

ABSTRACT

EXPLAINING ALLIANCE SUSTAINABILITY: The US-Japan Military Relationship

Matthew Aaron Long

This study seeks to explain the rationale for a post-cold war continuation of the Japanese-American military relationship. By constructing an analytical framework that integrates a comparative approach to the study of national defense policy with aspects of the foreign policy/area studies and international relations theory's literature dealing with the nature of military alliances, this study identifies, accounts for the support of, and assesses the influence of alliance functions beyond the United States and Japanese external security environments that encourage maintenance of the US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty.

An integration of the national defense policy literature highlights four comparative aspects of a state's defense policies that are useful in understanding the environment surrounding the US-Japan military alliance. A comparison of these four components when applied to the national security policies of Japan and the United States reveals the existence of greater fundamental differences than similarities in their security policies. Fundamental differences in national security orientation (Japan – economic; US – military) lay the foundation for the military alliance and its functions. These differences create and reinforce a condition of mutual dependency that enables the alliance to survive despite the

disappearance of a manifest external threat. In short, a congruence of policies that support and promote divergent – not convergent – national security interests may be found within the US-Japan military relationship.

The study argues that the United States and Japanese governments still diverge in their respective prioritization of national security interests. This prioritization originated during the postwar period and became endogenous to the military alliance throughout the cold war. The alliance's internal functions continue to support the divergent prioritization of national security interests between Japan and the United States. This divergence furthermore appears politically tolerable to the policymaking elites of both nations. Alliance durability in the post-cold war period is therefore better understood through a continued toleration of the divergent prioritization of interests than through the common threat thesis.

This study shows that the US-Japan military alliance supports the national security interests of the United States and Japan within both the larger global arena and within each nation's domestic arena. Political elites in both nations utilize the alliance in order to pursue national security within its two contextual subsets – its domestic and international environments. In the post-cold war period, where an absence of a common military threat exists, domestic interests in maintaining the US-Japan military alliance dominate. These domestic interests are served by the alliance's internal functions – the benefits each alliance party receives from the relationship. The predominance of internal benefits received by the US and Japan, continued toleration of those benefits by both parties, and the supporting role played by transnational penetration (public diplomacy, lobbying, and foreign pressure) combine to explain sustainability of the US-Japan military security alliance.

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THE U.S. - JAPAN
MILITARY RELATIONSHIP**


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
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For Lower Richland,
especially Les, Kris, Micah, and Evan

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This study is not intended as a statement nor a critique of US or Japanese governmental policy. Opinions, conclusions, recommendations, and factual errors, expressed or implied, are my own. They do not reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other governmental agency.

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**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
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Introduction**

All nations seek to achieve an acceptable level of national security through a complex combination of economic, diplomatic, and defense policies. As one of the most important policy functions performed by national governments, the pursuit of national security sometimes takes priority over all other governmental functions. Indeed, the concept of national security may be seen as the framework upon which a state constructs its foreign policy.¹

Within this foreign policy framework, the pursuit of national security through military means lingers despite the Soviet Union's collapse and the end of the cold war. In the East Asian region, specific circumstances surrounding the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and South China Seas have and may continue to demonstrate the importance foreign policy decision making elites place upon the military component of national security.

Yet, the significance accorded to military policy does not deny the newly visible emergence of economics within a state's national security calculus. The attention given to the economic dimension of security and the subsequent debate amongst Western scholars concerning its impact upon American and Japanese foreign policy originated well before the cold war's conclusion.² As we shall see from this study, however, prioritization of the

military and economic spheres in American and Japanese national security policy has remained relatively well defined in spite of external environmental changes. Economics has not replaced military deterrence in the American security calculus. In Japan, the inverse appears to be true. In the last analysis, prioritization of national security interests within both nations remains strikingly similar to a bygone era. Such a differentiation of interests creates strong interdependencies between Japan and the United States. Perhaps this phenomenon more than any other causal factor explains sustainability of the US-Japan military relationship.

Economics and National Security in East Asia

The East Asian economic success story is now well known. The question worth considering at this juncture is the extent to which expanding economic growth in East Asia will create conditions favorable to a stable military security environment. Will economic prosperity alone inhibit regional conflict between states, dampening the requirement for states to pursue the military component of national security? Or, will newfound economic prosperity define new conflict scenarios, create regional rivalries, reinforce historic animosities, and further exacerbate underlying regional tensions?³ Where does the US-Japan military alliance fit into this equation?

No one can answer the first two questions with a high degree of confidence. As a result, one answer to the third question may be derived from the fact that the nation-states of East Asia continue to pursue national security through its economic, political, and traditional military aspects. Four reasons account for this answer: 1) most nations in East Asia look to the Japan-US military alliance as a balancer of interests; 2) some see the relationship as a way to restrain full-scale Japanese remilitarization; 3) no one believes that

the current structure of the US-Japan military relationship will remain in perpetuity; and 4) the military dimension of national security remains vital to political leaderships throughout East Asia.

Numerous authors have noted the redistribution of national security capabilities from its traditional military component toward economic capabilities and greater interstate interdependence.⁴ The ideal scenario resulting from such a redistribution would signify a withering away of the security dilemma that is based upon the realist notion in which one state's security results in increased insecurity for its neighbors. The above discussion informs us that such a withering away will most likely not occur. The security dilemma could in fact be enhanced due to the increased economic and technological capabilities within the region. Another scenario could possibly see the security dilemma shift emphasis from its military to its economic and technological aspects. No one knows the effects such a shift would create in the relations between the nations of East Asia.

How much military capability is enough?

From the above discussion, one learns that the military component of national security policy remains both important and problematic. The question remains *how much military capability is sufficient to deal with probable case scenarios in a world characterized by the enhancement of economic and technological capabilities, increased economic ties, and greater interdependence?* Douglas Murray and Paul Viotti remain skeptical that the security dilemma will wither away. They attribute the prevailing traditional role of national defense within security policy to "the security dilemma in which all states find themselves ... and from which all governments must cope."⁵ The security dilemma endures despite increased economic ties and interdependence.

In its most extreme form, the security dilemma originates from one variant of realism concerning the permissive nature of the international system in which all states interact. Such a conceptualized permissive international system results from the perceived absence of regulative forces, or the lack of ability of such forces to restrain actions (if present) to ensure continued order.⁶ This system is based upon the lack of an enforceable security guarantee from a supranational authority over the continued stability of interstate action. Murray and Viotti contend that currently “no guarantor of order among states” exists.⁷ In this realist estimation, states must rely upon self-help to ensure their sovereignty. Such a premise gives rise to the defense policies of nations.

However, ironically enough, order does exist in such a self-help world. Two conditions help to establish order. First, the international system is comprised of a set of nation-states that interact. And interaction necessarily entails some degree of interdependence. Events, decisions, and changes in one part of the system will eventually affect other parts of the system.⁸ Second, regulative forces do exist. A sense of common interests may create order. Great powers have attempted throughout history to establish favorable rules of behavior based upon common interests with the intent of increasing predictability in their relations.⁹ Realist scholars also acknowledge that the international system possesses a structure based upon the distribution of national capabilities.¹⁰ For example, Hedley Bull argued that an international system characterized by norms that provide security against violence, fulfillment of agreement obligations, and possession stability would bring about order.¹¹ While it appears that the security dilemma is a concern to all nations within the international system, it does not have to result in disorder.¹²

From the complexity of the above discussion, one notes the problematic tension between the concepts of interdependence, sovereignty, anarchy, and the security dilemma; the problems associated with the transition from a once dominant military component toward the economic and technological aspects of national security; and their effects upon systemic order. Within such a dynamic international system, states must individually or in some combination seek refuge. This study focuses upon two such states: Japan and the United States.

The developing post-cold war regional military security framework finds that the United States and Japan have decided to maintain emphasis upon their military alliance as the centerpiece of East Asian security. The Japanese and American governments have striven to ensure their bilateral relationship assists in fulfilling such a role. This study seeks to account for the rationale behind sustaining the US-Japan military alliance.

The study's rationale

A comprehensive analysis endeavoring to explain the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan military relationship now appears more necessary than at any time since the beginning of the post-cold war era. The reasons are numerous. Foremost is the fact that the current international order continues to be characterized as a transition period from bipolarity to uncertain multipolarity. The term "post-cold war" demonstrates this point. We still don't know the configuration of the international system in either the short or long term, despite much scholarly debate.¹³

However, it can be said with some certainty that the military relationship between Japan and the United States will affect the prospects of a new East Asian military security structure. The choices that American and Japanese military security planners make during

the next seven to ten years will determine the structure of the U.S. - Japan military relationship and more generally the shape of East Asia's regional security system well into the 21st century.¹⁴ In short, these choices, along with the response to these choices, will define the very nature of East Asia's regional security and prosperity. This current period is in many ways analogous to the historical beginnings of the U.S. - Japan military relationship between 1947 and 1955. That era may be characterized as a time of transition that charted each nation's military and economic policy directions while establishing the institutional foundations upon which these policies were laid. Most of what came after the formative 1947-1955 period may be seen as the logical implementation of these basic policies within the context of external environmental change.¹⁵ Similarly, the choices made regarding American and Japanese defense policy changes to the alliance's institutional structure during the next seven to ten years will define the overall parameters of American, Japanese, and other East Asian national defense policies in the post-cold war world. Alliance continuation or abrogation will have an enormous impact upon regional stability and prosperity.

Secondly, both continuity and change characterize the structural order of East Asia. The region has experienced three distinct structural phases. Following World War II, the region depended solely upon the hegemonic powers of the United States as a security guarantor – a true Pax Americana. During the 1960s and early 1970s, this hegemonic security phase faded into a period of bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the United States withdrew from Southeast Asia and Soviet naval capabilities increased. The late 1970s and 1980s saw Japanese economic strength, Chinese political resurgence, and the economic rise of Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore exert greater

influence throughout East Asia. Yet, throughout the postwar period, the United States has played a vital role in the region's security framework. The current regional order is again undergoing transition as a result of the USSR's demise and will be heavily shaped by the relationship between the world's fastest growing industrial state (China) and its two largest industrial democracies (the US and Japan). Along these lines, the question of how to fit China into the East Asian regional power structure vis-à-vis alliance continuation or abrogation will continue to loom large for policy makers.

Thirdly, contemporary perceptions of America's relative economic decline and the changing nature of global threats provide an opportune time to reexamine the purposes served by the military alliance. Debate regarding the relationship's prospects that is grounded in an analysis of its evolving functions warrants a comprehensive explanation of U.S.- Japan military alliance sustainability. To date, such an examination has not been undertaken.

Critics and proponents alike debate the normative value of alliance continuation in light of their individual conceptualization of such concepts as regional peace and stability. They also attempt to sway readers with convincing phrases such as "free-riding", "burden sharing", and the now famous "security is like oxygen" analogy. These examinations sometimes provide detailed analysis toward explaining the actual purposes served by the alliance. Mostly though, they serve to substitute prediction and prescription for explanation.

Fortunately, numerous studies have been conducted that enumerate particularistic functions served by the alliance. Furthermore, a vast literature exists regarding the nature of the Japanese and American political systems and their contributions to national security

policies. These writings may provide an enhanced understanding of alliance sustainability. However, a comprehensive work that integrates these writings has at this juncture not been performed. This study attempts to fill the gap.

The Postwar U.S.- Japan Military Alliance

During the postwar period's formative years, the governments of the United States and Japan decided it was in their best interests to pursue national security through creation of a military alliance. The close knit national security relationship that developed between Japan and the United States benefited both nations.¹⁶ This relationship is generally seen as providing a quid pro quo: American access to military bases in Japan for Japanese access to U.S. technology and the American economic market.¹⁷ Under this quid pro quo, the United States anchored itself in East Asia politically, militarily, and economically under the banner of containing communist influence. The American military's contribution toward maintenance of regional peace, stability, and prosperity through forward force deployment would not have been possible without Japan's political cooperation. For its part, Japan concentrated upon rebuilding its export-oriented economy while slowly acquiring a defensive military capability closely tied to American military strategy. Japan's phenomenal postwar economic growth would not have occurred without U.S. stimulus. In sum, the American government combined a policy of unlimited Japanese access to the American marketplace with diplomatic pressures placed upon the nations of Southeast Asia and Western Europe to provide Japan with natural resources and additional export markets. These conditions allowed Japan to shed its international pariah status and provided a highly favorable economic environment in which Japan prospered.

This U.S. led environment favorable to Japanese economic, political, and military growth eventually spread across East Asia. Over the past forty-five years, the United States military and economic presence combined with Japan's economic vitality contributed greatly to East Asian regional stability and prosperity.¹⁸ However, with the rise of multipolarity and the demise of the Soviet military threat, an ongoing post-cold war strategic defense policy reassessment has been taking place in both Tokyo and Washington. Increased pressure placed upon policymakers on both sides of the Pacific from those seeking either to abandon the alliance or justify its continued existence represents a unique opportunity to reexamine the purposes served by a continued U.S. - Japan military security relationship.

Debate Concerning the Impact of Russia's Military Decline

In regard to changing global threats to national security, Russia's decline as an antagonist to the nations of East Asia has fundamentally changed debate concerning U.S. - Japan military alliance sustainability. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, those who premise the alliance upon containment of a common, manifest threat perceive a more benign East Asian security environment. Academic scholars such as Neil Renwick, Chalmers Johnson, Ted Galen Carpenter, and Tsuneo Akaha depict an eventual demise of the cold war built U.S. - Japan military alliance.¹⁹ In this view, primary justification for the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty between the world's two largest industrial democracies has disappeared. American support for the defense of Japan from Russian military forces in East Asia is no longer deemed necessary. Absence of a viable threat invalidates a continued justification for treaty continuation; therefore, the mutual security

treaty is an anachronism and should be fundamentally altered – even abrogated – to reflect the post-cold war absence of a militarily strong East Asian adversary.

In sum, this “common threat” alliance maintenance perspective holds that a decline in the region’s most significant military threat should, in general, reduce the necessity for continued emphasis upon military preparedness by the nations of East Asia. In the specific case of Japan, loss of the region’s most viable military threat should allow Japanese defense policy to become more autonomous vis-à-vis the United States. Taking this viewpoint to its logical conclusion, defense policy options for an autonomous Japan freed from the security alliance structure are numerous.²⁰

Yet, autonomous Japanese defense policy options appear undesirable to the political leadership in Tokyo, Washington, and even Beijing. Despite the disappearance of a truly formidable military opponent in East Asia, the Japanese and American governments recently reaffirmed their military relationship as the cornerstone of East Asian security.²¹ To policy decision makers in Tokyo and Washington, the overall impact of Russia’s military decline on alliance continuation appears limited.

Alliance Theory and the Common Threat Thesis

The perception of a common military threat, or mutual adversary, has been held as the *raison d’être* of military alliance formation. But what of alliance continuation? Is military alliance continuation based upon the same rationale as when an alliance initially forms? The common threat line of reasoning presupposes that a security alliance is founded predominately upon a mutually perceived military threat.²² Mutual adversary theories have dominated realist alliance literature from the time of Thucydides to the present, but their

rationale fails to adequately explain the continuation of military alliances in times of relative peace when no significant common military threat exists. This is not to say that military threats to both Japan and the United States no longer exist. Those that remain in East Asia (North Korea and China are most commonly cited) present potential sources of regional instability. Yet, these nations appear limited in their ability to implement policies of regional dominance upon East Asia. Additionally, these military threats fail to generate the widespread elite and mass public support necessary to forge post-cold war containment policies in either Japan or the United States due to an interesting paradox that has formed surrounding the economic and military aspects of national security. Differentiation between economic and defense issues in distinguishing a nation's allies and adversaries has become unclear.

During the cold war, the Soviet Union presented a unified economic, political, and military threat to the national security interests of Japan and the United States. This is not the case in the post-cold war era. While China is often regarded as a regional military threat, it has astutely established itself as an important trade partner to Japan, the United States, and the region more generally. This somewhat accounts for the various policy initiatives attempting to integrate China into the established international economic and military order. Meanwhile, longtime military allies such as Japan and the United States often regard each other as economic adversaries. Disputes over technology sharing and various trade issues create an image of economic warfare between the world's two largest industrialized nations. Who represents the manifest threat in this scenario? Is it possible that the United States presents a threat to China or Japan?

To summarize thus far, the common threat premise does not wholly explain the military relationship's continued maintenance. Rather, alliance theory based solely upon an extension of the common threat premise appears somewhat flawed in its ability to account for alliance continuation in the wake of an external threat's demise. This is due in part to the interdependent nature of the relationship.

Furthermore, the distinction between alliance formation and sustainability theory is vitally important. Conceptual blurring, misunderstandings, or convergence of these distinctive alliance dynamics could shake the very foundations of military security relations in East Asia. If heeded, the prospects of a viable U.S. - Japan alliance based upon the external threat argument could result in a situation that does not bode well for an East Asian region in which the last 45 years has portrayed a relatively peaceful and prosperous environment. The external threat argument may guide policy theorists and practitioners on both sides of the Pacific to perceive and ultimately base decisions upon these perceptions concerning the U.S. - Japan military security relationship in ways which would prove deleterious in their impact upon the Asia-Pacific region.

Beyond the Common Threat Thesis

In the post-cold war global environment, the common external threat argument proves somewhat inadequate in explaining continuation of the Japanese-American military alliance. Moreover, the common external threat argument may potentially provide an impetus toward destabilization of the Asia-Pacific region. Another explanatory route elucidating alliance continuation must be found. This study looks beyond the common military threat argument as primary justification for alliance sustainability in order to

critically evaluate the U.S. - Japan military relationship within the context of post-cold war East Asian relations.

Perception of a common military threat clearly provided some motivation for military alliance formation.²³ The manifestation of a Soviet military threat to the diversity of Japanese and American interests in East Asia was one of numerous factors involved in the creation of the U.S. - Japan military relationship. However, military alliances do not remain static once they are formed.²⁴ Rather, they may be characterized as dynamic – often taking on additional functions that allow for differing interests held by the various actors and institutions within the alliance structure. This study goes beyond simple realist theory. It seeks to explain the sustainability of the U.S. - Japan defense relationship in the wake of the cold war's collapse by identifying and analyzing other alliance functions that serve to benefit particular groups in both Japan and the United States – those groups that gain the most from alliance continuation.

This study focuses upon two central questions. To what extent does functional congruence of policies that support divergent national interests within the military security policy elites of Japan and the United States adequately explain the desire to sustain the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty in the post-cold war era? My hypothesis contends that the functional congruence of policies upholding divergent security interests indeed provides a solid foundation on which the alliance may remain both operationally viable and politically legitimate, thereby allowing for a continuance of the slow, yet steady transformation of the military alliance into a more equitable and balanced partnership. Secondly, what does the evolution of the U.S. - Japan military security relationship during the cold war and post-cold war periods teach us about the nature of security relationships?

Here the argument asserts that military security alliances possess functions that allow for a transformation of these relationships beyond the notion of mutual defense against a common military threat.

An Analytical Framework Based upon Functional Utility

This inquiry seeks to further our understanding of alliance sustainability through an analytical framework based upon an alliance's various functions. Sustainability refers to both the relationship's likelihood of survivability and its usefulness in the formation of a post-cold war global order. Functional utility may be broadly defined as national security interests served by an alliance in two mutually reinforcing ways: first, within its larger global arena (as partners vis-à-vis an often hostile international environment); and second, within the more localized domestic arena; that is, as individual states dominated by factionalized elites pursuing various domestic and foreign policy objectives within the alliance. Functional utility infers that policy actors pursue two subsets of national security (commonly referred to as relative gains and absolute gains in the international relations literature) within the alliance's institutional structure. Policy actors seek benefits both within the alliance as individual actors (relative gains) and as a monolithic alliance entity vis-a-vis the outside world (absolute gains). Conceptualization of the two subsets of national security utility encompasses various perceptions central to this basic premise – for an alliance to function, all parties agreeable to the alliance must believe the benefits derived as a result of the alliance are greater than their initial and continuing investments and the benefits are politically sustainable.²⁵

Without the accumulation of benefits gained from this sense of national security utility, alliance continuation may not be recognized as politically legitimate and operationally viable. The focus of alliance continuation would thus shift from an emphasis upon positive national security contributions toward policies aimed at dampening the influence of alliance abandonment arguments for fear of unintended consequences brought about by treaty abrogation. In sum, national security benefits derived from the framework of alliance functional utility is indispensable toward providing a rich and complex explanation of peacetime alliance sustainability.

The comparative approach to the study of national defense policy provides useful insights toward a greater understanding of an alliance's numerous purposes. The emerging field of defense policy literature demonstrates that the nature of an alliance is not simply one dimensional. That is, an alliance is not maintained solely upon an examination of the external environment. To make such an argument oversimplifies reality. Rather, alliances possess a multidimensional nature that is derived from a complex interplay of numerous functions that help shape defense policy. These functions are affected by, but are not necessarily limited to, the nature of a nation's domestic politics, its governmental policymaking process, its level of economic and technological development, and its dominant perceptions of the global environment²⁶ The purposes served by an alliance may be found within an examination of these factors. The primary objective of this thesis is to conduct such an examination in order to explain alliance sustainability.

Moreover, within this functional framework, the U.S. - Japan bilateral defense relationship has demonstrated a remarkable degree of tolerance toward the pursuit of national security advantages within the more localized domestic arena.²⁷ The relationship

has and will continue to confront numerous defense policy disputes and controversies.²⁸ In response to these disputes, the relationship has proven to possess a considerable measure of understanding, restraint, resilience, and creativity.²⁹ This phenomenon may be attributed to the existence of significant core conceptual differences in the essential meaning of national security itself.³⁰ Conceptual differences have existed since the relationship's postwar beginnings. The differentiation between Japanese and American perspectives of national security and the means used to attain national security objectives has generally been tolerated – allowing both nations to pursue divergent interests while enjoying national security advantages attributable to alliance continuation. Tolerance of relative gains by both governments in the overarching pursuit of absolute gains continues to move the alliance toward a more equitable partnership. This interplay of functions persists in the post-cold war era, benefiting not only the military relationship, but more generally the overall bilateral relationship.

Additionally, alliance functions and the relative and absolute gains created by these functions have become routinized and to a certain degree institutionalized through the present day, thus affecting the relationship's continued sustainability to a much greater degree than the notion of a mutually perceived threat.³¹ Provided that the toleration of relative gains persists while perceptions of political and operational costs do not rise above the benefits derived from the alliance beyond a mutual threat premise, continuation of the alliance appears justifiable. In sum, the concept of a functional congruence of policies supporting divergent national security interests provides an additional explanatory layer that more adequately justifies the continued efforts on both sides of the Pacific to nurture and retain the treaty, despite the demise of the cold war. As the Japanese and American

governments work not only together but in conjunction with the region's other great powers toward defining a new international economic, military, and political order, the effects, both past and present, of alliance functions and their routinization upon the factional interests of the political actors within the US and Japan – the governmental foreign policy elites, academics, business interests, and attentive publics – will define the battleground upon which future sustainability of the security treaty will be fought.³²

Conclusion

Sustainability of the bilateral military relationship between the world's two most significant industrial democracies rests upon a complex understanding of the alliance's functions that goes beyond the perceptual premise of a mutual military adversary. Future shaping of a new East Asian military security structure to replace the bipolar nature of the cold war order will be greatly affected by both nations. Toward this end, it is essential to understand the various objectives served by this alliance and the diverse meanings of national security as defined by the United States and Japan in the post-cold war era. The Japan-U.S. alliance – and more generally the prospect of other post-cold war alliances such as NATO – represents a case study that must not be understood solely as an alliance based upon a common military threat, but more persuasively as a relationship embedded in the divergent meanings of national security and the interplay of internal and external alliance functions.

Research Limitations

This inquiry constructs a logical framework from which the U.S. - Japan military relationship, U.S. East Asian defense policy, and Japanese defense policy may be studied in the future. Two caveats must be mentioned. Obviously, the task set forth in this

proposal is a major undertaking. Thus, this project will not engage in extensively detailed arguments surrounding particularly intriguing issue areas such as the American military basing situation in Okinawa or Japan's role in United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, these specific issue areas may provide potential future sources for testing my hypothesis.

The second caveat deals with research sources. This study will be based upon three sources: secondary sources that consist of scholarly and policy-oriented publications, almost exclusively in English; primary sources such as statistical data and policy documents from governmental and non-governmental sources; and where applicable, extensive interviews conducted in English with politicians, government officials, military officials, and academicians. The caveat lies in an almost total reliance upon English language sources rather than both English and Japanese sources. Therefore, this study will unfortunately be constructed from a heavily weighted dependence upon the American alliance perspective and, where applicable, the Japanese alliance perspective taken from English language sources such as direct translations and published English language journals such as the *Asia-Pacific Review*.

A Brief Outline

Chapter One presents a comprehensive definition of the term "military alliance." Chapter Two surveys the relevant literature concerning the nature of alliances. It also stipulates the limitations inherent within the literature, thereby establishing the requirement for construction of an alternative explanatory framework. After providing a comprehensive definition of the concept of national security, Chapter Three lays out this alternative analytical framework which is grounded in the national defense policy literature

and relies heavily upon the concept of functional utility. Chapters Four through Six identify, account for the support of, and assess the influence of those external and internal alliance functions that serve to benefit Japan, the United States, and the East Asian region as a whole.

Endnotes

¹ A comprehensive definition of the concept of national security is given in Chapter Three.

² See Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 67, Winter 1988-89, pp. 76-96. Indeed, Richard Samuels points out that from the Japanese perspective, the quest for economic and technological superiority began in the Meiji era! See Richard Samuels, *"Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994).

³ John Zysman and Michael Borras, "Lines of Fracture, Webs of Cohesion: Economic Interconnection and Security Politics in Asia," in Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, ed., *Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), p. 77.

⁴ Of particular relevance to this discussion is Richard Rosecrance's *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986) due to the emphasis Rosecrance places upon Japan as the ideal, or model, state which should be emulated within the international system.

⁵ Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, third edition, 1994), p. xix.

⁶ Discussion with Professor Donald Weatherbee, 6 March 1997. Numerous authors such as Arnold Toynbee, Thomas Lawrence, and Edward Carr have noted that the international system appears to be characterized by a competitive laissez-faire arena in which restraints on the powerful may be seen as weak or even nonexistent.

⁷ Murray and Viotti, op. cit., p. xix.

⁸ Harvey Starr, "International Law and International Order," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 301. See also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd edition (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1989).

⁹ These rules have mostly been designed to serve the self interests of those that agree to abide by said rules. Hedley Bull wrote that "order in any society is maintained not merely by a sense of common interests in creating order or avoiding disorder, but by rules that spell out the kind of behavior that is orderly." See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1977), p. 54. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory Raymond, op. cit., chapter six concerning international norms and great power cooperation.

¹⁰ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. write that "The structure of a system refers to the distribution of capabilities among similar units. In international politics the most important units are states, and the relevant capabilities their power resources ... The structure of the system profoundly affects the nature of the system." See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, 2nd edition, (Boston: Little, Brown Publishers, 1989), pp. 20-21. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1979). Realists disagree, however, concerning the structural conditions in which the distribution of national capabilities will produce order. Hegemonic stability theorists contend that order is brought about when the system is dominated by few great powers with stable levels of capability concentration. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes," in Alexander George, ed., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980). Balance of power theorists assert that legal norms are more apt to develop and flourish when national capabilities are dispersed relatively equally amongst numerous great powers.

¹¹ Hedley Bull, op. cit.

¹² Discussion with Professor Donald Weatherbee, 6 March 1997. Kegley and Raymond note that order within the international system has grown increasingly restrictive. They write that "by gradually accepting a restrictive interpretation of when it is permissible to resort to war, the great powers have fundamentally altered the rules for competition. To the extent that they continue to support a restrictive normative order, great power competition in the new post-Cold War multipolar system will not resemble the aggressive behavior that has characterized every previous multipolar era." Kegley and Raymond, op. cit., p. 126. The debate over support for a restrictive normative order also continues. Hans J. Morganthau believed that an evolving "moral consensus" restrains the use of force by great powers. See *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed., rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). Others argue that such a moral consensus does not exist in sufficient depth and strength to sustain such a restrictive order (see Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Cycle of American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986) and that states still consider themselves above the law if it suits their purposes (Stanley Hoffman, cited in Kegley and Raymond, op. cit., p. 146).

