescoping structures gives the appearance that a system of quasi-democratic leadership exists within ANO. In reality, al-Banna rules out of fear and intimidation of his subordinates. Dissent is not tolerated (and is historically fatal). When al-Banna says "make it happen," it happens...⁶⁸

The organizational maturity of ANO is well developed and represents an organization that is extremely long-lived for one whose primary output is terrorist actions.

⁶⁸ This phenomenon is explained in "Narcississism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship," *Political Psychology*, (Vol. 7, No. 4, 1986), wherein Jerrold M. Post describes the relationship authoritarian/charismatic leaders develop with their "value-hungry" followers.

ANO is now roughly twenty-two years old. There are approximately 100 personnel currently involved in ANO terrorist operations or supporting roles, with approximately 500 personnel serving as guerrilla fighters in the People's Army in Lebanon.⁶⁹ Not only is ANO anomalous in its long life, but it has also proven to be uncannily resilient against setbacks and major efforts from its enemies to destroy it.

Culturally, ANO members come from all strata of Palestinian Diaspora society. The leadership, managerial, and technical positions are filled predominantly by the intellectual class, while the actual operators are recruited out of the refugee camps in Lebanon. Many recruits are sent abroad for technical training, while others remain less-educated and wind up in the People's Army guerrilla wing. ANO membership is largely secular, and does not espouse Islamic Fundamentalism. Two particular ethno-cultural aspects apparent in ANO that reveal the connection to common Bedouin roots include the familial ties between al-Banna and other members of his family he has placed into positions of power, and the willingness of ANO to form temporary alliances with rival factions in an effort to defeat a common enemy. This last trait is also reflected in ANO's willingness to switch allegiance back and forth between sponsors and former enemies (except with the PLO).

3. Mission Goal

ANO's long-standing espoused goal is the ultimate destruction of the state of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian homeland encompassing all of

⁶⁹ The People's Army is an off-shoot of ANO and represents al-Banna's effort to counter al-Fatah in Lebanon. The People's Army conducts guerrilla operations only and is not involved in terrorist activities.

the land considered as Palestine. While this goal reflects those of other Rejectionist Front organizations, ANO's operations, as well as al-Banna's personal behavior, suggests that other goals on multiple levels of analysis conflict with this overarching goal.

On the personal level, al-Banna has demonstrated that his own survival, along with his continued massing of personal wealth have long-since replaced any selfless desire to help the Palestinian people. Likewise, his personal vendetta against the PLO in general, and against Arafat in particular has frequently conflicted with furthering the Palestinian cause.

From an organizational level of analysis, ANO has always acted in the best interest of its own organizational survival. This has manifested itself in actions as diverse as an internal purge of over 600 ANO members in an attempt to reduce its vulnerability to penetration by its enemies, to conducting terrorist attacks totally unrelated to its own goals in an effort to placate its state sponsor at that particular time.

From a societal level of analysis, ANO's actions indicate that it has continually drifted further away from its original mandate: the violent overthrow and destruction of the state of Israel in order to establish an autonomous, independent Palestinian state. A close examination of the ANO activity chronology (provided in Appendix C) reveals a pattern of continuous attacks against other Palestinians; the very group ANO espouses to be fighting for. Further examination reveals only a handful of attacks against Jewish targets worldwide and no attacks occurring within Israel. Likewise, upon comparison with the Middle Eastern activity chronology, in several instances, ANO's actions led to

extremely negative outcomes for the Palestinian movement as a whole.⁷⁰ Presented with these facts, it is very difficult to see how ANO has positively impacted the Palestinian people or their movement.

4. Core Technology

a. Inputs

Despite ANO's vast resources, it has until very recently relied heavily on exogenous support from its state sponsor. This support comes in several forms. Perhaps the most important is an overarching political protection associated with the state status of the sponsor and extended to ANO: protection within sovereign borders, travel passports and visas, and the use of diplomatic bags for moving funds and weapons.

ANO receives organizational support in the form of access to the sponsor's intelligence and security apparatus. In many cases, al-Banna established his own extensive intelligence net within the sponsoring states and successfully infiltrated his agents into those security services in order to keep abreast of any internal developments that might impact ANO. Additionally, ANO received funding, training bases, weaponry, and numerous personal gratuities from all of his various sponsors.

Other exogenous support included funds extorted from the oil-rich gulf states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which were paid to prevent ANO terrorist attacks within those countries. Similarly, allegations have been made that several Western European states paid ANO millions of dollars either to settle

⁷⁰ An example is the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador to England in 1982 directly led to the retaliatory invasion of Lebanon by Israel, in which the PLO was routed and deported. Seale, pp. 222-226.

ongoing terrorist operations, or to prevent ANO terrorist actions from occurring within their borders.⁷¹

Endogenous support to ANO also comes in a variety of forms. Palestinian Diaspora living in the refugee camps of Lebanon provide a sizable pool of possible recruits from which to choose. ANO has also developed its own sources of income through an elaborate network of investments, front companies, and arms trading companies. Many of these companies existed behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But after the downfall of the Soviet Bloc, this protective screen disappeared, and little is actually known about what happened to ANO's assets. In all probability, al-Banna saw the end coming and with his characteristic ability to stay one step ahead, re-invested the money into front companies in the West.

b. Production

ANO's production mechanism can be described as dispersed, complex, and inefficient. First, production is dispersed as each type of output is produced in a different location. This dispersion is a function of operational security, as compartmentation of various functions and operations ensures that if one part is compromised, the entire organization will not follow suit.

Next, production is considered complex due to the high degree of differentiation among the various outputs. ANO transforms its recruits into anything

⁷¹ In *Abu Nidal: Gun for Hire*, Seale alleges that Belgium paid ANO millions of dollars for the return of several kidnapped Belgian citizens, and to prevent any further incidents. Seale also alleges that France paid off ANO in a similar effort to prevent attacks on French targets.

from a basic guerrilla fighter in the People's Army, to intelligence operatives, assassins, bomb makers, newspaper publishers, financial managers, and a variety of other specialized functionaries. Likewise, because ANO conducts operations worldwide, its support networks are also highly complex, both to ensure mission success, as well as the survivability of the net.

Finally, ANO production can be considered inefficient in pure "production" terms. The length of time and amount of raw materials needed to produce a limited number of outputs constitutes inefficient production (an analogy between hand-crafted products versus mass-produced products is illustrative of this point). In ANO's case, many recruits are recruited initially, but very few survive (literally) the vetting process to become an active ANO operative. The process to train and emplace agents is very long and not easily accomplished. The training facilities are spread throughout the Middle East to ensure security, further subtracting from overall production efficiency. Yet what must be understood is that while producing a more "tailored" output may be inefficient in one sense, long term gains for the organization will ultimately be measured by its overall *effectiveness*, which should increase due to a higher-quality product, all other things being equal.

c. Outputs

ANO's outputs can be characterized as being highly diversified, especially for a terrorist organization that is considerably removed from its overarching political movement. Not only is there a high degree of diversification between the terrorist section of the organization and the guerrilla section (People's Army in Lebanon), but the terrorist

operations themselves represent a very diverse capability, again reflecting the complexity of the production mechanism.

5. Environment

a. Strategic

The strategic environment in which ANO operates is extremely dynamic, with a high level of uncertainty continuously in effect (an overarching state of affairs throughout the Middle East...). Complexity is also high due to the multiple mission goals ANO pursues which require continuous cross-spectrum strategic interaction. Similarly, support from the population varies widely among the various Palestinian groups, depending on location and their perceived risks or benefits of being associated with ANO.

b. Operational

The operational environment for ANO ranges from semi-permissive to extremely non-permissive. Within areas under the organization's direct control (i.e., within its own wire of a training camp located within a host nation), ANO has a reasonable level of autonomy and may be considered semi-permissive. However, outside the wire, even within its host nation, ANO implements security measures consistent with a non-permissive environment. Naturally, the international cells operate within an *extremely* non-permissive environment and conduct communications and operations utilizing maximum secrecy.

c. Tactical

On the tactical level, ANO utilizes the cover of secrecy to hide its activities, whether it takes the form of urban cells, or remote desert training bases. Raw

materials and resources, be they new recruits, weapons, or explosive materials remain plentiful. High value targets are readily accessible worldwide (over 70% of ANO's operations have been conducted outside the Middle East).

D. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ILOC FUNCTIONING

1. Structure

a. Overall Structure (Situational Template)

The great diversification of outputs and activities of ANO, along with the sophisticated infrastructure of the organization suggests an overall structure along the lines of a Divisional Hybrid Covert Organization (see Figure 6.1). This structure incorporates an elaborate "corporate" headquarters (consisting of the strategic apex, techno-structure, and support staff), along with two very distinct and differently structured divisions (the terrorist operations division and the guerrilla army division).




Figure 6.1. ANO Situational Template.

b. Major Divisions

The two major divisions consist of the People's Army in Lebanon, and the Intelligence Directorate (see Figure 6.2). The People's Army is structured as a Machine-like Covert Organization and is responsible for conducting guerrilla operations within Lebanon. The People's Army is fairly autonomous and self-supporting, except for leadership and funding ties back to ANO's headquarters. The Intelligence Directorate is responsible for the conduct of covert terrorist operations and takes the form of an Adhoc-Cellular Covert Organization. Each section within the Directorate is compartmentalized, as is each of its specialized operational cells. The only time the cells interact with each other is when they form a temporary matrix relationship during the execution of a mission. After the mission, the cells atomize once again.

**ANO Structure
(Major Divisions)**




Figure 6.2. Major Divisions within ANO.

c. Major Sub-Structures

ANO's sub-structure architecture is highly developed and complex. At the top of the leadership hierarchy within the strategic apex is al-Banna himself. Al-Banna acts as the head of the Political Bureau, a five person group responsible for senior-level decision making. Beneath and encompassing the Political Bureau is the ten member Central Committee, consisting of the heads of all the directorates and committees within ANO. The Central Committee is responsible for providing a supposedly democratic forum for deciding on recommendations for future operations forwarded by the Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary Council consists of all members of both the Political Bureau and Central Committee, plus other representatives from within the various substructures. The Council is supposedly an open forum for proposing and discussing future operations and organizational direction.

Beneath this leadership hierarchy lies a number of directorates and committees that are both diversified and autonomous in their function (see Figure 6.3). Because of the secretive nature of a terrorist organization (where security measures determine organizational and personal survival), most of the organizational substructures do not interface with each other on a routine basis. Because of this advanced organizational structure, ANO has been able to survive direct attack, penetration, and removal of state sponsorship, and has demonstrated an uncanny ability to repeatedly come back from the brink of extinction.

ANO Structure (Major Sub-Structures)




Figure 6.3. Major Sub-Structures within ANO.

2. ILOC Pathways and Infrastructure Functioning

a. Flow of Formal Authority

Despite the elaborate Marxist-based leadership hierarchy, what is readily apparent within ANO is that the most important substructures report directly to al-Banna (see Figure 6.4). These include the following: The Membership Committee, which maintains computerized files on all ANO members. The Finance Directorate, with responsibility over the management of all ANO assets worldwide, as well as disbursement of funds for operations. The Political Bureau, which publishes both an internal newspaper and an externally distributed journal, and also controls ANO's "ambassadors at large" charged with maintaining relations with other Arab states and

Palestinian groups. And finally, the Secretariat, which acts as a command and control node through which all communications and directives flow.

