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Testimony


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U.N. PEACEKEEPING

Issues Related to
Effectiveness, Cost, and
Reform

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of the body of work we have completed on issues concerning the effectiveness and cost of U.N. peacekeeping.¹ Specifically, my statement will address four key issues: (1) the U.N.'s limitations in conducting peace operations that require the use of force, (2) long-standing peacekeeping missions that are from 6 to nearly 50 years old, (3) the extent to which the United States has provided voluntary support to U.N.-sanctioned peace operations, and (4) the U.N.'s efforts to reform the management of peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Chairman, before elaborating on these issues let me summarize my remarks.

Summary

Limits on Success of U.N. Peace Operations Requiring the Use of Force

Over the years, the United Nations has had some degree of success in carrying out peacekeeping missions where the use of force was not required. Examples of this might include the U.N. Transition Assistance Group in Namibia and the U.N. Observer Group in Central America. However, as the Cold War came to a close and the United Nations was called on to lead large complex missions that required the use of force to restore peace and security, the United Nations was demonstrably less successful. There are clearly many reasons for this, including the failure to commit sufficient resources, the lack of sufficient will on the part of the international community, an inadequate operational structure for carrying out such missions, and the differences in the geopolitical situations that affect the execution of each mission.

Nonetheless, our analysis of seven operations that called for the use of force—either directly by citing Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter or implied by the wording of their mandates²—led us to the conclusion that the reasons for a lack of success were deeper than the conventional wisdom. We concluded that the organizational limits of the United Nations put at risk the success of such missions. Specifically, unlike a sovereign nation, the United Nations (1) cannot conscript troops and resources when

¹A list of GAO products on peace operations is attached to this statement.

²These include the U.N. peace operations in the Congo, Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Eastern Slavonia.

necessary but must rely on sovereign members to voluntarily provide them and (2) has no assurance that national troop contingents will carry out orders issued by a U.N. force commander. The United Nations also seeks the consent of the warring parties to carry out its mandate, even when force is authorized. These organizational limits were particularly apparent in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

Because of these limitations, we concluded that the United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle to lead missions where force is required to restore peace, unless a nation or coalition with sufficient military capability and commitment leads the operation. The U.N.'s limits in leading operations requiring the use of force have become increasingly accepted by experts on peacekeeping and by U.N. officials. This lesson is also reflected in U.S. policy and recent actions by the United States and the U.N. Security Council in ensuring acceptable leadership and support for the operations in Haiti and Eastern Slavonia.

Status of Long-Standing Peacekeeping Missions

In recognition of the limited success of operations such as those that required the use of force and the inability to bring closure to several long-standing missions, U.S. and U.N. policy has become more focused. There is now general agreement that the main objective of peacekeeping is to reduce tensions and provide a limited period of time for diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the underlying conflicts. Thus, peacekeeping missions are not to be open-ended commitments, and U.S. policy tries to ensure their effectiveness by seeing that they deploy in support of peacemaking efforts; have clear, realistic objectives; and have end points and exit strategies. These guidelines were articulated in a May 1994 public summary of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), the administration's policy on peace operations. To further ensure peacekeeping's value, PDD-25 also directed U.S. officials to consider vetoing the renewal of long-standing missions that are not achieving their mandates.

Despite the success of U.N. peacekeeping over the last 50 years, some situations have proven to be intractable, and the peacekeeping missions have evolved into open-ended commitments. At your request, we analyzed the eight U.N. operations that are from 6 to nearly 50 years old—including the peace operations in India and Pakistan, Cyprus, Angola, Iraq and Kuwait, the Western Sahara, and three in the Middle East. We focused specifically on whether these older missions are fulfilling their mandates and, if not, why the executive branch continues to support them. We found

that three missions—the ones in Lebanon and the Western Sahara and the one between India and Pakistan—essentially were not achieving their mandates, and, according to U.N. reports, had contributed marginally to more secure and stable environments. Three others—including the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East and the missions in Angola and Cyprus—were only partially achieving their mandates but had made some positive contributions to stability. The missions in the Golan Heights and between Iraq and Kuwait were successfully carrying out their mandates and contributing to stability in their areas of operation. More importantly however, six of the missions were not linked to settlement agreements, as called for by U.S. policy, and diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflicts had stalled or were stalemated. None had clear end points or exit strategies.

