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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

**THE STRATEGY OF SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Army.

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Abstract

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Chapter I

Introduction

The Strategy of Selective Engagement and Enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe

“Our peacetime efforts to counter regional instability, impede the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reduce the impact of transnational threats, and support democracy and reform are important for promoting stability and deterring aggression during the post-Cold War transformation process; the catalysts for these activities will be peacetime engagement”¹.

With the unforeseen dismantling of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, and more specifically, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) was faced with, and continues to battle, a rapidly changing political and military environment.

Throughout the late 1940s and spanning the Cold War period, the United States had continuously prepared for armed conflict with what was arguably the most powerful array of military might in history; the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Union not only maintained the largest intercontinental ballistic missile inventory the world has ever seen, it also possessed well trained, massively equipped conventional operating forces and some of the finest Special Operations Forces in modern times.

Recollecting a small piece in the overall defense strategy of Western Europe, the mission of my forward deployed Special Forces Battalion (Airborne) was to conduct Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations deep inside several former Warsaw Pact (FWP) countries.

The impact of the incredible events which unfolded just weeks after President Reagan’s “demand” that Soviet leader Gorbachev “tear down that wall”, were far reaching, to say the least. As with hundreds of other units (large and small) assigned to the collective defense of Europe, mine no longer had an aggressive, offensive mission against our long standing enemy.

In the aftermath of those events in 1990, the fundamental question on the minds of our National Command Authority (NCA), Commander in Chief, European Command (CINC/SACEUR) and tactical leaders alike was, “what’s the threat and what do we do about the Soviet military and Warsaw Pact”? The question is as relevant now as it was then. The answer, at least for now, is outlined in a carefully

tailored National Security Strategy (NSS) of Selective Engagement and Enlargement.

The focus of this paper is to address what efforts are being made by USEUCOM with regard to promoting the National Security Strategy through a regional approach for emerging countries in Central and Eastern Europe (C/EE).

I intend to present not only what programs have been initiated by EUCOM since 1990, but which have met with success, partial success, and some recommendations for the expansion of these programs.

Finally, this paper addresses what Inter-Agency efforts are being made to support these efforts, and more specifically, how our General Purpose (GPF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are playing instrumental roles in transitioning these countries from once feared aggressors to regionally supportive deterrence forces.

Chapter II

Background

Assistance to Former Enemies

The United States faces one of the greatest opportunities [and challenges] in modern times to shape the course of history and truly consummate solid regional security. The quest for freedom and democracy, open market economies and collective security is forcing the conversion of governments, militaries and economic infrastructure within the emerging nations comprising the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the Former Warsaw Pact (FWP).

The United States is in a unique position to directly influence the path of success for these countries by engaging in a carefully mapped-out strategy of peacetime engagement specifically designed for the region. Additionally, I would submit that the United States is the only global power capable of supporting a regional transformation of this magnitude.

Traveling throughout countries comprising the FSU and the now-disintegrated WP is an “eye-opener”, to say the least. One thing comes through loud and clear, whether coordinating training and assistance efforts with leaders in the Balkans or Security Assistance (SA) efforts in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic—*they need our help and they want it.*

Once “forcibly” bonded together through political necessity in forming the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of communism created severe conditions for the armies formerly comprising “red” forces. The break away from Soviet control, the formulation of the Community of Independent States (CIS) and the long overdue restoration of control over their own governments and armed forces, left many of the FWP and FSU systematically broken.

Like so many strands of rope unraveling, the glue (the Soviet Union) that once held these countries together was no longer in existence. Each country’s military was in search of leadership, guidance, and direction.

Some countries retained their old military “standard bearers” for leaders, others opted for immediate reform, beginning with the senior leadership of their armed forces.

Among the countries demonstrating clear willingness toward military and governmental reform were

Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (now Czech Republic), Romania, Slovenia, and of course East Germany (now defunct and part of the Federal Republic of Germany) .²

Other countries emerging from the ashes of communist failure and moving somewhat more hesitantly were those of the FSU; in particular, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Byelorussia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.