¹³ Concerning the debate about the future shape of the international order and America's role, see such works as Samuel P. Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 75, No. 6, November/December 1996, pp. 28-46; Charles William Maynes, "Bottom-Up Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Number 104, Fall 1996, pp. 35-53; Richard Rosecrance, "The Rise of the Virtual State," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 75, No. 4, July/August 1996, pp. 45-61; John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 75, No. 3, May/June 1996, pp. 79-91; Robert W. Tucker, "The Future of a Contradiction," *The National Interest*, Spring 1996, pp. 20-27; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-46; Paul Kennedy, *Preparing For the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1993); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, Volume 80, Fall 1990, pp. 153-71; Michael Howard, "Cold War, Chill Peace," *World Policy Journal*, Winter 1993/94, pp. 27-34; Donald J. Puchala, "The History of the Future of International Relations," *Ethics & International Affairs*, Volume 8, 1994, pp. 177-202; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992); and Peter F. Drucker, *Post-Capitalist Society* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1993).

¹⁴ I chose a seven to ten year timeframe as a result of the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa's final report which was released 2 December 1996. The report defines a seven year timeframe for the replacement and return of Futenma MCAS on Okinawa.

¹⁵ Mike M. Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995), pp. 1-2.

¹⁶ Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1993), p. vii.

¹⁷ Martin E. Weinstein first coined the quid pro quo phrase in *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University, 1971). Its usage within the academic field has become commonplace and was most recently vocalized by Chalmers Johnson during the PBS *Lehrer Newshour's* segment about the November 1996 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on 21 November 1996. See also Chalmers Johnson, "Containing China," *Japan Quarterly*, Volume 43, No. 4, October-December 1996, pp. 10-19; and Neil Renwick, *Japan's Alliance Politics and Defense Production* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 2.

¹⁸ Donald C. Hellman, "Future Strategic Options in the Pacific: A Nichibei Condominium?" in Dora Alves, *New Perspectives for US-Asia Pacific Security Strategy: The 1991 Pacific Symposium* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992), pp. 151-2.

¹⁹ See Neil Renwick, op. cit., pp. 105-151; Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy" in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 74, Number 4, July/August 1995; Ted Galen Carpenter, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship" in *Policy Analysis*, Number 244, 1 November 1995; and Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Security Policy in the Posthegemonic World: Opportunities and Challenges" in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, ed., *Japan in the Posthegemonic World* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

²⁰ These policy options include, singularly or in any combination: an inward turn toward pacifism; a continued buildup of homeland defense capabilities outside of the U.S.-Japan military alliance framework; a closer working relationship with the United Nations toward a more stable international environment; possible military alliance formation with an upcoming regional power such as China; and the eventuality of Constitutional revision or at least greater latitude in Constitutional interpretation whereby Japan could re-enter the international stage as a military great power foreign policy actor. I discussed these options – which were most recently enumerated by the National Institute for Defense Studies, a Japanese governmental thinktank that deals with defense issues – at length during numerous interviews with governmental policymakers from Japan and the United States. See also "NIDS Reveals Long-Term Forecast toward 2015," *Sankei*, 6 January 1997; and Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthur Alexander. *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Security Policies* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1993).

²¹ Please see the following joint communiques: "Alliance for the 21st Century: the Japan - U.S. Joint Declaration on Security," 17 April 1996 and the SACO final report published 2 December 1996.

²² Chapter Two discusses numerous theories of military alliance formation. Special emphasis is given to the realist "common threat" alliance formation literature.

²³ If nothing else, the communist threat in Asia provided the background and justification necessary to construct the alliance. Motivations certainly played a crucial role, but do not solely account for alliance formation between Japan and the United States. See Thomas A. Drohan,

The U.S. - Japan Security Bargain: Origins and Transformation, for a detailed explanation concerning the alliance's origins.

²⁴ Thomas A. Drohan, *The U.S. - Japan Security Bargain: Origins and Transformation*, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Politics, Princeton University, 1991.

²⁵ Internet discussion with Dr. Robert C. Angel concerning the concept of absolute and relative national security advantages, 6 August 1996. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century*, pp. 89-90. Political sustainability is currently a widely debated issue surrounding the US-Japan military relationship and will be dealt with at length later in the study.

²⁶ See Murray and Viotti, op. cit.; Jeral A. Rosati, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy* (Fort Worth, Texas: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1993); and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

²⁷ In a National Research Council report of the Defense Task Force Committee on Japan entitled *Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and Technology Relations with Japan*, the report suggests that tolerance of national security advantages began to dissipate in the early 1980s. See Defense Task Force Committee on Japan, *Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and Technology Relations with Japan* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995), pp. 16-19 [available over the internet at the following website URL: <http://www.nap.edu:80/readingroom/books/maxus/>]. However, one of the themes that came out of my numerous interviews with government officials was the need for a perpetuation of these tolerances. The interviewees felt that the relationship must be based upon a continued tradeoff, with sacrifices on both sides.

²⁸ Numerous works have been written regarding these disputes since the inception of the alliance. See Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*; George Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*; Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-treaty Japan* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 60-150; John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, *Will Japan Rearm: A Study in Attitudes* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), pp. 61-82; Fred Greene, *Stresses in U.S. - Japanese Security Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975); I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, Priscilla Clapp, and Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976); and Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. and Hideaki Kase, ed., *U.S. - Japan Mutual Security: The Next Twenty Years* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981).

²⁹ Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 164-5.

³⁰ On this point see Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); Thomas Drohan, op. cit.; and Richard Samuels, op. cit.

³¹ Drohan, op. cit.

³² One criticism of this approach contends that because foreign policy is often governed by inertia, momentum and lack of political will, leaders are reluctant to initiate change unless placed under the most intense pressure. This is understandable in that a domestic political price may be paid by political leaders courageous enough to discard former policies. Change indeed threatens entrenched interests held by domestic constituencies who desire preservation of their policies

and institutions. Kegley and Raymond note that this "is why at major historical watersheds a propensity to concoct new rationales for existing policies and practices is often evident." See Kegley and Raymond, *op. cit.*, p. 150. See also Kalevi J. Holsti, *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring Since World War II* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Rosati, *op. cit.*; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 5th edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). Admittedly, this argument is difficult to defuse. There exists, however, one related reason why policymakers are reluctant to change. The fear of initiating unintended consequences always looms large over any foreign policy decision, whether that decision supports or revises the status quo. Feedback from past decisions allows policymakers to digest unintended consequences that resulted from these policies. Significant change pushes policymakers into uncharted territory in which they may not feel sufficiently comfortable. This partially explains why policies are revised incrementally, even during periods of great transition such as the international system has been undergoing since 1989.

**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
The U.S. - Japan Military Relationship
Chapter One
The Military Alliance: A Comprehensive Definition

Arnold Wolfers wrote “Whenever in recorded history a system of multiple sovereignty has existed, some of the sovereign units ... have entered into alliances.”¹ The current international system continues to be characterized as a transition period from bipolarity to uncertain multipolarity. A study of military alliances is especially pertinent during such a transitional period. Because these security relationships have represented a universal core component of international relations irrespective of time or place, it is important to establish a comprehensive definition that operationalizes one of the key terms found within international relations.² This chapter seeks a broad definition that encompasses the duration, scope, types, and purposes of a military alliance.

What is a Military Alliance?

Though the term defies a definitive meaning, numerous authors have provided a multiplicity of alliance attributes that contribute to a comprehensive definition. This study focuses upon nine overlapping attributes in an attempt to flesh out its essential meaning. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan define an alliance as “a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.”³ Kegley and Raymond state that an alliance is made explicit through a written treaty.⁴ Russett builds on these definitions by

stating that alliances permit two or more states to specify "the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force."⁵ Bueno de Mesquita and Singer similarly state that alliances coordinate "behavior in the event of certain specified contingencies of a military nature."⁶

Within these definitions, three additional assumptions must be acknowledged. First, alliances attempt to promote security through the concept of deterrence.⁷ Second, alliances provide an exchange of benefits acceptable to both parties. Politically sustainable benefits are perceived to outweigh the costs. Entrapment involving a conflict over issues that do not directly affect one party's national interests is an additional factor that must be considered by policymakers.⁸ Third, either severing the relationship (abandonment) or failing to honor its commitments (betrayal) would presumably entail costs.⁹ These costs may differ depending upon the type of dissolution that occurs – unilateral abrogation versus mutually agreed upon negotiated dissolution (dealignment).¹⁰

From these definitions, we learn that alliances consist of the following eight essential attributes:

- 1) the joining of two or more parties, most always nation-states;
- 2) a formal agreement usually codified through a written treaty;
- 3) states undertake some commitment level upon treaty ratification;
- 4) an agreement lays out conditions under which signatories coordinate their behavior;
- 5) its behavior is militarily oriented;
- 6) a military orientation is usually based upon deterrence;
- 7) the behavior is designed in response to specific military contingencies.
That is, its behavior is necessarily reactive; and
- 8) both parties perceive that benefits outweigh costs, while abandonment entails costs that may outweigh benefits.

This study acknowledges and expands upon the above eight alliance components with one additional attribute. Though alliances are at times seen as reactions to the international

environment (number seven above), they may also influence – indeed shape – the international environment through the creation and preservation of stability. For the purposes of this study, an alliance exists when all nine conditions are fulfilled. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S. - Japan military alliance exemplify this comprehensive definition.

Alliance Scope and Duration

The duration and scope of an alliance accord may be specified or left ambiguous. In the case of the U.S. - Japan military relationship, both have occurred. The initial Security Treaty of 1951 could terminate only if both parties concurred.¹¹ Revision of this original treaty, known as the 1960 Mutual Treaty of Cooperation and Security, specifies that after ten years either party may give to the other a one year prior notice of its intention to terminate.¹² In contrast to this specificity, the treaty ambiguously stipulates its scope as the "Far East." The treaty's preamble declares that the United States and Japan "have a common concern in [contributing to] the maintenance of international peace and stability in the Far East."¹³ Donald Weatherbee correctly distinguishes between the alliance's political scope (the Far East), its military scope (for Japan the home islands), and the level of alliance behavior adopted by each party.¹⁴ Further discussion of this important topic will be addressed throughout the remainder of this study.

Based upon the conditions existing within the international environment, Singer and Small further differentiate between alliance types – those formed in times of war and periods of peace. Obviously, wartime alliances band together to fight a third party once hostilities have commenced. Their peacetime counterparts may be classified into three

distinct types: defense pacts (where signatories agree to militarily intervene when another signatory is attacked), non-aggression agreements (in which pledges of neutrality are made in the event a signatory becomes involved in armed conflict), and ententes (where consultations are undertaken in the event one of the signatories is attacked).¹⁵

The military security treaty between the governments of the US and Japan may be classified as a peacetime initiated defense pact. The treaty is rather unique in that the level of alliance behavior adopted by each state is fundamentally different. Article V stipulates that the Japanese government legally possesses no military obligation to defend American national security interests anywhere outside territory under the administration of the Government of Japan. Article V essentially binds Japan's Self-Defense Forces to the exclusive defense of the home islands. The treaty does commit Japan to defend American military personnel stationed in Japan, but only when these forces come under direct military attack by an external force.¹⁶ However, Article VI stipulates that the United States may utilize its military bases in Japan to militarily defend the mutual national security interests of Japan and the United States in the Far East after consulting with the Japanese government. The United States has employed Article VI numerous times, including during the Korean War, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf War, and in October 1996 when the United States launched Tomahawk cruise missiles against air defense installations in southern Iraq as a punitive response to aggressive Iraqi military operations against Kurdish factions in northern Iraq.¹⁷ Thus, the American military bases in Japan continue to serve as staging areas for US military operations conducted throughout the Far East. In sum, the level of alliance behavior is militarily skewed, or one-sided. However, this arrangement is agreeable to both governments.

Objectives, Interests, and Threats

Due in part to the anarchical nature of the international order in which each nation-state's political leadership finds itself, states align together with the purpose of adopting a common stance toward shared national security problems.¹⁸ Holsti writes that governments seek military alliances when "they assume that they cannot achieve their objectives, defend their interests, or deter perceived threats by mobilizing their own capabilities. Thus, they rely upon, and make commitments to, other states that face similar external problems or share similar objectives."¹⁹

Holsti correctly differentiates between objectives, interests, and perceived threats when characterizing the purposes of an alliance. The fact that states face similarities in the international environment does not automatically equate to states possessing similar objectives designed to deal with a nation's external environment. At times this important distinction becomes confused when similarities in national security problems are analogously equated as shared national security objectives. Conventional wisdom argues that alliances are inherently designed to serve congruent national security objectives amongst signatories.²⁰ Alliances must be based upon a common military threat according to conventional wisdom.

However, shared national security problems do not always correspond to shared interests or objectives. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, this study demonstrates that the U.S. - Japan military alliance often serves to support and at times promote divergent national security objectives through the creation of convergent security policies. These policies are designed to manage similarly perceived problems – not objectives – within the international arena while allowing Japan and the United States to pursue

divergent national security objectives. In short, a military alliance does not have to be founded solely upon a common adversary or convergent national security objectives.

By presenting a parsimonious operational definition of the military alliance, this chapter attempted to establish a foundation upon which to build an explanation of alliance sustainability. Reasons exist beyond mere containment of Soviet or Chinese military and political expansion in order to sustain the US-Japan security relationship. Chapter two reviews the relevant literature concerning the nature of military alliances.

Endnotes

¹ Arnold Wolfers, "Alliances," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 269.

² Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrance Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 4. George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 7, 1963, p. 773.

³ Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrance Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, op.cit., p. 4.

⁴ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the 21st Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p. 89. See also Kegley and Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 52.

⁵ Bruce M. Russett, *Power and Community in World Politics*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1974, p. 301.

⁶ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. David Singer, "Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthesis," in Cornelius Cotter, ed., *Political Science Annual*. Volume 4 (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 241.

⁷ George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 30. Liska informs us that "an alliance must enable [its] members to deter" and that the deterrent function is inherently defensive in nature. Inis Claude stresses the notion that alliances are war-preventing instruments by stating that "International trouble-makers are likely to be deterred much more effectively by superior power than by merely equal power." See Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Balance of Power Revisited," *Review of International Studies*, Volume 15, January 1989, p. 80. The concept of deterrence will be further discussed in Chapter Four.

⁸ Michael J. Green also stipulates that entrapment may result when the larger alliance partner in terms of military capabilities dominates the economic interests of the smaller ally. See Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 3. This situation has interestingly enough not been the case. If anything, Japan has been able to effectively deflect such

dominance by the United States in both the military and economic aspects of the bilateral relationship. A dilemma exists not only for Japan but also for the United States involving the entrapment-abandonment issue. Moving closer to an ally in order to avoid abandonment increases the likelihood of entrapment, while developing policies and capabilities independent of the alliance in order to avoid entrapment increases the risks of abandonment. This argument will be further examined in Chapter Four.

⁹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 1.

¹⁰ In the case of the US-Japan military alliance, Ted Galen Carpenter has made the argument that a mutually agreed upon dissolution is achievable in that it would bring no undue harm to either party. I consider this argument to be extremely naïve due to the multiplicity of linkages between Japan and the United States. A negotiated dissolution would bring about ever greater friction between the two governments since the defense linkage serves to dampen overall alliance conflict and competition. See Ted Galen Carpenter, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship," *Policy Analysis*, Number 244, 1 November 1995; and Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Dr. Green reinforced the theme of increased bilateral conflict despite a negotiated alliance dissolution during a personal interview.

¹¹ Robert F. Reed, *The US-Japan Alliance: Sharing the Burden of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 7. Article IV of the *Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, September 8, 1951*, states "This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area. The treaty text may be found in Martin E. Weinstein's *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

¹² For the complete text of the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan* of 1960, see Martin E. Weinstein, op. cit.

¹³ Weinstein, op. cit. The term "Far East" is used twice more with no further clarification. It is worthy to note that the April 1996 alliance "reaffirmation" replaces the term "Far East" with "the Asia-Pacific region." This revised terminology is used eleven times with no further clarification. In a section dealing with a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, the text simply states that "The two leaders [Clinton and Hashimoto] agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan." See full text of the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security," *Japan Times*, 17 April 1996.

¹⁴ Discussion with Professor Donald Weatherbee, 6 March 1997.

¹⁵ J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description," *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 3, January 1966, pp. 1-32.

¹⁶ Reed, op. cit., p. 9. Article V stipulates that "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." See also Weinstein, op. cit.

¹⁷ KC-135R tankers based at Kadena AB in Okinawa air refueled the B-52s that launched the cruise missile attack. Consultations between both governments occurred before the action was initiated. Personal interviews with Pentagon officials and Japanese embassy officials. See also *The Asahi Evening News* and *The Daily Yomiuri*.

¹⁸ Henry Teune, and Sig Synnestvedt, "Measuring International Alignment," *Orbis*, Spring 1965, pp. 171-189. See also Richard A. Skinner and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Correlates of International Alignment," *Journal of Political Science*, Volume 5, Spring 1978, pp. 97-108, and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*, p. 52.

¹⁹ K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 4th edition, 1983), p. 106.

²⁰ Kegley and Raymond, *A Multi-polar Peace?*, op. cit.

**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
 The U.S. - Japan Military Relationship
 Chapter Two
 International relations and foreign policy/area studies literature:
 limits and insights

An examination of the international relations and foreign policy/area studies literature brings to light its inability to give a full explanation for US-Japan alliance sustainability. That stated, portions of this literature provide the theoretical seeds necessary to better understand the military relationship between the world's two largest industrial democracies. This chapter surveys the relevant literature concerning alliances. The literature is differentiated into three distinct contribution areas: IR alliance formation, IR alliance sustainability, and the foreign policy/area specialty's literature. The chapter concludes by highlighting the literature's numerous limitations and insights. By presenting the insights and limitations inherent in both the foreign policy/area studies and international relations literature, this chapter establishes the basis for an alternative approach toward an explanation of alliance sustainability.

**International Relations Theory Contributions
 The Alliance Formation Literature**

International relations theorists have contributed a vast literature to explain military alliance formation. Within this literature, five general theoretical approaches have been proposed: balance of power, ideological solidarity, developmental incentives, national

attributes, and transnational penetration. The latter two approaches possess useful theoretical guidance toward an explanation of US-Japan military alliance sustainability.

Balance of power theories. The balance of power approach is derived from classical realism, neo-realism, and diplomatic history. It focuses upon attributes associated with the international system – its structure, the distribution of power held by individual nations within the system, and threats to the balance of power.¹ This approach argues that states facing a common external military threat will align to offset those states posing the threat. Nations form alliances to aggregate what they believe to be sufficient capabilities which will prevent other nations from achieving a dominant position.² Alliances are designed as expedients to counter the existence of common military threats, thereby preserving the status quo balance of power. A historical review of this approach follows.

Considered the father of realist thought and the international relations discipline, Thucydides wrote over 2,400 years ago concerning alliances and the balance of power in his classic work *The Peloponnesian War*. Thucydides noted that “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”³ Viotti and Kauppi comment that Thucydides associated a shift in the balance of power with the cause of war: “Sparta was afraid of losing its preeminent role in the Hellenic world and therefore took countermeasures to build up its military strength and enlist the support of allies. Athens responded in kind.”⁴ Thucydides also emphasized the lack of an institutional structure to the nature of international politics. In such an anarchic world – one with no superordinate authority to impose order – “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”⁵

Similarly, the Indian statesman-philosopher Kautilya wrote almost twenty-three centuries ago what some consider the first systematic treatise on alliances as instruments of statecraft. Kautilya advised future political leaders with such guidelines as “a state located between two powerful states should seek collaboration and protection from the stronger of the two.”⁶

Additionally, balance of power preservation has been the norm throughout the history of Western Europe. The balance of power maxim has been reinforced by the literature and diplomatic relations of the period. Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, and E.H. Carr, among others, all concerned themselves with the concepts of national security, the balance of power, anarchy, and alliances.⁷

Contemporary balance of power theorists who concern themselves with alliance formation continue in this tradition. Consider the following propositions⁸:

“Perceived imbalances in the distribution of international power will give rise to alliance formation,” Gullick, 1955.

“External threat, rather than national strength or weakness, is the primary source of alliances,” Liska, 1962.

“Common perceptions of threat are probably the most frequent source of alliance strategies,” K. Holsti, 1967.

“Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state-system,” Morgenthau, 1967.

“Alliances are formed when the balance of power is threatened,” Organski, 1968.

“When confronted by a significant external threat, states will ally with others against the prevailing threat (known as balancing),” Walt, 1987.⁹

“When there is an imbalance of threat, i.e., when one state or coalition appears especially dangerous, states will form alliances or increase their internal efforts in order to reduce their vulnerability (entitled balance of threat theory, a variant on balance of power theories),” Walt, 1987.

"A great power is likely to shun alliances if it is believed it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of commitment resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected," Morgenthau, 1985.

"Alliances involve military collaboration ... against particular other states," Snyder, 1991.¹⁰

As seen from this survey, the realist-oriented approach has dominated the alliance formation literature from Thucydides through the present day.

Ideological solidarity theories. Ideological solidarity approaches generally contend that alliances result from states sharing similar political, cultural, economic, and technological traits.¹¹ Edmund Burke thought that alliances were produced as a result of corresponding laws, customs, and habits of life among states.¹² Osgood asserts that "alliances generally presuppose national or ideological affinities that go beyond expediency."¹³ In a summary of hypotheses on ideology and alliance formation, Stephen Walt writes "when weak or unstable regimes often rely on ideological arguments to bolster their legitimacy, this reliance may affect their alliance choices ... Accordingly, we can expect regimes whose legitimacy is precarious to enter ideologically based alliances."¹⁴ Furthermore, Kenneth Waltz contends that ideological alignments are more likely to occur in a bipolar world because a condition of bipolarity creates greater stability.¹⁵

Developmental incentive theories. Approaches founded upon developmental incentives maintain that alliances result from wealthy, hegemonic states providing economic or military assistance to weaker states. Simply stated, the greater the amount of aid, the tighter the resulting alliance. Morgenthau wrote that military and economic assistance is thought to provide suppliers with significant political leverage over recipients.¹⁶ This theoretical approach helped policymakers justify the economic and

military assistance programs implemented by the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.¹⁷

National attributes theories. This approach attempts to expand upon balance of power theories by contending that leaders draw upon numerous motivations above and beyond the cold calculations of national interest and power usually associated with such theories. Alliance formation thus reflects leadership needs (i.e., “the greater the extent to which isolation satisfies internal or group leadership needs, the greater the tendency to avoid alliances”)¹⁸ and general domestic needs, including the requirements of internal political stability, status, and economic interests (i.e., “a nation’s alliance strategies are closely linked to domestic needs,” and “the motives of lesser powers to ally with great powers are security, stability, and status.”)¹⁹

This approach provides significant theoretical guidance toward an explanation of alliance sustainability in that it devotes attention to the domestic functions that an alliance serves. Japan and the United States often derive dissimilar benefits from their military relationship that strengthens their interdependence. These benefits will be discussed at length in Chapters Four and Five.

Transnational penetration theories. Approaches founded upon transnational penetration contend that alliances result from the ability of a certain state’s domestic and foreign policy processes to manipulate a target state’s domestic and foreign policies through lobbying techniques, public diplomacy, and foreign propaganda. Stephen Walt asserts that this penetration may take three forms: 1) transnational penetration efforts alter their target nation’s public perceptions and policy decisions regarding a potential ally through various means; 2) public officials may be influenced by these efforts to move their

nation closer to the desired ally; and 3) foreign propaganda may be used to sway the targeted nation's elite and mass attitudes.²⁰ Peterson alleges that Britain's effective propaganda campaign in the United States played a vital role in America's decision to join the Allied powers.²¹ Additionally, Koen argues that during the 1950s the China (Taiwan) Lobby exerted substantial influence over influential American officials who shaped U.S. policy in the Far East, especially American policies toward Taiwan.²² Walt summarizes the transnational penetration hypotheses by stating that penetration appears to be more effective when applied to open societies than closed societies.²³ This theoretical approach may also provide some insight into sustainability of the U.S. - Japan security alliance.

International Relations Theory Contributions The Alliance Sustainability Literature

In contrast to the vast literature on alliance formation, there exists a relative paucity of international relations theory seeking to explain alliance maintenance. What literature that does exist focuses upon four main areas: continued existence of a common threat, distribution of influence, public goods theory, and national attributes.

Existence of a common threat. As within the alliance formation literature, the sustainability literature is dominated by balance of power theories. In this approach, alliance cohesion depends upon a common threat and declines as the threat is reduced. The hypothesis here contends that as the military threat recedes, so will alliance cohesion.²⁴ Variations of this premise also exist. One group of propositions suggests that if only part of the alliance membership is threatened, severe divisions may arise which undermine the alliance. Another group contends that an inequitable division of labor

among alliance partners will erode alliance cohesion.²⁵ Many alliance critics cite this last thesis as the most probable reason for prospective alliance breakdown.

Distribution of influence. Conventional wisdom within this genre dictates that alliance influence reflects the distribution of capabilities among its members. In contrast, the revisionist view within this approach maintains that weakness provides a source of advantage when intra-alliance bargaining occurs since “the stronger alliance partner is in a weaker bargaining position within the alliance; it is usually the keener of the two to maintain the alliance.”²⁶ As the Japanese economy gained superpower status relative to that of the United States in the late 1970s to the present, this thesis has undertaken much criticism. One response to the revised US-Japan economic relationship in the defense arena resulted in Japanese governmental acquiescence to the creation of the so-called “sympathy budget.”²⁷

Public goods theories. This approach implies that states which would receive the most benefit from a public good (such as national defense through the framework of a military alliance) and which have the greatest ability to provide this public good will indeed bear the highest proportion of public goods costs.²⁸ This theory stresses the notion of free-riding, a concept in which the weaker nation within an alliance has little incentive to improve its relative position. Free-riding is likely to occur because this approach assumes that the larger ally places greater value upon the alliance.²⁹ The disproportion in direct military alliance contributions (such as increased capabilities in manpower, force strength, and power projection capabilities) should diminish as the weaker ally experiences relative gains in economic growth. Due to numerous constitutional, legal, and political constraints,

place upon the Japanese military by a highly rational Japanese foreign policy elite, such diminution has not occurred.

National attributes. This approach asserts that nations with substantially different attributes are less likely to be compatible alliance partners. Thus, great inequalities in size and strength among alliance partners is a likely source of dissension. An interesting variant on this thesis dealing with alliance dynamics contends that unequal changes in strength favor disunity. Liska predicted what many see as the cause of demise for the U.S. - Japan military alliance when he wrote "Unless allies have an ideal basis for identifying with one another, unequal increase in their present and likely future capabilities will not favor cohesion."³⁰

The Foreign Policy/Area Studies Literature

Due in part to the relative scarcity of alliance maintenance theory within the international relations literature, foreign policy and area specialists have attempted to fill the gap. This literature limits its analysis to an examination of the factors that either undermine or promote the Japanese-American military relationship. As a result, this literature may be divided into three themes: one that emphasizes factors favoring alliance sustainability; a second theme that highlights those factors that adversely affect durability; and a third theme that seeks to meld the two extremes. It should also be mentioned that these writings tend to be prescriptive in nature as they are intended to persuade political elites and the attentive public. Thus, policy recommendations range from alliance continuation – to modification – to abrogation.

Adverse factors affecting alliance durability. Most of the literature that analyzes factors leading to a demise of the alliance focuses upon the dominance of two intertwined

themes: America's containment psychology and the importance of domestic bureaucratic politics. The latter theme includes such factors as bureaucratic inertia, lack of political will on the part of the elected and non-elected political leadership, and the dominance of entrenched special interests.

Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson highlights both containment and bureaucratic politics. Johnson writes that the post-cold war relationship "continues only through inertia, without any foundation in grand strategy or in response to a common threat, despite a high degree of economic interdependence. Japan and the United States are today, as Nakanishi Teramusa puts it, merely 'paper allies.'"³¹ Johnson and E. B. Keehn stress the containment mindset, bureaucratic inertia, and entrenched special interests in their July/August 1995 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy." Johnson and Keehn question "whether a U.S. commitment to a Cold War vision of East Asia until the year 2015 reflects a viable strategy or inertia and drift. The Pentagon's understandable desire to maintain old spending levels and military commitments should not drive U.S. regional strategy."³² In a separate article, Johnson alleges that the Pentagon – as a lucrative trade agency – possesses ample incentives that will "perpetuate the Japanese-American security relationship unchanged for as long as possible."³³ On the lack of political will, Johnson laments that the Japanese political leadership will never stand up to America's commitment to maintain its forward deployed military forces almost exclusively on Okinawa.³⁴ For Johnson, this is due in part to the Japanese perceiving their relationship with the United States "as a convenience that allows them to continue building their regional capabilities in preparation for the day when the United States can no longer support – financially, politically, or both – its flawed regional vision."³⁵

Other foreign policy scholars and area specialists stress these themes. Ted Galen Carpenter writes that "It is highly unusual for a great power [such as Japan] to choose to remain catatonic in the face of such significant security problems in its own region [Korean peninsula, South China Sea, Taiwan]. But Japanese leaders know that they do not have to incur the costs and risks of playing a more active role to protect their country's security interests. The United States has obligingly agreed to incur those costs and risks."³⁶ Carpenter labels America's East Asian security policy a "smothering strategy" designed to preserve the so called 'cap in the bottle' thesis which maintains that no nation – especially the United States – trusts a rearmed, militarily resurgent Japan.³⁷

In their chapter entitled "Outdated Alliance Strategies," Alan Tonelson and Ronald A. Morse expand upon the smothering strategy thesis, arguing that since 1945 the United States has attempted to contain all the world's great powers – "to do nothing less than to prevent them from acting like great nations in the first place."³⁸ A continuance of this smothering strategy, in their opinion, has "encouraged American leaders to mortgage long-term economic strength for short-term geopolitical benefit."³⁹ America's political leadership has thus become hooked on the belief that perpetuating the smothering strategy outweighs the potential cost of an independent Japan within the East Asian region. This belief, combined with the habit of exerting American military and political clout in order to contain both its allies and enemies, has enabled the United States to maintain this strategy despite its certainty of failure.⁴⁰

Factors favoring alliance sustainability. The foreign policy/area studies literature that emphasizes factors favoring alliance sustainability highlights the continued anarchical nature of the international order. This literature stresses the diversity of threats derived

from the global in-order and its resultant security dilemma that continues despite the end of the cold war.

In juxtaposition to the Johnson/Keehn *Foreign Affairs* piece, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. maintains that North Korea represents the immediate regional security threat.

North Korea is a clear and present danger. Not only is it on the brink of a nuclear weapons capability, but it also has 1.1 million men under arms, with two-thirds of them deployed along the Korean demilitarized zone. Moreover, it is developing a new generation of ballistic missiles. The framework agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration last October has frozen North Korea's nuclear program and provides for its dismantlement. Over time, it holds the promise of a peaceful resolution of tensions on the peninsula. But it will take a decade or more for the agreement to be fully implemented, and there are many pitfalls along the way. In such circumstances, it would be a serious mistake to withdraw American troops from the region.⁴¹

Nye also mentions China as the other potential security threat to the region. While acknowledging that it is irresponsible to portray China as a current or future enemy of the United States, Nye points out that China's impressive economic growth will be accompanied by a commensurate rise in military capabilities, even without an increase in its defense budget as a percentage of its GNP.⁴²

In a similar vein, Thomas McNaugher argues that the goal of American strategy in East Asia should be to encourage Chinese regional and global cooperation, test Chinese intentions, and head off its emergence as a new threat. McNaugher believes that the continued American military presence in East Asia will serve as a balancer vis-à-vis China's military emergence in the event that a worst case scenario develops where the Chinese leadership decides to threaten its neighbors.⁴³

Richard Fisher argues that the modernization of China's Peoples Liberation Army, particularly the acquisition of and licensing rights to co-produce Russian SU-27 fighters,

represents “the first major post-Cold War challenge to U.S. strategy in Asia, as America’s ability to deter conflict in Asia will rely increasingly on air power.”⁴⁴ Though Fisher details the numerous obstacles faced by the Chinese military in its force modernization program, questions remain whether such a modernization drive depicts a significant risk to regional stability, whether Japan and the United States underestimate the rate of modernization, and what impact this may have upon the U.S.-Japan military alliance.

Kent Calder’s 1996 book, *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America’s Future in Asia*, interweaves all the above mentioned factors with the prospect of a growing energy shortage. The effects of a quasi-arms race, emerging energy shortages, perpetual historical antagonisms, rising technological sophistication, and potential economic competition for markets may loom large in the eyes of regional policymakers well into the 21st century.⁴⁵

In attempting to describe the Japanese perspective, numerous American and Japanese authors stress the common threat theme. Mike Mochizuki notes that some Japanese political and military analysts perceived the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis as a serious threat to Japan. These analysts considered numerous options in response to a military conflict.⁴⁶ Hisahiko Okazaki and Hajime Izumi saw the possibility that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force might assist the United States secure air superiority in the event that war did break out.⁴⁷ Thomas Wilborn argues that the end of the cold war has actually served to intensify “the Japanese sense of uncertainty and foreboding.”⁴⁸ Seizaburo Sato, in an interview with Eugene Brown, stated that “In East Asia there are three surviving communist countries, while there are none in Europe. Europe can neglect China and North Korea, but Japan cannot.”⁴⁹ Brown further cites Japanese insecurities toward Russia (“a heavily armed neighbor”), China (“its bid for regional hegemony”), and North Korea (“a

smoldering flashpoint”).⁵⁰ Hiramatsu unabashedly states that Beijing is attempting to “convert the South China Sea into the ‘All China Sea,’ seeking hegemony in the region and filling the vacuum forming in the wake of the end of the cold war.”⁵¹

The middle ground approach. This fast-growing approach, most notably articulated by Mike Mochizuki, Morihiro Hosokawa, and at times even Chalmers Johnson, seeks to meld the numerous factors favoring alliance durability and breakdown into a framework that calls for moderate revision of the US-Japan military relationship.⁵² This approach deals with alliance political legitimacy by arguing that the maintenance of a substantial American troop presence in Japan (47,000) – and in particular in Okinawa prefecture (29,000) – is not politically sustainable and should be reduced to bolster the alliance. Forward presence is still vital to the relationship’s operational capability, but reductions in troop strength, particularly the 3rd Marine division, would bolster Japanese political elite and mass public support. Serious consideration is being given to this approach in both Washington and Tokyo.

The Literature’s Five Limitations

US-Japan alliance sustainability cannot be fully explained by the international relations and contemporary foreign policy/area studies literature. As Thomas Drohan notes in *The U.S. - Japan Security Bargain: Origins and Transformation*, “the prime obstacle to understanding US-Japan security relations remains a lack of an appropriate intellectual framework to illuminate how security alliances actually behave. Conceptual tools are

needed to explain patterns of interaction between dissimilar yet increasingly interdependent nations.”⁵³

Five limitations account for the failure of international relations and foreign policy/area studies to develop such an appropriate intellectual framework. These limitations include: a failure to recognize alliance dynamism; a failure to distinguish between conceptual alliance paradigms; a failure to balance levels of analysis; an overemphasis placed upon policy prescription; and a failure to comprehend the complex interplay of divergent national interests, commonly shared interstate interests, and interstate cooperation.

Failure to recognize alliance dynamism. First, while the field of international relations has certainly advanced our level of understanding toward the formation of military alliances, these theoretical approaches do not equate to theories of alliance continuation. Such theories are not easily transformed, especially in contemporary international politics when a common military threat ceases to exist. In short, international relations alliance formation theories are static in nature. They tell us about the conditions that existed prior to alliance creation. However, these theories tell us little of other conditions that develop during an alliance’s duration.

For the most part, the alliance literature fails to adequately address the question of change. Drohan laments that “Alliances have been largely conceptualized as “on-off” switches rather than organic systems, and the focus has been on alliance formation, episodes of crisis, and breakdown.”⁵⁴ When the literature does consider this question, it usually presents hypotheses that view change as a significant contributor to alliance demise. When it comes to security alliances, change is theoretically damaging. However, the US-Japan military relationship demonstrates that alliances are continually evolving.

They are dynamic. As such, they do not have to rely solely upon those conditions that initially generated the alliance. Change is inherent in a military alliance and does not always spell disaster.

Failure to distinguish between conceptual alliance paradigms. Second, the distinction between alliance formation and alliance sustainability is vitally important. Traditional paradigms tend to present more obstacles than explanation when analyzing what is going on within the evolving U.S. - Japan military relationship. Conceptual blurring, misunderstandings, or convergence of these distinctive alliance dynamics could shake the very foundations of military security relations in East Asia. For example, an extension of the common external threat argument toward alliance sustainability may guide policy theorists and practitioners on both sides of the Pacific to perceive and ultimately base decisions concerning the US-Japan military relationship in one of three possible ways, all of which would prove deleterious in their impact upon the Asia-Pacific region.

The first detrimental policy choice accepts the lack of a common external threat. Assuming that both countries possess shared objectives (i.e., countering a manifest military threat), absence of a mutual adversary allows for the perception of a narrowing in commonly shared objectives. Without this sense of shared common objectives, the "unequal US-Japan military relationship" as perceived by some is now unsustainable. A collapse of the "myth" of common cold war goals undermines the relationship.⁵⁵ Continuing trade and technology disagreements provide added impetus for a bilateral breakup. Moreover, cultural dissimilarities, internal domestic political problems, and fits

and spurts of nationalism further heighten the abrogation argument. From this policy perspective, alliance dissolution appears to be a foregone conclusion.

A second destabilizing alliance policy option envisions the current military relationship seeking out new potential military threats or aggregating a set of moderate regional threats. This policy option shifts the cold war containment emphasis toward upstart regional powers such as China and a united Korea while stressing instability on the Korean peninsula as long as the North Korean regime appears politically explosive.⁵⁶ China is often cited as the upcoming common military threat to the nations of East Asia.⁵⁷ This argument points toward Japan's shared territorial disputes with both China and South Korea as sources of regional instability. Moreover, both the Chinese and the Koreans jointly harbor ill feelings toward the Japanese due to their colonial legacy. These ill feelings are loudly expressed and are used as leverage in their relationship with Japan. They occasionally surface anew, as the ongoing situation concerning territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku and Takeshima islands vividly demonstrates.⁵⁸ To the common threat protagonist, shifting containment policies from the former Soviet Union toward China appears logical.

The sovereignty issue leads into a third harmful alliance option that could be based upon an extension of the common threat thesis. Most writers in the field of Japanese military policy agree that the nations of East Asia fear a Japanese state perceived as militaristically resurgent should Japan gain greater independence from its alliance with the United States. Perceptions of a United States political leadership destined to eventually withdraw its military power projection capabilities has not been dismissed by the governments of East Asia, as evidenced in part by a dual track policy: one the one hand,

the governments of East Asia call for a continued regional role to be played by the American military; on the other hand, the region experiences increased defense spending growth rates, aggressive procurement of advanced technological hardware with increased power projection capabilities, and expanded efforts at improving core military capabilities through improved production capacities.⁵⁹ A renewed Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere led by Japan would be unacceptable to her neighbors. In this policy perspective, Japan would ultimately be perceived as the military threat to the nations of East Asia.

Failure to balance levels of analysis. A third explanatory failure of the international relations and foreign policy/area studies literature is that both bodies of literature have difficulty balancing the domestic and international political milieu when attempting to explain alliance maintenance. The theoretical and practical focus upon one level of analysis often leads to a refusal to recognize the importance of any other analytical level. IR literature stresses the anarchical nature of the international order and the military threats concomitant with the resultant security dilemma (particularly the realist school of thought; however, the idealist/liberalist school also acknowledges this theoretical foundation), while the foreign policy/area studies literature is divided in emphasis placed upon domestic politics versus the international balance of power. In short, it is important to recognize that an understanding of national security policy requires consideration of the dynamic interplay between numerous factors found at the international and national levels. This interplay does not remain static – where one environment continually predominates over the other. At times, the international environment will receive the most attention from policymakers. During other periods, policymakers will subordinate demands of the international environment to domestic politics. Recognition of this dynamic interplay

hopefully results in a study which seeks a middle ground analytical framework that reconciles this limitation.

Overemphasis placed upon policy prescription. Fourth, foreign policy/area studies specialists perform an analytical disservice toward an explanation of alliance sustainability when attempting to persuade political elites, the attentive publics, and the mass public toward revision or maintenance of current policies. While Robert Angel correctly points out that these specialists would argue in favor of painful short-term policy prescription to avoid more serious long-term damage resulting from doing nothing, the academic and policymaking community would greatly benefit from a comprehensive study that explains US-Japan military alliance functions and the conditions that either change or maintain its functions.⁶⁰ In short, such studies should utilize an approach that blends the international and domestic milieu with history in order to formulate policies based upon future scenarios. Current studies spend too much time prognosticating and not enough time conducting research.

Those that underscore factors leading to alliance breakdown devalue the benefits acquired from the alliance's present functions. As we shall soon see, the relationship serves to benefit widespread interests throughout Japan, the United States, and East Asia. In contrast, those that accentuate factors favoring alliance sustainability overemphasize the significance of external enemies. This overemphasis threatens to isolate regional powers such as Russia and China. Containment policies may hamper the successful integration of both nations within a dynamically evolving international order. Moreover, the United States and Japan do not individually or jointly possess the capability or political will to

implement containment policies toward China and Russia. Such policies could spell disaster not only for the alliance, but for regional stability and prosperity as well.

Failure to comprehend the complex interplay of divergent national interests, commonly shared interests, and interstate cooperation. A fifth limitation of the international relations and foreign policy/area studies literature encompasses confusion regarding national interests, commonly shared interests, and interstate cooperation. This limitation originates from the post-cold war neorealist/liberal idealist debate regarding national interests and the extent of state cooperation within the international arena.⁶¹ This debate appears conceptually inadequate and therefore holds little explanatory power when applied to the sustainability of the US-Japan military alliance. An overview of the contemporary cooperation debate follows.

Neorealists claim that relative gains matter to states seeking autonomy/independence in an anarchical world.⁶² This subset of the realist paradigm contends that with the collapse of the common Soviet military threat, the growing importance of relative gains could eventually force a dissolution of the alliance due to increasing economic and technological frictions. In contrast to this pessimistic view, liberal idealists (neointernationalists) assert that state cooperation is inevitable due to three assertions regarding the notion of cooperation. First, states are slowly converging upon commonly shared interests. Interdependence inevitably results from such a convergence. Second, these common interests matter more than relative gains, especially when cooperation is attempted between more than two states. This line of reasoning argues that the greater the number of participants, the less likely a particular state will perceive itself as losing out (suffering a relative loss) during the negotiating process of bargaining and compromise that occurs in

any multilateral framework.⁶³ Second, cooperative prospects are sensitive to the costs involved in fighting. Robert Powell contends "If the use of force is no longer at issue, then a state's relative loss will not be turned against that state. Relative gains no longer matter, and cooperation now becomes feasible. This is in keeping with the expectations of neoliberal institutionalism."⁶⁴ However, this neointernationalist argument fails to account for bilateral relationships such as the U.S. - Japan military alliance. How, then, does one explain defense cooperation between Japan and the United States?

This study suggests a third hypothesis: relative gains and common interests matter within the dynamics of any security framework, but are secondary in importance to the divergent national security objectives of Japan and the United States. The cooperation dilemma argument when applied to bilateral frameworks does not fully take into account two important attributes of the state. First, states are pluralistic, factionalized entities. They do not consist of monolithic, unified actors. Thus, relative gains may not always be perceived as absolute zero-sum games by those parties possessing vested alliance maintenance interests within each state. Second, an acceptable level of relative gains tolerance is allowed by both sides in the US-Japan military alliance. As long as both sides maintain specific areas of relative advantage upon which the other side remains dependent, relative gains in that specific area of alliance relative advantage will continue to be tolerated. In sum, contemporary nations-states simply cannot "go it alone" in the technologically advancing global order. Once again, though, interdependence does not translate into shared objectives. Rather, interdependence means that states may maintain the ability to pursue divergent national security objectives within an alliance framework (or multilateral framework) that remains sustainable under two conditions: 1) if they so

desire; and 2) if such actions are tolerable to other alliance members. For these reasons, the cooperation dilemma argument is somewhat inconsequential in the case of the US-Japan military alliance.

Yet, Insights Remain

In contrast to the literature's limitations, portions of the national attributes and transnational penetration approaches are insightful. The domestic political environment and a donor state's ability to influence policy elites and the mass public within a recipient state matter in the shaping of foreign policy. Both play important roles within the U.S. - Japan military alliance. These theoretical approaches will receive greater emphasis in Chapter Three.

Conclusion

Overall, neither international relations theory nor the foreign policy/area studies literature presents a suitable single analytical framework in which the US-Japan military relationship may be explained. Five limitations were presented to reinforce this assertion. Therefore, this study looks beyond the international relations and foreign policy/area studies literature for a more complete explanation. The study proposes an analytical framework based upon an integration of the comparative study of national defense policy mixed with relevant portions of the foreign policy/area studies and international relation's fields (the national attributes and transnational penetration approaches). This analytical framework yields increased ability to identify, account for the support of, and assess the influence of alliance functions that encourage maintenance of the US - Japan military security alliance. Chapter Three captures the argument.

Endnotes

¹ Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, op. cit., p. 4.

² Ibid, p. 4.

³ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 49.

⁴ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, second edition), p. 38. Thucydide's emphasis on fear is echoed throughout history. Viotti and Kauppi then cite numerous historical examples to support the balance of power approach: 17th and 18th century France and Britain, the early 19th century Napoleonic France and Western Europe, Germany and Britain after the Franco-Prussian War, and the Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war.

⁵ Thucydides, op. cit., p. 401.

⁶ Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, op. cit., p. 1.

⁷ Machiavelli advised that "It is not wise to form an alliance with a prince that has more reputation than power."⁷ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1950), Book Two, Chapter XI, p. 312. Thomas Hobbes noted that anarchy prevails in international relations. In the absence of any superordinate authority over states (a social contract between states), moral obligations would not govern interstate relations.⁷ See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1974), Book One, Chapter 15. Hugo Grotius regarded treaties as binding states to their obligations in the presence of international anarchy. Hugo Grotius, *Law of War and Peace* (1625). See also E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1962) for a scathing criticism of early 20th century idealism and its attempt to overcome international anarchy.

⁸ The first five propositions are taken from a comprehensive compilation of alliance propositions found within Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan's *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, Appendix C. Propositions by Walt come from his book *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987). The last two propositions come from Kegley and Raymond's *When Trust Breaks Down* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990). See also Kegley and Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great Power Politics in the 21st Century*.

⁹ The term balancing is attributed to Kenneth Waltz in his *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Massachusetts: 1979).

¹⁰ Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," *International Organization*, Volume 45, No. 1, Winter 1990/91, p. 123.

¹¹ Walt, op. cit., p. 33.

¹² Cited in Walt, op. cit., p. 33.

¹³ Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 20. A strong case is made against this approach. Arnold Wolfers notes that "religious or ideological homogeneity has not been a traditional prerequisite of alignment amongst states." See Arnold Wolfers, "Alliances," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Volume I, New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968), p. 20. George Liska writes

the "ideology provides the rationalization for alliances. ... Where they exist, ideological affinities among regimes are merely the immediate impetus to such alignments or their consequences." See Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 14 and 61-62.

¹⁴ Walt, op. cit., p. 39. Walt also warns that this theoretical orientation "may exaggerate the importance of ideology by taking the rhetoric of statesmen too seriously."

¹⁵ Kenneth Waltz argues that bipolar worlds are the most stable of all possible international security environments. Bipolarity may empower other states to follow their ideological preferences rather than actual security requirements. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Volume 93, no. 3, 1964 and *Theory of International Politics*, 1979.

¹⁶ See Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review*, Volume 56, no. 2, 1962.

¹⁷ However, Walt further suggests that foreign aid "may be more the result of political alignment than a cause of it." Walt, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

¹⁸ Guetzkow, 1957, p. 157; cited in Holsti, Hoppman, and Sullivan, op. cit.

¹⁹ K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 110; George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 27.

²⁰ Walt, op. cit., p. 46.

²¹ See Horace C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War: The British Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914-1918* (Norman, Oklahoma: 1939).

²² See Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York, 1974) and Stanley Bachrack, *The Committee for One Million: "China Lobby" Politics* (New York, 1976).

²³ Walt, op. cit., p. 49.

²⁴ Arnold Wolfers hypothesized that "where external defense rather than economic co-operation or the pacific settlement of disputes among members of the group is the essential aim as in an alliance, any diminution of the external threat or of the will to meet it will tend to undermine cohesion and render futile any attempts to save the alliance by inward-directed 'diversions'." Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 29.

²⁵ Examples include "Alliance decision making becomes more difficult when an external threat is directed at only a few members rather than the alliance as a whole." Liska, 1962, p. 129. Kenneth Waltz (1967; 11) contends that "A common external danger does not necessarily produce an equitable division of labor among alliance members." Cited in Holsti, Hoppman, and Sullivan, op. cit.

²⁶ Arthur Lall, 1966, p. 182. Cited in Holsti, Hoppman, and Sullivan, op. cit.

²⁷ The sympathy budget was created to offset American defense expenditures in Japan through the concept of alliance burden-sharing, or host nation support – where the host nation shares the cost of maintaining American military forces in country.

²⁸ See Mancur Olsen, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). See also Mancur Olsen and Richard J. Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Volume 48, pp. 266-279.

²⁹ Drohan, op. cit., p. 10.

³⁰ Liska, 1962, p. 89. Another example includes "In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, differences are almost certain to arise." Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), p. 226.

³¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1995), p. 296.

³² Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 74, No. 4, July/August 1995, pp. 112-113.

³³ Chalmers Johnson, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia," *Quadrant*, March 1996, pp. 28-29.

³⁴ Chalmers Johnson writing in *The Japan Times* anniversary special entitled "100 years, 100 views," February 1997.

³⁵ Johnson and Keehn, p. 105.

³⁶ Ted Galan Carpenter, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," *Policy Analysis*, No. 244, 1 November 1995, p. 7.

³⁷ Carpenter, p. 13. Major General Henry C. Stackpole, former Marine Corps commander in Japan, received widespread attention for espousing this thesis in a 27 March 1990 *Washington Post* interview with Fred Hiatt entitled "Marine General: U.S. Troops Must Stay in Japan."

³⁸ Alan Tonelson and Ronald A. Morse, "Outdated Alliance Strategies," in Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., Ronald A. Morse, and Alan Tonelson, eds., *Powernomics: Economics and Strategy After the Cold War* (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1991), p. 243. The smothering strategy denies foreign policy independence to Japan and the major West European powers through a security guarantee based upon the maintenance of a massive troop presence, extending America's nuclear umbrella, opening U.S. economic markets to allied exports, tolerating allied protectionism, and upholding a stable international monetary order.

³⁹ Tonelson and Morse, op. cit., p. 242.

⁴⁰ Tonelson and Morse, op. cit., pp. 243; 253.

⁴¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 74, no. 4, July/August 1995, p. 95.

⁴² Nye estimates China's defense expenditure at about four to five percent of its GDP. See "The Case for Deep Engagement," pp. 91-92.

⁴³ Thomas L. McNaugher, "U.S. Military Forces in East Asia: The Case for Long-Term Engagement," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., *The United States, Japan, and Asia* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1994), p. 212.

⁴⁴ Richard Fisher, "China's Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the U.S.," *Asian Studies Center Backgrounder*, The Heritage Foundation, No. 142, 31 July 1996, p. 21.

⁴⁵ Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1996).

⁴⁶ Mike M. Mochizuki, *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995), pp. 77-78.

⁴⁷ Hisahiko Okazaki and Hajime Izumi, "Nihon ga sansen suru tejun," *Voice*, June 1994, pp. 102 and 105.

⁴⁸ Thomas L. Wilborn, *How Northeast Asians View Their Security* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 30.

⁴⁹ Cited in Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," *Asian Survey*, Volume 34, no. 5, May 1994, p. 432.

⁵⁰ Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 432-438.

⁵¹ "Asia Becoming 'Wary' Over China's Naval Buildup," *Kyodo*, December 21, 1992, in FBIS, *DR/EAS*, December 22, 1992.

⁵² See Mike Mochizuki, "The Future of the U.S. - Japan Alliance," *Sekai Shuho*, February 1996; "Slow Motion Crisis: China's Missiles Sent an Urgent Message: Our Asia Policy Needs Fixing," *The Washington Post*, 17 March 1996; "The Marines Should Come Home," with Michael O'Hanlon, *The Dead Fukuzawa Society Monthly*, March 1996; and "Toward a New Japan - US Alliance," *Japan Quarterly*, Volume 43, No. 3, July-September 1996. Former Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa called for a similar solution in two public speeches in March 1996. See his address to the Council on Foreign Relations, 11 March 1996; along with "Rebuilding the U.S. - Japan Security Structure," address to the annual dinner meeting of the Japan American Society of the State of Washington, 12 March 1996; available over the internet at <http://www.us-japan.org:80/jassw/what/archive/96/031296/Hosokawa.html>. In "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia," Chalmers Johnson suggests leaving the American 7th fleet in Japan, while returning ground and air forces to Guam, Hawaii, or the American mainland.

⁵³ Thomas Alan Drohan, *The US-Japan Security Bargain: Origins and Transformation* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1991), p. 4.

⁵⁴ Drohan, op. cit., p. 5.

⁵⁵ See Renwick, op. cit., chapter one.

⁵⁶ Regarding the explosive nature of the prospects for Korean unification, General Gary Luck, commander of American forces in South Korea, recently stated in congressional testimony that "the question is not will this country [North Korea] disintegrate [following two years of unprecedented crop damage due to extensive flooding that has created near famine conditions] but rather how will it disintegrate, by implosion or explosion, and when." The South Korean, American, and Japanese governments are collectively attempting to achieve what is termed a "soft landing" concerning North Korea. Selig Harrison defines a "soft landing" as "a gradual process of [Korean] unification in which neither side is swallowed up by the other and Washington [and Tokyo] helps Pyongyang achieve a China-style economic transformation." See Selig S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," *Foreign Policy*, Number 106, Spring 1997, p. 57.

⁵⁷ See Fisher, *op. cit.* Other works that consider China's future military impact upon East Asia include June Teufel Dryer, "The Military's Uncertain Politics," *Current History*, Volume 95, no. 602, pp. 254-59; David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger," *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 19, no. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 19-36; David B. H. Denoon and Wendy Frieman, "China's Security Strategy: The View from Beijing, ASEAN, and Washington," *Asian Survey*, Volume 36, no. 4, April 1996, pp. 422-39; Gary Klintworth, "Greater China and Regional Security," in Gary Klintworth, ed., *Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Robert Sutter, "China [country profile]," in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, ed., *Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Henry J. Kenny, "An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes," *Center for Naval Analyses Occasional Paper* (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, February 1996); William R. Heaton, Jr., "The People's Republic of China [country profile]," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, ed., *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study* (3rd edition, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and journalist Jim Rohwer's *Asia Rising* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), particularly chapter 15; and Sheldon W. Simon, "East Asian Security: The Playing Field Has Changed," *Asian Survey*, Volume 34, no. 12, December 1994, pp. 1047-1063.

⁵⁸ For the Korean perspective concerning territorial claims to the Tokto (Takeshima) islets, see Yoo Young Ock, "A Research into Historical Justification of Disputed Territorial Claims to Tokto Islets between Korea and Japan," *East Asian Review*, Volume 8, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 3-22. Ock's article concludes by stating that "There is no doubt that Tokto is the territory of Korea ... In addition, a cold and rational preparation for a confrontation over the Tokto issue is required more than ever, let alone the need for studies on the nature of international law and justice in case the issue should become disputed at the International Court of Justice."

⁵⁹ See Kent E. Calder, *op. cit.* For a detailed analysis concerning regional efforts at improving military production capabilities, see Norman D. Levin and Paul J. Bracken, *The U.S. Military Role in a Changing Asia: Preparing for the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1993), pp. 19-27.