Although these eight missions have become, in essence, open-ended commitments, U.S. officials support continuing all of them because in their view the missions help stabilize and prevent the recurrence of conflicts in areas vital to U.S. interests. We have recommended that the United States take the lead in working with other members of the Security Council to identify specific exit criteria and strategies for these missions. This should be done in a manner consistent with PDD-25, balancing the need to bring closure to some of these operations with other U.S. interests such as stabilizing conflicts that pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

U.S. Voluntary or Indirect Support

In addition to paying assessed contributions for U.N. peacekeeping operations—currently at a rate of 25 percent of the cost of the operation—the United States often provides additional support to U.N.-sanctioned missions for which it is not reimbursed. In March 1996, we reported that for fiscal years 1992 through 1995, the United States paid \$1.3 billion in assessed contributions for the missions in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia. But in addition, the United States undertook actions in support of these U.N. operations that cost \$5.3 billion. This includes about \$3.4 billion in incremental costs incurred by the Department of Defense (DOD) and \$1.9 billion incurred for humanitarian and other assistance by other U.S. agencies.

For example, in Haiti, the United States spent an additional \$953 million to remove the military dictatorship from Haiti, provide training and equipment to countries to help prepare them for participating in the subsequent U.N. operation, and establish civic order so the U.N. mission could function. Similarly, since the humanitarian crisis was overwhelming

peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, U.S. agencies spent an additional \$463 million to provide emergency food, water, and sanitation for the war-affected population, as well as send 2,000 troops to the region in support of humanitarian actions. And in the former Yugoslavia, DOD incurred about \$784 million in incremental costs for humanitarian airdrops, airlift of relief supplies into Sarajevo, and for enforcing the no-fly zone.

U.N. Peacekeeping Reform Efforts

Finally, let me comment on management reforms the United Nations has undertaken to improve the operational effectiveness and efficiency of its peacekeeping missions. In 1992 and 1993, we reported that the United Nations was ill-equipped to plan, logistically support, or deploy personnel to large, complex missions such as in Cambodia and Somalia. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York had a very small staff, planning was not integrated, the organizational structure obstructed efficient operations, and field communications with headquarters was difficult and sometimes impossible. Since then, the United Nations, with U.S. and other member support, has made progress in strengthening operations. It has reorganized and expanded the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; established a 24-hour situation center; revised its procurement, contracting, and logistics procedures; and established a logistical support base in Brindisi, Italy. While we have not specifically evaluated the effectiveness of these reforms, we have observed improvements in planning and implementing peacekeeping efforts as we looked at the missions in Haiti and Eastern Slavonia.

While steps to improve management have been made, as one would expect, peacekeeping operations are not without problems. Reports by the U.N.'s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)—created in 1994 at the urging of the United States as an important reform measure—have continued to identify problems with U.N. peacekeeping operations. For example, it recently reported that due to poor planning, almost 900 generators costing \$6 million were purchased for operations in the former Yugoslavia but were unneeded and not used; bids for supplying fresh food rations to another mission were manipulated to favor one bidder; lack of internal controls caused fraudulent claims to be paid on vehicle spare parts and repairs; and staff members falsely claimed they were in Haiti and received related benefits to which they were not entitled. I should mention that, at the request of Senators Helms and Grams, we are now reviewing how well OIOS is functioning, including whether it is operationally

independent, has adequate staffing, and is otherwise equipped to carry out its mandate.

Limits on Success of U.N. Peace Operations

Over the past 50 years, the United Nations has led peacekeeping missions with some degree of success; however, as we reported in March 1997, it has not effectively led operations calling for the use of force.³ This includes both missions authorized to use force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and those missions whose mandates call for forceful action but do not explicitly authorize it. In part, it is the limits of the U.N. organization that put at risk the success of such operations. These limits stem from the United Nations being an organization based on a fundamental respect for the sovereignty of its members. Unlike sovereign nations, the United Nations (1) cannot conscript troops and raise other resources that may be necessary to effectively conduct operations requiring the use of force; and (2) has no assurance that national contingents under its command will carry out orders issued by a U.N. commander. The United Nations also seeks the consent of warring parties to carry out its mandate, even when force is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter. These limitations have been overcome when a nation with sufficient military prestige and credibility and the commitment of resources has assumed leadership of the operation.

