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THE "MOOSE MUSS" OF THE ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN:
AN OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS USING THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Conducted over a thousand miles of islands in extremely harsh conditions it was a conflict that involved "military frustration." This conflict should not be "forgotten" as it consumed hundreds of Japanese and Allied lives and resources. A close study of the Aleutian Campaign has much to offer the future operational planner. Analysis of this historical campaign using the principles of war ("MOOSE MUSS") is valuable to today's operational planners; they may avoid mistakes in future campaigns. Failure to provide unity of command, neglect of operational intelligence and improper training, and inadequate protection from the elements were all factors that contributed to a protracted war. The analysis has significant lessons learned for the contemporary student of operational art.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Principles of War's nine elements: mass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security and simplicity are sometimes remembered by use of the creative acronym "MOOSE MUSS." The critical application of these elements to the first American joint operation of World War II holds valuable lessons for the future operational commander.

The overall U.S. mission in the Aleutians was accomplished and the United States won the war in the Pacific. However, the campaign has earned a variety of derogatory names throughout history: "the theater of military frustration," "the forgotten war," and "the thousand-mile war." The remote location and the secondary theater of war designation offers an excellent examination in the economy of force for both the United States and Japan. A simple Aleutian operational maneuver set the stage for "...the island-hopping technique that was to be used so effectively in the South Pacific."¹ From mass to simplicity, the study of both the Japanese and American operational level decisions through the principles of war will demonstrate why the Japanese failed. American decisions were not flawless. The Aleutian Campaign is a historical case study that should not be overlooked. The operational planner of today is wiser having studied it with the principles of war firmly in view.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Not only was Alaska and the Aleutians a secondary theater of war during World War II, the United States had always considered it of secondary importance. In 1904 the Navy established a naval reservation on Kiska Island but, never developed it any further. The arms

limitation efforts in the form of the Washington Conference Treaty, signed in 1922, limited United States development of the Aleutians. In 1934, Japan, a signer of that agreement renounced it. Neither the U.S. government or the military took any action. General "Billy" Mitchell, in 1935, pointed out the importance of an Alaskan defense and claimed Alaska was the "...most important strategic place in the world."² The United States did not improve Alaska's military readiness until 1940 when the Alaskan Defense Force was headed by Lieutenant General Buckner. He had less than 10,000 troops and a tiny air force. The Navy assigned to the theater was insufficient.

By 1940, the Japanese had slowly expanded their empire south, east and west. Only the northern flank still needed protection. It is believed that "Japan had no plan to invade Alaska, and American strategists had ruled out invading Japan via this short but rugged route."³ The Japanese military leaders knew the Aleutians were poorly defended and were a logical route for an invasion of the United States. Additionally, the Japanese High Command had concerns about the protection of their homeland. From their perspective, Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle's raid against Tokyo probably originated in the Aleutians (In fact the bombers had flown off U.S.S. Hornet 700 miles off the Japanese coast.). This raid inflicted minor damage but, demonstrated that Japan was vulnerable to attack. Seizure of Attu and Kiska Islands could serve as a buffer to Japan's Kuril Islands. Lieutenant General Higuda, Commander of the Japanese Northern Army had a three-fold objective.

"They wanted to break up any offensive action the Americans might contemplate against Japan by way of the Aleutians, to set up a barrier between the United States and Russia in the event that Russia determined to join the United States in its war against Japan, and to make preparations through the construction of advance air bases for future offensive action."⁴

The most important reason for the Japanese occupation of the Aleutians was that the Americans committed forces and resources away from more significant war zones.

The bombing of Dutch Harbor and the occupation of Attu and Kiska by the Japanese woke up the American public. This was the only U.S. territory in the western hemisphere that the enemy would control. The bombing of Dutch Harbor and the capture of Alaskan soil stirred the national pride and provoked the obvious fear raised after Pearl Harbor: Would the Japanese invade the continental United States? Japanese Admiral Yamamoto proposed a joint sweep of Midway Island and the Aleutians. Midway was the main thrust with Dutch Harbor as a diversionary attack. Yamamoto was aware that American carriers were not destroyed at Pearl Harbor and thought the diversion would "...possibly draw the carriers into battle where the superior Japanese forces would annihilate them."⁵ Japan never achieved her objective in the Battle of Midway and a minimal victory in the Aleutians were used by the Imperial government to mask the more important Midway defeat.⁶

CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES OF WAR: "MOOSE MUSS"

MASS

Mass in most cases applies to the primary theater of war. Since the Aleutian Campaign took place in a secondary theater it is more practical to describe the events from an economy of force principle. Mass also "...means superiority at the point of contact."⁷ Applying this principle is possible while observing the economy of force principle.