Infrastructure Functioning (Flow of Formal Authority)




Figure 6.4. The Flow of Formal Authority within ANO.

b. The Flow of Decision Making

The flow of decision making within ANO is quite similar to the flow found in other covert, highly secretive organizations in that it is decidedly uni-directional from the top, down to the lower echelons. However, due to the Marxist/democratic structure of the strategic apex, “officially” there is some allowance made for lateral, as well as “bottom-up” input into the decision loop (see Figure 6.5).

Infrastructure Functioning (Flow of Decision Making)




Figure 6.5. Flow of Decision Making Within ANO.

In theory, ideas concerning future ANO operations are initiated and openly discussed within the Revolutionary Council. Recommendations are then forwarded to the Central Committee for refinement and approval. Once approved, the decision to conduct an operation would pass through the Secretariat to the Intelligence Directorate, to then be disseminated to the appropriate sections and subsequent action cells. However, reality indicates that al-Banna routinely makes unilateral decisions without input or debate from others and then jumps the communications channel to personally initiate an action.

c. System of Regulated Work Flows

This view of ANO examines the system of regulated work flows occurring on a routine basis. This system includes the flow of information from the support structures on efficiency and productivity necessary for strategic planning; feedback from

the major divisions on current operations or any problems encountered; the flow of work through both operating cores; and finally, the flows of commands and decisions from the apex that direct the efforts of the divisions' operating cores. What we observe within ANO is a very compartmented and limited lateral flow with elongated vertical flows to the two divisions, as well as to sub-divisions within each (see Figure 6.6).

Infrastructure Functioning (System of Regulated Work Flows)




Figure 6.6. System of Regulated Work Flows Within ANO.

d. Work Constellations

The work constellation pattern depicts routine working relationships between various components within ANO. Analysis reveals a pattern that follows along the same narrow, elongated pathways as seen in the view of the system of regulated work

flows (see Figure 6.7). This suggests extreme compartmentation with limited contact on an “as-needed” basis. The pattern appears much “busier” between the corporate headquarters sub-structures and internally within each of the divisions, but to a much lesser degree between headquarters and the two divisions.

Infrastructure Functioning (Work Constellations)




Figure 6.7. Work Constellations Within ANO.

e. Informal Communications

As in most successful covert organizations, ANO strictly enforces the prohibition of informal communication between any of its members (with, of course, the exception of al-Banna himself). Even top-level functionaries are prohibited from meeting with each other informally unless al-Banna personally grants prior clearance. The supposed penalty for violating this rule is death (after a prolonged, and most certainly

brutal torturing). While this measure marks the ultimate in operational security procedures, it also provides for the largest opportunity for communications to be misinterpreted or slowed down.

3. Structural Strengths and Weaknesses

a. Strengths

The first structural strength immediately apparent is the extreme level of compartmentalization of functions, operations, and communications within ANO. While this characteristic is quite common within covert organizations, ANO has developed it to an extreme degree. Much of this is surely a result of al-Banna's paranoid penchant for secrecy and his desire to centralize power around him, but it has no doubt served him well, as evident by both ANO's and his own personal longevity.

The next structural strength stems from the physical dispersion of the various sub-structures of the organization. While many directorates and committees are located within Lebanon, few are collocated with each other. Similarly, many directorates have back-up offices in the sponsor state of the time. This structure effectively spreads the risk of compromise or destruction over a wider physical area, ensuring that the organization cannot be completely destroyed through a direct action *fait accompli*.

The final structural strength is ANO's diversified sources of inputs. From the beginning, ANO has tried to develop multiple sources of income, supplies, and sponsors. Similarly, ANO has continued to convert from a reliance on endogenous support to primarily endogenous sources of support. This can be seen in the operations of the Finance Directorate, where money given by sponsors or extorted from other states is

subsequently reinvested into front companies and bankrolled in multiple Swiss bank accounts. Thus ANO has developed a capacity for self-sustainment at a level other terrorist organizations only dream of.

This trend is also reflected in ANO's efforts toward local hegemony over other Palestinian groups (particularly al-Fatah) within Lebanon. While located within a sponsoring country still makes ANO vulnerable to that sponsor's considerable political influence, it would be difficult for any country (including Israel, Syria, or the United States) to root ANO out of its entrenched position in Lebanon. This would provide ANO with nearly unlimited freedom of maneuver.

b. Weaknesses

While the above strengths may make ANO appear to be invulnerable to penetration or destruction, each strength described also has its own accompanying weakness. While extreme compartmentalization ensures operational security, it also tends to hinder unity of effort throughout the organization. Operational planning and execution occur within a virtual vacuum. Few ANO operations have been successfully coordinated (one exception being the simultaneous attacks in Rome and Vienna) and fewer still have supported any overarching strategically planned campaign.

Similarly, the dispersion between the various sub-structures within ANO contributes to overall inefficiency. Communications are slower, and the isolated components cannot reinforce or support each other without great difficulty if attacked. The physical separation also means there must be redundant support and logistics channels, as well as an increased number of security personnel to safeguard the various

sites. This would point to a larger signature of activity, as well as an increase in the number of people who would know about various aspects of the organization.

4. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Based on our theoretical propositions concerning infrastructure vulnerabilities as summarized in Chapter II (Table 2.3), the following macro-level vulnerabilities are apparent within ANO: C3 ILOC's between the headquarters and the two major divisions; isolation/decapitation of the strategic apex; internal substructural C3 nodes and ILOC's; input ILOC's; ILOC's between ANO and its state sponsor. While these represent theoretical vulnerabilities without regard to operational or political constraints or considerations, practical considerations of the real world show that they are in fact *relative* to the apparently invulnerable nature of ANO (in other words, if they were easy to neutralize, they would have been a long time ago...).

5. Generic Action Plan

Again turning to our theoretical guidance (as summarized in Table 2.3), we can situationalize a macro-level generic action plan for conducting a counter-organization campaign against ANO. We must first caveat this by recognizing that we are presenting a plan unconstrained by political realities or operational limitations. While this condition rarely, if ever, exists in the real world, this framework offers a starting point for generating viable courses of action that take all relevant factors into account. These course of action would then be further analyzed and refined into a strategic level counter organization campaign plan for targeting ANO. Additionally, we alert the reader that particular methodologies and techniques offered here, are purely illustrative and are in no

way offered as a specific recommendation. Any methodologies and techniques relevant to targetting ANO would only come as a byproduct of a micro-targetting process.

First, we would attempt to isolate all major structures from each other. This would mean isolating the strategic apex (through interdiction or decapitation), isolating the headquarters from the major divisions, and isolating each division from one another. Further, we would isolate exogenous sources of support and put political and economic pressure directly on the sponsor state. Simultaneously, we would likewise attempt to interdict endogenous support ILOC's, but this would require a high degree of multinational cooperation.

Next, we would interdict C3 ILOC's in an attempt to disrupt communications and force ANO to waste time and assets trying to counter our efforts. This action would further isolate the various sub-structures and deny mutual support. These interdiction efforts would culminate in the concentration of effort against the most vulnerable division most likely the People's Army), forcing ANO to contract in on itself, and completely switch to the self-preservation mode. At this point, terrorist operations would have ceased, cells would have been compromised or dispersed, and al-Banna would probably be consolidating his personal holdings and looking for a safe location for retirement.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The case of the Abu Nidal Organization demonstrates several very important points with regard to the utility of our framework for analysis, as well as our overall theory and the importance of infrastructure targeting to any counter-organizational targeting campaign. Likewise, it demonstrates the ability of our framework to describe

and explain other types of covert organizations' structures and functioning (besides pure insurgent organizations), and how to derive a macro-level action plan for a case in progress.

1. Framework for Analysis

Our framework for analysis leads to the first conclusion that from an organizational perspective, ANO is no closer today from achieving its mission goals than it was the day al-Banna split away from al-Fatah. ANO suffers from an extremely dysfunctional structural hybrid stemming from the conflict between ideology and organizational personality factors, that has ultimately led to a straying from and splintering of the primary mission goal.

Second, our framework reveals that the impact of organizational personality on overall organizational survival cannot be discounted in the ANO case. Similarly, the framework provides an example of what happens to a covert organization when it relies too heavily on its sponsor for exogenous support. Figure 6.8 depicts the relationship between activity level and sponsorship control.




Figure 6.8. ANO Activity Level/Sponsorship Correlation

What we see is a direct correlation between the two variables: when a sponsor provides a steady flow of exogenous support, activity levels rise; when a sponsor curtails support (either due to retaliation, sanctions, or fear thereof), particularly that all-important political support, activity levels drop. While this relationship pertains to state-sponsored terrorism in this particular case, the same relationship exists within other types of covert organizations in the form of an insurgent or resistance group, and a terrorist wing it owns or controls (i.e., Sinn Fein and the IRA). Thus we can now understand ANO's push for more autonomy through its increased control inside Lebanon. ANO has nothing to fear from the government of Lebanon as it is too weak to present a legitimate challenge (this move also provides more strategic depth between Israel and ANO as Israeli interventions into Lebanon prove extremely costly and unpopular in terms of world opinion).

2. Relevance to Infrastructure Targeting and Overall Theory

The ANO case serves as a negative example of what happens when the infrastructure of an extremely covert organization is not targeted correctly nor tied into an overarching counter-organization campaign plan. The most obvious evidence of this comes from the ongoing campaign by the PLO/PA to destroy ANO and kill al-Banna (in this example, the PLO acts as a de facto regime with al-Fatah acting as regime security forces).

As evidenced by the ANO chronology of activity (Appendix C), the primary means al-Fatah has used to target ANO is through the killing of top-level functionaries within ANO (this has also been al-Banna's strategy against al-Fatah, and has also proven equally unsuccessful). Because of the decentralized and redundant nature (except for decision-making) of ANO, it is highly unlikely that even the successful decapitation of ANO (by killing al-Banna) would prove a fatal blow to the organization.

From a theoretical standpoint, the ANO case validates our propositions (through Mill's method of difference) by illustrating that when ILOC's are not correctly targeted, and when the targeting effort is not tied into an overarching campaign plan, a negative outcome will follow. This would demonstrate the necessity of these two conditions for overall success. Likewise, this case demonstrates that when targeting is conducted solely on intuitive, intimate knowledge by one organization thoroughly familiar with the other (one having sprung from the other), it will not necessarily lead to correct ILOC targeting. This supports our argument for the systematic approach to targeting.