Several examples help illustrate these points. Of the 42 peace operations led by the United Nations since 1945, the operations in Bosnia (1992-95), Somalia (1992-95), and Eastern Slavonia (1996 and ongoing) were explicitly authorized to use force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.⁴ Four other operations—Lebanon (1978 and ongoing), the Congo (1960-64), Rwanda (1993-96), and the second phase of the Haiti mission (1995-96)—were not so authorized but had mandates calling for forceful action. Of these operations, the ones in which the United Nations had full leadership were hampered by the limitations previously mentioned. For example, despite Security Council calls for action, the United Nations could not obtain adequate troops, equipment, and reinforcements to effectively carry out the operations in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia. For Bosnia, 34,000 additional troops were requested to deter attacks on “safe areas,” but only 7,600 were made available.

³United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34, Mar. 27, 1997).

⁴The U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission was authorized under Chapter VII to redress small-scale violations of the demilitarized zone, but is not used as an example here because of the limited scope of the authority to use force.

Limits on U.N. command and control hindered U.N. commanders from effectively deploying U.N. peacekeepers to mission-critical locations in Somalia, Bosnia, and the Congo. National contingents frequently sought instructions from their capitals before redeploying troops, and in some cases they refused to redeploy. Finally, the U.N.'s will to use force in Somalia, Bosnia, and the Congo was uncertain at key points and caused U.N. forces to lose credibility among the warring factions. The U.N. operations continued to rely on the consent of the warring parties to conduct operations. In Bosnia, U.N. officials were reluctant to use airpower to deter attacks against safe areas, in part because of threats of retaliation, but also because they feared such action would make it appear that they were taking sides in an internal fight. Moreover, the U.N. operation in Bosnia acceded to roadblocks, sought clearance from the warring factions before moving its vehicles, and allowed the warring factions to influence the deployment of troop contingents. These actions partly reflect the U.N.'s fundamental organizational principle of ensuring that the sovereignty of its members is respected at all times.

In contrast, the operation in Eastern Slavonia and the second phase of the Haiti mission have been operationally effective, partly because of leadership by sovereign nations with credibility and respect. The United States provided leadership for the second phase of the operation in Haiti and ensured that adequate troops and resources were available to carry out assigned tasks, used its command and control structure for the operation, and applied its doctrine for operations other than war to help guide actions. Military leadership for the operation in Eastern Slavonia is provided by a Belgian major general, who uses Belgian officers to provide headquarters command and control. This operation also has the commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide close air support and other help.

Partly in response to peacekeeping operations that were less than fully successful, the executive branch developed PDD-25, its policy on peace operations. According to PDD-25, peacekeeping is a tool intended to provide a finite window of opportunity for combatants to resolve their differences through diplomatic means. The policy also lays out factors to be considered both in approving new missions and voting to continue ongoing ones. These factors include whether U.N. involvement advances U.S. interests; whether there is a threat to international peace and security; and whether the missions have clear objectives, international support, realistic exit criteria, and end points. The application of this policy was cogently expressed in 1996 by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the

United Nations. She said that the international community simply cannot afford to maintain operations where the disputants' commitment to overcoming obstacles is in question, where there is no discernable progress toward resolution, and where no end is in sight. The policy also directs executive branch officials to rigorously scrutinize all missions and consider voting against the renewal of long-standing ones not accomplishing their objectives.

Status of Long-Standing Peacekeeping Missions

Currently there are eight long-standing peacekeeping missions that range from 6 to nearly 50 years. These are discussed in some detail in our report being released today.⁵ These long-standing missions account for over 40 percent of the current U.N. assessments for peacekeeping and, as of March 1997, cumulatively cost over \$6.1 billion. Of these eight operations, two—the ones in the Golan Heights and on the Iraq-Kuwait border—have generally carried out their mandates and helped maintain stability in their areas of operation. Three other operations—the ones in Angola, Cyprus, and the Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East—have partially fulfilled their mandates and made some positive contributions to stability.

