Toetjes,

Abstract

A number is secretly chosen from the interval (0, 1), and n players try in turn to guess this number. When the secret number is revealed, the player with the closest guess wins. We describe an optimal strategy for a version of this game. We have shown that a simple zero-sum game in which all players play independently so as to maximize their own payoff can be viewed, under certain conditions, as a game in which the players cooperate to minimize the payoff of the last player. Furthermore, this approach is helpful in developing an optimal strategy for the game. An interesting question is whether this principle can be applied to a broader family of zero-sum games.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1988
Accession Number
ADA324469

Entities

People

  • Tomas Feder

Organizations

  • Stanford University

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Ambiguity
  • Availability
  • Classification
  • Commerce
  • Computer Science
  • Computers
  • Contracts
  • Equations
  • Intervals
  • Mathematics
  • Military Research
  • Operations Research
  • Probability
  • Security
  • Sequences
  • Zero-Sum Games

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.