The United States decision to mass the available Aleutian forces for a final strike to reoccupy Kiska achieved an operational goal but, was also a disaster. The appropriate joint force capabilities were synchronized but, this assault wasted resources and also failed to minimize human losses.

By recovering Attu first, Admiral Kinkaid cut off Japan's sea lines of communication to Kiska through a naval blockade and by establishing air supremacy. The United States was now starving out the remaining Japanese garrison. The Japanese acknowledged their losses on Attu and made plans to exit Kiska as soon as possible. With the help of the weather the Japanese evacuated Kiska around July 28, 1943. Despite the Japanese evacuation, the U.S. assault on Kiska proceeded on a grand scale. "Major General Charles H. Corlett USA commanded 34,426 troops, 5300 of them Canadian...and...Admiral Rockwell had nearly a hundred ships in his amphibious force."⁸ The American and Canadian forces would storm ashore August 15, 1943 only to find stray dogs, abandoned military equipment and personal gear. Battleships, cruisers and destroyers were committed to conduct pre-invasion firing on Kiska targets, and transport ships carried 6,500 troops to the beach. In the movement 24 men were killed by their comrades,

four died from Japanese booby traps, 50 additional were wounded ashore and a destroyer struck a mine killing 71 men and injuring 24 at sea. Radio transmissions from Kiska had stopped on July 27, 1943, Airmen noted extensive demolition and alterations in island defenses, and anti-aircraft fire stopped July 28, 1943 except for light weapons firing. Proper analysis of available intelligence or prior special forces reconnaissance would have revealed the Japanese withdrawal; the full invasion could have been called off. The invasion was anti-climactic and disappointing, "Admiral Halsey could have used some of those ships and men to speed up the capture of New Georgia; General MacArthur, at the end of the line, might have employed a few of them to help drive the Japanese from Huon Gulf and the Bismarcks Barrier."⁹

OBJECTIVE

The objective "...is unquestionably the most important of all the principles of war."¹⁰ The operational objective is the link between the strategic and tactical objectives. The United States national objective was "unconditional surrender" of Japan. The strategic objective in the Aleutian Campaign was to evict the Japanese from the Aleutians. The campaign actually began after the bombing of Dutch Harbor and had two major operational objectives.

With the limited forces available to them, Admiral Theobald's and General Buckner's only operational choice was defensive with strong attrition of the enemy. They were not capable of going on the offensive. In the Aleutians "...the American purpose was to prevent any military build-up in these islands, to sever their sea communications with Japan and to destroy their usefulness to the enemy while awaiting an opportunity to recover them."¹¹ After the bombing of Dutch Harbor the first U.S. operational objective was to occupy Adak and Amchitka. The original operational objective for the Japanese after the bombing was to occupy Adak as well.

They decided not to occupy Adak because of long lines of communication and proximity to American military bases to the east. Japan's decision worked to the United State's advantage permitting the construction of forward airfields.

Once the American bases were established on Adak and Amchitka the United States was ready to go on the offensive. U.S. forces increased significantly, but they still remained small compared to those in the South Pacific. With a move to an offensive strategy the Americans were capable of re-taking American soil. The second operational objective was recovering Attu and Kiska. In the campaign "...Kiska came to be regarded as the primary objective.... Not only was it the most advanced Japanese threat to those Aleutians remaining in our possession and to the Alaskan mainland, but it provided better potential air facilities, a more satisfactory harbor, and terrain more suitable for a base."¹² The strategic objective of removing the Japanese from the Aleutians was accomplished after the recovery of Kiska.

OFFENSIVE

As noted earlier, America considered the Aleutians a secondary theater and remained in a defensive mode predominantly because the troop and equipment strength was insufficient for any offensive strategy. During the bombing at Dutch Harbor the United States took a defensive approach but, retained an offensive spirit through the use of surprise (as discussed below). The Americans retained a defensive posture even after moving out to Adak and Amchitka, but the move was viewed as offensive from Tokyo. "American occupation of Adak revived Japanese apprehension of an American plan to invade Dai Nippon via the Kuriles."¹³ This caused the Japanese to send more forces to Attu and Kiska and take troops away from Guadalcanal operations.¹⁴ In support of the offensive spirit the U.S. Navy Seabees and Army engineers

worked together with incredible speed to build an airstrip in 10 days on Adak and the same on Atka. A final airstrip was built on Amchitka to take advantage of the weather differences between the islands for air operations.