The remaining three operations—Lebanon, Western Sahara, and on the India-Pakistan border—have generally not carried out their mandates and, according to U.N. reports, have contributed only marginally to establishing more secure and stable environments. For example, while the operation in Lebanon does provide humanitarian relief and some security for the local population, the U.N. Secretary General has reported for the past several years that the operation's mandate issued in 1978 remains unfulfilled. One of the operation's mandate objectives was to help restore Lebanese sovereignty and prevent its area of operation from being used for hostile activity of any kind. However, the United Nations has taken the position that it has no right to stop Lebanese forces, including Hizbollah, from resisting Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon.

Seven of the eight long-standing operations were originally deployed to support diplomatic efforts to achieve lasting settlements of the conflicts. However, as of February 1997, talks associated with the conflicts in Cyprus, Western Sahara, Syria, Lebanon, the Middle East, and Kashmir had stalled or stalemated. I should note that in Angola, progress on the Lusaka agreement has stalled; whereas in the case of India and Pakistan, there has been some preliminary movement on arranging discussions. U.N. and U.S.

⁵U.N. Peacekeeping: Status of Long-standing Operations and U.S. Interests in Supporting Them (GAO/NSIAD-97-59, Apr. 9, 1997).

officials and area experts attribute the inability to reach settlements after so many years to a variety of factors including the deeply rooted nature of the conflicts and the lack of commitment of the warring parties to resolve differences peacefully. They also point out that the long-standing operations may be a part of the problem by promoting a status quo that seems more preferable than making compromises to achieve settlements.

The eight long-standing operations have become costly and open-ended commitments. Although seven of these operations were undertaken to create stable, secure environments to assist diplomatic efforts aimed at settling these underlying conflicts, diplomatic efforts to resolve the underlying conflicts had, in most cases, stalled. Nevertheless, U.S. officials currently see no reasonable alternative to continuing these operations because they help stabilize conflicts that could threaten U.S. security interests. In their view, ending these operations would risk renewed conflict and damage future peacemaking efforts. However, continued support of these operations does not appear to give adequate consideration to other factors articulated by U.S. policy that seeks to ensure that peacekeeping operations are limited in duration, linked to concrete political solutions, and have exit criteria and identified end points for U.N. involvement.

In light of U.S. interests in supporting well-defined peacekeeping operations linked to concrete political solutions, our report recommended that the United States take the lead in working with other U.N. Security Council members to identify specific exit criteria and strategies for these operations. We suggested that this should be done in a manner consistent with PDD-25, balancing the need to bring closure to these operations with other U.S. interests such as stabilizing conflicts that pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy objectives. We noted that these strategies need not propose immediate ends to these operations but, rather, may focus on how and when the desired end states can be achieved, what intermediate and final objectives are sought, and what specific role these operations play in achieving the sought-after end states.

U.S. Support of U.N. Peace Operations

The United States paid \$1.95 billion for U.N.-assessed contributions for U.N. peacekeeping for fiscal years 1994 through 1996, but according to the State Department's budget request, the United States still owes about \$658 million for peacekeeping arrears. Approximately \$533 million of the U.S. arrearage is owed for assessments to the mission in the former Yugoslavia.

In addition to paying for the assessments for U.N. peacekeeping missions, the United States often provides voluntary support for the operations. As noted in table 1, during fiscal years 1992 through 1995, the U.S. costs for supporting U.N.-sanctioned peace operations in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia was about \$6.6 billion. This includes about \$1.34 billion in assessments, and an additional \$5.26 billion for other support. For example, in addition to making payments of \$786 million in assessments for the operation in the former Yugoslavia for these years., DOD incurred incremental costs of \$784 million when it helped enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia with other NATO members, provided close air support for U.N. peacekeepers, launched air strikes against parties that attacked safe areas, flew humanitarian airdrops with meals-ready-to-eat and other necessities for besieged enclaves, and operated a hospital in Croatia for U.N. peacekeepers.