VII. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

A. FINDINGS

1. Variable Dominance Between Cases

Findings regarding the analyses of our case studies demonstrate that different variables (and subsequent sub-variables) proved dominant from case to case. Our findings validate our chosen variables in their ability to describe the structure, function, and associated strengths and weaknesses of each insurgent organization's unique mix. Further, we find that we can rank-order the impact of each variable within each case, and then compare the outcomes for any similarities, differences, or significant emerging patterns (see Table 7.1). These findings lead to a number of observations about the relationships between variables and their rank-order, and the dominance or

CASE: VARIABLE:	PHILIPPINES	MALAYA	VIETNAM	ABU NIDAL
I DEOLOGY	4	3	1	4
ORGANIZATION PERSONALITY	1	4	4	1
CORE TECHNOLOGY	3	2	3	3
MISSION GOAL	5	5	2	5
ENVIRONMENT	2	1	5	2

Table 7.1. Variable Dominance Rank-Ordering.

recessiveness of individual variables within each case. These observations are stated as inductive, data-derived hypotheses (in italics), and are grouped together by variable:

a. *Ideology*

Organizations that stay ideologically focused seem to demonstrate a higher level of cohesion and enhanced longevity over those that drift. In the Vietnam case, we see first the Viet Minh's, and then the Viet Cong's adherence to their ideology as an overriding influence acting as a cement to keep the organization focused and together, even when under intense external pressure. The VC's indoctrination program was intense and never-ending; and ideologically-reinforcing positions (such as people's councils and political officers) were designed into the organization's structure at every level from the start.

In the other three cases, we see ideology treated as a low organizational priority. This was reflected in the lack of any regulated, on-going efforts at indoctrination within the Huks, the MRLA, and ANO. This lack of a deep-rooted belief in a singular ideology is further reflected within the leadership hierarchy of those respective organizations. This lack of ideological emphasis may be the result of the dysfunctional hybrid structure of the strategic apexes of these three organizations, as was detailed in the case analyses. Further, this deficiency correlates very highly with a low prioritization of mission goal across the same three cases, and may in fact speak to the necessity for a strong, binding ideology to provide a focus for mission goal as a condition for success of a covert organization.

b. *Organization Personality*

The overwhelming dominance of organization personality within a covert organization can bring about decline if not modulated by other variables. In both the

Huk case and the ANO case, we find organization personality as the dominant variable. With the Huks, the patriarchal nature of the various leaders clashed with the Marxist-based structure, which led to complications with command and control and the eventual decline of the organization.

In the ANO case, the overbearing dominance of al-Banna's psychotic personality leaves the organization susceptible to general paranoia, internal division, and ultimate decline. These events have all occurred at different points in ANO's life-cycle. The most extreme examples being the mass-execution of ANO recruits, the purges of upper-level leadership, and the decreasing levels of activity in the late '80's, as well as in recent years. While this factor is most closely associated with decline, we cannot ignore the point that conversely it has been through al-Banna's sheer force of will that ANO has survived (albeit not very effectively) to this day.

c. Core Technology

The core technology of a covert organization rarely proves dominant, but the "how" of organizational production is central to overall efficiency and therefore, ultimate effectiveness. Across the four cases, core technology was ranked in the "middle of the road" in dominance. While this finding does not, on the surface, provide any startling revelations, if we increase the magnification of our focus on this variable we can observe an interesting correlation on a finer level of analysis.

In the Huk, Malaya, and ANO cases, the covert organizations relied primarily on one form of support. The Huks and the MRLA relied exclusively on endogenous support (although in the case of the MRLA, the ethnic Chinese population

from which they received support from was quickly isolated by the British and thus became, by our definition, exogenous), and were forced to divert most of their time and resources towards maintaining the flow of production. When the organizations attempted to expand, they exceeded the capacities of their sources of support, and were pushed across the threshold of efficiency. The regimes in these two cases were also successful at isolating the organizations from their resources, thus causing an immediate decline in productivity and effectiveness. This continued pressure led to the insurgents' ultimate defeat.

In the ANO case, we see a total dependence on exogenous (state-sponsored) support as an equally limiting factor. While ANO's sponsors provided enormous amounts of money and logistical support to the organization, this only lasted as long as ANO served the sponsor's purposes. When supporting ANO became too much of a physical or political risk, the sponsor either withdrew support and kicked ANO out of the country (Iraq and Syria), or simply "clamped down" and prevented ANO from conducting operations (Libya). That ANO realized this dependence as a liability is borne out in initiatives designed to generate endogenous sources of support, as well as carving out its own "sphere of influence" inside Lebanon.

In the Vietnam case, the Viet Cong relied on a mixture of both endogenous and exogenous sources of support for their production. While the percentage of each varied within the mix over time, what invariably transpired was when one source would come under great pressure, the other source was able to "take up the slack" and compensate until the situation normalized. This provided the VC with a steady flow of

personnel and equipment with which to conduct operations. While the Phoenix Program did impede the functioning of the VCI to a large extent, it must be remembered that the decline of the VC is more attributable to poor timing and the mis-reading of popular support during Tet-'68 than to direct pressure from U.S. or ARVN forces.

Thus we may hypothesize that *from the covert organization's perspective, utilizing mixed sources of support is better than relying entirely on either endogenous or exogenous sources by themselves.* How much of each is appropriate? The answer to that question goes beyond the scope of this investigation, but it is obviously context-dependent. However, it is the analyst's job to determine what that mix is within a given organization, and then concentrate on isolating the most vulnerable source for intense micro-targeting.

d. Mission Goal

Organizations that do not hold mission goal as a high priority typically do not succeed. An interesting finding concerning mission goal is that three of the covert organizations in the case studies (Huks, MLRA, ANO) all held mission goal as their lowest priority. While it is almost certain that if a researcher were able to interview members from these organizations they would all respond that the ultimate victory for their people over their respective opponents was their number one priority, reality shows that the disparity between their espoused and actual (or even more realistic) mission goals prevented victory.

Conversely, the VC in the Vietnam case placed mission goal as a high priority (both espoused and in actuality) and resulted ultimately in victory. While it is

questionable as to whether the North Vietnamese held the same espoused and actual mission goals as the VC (as demonstrated by the arrests of prominent members of the VC by the North shortly after the successful invasion in 1975), the outcome still resulted in a Communist victory over the South.

Thus the importance of mission goal as a sort of "lynch-pin" variable as proposed in Chapter II is reasonably confirmed. The particular synergistic effect of ideology on mission goal (as first proposed in sub-section *a.* above) is graphically demonstrated in the Vietnam case, and even more graphically demonstrated by its absence in the other three cases. Finally, the correlation between mission goal and covert organizational success as hypothesized at the beginning of this sub-section clearly seems to be high.

e. Environment

Covert organizations that can hold the environment "constant" (i.e., overcome physical obstacles and conditions, responses to regime pressure, etc...) and still maintain production have a significant advantage over their regime opponents. This hypothesis reflects the organization's ability to adapt to changing strategic, operational, and tactical environmental conditions and still maintain a steady operational tempo against the regime. The most successful organization (from our case studies) in this respect was the Viet Cong.

The VC became totally integrated with its physical and operational environment. The jungle provided sanctuary to the VC, whereas the American forces viewed the jungle as an obstacle. The VC conducted all manners of business at night,

while American forces typically "dug in" by nightfall. In the cities, the VC adapted its structure to guard against the increased presence of U.S. and ARVN forces in urban areas. Strategically, the VC were able to stabilize environmental factors; and those people they were not able to win the support of were either intimidated into indifference, or eliminated. As a result, the environment proved to have the least impact in the Vietnam case.

In contrast, the environmental variable ranked relatively high across the other three cases. Strategically, all three environments remained complex and extremely unstable. The decisive support of the people was never solidified. Operationally, once the various regimes devised a comprehensive plan and fielded enough trained forces, they took the initiative away from the insurgents.⁷² Thus we see the Vietnam case as the only case in which the covert organization neutralized the effects of the environment, and an overall positive case outcome from the insurgent's perspective.

2. Conditions For Success Between Cases

Having demonstrated the viability of our variables as a framework for analysis, we can now examine each regime's targeting responses against its corresponding covert organizational opponent as detailed in each case. First, we must evaluate each targeting condition in terms of its necessity and/or sufficiency as analyzed in each case (see Table 7.2). Next, we will analyze these findings for any patterns or correlations between

⁷²While the ANO case differs in that it is not in direct confrontation with only one regime (Israel notwithstanding), once the international community brought concerted pressure against sponsor states, ANO was forced into the reactive, survival mode and activity drastically declined.

conditions which might help validate our hypotheses and our theory. Finally, we can then compare our results with those we hypothesized in Chapter I.

a. Systematic Targeting

The first finding we observe is a mixture of targeting types across the four cases. Next, we see that there is no apparent correlation between intuitive or systematic targeting and overall success. Thus we must conclude that systematic targeting is not a necessary condition for success in and of itself. However, the price of relying on intuitive

CASE: CONDITION:	PHILIPPINES	MALAYA	VIETNAM	ABU NIDAL
INTUITIVE or SYSTEMATIC	Intuitive	Systematic	Systematic	Intuitive
NODES/ILOC's CORRECTLY TARGETED?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
TARGETING INTEGRATED INTO OVER- ARCHING COUNTER-ORG. CAMPAIGN?	Yes	Yes	No	No
OVERALL C-O SUCCESS?	Yes	Yes	No	No
OVERALL POSITIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION?	Yes	Yes	No	No

Table 7.2. Targeting Conditions Case Comparison.

targeting is time, primarily that neither the gifted intuitive leader nor the trial-and-error method will provide the correct plan before the covert organization achieves its goal.

Thus we must caveat this finding that systematic targeting, while not an absolute

necessity, is the most efficient process for correctly identifying and targeting covert organizations and their ILOC's, particularly when time is at a premium.

b. Correct Targeting of Nodes and ILOC's

Here we see three positive results (Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam), and one negative result (ANO). Yet the only two cases of overall success are the Philippines and Malaya, which leads to the conclusion that the correct targeting of nodes and ILOC's is a necessary condition for success, but not sufficient for success by itself. This conclusion is substantiated in the Vietnam case. While the Phoenix Program (arguably) correctly and effectively targeted the VCI (even though Phoenix wasted effort in some areas), its efforts could not overcome the failure of other, less effective initiatives (such as conventional force operations, the civilian police force, and "Vietnamization") and provide an overall counter-organization campaign success against the Viet Cong.

c. Targeting Integrated Into Overarching C-O Campaign Strategy

Here again with this condition we see a split across the four cases with two positive results (Philippines and Malaya), and two negative results (Vietnam and ANO). When correlated against overall success, we once again find that this condition is necessary for success, but is not sufficient in and of itself. The two positive cases validate the condition's necessity, as does its absence in the two negative cases. However, none of the cases provide substantive evidence against its sufficiency. A confirming example would include a case wherein incorrect targeting of nodes and ILOC's are targeted, and yet an overarching counter-organization campaign proves

successful anyway. A case such as this example would almost surely reveal the presence of an extremely weak or inept covert organization to begin with.

d. Overall Success/Overall Conflict Resolution

The pattern of conditions for overall success against a covert organization appears to be based on a "building-block" process of necessary conditions. First, regardless of method, the critical nodes and ILOC's within a covert organization must be correctly identified and targeted. Next, the targeting effort must be integrated into an overarching counter-organization campaign strategy. These two conditions, if executed correctly, should prove sufficient for overall success.

However, success of the counter-organization campaign proves to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for overall positive conflict resolution. Ultimate conflict resolution will depend on the regime's coordinated efforts at addressing social, political, and economic issues which fall under the rubric of counterinsurgency or internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy.⁷³ Further, while systematic targeting is not necessary per se, it does represent the most accurate and efficient means available, particularly when time is a critical factor.