In September 1942 the Japanese withdrew their troops from Attu to Kiska. Alaska Defense Command was aware of this but, they did not try to occupy the island because "...Alaskan defenses at this period were not yet complete, and troops and naval units in sufficient strength were not available."¹⁵ This was a prudent use of the principle of the offensive. The United States did not over commit despite the fact retaking Attu was one of their operational objectives. The senior American leaders would not take the island until they were sure they could adequately defend it from the enemy. Later the Japanese returned to Attu, but the main garrison and Japanese center of gravity remained on Kiska. The new air fields at Adak and Atka afforded close continuous bombing and Adak offered a natural safe harbor. The naval and air force harassment eventually wore down the Japanese until the Americans had enough forces in theater to complete the final operational objective to retake Kiska. The United States demonstrated a move from the defensive to offensive with the seizure of Attu and then Kiska. "The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit..." thereby achieving decisive results.¹⁶ This is precisely what the United States did operationally in support of the overall Aleutian Campaign strategic objective.

SURPRISE

"Surprise is frequently termed the greatest weapon in war."¹⁷ Surprise can lead to a decisive victory. Both the Japanese and the Americans were successful at exploiting the element of surprise. Operational deception can contribute to surprise. The Japanese evacuation of Kiska,

near the end of the Campaign, is noted as an exceptional case. The failure of the United States to effectively evaluate intelligence contributed to the Japanese safely removing greater than 6000 personnel from the island three weeks before the American landing and reoccupation. Critical American forces were wasted on this Aleutian operation.

Sun Tzu was an advocate of surprise and deception. "Take him unaware by surprise attacks where he is unprepared. Hit him suddenly with shock troops."¹⁸ Secret American air bases on Umnak and Cold Bay contributed to protection of forces at the operational level during the Aleutian Campaign. The enemy had no idea that the Blair Fish Packing Company, and Saxton and Company were air bases. These two bases disguised as fish cannery operations were completed before the attack on Dutch Harbor. All mail, radio and courier messages supported the same disguise. This deception was so successful the Japanese never discovered these two bases. The aircraft that took off from these bases caught the Japanese by surprise and helped defend Dutch Harbor from further damage. The combination of the Midway massacre and the unexpected U.S. air strength from the secret air bases possibly contributed to the Japanese High Command exercising a restraining influence on future offensive actions in the central and eastern Aleutian chain.¹⁹

ECONOMY OF FORCE

On the opposite end of the spectrum from mass is the economy of force. As a secondary theater of war resources were rationed during the Aleutian Campaign for both sides. Cracking the Japanese naval code gave U.S. operational planners the opportunity to better tailor forces for Alaska. The Japanese were expected to hold Attu and Kiska. At the same time the Americans attempted to regain the territory by severing the enemy's sea lines of communication and

deterring military build-up. Japanese and American commanders suffered the same fate in the Aleutian Campaign: "...the high command on neither side would not give its local commanders the forces to attain even these limited objectives."²⁰

The Navy Seabees and Army engineers worked at a feverish pace to build functioning airfields on Adak and then on Amchitka within two weeks of landing on them. These forward bases in the western islands allowed for shorter flights in the fog-laden environment. With no available carriers, bombing Attu and Kiska from these two islands was a definite advantage. It allowed U.S. operational planners to wisely ration limited forces and resources. In contrast, even after a year of getting a foothold in the Aleutians the Japanese forces did not have a single airfield completed. The combination of luck, cooperation of the weather and Japanese lack of aggressiveness tactically and operationally benefited the American objectives. The Americans prudently utilized their economy of force where the Japanese failed.

The small amount of troops, limited number of aircraft and a minimal naval contingent of older ships accurately described the forces of the Alaskan Command. Admiral Theobald did not even have a single carrier. As the South Pacific theater heated-up it impacted the exercises and operations in the Aleutians as some of these ships were diverted. A higher priority of operations existed in the South and this forced operational planners in the Aleutians to utilize limited combat power more efficiently. The operational planners were judicious in employing and distributing the forces in keeping with the economy of force principle.