Table 1: U.S. Costs in Support of Selected U.N. Peace Operations, Fiscal Years 1992-95

Country	Dollars in millions				
	Fiscal years				
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992-95
Haiti Total	\$79.7	\$130.4	\$530.8	\$875.8	\$1,616.7
(U.S. assessment)	(0)	(0)	(0.5)	(51.9)	(52.4)
Former Yugoslavia Total	126.7	408.7	959.0	692.5	2,186.9
(U.S. assessment)	(76.4)	(70.1)	(459.7)	(179.8)	(786.0)
Rwanda Total	22.1	24.8	261.4	265.4	573.7
(U.S. assessment)	(0)	(0)	(34.0)	(75.5)	(109.5)
Somalia Total	92.9	1,124.8	913.3	92.1	2,223.1
(U.S. assessment)	(0)	(40.9)	(330.9)	(16.9)	(388.7)
Total	\$321.4	\$1,688.7	\$2,664.5	\$1,925.8	\$6,600.4
(U.S. assessment)	(76.4)	(111)	(825.1)	(324.1)	(1,336.6)

Note: As of August 1995, the United Nations had reimbursed the United States \$79.4 million for its participation in these operations.

Other U.S. agencies also provide voluntary support for peacekeeping operations. Like DOD's support, most of this assistance is not contributed directly to the peace operations but helps create environments in which operations can take place. For example, in fiscal years 1992 through 1995, the U.S. Agency for International Development spent over \$480 million for activities in Haiti such as training the Haitian police force in conducting criminal investigations, funding the human rights monitoring mission, and providing food and health services for the population. In fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the Departments of Justice, Commerce, the Treasury,

Transportation, and Health and Human Services provided over \$55 million for programs to help train Haitian judges, strengthen the criminal justice system, and help with migration emergencies and refugee processing. In Somalia, the U.S. Agency for International Development spent \$239 million from fiscal years 1992 through 1995 for activities including food distribution, water and sanitation, mine clearing, and efforts to establish a police and judicial system.

U.N. Peacekeeping Management Reform Efforts

Over the years, the United Nations has come under increasing criticism for its inefficient management of peacekeeping missions. However, by the early 1990s when the United Nations was called upon to undertake several large, complex missions such as Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia almost simultaneously, the U.N.'s management deficiencies were magnified. In 1992 and 1993 we reported that the United Nations was poorly equipped to efficiently and effectively manage large complex missions. For example, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations lacked sufficient staff to plan and implement missions and, moreover, had to rely on other organizations within the United Nations to prepare budgets, procure equipment and supplies, and provide logistical support. For both the Cambodia and Somalia missions, these weaknesses were reflected in (1) the lack of detailed operational plans prior to deployment, (2) fragmented military and civilian plans, (3) limited and erroneous information, and (4) poor communications between headquarters and the field.

In response to such problems, the United Nations, with the help of member states, has taken steps to improve its capacity to plan, deploy, and support missions. Key reform efforts have been to restructure the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is responsible for the planning and day-to-day conduct of missions; upgrade logistics support for missions; and improve procurement practices. We have not specifically evaluated the effectiveness of these reforms but believe they are steps in the right direction. One indication of the reforms' impact is the Eastern Slavonia operation, where the Security Council ensured that a NATO member provided the military leadership and the mission's command and control and where the deployment of 5,000 peacekeepers took place on schedule and without direct assistance from the United States.

Despite these positive signs, OIOS has reported some continuing weaknesses in managing operations. Three efforts—(1) the restructuring and strengthening of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the

creation of a logistics center at Brindisi, Italy; and (3) steps to improve procurement practices—help illustrate reform steps taken and the continuing weaknesses.