⁶⁰ Discussion with Professor Robert Angel, 29 January 1997.

⁶¹ Two authoritative sources that take somewhat divergent normative stances on the contemporary neorealist/liberal idealist debate include David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Baldwin's edited piece suggests that the neoliberalist paradigm has theoretically succumbed to most neorealist assumptions (i.e., the nature of international anarchy, the primacy of the state, etc.). For Baldwin et. al., the contemporary debate now centers around the ability of states to cooperate in multilateral frameworks and institutions. I summarize the central premise found within the Baldwin edited volume. Kegley's work complements the Baldwin volume as it also emphasizes a synthesis of the realist and idealist paradigms.

⁶² For an insightful discussion of the concept of relative gains in regard to international cooperation, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, pp. 116-140.

⁶³ Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, pp. 209-233. See also Grieco, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
The US-Japan Military Relationship
Chapter Three**

**Functional congruence of policies supporting divergent interests: national security
and national defense within the foreign policies of Japan and the United States**

Neither the international relations nor foreign policy/area studies literature presents a suitable single analytical framework in which to explain the US-Japan military alliance. Chapter One set forth the argument that both have difficulty balancing the domestic and international political variables when attempting to explain alliance maintenance. This chapter explores the national defense policy literature in seeking a suitable starting point toward explaining alliance sustainability. The national defense policy literature presents an inclusive framework from which to study the alliance because it more fully integrates the domestic political environment within each nation's security policy calculus. Both the internal and external environments are important. Emphasis placed upon one or the other varies according to numerous factors that will be presented in this chapter. Before constructing this analytical framework, a comprehensive definition of the concept of national security will be laid out.

The Concept of National Security

The concept of national security is difficult to clarify. The term often seems ambiguous. This conceptualization problem is not aided when political leaders use the term without context or specification, for this often leads to policy confusion among the political elites

and mass publics of allies, adversaries, and ourselves. Arnold Wolfers argued that the concept of national security often serves as an ambiguous symbol utilized by policymakers, the media, and academics in order to advocate specific foreign policies that promote their individual interests.¹ Alexander George presents a similar argument by stating that

[the] 'national interest' has become so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is highly problematic and controversial. Most thoughtful observers of U.S. foreign policy have long since concluded that the 'national interest' concept unfortunately lends itself more readily to being used by our leaders as political rhetoric for justifying their decisions and gaining support rather than as an exact, well-defined criterion that enables them to determine what actions and decisions to take.²

Much may be gleaned from these criticisms. First, a nation's foreign policy – its relations with actors outside its borders – must be guided so that it specifies national goals, the means to pursue such goals, and a method of feedback that measures whether said goals have been attained. Such a guide is necessarily complicated in that it must "specify the degree of security that a nation shall aspire to attain and the means by which it is to be attained in [any] given situation."³ Secondly, the conduct of foreign policy must possess a broad consensual basis from which it legitimately operates. At the very least, foreign policy elites must develop and continually build consensus amongst themselves regarding specific aspects of foreign relations, including policies concerning American military intervention.⁴ The concept of national security seeks to fulfill these characteristics. In short, the concept of national security serves as a framework from which a nation – its political leadership, attentive public, and mass public – conducts its foreign policy. National security is the unifying glue that ties the goals, policies, and feedback measurements of the foreign policy process.

Broadly defined, then, national security encompasses the framework of goals, policies, and feedback measurements designed to protect those values a nation deems as central to its continued existence – its very survival. National security is a condition in which the protection and continued enhancement of values widely held amongst not only a nation's political elite, but also amongst its populace, are pursued.⁵ National security revolves around the protection of those values a state deems as central to its continued existence (its core values). Walter Lippman wrote that “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice [its] core values.”⁶ Territorial integrity, economic and technological development and prosperity, and democratic ideals may represent three such core values. President Clinton's *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* begins by stating that “Protecting our nation's security – our people, our territory, and *our way of life* – is my Administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty.”⁷

National security may be measured both objectively and subjectively. This characteristic of national security is attributable to Arnold Wolfers, who asserted that “In an objective sense, [national security] measures the absence of threats to acquired values; in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”⁸ Political leaderships emphasize the subjective measurement of national security for two reasons. First, the possibility that a state will lack threats to its continued existence remains extremely remote. Second, it is important to remember that policymaker's perceptions often guide policies with national security concerns more than the actual situation may dictate. Thus, the concept of national security focuses upon its subjective aspect. Nations perpetually seek to dampen fears in which their acquired values will be taken away.

The pursuit of national security also entails the perceived and actual capability and willingness on the part of a nation's political leadership and populace to sacrifice short term interests for the protection and enhancement of long term core values. America's military role in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf exemplifies this pursuit. Efforts by the postwar Japanese government and its citizens to rebuild Japan's export-oriented, technologically-based economy demonstrates a different form of sacrifice toward the attainment of national security.

The two examples above highlight another facet of the national security pursuit. States seek to attain a satisfactory sense of national security through a complex interaction of economic, diplomatic, and military defense policies. While it is nonsense to believe that nations such as Japan have voluntarily given up the capability and willingness to defend themselves through military means in order to concentrate solely upon national security by means of becoming the world's model trading state, differences in emphasis on political, military, and economic means do exist amongst states. This difference in emphasis is most strikingly visible between Japan and the United States. Richard Samuels writes that while the United States' national security interests during the cold war allowed it to routinely trade technology and economic advantages to its allies for political and military objectives, the Japanese leadership never thought to make the distinction that emphasizes military over economic aspects of national security.⁹ Acknowledging that the political, military, and economic means to achieve national security are closely intertwined, this study expands the meaning of national security to include all three means components.

Samuels provides keen insight into the origins and nature of the national security framework upon which a nation conducts its foreign policy. A nation's foreign policy

strategies for enhancing national security are contingent upon its historical, geographical, and domestic political situation. In short, a nation's history, geography, and political structure constrain its national security choices. In the case of Japan, the Japanese perceived themselves as late-comers in a Hobbesian global environment. Japan's pursuit of military technology during the Meiji era and its fatal decision to attack Pearl Harbor were perceived as the most viable means of maintaining national survival in such an environment. In the postwar era, Japan shifted its national security emphasis toward rebuilding its economy and acquiring advanced technologies to enhance its survival.

In contrast, the United States has shown itself to be much slower, even reluctant, to shift its national security priorities in favor of economic policies during the postwar period. Certainly the military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union, along with America's immense postwar economic strength, heavily influenced this decision. Nevertheless, despite the Soviet Union's collapse, U.S. foreign policy elites still accord the military aspect of national security a predominant role within the policy arena. Kegley and Raymond contend that

While the impact of ... new nonmilitary threats to global welfare [trade-bloc competition, neomercantilism, international drug trafficking, natural resource depletion, deforestation, etc.] promises to be potent, they do not necessarily mean that geoeconomics or ecopolitics will replace geopolitics. The distribution of power and threats to great-power peace demand continuing attention, and therefore military power balances among the most powerful states will remain of paramount importance. For without the successful coordination of great-power relations, no other threats can be managed. Preserving peace is the sine qua non to prosperity and progress.¹⁰

Military policy is still high policy in the United States.¹¹

Certainly, national security interests are prioritized by policymakers, the media, academia, and the general public. The Clinton Administration's *National Security Strategy*


of Engagement and Enlargement focuses upon three central national security goals that appear to be weighted in precedence: security enhancement through military might, furtherance of America's economic revitalization, and promotion of democracy abroad.

The report states

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Free market nations with growing economies and strong and open trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development ... Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners and are far less likely to wage war on one another.¹²


A hierarchy of America's national security framework loosely based upon the current administration's assessment might look like figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1: A Hierarchy of America's National Security Priorities



For comparative purposes, a hierarchy of Japanese national security interests loosely based upon various sources might look like figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2: A Hierarchy of Japanese National Security Priorities¹³



A comparison of the national security hierarchy of Japan and the United States reveals fundamental differences in the emphasis placed upon the prioritization of the military and economic dimensions of national security. Japan emphasizes the economic dimension, while the United States underscores the military aspect. Japan's military priorities do not include the capability to intervene, while US military priorities do not stress disaster relief preparedness in either the domestic or international environment. Within the economic dimension, Japan places greater emphasis upon access to foreign technology than does the United States. Additionally, Japan does not stress the ideological importance of democracy, while US foreign policy interests place some emphasis upon democratic principles in the belief that democracies tend not to wage war against one other. The

divergent prioritization of national security interests between Japan and the United States suggests that alliance maintenance may be sustainable despite the lack of a common military threat. This concept will be developed further throughout the remainder of this study.

In order to attain acceptable levels of national security within a diverse range of foreign policy challenges, states at times seek cooperation with other states within the international arena. Bilateral approaches occur when portions of a state's policies are directly tied to another country through specified arrangements. Military alliances and trade agreements between the United States and Japan such as the pact regarding the Japanese domestic semi-conductor, automotive, insurance, and aviation market and American corporate market share typify this form of national security pursuit. Additionally, nations may acquire a sense of national security through participation in multilateral arrangements such as international organizations and frameworks. Examples include The United Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At other times and for a variety of reasons, individual states tend to shun such cooperative behavior, favoring unilateral policies designed to "go it alone." The Clinton administration's policy toward Cuba represents a unique unilateral stance in American national security policy.

Integration of the National Defense Policy Literature

Building upon an integration of the national defense policy literature provides an analytical framework that allows for increased explanatory power when dealing with the US-Japan military alliance.¹⁴ One problematic dilemma within the alliance literature that

was described in Chapter Two deals with the amount of emphasis placed upon the level of analysis. Indeed, as Samuel Huntington has written, defense policy appears Janus-like in that it exists in both the fields of international and domestic politics.¹⁵ Thus, this study adopts and modifies the approach utilized in Douglas Murray and Paul Viotti's *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*.

The comparative approach to the study of national defense policy provides useful insights toward a greater understanding of an alliance's numerous functions. National defense policy literature demonstrates that the nature of an alliance is not simply unipolar; that is, an alliance is not maintained solely upon an examination of the external environment. Rather, alliances possess a bipolar nature heavily dependent upon domestic political variables. These variables include a nation's basic political structure, its defense policymaking process, and its level of economic and technological development. A complex interplay of domestic and global variables creates the environment in which an alliance may be sustained.

An integration of the national defense policy literature highlights four comparative components of a state's defense policies that may be useful in understanding the environment surrounding the US-Japan military alliance: 1) perception of the international environment and its position within that environment; 2) particular national objectives, strategy, and military force employment doctrine; 3) the defense policy-making process; 4) various recurring defense issues such as force posture, weapons acquisition, and civil-military relations.¹⁶

An adaptation of these four components found within the national defense policy literature expands upon the traditional American concept of national security from that of

military security policy to include its economic and technological aspects. This adaptation loosens the narrowly defined American conception of national security that is limited to military defense policies. In this adaptation, national security entails a holistic approach encompassing a state's military, economic, and technological security components. In the case of Japan, this approach also examines the survivability of its postwar political structure.

A Paradox of Divergent Interests?

A comparison of these four components when applied to the national security policies of the United States and Japan demonstrates an interesting paradox. Within this comparison, there exist greater fundamental differences than similarities in the national security policies of Japan and the United States. This phenomenon conflicts with a basic tenet of alliance literature which argues the necessity of similarities for an alliance to function effectively. Yet, fundamental differences between Japan and the United States lay the foundation for the military alliance and its functions. These differences create a condition of mutual dependency that enables the alliance to survive despite the disappearance of a manifest external threat. In sum, the analytical framework of this study is founded upon the concept of functional utility that results from a congruence of policies that support and indeed promote divergent national security interests.

Position within the International Environment

Placed upon a security continuum, Japanese and American perceptions of the international environment and their respective positions within this environment are closely parallel. This line of reasoning asserts that Japanese and American political elites are

driven by perceptions of insecurity. This study will focus solely upon the elites that influence policy.

Japanese elite perceptions. Japanese elite perceptions of insecurity are reinforced by numerous factors, including: 1) geographical isolation as an island country off the coast of the most heavily populated continent in the world; 2) political isolation as a result of its World War II atrocities and subsequent dependence upon American political leadership to assist Japan in regaining a favorable position in the international arena following its immediate postwar pariah status; 3) the overwhelming “western” orientation of the developed world throughout Japan’s rise to great power status; 4) a paucity of raw materials required in successfully operating an export-oriented economy and the subsequent feeling of economic dependence upon others for continued access to these raw materials; 5) a propensity for Japan to view itself as behind in efforts to “catch up” to the West in the fields of technology, trade, and finance (this perception commenced when Japan was opened to western trade and technology in the 1860s); and 6) Japan’s dependence upon the continued international economic regime based upon market principles in order to expand its export-oriented economy. Robert Angel and Richard Samuels have deemed this theme as “Japan is an island trading nation precariously dependent on imported raw materials cut adrift in a hostile world.”¹⁷

To sum thus far, feelings of isolation and dependency drive Japanese perceptions of insecurity. Yoshio Okawara, former ambassador to the United States, devoted an entire book to this subject entitled *To Avoid Isolation: An Ambassador’s View of U.S./Japanese Relations*. Okawara bluntly points out Japan’s economic reliance upon the American marketplace. He recalls two incidents that provided the impetus behind the book: receipt

of an urgent message from a notable Japanese journalist and friend in late January 1985 that read:

Japan-U.S. economic friction must not be allowed to get any worse. No country is as important to Japan as the United States. Despite this fact, many economic leaders in Japan are complacent, and make no effort to understand why Americans are now leveling such scathing criticism at Japan. As soon as you return [to Tokyo], I urge you to sound the alarm in Japan, to tell the Japanese people exactly what the problems are. I urge you to impress upon all concerned the necessity of taking real steps to avoid being internationally isolated.¹⁸

On another occasion, during a Japanese Embassy sponsored trade conference addressing Japanese-American trade issues, Okawara noted that the younger conferees generally expressed the opinion that America's economic future was bleak (based upon the technical level of the U.S. work force, attitudes about work, and American industrial productivity). This group was quieted when an elderly participant stated this opinion: "In addressing these issues, we need to do so with a modesty which recognizes that Japanese industry is being allowed to do business here in one small corner of the American marketplace."¹⁹

Jitsuro Terashima concerns himself with the triangular relationship between Japan, China, and the United States. Terashima worries that a triangular relationship is inherently unstable. As such, there will eventually be an alliance/condominium relationship of two against one – of China and the United States against Japan. Terashima asserts that a Sino-American alliance is inherently more natural than the current U.S.-Japan alliance due to two fundamental factors: there are more Sinophiles than Japanophiles in Washington and New York, while citizens of large continental nations have greater affinity for each other because of their inherent size.²⁰

Glen Fukushima further advocates the American affinity for China over Japan. In a commentary for *The Asahi Evening News*, Fukushima points out that those who pessimistically regard the U.S.-China-Japan triangular relationship can fall back upon historical precedent – when U.S.-Japan relations were up during the late 1800s and post-1945, U.S.-Sino relations were down; when U.S.-China relations were positive between 1920 and 1949, U.S.-Japan relations were in disarray. Fukushima also notes that American business prospects are much greater in China than Japan. The vice-president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan cites eleven reasons for Sino-U.S. affinity, ranging from such items as American difficulty in entering Japan's already saturated domestic economic market, Japan's complex political structure, and Japan's circumlocution and ambiguity in its American relationships, to Japan's lack of a "cultural, philosophical, and religious heritage of a truly grand world civilization."²¹

Richard Samuels finds Japan's autonomous technological quest – what he terms "technonationalism" – embedded in the national security concept and the pervasive anxiety of insecurity.²² Kitaoka Shin'ichi stresses Japan's geographic isolation in this avoidance theme. He writes:

It is Japan's geopolitical fate to face America to its east, Russia to its north, and China to its west. These three countries are no ordinary states. All possess immense land areas and huge populations, and all perceive themselves as central to the world or at least to a region. America sees itself as the champion of freedom and democracy. Russia used to call itself the leader of the Slav people ... China has a long history of regarding itself as the 'middle kingdom,' central to the world ... All three countries have, on occasion, challenged traditional diplomacy with a revolutionary diplomacy rooted in their conviction of their pivotal place in the global or regional order ... Each of the three, not only because of its size but also because it represents a civilization, deserves to be called an empire. Japan, by comparison, is a mid-ranking nation-state. Historically, it was always on

the periphery of the Chinese culture sphere. At one point, some Japanese adopted the view that their country should be the center of East Asia, if not the world, but this thinking came to the fore only during the brief decade from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s. Japan's imperial urge was an artificial construct that vanished with the empire's precipitous collapse in 1945.²³

This is not to say that Japan is terribly uncomfortable with its geopolitical position. Japan benefits greatly from its current status and fears that fundamental changes in the status quo would heighten its insecurity. Numerous defense-related examples support this line of reasoning.

First, within the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines review, Japan has habitually reiterated its position to abstain from a concept of collective defense in conjunction with the United States. It appears as if Japan will not fundamentally revise its alliance role without the onset of crisis to precipitate such change. Some change is expected, however, such as Japanese governmental assurances of rear area operational support in the event of a regional military crisis. This change does represent one example of the slow progression of incremental transformation found throughout the history of the alliance.²⁴

Second, the Japanese government continues to stall in its agreement to cooperate in joint research and development of a theater missile defense system. Interviews with senior Japanese embassy personnel stressed substantial costs, along with the potential for a decline in the relationship with China for the delays. Interviews with officials associated with the Pentagon stressed the notion that the American military-industrial-scientific complex, while it would applaud the influx of financial resources, does not require Japanese technological cooperation. The projects will be completed with or without Japanese assistance.²⁵

Third, the Japanese government announced that it would delay implementation of its latest Mid-term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000) due to financial costs. This decision was publicly announced by the Japanese government following U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright's reaffirmation of American troop strength in Japan at 47,000 personnel during her February 1997 inaugural overseas "get acquainted" trip.²⁶

American elite perceptions. It is often asserted that the political elites and populace of the United States probably feel more secure than any other nation-state. The reasons are numerous: America is vast; it is surrounded by friendly, docile neighbors; its position as an international superpower (combined political-military and economic power) is currently unrivaled; Americans perceive themselves as the world's "honest broker" when given the opportunity to settle disputes beyond its borders; and America's political leadership espouses unwavering faith in the free market and in America's ability to lead the world in technological innovation. Thus, the ability to intertwine independence and global leadership characterize this perception of American security. In this line of reasoning, any attempt to change the status quo may chip away at this security.

However, in reality, America's post-cold war political leadership may not perceive such hegemony for two reasons.²⁷ During the cold war, the United States relied upon its friends and allies for support of diplomatic and military initiatives that bolstered the stability and prosperity of the bipolar international order. Today, American reliance upon its friends and allies to maintain the international system, whether seen as unipolar or multipolar, is of even greater importance. With the absence of a manifest threat to system maintenance, the United States has lost an important leverage tool with its friends and allies. The absence of a common military threat has also allowed the economic aspect of

national security to gain heightened importance in national security matters.²⁸ America's relative economic decline vis-à-vis its East Asian allies bolsters further incentives for these nations to conduct foreign policy with a degree of greater independence from American objectives when these objectives diverge. In sum, US foreign policy has always relied upon widespread international support. Two foundations of this support (economic dominance and a common military threat) have disappeared. American policymakers understand this dynamic situation and feel less secure than wisdom dictates.²⁹ Moreover, American policymakers may feel more dependent upon their alliance partners (especially Japan) today to maintain the status quo than at any time in the postwar period. Mutual insecurity seems to be more ubiquitous in the relationship between the United States and Japan.

National Security Objectives, Strategy, and Military Force Employment Doctrine

It is often presumed that Japanese and American interests in maintaining the international status quo equate to parallel national security objectives. This is hardly the case. Beyond the general emphasis placed upon status quo maintenance of the international order, Japanese and American national security objectives, strategy, and military force employment doctrines are fundamentally different. Yet, they are mutually reinforcing because they are different. This creates an alliance environment conducive to a high degree of interdependence.

Japanese national security objectives. Japan's national security objectives represent a commitment to maintenance of the status quo. Japan's objectives are fourfold: 1) maintain and enhance the current international economic system in order to sustain

Japanese dominance as brought about by its export-oriented economy; 2) build upon stable relations with the United States in order to enhance Japanese security through continued American military forward deployment, coverage under the U.S. nuclear deterrent umbrella, and access to the American consumer market while cooperating in common security and environmental concerns; 3) continue establishing stable relations with China in order to gain greater access to raw materials and the Chinese domestic market, lighten Japan's trade surplus dilemma with the United States by establishing an export base within China, dampen potential Chinese domestic political problems and their effects that could in turn threaten Japanese national security (militarily or economically), and alleviate negative perceptions of Japan as a consequence of her imperialist conduct toward China during the first half of the twentieth century; 4) enhance relations with southeast Asian nations, allowing for expansion of Japan's export base in order to decrease bilateral trade tensions with the US, gain further access to raw materials, increase Japan's export-oriented market, cooperate in common security and environmental concerns, and bolster positive perceptions of Japan following its brief colonial history. Ichiro Ozawa best summarizes these four national security goals in *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*. Ozawa writes

the mission of politics today is to ensure that we maintain and enhance the affluence and stability that we now enjoy. The conditions necessary to accomplish this are peace and stability in the international environment and the free trade that flourishes as a result. Without these, Japan will be unable to survive in the new post-Cold War world. It is widely acknowledged that resource-poor Japan built its economic might on wealth accumulated in the world free trade system. If Japan loses the ability to trade, it will lose the very source of its prosperity.³⁰

A brief history of Japanese national security strategy. One commonly argued theme asserts that Japanese national security policy is non-rational due to its relative lack of ability to devise coherent, sound, and rational decisions.³¹ I believe this theme is ill-founded. Japanese security policy has been anything but non-rational. It is plainly pragmatic and realistic. To Michael Blaker, Japanese foreign policymakers have carefully assessed the international situation, methodically weighed each alternative, and sorted out various options to “cope” with issues since the late 19th century.³²

Numerous authors have further argued that in the postwar period Japanese national security policy has been largely based upon pragmatic behavior. The Yoshida Doctrine formulated by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru during the early postwar period is seen as the foundation of such realistic behavior.³³ The Yoshida Doctrine may be summarized as a national security policy subordinating Japan’s international political and military status to the requirements of national economic growth through reliance upon access to foreign markets (most importantly the United States), the nurturing of Japanese industry through protective measures against foreign competition while acquiring and diffusing high-value-added technological innovations, and through development of a moderate self-defense capability coupled with a substantial U.S. military security guarantee.³⁴ Yoshida himself stated that alignment with the United States “is not essentially a question of either dogmas or philosophy, nor need it lead to a subservient relationship; it is merely the quickest and most effective – indeed the only way – to promote the prosperity of the Japanese people.”³⁵ Such a statement clearly demonstrates a rational actor model at work.

Ichiro Ozawa criticizes the perception of rationality in Japanese national security policy decision making. Ozawa says that the Yoshida doctrine has been consistently

misunderstood, misrepresented, and misapplied. He argues that the Yoshida strategy was rational at the time but should not be seen as immutable.³⁶ Ozawa substantiates this argument with a passage from Prime Minister Yoshida's 1963 published work *Sekai to Nihon (The World and Japan)* that reads

It was not economically, socially, or intellectually possible for Japan to set about rearming itself ... during my administration. As I think about all that followed, I have come to have many misgivings about the current state of Japanese defense. My view at the time was that we should leave our defense mainly to our American ally, and that we should put all our effort into recovering our prewar strength and improving the harsh lives of our people. However, both the domestic and international environments have since changed significantly. Economically, we have overcome the need to rely on foreign aid and are even able to assist the world's developing nations. Does it not seem that we are already past the stage when we should be depending on another nation's might in the realm of defense? I have come to think so ... Even a Japan that stands in the world's top ranks economically, technically, and scholastically will remain something of a crippled nation if it remains dependent on others for its own defense. It is a position that cannot be respected in international diplomatic circles.³⁷

However, Ozawa quickly contradicts himself by asserting that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is not obsolete in the post-cold war world. Citing two environmental conditions – that Japan's neighbors still fear a militarily autonomous Japan, while the United States represents efforts to maintain peace and stability – Ozawa states that the “most rational and effective way for Japan to contribute to world peace is by cooperating with America ... based on the firm foundation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.”³⁸ Thus, it is still rational for Japan to rely upon its military relationship with the United States to ensure regional peace and stability.

Two other environmental conditions have significantly bolstered the ability of Japanese national security policymakers to act rationally. The first is derived from fundamental changes occurring within the global political, military, and economic environment. The

other condition comes from within Japan itself through the nature of its domestic political system and responses to external environmental changes.

Fundamental change in Japan's external environment has presented challenges for policymakers to formulate rational policies in the defense realm. Seen through a crisis perspective, two crises with global origins have altered, but not significantly revised, the security relationship between Japan and the United States.

The first crisis – whether real, imagined, or some combination of both – came about as a product of American cold war containment policy. Japan gained its independence at the height of the Korean War. Hindsight informs us that the reemergence of Japan as an independent entity could not have come at a worse time for the prospective military relationship.³⁹ The advent of the cold war era presented a most unique and opportune environment for both the United States and Japanese government to exploit, an event much like the rare occurrence of the celestial stars aligning. The Yoshida doctrine and its political interpretation of the Japanese Constitution set the parameters upon which the US - Japan alliance remains steadfast: a tradeoff involving Japanese territorial basing rights for access to the American consumer marketplace and influence in the international political economy.

The second crisis to alter the military security relationship and Japan's perceptions concerning national defense resulted from an intertwined set of crises occurring between the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. In the waning days of the Vietnam War, President Nixon announced the "Guam doctrine" enunciating a more limited American military role within East Asia. The "Guam doctrine" de-emphasized the presence of American ground forces, thereby limiting U.S. regional security strategy to deterrence policies based upon nuclear,

naval, and air power projection.⁴⁰ Such a shift in strategy demonstrated to the Japanese political leadership a relative decline in the U.S.-centered hegemonic international system and in American regional defense capabilities.

As a result of the phenomenal economic growth of Japan and the relative decline in American economic power, relative decline in American military capability was coupled with unsustainable burdens placed upon the structure of the international economic system that was established by the leadership of the United States following World War II. In 1971, the Bretton Woods system fell apart, with President Nixon ending convertibility of the dollar while placing a temporary ten percent surcharge on all dutiable imports in order to persuade Japan and other countries to enter negotiations on policies designed to offset expanding balance of payments deficits and to placate U.S. domestic protectionist sentiments.⁴¹ Moreover, the OPEC initiated oil embargo of 1973-74 also placed extensive burdens upon Japanese foreign and domestic policy and broadened perspectives to include the problem of Japan's fundamental reliance on the international economy for strategic resources. Other events such as Sino-American rapprochement allowed new avenues to be explored between Japanese and American defense counterparts with decreased Chinese resistance.⁴² These events transformed the framework of Japanese national security and the defense debate in Japan in two respects. Most importantly, the Japanese government adopted a comprehensive security policy that officially recognized the overarching emphasis already placed upon economic and diplomatic means for pursuing national security.⁴³ The concept of comprehensive security represents a rational policy response to a careful examination of the changed external security environment of the late 1960s and 1970s. Secondly, these events shifted emphasis from constitutional considerations of the

Self-Defense Forces legality to the more healthy debate defining the parameters of Japan's incremental defense buildup.⁴⁴

The second condition to have significantly supported the rational nature of Japanese national security policy results from the domestic political environment. Kent Calder argues that Japanese defense budgets, consistently held under one percent of GNP, are low in proportion to other major powers due to intense domestic pressure upon the Japanese political system from agriculture, public works, and other economic oriented sectors. Calder views structural factors as important (such as the subordinate status of the Defense Agency), but these factors are reinforced by overwhelming domestic political pressures.⁴⁵ Joseph P. Keddell, Jr. further asserts that domestic political factors have demonstrated a disproportionate amount of influence in Japanese defense policy. Particularly important to Keddell's argument is the role played by the ruling factions within the Liberal Democratic Party, whose interests underlie policies designed to minimize domestic political conflict. Of additional importance to Keddell's argument is the pervasive influence held by opposition parties in the past in their ability to constrain Japanese defense policy changes to incremental policy shifts.⁴⁶

Another facet of the Japanese domestic political arena entails the role of anti-militarism.⁴⁷ This refers to a prevalent attitude amongst the Japanese public and policymakers alike toward the use of military aggression as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Japan's anti-militarism developed out of the twin experiences of World War II, particularly the tremendous sacrifices made by the public (that culminated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the utter destruction of the Japanese society and its economy, and the humiliation of being militarily occupied for the first time in

national history), along with the indigenization and support for Japan's postwar Constitution that followed.⁴⁸

In sum, the national security objectives of Japan center upon two central themes. The first theme revolves around commitment to status quo maintenance. The second theme encompasses the nature of Japanese national security policymaking as based upon a rational actor model.