MANEUVER

"The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power."²¹ The final operational objectives of the Aleutian

Campaign were occupation of Attu and Kiska. The decision of the United States to by-pass Kiska and invade the eastern-most island of Attu was a first for this island-hopping technique. It was successfully used again and again in the South Pacific. Sun Tzu's ideas on maneuver tied perfectly into the island-hopping tactic. "Go into emptiness, strike voids, by-pass what he defends, hit him where he does not expect you."²² By taking Attu first the Americans cut off the supply lines to Kiska and basically starved them out. The Japanese in fact evacuated Kiska and surprised the United States. The tactical invasion of Attu supported the operational island hopping maneuver and achieved the strategic objective.

Surprise can be an important element of maneuver. Another important example was the tactical engagement near the Russian Komandorski Islands in March 1943. Kiska was the Japanese center of gravity in the Aleutians. Movement of American forces in relation to the enemy allowed operational planners to retain positional advantage in the Aleutians. Prior to the reoccupation of Attu the United States used inherently mobile combat power, naval forces, to threaten Japanese resupply. Admiral Hosogaya attempted to run the blockade with his available Japanese fleet. To the Japanese surprise, the United States would be victorious against a naval force twice its size and fire power.²³ The three and a half hour battle took place without the help of air power or submarines. Even though U.S.S. Salt Lake City was nearly sunk the Japanese ended the engagement and steamed home to Paramushiro for fear of being attacked by heavy bombers.²⁴ Being in the right place at the right time allowed the Americans a successful tactical naval maneuver through flexible application of combat power. The eventual naval and air supremacy that was established brought the Americans closer to their operational goals. The sea

dominance preserved freedom of action at the tactical level and supported the operational level objective by allowing the recovery of Attu and Kiska.

UNITY OF COMMAND

“The primary emphasis in command relations should be to keep the chain of command short and simple so that it is clear who is in charge of what.”²⁵ The greatest U.S. failure during the Aleutian Campaign was the result of the lack of command unity. The command structure was far from simple and cooperation almost appeared non-existent at times. This single element alone could have caused a serious set back to the United States. The failure to unite the forces and command structure caused the 15 month campaign to consume numerous lives, resources and more time than necessary.

Not only was the command structure convoluted, but the principle players of the individual services continuously disagreed over the simplest of campaign objectives. The most outstanding problem was the lack of a theater or unified commander. All information flowed directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC), located in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and General DeWitt, Western Defense Command, located in San Francisco, California.

The ground forces of the Alaska Defense Command, located in Anchorage, belonged to Major General Buckner. Established in July 1940 as the Alaska Defense Force, he labored two long hard years to build the considerable forces from scratch. With Admiral Theobald in theater, Buckner would only retain administrative control of the Alaskan Air Forces. Buckner worked directly for General DeWitt.

Just before the attack on Dutch Harbor, in May 1942, Admiral Nimitz would name Rear Admiral Theobald as Commander, North Pacific located in Kodiak. He also reported to the 13th Naval District (Washington, Oregon, Alaska) located in Seattle.²⁶ As the operational commander he would have at his disposal the air, submarine and surface forces of the Navy, and Canadian and United States air forces. Buckner never fully accepted CINCPAC's decision to give operational control of the Alaskan Air Forces to Admiral Theobald.²⁷

Upon their first meeting at the Kodiak naval base, Theobald emphasized the Navy's importance and Buckner never backed down on the importance of the Army's mission. Each commander was looking out for his own "rice bowl." This was the first in a series of examples that demonstrate lack of unity of effort. After this initial joint conference, Rear Admiral Theobald inquired from Admiral Nimitz concerning the clarification of the chain of command. "The command relationship between...Alaska Defense Command under General Buckner and the North Pacific Force is to be one by mutual cooperation."²⁸ The answer from Nimitz did not make things any clearer. Another Army versus Navy confrontation was about the move to Amchitka. The Army command opposed the move, while Nimitz sided with Theobald to land on Amchitka before Kiska. The JCS was forced to make the final decision. Even though Theobald was right about the move his failure to successfully cooperate on his own with the Army gave Nimitz reason to relieve him.²⁹

The differing operational ideas and opinions created inter-service quarreling which affected the major operations of the Aleutian Campaign. The powerful personalities destroyed the established network that was so vital to success in the harsh Aleutian environment. The power struggle was a result of lack of unity of command and unity of joint effort. Joint

operations occurred, but a clearly defined chain of command might have expedited development and execution of the joint campaign plan. By not having a unified commander in the theater the two component commanders in Alaska would prosecute the campaign relatively independently. In January 1943 the unity of command and effort improved when Nimitz replaced Theobald with Rear Admiral Kinkaid. Kinkaid's smooth but aggressive style and his appreciation for cooperation assisted the campaign to closure.