⁷³ See Army FM 100-20 for current elaborations on these topics.

B. CONCLUSIONS

In Ted R. Gurr's classic work, *Why Men Rebel*, Gurr asserts that:

The central scientific criterion for theory is that it be subject to empirical assessment. Four attributes of theory that facilitate its assessment are its falsifiability, definitional clarity, identification of relevant variables at various levels of analysis, and applicability to a large universe of events for analysis. The first two are necessary conditions for assessment, the others desirable.⁷⁴

Throughout this investigation, we have held this passage as our standard towards which we have strived. We feel that we have met the above criteria both fairly and objectively. We have backed up our hypotheses with historical fact, and validated the consistency of our theory removed from history and operationalized in the real (and present) world. We have been clear and consistent in our defining and usage of variables and terminology, and demonstrated our variables' descriptive power across multiple levels of analysis. While this study did not utilize the large-n statistical analysis methodology, we did subject our framework to a more-than-adequate number of cases for utilizing case study methodology.

To be certain, this work makes no claim to offer the "golden bullet" or miracle formula for achieving success in future intra-state conflict scenarios. It does however, offer an innovative framework allowing for a logical and common sense approach to observing, assessing, targeting, and interdicting adversary organizations. Additionally, the melding of two academic disciplines in the construction of both the theory and the

⁷⁴ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 16.

analytic framework, strengthens both the explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive qualities encompassed within the body of the work. While we consider this a self-evident conclusion based on the detailed findings presented in this chapter, we also feel it necessary to address these conclusions with respect to the predictive and prescriptive qualities of the theory, as applied against the operational continuum.

a. Predictive

The predictive quality of this work comes as a result of its utility as a lens for observation and as an analytic tool. When placed under the scrutiny of our framework, not only is an organization's past behavior made more understandable, but its intentions and goals (hence future behavior), become predictable as well.

The framework we have constructed allows for a clear understanding of the cyclic nature of an organization's life-cycle and provides a finite number of options for an organization reacting to a changing environment. Combined with the knowledge and familiarity derived from our in-depth analysis, the number of options can be further reduced to a highly manageable level. These options, and the behavior associated with them, can then be tracked as trends and indicators, and predicted as tendencies.

An appropriate analogy to the predictive quality of our work, can be seen in those activities associated with stock and commodity trading. Analysts and brokers have established certain indicators in the "business environment" (interest rates, currency exchange rates, etc.) that serve as tripwires for an approaching shift in trends. By tracking the effect of these indicators over years of market performance, their understanding has been refined to the degree that the effect of a shifting trend on any part

of the market, is fairly predictable. This predictability, while far from precise, has shown a general utility in terms of market direction and subsequent effects. It is this same manner of general predictability that we offer as a result of applying our framework for analysis against an organization.

b. Prescriptive

The prescriptive qualities of this work are evident throughout and need little elaboration. Suffice it to say that resultant from this study, a planner can analyze a potential adversary organization, identify its strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities and attack it in the most efficient and effective manner possible.

One aspect of the prescriptive qualities of this work that does beg elaboration is its role with respect to the greater strategic-operational-tactical continuum. We argue that to achieve the greatest effect in operationalizing this study, it should be integrated as part of any logical planning process. Accordingly, we believe it is best used to fill the niche between the strategic level analysis offered in Appendix A, and the tactical level micro-targeting procedure found in Appendix B. We submit that when these processes are performed together, in order, and on a continuing basis, they will become an integrated campaign planning tool.

The final conclusion that comes from this work appropriately concerns the practitioner who plans and executes, whether in an emerging intra-state conflict scenario, or in response to a heightened terrorist threat, a counter-organization campaign. Our intention throughout this study has been to offer a campaign planning tool that better prepares and equips these practitioners. To that end, we have endeavored to create a

mechanism by which commanders can seize and retain the initiative in the poorly defined battlescape of the future. In so doing , we have also reinforced one of the constructs of a path leading to ultimate conflict resolution.

APPENDIX A. STRATEGIC/MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS

The following text appears in the U.S. Army's new Field Manual 100-20 - *Stability and Support Operations*, as "Appendix C - How to Analyze a Society in Conflict. It is included in this thesis as an excellent example of a strategic/macro-level analysis framework that must be conducted prior to the introduction of U.S. forces in a stability and support operation. The resulting products from this analysis would in turn, provide the initial database that would drive our operational-level targeting analysis of oppositional covert organizations (which is the subject of this thesis), which would finally lead to the tactical-level micro-targeting analysis of a specific covert organization's ILOC's (the process of which is detailed in Appendix B). Where comment is appropriate, we have included (*AUTHORS' NOTE*:).

How to Analyze a Society in Conflict

This appendix provides guidance for the analysis of a society in conflict. It contains general questions that the analyst must ask. The questions address conditions in the whole society. The answers are not simple, and the list of questions is not complete.

The military analyst must analyze a situation in detail. He must understand the nature of this complex conflict to determine effective courses of action. His analysis must consider the following factors:

- The nature of the society.
- The nature of the conflict.
- The nature of the government.

The analyst must identify the principal factors for each of these broad areas. He must study each in turn. Finally, he must weigh and compare the factors in each area and reach conclusions. These conclusions lead to development of courses of action. The analyst then predicts the potential effects of each possible course of action and selects the best one.

This guide for analysis is more than just a simple checklist. Each area and factor requires detailed study. The process is time-consuming and may require additional expertise.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis requires a concise, yet broad, description of the end state to be achieved. The analyst must consider all constraints and restrictions

affecting mission achievement. Among these are material and human resource constraints, as well as the demands of politically active groups in the society.

The analysis uses assumptions in the absence of facts and replaces them with the facts when they become available.

The depth of analysis required varies by echelon. At national and theater levels, great detail is required. It would be useful to contract with a university to bring the best minds in the country to focus on the problem. At lower echelons, commanders and staff should make use of the work done at higher levels, adding depth in areas that particularly concern them. *(AUTHORS' NOTE: This integrated approach is, as we've shown, a necessary condition for success not to be overlooked or taken for granted).*

Nature of the Society

Social Organization

1. Identify social groups; for example, race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, armed forces, occupation, and age.
2. Identify overlaps among classes and the splits within them. Do union members belong to one or a few religious or racial groups? Are there ideological divisions within a profession?
3. Identify composite groups based on their political behavior; for example, those that actively or passively support the government or the opposition, or those which are neutral. Determine the component and composite strength of each.
4. Identify active or potential issues motivating the political behavior of each subgroup and group; for example, desire for economic benefits, social prestige, political participation, and perception of relative deprivation. Determine population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by groups.

Analysis. Determine programs that might accommodate the goals of a plurality of the politically active groups. Are these programs within the value systems of the opposition or counterinsurgency?

Conclusion. The analyst must determine which groups and composite groups might be motivated to support his position. He should determine which groups might be politically neutralized and identify programs acceptable to him that might mobilize these groups

Economic Organization and Performance

1. Identify the principal economic ideology governing the society; for example, communist, socialist, capitalist, or a mix of these. Determine local innovations and departures from this ideology.
2. Evaluate the economic infrastructure; for example, fuel and mineral resource locations; electricity production and distribution; rail, highway, and other transport facilities; and postal, telephone, telegraph, and other communication networks. (*AUTHORS' NOTE: This infrastructure refers to the physical network of utilities and communications of a country, which is not the infrastructure we refer to in the covert organization*).
3. Evaluate economic performance; for example, gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.
4. Evaluate the performance of productive segments of the society; for example, agriculture, manufacturing, information, service, transportation, mining, and forestry. Determine ownership patterns in each. Are they public or private? Are they concentrated or dispersed?
5. Evaluate public health factors; for example, birth and death rates, nutrition, water supply, sanitation, and the availability of health care. Identify endemic diseases.
6. Identify foreign trade patterns; for example, domestic and foreign indebtedness (both public and private) and resource dependencies.
7. Determine the availability of education; for example, its accessibility to individuals and groups, and its sufficiency for national needs. Consider scientific, technical, professional, and liberal education and crafts training. Identify surpluses and shortages of skills in the society.
8. Identify unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups from employment. Identify career mobility, both horizontal and vertical.
9. Identify taxing authorities, tax rates, and how they are determined.
10. Evaluate the distribution of economic benefits, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.

11. Identify population shifts; for example, rural to urban or manufacturing to service. Determine their causes and effects.

Analysis. Correlate the economic factors with social groups and subgroups. Determine which groups are favorably and unfavorably affected by each economic factor. Identify the economic motives and goals of group behavior.

Conclusion. The analyst must identify economic programs--consistent with his values and resources--which might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize hostile groups.

Political Organization and Dynamics

1. Determine the formal political structure of the government.
2. Identify the informal structure and compare the two; for example, ask whether the government is a dictatorship with only superficial democratic characteristics.
3. Identify legal and illegal political parties. What determines their legal status? Do they have reasonable prospects to accede to office? What is the program of each? Quantify the strength of each. Which might unite in coalitions?
4. Identify nonparty political organizations; for example, political action groups. What issues motivate them? Assess the strength of each organization. Which political parties do they support? Does the government regulate these organizations?
5. Identify nonpolitical interest groups; for example, churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions. Do they have interests corresponding to parties or to nonparty political organizations?
6. Identify the mechanism for government succession. Are government offices inherited? Does government function by exercise of power or consensus of a ruling class or oligarchy? Are elections held regularly? Are the results honored? What are the requirements to vote? Does the electoral process systematically exclude any groups? Determine which groups, if any, vote as a bloc. Does a patron-client relationship determine bloc voting?
7. Determine if the judiciary is independent.
8. Determine if government or any other group controls the press. What alternatives exist for dissemination of information and opinion?

9. Determine if decision making is overcentralized. Determine whether individuals and groups can make important decisions for themselves. Determine whether government agents at the state or local level can make important decisions. Can individuals and groups make their voices heard in policy-making councils?

10. Determine the administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are politicians and civil servants self-serving or corrupt?

Analysis. Correlate political groups with economic and social groups. Determine which subgroups have joined together to form significant political forces. Are they favorable or unfavorable to the opposition or are they neutral? Identify the political issues motivating the behavior of subgroups and groups.

Conclusion. The analyst must identify political programs that fall within his value limits. He must ask which programs might neutralize opposing groups or mobilize support from neutral groups. He should identify groups that can combine to produce a plurality favorable to the analyst's position.

History of the Society

1. Determine the origin of the incumbent government. Does it have a long history? Was it elected? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government? Did the government originate in violence? If so, was it by popular revolution or coup d'etat?

2. Determine the history of political violence; for example, is violence a common means to resolve political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, coups d'etat, or assassination? Does the country have a history of consensus building? What is the frequency of violent crime?

3. Does the present opposition have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

Analysis. Determine the legitimacy of the government. Estimate how acceptable violent remedies to political problems are among the people.

Conclusion. The analyst must determine the type and level of violence required. He should determine the type and level of violence the opponents are likely to employ. He should identify groups or subgroups which will support the use of violence and those which will oppose it.