Not surprising, the former Warsaw Pact countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary) were in a far stronger position to adapt to the rapid changes than were the countries comprising the FSU. Some would argue that this was the result of less meddling by the Soviet Union in the affairs of the WP governments and their militaries; I contend that it was due to three fundamental realities.

First, it's important to remember that the majority of the countries comprising the Warsaw Pact were invaded and taken over by the Soviet Union. Most were either placed in a "protectorate" status or annexed by the Soviet Union outright. In other words, the make-up of these countries and its people were not ethnically Soviet.

Secondly, countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary had well established economies, military infrastructure, education systems and government organization well before the Soviets decided to extend their "operational reach" and impose their will. Governmental institutions were already somewhat prepared for transition to democratic reform, and their militaries were well suited to integration into NATO, United Nations and Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiatives from the United States .³

Third, and lastly, the majority of these countries had cultural and societal ties to the West, not the East, and for the most part were far more inculcated with western ideals, to include religion, freedom and democratically elected representation.

Dissimilarly, those countries of the Former Soviet Union were immersed in Soviet culture, operated on a Soviet economy, were supported directly by the state, and for all practical purposes, its people ["subjects"] were Soviet citizens.

Chapter III

Regional Strategies: Performance Programs Already in Existence

“Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Democratic nations are less likely to threaten U.S. interests and more likely to meet collective security requirements through partnerships and sustained development. Doing this means that we must remain engaged worldwide and facilitate enlarging a community of secure, free market economies and democratic governments”

President William J. Clinton

Transitioning governments through democratic reform, changing economies from state-controlled to open market, establishing free societies from previously censored and deprived, and converting militaries once bent on the destruction of western ideals, is a mean task to be sure.

Not only is CINCEUCOM, General George Joulwan, concerned with the National Military Strategy (NMS) governing his Area of Responsibility (AOR), he is concerned with facilitating a customized approach to transforming civil, economic, governmental and military systems to more fully integrate them into open market and democratic societies.

Undoing decades of state-driven processes and established practices is not going to happen overnight. The pursuit of open market economies and transitioning to westernized systems out of necessity, is going to be a lengthy, painful process for nations comprising the FSU, and to a lesser extent, the FWP.

The intent is not to “empty the cup” and discard already established practices, ideals, and systems in existence in these countries. To the contrary, the intent of our National Security Strategy (NSS) and its “brother in arms”, National Military Strategy, is to “engage in a broad continuum of non-combatant activities that demonstrate commitment to improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability.”⁴

I think it’s fair to say, that to a certain degree “we” were “caught with our pants down” with regard to the fall of communism in Europe. Our plan for post-hostilities was neither current, nor adequate for the sudden events of 1990. However, since those landmark changes and the end of the Cold War, a great deal has happened with regard to the future of Central and Eastern Europe and where the United States military “fits” in that puzzle.

We (the United States) is now fully engaged in a number of different programs to assist in the

development of emerging nations and their militaries in the reform process.

Military to Military Joint Contact Program

One program well underway and closely supervised by EUCOM is the Military-to-Military Joint Contact Program. "Mil-Mil" was initially a test program in 1990 for EUCOM; its effectiveness has proven itself several times over in building cooperative relationships with former adversaries.

In layman's terms, the Mil-Mil program is a host of "recipes" for promoting interoperability, better understanding, providing assistance and advice, and developing long term regional security through military and governmental interaction .

The agency responsible for planning, organizing, and in many cases executing actual Mil-Mil Contacts, are the Joint Contact Teams (JCTs). The popularity and success of these "JCTs" has grown immensely over the past 5 years. With JCTs in over seventeen (17) of these countries and a growing demand for more, coupled with the fact that it is clearly a "benefit over cost" program, there is seemingly little reason not to expand the program and fully fund it. ⁵

The Mil-Mil Program includes combined training with host country forces, individual (specialized) training with selected personnel from those nations and a host of smaller assistance and advisory programs for selected units.

Combined Training Exercises

For several years, United States Armed Forces have engaged in training exercises with foreign nations. In Europe, these combined exercises typically consisted of forces from the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and occasionally France.