SECURITY

Security "...has been called the hand-maiden of surprise."³⁰ Operational security offers freedom of action. Operational level security was enhanced by one significant U.S. intelligence act. Fleet Admiral Yamamoto intended to end the existence of the last of the U.S. Pacific Fleet with the Battle of Midway. The diversionary attack planned against the Aleutians was to mislead Nimitz. "Unfortunately for Yamamoto, U.S. cryptanalysts successfully broke the Japanese fleet code, thereby puncturing the already fragile veneer of Japanese operational security."³¹ The damage to the U.S. Fleet was minimal, but the Japanese were ambushed by Nimitz at Midway and caught by surprise air attacks in the Aleutians from two secret bases.

"Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces."³² The security measures taken to conceal the two secret air bases were elaborate as noted earlier. They offered operational protection to the Dutch Harbor naval station and prevented it from being captured by the Japanese. Knowing the Japanese were going to attack and having the secret bases, preserved freedom of action for the operational planner.

Failure to protect forces at the tactical level will have a synonymous affect at the operational level. Part of the final operational objective of the joint Alaska staff was to seize

Attu within days. The 7th Infantry Division that had been training in the California desert had no previous experience or familiarity with the cold Alaskan environment. They were training to go to North Africa and thought they were headed to the South Pacific when they deployed. The Army troops had less than appropriate protection from the unpredictable, harsh weather. The clothing issued was inadequate for the cold and wet Aleutians.³³ A significant number of troops were lost to frostbite, exposure and cold injuries. In the three months it took to rid the island of the enemy 549 Americans died and greater than 3200 were wounded or suffered from exposure. The loss of these troops affected the overall fighting capability and contributed to the delay in overtaking the Japanese garrison on Attu. The operational objective of reclaiming Attu in a few days would "...prove far longer and more costly than had been projected."³⁴ It took longer than two weeks. The reduced forces were a contributing factor to the delay in achieving the goal.

SIMPLICITY

As a secondary theater, with an economy of force in place, U.S. Aleutian tactical and operational plans were kept simple. Orders, planning and direction may be the backbone of the principle of simplicity, but simplicity in an organization is important too. "Command relationship must be clear and the chain of command direct and unbroken."³⁵ Admiral Nimitz's failure to convey anything more concrete than "mutual cooperation" as the basis for a theater command relationship made the situation more complicated. Over time, Army and Navy disagreements took a toll on the tactical, operational and strategic objectives in the Aleutian Campaign. No single campaign plan was ever made or executed. Simplicity is addressed as "...Murphy's Laws of Combat: If it takes more than 10 seconds to explain the command arrangements, they probably won't work."³⁶

Training was not kept simple either. The decision to invade Attu effectively required trained and weathered troops. Rather than selecting locally trained Alaskan troops the American High Command would select the 7th Infantry Division that had not seen action. They were a motorized unit training in the California desert. Their equipment was not capable of handling the Aleutian tundra and mud valleys, and they had not practiced any amphibious landings. The unit made a costly move to another site in California with expectations of simulating conditions in the Aleutians. The move did little to prepare them. A group of Alaskan Defense Command officers were assigned to assist in training. The additional training would take three months and therefore impact the operational timeline to take Attu and then Kiska. These troops were not prepared to deal with the weather. To improve simplicity, "...when another expedition was organized some time later to capture Kiska, a substantial part of the training period was spent in the Aleutian area."³⁷

CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

The principles of war are simple tools or guidelines that aid the student of operational art to answer questions about: goals achieved (ends); ways to achieve those goals (ways - unity of effort or command); how to apply resources (means - mass or economy of force); and the cost or risk involved. The strategic objective was to remove the Japanese from the Aleutians; with joint forces, in a secondary theater, in a minimal amount of time and with a limited number of casualties. Instead the Aleutian Campaign "...would take several thousand Japanese lives and hundreds of allied lives and cost millions of dollars and tie up thousands of allied troops in the area for almost two years."³⁸

The campaign offers more than just historical value; it provides important lessons learned. Lessons learned have a tendency to focus on what went wrong rather than what went right. Lessons are learned from enemy mistakes too. By using the nine elements of "MOOSE MUSS" as a vehicle, several valuable lessons are available for the operational planner of tomorrow. The principles inherently interrelate, overlap or complement one another and therefore should not be considered independently.