Japanese military force doctrine. Japan's national security strategy attempts to accomplish its objectives without resorting to the use of military means as a method of persuasion. Japan's strategy is termed comprehensive in that it places emphasis upon the American military presence while expanding upon its own economic and diplomatic ties to maintain peace and stability within the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's military force employment doctrine may be effectively called "defensive defense" – a minimum necessary level of self-defense – as Japan's military is constrained from operating beyond its borders (and the sea lines of communication extending 1000 miles south of Honshu) by constitutional limitations, legal restrictions, and political interpretation.⁴⁹ The Japanese government maintains the right of self-defense. As the 1996 JDA White Paper succinctly states, "As long as Japan is a sovereign state, it is recognized beyond doubt that the provision in the article [article 9] does not deny the inherent right of self-defense that Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation. Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the government remains firm in the belief that the Constitution does not inhibit the possession of the minimum level of armed strength necessary to exercise that right."⁵⁰ Beginning in the 1970s, this debate lost most of its significance. In 1991 the Socialist Party of Japan (now the Social Democratic Party) reversed its long standing 'unarmed

neutrality' policy and no longer opposed the US-Japan Security Treaty.⁵¹ Its demise was further demonstrated when in July 1994 Social Democratic Party leader and coalition prime minister Tomiichi Murayama declared that the army, flag, and national anthem are all constitutional.⁵² Thus, it appears that political debate over the right of self-defense has for the most part been resolved.

The central issue then appears to turn upon the extent to which Japan should fulfill its defensive commitment within the boundaries of its military relationship with the United States – what Neil Renwick terms the secondary alliance problem.⁵³ The 1991 Persian Gulf War further stimulated debate concerning Japan's defense policy. This debate revolved around the Japanese contribution to multilateral peacekeeping operations – specifically the legality regarding overseas deployment of SDF personnel.⁵⁴

Regarding the right of collective defense, the Japanese governmental interpretation understands that this right is not prohibited by current international law. However, the government maintains that this right exceeds the limit of its "defensive defense" policy and is therefore constitutionally impermissible.⁵⁵

United States national security objectives. America's traditional national security objectives in East Asia are also centered around commitment to protect and enhance the status quo. As such, U.S. objectives are fourfold: 1) prevent regional domination by a power with potentially hostile interests, while preventing the reemergence of a global threat to the United States and its allies; 2) encourage regional peace and stability through forward military deployment; 3) assure American diplomatic, military, and economic access/influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Military access has largely been defined as naval access; and 4) foster the spread of market-oriented economies and

democratic political systems.⁵⁶ America's vital interests in East Asia have led to remarkable constancy in its objectives since the beginning of the 20th century when the United States became an Asian regional power.⁵⁷

The Clinton administration's national security strategy maintains the above four objectives in two governmental reports. The first report, entitled *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, classifies American governmental objectives in East Asia into three pillars: enhancing security with operationally ready, forward deployed military forces; bolstering American economic revitalization through stimulating regional economic cooperation based upon open markets; and continuing support for regional democratic reform.⁵⁸ These objectives are reinforced in the 1995 Department of Defense strategic review document titled *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region*. This East Asian strategic review asserts that military security is the foundation upon which economic growth and prosperity may be attained. The report offers Joseph Nye's now famous "security is like oxygen" argument – you don't think about it until its not there to sustain you.

Further evidence of the ubiquity of these objectives, specifically the presence of forward deployed military personnel, comes from 30 May 1996 testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, where Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Security Policy, along with Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, reaffirmed the administration's national security strategy. Lord stated

We believe that a strong U.S. security presence is essential for the continued stability and prosperity of the region. Our 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed in Asia underscore our commitment to the region. This presence is warmly and widely welcomed by the nations of the region as serving stability and signaling U.S. engagement. Although the post-Cold War era has left the region largely free of conflict, and many age-old rivalries stemming from the colonial era and even before have passed into history, there will always be concern that today's peace and prosperity, if not carefully nurtured, could slip away. We have all welcomed the dynamic growth of the region, but this growth, stimulated by competition, can lead to new tensions ... By cooperating with our Southeast Asian friends, we can ensure that the peace and development of today is not undermined in the years ahead.⁵⁹

Campbell reiterated this strategy by maintaining that the United States

strategy for engagement is designed to promote peace and stability by endeavoring – in succession – to prevent, deter, or defeat threats to regional tranquillity and prosperity. The U.S. security presence is a visible demonstration of our commitment to allies and friends in the region; it supports overall regional stability; and the multinational training and initiatives we undertake with the various military forces in the region promote transparency and confidence building. In the aftermath of the Cold War, our engagement strategy in Southeast Asia is less threat based and more designed to promote dialogue and trust in a region that will be increasingly critical to U.S. and indeed global security into the next century.⁶⁰

United States military force doctrine. In contrast to Japan, the United States national security strategy relies upon political leverage through the utilization of global power projection coupled with diplomacy. A forward deployed military force employment doctrine lies at the core of America's national security strategy. This pillar of American national security strategy was covered in the last section.⁶¹

Additionally, both nation's military force employment doctrines are highly dependent upon sophisticated technological hardware. Reliance upon technological sophistication of

military hardware has resulted in a highly interwoven web of dependence upon the scientific-industrial complex of each nation.⁶²

Thus, the US-Japan military alliance serves to mutually reinforce both Japanese and American national security objectives. Through the alliance, the United States is able to maintain its superpower status, while Japan continues to benefit from the international economic and regional military security structures. As long as this environment remains tolerable to the political leaderships of both nations, the US-Japan military alliance may remain sustainable.⁶³

The Defense Policymaking Process in Japan and America

The defense policymaking processes found within the United States and Japan are also fundamentally different when analyzing which faction or agency holds the most influence and the extent that that influence drives decision making. It is here that the bureaucratic politics model of governmental decision making provides some guidance.⁶⁴ The bureaucratic politics model argues that governments are subdivided into factionalized entities (i.e. bureaucracies) striving to bolster support for their vested interests. Moreover, the model asserts that foreign policy decision makers act according to their unique conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals. Thus, Graham Allison concludes that "the name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned within the government" constitutes the essence of foreign policy decision making.⁶⁵

This argument possesses some explanatory power due to the diversity of foreign policy issues that governments face on a daily basis. Governments are in a sense forced to

decentralize in order to most efficiently deal with issues. They are forced to bargain and compromise on solutions to problems. This holds true when dealing with issues that extend beyond a nation's borders.

However, the bureaucratic politics model suffers two main weaknesses. First, government bureaucracies often do possess common – or at the very least parallel – strategic objectives. This is seen in the widespread support found within the U.S. government for the administration's national security strategy. After much bargaining and compromise has taken place, the State and Defense Department read from the same sheet of music. Similarities are also found within Japan's defense policy process. These will be discussed at length below. Second, the model unfortunately asserts that outcomes derived from the foreign policy decision making process are not rationally derived because the various bureaucracies that affect decisions do not possess a consistent set of strategic objectives. This is not wholly true. Foreign policy decisions may still be seen as rational after bargaining and compromise has occurred. Decisions often enjoy greater widespread support following conclusion of the bargaining process because most of the factions involved have received some benefit as a result of the process.⁶⁶

U.S. defense policymaking. America's defense policymaking process may be characterized as largely governed by military interests. In fact, the military aspect of national security predominates over the other facets.⁶⁷ The American military-industrial-scientific complex holds great weight within government in both foreign and domestic policy. In military research and development expenditures alone, government spending during the cold war accounted for more than 60 percent.⁶⁸ Technological improvements with civilian applications, known as spin-offs, often derive from military research and

development. Two examples of technological spin-off include jet engines and the internet.⁶⁹

Tremendous budget and manpower resources are appropriated to the defense establishment. Federal government finances and employment statistics tell the story well. Fiscal year 1995 outlays to the Defense Department exceeded those to the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce combined by a factor of four (\$259.6 billion to \$65.4 billion). Fiscal year 1994 federal employment of the combined Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture personnel totaled only 182,700, while Defense Department personnel (civilian and military) totaled more than 3.62 million – a twentyfold increase.⁷⁰ In sum, due to both its size and influence, the Department of Defense may be found at the core of the executive branch as it formulates defense policy. The Defense Department also plays an important, but secondary, role in trade and technology policies as well.

Japanese defense policymaking. In contrast, Japan's defense policymaking process may be characterized as bureaucratically colonized by dominant ministerial interests, particularly economic interests. The Japanese defense establishment, known as the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), takes a back seat to economic interests. In fact, the Japanese defense establishment was organizationally designed as secondary in importance to other interests, as demonstrated by its agency versus ministerial status within the Japanese government. Personnel and budgetary considerations provide ample evidence that the JDA occupies a position of secondary importance in the overall policymaking process.

Significant leadership positions within the Defense Agency are continually filled with bureaucrats "on loan" from other ministries such as Finance, International Trade and Industry, and Foreign Affairs. For example, Gaston Sigur wrote in 1975 that most of the

JDA's deputy ministers come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance.⁷¹ Sigur unfortunately did not provide statistics to substantiate this claim. However, Paul Kim's 1988 work *Japan's Civil Service System: Its Structure, Personnel, and Politics* does substantiate this assertion. Kim shows that as of June 1986, seven of the eleven top officials who run the JDA's internal bureaus are officials from other ministries who come to the JDA "on loan." two from Finance (the administrative vice minister and chief of the secretariat – arguably the two most important posts held within the JDA), and one each from MoFA, MITI, Health and Welfare, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. Kim also notes that no civil servant who began his career with the defense agency had attained the rank of bureau chief until 1982.⁷² As of 1995, five of the ten top officials (information regarding the administrative vice minister was unavailable) in the JDA were "on loan" from various other ministries: two from Finance and one each from MITI, MoFA, and Health and Welfare. In 1995, chief of the secretariat began his career as a JDA official. The defense bureau chief came from Finance.⁷³

From a budgetary standpoint, it is common knowledge that the Japanese government continues to limit its defense budget to less than one percent of GNP, despite the lifting of this barrier in 1987.⁷⁴ However, the defense budget process is more complex than this limitation portrays. Appropriations are closely overseen and scrutinized by the Ministry of Finance. Joseph Keddell notes that debate over the Japanese defense buildup has been treated as a budgetary – not a strategy – issue due to the ministry's authority to review JDA budgetary requests.⁷⁵ A May 1990 Office of Technology Assessment report summarized this viewpoint by stating "restraining total defense spending is still an article

of faith at MoF.”⁷⁶ Defense spending cuts are attempted by opposition parties within the Diet. Conversely, Liberal Democratic Party politicians specializing in defense issues call for increased defense expenditures. The defense budget – like every other important aspect of the national budget including social welfare and public works expenditures – is worked out by the various agencies concerned (MoFA, JDA, MITI, and MoF) along with the upper echelon of the ruling political party – usually the policy affairs research council of the Liberal Democratic Party – prior to Diet submission.⁷⁷

Japanese defense procurement is carefully managed by interests held within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Alistair Edgar and David Haglund have shown that the JDA’s Equipment Bureau chief who recommends the method of defense procurement – options include off-the-shelf imports, licensed production, co-development and production, or autonomous domestic production – has been dominated by former MITI Aircraft and Ordinance Division directors. These former MITI division directors are officially “on loan” to the JDA.⁷⁸ Thus, MITI possesses some influence over the defense procurement process in Japan.

A third ministry with great influence over the defense policymaking process is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Because the ministry is the principal governmental entity charged with establishing national security, as noted by the government’s comprehensive security policy, MoFA sets the general guidelines and priorities which the JDA must follow.⁷⁹ MoFA is also deeply involved in all bilateral defense negotiations between the United States and Japan.⁸⁰

Finally, unlike in the United States, the Japanese defense industry is subsumed within the civilian economy. Military technological advancements are almost always derivatives

of civilian research and development (spin-ons).⁸¹ Thus, with the exception of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the business sector does not garner significant profits from defense projects. Japanese businesses have begun, however, to possess substantial defense oriented linkages through partnerships with the JDA. These interests were previously better represented within MITI.

There are at least three reasons why the JDA will remain subservient to other ministerial interests. As presented earlier, the practice of placing ministerial bureaucrats "on loan" within the highest posts of the JDA should continue. Secondly, the inability of defense *zoku* to stimulate interest amongst their constituencies means that politicians will continue to concentrate their re-election energies upon showering their supporters with pork-barrel projects and ombudsman activities.⁸² Finally, the bureaucratic leadership within the ministries themselves do not want to see increased competition for influence from an upgraded Defense Agency. Thus, the ministries will probably try to prevent the JDA from gaining ministerial rank and the status accrued to such a rival entity.

In sum, the defense policymaking process in the United States is driven more by military than economic security interests. The opposite is true in the case of Japan.

Recurring Defense Issues

In regard to various recurring defense issues such as force posture and weapons acquisition, similarities and differences between the United States and Japan coexist. As for the similarities, both governments continue to stress the need for an American forward deployed military force in Japan as evidenced by the April 1996 alliance reaffirmation, the December 1996 final report of the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and

the February 1997 visit to Tokyo by Secretary of State Madeline Albright, where Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto requested a stay in American discussion revolving around the withdrawal of the 3rd Marine Division from Okinawa.⁸³

For the reasons previously cited in this chapter, it is often argued that Japanese defense interests, while important, are nonetheless regarded as residuals and are subsequently located at the periphery of the political process. Does this allow for increased political leverage by the American military establishment in Japanese defense procurement, force structure, and operational planning decisions? Sheila Smith correctly asserts that "the [Japanese governmental] policy of maintaining two national militaries on Japanese soil remains as evidence of a continued commitment to refusing a solely national military response to providing for state security."⁸⁴ But this statement does not equate to arguing that the JDA is an allied branch of the American military establishment.⁸⁵ If such a statement were indeed true, the degree of American influence over the Japanese defense policymaking process would be much greater than has historically been the case.

Because the defense policymaking processes in Japan and the United States are fundamentally different – that is, military interests drive the US process while economic interests drive the Japanese process – the Pentagon (knowingly or unknowingly) often finds itself negotiating defense issues with ministerial interests from Finance, MITI, and MoFA even though negotiations are organizationally structured as direct discussions with the Japan Defense Agency.⁸⁶ This is one of the reasons why the Japanese government has continually refused to expand its military operational roles, missions, and support functions to become more compatible with the American military stationed in Japan.

Evidence of this is further seen in the 1997 status of negotiations to revise the 1978 "Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines."

The Role of Transnational Penetration

As demonstrated above, domestic politics matters in the shaping of national security policy within both the United States and Japan. An adaptation of the theory of transnational penetration plays an additional role in this process. This approach, as related to alliance formation, portends that alliances result from the ability of a certain state to manipulate a target state's domestic and foreign policies through lobbying techniques and foreign propaganda (known more politely as public diplomacy). For the purposes of this study, the transnational penetration approach will be examined from a standpoint regarding its ability to influence maintenance of the US-Japan military security treaty. Both Japan and the United States engage in lobbying efforts and persuasion through public diplomacy aimed at their respective partner's elite and mass publics. This study will focus upon Japanese efforts (to maintain the status quo through extensive lobbying) and the American response (to change the status quo).

This body of literature is gaining greater scholarly interest in light of the massive direct and indirect efforts targeted toward influencing American governmental policies regarding specific nations in East Asia. Robert Keohane asserted in 1971 that with the rise of economic interdependence, transnational lobbying is one instrument utilized by relatively weaker states in their relationship with stronger coalition partners.⁸⁷ B.G. Haskell argued that access to societies is an important and often neglected dimension of power within relationships.⁸⁸ Chung-in Moon masterfully applied this thesis to the states of South

Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Israel in their bilateral relations with the United States. He demonstrated that the transnational penetration approach occurs through direct and indirect lobbying efforts. Moon constructed a typology of lobbying efforts based upon: 1) access to key decision makers through political favors; 2) access to knowledge and expertise through lawyers and technical experts; 3) formation of coalitions of private and public interest groups; and 4) mobilization of grass-roots organizations based upon ethnic and ideological ties. Moon further demonstrated that these lobbying efforts may be directed at either encouraging or preventing revision of American foreign policy in its relations with South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and Japan.⁸⁹ Although concerned mainly with the South Korean approach to transnational penetration, Moon provides useful insight into Japanese lobbying techniques. Moon states that "Japan's approach has evolved from heavy reliance on power and knowledge to coalition building through functional networks. Such a change accounts for much of the Japanese success in influencing the United States."⁹⁰ By taking note of Japanese direct foreign investments and growing indirect investments through purchases of government bonds and corporate stocks in the United States, the Japanese government has provided itself with additional sources of political leverage which will assist its coalition-based strategies.⁹¹

Japanese lobbying efforts. Robert Angel further explores the theory of transnational penetration by applying it to Japanese governmental and private sector ventures that influence the US foreign policy process through unofficial and non-diplomatic means.⁹² Angel differentiates between institutional and individual participants in both Japan and the United States. His locus of inquiry centers upon American participants in the Japan lobby, and Angel constructs a typology consisting of three categories: 1) those that are controlled

by Japanese clients who perform such services as direct representation, information collection, and strategic political advice; 2) those that are supported by Japanese donor organizations including think tanks, academic research institutes, Japan studies programs at American colleges and universities, and "mutual understanding" societies whose programs frequently address problematic issue areas in US-Japanese bilateral relations; and 3) those that are recognized by Japanese donor organizations for their interest in promoting US-Japan relations through continued recognition, attention, and involvement.⁹³

The Japan lobby seeks to maintain the status quo in US-Japan bilateral economic and military relations. Angel writes that "Lobby participants have been directed to promote a positive elite and public image of Japan as a reliable, supportive global ally, and as a democratic market-economy nation that shares the national values and objectives that responsible Americans are thought to cherish."⁹⁴ The Japanese government recognized that the bilateral relationship as established in the formative cold war years (the quid pro quo of American access to Japanese military bases for Japanese access to the US economic market) could not endure forever. Gradual erosion of economic relations with the United States as Japan slowly gained economic great power status would have to be checked. This, in Angel's opinion, became the Japan lobby's primary objective. Angel asserts that "as pressure intensified on Washington from American manufacturing and labor interests demanding renegotiating with Japan, Japan Lobby participants were directed to generate counter-pressure in opposition to such changes demanded and in support of the status quo."⁹⁵

Angel further argues that the Japan lobby's near-term efforts have been largely successful:

Japan Lobby managers and paymasters can rightfully claim credit for achievement of their primary assignment: delay as long as possible change in the American Cold War foreign economic policy status quo while retaining Japan's own mercantilistic foreign economic policies only modestly modified. The hundreds of millions of dollars distributed to American Japan studies scholars, students, and institutions, to professional policy influencers in Washington, and to various public policy institutions to improve American perceptions of Japan undoubtedly has helped to stifle proposals for change from their most likely sources and has countered efforts to mobilize public opinion behind proposals for change when they emerged from other quarters.⁹⁶

These successes will continue until pressure builds in the United States for serious policy adaptations that can no longer be ignored. Angel points to the Nixon administration's decision to modify the international monetary system in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a precursor of possible events that could occur in US-Japan bilateral trade relations.⁹⁷ Angel writes that "Japan's stalling tactics may invite yet another "shock" that will affect the whole international economic system."⁹⁸

This is also true for US-Japan bilateral military security relations. The Japanese government recognizes that it can no longer afford to sit idly by and watch the American military defend the home islands. However, the GoJ only partially acknowledges its enhanced role in the defense of Japanese national interests outside its territorial boundaries. This partial acknowledgment is demonstrated through the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement signed in April 1996 which provides rear area support to American military personnel in peacetime exercises and peacekeeping operations. Review of the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines will provide more answers to this

problem as the US government seeks to garner Japanese governmental rear area support in wartime contingencies outside Japanese territory.⁹⁹

The American response. In contrast to Japanese efforts to maintain the status quo, the United States government has continually attempted to revise Japanese economic and military policies through external pressure. The external pressure dimension of the US-Japan relationship is usually examined from an economic perspective, but it also applies to the military component. The use of external pressure by the United States has become a ritual in US-Japan relations and is an important dimension of the relationship. Kenneth Pyle argues that external pressure represents the essential dynamic of change, reform, and liberalization found within Japan.¹⁰⁰ Takashi Inouguchi also sees US pressure as essential to change in Japan as he writes that it is foreign pressure which forces Japan to “transcend the framework of Diet operations [and] strike down the vested interests syndicate.”¹⁰¹

The external pressure ritual is usually played out in the following manner. American interests complain about a situation in Japan. The Japanese respond by explaining that culture, legal barriers, and political barriers impede change. US interests take their complaints to the administration, which officially requests change from Tokyo. The GoJ denies all charges brought by the American government. The US administration then threatens some form of retaliatory action, while the GoJ countercharges that external pressure is now being unfairly applied. Following protracted negotiations, Tokyo makes modest concessions, citing the irresistible pressure under which it was placed by the American side. Both partners then declare victory to their publics.

One military example of the conduct of external pressure in US-Japan bilateral relations supersedes all economic examples and possibly set the precedent for future negotiations.

American efforts aimed at Japanese rearmament commenced shortly after ratification of the Japanese Constitution in 1947.¹⁰² The US side wanted full-scale Japanese rearmament comparable to that being undertaken by most NATO nations and tried to tie rearmament directly to the mutual security treaty of 1951 and indirectly to the concurrent peace treaty which returned Japanese sovereignty upon completion of the American occupation.¹⁰³ The Japanese government wanted an American security guarantee based upon the maintenance of American armed forces in areas adjacent to Japan while making available homeland bases only in the event of a military emergency.¹⁰⁴ Japan thus tried to avoid such a rearmament commitment, citing its new peace Constitution and other political and economic factors. Talks slowly progressed on all three issues (rearmament, sovereignty, and the security treaty) until January 1951, when John Foster Dulles went to Tokyo seeking a Japanese rearmament program capable of repelling a Soviet invasion with manpower levels somewhere on the order of 350,000 men. Prime Minister Yoshida's negotiating team refused to directly tie the three issues. Martin Weinstein writes "negotiations took on a bitter, unpleasant tone. Neither side felt it could compromise on the rearmament issue, and it seemed that the talks would end in failure."¹⁰⁵ The rearmament impasse was taken to General MacArthur, who worked out a compromise arrangement where the Japanese government softened its position by verbally pledging to make every effort within Constitutional and economic limits toward building a defense force designed to thwart direct and indirect attacks against Japanese sovereignty.¹⁰⁶ Both sides claimed victory and the San Francisco Peace Treaty and US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty were signed in April 1951.

External pressure represents a significant dimension of US-Japanese bilateral relations. In the short-term, the Japanese government can implement policies required for US-Japanese cooperation without domestic political retaliation. Governmental decisions are seen as more palatable to the Japanese public than other alternatives. The US government can appear to make progress within its Japanese relations, thereby deflecting public criticism of administration policies. However, Robert Angel warns that

the longer term costs both for Japan and the United States [are] enormous. This episode [the monetary crisis negotiations of the early 1970s] left the policymakers and publics of both countries more resentful and suspicious of the other, and made the Japanese more inclined to see the United States as an insensitive bully while making Americans more likely to see Japan as the devious, unfair exploiter of an international economic system she was unwilling to support until forced.¹⁰⁷

Increased Japanese popular resentment of the US as a global bully, coupled with increasing distrust of Japan in the United States, may continue to grow as an unintended consequence of the external pressure dimension regarding US-Japan relations.

In sum, transnational penetration provides additional incentives for both countries to influence governmental policies that affect the US-Japan bilateral relationship. The role of transnational lobbying efforts helps to further explain sustainability of the Japan-American military alliance and the overall relationship more generally.

Conclusion

The national defense policy literature appears most suited to providing a conceptual paradigm when attempting to explain US-Japan military alliance sustainability. The chapter reviewed four areas of interest within the comparative national defense policy literature that may shed light upon durability of the U.S.-Japan military relationship. These four areas encompassed: 1) the international environment and state position within that

environment; 2) the national security objectives, strategy, and military force employment doctrine of each state; 3) the defense policymaking process found in each state; and 4) recurring national defense issues.

Adapting the national defense policy literature to more fully encompass an expanded definition of national security highlights an interesting paradox – there exist more fundamental differences than similarities in what the American and Japanese sides bring to the alliance. This paradox demonstrates the need for an analytical framework that explains alliance sustainability through its functional utility – the congruence of policies that support and often promote divergent national security interests and the high degree of mutual dependency created by these divergent interests that is inherent within the policymaking elites of Japan and the United States.

A framework based upon policy congruence, along with the mutual dependency such policies engender, may serve to identify, account for the support of, and assess more fully those functions that maintain the alliance. It is to those functions that this study now turns.

Endnotes

¹ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Relations*, op. cit., p. 147. Wolfers further states "When political formulas such as "national interest" or "national security" gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name."

² Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Political Legitimacy," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, ed., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 234.

³ Wolfers, op. cit., p. 165.

⁴ In the specific case of the American military deployment to Bosnia, the foreign policy establishment made its affirmative decision despite little mass public support. In contrast, the Persian Gulf War and the Somalia initiative illustrate that mass public support is extremely beneficial – and potentially damaging – in both short and long term military deployments.

⁵ This is not to say that consensus amongst the mass public is always preferable or desirable as the time required for consensus might take longer than the time allotted to act on any given policy. However, as stated earlier, consensus amongst the political elite is a necessary requirement for the success of any foreign policy initiative. I believe the American public will follow its political leadership. When united, the American political leadership can be highly convincing in its ability to garner public support for American foreign policy. For a detailed analysis on this topic, see Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996). Though Larson's thesis is limited to U.S. military policy, it may be extended to include other aspects of American foreign policy as well. In contrast to this view, Larry Elowitz and John W. Spanier assert that the American political system "locks in" the executive branch, providing a relatively short time to successfully deploy military force. As an intervention drags on in duration, the rising level of public dissension and a decline in Congressional support lead to an erosion of public support for the military action. This thesis is intricately tied to the Nixon doctrine and later on the Weinberger doctrine concerning the use of American military force. See Larry Elowitz and John W. Spanier, "Korea and Vietnam: Limited War and the American Political System," *Orbis*, Summer 1974, pp. 510-534.

⁶ Walter Lippman, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1943), p. 51.

⁷ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, p. i.

⁸ Wolfers, op. cit., p. 150.

⁹ See Richard Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), chapter two.

¹⁰ Kegley and Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace?*, p. 6.

¹¹ Despite the aspirations of scholars such as Jerel Rosati. See *The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*, op. cit. This is due in part to America's liberal historical foundations with Western Europe and the institutional structure of the U.S. political system. It remains difficult for the American government to guide economic policy decisions due to its 20th century laissez-faire historical legacy that originated in Western European liberal thought. Indeed, it often seems as if particularistic American economic interests hold great influence over the government in the conduct of its foreign policy. This seems particularly true when examining America's foreign policy toward China, where business interests such as Boeing, IBM, and Microsoft hold great influence. In sum, the National Economic Council and the Commerce Department will be hardpressed to gain control over the American economy to the extent that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) or Finance Ministry (MoF) maintains. The American government currently lacks the institutional structure to gain greater control over the economy in its present state of moderate health (the exception here being the Pentagon, which still possesses great sway within the American military-industrial-scientific complex). This is not to say, however, that economic interests will never again dominate the national security agenda as during the Great Depression when its impact upon the general economic welfare held substantial influence over the conduct of foreign policy during the 1930s.