Since 1990, the focus of course, has changed. The need to establish trust and rapport, build alliances and develop interoperability with emerging nations from the FSU and FWP has come to the forefront.

In 1995, a Joint and Combined Exercise dubbed "Double Eagle" between the United States Army's 3rd Infantry Division (Mech) and the Polish 34th Mechanized Division, augmented by Special Operations (SOF) and Air Force elements from both countries, was one such success in Mil-Mil planning and organization.

After nearly two years of coordination between DOS, DOD and the Polish Ministry of Defense, the

goals and objectives for the exercise (clearly to enhance interoperability) were decided.

Participating units were tasked, pre-deployment training commenced, units deployed, link-up was affected, and then one of the largest combined exercises between former Warsaw Pact and U.S. forces kicked-off.

Its success in building long term security and interoperability with the Polish Armed Forces and its government cannot be overstated. Not only did this exercise develop a common understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures with U.S. forces, like other similar exercises, it was the catalysts for enhancing interoperability with other NATO and United Nations forces for future application .⁶

These exercises and smaller scale efforts are clearly the reason why Hungary, for instance, allowed so much logistics support to base and launch from their country during operations supporting the Implementation Forces (IFOR) in Bosnia. In fact, without their direct support and allowances, the international coalition to restore peace to Bosnia could not have existed .⁷

I saw this interoperability later in operations in Bosnia, where USSOF Faction Liaison Teams (FLT's) worked closely with conventional counterparts at the brigade and battalion level (both FSU and FWP). Dialogue initiated earlier by EUCOM Mil-Mil Contact Teams and subsequent unit exchanges had transcended into executing actual operations of a combined nature in a semi-permissive environment. This was the "proof in the pudding" that the programs were in fact viable.

Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Programs: (Small Unit Exchanges)

The Mil-Mil Program also boasts a variety of smaller advisory and assistance programs. One such program in EUCOM is the Joint and Combined Exchange Training Program (JCET), supervised and executed by units under the control of the Theater Special Operations Commander (COMSOCEUR).

The JCET program has been in existence for several years. But, only since 1990 has it extended to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the Former Soviet Union.

The JCET program is designed to facilitate several things. First and foremost, it is designed to enhance the training level of the U.S. forces participating. Secondly, it is to enhance cooperation and interoperability between U.S. and host nation forces. Thirdly, and probably most important, it is designed to build long standing relationships between militaries, and as a residual benefit, enhance collective security arrangements between governments.

Up until 1990, JCETs were primarily oriented toward training with host nations from Western Europe, with the majority of the focus on combined defensive operations, cold weather training and regionally driven activities.

As with Combined Exercises, the influx of emerging nations in Central and Eastern Europe forced training priorities to re-orient on less lethal, more advisory-oriented exchanges. In other words, the scope of the training was modified in order to develop trust and rapport first, and then slowly move toward actual training and interoperability. This was "smart strategy" that paid huge dividends down the line.

Over the past several years, training and interoperability between USSOF and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet units has progressed much more rapidly than expected. In fact, as a measure of its effectiveness, several partnerships and "unit specific" habitual relationships have developed between regionally oriented USSOF and units from the FSU and WP militaries.

In particular, the countries of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia have been most responsive and appear to be "leaps and bounds" ahead in the interoperability arena .⁸ Discussed in some detail below, there are several reasons for this development.

Since 1990, several hundred JCETs have taken place between these countries and the United States. And they have taken place in both Central/Eastern Europe and in the United States (hence, the word *exchange*).

Although EUCOM and SOCEUR continue to make successful in-roads into the Former Soviet Union, the training exchanges have been few and limited in scope. The countries comprising the Balkan states are probably the most in need and receptive to advice and assistance from the United States military.

EUCOM deployed several Joint Mil-Mil Contact Teams and JCETs into Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia in 1994 and 95', with varying degrees of success. The biggest issue identified with these countries has been a lack of money, equipment, leadership, and an overall lack of individual and collective unit training. To say it another way, these countries need all around Security Assistance and a dose of direction and motivation.

Some of the countries comprising the FSU are extremely poor, lack infrastructure in both government and military, and cannot be approached in the same manner as say, Hungary or Poland.