Admiral Nimitz made one important mistake by not selecting a unified commander in theater.³⁹ "Stove-pipe" chain of commands operating in the same theater waste resources and cause casualties. The need for unity of command and simplicity of its structure can not be over emphasized in order to reduce those risks. Unity of effort and good command relationships are paramount to accomplishing all levels of objectives. Personalities should not dictate maneuvers and offensive plans.


“Surprise can be a boomerang, too. It can so intoxicate the user as to lay him open to an even greater surprise.”⁴⁰ This can be avoided by using good intelligence . The United States intended to surprise the Japanese on Kiska, but they had already evacuated. The Japanese two pronged attack planned to annihilate the Pacific Fleet, instead they were ambushed in Midway and surprised by the secret base air attacks.

The recovery of Kiska demonstrated how poor or misinterpreted intelligence can cause a commander to concentrate forces where they are not really needed. Today’s operational commander no longer has the luxury of employing all their available forces. A reduced infrastructure of today mandates that alternative plans are seriously considered first before mass forces are employed on fruitless objectives.

Forces must be adequately trained and protected from the elements if maximum performance is expected to achieve tactical success. The operational leader that fails to consider these basics at the tactical level, risks loss of combat power at the appropriate time or place; thereby diminishing an opportunity to achieve an operational objective. A significant loss of assets can impact the operational plan.

“History never repeats itself exactly, but it is a mistake to think that history has ended and we now live in a modern age with nothing to learn from the past.”⁴¹

APPENDIX I



APPENDIX II

IMPORTANT ALASKAN EVENTS FOR THE ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

1904

Naval reservation on Kiska established.

1922

Washington Conference Treaty: limited U.S. development in the Aleutians.

1934

Japan renounces Treaty agreement.

1940

JUL Army Alaska Defense Force established (renamed Command one year later).

1941

DEC 7 Bombing of Pearl Harbor and U.S. enters World War II.

11 Army Western Defense Command activated.

1942

APR 18 Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle's raid on Tokyo.

MAY 15 U.S. Navy cryptanalysts break Japanese Fleet code (Midway/Aleutian attack).

21 Rear Admiral Theobald assumes Commander, North Pacific.

JUN 3/4 Japan attacks Dutch Harbor.

7 Japan occupies Attu and Kiska Islands.

11 U.S. bombing operations begin on Attu and Kiska Islands.

AUG 30 U.S. Army occupies Adak.

SEP 14 U.S. air field completed on Adak.

(First flights begin two weeks after occupation.)

* U.S. Army occupies Atka and builds emergency air field.

1943

JAN 4 Rear Admiral Kinkaid replaces Rear Admiral Theobald.

11 U.S. Army occupies Amchitka and builds air field.

MAR 26 Naval battle near the Russian Komandorski Islands.

MAY 11 U.S. Joint Forces invades Attu - OPERATION LANDCRAB.
(U.S. Army's first amphibious landing of the war.)

30 U.S. reoccupies Attu.

JUL 27/28 Japanese garrisons evacuate Kiska.

AUG 15 U.S. Joint Forces invade and reoccupy Kiska - OPERATION COTTAGE.

*Note: Only month and year are known.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹⁷ Brown, 629.
- ¹⁸ Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), 108.
- ¹⁹ The Aleutian Campaign June 1942-August 1943, 8.
- ²⁰ Morison, 4.
- ²¹ U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, A-2.
- ²² Handel, 79.
- ²³ Morison, 22.
- ²⁴ Cohen, 156.
- ²⁵ U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Washington D.C., 10 January 1995, III-9.
- ²⁶ Cohen, 94.
- ²⁷ Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War, (New York: Double Day and Company, 1969), 14.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ²⁹ Morison, 17.
- ³⁰ Brown, 630.
- ³¹ M.R. Critz, "Operational Deception," Unpublished, U.S. Naval War College Research, Newport, RI: September 1996), 7.
- ³² U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, A-2.
- ³³ Cohen, 190; The War Department, 5.
- ³⁴ Cohen, 190.
- ³⁵ Brown, 632.
- ³⁶ Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 92.
- ³⁷ The War Department, 5.
- ³⁸ Cohen, 111.
- ³⁹ Garfield, 15.
- ⁴⁰ Brown, 630.
- ⁴¹ James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1986, 41.

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