¹² The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996), pp. ii and 2. See Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics Revisited," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 83-106 for a discussion of the "democracies don't wage war against each other" thesis.

¹³ See Richard Samuels, op. cit., and *Defense of Japan*, 1996.

¹⁴ Numerous approaches have been formulated with regard to the study of national defense policy. Some comparative approaches include a focus upon recurring military issues, budget expenditures, and military-political sociology. For an overview of this relatively recent field of inquiry, see "Introduction" in Murray and Viotti, op. cit., pp. xvii-xxiv.

¹⁵ Cited in Murray and Viotti, op. cit., p. xviii.

¹⁶ Murray and Viotti, op. cit., pp. xix-xxii.

¹⁷ Discussion with Robert C. Angel concerning Japanese elite perceptions regarding foreign policy, 27 July 1996. See also Richard J. Samuels, "Japanese Views of China," *Dead Fukuzawa Society Discussion Board*, 26 January 1997. Both Angel and Samuels are skeptical of this perception, arguing that Japan's abundance of technological innovation and human resources compensates for Japan's isolation. See Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994). See also Yoichi Funabashi, "Introduction: Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s," in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., *Japan's International Agenda* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 1-27. The *Dead Fukuzawa Society Discussion Board* was initiated by Professor Chalmers Johnson and seven graduate students attending the University of California, San Diego. The DFS board currently serves over 700 members, who seek a better comprehension of Japan.

¹⁸ Yoshio Okawara, *To Avoid Isolation: An Ambassador's View of U.S./Japanese Relations* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp. viii-ix.

¹⁹ Okawara, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

²⁰ Jitsuro Terashima, "Nichi Bei Chu Toraianguru Kuraishisu o Doo Seigyo Suru ka ("How will we Manage a Japan-U.S.-China Triangular Crisis?," *Chuo Koron*.

²¹ Glen S. Fukushima, "China Sparks Interest," *Asahi Evening News*, 10 July 1996.

²² Richard J. Samuels, op. cit.

²³ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "Koritsu no Nihon (Isolation of Japan)," *Gaiko Forum*, No. 92, April 1996, pp. 7-16. See also Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Case for a Stronger Security Treaty," *Japan Echo*, Summer 1996.

²⁴ For a detailed analysis of incremental change within the Japanese defense relationship with the United States, see Kent Calder, "The Residual: Defense," in *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 411-439; Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); and Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

²⁵ Personal interviews with Pentagon officials, 31 January 1997 and 14 February 1997.

²⁶ See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 February 1997; *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 February 1997; *Mainichi Shimbun*, 24 February 1997; *The Washington Post*, 23 February 1996; and *The New York Times*, 23 February 1997.

²⁷ Hegemony encompasses both operational capability, political will, and political legitimacy through acquiescence of its position within the East Asian region.

²⁸ On 9 March 1997, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* reported that the German government is seeking to expel an American embassy official for economic espionage. If true, this event vividly illustrates the loss of American leverage in the post-cold war period.

²⁹ Views offered in interviews with Japanese and American governmental officials.

³⁰ Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994), pp. 93-94.

³¹ Numerous scholars on Japan have debated the rationality of Japanese foreign policy formulation. Characterizations from this debate include "knee-jerk," "passive," "reactive," "leaderless," "defensive driver," "minimalist," "coping," "incremental," "compensatory," and the "military and psychological dependent of Asia." See articles by Michael Blaker, Nathaniel Thayer, Michael Donnelly, Norman Levin, Martin Weinstein, and Susan J. Pharr, in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). See also Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Kent E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Stability in Japan, 1946-1986* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Kazuhiro Aoyama, "The Peter Pan of Asia: Japan as a Military and Psychological Dependent," *Columbia University East Asian Institute Reports*, May 1996.

³² Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance," in Gerald Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change*, p. 3. Admittedly, Blaker states that "coping" is not a calculated strategy, but rather an automatic, time-tested, and unconscious response pattern. This argument rests upon the assumption that the coping strategy originated during Japan's pre-World War II negotiating behavior vis-à-vis mostly Western powers. This strategy continued when prime minister Yoshida Shigeru and General Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP) developed the postwar US-Japan relationship between 1945 and 1952. See Michael Blaker, *Japanese International Negotiating Style* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) and Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance," p. 3. Robert Angel presents a more sophisticated form of this argument by asserting that Japanese foreign policy decision makers have had difficulty changing well established policies when its external environment changes due to weaknesses in its central political leadership structure. See Robert C. Angel, *Explaining Economic Policy Failure: Japan in the 1969-1971 International Monetary Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). Kenji Hayao makes a similar argument in *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1993).

³³ Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru is seen as the architect of the postwar Japanese state. See Ichiro Ozawa, op. cit., p. 98.

³⁴ See Aurelia George, "Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?," *Asian Survey*, Volume 33, No. 6, June 1993, p. 560; Kent Calder, *Pacific Defense*, p. 94; Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. Flanagan, *Politics in Japan* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 443; Peter Duus, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 251-52; Norman D. Levin, "The Strategic Dimensions of Japanese Foreign Policy," in Gerald L. Curtis, *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 202-203; and Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan's Foreign Policy Options: Implications for the United States," in *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 218-19.

³⁵ Quoted in Koosaka Masatake, *100 Million Japanese: The Postwar Experience* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1972), pp. 106-107.

³⁶ Ichiro Ozawa, op. cit., p. 98.

³⁷ Ichiro Ozawa, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

³⁸ Ichiro Ozawa, op. cit., pp. 103-106.

³⁹ Miyasaki Katsuji convincingly argues in "Time to Reevaluate the Security Treaty" that the democratic ideals embodied within the "peace constitution" were compromised by the threat of communism, thereby leaving the United States with no alternative but to seek accommodation with the traditional paternalistic political norms found within Japan prior to World War II. This return to the status quo eventually led to a failure of the Japanese people to objectively consider the "true meaning of national security." See Miyasaki Katsuji, "Time to Reevaluate the Security Treaty," *Japan Quarterly*, Volume 34, No. 4, October-December 1990.

⁴⁰ Patrick M. Cronin and Ezra F. Vogel, "Unifying U.S. Policy on Japan," *Strategic Forum: Institute for National Strategic Studies*, Number 51, November 1995, p. 2.

⁴¹ See Jerel A. Rosati, op. cit., p. 230; Keddell, op. cit., pp. 66-71. For an excellent indepth analysis of the 1970s international monetary crisis and the roles played by the United States and Japan, see Robert C. Angel, *Explaining Economic Policy Failure: Japan in the 1969-1971 International Monetary Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

⁴² J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte, and I.T.M. Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence—Diplomacy—Dependence* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p. xiii.

⁴³ For two excellent accounts regarding Japan's comprehensive security policy, see Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy," *Asian Survey*, Volume 31, No. 4, April 1991; and J.W.M. Chapman, et. al., op. cit.

⁴⁴ Keddell, op. cit., p. 41.

⁴⁵ See Kent E. Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 411-439.

⁴⁶ See Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). An insightful example of the limiting effects of domestic politics upon foreign policymaking comes from the 1960 security treaty riots, the origins of which may be traced to Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's difficulties regarding 1958 revision of the Police Duties Performance Law. Kishi's efforts to strengthen the law provoked widespread criticism, which culminated in the formation of a national anti-police law revision movement. Some Japanese demonstrated a willingness to oppose its government by taking to the streets, an act that would be repeated in 1960. The overall effect from these demonstrations, as perceived by both governments, seriously undermined the political debate concerning Japan's ability to cooperate in regional security policy — something the U.S. leadership greatly desired. Kishi was driven from office, and his replacement, Hayato Ikeda, downplayed defense issues, choosing to shift the political agenda toward economic development and the income doubling policy. For a thorough analysis of the treaty revision process, see Junnosuke Masumi, *Contemporary Politics in Japan* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 15-50. For a well-documented historical analysis, see George R. Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo:*

The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966). See also Martin Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 87-103, and Keddel, op. cit., pp. 31-41.

⁴⁷ I use the term anti-militarism rather than the usually cited "pacifism" because these two concepts possess substantial differences. Pacifism refers to the refusal to use military force in any situation. Although there are some in Japan who espouse this concept, its usefulness as a basis for national security policy is not widely acknowledged as credible by political elites or the public.

⁴⁸ For an excellent analysis on the topic of anti-militarism, see Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996). Hook argues that the war and its aftermath challenges the notion of Japan ever becoming "normal" in the sense of utilization of its military forces as political leverage in the international arena. The argument that Japan will never again use its military as a foreign policy tool is, in my humble opinion, not sustainable. I agree with Robert Angel in that Japan's anti-militarism will endure only until it perceives a genuine military threat (12 March 1997 discussion). An associate professor of international relations at Japan's National Defense Academy, Mataka Kamiya, sustains this argument in the particular case of Japan's will to acquire nuclear weapons by writing "Only a situation where Japan found itself faced with a direct and serious nuclear threat to its survival, and where the Japan-US security cooperation ceased to function properly, could circumstances induce Japan to revoke its nonnuclear policy." Kamiya stipulates three simultaneous conditions upon which Japan would consider acquiring nuclear weapons: 1) no progress is reached in nuclear arms reduction negotiations; 2) Russia, China, a nuclear-armed North Korea, or any other nuclear power attacks Japan with nuclear weapons or attempts to blackmail Japan; and 3) the US nuclear umbrella fails to function, or the US tries to take advantage of its relationship with Japan by forcing the Japanese government to submit to unreasonable, intolerable trade concessions as compensation for extending the American nuclear umbrella over Japan. Kamiya Mitake, "Will Japan go Nuclear? Myth and Reality," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 2, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 1995, pp. 13-14. Robert Angel also notes the historical legacy of the occupation upon the Japanese public, arguing that the Japanese public resented both the Japanese and American governments for the treatment of Japan during the Occupation (12 March 1997 discussion).

⁴⁹ The term "defensive defense" is widely used throughout the Japanese foreign policy establishment. The concept is based upon Article IX of the Japanese Constitution adopted in 1947, the "Basic Policy for National Defense," espoused by the National Defense Council and approved by the Kishi Cabinet in May 1957, the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty ratified in 1960, the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," approved by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in November 1978, and most recently the latest National Defense Program Outline, adopted by the Security Council and by the Murayama Cabinet in November 1995. A collection of the aforementioned documents is found in the 1996 JDA White Paper entitled *Defense of Japan: Response to a New Era*. The government's concept of "defensive defense," as found in *Defense of Japan*, stipulates that "military force cannot be exercised until armed attack is initiated, and that the scope and level of use of defense forces are kept to the minimum required for the purpose of self-defense" (pp. 57-60). At this time, the JSDF is legally bound to not possess offensive weapons that may be used for deterrence or defense. Weapons systems in this category include possession of ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers, and "offensive" aircraft carriers. See also Akihiko Tanaka, "Japan's Security Policy in the 1990s," in Yoichi Funabashi, op. cit., p. 42.

⁵⁰ Defense Agency of Japan, *Defense of Japan: Response to a New Era* (Tokyo: Defense Agency of Japan, 1996), p. 58. The White Paper stipulates three conditions under which the right of self-defense would be exercised: 1) an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan is about to take place; 2) no other appropriate means to deal with this aggression remains; and 3) use of armed strength is confined to the minimum level necessary. The governmental

interpretation regarding geographical scope is "not necessarily confined to the geographic scope of Japanese territorial land, sea, and airspace ... nevertheless, the government believes that the Constitution does not permit it to dispatch armed forces to foreign territorial land, sea, and airspace for the purpose of using force, because such an overseas deployment of troops generally exceeds the limit of minimum necessary level of self-defense" (p. 59). However, nothing is said regarding international waters and airspace. Since the government adopted the 1000 mile defense of the lines of communication south of Honshu, it is generally assumed that the Japanese government recognizes its right to utilize armed force within international waters and airspace.

⁵¹ Peter J. Herzog, *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy* (Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 229. However, the Socialist Party continued to regard Japan's Self-Defense Forces as "unconstitutional in their present form."

⁵² *The Economist*, 30 July 1994, p. 30.

⁵³ See Neil Renwick, op. cit., chapters one and two.

⁵⁴ For more on this debate, see Aurelia George, op. cit.; Ichiro Ozawa, op. cit., pp. 91-121; Toshihiro Yamauchi, "Gunning for Japan's Peace Constitution," *Japan Quarterly*, Volume 39, No. 2, April-June 1992, pp. 159-67; Jirou Yamaguchi, "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Volume 18, No. 1, 1992, pp. 155-172; Yoshitaka Sasai, "Japan's Undue International Contribution," *Japan Quarterly*, Volume 40, No. 3, July-September 1993, pp. 250-265; Edward C. Luck, "Layers of Security: Regional Arrangements, the United Nations, and the Japanese-American Security Treaty," *Asian Survey*, Volume 35, No. 3, March 1995, pp. 237-252; and Hisako Shimura, "Should Japan Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations?" *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 3, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1996, pp. 237-144. See also Selig S. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara, ed., *U.N. Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), particularly contributions by Akihiko Tanaka (pp. 89-105) and Takako Ueta (pp. 127-139).

⁵⁵ *Defense of Japan: Response to a New Era*, p. 59.

⁵⁶ Norman D. Levin and Paul J. Bracken, *The U.S. Military Role in a Changing Asia: Preparing for the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1992), p. 10. See also Wyn Q. Bowen and David H. Dunn, *American Security Policy in the 1990s: Beyond Containment* (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996), p. 43. These national security objectives integrate the realist and idealist schools of thought. As such, they are currently under academic scrutiny. For an excellent account of this debate, see Norman D. Levin, *Prisms and Policy: U.S. Security Strategy After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1994). See also The White House, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996).

⁵⁷ A. James Gregor emphasizes this point in his book entitled *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), p. 30. See also Norman D. Levin, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵⁸ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, pp. 39-41.

⁵⁹ Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, 30 May 1996 testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

⁶⁰ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Security Policy Kurt Campbell, 30 May 1996 testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

⁶¹ See also Defense Secretary William J. Perry, "Preventive Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Defense Issues*, Volume 11, No. 49, May 1996; Defense Secretary Perry, "Preventive Defense: Aim of U.S. Security Policy is Preventing Conflict," 13 May 1996 speech delivered at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government; and Navy Secretary John H. Dalton, "Continued U.S. Engagement Crucial to Asia Security," 13 May 1996 speech delivered at the Navy League breakfast in Singapore.

⁶² See Chapters Four and Five for an indepth analysis of technological interdependence between Japan and the United States.

⁶³ Tolerance of the current status quo may be termed the alliance's external problem. The concluding chapter of this study will also discuss another aspect of the alliance that looms large over its durability prospects. This problem may be termed the alliance's internal problem. It deals with the political legitimacy aspect of the American military presence in Japan.

⁶⁴ This body of literature is extensive. Classics in this field include Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review*, Volume 63, No. 3, September 1969, pp. 689-718; Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Harper Collins, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974); and Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1987).

⁶⁵ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, p. 144.

⁶⁶ See Kent Calder, *Crisis and Compensation*, op. cit., and Joseph Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, op. cit.

⁶⁷ This is evident from the prioritization of national security objectives as defined by *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*.

⁶⁸ David B. Friedman and Richard J. Samuels, "How to Succeed without Really Flying: The Japanese Aircraft Industry and Japan's Technology Ideology," in Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler, ed., *Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 251.

⁶⁹ For a comprehensive analysis of technological spin-offs and spin-ons, i.e. civilian technological improvements with military applications, see Richard J. Samuels, op. cit.

⁷⁰ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996* (116th edition), Washington, D.C., 1996, pp. 334-35 and 352.

⁷¹ Gaston J. Sigur, "Power, Politics, and Defense," in James H. Buck, ed., *The Modern Japanese Military System* (Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications, 1975), p. 189.

⁷² Paul S. Kim, *Japan's Civil Service System: Its Structure, Personnel, and Politics* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 107-110.

⁷³ *Sankei Deeta Bokku* [Sankei Datat Book] (Tokyo: Kankocho Bunkajin, 1996). See also *Shokuinryoku* (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1996). I would like to thank Ichiko Morita, Laura Wong, and Michiko Kitsmiller at the Japan Documentation Center for all their assistance.

⁷⁴ This cabinet order was enacted in 1976. Joseph Keddell writes that deliberations over this expenditure ceiling were restricted largely to the Defense Agency and the Ministry of Finance. Prime Minister Miki sided with MoF. However, this barrier was not absolute, for the revised version sent to the Diet read "for the time being the aim will be to prevent yearly defense expenditures from exceeding One Percent of GNP." See Keddell, op. cit., p. 57.

⁷⁵ Joseph Keddell, op. cit., p. 191.

⁷⁶ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1990), p. 103.

⁷⁷ Joseph Keddell, op. cit., p. 19. As of 1984, over 80 percent of the bills enacted by the Diet originated in the bureaucracy. Chalmers Johnson cites two Japanese social scientists in asserting that "the two greatest powers of the bureaucracy are the initiating of legislation and the compilation of the budget." Johnson also informs us that within Diet deliberations, ministry and agency officials respond to questions from opposition Diet members. Johnson concludes that "the power of the bureaucracy with regard to legislation goes well beyond the initiation of legislative proposals and includes a degree of managing bills within the Diet itself." See Chalmers Johnson, *Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 123-4. For a contrasting viewpoint, see Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, "Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan," *American Political Science Review*, Volume 78, No. 1, March 1984, pp. 126-146.

⁷⁸ Alistar D. Edgar and David G. Haglund, "Japanese Defence Industrialisation," in Ron Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama, ed., *Japan's Military Renaissance?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 150-51.

⁷⁹ Edgar and Haglund, op. cit., pp. 151-52.

⁸⁰ Interview with two high ranking officials from the Embassy of Japan. Both officials confided that the ministry is immersed in negotiations over theater missile defense, the Okinawan land leases issue, co-production share of the Experimental Support Fighter (FSX), and the Technology-for-Technology transfer issues.

⁸¹ See Richard Samuels, op. cit., and Michael W. Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics, and Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 1992), Appendix B.

⁸² This point will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.

⁸³ *The Daily Yomiuri Online*, February 1997.

⁸⁴ Sheila A. Smith, *At the Intersection of the Cold War and the Postwar: The Japanese State and Security Planning* (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1996), p. 333.

⁸⁵ Chalmers Johnson, "The Kasumigaseki-Pentagon Axis (english translation)," *Sekai*, July 1996.

⁸⁶ Glen Fukushima related one such incident on the *Dead Fukuzawa Society* discussion board in October 1996. Fukushima recalled that Pentagon officials negotiating with their counterparts

from the JDA concerning FSX co-development did not realize that the Japanese negotiators had been seconded from MITI to the JDA specifically for these negotiations.

⁸⁷ Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, No. 2, 1971, pp. 161-82.

⁸⁸ B. G. Haskell, "Access to Society: A Neglected Dimension of Power," *International Organization*, Volume 34, No. 1, 1980, pp. 89-120.

⁸⁹ Chung-in Moon, "Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States," *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 32, 1988, pp. 67-89.

⁹⁰ Chung-in Moon, op. cit., p. 85. See also D. Osborne, "Japan's Secret Agents," *The New Republic*, 1 October 1984, pp. 20-23 and S.C. Schwab, "Japan and the U.S. Congress: Problems and Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 37, No. 1, 1985, pp. 123-39.

⁹¹ Chung-in Moon, op. cit., p. 85.

⁹² Robert C. Angel, "The Japan Lobby: A Preliminary Assessment of its Activities in the United States since 1970," unpublished paper presented at the 36th annual meeting of the Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Savannah, Georgia, 18 January 1997.

⁹³ Robert C. Angel, "The Japan Lobby," pp. 4-12.

⁹⁴ Robert C. Angel, "The Japan Lobby," p. 12.

⁹⁵ Robert C. Angel, "The Japan Lobby," pp. 12-13. The Japanese Foreign Ministry began running a series of television advertisements on CNN in January 1997 that stressed Japan's important role in humanitarian relief efforts and official development assistance. These advertisements targeted the American West Coast and were reported on the *Dead Fukuzawa Society* discussion board, an internet exchange forum concerning issues of importance to Japan and Japanese-American relations. The DFS was created by seven graduate students at the University of California, San Diego under the tutelage of Professor Chalmers Johnson, who now serves as president of the Japan Policy Research Institute.

⁹⁶ Robert C. Angel, "The Japan Lobby," p. 42.

⁹⁷ Ibid. See also Robert C. Angel, *Explaining Economic Policy Failure*, op. cit.

⁹⁸ Robert C. Angel, "The Japan Lobby," pp. 42-43.

⁹⁹ Interviews with Pentagon officials involved in the Defense Guidelines negotiations.

¹⁰⁰ Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992), p. 111.

¹⁰¹ Cited in Pyle, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁰² See Peter J. Herzog, op. cit., chapter nine; Martin E. Weinstein, op. cit., chapters two and three; and Roger Buckley, op. cit., chapters one and two.

¹⁰³ Weinstein, op. cit., chapter two.

¹⁰⁴ See Foreign Minister Ashida's September 1947 memorandum to the American government in Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

¹⁰⁵ Weinstein, op. cit., p. 61.

¹⁰⁶ Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 61-63.

¹⁰⁷ Robert C. Angel, *Explaining Economic Policy Failure*, p. 290. See also Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan that Can Say 'No'*, translation by Frank Baldwin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) and Leon Anderson, *Japanese Rage: Japanese Business and its Assault on the West* (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1992) for extremist views partially resulting from such a relationship.

**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
The U.S.-Japan Military Relationship
Chapter Four**

Maintenance of peace and stability: the alliance's external functions

This chapter identifies and assesses the Japan-US military alliance's external functions that encourage its maintenance. In short, the alliance's cold war containment mission benefited regional peace and prosperity and promoted conditions favorable to its durability. The political, economic, and military threat to the region at that time was perceived as a manifestation of the larger, global communist threat. With the communist threat greatly diminished, does the alliance continue to promote regional peace and prosperity?

While the alliance still serves to maintain peace and stability even in today's vastly changed external environment, its sustainability does not appear to hinge upon external functions. Persistence is better understood through the continued prioritization of divergent Japanese and American national interests. These dissimilar interests originated during the cold war and become endogenous to the alliance. Its internal functions continue to serve these divergent national security interests. Thus, a secondary theme within the chapter seeks to lay the foundation for those functions internal to the alliance that separately benefit divergent national security interests found in Japan and the US.

The US-Japan military alliance has meant much more to policymakers in both countries than simply providing an expedient military structure aimed at containing aggressive

Soviet foreign policy. The oft utilized phrase “maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia” proclaimed by American and Japanese policymakers transcends military containment policy. It signifies fundamental American foreign policy objectives in the region that have endured for more than a century. For the most part, these objectives have suited Japanese foreign policymakers – whose own objectives were different from, yet compatible to, American objectives. This explanation helps to account for the fact that the Soviet demise in East Asia led to less change in Japanese and American foreign policy than that predicted by the wisdom of international relations and area studies/foreign policy specialists.¹

Three External Functions

Maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia encompasses at least three symbiotic external functions that are served by the US-Japan military security alliance: 1) it establishes a foundation for peace and stability through strategies of preventive defense and military deterrence; 2) it promotes potential for increased economic development and prosperity; and 3) it advances economic, political, and military cooperation through regional integration. These three external functions represent the absolute benefits to the East Asian region that are generated by the alliance. As Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto stated during his February 1997 trip to five ASEAN nations, the US-Japan military relationship serves as a public good or public asset whose absolute benefits are reaped by all parties interested in maintaining the current regional order – the status quo.²

Preventive Defense and the Deterrent Function

The US-Japan military alliance performs the most fundamental of all alliance functions – it dampens the potential for regional military aggression. This function is bolstered by the twin national security strategies of preventive defense and deterrence.

Preventive defense. Some of the most deadly wars waged during the 20th century have occurred in East Asia – the Pacific theater of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Preventing conditions that surround the increased potential for military conflict from recurring is vital to maintaining regional peace and prosperity. Former US Defense Secretary William Perry likened the strategy of preventive defense to preventive medicine. “Preventive medicine creates the conditions which support health and when successful makes disease less likely and surgery unnecessary. Preventive defense creates the conditions which support peace and when successful makes war less likely and deterrence unnecessary.”³ Defense Secretary Perry maintains that this strategy is based upon four pillars: 1) a system of strong alliances; 2) progress in regional confidence-building measures (such as the ARF, joint military training, joint peacekeeping operations, and the 1995 opening of the Asia-Pacific Security Center in Honolulu, where civilian and military personnel from across the region discuss ways to build better security relations); 3) comprehensive engagement with China that lessens the chance of misunderstanding or incidents occurring between military forces (this category includes reciprocal visits of defense personnel and port calls); and 4) counterproliferation of nuclear weapons (specifically the 1994 agreed framework for halting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program).⁴ US Secretary of the Navy John Dalton commented on the importance of the US-Japan military alliance:

By working together, the United States and its allies have made real progress toward our shared goal of seeing prosperity and freedom flourish around the globe. Our cooperative efforts have kept a lid on regional conflict, guaranteed freedom of the seas ... promoted democracy [and] respect for free markets ... the security and stability of this entire region absolutely depends on our continued alliance.⁵

US administration officials are not overly sanguine about the prospects of the preventive defense strategy, however, noting that such a strategy consisting of mere presence cannot by itself assure regional peace and stability. Military forces powerful enough to represent a persuasive deterrent are also necessary.

Deterrence. Deterrence is a strategy intended to discourage hostile military actions by one regional actor upon another. Glenn Synder writes that the deterrence function imposes both increased risk and cost factors within the military calculus of a would be hostile neighbor. Such factors are meant to outweigh any prospective gains.⁶

The alliance performs its deterrent function by serving as a military security framework that combines three essential components: 1) military operational capability to defend US and Japanese national interests in the region against aggression. It must be remembered, however, that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces only maintains one operational mission beyond the territorial sovereignty of Japan – that being the defense of the sea and air lanes of communication extending 1000 miles south of Honshu. The US military maintains almost exclusive possession of the alliance's operational capabilities; 2) political will on behalf of the alliance leadership to utilize its military operational capability. This political will was demonstrated in September 1996 when US naval and air forces launched punitive air strikes against Iraqi air defense units based in southern Iraq. A US guided missile destroyer and air refueling aircraft that are based in Japan were utilized in the air strikes; and 3) political legitimacy accrued through widespread support from the political elites and mass publics of both nations. Barring the other US bilateral military alliances with the Republic of Korea and Australia, no comparable security framework in East Asia possesses these three fundamental components that are necessary for allaying the threat of

military aggression. Since the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the United Nations are the most widely noted alternatives to the US-Japan alliance, a short discussion detailing the limitations of these frameworks follows.

ARF. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was initially created in 1994 as a multilateral political security framework designed to provide a consultative forum that promotes confidence building measures through increased dialogue and transparency.⁷ At the July 1995 meeting in Brunei, the ARF membership agreed to abide by two principles; 1) promotion of ARF's gradual evolution through three broad stages: confidence building, preventive defense, and conflict resolution; and 2) all forum decisions will be based upon consensus.⁸ To date, the consultative members within ARF have not agreed to establish concrete measures that would move the forum beyond its confidence building stage. The forum membership has also not agreed to establish a centralized headquarters or any other institutional structure beyond commitment to annually study issues. For these reasons, Donald Weatherbee ponders whether ARF will end up as a venue consisting of "all bark and no bite."⁹

Another factor that weighs against the prospects for ARF as a viable multilateral security entity is time. The forum is in its formative stages, so one could argue that ARF's best chance for asserting itself as a constructive framework is now. However, new institutional processes take time to develop. Widespread consensus is difficult to obtain in a quick and efficient manner amongst such a large membership. As Desmond Ball maintains:

It could well take over a decade for the developing dialogue processes to provide sufficient mutual understanding, confidence and trust for resolving or managing substantive regional security issues. It will be some

time before any mechanisms for arms control or conflict resolution are acceptable, let alone constructed and operated effectively. The fact that much of the current and prospective CSBM [confidence and security building measures] activity is proceeding indirectly through the second track process is itself a manifestation of the hesitancy of officials in directly addressing security concerns.¹⁰

Moreover, the forum's great power members – China, the US, and Japan – have not allowed ARF to possess the legitimacy or political will required to rapidly assemble a multinational military security force in the event of a regional emergency. This is due to the great power's own vested national interests. China refuses to move beyond the dialogue stage concerning its South China Sea claims. Beijing prefers to deal with its neighbors about such issues on a bilateral basis. The PRC leadership rightfully feels it possesses much more leverage with its smaller neighbors in bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations.¹¹

The Clinton administration's 1996 *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* asserts that regional security dialogues like ARF are seen as a way to supplement – not supplant – American alliances and forward military presence.¹² The report affirms that

The United States believes the ARF can play a useful role in conveying governments' intentions, easing tensions, constraining arms races and cultivating habits of consultation and cooperation on security issues. We envision that the ARF will develop over time into an effective region-wide forum for enhancing preventive diplomacy and developing confidence-building measures. We believe that discussion of modest defense transparency measures would be a constructive area for future work. Discussions might include such measures as limited exchanges of defense data, the publication of defense white papers, and submission of information to the UN arms register. Efforts in areas such as disaster relief and peacekeeping could also help establish patterns of cooperation. Furthermore, the ARF presents an opportunity for a non-confrontational discussion of the relevance of democratization for regional security.¹³

Conspicuously absent from the US strategy report is the third ARF goal – that of developing conflict resolution approaches. Such approaches do not appear to be in the national security interests of the United States government.