In the case of Estonia [probably the least developed militarily], fifteen of the nineteen military districts

were in “less than satisfactory” condition with respect to unit readiness and training preparedness .⁹ Some districts had no formal training whatsoever; others were undermanned, undisciplined, their equipment was in terrible disrepair and the units appeared to have no mission to support national defense whatsoever [although their Defense Ministry thought so] .¹⁰

What these countries didn't need for “starters” was JCETs; they needed extensive Security Assistance in both equipment and training, to include personalized military education and infrastructure. In fact, they needed individualized programs to target selected leaders and trainers, not units. These programs are discussed in detail below.

Joint Readiness Assessment Teams (JRAT)

The Joint Readiness Assessment Team Program is closely aligned with JCETs, but maintains a different focus. Where JCETs are concerned with training exchanges with foreign forces, JRATs are designed to coordinate the efforts of several U.S. military and non-military agencies to create synergy in meeting the needs of developing countries .¹¹

Only in existence since 1995, the JRAT Program is new to EUCOM. Prior to 1995, there was dysfunction in coordinating efforts between DOD and DOS in operations supporting the regional strategy. To show the extent of this problem, the following actual example sets the stage.

In 1993 and 94' great efforts were being made in one particular Central European country to develop a fully integrated communications and information system which could service not only the built-up urban populace, but a large segment of the population in remote areas.

In this particular country, agencies from the Country Team were supporting the effort with Security Assistance (equipment), Information (USIA), Intelligence and technical support. The DOD was also supporting the operation with Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (broadcast and communications connectivity), Engineers and liaison. While DOS agencies pushed forward with their agenda, the military pushed forward with their own. The problem was a lack of unified effort, with neither agency complimenting the actions of the other, and in several instances (PSYOP and USIA), actually working in completely different directions and “transmitting” conflicting themes to the host nation. On top of all of it, in the final analysis, both had their own ideas of what the CINC, Ambassador and host nation expected .¹²

There are other similar activities which have taken place by a number of agencies from the Country Teams (USIA, SAO, DAO, ODC and CIA), Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) and DOD (Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Engineers, Special Forces and Intelligence) , where the results were similar.

In nearly every case, the cumulative wasted effort, damage to the credibility of such programs, and general embarrassment to the United States demanded a solution to the problem. In an effort to "fix" it, the JRAT Program was borne .¹³

In late November 1996, the "boilerplate" for the JRAT program was launched in Macedonia. This joint, combined and inter-agency supported effort involving Security Assistance, Information Agencies, Intelligence, Special Operations Forces and several host nation agencies focused on the regional security of Macedonia.

Threat Assessments were conducted, a complete review of the country's military support structure was analyzed and a comprehensive study of Security Assistance requirements were identified.

After several months of concerted effort among experts from DOD, DOS and the host nation, the first full JRAT was completed and characterized as a huge success. The net result was the development of a comprehensive security plan for Macedonia and increased regional security and enhanced threat deterrence for the United States .¹⁴

Military Professionalism and Advanced Individual Training Programs:

In U.S. Army training terminology, the programs identified above are designed to satisfy *collective/multi-echelon* and *unit* requirements. The EUCOM Mil-Mil Program also has a number of smaller, specially focused programs designed to expose, educate and develop selected *individuals* from these emerging countries.

In addition to programs carried under the auspices and funding of International Military Education and Training (IMET), EUCOM maintains a host of programs to satisfy similar needs.

The Familiarization Program (FAM) is one of these individually focused programs designed to educate and train selected personnel in very specific skills and/or type warfare. Both General Purposes and Special Operations Forces have been intimately involved in these for several years.

FAM Programs work on an exchange basis much like JCETs. In a typical FAM, Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers from former Warsaw Pact and FSU travel to the United States, are linked-up with specific units or organizations with similar roles and missions, and commence one-on-one training, education and “mentoring”.

For instance, after a lengthy assessment of the Latvian and Lithuanian Non-Commissioned Officer’s Education System (NCOES), it was determined by both host nation(s), in concert with EUCOM and the Ambassadors, that both lacked a structured program of instruction for their senior NCOs.

