Uncle Sam in Asia: Western Bastion or Vulnerable Salient?
Abstract
General MacArthur, in his farewell address to Congress in 1951 accurately delineated the American strategy in the Western Pacific. Far from forming a strong defense, the American bases in Hawaii, Midway, Guam, and the Philippines provided an avenue for the enemy advance during the early months of World War 2, instead of their intended point defense. Hard earned gains in the Pacific through the war enabled the United States to establish a defensive perimeter to the shores of Asia through American (and other friendly nations) control over a chain of islands from the Aleutians to the Marianas. Any predatory attack from the Asian continent had to be an amphibious effort. No amphibious effort could be successful without control over the sea lanes and the air over those lanes. Today the threat is not from Japan, but from a growing Communist China. Though American operational commanders today provide a strong deterrent to the aggressive Chinese, shrinking American and Japanese defense budgets will soon allow China a technological edge in addition to their already overwhelming numbers. Soon, the American forward deployed forces may once again be a vulnerable salient against the Chinese threat. Cost effective alternatives for operational commanders are discussed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 07, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA325137
Entities
People
- Robin L. Russell
Organizations
- Naval War College