Environment

1. Determine the density and distribution of population by groups. What is the balance between the urban and rural populations? Are there sparsely populated areas? Are primary racial, linguistic, or similar groups concentrated in specific areas?
2. Identify distinct geographic regions; for example, mountains, forests, plains, deserts, swamps, and coastal lowlands. What are their effects on economic and social development?
3. Identify natural and man-made aids and obstacles to mobility; for example, rivers, canals, lakes, roads, railroads, mountains, forests, and urban areas. What are their effects on economic development? What are their effects on political and social integration?
4. What are the effects of aids and obstacles to mobility on tactical operations? Is heavy equipment road-bound? Are special units required; for example, airmobile, riverine, amphibious, or mountain units? What special equipment and tactics can overcome geographic limitations? How can off-road mobility be enhanced? Are electronic communications masked? How can cover and concealment be used to advantage?
5. Identify climate types by area and season. What are the effects of extreme heat, cold, rain, snow, blowing dust, and sand on tactical operations? What are their effects on mobility and air operations? Do the seasons dictate the timing of operations? How can weather restrictions be used to advantage? How can weather obstacles be overcome?

Analysis. How does the environment affect development programs? Are some economic dependencies a result of the weather and terrain? What are the effects of weather and terrain on the organization, equipment, and doctrine of the security forces?

Conclusion. Are development and security programs appropriate to the environment? What changes need to be made in plans, organization, and doctrine?

Nature of the Conflict

Objectives

1. What is the desired end state of the opposition? Is it clearly formulated? Is it openly articulated?

2. Do all elements of the opposition share a common view?
3. Is the desired end state different from that publicly advocated?
4. How does the opposition's view of desired social organization differ from that of the government?

Analysis. Identify groups and subgroups that support the general objectives of the opposition, as stated publicly or privately. Identify factions, minority views, and dissensions within the opposition regarding all or parts of its general program. Identify groups that the opposition may have misled or deceived concerning its end-state objectives. Make a similar analysis of groups and subgroups supporting the government.

Conclusion. The analyst should identify objectives of groups supporting the government and those supporting the opposition. He must determine which of these objectives he can accommodate within his value system as part of a preemptive strategy. He should devise programs to lead groups away from the enemy toward neutrality or support for the analyst's position.

Strategy

1. Determine the strategy used by the opposition (see Chapter 6). Identify variations or combinations of the basic models of organization and operation employed. Determine whether the opposition has previously shifted from one pattern to another or is likely to do so in the future. Determine the balance between urban- and rural-based centers of opposition. Does one have primacy over the other?
2. Determine the stage or phase of the opposition. Has it progressed through successive stages? Has it regressed to an earlier or simpler stage? Is the opposition capable of moving forward or backward from stage to stage?
3. Is the opposition employing a united front and, if so, with what group? What are their common interests and areas of disagreement?

Analysis. Determine the strategy employed by the opposition. Identify leadership, environmental, and geographical factors in the selection of one pattern over another. Identify elements within the opposition that disagree with the model being used. Determine the ability and propensity of the opposition to adopt different organizational and operational patterns.

Conclusion. The analyst must identify resource, leadership, and environmental conditions and requirements that will best enable the opposition

to accomplish its goals. He must determine whether the opposition needs to change organizational and operational patterns, how they should do this, and how the government can prevent or limit their freedom to do so. The analyst must identify conditions that will permit the opposition to advance to a higher phase or stage. He must determine which factors will force the opposition to regress to an earlier or simpler stage.

Leadership

1. Who are the leaders of the opposition? Is there a single, dominant, charismatic leader?
2. Are the leaders highly dedicated to an ideology?
3. Are the leaders committed to a specific strategy? Identify differences of opinion among leaders regarding purpose and method.
4. What is the relationship between the leaders and the combat elements? Do the leaders participate directly in violence?
5. Determine the decision-making process in the opposition leadership. Are decisions made by a dictator, by consensus, or by democratic participation?

Analysis. Identify divisions within the leadership. Determine whether rigid commitment to a method constitutes vulnerability. Compare the leadership's goals and methods with the preferences of major societal groups. Will the leadership's methods enhance social mobilization?

Conclusion. The analyst must determine the political and physical strengths and weaknesses of the opposition's leadership, and how an opponent could exploit weaknesses to destroy or discredit it. Conversely, he must determine how the government's weaknesses are exploited in order to build the opponent's strength.

Tactics

1. What are the short-range and long-range tactical objectives? Are they designed to apply force decisively at the areas of government weaknesses? (*AUTHORS' NOTE: We would argue that what is referred here to as "long-range tactical objectives" are more correctly termed as **campaign objectives***).
2. Identify the primary targets; for example, government organization, security forces, or economic infrastructure.

3. Identify military tactical doctrine, order of battle, and training, morale, and discipline of the regular and part-time combat forces.

4. Do the tactics make effective use of the terrain and the political environment? What is their attitude toward the use of terror? How do they use it?

5. Identify the material resources and determine how they can overcome the limitations of these resources.

Analysis. How can the opposition develop locally superior combat power? How can the opposition overcome the government's superior firepower and mobility? What intelligence sources and methods does each side use?

Conclusion. The analyst must determine how the opposition can use terrain, offensive actions, surprise, and cross-country mobility to develop locally superior combat power. He must identify areas of government and opposition weakness. He must determine the political effects of combat tactics and countertactics. He must develop courses of action that will optimize the political-military coercive power of the analyst's side. He must consider the government's superior mechanized mobility, firepower, air power, and numerical strength.

External Support

1. Identify the sources of external support for the government or the opposition; for example, countries, blocs, or nonstate entities (including international organizations, ideological groups, religions, terrorist groups, and cultural, social, and linguistic groups).

2. Determine the extent and effectiveness of moral or political support. How and by whom is it articulated? What media are used? What are the effects of moral and political support?

3. Identify the sources and amounts of foreign economic support. How is money made available; for example, through foreign banks or laundering? Is economic support overt or covert? Does it originate with public or private sources? What constraints does the supporting entity require? Do they hinder operations?

4. Identify sanctuaries for opposition forces, logistical activities, and political and propaganda work. How can sanctuaries be denied? Consider the possibilities of political action (boycott, information, or propaganda operations). Consider military action (attack, isolation, or interdiction).

Identify the land, sea, and air routes to and from sanctuaries.

5. Identify material support; for example, weapons, equipment, supplies, and services provided.

6. Identify advisory assistance as well as CS and CSS assistance.

Analysis. Determine the dependency of the government and the opposition on external support. What would be the effect of reduction or elimination of this support?

Conclusion. The analyst must develop plans for the reduction or elimination of external moral or political support, economic support, or military and material support. Conversely, he should determine the means for increasing such support. *(AUTHORS' NOTE: While many of the same specific topics for analysis that we address in our framework are addressed here as well, note that references to specific processes to accomplish this analysis are glaringly absent; as is any reference or acknowledgement of the "opposition" as an ORGANIZATION...).*

Nature of the Government

National Strategy

1. Has the government established a general plan to counter the opposition? Does the plan address political, social, and economic issues? Does it correctly define the issues? Does it consider all social and political groups and subgroups?

2. Determine the government's organization and methods for the strategic planning and execution of its program. Identify areas of strength and weakness. Identify resource requirements and constraints. Has the government established realistic priorities?

Analysis. Determine the effect of the government plan on specific groups and subgroups. Which will the government's plan mobilize? How can an opponent prevent mobilization? Which groups or subgroups are not likely to be satisfied by the plan? How can they be mobilized? What is the effect of mobilization by the government or the opposition on the political balance?

Conclusion. The analyst must identify the means by which the government can mobilize a favorable political balance through combinations of coercive measures and progressive political, social, and economic development. Conversely, he should determine what opposition actions might tip the balance in its favor.

Coercive Measures

1. Identify the government's use of populace and resources control. How does it affect each social group? How can the opposition turn adverse effects to their own advantage?

2. Determine the organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine of government security forces. Are they sufficient? Are they appropriate to the environment? Are they appropriate to the nature of the conflict?

3. What is the effect of government military operations on each group within the population? Does the government effectively limit collateral damage to people and property?

4. Does the government maintain the initiative? Can it identify, locate, and attack key personnel, installations, and military forces? How does the government protect installations and the populace? What is the effect of protective measures on the government's ability to take the offensive? Do the people provide intelligence to the government and deny it to the opposition?

Analysis. The analyst must balance the beneficial effects of coercive measures against the harm they may do to friendly or neutral groups.

He must determine the favorable balance between government firepower and mobility and its dependence on logistical support and modern lines of communication (LOC). Does government firepower cause civilian injury and death, thereby undermining popular support? Are government weapons and vehicles restricted to roads?

Conclusion. The analyst must develop plans for populace and resources control that will not cost him popular support. How does the government provide security for the populace without losing the initiative?

He must devise tactics to employ superior firepower without incurring debilitating dependence on logistical support. He must ask how surprise, deception, and restrictive terrain can be used to overcome government firepower, armor protection, and air power. He must determine how the government can seize and maintain the initiative.

Balanced Development

1. Determine prioritized economic programs to mobilize support within key subgroups and groups. Determine which groups, if mobilized, will tip the

balance of forces. Identify each group's perception of its economic standing. To what extent will groups tolerate the postponement of economic programs? How can the government or the opposition make economic benefits contingent on supportive behavior by affected groups?

2. Establish feedback mechanisms to determine group reaction to programs. How can decision making be decentralized without loss of direction?

3. Determine social imbalances. Identify the affected groups. Develop programs to correct these imbalances. What is the effect of these social development programs on other groups?

4. Identify groups that lack a political voice. How can the government accommodate them? How can the opposition accommodate them?

Analysis. How can the benefits of development be evenly distributed?

Conclusion. The analyst must identify groups whose change of loyalty will affect the balance of forces. He should target those groups for development without it having an adverse effect on other key groups.

Administrative Competence and Efficiency

1. Determine whether national plans are effectively executed. Identify sources of incompetence and corruption.

2. How is a balance achieved between centralized planning and decentralized execution?

Analysis. Identify corrupt and incompetent officials. How can they be reformed or eliminated? Were they appointed by a spoils or patronage system? To what levels of government does corruption reach? What would be the effect of reform on the structure of government? Identify the source of new leadership. Do artificial barriers exist? For example, does the government require unnecessary academic degrees, racial or other social classifications, or patronage as a precondition for employment? Are there opportunities for vertical mobility by merit? Are the most competent people concentrated at higher levels of government?

Conclusion. Determine the means for equitable distribution of competent leaders at all levels of government. Determine whether material and symbolic rewards are adequate. Are talent and initiative frustrated? What psychological and tactical opportunities does government incompetence and inefficiency provide to the opposition?

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND COURSES OF ACTION

The analyst must now consider the separate analyses of the society, the opposition, and the government together. His conclusions must reflect the interaction of all factors. The analyst must determine the dynamics with which each side attempts to mobilize human and material resources in its favor. These dynamics affect specific groups of people. The analysis identifies issues that concern key political, social, and economic groups. The government and opposition offer solutions to the people's problems and attempt to deliver on their promises, within resource constraints. Measured combinations of benefits, persuasion, and coercion motivate groups to conform their behavior to the will of the government or the opposition.