After coordination and diplomatic “wheel greasing”, selected senior NCOs and supervisors from these two countries arrived in the United States to engage in a series of briefings, workshops and opportunities to conduct “hands-on” training following the education phase.

Their FAM Program included on-site training and education at the U.S. Army’s Sergeants Major Academy, several NCO Advanced Courses and Basic NCO Courses around the country.

The overall intent behind the FAM Program is to get participants to export the education and lessons learned back to their own countries for implementation and hopefully, development of similar programs for their militaries.

Regionally focused Special Operations Forces, well trained in the languages and culturally oriented to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, have proven to be invaluable in the FAM role. Since 1990, there have been literally hundreds of FAM Programs initiated for selected personnel from the emerging countries. The vast majority of these have involved USSOF.

The example above was a FAM Program to initiate those country’s Advanced NCO Educational Systems. SOF have conducted innumerable seminars, demonstrations, workshops and “specialist-oriented” one-on-one training courses.

United States Special Forces have provided instructional blocks to Estonians, Hungarians, Belorussians and Slovaks in Battle Focused Training and Combined Arms Warfare; Latvians in mountain operations; Russian and Polish leaders in establishing and properly operating an advanced Airborne School. Elements from Naval Special Warfare Units have educated and trained several military personnel from C/EE in everything from small boat training to intricate patrol vessel procedures in navigation .¹⁵

As was already mentioned, the FAM Program can and does operate under an exchange charter. Without exception, every emerging country has something to offer selected U.S. military personnel. Whether Advanced Terrain Analysis instruction in the trans-Caucasus with the Russians or Biological-Chemical Decontamination training with the Czech Republic (arguably better than the United States' program), these countries have much to teach us, and in several areas, are far more advanced than us.

As with the other programs identified above, the FAM Program helps strengthen regional security in EUCOM by fostering interoperability, understanding, and commitment to the emerging nations. The program has proven to be priceless in breaking down long standing barriers between East and West and is another "benefit over cost" program that is only going to grow in scope and demand.

Chapter IV

Assimilation and Progress; the Measure of Effectiveness and Where to Provide Security Assistance

In several instances mentioned above, it is clear that several of our former enemies are transitioning very quickly indeed [at least militarily speaking]. Others, notably in the Former Soviet Union, are not doing quite as well.

Critics of the Clinton Administration are quick to point out that we are putting a great deal of money and "blind trust" into these programs, and in typical American fashion, the results have not come quickly enough.

The fact of the matter is, our collective support of these nations has made a huge difference. Security Assistance has been particularly effective. Through military efforts, supported by governmental programs and Department of State, the United States [carrying most of the financial burden] is rebuilding government and military infrastructure left ripped apart following the collapse of power in the Soviet Union.

If the United States failed to continue to provide aid to these nations, it would seriously jeopardize our national interests worldwide, but particularly in C/EE, and more importantly, it would directly impact our national security in that part of the world .¹⁶

So the issue is not whether the United States will continue to "shoulder this load", it's really a matter of how effective are the programs to date and where are we going with them from here?

If the Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) for our National and Regional Security Strategy is the proven capability for these nation's militaries to now operate in support of NATO and the United Nations, then there is probably ample evidence to shown that certain militaries from C/EE can do it. However, if the measure is to demonstrate comprehensive interoperability with the United States and exhibit true deterrence capability, we have some ways to go.

Clearly, with U.S. assistance, countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia are pushing to assimilate and reform their militaries as rapidly as possible. These country's armed forces are exceptionally well trained, well led and have solid organization and infrastructure. These countries have near-fully "bought into" the concept of mutual security and strength through global and regional deterrence, for which the United States is clearly the mainstay.

The majority of the countries comprising the former Warsaw Pact don't need a lot of the type support being "thrown at" the countries of the Community of Independent States (CIS). What they do need is, interoperability [through training opportunities], education [through technical support and personalized / specialized programs] and "focused" regional commitment, something we cannot teach, but can export in terms of appealing to global and regional security .¹⁷

The countries comprising the Former Soviet Union are quite a different story though. The fact of the matter is that these emerging nations need extensive Security Assistance and programs to revitalize their militaries, not to mention a great deal of governmental and international aid to boost their economies.