The Japanese governmental assessment is closely analogous to that of the United States. The 1996 JDA White Paper *Defense of Japan: Response to a New Era* asserts that “Although ARF at present cannot be described as a regional security framework like one seen in Europe, it is very important that it provides almost the sole opportunity for high-level multilateral dialogue about security in this region ... it deserves attention how ARF will fare in the future.”¹⁴ Ministry of Finance official Motohide Hashimoto echoes the US security strategy report by writing that:

Japan must actively take part in regional multilateral dialogue and could even take the lead in an effort to build trust in Asia. The function of multilateral dialogue, however, is limited to building trust, and this is fundamentally different from the function of the alliance, which involves cooperation to deal with threats. Multilateral dialogue can only supplement and can not replace the Japan-US alliance.¹⁵

From the above argument, it seems clear that ARF lacks the essential components of a viable military security framework. As Richard Solomon notes, “it is unlikely that the forum will become the core of a collective security system.”¹⁶

United Nations. Regarding a United Nations military security role in East Asia, many Americans and Japanese became attracted to a revitalized UN role in collective security following the end of the cold war. A 24 September 1991 *New York Times* editorial trumpeted the UN’s comeback after decades of malaise:

In a wondrous sea-change, the United Nations has silenced most of its detractors. A body once scorned as a dithering talk-shop has now mobilized impressively to punish Iraq’s aggressions in the Gulf ... the UN

offers hopes for a new world order to resolve conflicts by multilateral diplomacy and collective security.¹⁷

Former Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party and current Shinshinto chief Ichiro Ozawa saw the end of the cold war as a vital opportunity for the United Nations to assert itself as an effective multilateral security forum. Ozawa writes "We are no longer subject to the confrontation of the two great ideologies. The United Nations therefore is called upon to determine the security policies necessary for today's world."¹⁸

It is often noted by proponents of multilateral security groupings that the UN Security Council successfully cooperated in legitimating the US led coalition which expelled the Iraqi military from Kuwait.¹⁹ However, three caveats must be remembered.

First, all three East Asian permanent council members (the US, China, and Russia) possessed vested interests in keeping the flow of oil relatively undisturbed. Other political factors also came into play during the prelude to the Persian Gulf War. Two possible reasons for China and Russia backing the UN coalition effort include China's desire to divert political attention from its Tiananmen Square incident and Russia's request for increased financial assistance.²⁰ If these political factors bear any relevance, then conflict in the immediate East Asian region surrounding Japan (i.e. Taiwan or the Korean peninsula) or in the South China Seas might not garner such support, especially if the armed conflict involves the permanent council members themselves. Edward Luck epitomizes such a pessimistic view as he notes that the five permanent UN Security Council members also happen to be the five declared nuclear powers and the world's five largest arms exporters.²¹

Secondly, it must be remembered that the United States initiated and promulgated the liberation of Kuwait. It was essentially an American military operation undertaken with Security Council authorization.²²

Thirdly, UN peacekeeping missions expanded tremendously in the wake of the cold war. As shown in Somalia and Bosnia, the United Nations has at times proven to be a very ineffective peacekeeper.²³ The case of Cambodia, in contrast, represents a partial success in UN peacekeeping. The increased number of conflicts in the post-cold war era, coupled with the willingness of states to take their cases directly to the UN Security Council, will severely test that body's institutional structure and decision-making process since it lacks an appropriately sized policy planning staff to handle the increased workload.²⁴

In short, multilateral security frameworks such as ARF and the United Nations lack the "teeth" necessary to deter potential aggression. By representing the "teeth" of the deterrence function, the US-Japan military alliance promotes continued maintenance of peace and stability.

Deterrence geared toward whom? If the alliance's deterrent function discourages potential military aggression by one regional actor upon another, then a reasonable question to ask may be "toward whom is the deterrent function aimed, especially since the cold war's demise diminished the military threat of Soviet aggression?" One frequently given answer maintains that deterrence is aimed at no particular country, but rather toward the whole range of threats found within East Asia. To the extent that the United States (and to a much lesser extent Japan) is willing to assist in the maintenance of both the territorial sovereignty of East Asia's nation-states and the contemporary international economic regime, the deterrence blanket covers the whole region. This is not to say that

the political and military leadership within the United States is wholeheartedly willing to engage itself in another Asian land war.²⁵ The US will act only when its own national interests are threatened. The Persian Gulf War illustrates this argument. The Gulf War also points out that the United States maintains both the ability to bring together multilateral coalitions and the ability to successfully engage in warfare far from its own borders through the forward deployment of military forces when the cause impacts upon its national interests.²⁶ Meanwhile, the Japanese government stands in the wings, supporting the US government financially and politically when Japanese national interests are involved. Japanese financial contributions in excess of thirteen billion dollars following the Gulf War and the GoJ's political support of US military air strikes against Iraq in September 1996 illustrate this point.²⁷

It is important to remember that the potential for military aggression did not disappear with the end of the cold war. Problems that could spark military interventionism by one neighbor against another are numerous. These include:

- 1) regional ethnic disputes
- 2) the proliferation of nuclear weapons
- 3) heightened proliferation of convention weapons, specifically those that emphasize power projection capabilities
- 4) the rise of nationalism
- 5) territorial disputes involving islands in the South China Seas, the Senkakus (Diayou), and the Takeshima (Tokdo)
- 6) political uncertainty regarding Korean reunification
- 7) the mainland China-Taiwan unification situation
- 8) increased energy, food, and water requirements that are less than assured
- 9) stable transfers of political power

The US-Japan military relationship adds an increased cost factor to the military calculus of such a would be hostile neighbor. Thus, it lessens the potential for any of the above nine problems to spark military conflict.

Additionally, the United States serves a balancing role between the region's two largest military powers – China and Japan. John Bresnan contends that

The only reason for the United States to maintain a forward presence in the western Pacific is to avoid a major shift in the balance of power in the region, and the only states that could cause such a shift are China and Japan. Both nations are stepping up their efforts to be of influence in Southeast Asia, and governments there have already begun to see both as having increased strategic interest of their own ... the consensus view is that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is of paramount importance to Southeast Asia. If that should break down, Southeast Asians would have to deal with a very different Japan.²⁸

Michael Mandelbaum additionally cites the fact that every Southeast Asian government except Myanmar publicly and privately favors some form of continued American military presence in East Asia.²⁹ One staunch supporter of this sentiment is Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who has publicly stated that ASEAN relations with Japan are heavily contingent upon an American regional presence.³⁰

Both Japan and China view the United States as useful in serving a regional military security role by providing a military buffer between the two nations. Absence of a US military role would heighten Japanese concerns of increased Chinese military expenditures and power projection capabilities. For its part, China could always assume that within the US-Japan security treaty framework, Japanese military forces would be operationally limited. This US buffer role predates the end of the cold war and has played an important, yet under emphasized, part in Sino-Japanese relations.³¹

Deterrence Lays the Foundation for Increased Commercial Interests

The US-Japan military alliance's foremost external function – preventive defense/deterrence – serves to allay potential aggression. Deterrence lays the foundation for the second external alliance function. The alliance enhances the opportunity for East Asian policymakers to channel resources (financial and manpower) otherwise earmarked for military security purposes into non-military, commercial ventures. As such, the alliance establishes a necessary precondition for economic development. By establishing such a precondition, this function promotes increased potential for regional economic development and prosperity.

Despite the end of the cold war, national security remains one of the most important issues facing the nation-states of East Asia. Yet the nature of national security in the region does not focus upon its purely military dimension (much like the US conception). East Asian national security is a concept that encompasses both its military and economic aspects. The states of East Asia may place emphasis upon the economic component of national security vis-à-vis its defense policy component due to the alliance's preventive defense/deterrent function.³² They can do this because of the convenience provided by the American military presence. Michael Howard argues that the American buffer role in East Asia has not so much served a deterrent function against existing threats as it has served as a measure of assurance against the development of new threats. Howard calls this role "reassurance" and defines it as "the task of instilling confidence in allies so that they can conduct their domestic affairs and foreign policies without feeling intimidated ... [thus sparing these governments] the need to make adjustments in their own policies that they preferred to avoid."³³

Renato de Castro provides an excellent summary of the current East Asian strategic situation. De Castro writes that the region requires two important prerequisites for fostering economic development and interaction: 1) preventing emergence of a threat that could disturb relations; and 2) mitigating intra-regional fears and suspicions.³⁴ Stability, then, is an important precondition within the security perceptions of policymakers, business, and the populace. Security in a sense is like Joseph Nye's oxygen analogy – it provides the proper atmosphere that attracts investment (the fuel) in order for economic growth to take place.³⁵ Just as a proper fuel-air mixture allows an engine to operate efficiently, a proper mixture of internal and external state security coupled with financial investment and continued access to the American consumer marketplace allows the East Asian economic machine to run unimpeded.

The US-Japan military alliance partly serves to bolster the perception of external stability within East Asia because the alliance acts as a balancer of interests that shifts emphasis from the military to the economic dimension of national security. In short, a continued American military presence allows the countries in the region to make more butter than guns. Some may scoff at this viewpoint, contending that the implied threat of an American military presence has influenced governments in the region to be more cautious, allocate more expenditures to their militaries, and threaten regional stability by creating an environment conducive to an all out arms race. This argument is simply not realistic. Rather than a continued American military presence contributing to heightened regional instability, it is the perception of American military withdrawal that drives the procurement of power projection weapons by the governments of East Asia.³⁶ The US-Japan security alliance is seen as benign by most nations in East Asia for two reasons.

First, a US military presence threatens no particular nation. Second, the alliance constrains Japan's regional military security role. The alliance's balancing role is therefore essential to continued peace and prosperity. Even Beijing realizes that it receives substantial economic, political, and military benefits from the US-Japan military alliance. This may not hold true in the future, however, if the alliance experiences greater resentment from China as confidence increases or if domestic political stability wanes.³⁷

The caveat about domestic political stability recognizes another facet of national security. Domestic political stability matters in a nation's security calculus. By creating conditions favorable for increased prosperity, the alliance may indirectly serve to bolster regional domestic political stability. A government's efforts may be utilized to garner popular legitimacy by promoting the economic dimension of national security. Regime legitimacy based upon policies that promote prosperity through commercial interests rather than through the use of military force against one's domestic populace appears to be the growing choice of political leaderships throughout East Asia.³⁸ On the down side, the alliance might also prevent functional political change such as a thorough Japanese recognition of (and apologies backed by compensation for) its World War II atrocities. Another unintended consequence could be seen in Chinese domestic politics if the Chinese military is able to capitalize upon a number of developments, including the perception/reality of an increased military role for Japan with or without the security alliance, the rise in nationalism, and a demise in the capabilities of a new generation of Chinese leadership in order to claim control of the Chinese central government. Such a situation occurred in Japan during the late 1920s and 1930s that led to the military takeover of the government.

Advanced Regional Integration

Through the promotion of increased potential for economic development and prosperity, the alliance serves to advance regional integration at a time when prosperity could unintentionally foster instability. Regional instability could occur as a result of four factors: 1) uneven economic development, 2) domestic political turmoil generated by a growing economic middle class that could seek greater political involvement, 3) domestic political instability resulting from less than peaceful transfers of governmental power; and 4) heightened external tensions brought about by a growing scarcity of resources and market access friction.³⁹

Prosperity appears to be a two-sided coin; that is, prosperity may create conditions both favorable to and undesirable for internal and external political stability. The US-Japan military alliance serves to counter political instability in two reinforcing ways: 1) the alliance possesses the operational capability to deter and defend against interests that seek to militarily disrupt the status quo; 2) the alliance assists in the creation of a favorable atmosphere for generating greater trust and cooperation amongst the states of East Asia. Political fora regarding economic and military issues such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and ARF are now beginning to take root. Progress in regional integration could not have occurred without an environment widely favored by most national leaderships. Such an environment is based upon the common interests of enhanced security, both internal and external, and economic prosperity.

Additionally, the US-Japan bilateral military relationship may be considered to be a precondition to both nation's successful participation in regional integration.⁴⁰ Without

this participation, regional integration would be more difficult to develop. Ralph Cossa argues that

The combination of the strategic interests of the U.S. and the constraints imposed on Japanese international behavior make the U.S.-Japan security alliance as close to a permanent fixture of East Asia as one can identify. The interconnection [between the bilateral framework and multilateralism] is important to understand: the bilateral relationship is a precondition for multilateral initiatives; simultaneously, no multilateral initiatives can or should be undertaken that would weaken the bilateral connection.⁴¹

It appears that regional integration and multilateral security frameworks are built upon bilateral security institutions and not vice versa.

The classic historical case study where Cossa's argument was not heeded is derived from the 1920s Washington Naval Conferences and abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese military alliance in favor of the multilateral Four Powers Treaty. World War I destroyed the imperialist balance of power in East Asia that consisted of a French, British, and German preponderance of power. The United States and Japan were perceived as rising regional powers. Britain was perceived as the declining global power who had secured an alliance with Japan to protect British interests in East Asia while turning its attention toward Europe and the rise of Germany. The United States, insistent upon constraining Japanese efforts at regional hegemony through its imperialist expansion on the Asian mainland, sought termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Additionally, the US was enamored at the time with Wilsonian principles of idealism and successfully persuaded Britain and Japan that their interests could be better served through a vague series of multilateral treaties in which the four powers (including France) promised to undertake consultations in the event that any regional security threat arose. As Kenneth Pyle

correctly notes, the Washington treaty system “represented a commitment on the part of the powers to engage in multilateral consultation and cooperation to maintain regional stability.”⁴² The treaty system also set forth agreement upon the territorial integrity of China (the Nine Power Treaty of February 1922), established an institutional structure limiting naval rearmament (capital ships), and stipulated that the four powers agree to respect each other’s rights in East Asia while national interests would be advanced through economic means rather than military competition.⁴³

An analysis of the early 1920s Anglo-Japanese military alliance termination may illustrate the dangers inherent in replacing bilateral security alliances with multilateral frameworks.⁴⁴ Coming off a recent upheaval in the regional security order (World War I preceded earlier by Japan’s military victories over China and Russia), the Japanese political leadership at the beginning of the 1920s felt relatively secure within the framework of the bilateral Anglo-Japanese alliance. This may be attributed to the alliance’s ability to offer Japan a politically maintainable position vis-à-vis the other Asian great powers. However, when the United States and France pushed for termination of the alliance, Japan’s new generation of influential political figures perceived that Japan could no longer maintain a position of relative security in the Asia-Pacific. One such leader, Fumimaro Konoe, perceived the Washington treaty system as a regional derivative of the League of Nations, pursued by the United States and Britain as an effort to establish and preserve the new status quo that did not include Japan. Konoe would go on to write that Japan “may be forced to destroy this new status quo for the sake of self-preservation.”⁴⁵

Admittedly, circumstances differ today from those found in the 1920s. Great power distribution was heavily skewed toward European colonial powers during the 1920s. The

only recognized Asian great power within the Four Power Treaty system was Japan. In the late 1990s, Japan, China, and to a lesser extent South Korea play significant great power roles within East Asia. However, this does not detract from the argument that the multilateral structure created during the 1920s lacked both operational capability and political will from the leadership of the great powers due to an expanded complexity of the system. One unintended consequence resulting from such a structure involved the Japanese, who felt they could not adequately cope with the rise of Chinese nationalism and the threat of Soviet Bolshevism within the newly constructed multinational security framework.⁴⁶ Japan eventually lost its sense of national security during this time period in part due to feelings of international abandonment. There were simply not enough chairs at the great western power table. Japan eventually sought ties with Germany and utilized aggressive means to regain its national security interests of maintaining access to resources.

From the Washington treaty system case study, we learn that multilateral security measures are important. But without the deterrent function, multilateral fora cannot replace the significance of bilateral security arrangements that possess operational capability, political will, and political legitimacy. Regional integration is best served through the combination of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Reliance upon a single initiative may bring about undesirable consequences.

Mutually reinforcing functions

The US-Japan military alliance's three external functions are mutually reinforcing. The current regional order as bolstered by the alliance appears analogous to a three-tiered layer cake with the bottom layer buttressing the upper layers. In short, the regional framework

established by the alliance is founded upon its military security function. Without the establishment of a relative condition of peace through preventive defense/deterrence, prosperity and integration would be much more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Allaying fear from internal or external attack must occur before a nation can divert attention to other facets of national security such as economic development. By keeping American forces stationed in East Asia, the US-Japan military alliance helps to allay fears that the region's states will divert an ever greater percentage of resources to military commitments – in essence a perpetuation of the security dilemma.

Figure 4-1 The alliance's three external functions

advances cooperation through regional integration
 promotes increased economic development and prosperity
 enhances deterrent capability against potential military aggression

Moreover, economic development depends upon state stability. Domestic and foreign commercial business interests will tend not to invest in an environment deemed inherently unstable – they will look elsewhere. US investors are particularly averse to high risk environments.⁴⁷ Finally, regional integration may tend to be abandoned in favor of unilateral, isolationist measures or bilateral measures when states fear external and internal instability. This was the case with Japan during the 1920s, 1930s, and late 1940s, the Republic of Korea during the 1950s, and the nations of Southeast Asia during the 1950s and 1960s as they attempted to sever their colonial ties through nation building. Significant intra-regional ties (in the form of ASEAN) did not develop for two decades following World War II. Due in part to Japan's colonial legacy and the US bilateral military alliance structure, such arrangements have still not taken root in Northeast Asia.

Further regional economic and political integration through institutions such as APEC did not occur throughout the whole of East Asia until the 1980s.

In short, regional integration is dependent upon the prosperity of the region's individual states, which is in turn dependent upon a condition of relative domestic and regional stability.⁴⁸ This is not to say that internal and external stability leads to prosperity in every case (that is, non-aggression is sufficient), or that prosperity will guarantee regional integration. However, stability is a necessary precondition toward the prospect of economic prosperity, while economic prosperity is a necessary precondition toward the prospect of regional integration.

Assessment

The alliance's external functions served the region well during the cold war period. In 1960, the Asian economies produced less than five percent of global gross national product (GNP), but by 1990 the region accounted for over twenty-five percent of global output.⁴⁹ Economic prosperity spread across East Asia, starting with Japan, then extending during the 1970s to Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. By the end of the 1980s, newly industrializing economies such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the southern coastal region of China had joined this trend.

The region's rapid economic growth was made possible in part by the three external functions served by the US-Japan military security alliance. However, the military security contribution offered by the alliance does not tell the whole story. A quid pro quo of American military access to Japanese bases for Japanese access to the American economic market existed throughout the entire growth period in order to satisfy the divergent national interests of Japan and the United States. This quid pro quo remains largely intact.

The American government encouraged export-oriented economic policies throughout East Asia and often ignored neo-mercantilistic trade practices toward the United States. Such practices also accounts for rapid economic growth.⁵⁰

The United States in the post-cold war period now faces the daunting task of rectifying not only its federal budget deficit, but also the substantial trade deficits that it runs with almost every nation in East Asia.⁵¹ Is such a situation sustainable following the demise of the cold war?

Policymakers in Washington recognize the problem, but have thus far not been able to produce a viable solution. The US government has attempted to link the East Asian region's economies to its own economic security through a strategy of liberalizing regional trade and investment. It is hoped that such liberalization will stimulate American exports, economic growth, and employment.⁵² Difficulties in implementation of such a liberalization strategy do exist, however.

The most significant problem for the US government revolves around its position of relative economic decline in the region. The US feels that the economies of East Asia must bear their fair share of the burden toward maintaining a healthy global market economic system. This essentially means modifying a system that has been based upon the East Asian practice of neo-mercantilism toward American products while relying upon mostly unimpeded export access to the American marketplace. Opening the economies of East Asia to greater amounts of US products while limiting exports to the US marketplace will be difficult to accomplish – especially in light of the fact that the US government maintains little interest in engaging in long term economic policy planning, US business interests focus upon the vast American domestic marketplace, US commercial ventures

understandably lack the courage to invest in risky foreign markets because the US government does not provide a safety net comparable to that provided by MITI, and the US government continues to stress the significance of America's current regional military force structure. Economic aspects of American national security interests are gaining increased attention, but changing the national security emphasis of the United States government toward a more equitable distribution of military and economic interests has been an arduous process.

A second problem regarding the implementation of a liberalization strategy within the US-East Asian relationship results from the US federal budget deficit. The US government must rely upon investors who are willing to buy US debt-servicing instruments. The amount of investment from foreign sources – especially East Asian sources – has steadily increased with the rise in the federal deficit. At some point, the US government may find itself vulnerable to reliance upon East Asian investments in order to maintain the current expenditure levels. This is not a prospect that bodes well for the US-East Asian relationship.

In sum, tremendous change in the relationship between the United States and the nations of East Asia has occurred as a result of the region's economic growth. The balance of power has shifted toward a more equitable distribution and the weight of American influence has declined relative to its position throughout the cold war. What necessarily follows from this conclusion, then, is that the United States must act like a nation that works from a position of lessened influence by putting its own economic house in order through greater efforts toward a balanced budget. One way to cut military expenditures would be through a modification of America's military position in the region.

It must be remembered that the US military budget is not an entitlement.⁵³ Expenditure reduction is almost a certainty in any deficit reduction plan, so it is wise to devise a plan that is politically and economically acceptable not only to Congress and the executive branch, but also to the nations of East Asia.

Revision of the US-Japan military alliance may be needed as a first step toward providing a partial remedy of the difficulties facing the relationship between Japan, the nations of East Asia, and the United States. Modification does not mean an American military withdrawal, however. It does not even necessarily entail a significant reduction in US military operational readiness. Brookings Institute scholar Mike Mochizuki brilliantly puts forth a sound and realistically achievable US-Japan military alliance modification proposal that possesses an acceptable combination of political legitimacy, political will, and operational capability.⁵⁴

Conclusion

Maintaining some form of the US-Japan military alliance in the realm of military security proves to possess widespread incentives not only for Japan and the United States, but for the whole of East Asia as well. Deterrence, enhanced opportunities to pursue national security through economic prosperity, and the furtherance of regional integration may be seen as the external benefits provided to the region by the US-Japan military security alliance. Economic problems hamper US relations with most countries in the region, however. It is possible to modify the alliance in recognition of these problems to better serve the national interests of all concerned. Its external functions could continue to benefit the region.

This chapter argues that while the alliance does somewhat serve to maintain peace and stability even in today's vastly changed external environment, its sustainability does not appear to hinge upon its external functions. Durability is better understood through the continued prioritization of divergent Japanese and American national security interests. These dissimilar interests originated during the cold war and become indigenous to the alliance by serving as its internal functions.

This chapter merely hinted at the functions served by the alliance that individually benefit divergent Japanese and American national security objectives. The next two chapters present these functions in greater detail.

Endnotes

¹ See this study's Introduction and Chapter Two for details.

² Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto used the term "public asset" when referring to the U.S.-Japan security alliance during his February 1997 diplomatic trip to five ASEAN nations.

³ Prepared remarks of Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the Pacific Basin Economic Council, Washington, D.C., 22 May 1996, cited in *Defense Issues*, Volume 11, No. 49, May 1996.

⁴ Ibid. See also US Naval Secretary John H. Dalton's 13 May 1996 speech to the Navy League Breakfast in Singapore. Chinese Defense Minister Chi visited Washington in December 1996. The US Navy regularly makes port calls at Hong Kong and will continue to do so after its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997. The Chinese navy conducted port calls in Honolulu and San Diego in March 1997 – the first time such visits were authorized since 1989 before US-Sino relations soured because of the Tiananmen Square incident.

⁵ US Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton, op. cit.

⁶ Glenn Snyder, cited in Murray and Viotti, op. cit., pp. xviii-xix. Snyder differentiates between deterrence and defense. Deterrence is primarily a peacetime national security objective that influences a potentially hostile neighbor's intentions by reducing the likelihood of aggression. Defense is a wartime value intent upon reducing one's own costs and risks in the event that deterrence fails. Defense seeks to reduce an enemy's capacity to damage and deprive a nation of its territory, population, and industrial capabilities.

⁷ ARF gradually developed out of the ASEAN Institutes of Security and International Studies (ISIS) regional grouping (formed in 1988), and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC; formed in 1992). ARF membership includes the seven nations of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the seven official PMC "dialogue partners" (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States), together with China, Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Russia. Notable absences

include North Korea, Taiwan, and Myanmar. See Donald E. Weatherbee, "Southeast Asia at Mid-decade: Independence through Interdependence," in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1995* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1995), pp. 4, 10-11; Sheldon W. Simon, "The Parallel Tracks of Asian Multilateralism," in Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon W. Simon, ed., *Southeast Asian Security in the New Millenium* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 26-30.

⁸ Sheldon Simon, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

⁹ Donald Weatherbee, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

¹⁰ Desmond Ball, "Building Confidence and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Gary Klintworth, ed., *Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 255.

¹¹ Ralph A. Cossa, *The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security*, McNair Paper 51 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), p. 48.

¹² President Clinton underscored this theme in his July 1993 "new Pacific community" speech before the Republic of Korea's National Assembly in order to accentuate the theme that American involvement in multilateral activities does not provide a convenient excuse for significant military force reductions in East Asia. See Ralph A. Cossa, op. cit., p. 46.

¹³ United States Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1995), p. 13. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 74, No. 4, July/August 1995, pp. 90-102.

¹⁴ Defense Agency of Japan, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁵ Motohide Hashimoto, "Security in Asia: Roles and Tasks for Japan and the US," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 3, No. 2, Fall/Winter 1996, p. 137.

¹⁶ Richard H. Solomon, "Who Will Shape the Emerging Structure of East Asia?," in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), p. 203. Solomon cites problems associated with regional diversity, differences in security perceptions, and the historical lack of practice with multilateralism as the root causes behind the prospective failure of ARF to replace the US-Japan alliance. Others who do not give much weight to the prospect of Asian-Pacific multilateral security approaches include Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," *Survival*, Volume 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 3-21. For a more cautiously optimistic analysis, see James L. Richardson, "The Asia-Pacific: Geopolitical Cauldron or Regional Community?," Desmond Ball, "Building Confidence and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," and Stuart Harris, "The Regional Security Outlook," in Gary Klintworth, ed., *Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

¹⁷ *New York Times* editorial, 24 September 1991, p. A 23.

¹⁸ Ichiro Ozawa, op. cit., pp. 113-14.

¹⁹ See Barry M. Blechman, "The Military Dimensions of Collective Security," in Roger A. Coate, ed., *U.S. Policy and the Future of the United Nations* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 68. For the Japanese perspective, see Akihiko Tanaka, "Japan's Security Policy in the 1990s," Yoichi Funabashi, op. cit., p. 52. Tanaka writes, "If the United Nations is regaining

authority and effectiveness in coping with aggressor states, it is in Japan's security interests to cooperate with it."

²⁰ Interview with Roger A. Coate, 18 May 1996.