Conclusions lead to courses of action. Whether the analyst supports either side or is a neutral third party, he must determine what is necessary to--

1. Mobilize a plurality of societal groups to provide active or tacit support.
2. Neutralize opposition groups. (*AUTHORS' NOTE: This is where our thesis ties in to help develop both the counter-organization, and overall campaign plan*).
3. Prevent unaligned groups from supporting the opposition.

Whether he is an observer or a direct or an indirect participant in this struggle, the analyst must keep his courses of action in balance. He must consider the effect of each course of action on each societal group. Frequently, a benefit to one group will have a negative effect on another. He must consider all groups and neglect none. He must assign priorities to groups in proportion to their importance in achieving a favorable balance of forces.

If the analyst is a supporter of either side, he must consider using coercive measures against those groups implacably committed to the opposition. He should recommend using a degree of violence appropriate to the nature of the groups' involvement in the conflict. He may recommend an attack on the enemy's main combat forces with all available military resources. He may recommend the neutralization of passive supporters by close observation and movement control. He concedes no group permanently to the enemy. He holds open the option that a group will defect to his ranks. In general, he should select courses of action that hold the greatest promise of mobilizing groups to his side and the least risk of driving groups into the enemy's camp.

APPENDIX B. TACTICAL-LEVEL MICRO-TARGETING PROCEDURE

The purpose of this appendix is to provide the practitioner and planner a tactical-level organizational sub-structure targeting procedure. In so doing, we establish the final link in the strategic-operational-tactical continuum.

A. ROLE OF TACTICAL TARGETING

Tactical targeting is the final step prior to bringing actual force to bear against an adversary organization. At the tactical level, commanders frequently encounter a classic cost-benefit scenario when planning operations. At its simplest, it is a question of "How much of my resource pool will I deplete in achieving an objective, and then having achieved that objective, will I have damaged my adversary to a relatively greater degree than I have damaged myself?" To take the guesswork out of this process, a procedure for analyzing potential targets against an established criteria is a must. While tactical target analysis is not a new process (we have borrowed heavily from pre-existing tactical frameworks), applying it from an organizational perspective is; and the one we offer is a logical evolution from the operational level of analysis offered within the body of this thesis.

B. TACTICAL TARGETING METHODOLOGY

The tactical targeting methodology we propose consists of two elements. The first element calls for a distillation of background information that is gleaned from the operational level analysis resultant from our framework, and a "ground-truth" assessment of factors influencing the variables comprising our analytic framework. To facilitate the ground-truth assessment, we have provided a series of questions that allow the tactical

level analyst to refine the pre-existing analysis and targeting plan to a finer, more detailed level. While this aspect is initially time consuming, it should be considered time invested, rather than lost.

The second element of the methodology requires the tactical level analyst to apply the results from the ground-truth analysis against a targeting analysis matrix. While the results of the tactical analysis actually identifies targets, thus refining the generic action plans, these targets must now be evaluated against a standard targeting matrix. The matrix we offer, a revision of the U.S. Army's *Special Forces Demolition Target Analysis*, is the final analytical step in the process and allows commanders to make informed, logical decisions concerning the allocation of their assets.

1. Background and Assessment

The structure for the tactical assessment follows the framework offered in Figure 2-3. While many of the questions we ask at the tactical level are also appropriate for operational level analysis, the responses may in fact show variance and a more finite resolution when viewed from a tactical perspective.

a. Identify Mission Goal of the Organization

- What final outcome does the organization want? Expect? Settle for?
- What does the organization's propaganda say?
- What does the organization's strategy appear to be?
- What is the power status quo in the organization?

b. Identify Core Technology of the Organization

- What are the organization's endogenous sources for personnel, weapons, and sustenance?
- Does the organization receive exogenous support? From whom? What type? How strong is the coupling?

- Is support centralized or decentralized?
- Is production centralized or decentralized?
- Does production occur in a certain region? Inside or outside of the host nation?
- What types of outputs are produced?
- What types of operations have occurred/are occurring?
- What are the organization's estimated consumption rates? (As determined by tons of food, number of casualties, etc.).

c. *Identify Organization Ideology*

- What is the source of the organization's core system of beliefs (political, ethnic, religious, or societal)?
- If political, what is the organization's platform? Is there an overt wing?
- If societal, where are the lines of distinction (clan, tribal, caste)?
- If ethnic, what is the diversity and demographics?
- If religious, is the organization fundamentalist, reformist, apocalyptic?

d. *Identify Attributes of the Organization Personality*

- Who are the people who comprise the organization?
- What ethnic, political, or religious cleavages exist in the society as a whole?
- What are the important traditions and symbols for the organization?
- How do politics work in the host nation?
- What form of leadership does the organization have (charismatic, autocratic, democratic, etc.)?
- How old is the organization?
- What sort of challenges has it survived?

Having established a tactical view of the "playing field," the commander is now in a position to determine the adequacy of the target sets offered in the generic action plan. This determination is based on the use of the tactical analysis in assigning values or scores to the ILOC's comprising each sub-system.

2. CARVER-RIME Matrix

CARVER-RIME is the acronym used to identify the components of our targeting matrix. The purpose of this matrix is to allow for a comparison of sub-systems against a standardized criteria. These criteria, which make up the components of the matrix are defined as follows:

- **Criticality-** The degree to which a target's destruction or neutralization will influence the organization's ability to conduct operations.
- **Accessibility-** The ease with which a target can be interdicted, either by direct or indirect means.
- **Recuperability-** The amount of time an organization will require to recover from the damage or destruction of a particular target.
- **Vulnerability-** The degree to which a target is exposed, relative to the means and expertise possessed by friendly forces which enable them to successfully attack the target.
- **Effect-** The results, both positive and negative, of a successful attack against a target. While positive results may be observed in a diminished capability for the organization, negative results, in the form of reprisals, terrorism, or other reactions must be considered.
- **Recognizability-** The ease by which a target can be positively identified.

Against fixed installations this is a relatively simple component when compared to individuals comprising an organizations strategic apex.

- **Redundancy-** The degree or depth to which target functions are duplicated within an organization. Much like a depth chart on a sports team. Highly redundant targets will have an impact on recuperability as well.
- **Isolatability-** The degree to which a target sub-system can be segregated from other organization systems which can either support or absorb it during periods of volatility.
- **Mutability-** The degree to which an organization or target sub-system will likely restructure itself if threatened.
- **Exploitability-** The degree to which a target's destruction or damage will cause the organization to expose more sub-systems as potential targets.

Many of the components of **CARVER-RIME** offer obvious units of measure. For instance, recuperability can be scored in terms of time as measured by hours, days, weeks, or even months. Other components lend themselves to a subjective (albeit highly informed), scaled numeric rating. A rating of this type might score a component such as redundancy as a seven on a scale of one to ten. While either of these techniques is acceptable, they, like most techniques, are inconsequential. The most important aspect of conducting the tactical targeting analysis is consistency. Stated bluntly, all components must be measured against each target presented in an absolutely identical manner, utilizing the same unit of measure.

To determine which sub-system(s) to concentrate targeting on, an analysis matrix would be performed first comparing each major functional sub-system of the covert organization (i.e., personnel, intelligence, operations, training, logistics, transportation,

communication, etc...). Once the decisive sub-system(s) is/are identified, a micro-analysis is performed to determine critical ILOC nodes. The matrix in Table B.1 depicts a **CARVER-RIME** matrix for a specific sub-system. When placed into operation, each numbered ILOC would be replaced by a potential target, and the analytic scoring would fill the descending vertical boxes.

SUB-SYSTEM: (Communications, Logistics, Intel, etc.)	ILOC-1:	ILOC-2:	ILOC-3:
Criticality			
Accessibility			
Recuperability			
Vulnerability			
Effect			
Recognizability			
Redundancy			
Isolatability			
Mutability			
Exploitability			

Table B.1. The CARVER-RIME Matrix.

The strength of this targeting system is that it allows analysis and prioritization of identified ILOC's of each sub-system with respect to time and assets available. The system also allows the tactical commander the flexibility to address ILOC's relevant to the overall campaign goals. It is these goals, influenced by host nation wishes, U.S. policy, and various other constraints, that provide the principal control over the conduct and manner of tactical operations on the ground.

APPENDIX C. MIDDLE EAST EVENTS/ANO ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGY

MIDDLE EAST EVENTS

1972

May- Four terrorists from Black September group seize Sabena jet; killed by Israeli paratroopers.

In retaliation, three Japanese terrorists allied with PFLP attack Lod airport; kill twenty-four.

September- Eight Palestinian terrorists attack Israeli Olympic team in Munich, killing two and seizing nine hostages. Hostages along with five Palestinians killed in exchange with German police.

December- Members of Black September seize Israeli Embassy in Bangkok; hostages eventually released unharmed.

1973

February-Israeli fighters down Libyan Airlines airliner; kills 104.

April-Israeli hit team assassinates three high-ranking PLO Fatah officials in Beirut; Lebanese government falls.

July-Israeli hit team looking for a Black **September**-commander mistakenly kill a Moroccan waiter in Lilehammer, Norway. Trial follows and exposes Israeli counter-terrorist efforts.

October-Israel surprised by joint Egyptian/Syrian/Jordanian attack during Yom Kippur holiday; narrowly averts defeat.

1974

October-Arafat denounces use of terrorism; Abu Nidal tried in absentia and sentenced to death.

1975

April-PLO/Christian civil war begins in Lebanon.

1978

March-Israel begins *Operation Litani* and invades southern Lebanon; drives PLO north to Beirut.

1979

January-Ali Hassan Salameh, head of PLO Force 17 and mastermind of Munich Olympics mission, is killed in Beirut by an Israeli car bomb.

Shah of Iran flees into exile.

Ayatollah Khomeini takes power.

November-Iranian militants overrun U.S. Embassy in Tehran and seize sixty-three embassy personnel as hostages (this ordeal would last 444 days).

1980

April-Attempted hostage rescue by U.S. forces fails.

1981

January-American hostages released as Ronald Reagan is sworn in as President.

1982

June-(6)-Israel launches *Operation Peace for Galilee* into Lebanon in an attempt to dislodge and destroy the PLO.

(9)-Israel destroys Syria's air defense system in Bekaa Valley.

(13)-Siege of Beirut begins.

September-PLO in Beirut (over 10,000 guerrillas) are shipped out of Lebanon.

Israeli protégé' Bashir Gemayel, president of Lebanon, is assassinated (Syrian complicity suspected).

As retribution, Christian militiamen raid Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and kill over 1,000 Palestinians as Israeli soldiers look on.

1983

April-U.S. Embassy in Beirut is blown up by suicide bomber in a truck bomb.

August-Due to mounting opposition at home and increasing casualties, Israel's Prime Minister, Menachem Begin resigns.

October-Factional fighting and clashes with Israeli troops leave thousands of Lebanese civilians dead or displaced. U.S. criticized for supporting Israel.

U.S. Marine compound in Beirut is destroyed by suicide truck bomber killing 241 Marines.