Restructuring the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was restructured over the past few years to include the field administration and logistics division. Previously, the field logistics division was in a different department, causing delays in mission planning and support and disagreements on priorities. Several units were also added to the department to support peacekeeping actions to hold elections, mount international civilian police actions, and effectively use information in peacekeeping missions. To ensure adequate staffing for these functions, the department's personnel was increased from 60 in 1992 to an authorized staff of 398, with an additional 110 military officers on loan from member states to deal with logistics, planning, and procurement. A situation center was also completed and tasked to maintain 24-hour communication with all ongoing missions and provide periodic situation reports from the missions.

In reviewing some of the recent field missions, OIOS noted that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations still needs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. For example, OIOS reported that the department needs to provide appropriate guidance and direction for operations at headquarters and in the field, and it recommended that the department standardize procedures in the areas of budgeting, finance, field administration, procurement, and property management. It also noted the need to institutionalize the lessons learned from past missions in the form of policies, guidelines, handbooks, and manuals. OIOS said that it would be an extraordinary waste of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of experience in tasks of continuing significance, such as the demobilization of warring factions, if this experience was not translated into practical guides for future missions.

Establishment of a Logistics Center

To improve logistics, the United Nations established a center at Brindisi, Italy, to receive, repair, and store surplus equipment from closing missions and to maintain mission start-up kits. The logistics center was intended to safeguard and put to effective use the millions of dollars' worth of vehicles, generators, computers, and other assets from completed missions and to organize them into off-the-shelf kits to support new missions. According to the 1996 Annual Report to Congress on

Peacekeeping, the center is cost free, except for utilities and upkeep, and has demonstrated its value.

However, an OIOS report raised questions about the cost-effectiveness of the center because it was uncertain if its annual operating cost was greater than the value of the equipment it was recovering. For example, the center recorded the value of its inventory at about \$20 million. However, this was the purchase price rather than the actual value of the inventory. According to OIOS, much of the equipment and supplies in the inventory was in poor condition and should have been written off. It estimated that 50 percent of the generators were not working and most of the trucks and light vehicles could be used only for spare parts. Some of this equipment—generators and food rations, for instance—was shipped to missions where it was unusable and had to be destroyed or shipped back at additional cost. OIOS reported that “in view of the annual costs of the Logistics Base of more than \$7 million, the actual value of the assets stored is a key element in assessing the cost-effectiveness of the Base.”

**Peacekeeping
Procurement Concerns
Continue**

Procurement weaknesses have been a major concern, and the United Nations has taken several steps to improve its procurement practices. According to a recent executive branch report, the United Nations reorganized its Purchase and Transportation Service from regional desks to commodity desks to take advantage of economies of scale and established professional training programs for procurement officers. To expedite procurement of commonly needed items at the lowest cost, the United Nations negotiated 35 contingency contracts for items such as vehicles, spare parts, generators, and rations. Also, the practice of reimbursing troop-contributing countries based on the countries' own surveys was replaced with a more efficient standardized cost schedule.

Despite these steps, reports from OIOS indicated continuing weaknesses involving procurement-related issues. One key weakness was a lack of internal controls in authorization and approval of contracts that might have prevented the purchase of mobile cranes that did not meet the users' needs in Bosnia; the purchase of millions of dollars' worth of uniforms and protective gear, 50 percent of which were unused at the close of the mission; and a contract for photocopier parts that exceeded the initial value of the contract by 300 percent, partly because of overbilling. OIOS also found several instances in which conflicts of interest were created, such as where the chairman of the contracts committee was also the independent approving official for those contracts and where departments

requisitioning goods were also responsible for contracting and purchasing them. Similar problems occurred at other missions.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I will be happy to answer any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.

Related GAO Products

U.N. Peacekeeping: Status of Long-standing Operations and U.S. Interests in Supporting Them (GAO/NSIAD-97-59, Apr. 9, 1997).

United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34, Mar. 27, 1997).

Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Likely to Exceed Estimates (GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996).

Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar. 6, 1996).

Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Oct. 18, 1995).

Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (GAO/NSIAD-95-113, Aug. 15, 1995).

Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia (GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995).

Peace Operations: Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United States (GAO/NSIAD-95-138BR, May 3, 1995).

Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).

Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities (GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, Feb. 13, 1995).

United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations Are Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug. 1, 1994).

Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).

Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia (GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).

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(GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Sept. 9, 1992).