The militaries comprising these nations are in dismal disrepair by most accounts. For instance, although Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have exceptionally disciplined, well led and trained soldiers, the majority of their forces are lacking equipment to create real interoperability with the United States and/or NATO/United Nations. The equipment they do have is severely outdated and completely inadequate for use in a coalition operation [except on a very limited scale].¹⁸

These countries bordering Afghanistan and China are badly in need of extensive funding, interoperability training and education for selected personnel. Countries such as these would benefit immensely through programs such as the Joint-Combined Exchange Program, and probably more effectively, the Joint Readiness Assessment Program, where both the full effort of the Department of State and DOD could act in concert to expedite transition for this important region.

Although expending funds to support their participation in Combined Partnership for Peace exercises is well intended, and does enhance interoperability, it could probably be better invested in technical and specialized training for selected personnel in their militaries.

The countries comprising the Balkans and those further to the South (Byelorussia and Ukraine) are in equal need of Security Assistance and training. However, the type training and support would be quite different from that given to say, Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan, in that the threat is different.

For instance, Ukraine and Byelorussia, still owners of huge nuclear stockpiles, are in dire need of assistance geared toward expediting the "decommissioning" and security of these warheads. This will include extensive security training, funding for monitoring and surveillance systems and a great deal of

technical education to avert disaster in the process .¹⁹

Although there is keen interest in the United States and the entire international community in seeing this come to fruition, the funding for these programs has been cautious and painstakingly diplomatic. This is not to say that either of these countries is “dragging their heels” with regard to efforts in enhancing regional security through EUCOM and Department of State initiatives, it’s just the fact that the extent of the need in these countries forces the United States to closely prioritize what Security Assistance is going to be given where and when.

For instance, the support “we” have provided the countries in this region (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine) has been largely educational and FAM oriented. Technical support to countries possessing nuclear capability (Ukraine and Byelorussia) are going to receive priority with regard to security training and extensive funding, and most assuredly at the expense of countries in need of less critical training or assistance for the time being.

Lithuania, for instance, although a very small country “jammed” between Estonia and Byelorussia, has a very potent military, an excellent Officer and NCO Corps, and although in need of equipment and technical support to enhance regional and local security, they are quite versatile and interoperable with United States forces, their neighbors, and most countries in NATO and the U.N. .²⁰ Hence, extensive support to assist them, although forthcoming, is not on the “front burner”.

Chapter V

Conclusions and Recommendations

The United States European Command (USEUCOM) is promoting a number of excellent programs to assist emerging nations from the Former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

The use of conventional U.S. forces in facilitating interoperability through engagement in Combined Exercises, is directly enhancing regional security and commitment between the United States and nations comprising Central and Eastern Europe (C/EE).

United States Special Operations Forces have been engaged in Combined Exercises, Small Unit Exchange Programs and Individualized Training for years. Their involvement in a host of EUCOM's programs have helped build rapport, establish long term relationships and have provide timely technical advice and assistance to these emerging nations.

Although EUCOM reacted quickly and decisively to support reform of the governments, economies and militaries following the demise of the Soviet Union, we have missed several key opportunities to make real change in some of the most needy countries. EUCOM's programs are at least assisting to overcome those problems.

The United States must continue to expand its advisory and assistance roles in these countries, particularly those comprising the Community of Independent States (CIS) to the East.

With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uncertain alliances and coalitions, the increase of regional and transnational threats and an uncertain future for several of these countries, the need to "press" our National Security Strategy and develop mutual security arrangements in the EUCOM AOR is an absolute must.

With the demonstrated efforts in interoperability of their armed forces and their willingness to go the distance to effect real reform, several of these countries are hungry for continued opportunity to work toward integration with democratic governments and defensive militaries. With continued funding and comprehensive military support, there is no reason to believe these countries will not grow to be full fledged partners with the United States and fulfill regional and global security responsibilities.

Notes

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