December-U.S. retaliates against Syrian-backed factions with air strikes and naval gunfire. Eight more Marines are KIA and two aircraft are shot down.

1984

March-Beirut CIA station chief William Buckley is kidnaped by Shi'ite militants. Killed later in June.

April-President Reagan signs bill authorizing reprisals against terrorists.

Britain breaks off diplomatic ties with Libya after British policewoman is shot during demonstration in London by Libyan gunman.

1985

February-Israeli army units raid Lebanese villages near Tyre destroying homes and killing and wounding many civilians.

March-Large car bomb explodes in Beirut killing eighty people. Explosion was near the residence of Hizballah's "spiritual guide" Sheikh Fadlallah. CIA-trained and funded covert action team was implicated in the operation.

Israeli army units raid southern Lebanese villages killing and wounding many civilians.
June-TWA airliner hijacked by Shi'ite militants and fly back and forth between Algiers and Beirut. Hijackers kill a U.S. Navy diver and demand the release of imprisoned Lebanese held in Israel.

September-Israeli agents intercept boat in international waters off Cyprus and kidnap Faisal Abu Sharah, a senior commander in the PLO security unit Force 17. Sharah is taken back to Israel for interrogation and imprisonment.

In retaliation for Israel's actions, a Force 17 team boards a yacht near Cyprus and kills three Israeli civilians (claimed to be Mossad agents).

October-In retaliation for the murder of the three Israeli's, Israel mounts an air attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis killing seventy-one and wounding 100+. Arafat narrowly escapes death.

In retaliation for air raid, members of the extremist PLF group hijack the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and murders a handicapped American Jew on board.

1986

January-Italy issues an international arrest warrant for Abu Nidal in connection with the Rome attack. He is sentenced in absentia to life in prison.

PLO chairman Arafat again condemns the use of all forms of terrorism.

February-Qaddafi holds a terrorist conference in Tripoli to prepare for action against the U.S. in case of attack.

Israeli jets intercept Libyan executive jet returning Syrian delegation from conference. Delegation is escorted to Israel. Reports that Abu Nidal was aboard proved false.

March-Car bomb in Damascus is blamed on Israeli/CIA agents.

U.S. naval task force begins freedom of navigation exercises in the disputed waters of the Gulf of Sidra. Attacks Libyan missile sites and ships when fired upon by Libyan aircraft.

April-TWA jetliner en route from Rome to Athens has hole blown in section of fuselage from bomb in luggage. Four Americans are sucked out of aircraft but it is able to land safely in Athens.

Bomb rips through La Belle discotheque, a club frequented by U.S. servicemen in Berlin. One soldier and one civilian are killed; over 200 wounded. U.S. claims evidence points to Libyan involvement.

U.S. aerial strike force attacks targets in Libya in retaliation to La Belle bombing.

Qaddafi barely escapes death.

In response to the U.S. attack, extremists in Lebanon execute three western hostages.

Security guards stop bombing of an El Al airliner at London's Heathrow Airport. Nizar Hindawi, a Syrian agent, is arrested after implicating Syrian intelligence (paid for by Libya).

October-Hindawi is sentenced by a British court to forty-five years in jail; the longest sentence handed-down in British history. Britain breaks formal diplomatic relations with Syria.

November-First published report of the U.S. arms-for-hostages deal with Iran appears in a Beirut newspaper.

1987

December-*Intifada* begins in Occupied Territories.

1988

Iran/Iraq war threatens Persian Gulf oil shipping. U.S. reflags Kuwaiti tankers and naval warships patrol the Gulf.

June-Iraqi fighter mistakenly targets *USS Stark* in Gulf with an Exocet missile.

July-*USS Vincennes* mistakenly shoots down an Iranian Airbus, killing all 290 on board.

1989

The fall of the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern Bloc effectively end their sponsorship, funding, training, and political protection of terrorist organizations worldwide.

1990

August-Iraq invades and occupies Kuwait over disputed land and oil rights. U.S. responds by forming international coalition against Saddam Hussein. *Operation Desert Shield* begins in Saudi Arabia.

June-U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia is destroyed by a 5000 gallon fuel tanker truck bomb.

July-TWA jumbo jet explodes shortly after takeoff from Kennedy Airport in New York. All 230 passengers and crew are killed. Either bomb or missile is suspected. No group claims responsibility.

August-Israel restarts settlement projects in Palestinian-controlled areas in violation of negotiated agreements. Arafat calls the moves totally unacceptable.

1991

January(15)-Deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait passes. President George Bush orders ground attack, *Operation Desert Storm* to begin. Iraq is invaded and cease-fire ordered within 100 hours.

October-U.S./Former Soviet Union host the Madrid Conference for Mideast peace.

1992

June-Israeli government changes; Yitzak Rabin is elected Prime Minister. Peace negotiations continue.

November-U.S. President Bush is defeated by Bill Clinton in national election.

1993

February-Bombing of World Trade Center in New York leaves eighteen dead, hundreds injured. Suspected mastermind Ramzi Ahmed Yousef linked to militant Egyptian Muslim cleric Abd al-Rahman, suspected of involvement in assassination of Anwar Sadat.

September-After a series of secret negotiations, Israel-PLO sign Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington.

1994

July-King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel sign Washington Declaration, ending the state of war between the two countries.

Yasir Arafat returns to the Gaza Strip and establishes the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a step in the transition to self-rule.

1995

February-Ramzi Yousef is arrested and extradited to the U.S. to face charges of planning the World Trade Center bombing, as well as an alleged scheme in conjunction with Filipino Muslim groups to blow up U.S. airliners over the Pacific.

June-Gunmen attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during his visit to Ethiopia. Gunmen flee to Sudan.

July-Senior Hamas official Musa Abu Marzuq was detained while trying to enter the U.S. in New York. Israel seeks extradition.

October-Shaykh Abd al-Rahman and co-conspirators were convicted in New York of bombing the World Trade Center and plotting to blow up the United Nations, the New York FBI Building, and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels.

November-Hamas military wing commander and master bomb-maker, Yahya Ayyash, alias the engineer, is assassinated in Gaza. Israeli Shin Bet is suspected, along with PA complicity.

Israeli Prime Minister Rabin is assassinated by a radical right-wing Jew. Shimon Peres takes over.

Terrorists bomb headquarters of the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard in Riyadh. Kills seven (five U.S.) And wounds forty-two.

1996

February-Hamas conducts suicide bombing campaign inside Israel allegedly in retaliation for the killing of Ayyash. Peres government under increasing pressure to act.

May-By the narrowest of margins, Peres loses election to conservative candidate Benjamin Netanyahu who is elected Prime Minister.

ABU NIDAL MAJOR ACTIVITIES

1973

Abu Nidal is PLO representative in Baghdad. *Secretly begins organizing ANO with Iraqi backing.*

October-ANO's first attempt on Arafat's life; PLO Treasurer killed instead.

November-KLM airliner hijacked to Malta. Passengers/crew released; hijackers land in Syria.

1974

October-Abu Nidal makes formal break from Fatah; sentences Arafat to death in return; attempt on Arafat's life fails, as does attempt on Arafat confidant Abbas.

November-BEA airliner hijacked and diverted to Tunis. One fatality. Passengers/crew released while hijackers continue on to Libya.

1976

September-Attack Semiramis Hotel in Damascus.

October-Attack Syrian embassies in Pakistan & Rome.

November-Attack Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, Jordan.

December-Attempted attack on Syrian embassy in Turkey fails; Attempted assassination on Syrian foreign minister fails.

1977

October-Second attempt to kill Syrian foreign minister at Abu Dhabi airport; UAE foreign minister accidentally killed.

November-Assassinated director of Arab Library in Paris.

1978

January-PLO representative in London, Sa'id Hammami (a PLO moderate) assassinated.

February-Senior Egyptian journalist and director of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee assassinated in Cyprus.

April-Abu Nidal sends 130 of his best fighters from the People's Army to join forces with Fatah and fight the Israeli's. Arafat suspects a plot and has all guerrillas arrested. Abu Nidal is enraged...

June-PLO representative in Kuwait assassinated.

August-PLO representative (and moderate) in Paris assassinated.

PLO representative in Pakistan narrowly escapes assassination attempt; four others are killed.

1979

June-Assassinate former ANO member Muhammad Arif.

November-Attempt assassination of Israeli Ambassador to Portugal; bodyguard is wounded instead.

Attempted attack on a Jewish conference being held at the Peter Hotel in Salzburg, Austria.

1980

January-Assassinate director of the Arab Library in Paris.

April-Attempt assassination of PLO intelligence and security chief Abu Iyad in Belgrade.

July-Attack on children at Agudath Israel school for Jewish children in Antwerp.

Attempted attack on El Al airliner in Brussels.

Assassinated Israeli Commercial Attache' in Brussels.

October-Bombing of Rue Copernic synagogue in Paris..

1981

May-Assassination of Viennese City Councilman Heinz Nittel and threatens life of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

June-Assassinates PLO representative (and moderate) in Brussels.

July-Attempted assassination on Fatah guerrilla commander Abu Dawud in Warsaw, Poland.

August-Attack on Vienna synagogue; kills two, wounds seventeen.

September-Bomb attack on Shoham-Zim offices in Cyprus; five wounded.

October-Bomb attack on Abu Sharar, spokesman for PLO Unified Information Office and member of the Fatah Central Committee; successful.

Attempted assassination of PLO representative to Libya in Malta; another man killed by mistake.

1982

June-(3)-Shlomo Argov, Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain is shot and wounded in assassination attempt in London.

August-Attack on restaurant in Jewish quarter of Paris leaves six dead, twenty-two wounded.

September-Assassinated the first secretary of Kuwaiti embassy in Madrid, Spain.

Attacks synagogue in Brussels.

October-Attacks synagogue in Rome killing one, wounding ten.

Begins to Transition ANO out of Iraq and into Syria.

1983

April-ANO claims responsibility for killing PLO's roving European ambassador, Issam Sartawi while attending Socialist Congress in Portugal.

June-Attempted assassination of Fatah official in Barcelona.

August-Egyptian cell broken up by police while planning attacks against Israeli and Fatah targets.

September-Gulf Air (UAE) airliner blown up by bomb killing all 122 people on board.

October-Now fully transitioned and working for Syria, ANO begins a two year terrorist campaign against Jordan to prevent King Hussein from negotiating peace with Israel.

Attempts to kill Jordan's ambassadors in Italy and India. One wounded (India).
November-Attacks Jordanian Embassy in Athens killing one guard while wounding another.

December-Bomb attack against French Cultural Center in Izmir, Turkey.

1984

February-Implicated in murder of UAE Ambassador to France.

March-Explodes bomb in hotel in Amman, Jordan, two days prior to a planned visit by Queen Elizabeth.

Assassinates deputy director of the British Council from the British Embassy, Kenneth Whitty, in Greece.

May-Abu Nidal meets Colonel Qaddafi in Libya and agrees to do contract work for Libya.

September-Assassinate PLO representative in Bucharest, Romania (gunmen escaped).

November-Assassinate Britain's deputy high commissioner in Bombay, Percy Norris.
Bombs Beirut office of British Airways.

1985

Abu Nidal opens up operations in Libya and gradually breaks away from Syria.

March-British journalist Alec Collet is kidnaped by front organization for ANO.

May-Egyptian police arrest ANO agent who was targeting U.S. Embassy in Cairo for a truck bomb attack.

July-British Airways office in Madrid is destroyed by a bomb blast.

August-A bomb attack on a hotel in the resort of Glyfada outside of Athens injures thirteen.

September-Grenade attack on the Cafe' de Paris in Rome injures forty people.

Jordanian journalist and avid Arafat supporter Michel Nimri is assassinated.

November-ANO terrorists hijack an Egyptian airliner and force it to fly to Malta.

Hijackers kill six passengers before an Egyptian commando unit storms the aircraft. Sixty passengers are killed as a result of the assault and the ensuing fires caused by it.

December-ANO squad attacks El Al ticket counters at Leonardo Da Vinci Airport in Rome while another squad simultaneously assaults counters at Schwechat Airport in Vienna. Eighteen dead and 110 wounded between the two before the attackers are either killed or wounded.

1986

February-France releases ANO members responsible for murder of PLO representative in Paris in August, 78 are released on probation. Deal between ANO/France suspected.

April-Abu Nidal involvement suspected in both the TWA and the La Belle disco bombings.

Attack against an Israeli bus in the West Bank. One killed.

Abu Nidal traced to supplying the explosives for Hindawi's failed bombing of El Al airliner in London.

ANO front organization executes hostage British journalist Alec Collett in retaliation for Britain's complicity in U.S. air strike on Libya.

August-ANO front organization on Cyprus conducts rocket and mortar attack on British base. No fatalities.

September-ANO hijackers seize Pan Am jumbo jet with 358 people on board in Karachi. Pakistani troops assault the aircraft and seventeen people are killed, 150 wounded during the course of the shoot out.

ANO gunmen attack the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey. Twenty-one worshipers are killed.

October-Britain expels six known ANO members from the country.

1987

June-ANO is kicked out of Syria; Abu Nidal breaks completely from Syria and works solely for Libya.

July-Bombing of restaurant in the West Bank city of Qalqilya wounds seventeen.

During 1987, Abu Nidal allegedly sentenced over 600 of his own people to death as traitors to the organization.

1988

Abu Nidal continues purge of his own organization and has some of his most trusted leaders killed. Others defect before they are killed.

March-AllItalia airline crew is attacked on a commuter bus in Bombay, India; one wounded.

May-Detonated a car bomb near the Israeli Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus; three dead, seventeen wounded.

Two targets in the Sudan attacked simultaneously; total of eight dead, twenty-one wounded.

Belgian doctor kidnaped in southern Lebanon.

July-Assault team attacks the Greek cruise ship *City of Poros*; nine killed, eighty wounded. On same day, ANO assault team leader Samih Khudr was killed by car bomb intended for cruise ship.

1989

Purges continue within ANO; massive reorganization occurs throughout.

1990

March-Attacks and wounds a senior dissident in Algeria.

Reportedly fearful of U.S. retaliation, Libya's Qaddafi keeps Abu Nidal under house arrest. ANO performs no terrorist acts in support of Iraq during entire Gulf War.

1991

January(13)-Bodyguard (working deep cover for ANO) of PLO chief of security Abu Hol and PLO chief of intelligence (and long-time enemy of Abu Nidal) Abu Iyad, assassinates both in Tunis.

December-Ibrahim-Mohammed Khaled, sole ANO survivor of ANO attack at Rome airport in 1985, is captured by Italian authorities. Agrees to cooperate and describes organization and functioning of ANO.

1992

January-Former member Samir Hammouda is assassinated in Lebanon.

April-Attempted assassination of Fatah commander of forces in Tyre, Lt. Col. Ainain.

June-Assassinates Atef Bseiso, chief of Fatah intelligence in Paris.

Assassinates Lt. Col. Anwar Madi, top Fatah officer in Lebanon.

October-Assassinates Mohammad Houbesh, a former ANO member and Fatah commander in Tyre.

Assassinates three Fatah officials, bodyguard, and a civilian at a cafe in Sidon. Attack came hours after bomb blast destroys an ANO official's car.

December-Two ANO members are killed as they attempt to plant explosives in order to kill Fatah Lt. Col. Sufyan, also a former ANO member. Later, a Fatah member is killed by ANO members.

Third attempt to assassinate Fatah Lt. Col. Ainain fails when bomb planted in Rashidayah refugee camp explodes but misses Ainain's passing convoy. Twenty civilians wounded in blast.

1993

February-Fatah activist Yousif Mansour is assassinated in Sidon.

March-Mouin Shabaytah, Fatah's top official in Lebanon, is assassinated in Sidon.

April-Assassinates Lt. Col. Salim, Fatah's top official in Beirut.

In the United States, the FBI breaks up ANO cell (Isa, Musa, Nijmah) organizing in the Midwest. FBI had been tracking cell's movements/activities since 1986. Cell planned to kill Jews and blow up the Israeli Embassy.

Fatah declares open war against ANO. Accuses Lebanon and Syria of providing aid to ANO.

Assassinates Dr. Ibrahim Turkiyah, Fatah regional commander for southern Lebanon.

Assassinates Yahya Nabl al.Masri, Fatah head of Shabriha refugee camp near Tyre.

Faction led by Abdul Karim al-Barna splits from ANO in dispute over the targeting of moderate Palestinians.

June-Fatah releases fifty-two ANO members in southern Lebanon who had previously been convicted of terrorism.

July-Barna claims ANO is too weak to resume activities and has been expelled from Algeria, Libya, and Sudan, and no longer has any political or organizational existence.

1994

January-Jordanian diplomat Naeb Omran Maaytah is Assassinated in Beirut. Killers remove sensitive documents from body.

February-During Nonaligned Summit being held in India, security forces capture ANO cell attempting to assassinate key officials at meeting.

July-Yussef Shaaban, a Palestinian follower of Abu Nidal, claims responsibility for the destruction of PanAm Flight 103, destroyed over Scotland in 1988. Many feel Qadaffi is behind the claim. Motive unknown.

1995

January-President Clinton orders a freeze on the U.S. assets of twelve Mideast groups that could disrupt the peace process; Abu Nidal is specifically named.

February-A man believed to be Mahmoud Khaled Eintour (Abu Ali Majed), one of ANO's top assassins, is arrested in Sidon.

August-ANO accused by Lebanese Fatah faction of assassinating Shaykh Nizar al-Halabi, chairman of the Islamic Charitable Projects Society in Beirut.

November-Five suspected ANO members are arrested by PA security attempting to infiltrate into Gaza via Egypt. Linked to plan to assassinate Arafat.

1996

January-PA security chief Amin al-Hindi announces the capture of ANO cell in Gaza that was allegedly preparing to wage a terror campaign by assassinating top PA officials and bombing schools. Large quantities of weapons and explosives were seized.

Recent reports indicate that ANO is attempting to establish closer contact with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Continuing relationship with Iraq.

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Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5000 | 1 |
| 9. | RADM Thomas R. Richards
Commander
Naval Special Warfare Command
San Diego, CA 92155 | 1 |
| 10. | Commander
Naval Special Warfare Development Group
FCTCL Dam Neck
Virginia Beach, VA 23461-5200 | 1 |
| 11. | Commander
Naval Special Warfare Group One
NAB Coronado
San Diego, CA 92155 | 1 |
| 12. | Commander
Naval Special Warfare Group Two
NAB Little Creek, VA 23521 | 1 |
| 13. | Commander
Naval Special Warfare Center
NAB Coronado
San Diego, CA 92155 | 1 |
| 14. | MG James L. Hobson
Commander
Air Force Special Operations Command
Hurlburt Field, FL 32544 | 1 |
| 15. | MG Michael A. Canavan
Commander
Joint Special Operations Command
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307 | 1 |
| 16. | COL Joseph B. McMillan
Commander
1st Special Forces Group (Abn)
Ft Lewis, WA 98433-5000 | 1 |

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| 17. | COL David E. McCracken
Commander
3d Special Forces Group (Abn)
Ft Bragg, NC 28307 | 1 |
| 18. | COL Thomas Carlin
Commander
5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
Ft Campbell, KY 42223 | 1 |
| 19. | COL James Parker
Commander
7th Special Forces Group (Abn)
Ft Bragg, NC 28307 | 1 |
| 20. | COL Les Fuller
Commander
10th Special Forces Group (Abn)
Ft Carson, CO 80913 | 1 |
| 21. | COL Glenn M. Harned
Commander
Special Operations Command, Korea
PSC 303, Box 97
APO AP 96204 | 1 |
| 22. | BG Robert W. Wagner
Commander
Special Operations Command, South
Albrook Air Force Station, Panama | 1 |
| 23. | BG Robert R. Holland
Commander
Special Operations Command, Pacific
Camp Smith, Oahu, HI 96861 | 1 |
| 24. | BG Philip R. Kensinger, Jr.
Commander
Special Operations Command, Central
Macdill Air Force Base, FL 33621 | 1 |

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| 25. | COL Geoffrey C. Lambert
Commander
Special Operations Command, Europe
Patch Barracks, Vaihingen, Germany | 1 |
| 26. | COL Donald W. Richardson
Acting Commander
Special Operation Command, Atlantic Command
Norfolk, VA 23511 | 1 |
| 27. | COL Lance Booth
Commander
1st Special Warfare Training Group
Ft Bragg, NC 28307 | 1 |
| 28. | Jennifer Duncan
Center for Special Operations
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 | 5 |
| 29. | Library
Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 | 1 |
| 30. | Library
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02840 | 1 |
| 31. | Strategic Studies Group (SSG)
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02840 | 1 |
| 32. | U.S. Naval Academy
Attn: Library
Annapolis, MD 21412 | 1 |
| 33. | Department of Military Strategy
National War College (NWMS)
Ft Leslie J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319-6111 | 1 |
| 34. | US Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: Library
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 | 1 |

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| 35. | Library
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6428 | 1 |
| 36. | US Army Center for Military History
1099 14th St NW
Washington, DC 20005-3402 | 1 |
| 37. | US Military Academy
ATTN: Library
West Point, NY 10996 | 1 |
| 38. | Marquat Memorial Library
US Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
Rm. C287, Bldg 3915
Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5000 | 1 |
| 39. | USASOC
Director of History and Museums
ATTN: AOHS-Dr Stewart
Ft Bragg, NC28307-5200 | 2 |
| 40. | Commander
USASOC, ATTN: Mr. Tony Norman
Ft Bragg, NC 28307 | 1 |
| 41. | United States Special Operations Command
Joint Special Operations Forces Institute
Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5000 | 1 |
| 42. | US Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: COL James G. Conroy
Bolling Air Force Base
Washington, DC 20332 | 1 |
| 43. | U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA/TWC-2
Attn: Steve Scherer
Bolling Air Force Base
Washington, DC 20332 | 1 |

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| 44. | MAJ Joseph E. Osborne
811 40th Ave. N.
St. Petersburg, FL 33703 | 2 |
| 45. | MAJ Daniel C. Daoust
207 Colmar Rd.
Seaside, CA 93955 | 2 |