²¹ Edward C. Luck, "Layers of Security: Regional Arrangements, the United Nations, and the Japanese-American Security Treaty," *Asian Survey*, Volume 35, No. 3, March 1995, pp. 241-42.

²² Barry M. Blechman, op. cit., p. 68.

²³ Michael W. Doyle, "Managing Global Security: The United Nations Not a War Maker, a Peace Maker," in Charles William Maynes and Richard S. Williamson, ed., *U.S. Foreign Policy and the United Nations System* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), p. 55. Doyle classifies UN peacekeeping operations into three generations: the first may be seen as traditional peacekeeping where lightly armed UN forces are stationed between hostile parties in order to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, and/or buffer zone while political negotiations progress; "second generation" peacekeeping builds on these policies, serving as peacemaker that facilitates a peace treaty, peacekeeper that monitors demobilization of military forces, resettling refugees, and supervises transitional governmental implementation, and peacebuilder, which at times organizes, implements, and monitors elections, human rights liberties, and economic rehabilitation. In contrast, "third generation" peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement, authorizes the use of collective military force to deter, dissuade, and deny military operations by hostile parties. Peace-enforcement also seeks to protect humanitarian assistance missions and may assist in the re-building of "failed" states. For a further discussion of UN peacekeeping roles, see Selig S. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara, op. cit.

²⁴ Edward C. Luck, op. cit., pp. 239-40.

²⁵ The Nixon Doctrine and the Weinberger Doctrine that followed in the 1980s both refute such a military role, instead relying upon the nations of East Asia to defend themselves. American military assistance in the form of air and naval power, training, and equipment will be provided, but the US will most likely not fully engage its military in another Asian land war.

²⁶ Critics of this view will note, as John Bresnan has done, that "The United States is not going to become seriously involved in disputes between Southeast Asian states; it is difficult to imagine the occurrence there of anything like the Gulf War." See John Bresnan, *From Dominoes to Dynamos: The Transformation of Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), p. 82. I disagree with this viewpoint because sustainability of the sea lanes of communication through Southeast Asia are vitally important to the United States, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China. As these economies increasingly seek to import raw materials such as oil from the Persian Gulf and to export manufactured goods, Southeast Asian stability will be of increased concern to the militaries of China, Japan, and the United States. See Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Defense*, op. cit., chapter three.

²⁷ Japan and Great Britain were the only great powers to publicly support the September 1996 US air strikes against Iraq. This also shows the lack of cohesion amongst the West and the loss of US political leverage in the wake of the cold war.

²⁸ John Bresnan, op. cit., pp. 82, 85-86.

²⁹ Michael Mandelbaum, "The United States and the Strategic Quadrangle," in Michael Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 155.

³⁰ Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, keynote speech to the Kansai Zaikai seminar in Kyoto, Japan, cited in *Straits Times*, 14 February 1992.

³¹ Michael Mandelbaum, op. cit., pp. 160-61. The Chinese government is indeed worried about an increased role for Japan's Self-Defense Forces – even within the US-Japan military alliance. One Chinese governmental viewpoint, taken from an anonymous foreign ministry spokesman, was quoted in the Chinese press as stating that "The original [US-Japan] accord was simply a bilateral agreement, under which the United States provided nuclear protection for Japan. But the new accord [the April 1996 reaffirmation] tends to poke its nose into regional affairs ... Naturally, it will affect the interests of other nations, who are unavoidably worried." Cited by Stephen Anderson in a discussion concerning East Asian security issues on the *Dead Fukuzawa Society* discussion board, 30 May 1996. Two related concerns are worth noting. First, many scholars are worried that an increased Japanese military role within the alliance might create a series of unintended consequences in Sino-Japanese relations and within Chinese domestic politics. One wonders if an increased alliance role for Japan might strengthen the position of the Chinese People's Liberation Army within Chinese politics and thus accelerate advancement of the military's modernization program. The Chinese are definitely watching the US-Japan alliance with increased interest, as the Chinese press regularly reports on major speeches and events surrounding the alliance. The Chinese government is also exerting as much influence as it can bear upon the alliance, as demonstrated in Japan's decision to delay its commitment to co-research, development, and production of a theater missile defense program. See Michael J. Green, "TMD and Strategic Relations with the PRC," discussion paper presented at the CSIS Pacific Forum Okazaki Institute Seminar, 10-14 January 1997. Second, Robert Angel and others are concerned that the Japanese government lacks adequate mechanisms for maintaining civilian control over the Self-Defense Forces. Even incremental increases in Japanese military roles and missions bound within alliance constraints might set a precedent toward greater Japanese involvement in regional security issues without establishing an environment conducive to a reexamination of Japan's defense decision-making process. One example might be derived from the February 1997 decision regarding Japanese Air Self-Defense Force assistance in tracking down suspected illegal immigrants. It is yet to be publicly acknowledged who authorized such a role for the SDF – Prime Minister Hashimoto, JDA Director Fumio Kyuuma, or the local ASDF base commander. Such a role is politically sensitive in nature since most of the illegal immigrants coming to China are from Korea and China – both formerly hostile neighbors.

³² Interviews with officials from the Embassy of Japan, the US Department of Defense, and the US State Department.

³³ Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 61, No. 2, Winter 1982-3, pp.

³⁴ Renato de Castro, "U.S. Grand Strategy in Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Volume 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 347.

³⁵ The "security is like oxygen" analogy was initiated by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in the *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* during his time as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Asia and Pacific Affairs.

³⁶ See John Bresnan, Kent Calder (*Pacific Defense*), Michael Mandelbaum, and Norman Levin, op. cit., regarding this argument. All four scholars note that increased power projection capabilities by the militaries in East Asia is being driven by the perception of American military withdrawal and the need for enhanced military capabilities in the not so distant future.

³⁷ Personal discussion with Robert C. Angel, 14 March 1997.

³⁸ Though some governments, such as the People's Republic of China during the Tienanmen incident, and the Republic of Korea during Kwangju and the recent labor and student unrest have shown a propensity to revert back to authoritarian measures to enforce governmental policy.

³⁹ See Kent E. Calder, op. cit. See also Kusuma Snitwongse, "Economic Development and Military Modernization in Southeast Asia," K.S. Nathan, "Linkages between Asia-Pacific Regional Economic and Security Relations: Emerging Trends in the Post-Cold War Era," and John Zysman and Michael Borrus, "Lines of Fracture, Webs of Cohesion: Economic Interconnection and Security Politics in Asia," in Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, ed., *Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1996).

⁴⁰ Robert Angel notes that the alliance "may ease Japan's entry into Asian society since for the time being other Asian countries may be less suspicious of a "corked" Japan than a Japan on its own." Personal discussion with Robert C. Angel, 14 March 1997.

⁴¹ Ralph A. Cossa, op. cit., p. 48.

⁴² Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan and the Future of Collective Security," in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, ed., *Japan's Emerging Global Role* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 100.

⁴³ The Washington system historical case study has been extensively studied by numerous scholars. Its applicability to the post-cold war situation in East Asia is very enlightening. See Ian Nish, *Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic, and Social Change Since 1850* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 160-64; Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), pp. 230-34 and 301-303; and Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan and the Future of Collective Security," in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, ed., *Japan's Emerging Global Role* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 100-101.

⁴⁴ Similar arguments in favor of multilateralism are made today. See Neil Renwick, op. cit., chapter six; and Kegley and Raymond, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Cited in Kenneth Pyle, op. cit., p. 101.

⁴⁶ Mike M. Mochizuki, "Toward a New Japan-US Alliance," *Japan Quarterly*, Volume 43, No. 3, July-September 1996, p. 11. See also Ian Nish, op. cit., pp. 7-10 and Peter Duus, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 198-201.

⁴⁷ Discussion with Professor Donald Weatherbee, 25 March 1997.

⁴⁸ Continued prosperity is also contingent upon greater regional integration and interdependence. Discussion with Professor Donald Weatherbee, 1 April 1997.

⁴⁹ Stephen Bosworth, "The U.S. and Asia in 1992," *Asian Survey*, Volume 31, No. 1, January 1993, p. 109.

⁵⁰ Renato de Castro, op. cit., p. 347.

⁵¹ In 1992, Australia and Brunei were the only East Asian countries with which the US carried a trade surplus.

⁵² Renato de Castro, op. cit., p. 346. See also John Bresnan, op. cit., chapters four and five.

⁵³ Discussion with Professor Donald Weatherbee, 13 February 1997.

⁵⁴ See the following four journal articles/op-ed pieces by Mike Mochizuki that discuss this issue: "The Future of the U.S. - Japan Alliance, *Sekai Shuho*, February 1996; "Slow Motion Crisis: China's Missiles Sent an Urgent Message: Our Asia Policy Needs Fixing," *The Washington Post*, 17 March 1996; "The Marines Should Come Home," with Michael O'Hanlon, *The Dead Fukuzawa Society Monthly*, March 1996; and "Toward a New Japan - U.S. Alliance," *Japan Quarterly*, July-September 1996.

**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
The US-Japan Military Relationship
Chapter Five
How the military alliance benefits Japan

This chapter identifies and assesses the Japan-US military alliance functions that benefit Japan. The alliance serves the Japanese government through six primary functions: economic national security orientation, domestic political system stabilization, military re-armament legitimization, defense-related technological acquisition, international recognition of non-aggression, and a long-term security guarantee in the face of adverse domestic demographic and fiscal factors. These functions encourage alliance maintenance by the Japanese government in three interconnected ways. First, they allow the Japanese government to pursue its foreign policy objectives relatively unimpeded. Second, they enable the Japanese government to maintain the alliance with a minimum of economic, political, and military cost. Third, these functions create a condition of interdependence with the United States that would most likely not occur otherwise. A brief description of these six functions precedes an assessment of their effect upon alliance durability.

Six Internal Functions:

Economic national security orientation The US-Japan military alliance encourages Japanese political elites to place continued emphasis upon the economic aspect of national security. This economic orientation is driven largely by Japan's quest for political survival through reliance upon an export-oriented economy that is inextricably tied to US market

access. The Japanese economy requires secure access to the international economic system – its financial and trade markets and its sea lanes of communication. The Japanese economy is therefore dependent upon continued stabilization of the international economic system in order to import vital raw materials, convert these raw materials into the production of high-value added goods, and export these products to the global marketplace. For Japan, alliance maintenance enhances stability in the global market economy and assures Japan a continued seat at the economic table. The alliance helps allay fears of isolation and economic demise.

The alliance also promotes continued Japanese foreign policy emphasis upon the acquisition, development, and diffusion of external technological advancements.¹ In order to maintain and bolster its global economic standing, Japan often relies upon access to foreign – specifically US – technologies. The alliance permits access to American technologies in the fields of aviation, computers, finance, and telecommunications, that otherwise would be more difficult to obtain outside the alliance or to develop internally.

Domestic political system stabilization. American influence plays an important role in the Japanese postwar process of political stabilization. The US-Japan military alliance supports stability of Japan's postwar political system in two ways. First, it allows Japanese politicians (elected officials) to defer decisions concerning national security issues to the governmental bureaucracy. For the most part, Japanese politicians allocate resources and gear policies toward localized constituencies rather than focus energies on national security issues. Second, the alliance enables the national bureaucracy to emphasize the economic aspect of national security over the military aspect.

Elected officials. A fundamental objective held by the American occupation forces entailed political democratization – a reconstruction of the Japanese political system along democratic principles.² Policies initiated by the occupation forces before the onset of the cold war were geared toward shifting the locus of decision-making authority away from the various non-elected governmental bureaucracies and more toward a central political leadership consisting of elected officials. The objective of political democratization is interwoven throughout the American authored Japanese postwar constitution.³

However, from the beginning of the postwar period numerous factors made it difficult for the elected central political leadership to exert much control over national policies. These factors included the Japanese public's historically explicit trust in and high esteem given to her non-elected civil servants, lingering memories surrounding the military's disastrous rise within the political arena, the lack of a large political corps located outside the various governmental ministries with experience in domestic and foreign policy processes, institutional structure of the central political leadership vis-à-vis the national bureaucracy that has generally led to weak central political authority, and the urgent need for a capable leadership faced with the dual priorities of national economic redevelopment while coping with the external pressures of an emerging cold war.⁴ Historian John Dower emphasizes the strategic factor as he writes "The reconsolidation and recentralization of conservative authority during the Yoshida era was inseparable from the strategic settlement reached between the United States and Japan."⁵ Michael Green echoes this sentiment, noting that the Yoshida era was an orchestrated compromise among

the advocates of disarmed neutrality, unilateral rearmament, and disarmed economic and technological alliance with the United States – all of whom had to fit under the conservatives' ideological tent in order to achieve the

political stability necessary for economic reconstruction. Only alliance with the United States would allow the accommodation of all three views, and the stability of the conservative leadership of Japan today is still based on that strategic settlement.⁶

In sum, the non-elected bureaucratic leadership quickly regained its control over governmental policies due to these factors. That left the elected politicians to legitimate their role in the postwar system, as in the prewar system, by parceling out the pork and leaving policy responsibilities to the various government ministries. Kosaka Masataka maintains that pork-barrel politics remains a fact of Japanese political life. "As least in the form of democracy practiced today, an important role of the politician is to serve the interests of his or her constituents. No politician who ignores this role can continue to get elected."⁷ Politicians choose to allocate their time and effort pursuing electoral victories through bestowing economic benefits upon their constituencies. The pursuit of electoral victories has remained institutionalized throughout Japan's postwar history.

For the most part, Japanese politicians rely upon the bureaucracy to lessen their involvement in issues of national significance. National security issues do not resonate with constituencies as loudly as do local issues designed to bring home the bacon. The responsibility of pursuing policies geared toward the achievement of national security objectives is therefore left with non-elected civil servants. Porkbarreling appears to be the niche of elected officials in Japanese politics.⁸

Japanese bureaucracy. The US-Japan military alliance also provides continuity to a Japanese political system in a second, interrelated manner. Japanese national security policy is formulated by government ministries (Finance, MITI, and Foreign Affairs) that emphasize national power through economic might. Japan's ministries are in effect geared

toward and generated by the politics of affluence.⁹ The US-Japan military alliance necessarily fills the national security gap left as a result of the Japanese government's decision to emphasize economic growth.

One reason that accounts for bureaucratic dominance in Japanese politics is derived from a weak central political structure. Robert Angel and Kenji Hayao have both argued that the Japanese prime minister's influence over policy formulation is relatively weak – despite possessing significant formal authority given to him through the Constitution. Hayao presents a convincing argument that possesses numerous facets. First, Hayao contends that factional party politics constrain the prime minister's ability to lead. Second, subgovernments such as the various ministries, the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council, politicians who specialize in certain policy areas (*zoku*), and the relationship between these entities effectively resist attempts by the prime minister to control issues. Subgovernments can block such attempts because they possess most of the information and expertise regarding specific policy issues. The prime minister must rely upon personnel outside of his office to remain engaged in policy formulation. Third, the modest size of the prime minister's staff does not give him the resources necessary to penetrate the subgovernment's control of information and expertise.¹⁰

In *Explaining Economic Policy Failure: Japan in the 1969-1971 International Monetary Crisis*, Robert Angel extends the weak central political leadership thesis to include the prime minister's cabinet. Angel contends that the prime minister and his cabinet lack a structure of developed communications channels between themselves and the various bureaucracies. Such a structure is intentionally impeded by Japan's civil servants, who regard politicians as particularistic and self-interested meddlers within the

realm of national policy formulation and implementation.¹¹ "Political non-interference" is deeply rooted in Japan's past – through its feudal tradition and adoption of the Prussian capitalist developmental state model during the Meiji restoration.¹² It will be difficult for Japan's prime minister and cabinet to exert significant influence over policymaking until their dependence upon the bureaucracy is significantly diminished.¹³

An additional factor worthy of mention is the notion that change is hard to come by when the Japanese political system has worked effectively to raise Japan's economic status over the past fifty years. It will be interesting to see how the Japanese political system adapts to numerous developments, including increased US trade tensions, revelations regarding bureaucratic ineptitude and political corruption that previously had only ensnared elected officials, and significantly lower statistical economic growth rates (rates of increase versus absolute growth) that have resulted in a perception of economic recession.¹⁴ While the Japanese economy continues to expand (despite reports of demise), its sheer enormity, along with additional factors such as an aging population and an expansion of the Japanese industrial manufacturing base outside of Japan proper may present impediments to continuation of growth rates seen during the 1970s and 1980s.

In sum, stabilization of the Japanese political system finds itself dependent upon the US-Japan military relationship. Politicians rely upon the bureaucracy, which relies upon the security alliance to continue their economic orientation toward foreign policy. As a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official conveyed during a brief interview, "It is difficult to think about Japan's domestic political situation without the alliance."¹⁵

Military re-armament legitimization. The US-Japan military relationship permits the Japanese government to significantly rearm itself in the face of often substantial local and

regional opposition. The alliance politically legitimates Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) and its quest for battlefield technological superiority in the event that the SDF must defend Japan's territorial sovereignty. Japan most likely has become one of the top five military forces in the world in terms of military expenditures.¹⁶ Some academic specialists of Japanese foreign policy believe that Japan ranks second to only the US in military expenditures.¹⁷ Japan maintains a technologically modern air and maritime self-defense force, with the latter also being the second largest in the world. This could not have occurred without American assistance and political cover.

The United States government encourages Japan's responsible military growth. America has continuously pursued a postwar policy of Japanese military rearmament for two reasons. First, the United States desired (desires) allies that can militarily defend themselves against external threats. Additionally, as Japan's SDF continues to fulfill this role, the United States desires allies that can militarily support operations designed to protect the international economic system and its dependence upon the sea and air lines of communication.¹⁸ America's Japan policy is no exception to this general rule.

Contemporary Japan finds itself in a dilemma of its own creation. Whatever it does in the military arena, the Japanese government is criticized. Most of the criticism heaped upon Japan from its neighbors and former colonies – China and South Korea – is politically motivated to serve four purposes: 1) to continue Japanese “unofficial” war compensation in the form of official development assistance (the case of China); 2) to justify continued arms buildups, particularly purchases of high technology, power projection capabilities; 3) to limit Japanese military capabilities, roles, and missions; and 4) to ensure that limitation by seeking a continued America military presence in Japan.

American elite perceptions regarding Japan's military buildup varies widely. The lack of Japanese progress in bolstering military and political support for the alliance is regarded as unfortunate by some. Others lament the dependence (intentional?) of Japanese defense upon Washington. Still others perceive Japan as deceptively using the American defense establishment in order to rebuild Japan's military – once this occurs, Japan will presumably shed its alliance burdens.¹⁹

In reality, the US-Japan military alliance allows the Japanese government to pursue a middle ground policy of re-armament designed to protect Japan's vital national interests without fomenting regional instability. Under the US-Japan military alliance umbrella, Japan continues to responsibly rearm itself. Norman Levin, Mark Lorell, and Arthur Alexander write

Barring a major rupture in U.S.-Japan relations over economic or other tensions, current trends suggest a continuation of Japan's general policy direction. The fact is that Japan's general approach has been quite successful. The Japanese have gradually built up a significant self-defense capability – i.e., one whose purpose is not to threaten Japan's neighbors, but to provide for the defense of Japanese territory and immediately surrounding areas against small scale acts of aggression – in the face of strong domestic and regional opposition to Japanese "rearmament."²⁰

The alliance also allows Japan to demonstrate its commitment to the pursuit of regional peace and stability without revoking its constitutional prohibition against the use of military force as a foreign policy tool.²¹ Retired Ground Self-Defense Forces Lieutenant General Shikata Toshiyuki argues that a shift in the security treaty's emphasis from Article 5 (defense of the Japanese homeland) to Article 6 (conditions constituting a threat to peace and stability in the Far East) appears probable due to the lessened direct military

threat to Japan and the rising possibility that regional instability could lead to military conflict. Shikata writes

This kind of shift signifies a giant step forward from the former concept of Japan-US cooperation in Japan's territorial defense, to that of securing the stability of the whole of East Asia. This does not mean that the US forward-deployed forces stationed in Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will engage in joint military activities in East Asia. With an aim to provide support services that make the US forces' operations in East Asia easier and more efficient, Japan will take the maximum cooperative action allowed under its Constitution.²²

Such statements should allay fears that Japan will become a military great power actor within the US-Japan alliance framework. Domestic and external fears of remilitarization are thus dampened and deflected by means of the alliance.

Defense-related technology and equipment acquisitions. Defense-related technology and equipment acquisitions through the alliance creates a complex interdependence between Japan and the United States. Interdependence enhances alliance sustainability.

The US-Japan military alliance permits Japanese access to American military technology. It also allows for acquisition of military equipment and licensed co-production agreements. Defense-related technology flows from the United States to Japan commenced with the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement of 1954. Japan reciprocated by allowing military technology transfers to the United States in 1983.²³ Technology transfers continue today, with the US and Japan conducting joint research regarding ducted rocket engines (Sept 1992), advanced steel technology (Oct 1995), and the utility of ceramic materials applied to diesel engine technology for armored fighting vehicles (Oct 1995).²⁴ In regard to equipment acquisitions, the Japanese government has acquired

numerous armaments such as the AWACS, AEGIS, and patriot weapons systems "off the shelf" from American weapons manufacturers.

The flow of American military technology to Japan allows Japan's defense industry to prosper despite a small domestic market and legal restrictions placed upon weapons exports. Technology acquisition has enabled Japan's defense industry to evolve through three stages: a short-term stage immediately following World War II of small arms manufacture (i.e., total dependence upon acquisition of major American weapon's systems), the current stage consisting of major weapons system co-production through licensing agreements, and the ongoing development of an autonomous stage whereby Japanese defense industries domestically design and produce indigenous weapons systems.²⁵ With the development of Japan's financial, technological, and industrial capability to possess an autonomous defense industry, the debate continues regarding how this development will affect the alliance.

Japanese technological capabilities in the development and production of particular military subsystems now meet or exceed those found in the military industrial capabilities of Western Europe and the United States. However, for political, economic, and military reasons, Japan has not undertaken autonomous development of independent weapons systems. Japan's defense industrial complex thus remains partially dependent upon the United States in numerous ways. As mentioned earlier, a small domestic market resulting from the prohibition on arms exports (initiated by the Sato Cabinet and known as the Three Arms Export Principles) imposes limitations on the nation's defense industrial growth and experience. Arthur Alexander notes that Japan produces only 12 major weapons systems, while Italy and Israel produce 21 and 23 respectively.²⁶ Second, budget

constraints on weapons systems will likely continue because the financial cost of autonomous development and production often exceeds the cost of foreign acquisitions by as much as three times. Third, mission capabilities will likely be impaired to the extent that the JDA relies upon autonomous weapons systems due to cost and experience constraints.²⁷

Michael Green presents a more sophisticated version of the argument that Japan will not seek to possess an autonomous national defense industry. Green argues that two trends in the US-Japan security relationship dampen Japan's quest for autonomous defense production. First, there exists a tension between the goals of autonomy and superiority in military technology. Increased product and process differentiation has brought about an environment where national economies adopt particular niches. Any nation that attempts to become self-reliant in the defense realm will end up paying increased economic and military capability costs. Green argues that the US-Japan defense-related interdependence alleviates this tension.²⁸ More importantly, Green maintains that the political costs associated with Japanese self-reliance in defense production have grown during the postwar era. The Self-Defense Forces expanded role and increased expenditures would have been put to risk within the Japanese government by confrontation with the United States over a defense industry independent of the alliance. The political risk of abandonment was simply too great for Japan's national leadership to bear.²⁹ Thus, the Japanese stopped short of full-scale autonomy, opting for interdependence with the United States to not only decrease the risk of abandonment, but also to increase its political leverage within the alliance structure. Interdependence plays an important role to Japan. It increases Japan's value to the United States as an alliance partner, empowers Japan within

the alliance, and hedges Japan's prospects against the possibility of American abandonment.

International recognition of non-aggression. The US-Japan military alliance allows Japan to legitimate its gradual process of rearmament while simultaneously enjoying the fruits of international recognition for its non-aggression foreign policy orientation. Through the alliance, Japan effectively pursues fulfillment of its postwar peace constitution. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution outlaws the use of military aggression as a tool of foreign policy. The government interprets the constitution in such a way that justifies the right to national self-defense.³⁰ Qualitative expansion of Self-Defense Force capability fits neatly within this interpretation.

As long as the US-Japan military alliance remains viable (it maintains a credible preventive defense/deterrent function through operational capability, political will, and political legitimacy), Japan's neighbors have little cause to fear a militaristically resurgent Japan. Insecurities concerning access to the international economic system that led Japan to militaristically expand in the 1930s and 1940s will most likely not reoccur. This can be demonstrated from the conscious Japanese political decision to maintain a compact quantitative military force. 1996 manpower figures illustrate this point. Self-Defense personnel totaled 242,693, with 152,515 GSDF members, 44,135 MSDF members, and 45,883 ASDF personnel.³¹ The Japanese military would require a fivefold force structure increase in order to attain the ability to secure access to the international economic system. In short, Japan has little incentive to alter the status quo within the alliance framework. Indeed, Japan has acquired great incentives to maintain the current system.

Long term security guarantee. The US-Japan military alliance provides Japan with a long term security guarantee in the face of adverse demographic and budgetary factors. Three demographic factors create a dilemma for Japanese national security planners: low birth rate, an increased life expectancy rate, and a subsequent rapidly aging population. Total fertility rate of Japanese women declined from 2.0 in 1960 to 1.54 in 1990 to 1.47 in 1993. Ogura Seiritsu wrote that if this low fertility rate persists, by 2025 only three-quarters of the working population will be supporting almost twice the current elderly population.³² Based upon Japanese Economic Planning Agency estimates, the Japanese population will begin a gradual decline during the twenty-first century from its current 125 million figure, eventually stabilizing somewhere between seventy and eighty million by the year 2050. The Japanese Institute for Economic and Social Affairs projects that by the year 2025 one-quarter of the Japanese population will be over the age of 65.³³

Japanese national security planners are concerned with at least two consequences resulting from these statistics. First, the male military age population will continue to decline. The long term consequences for securing SDF personnel are significant. The Japanese defense white paper *Defense of Japan* states that the number of potential candidates for recruitment within its enlisted ranks is projected to steadily decline from its 1994 peak of 9 million and will drop below 6.4 million around 2008.³⁴ Expanding the size of the Self-Defense Force will become much more difficult to initiate under such circumstances. Second, the tax base from which the government will garner its resources will also continue to shrink. Government debts already exceed seven percent of GDP, and the Hashimoto Cabinet continues to prime the domestic economy with supplementary public works projects. The Hashimoto Cabinet wanted to increase defense spending by

four percent, but held defense spending down to a 2.77% rate of increase in the 1997 fiscal budget, thus continuing the small rates of increase that began in 1993.³⁵ The Cabinet also decided to delay appropriations for the 1996-2000 Mid Term Defense Plan through the year 2003. For these reasons, it will be more difficult to justify military expansion without fostering perceptions of an imminent threat. Further, the resources required to sustain a social security system for an expanding elderly population will increase. This factor will also take away from resources available for military expansion. Taken together, these demographic and budgetary factors encourage alliance maintenance.

Assessment

The alliance benefits Japan through six mutually reinforcing functions: an economic national security orientation; domestic political stabilization; military re-armament legitimization; defense-related technology acquisitions; recognition of a non-aggressive military foreign policy; and a long-term security guarantee. These six functions serve to encourage alliance maintenance from a Japanese perspective. In short, Japan relies heavily upon its American ally in order to maintain the status quo. The cost of alliance abrogation or demise would be greater than the benefits currently derived. Japanese policymakers also tend to be conservative and will not make radical alterations in their foreign policy orientation.

Chapter Four presented the argument that it is the internal benefits of the alliance to the partners that allows it to be sustainable in an era where no viable external military threat exists. This is due in part to the national security orientation of Japanese and American policymakers. Fundamental differences exist between the national security objectives of

Japan (which emphasizes economics) and the United States (which is guided by its political, military, and economic superpower status). Japan's national security policies then lay the foundation for the US-Japan military alliance by creating a dependency upon the United States (Chapter Six will demonstrate that the United States is also dependent upon Japan). As long as both nations continue to recognize this prioritization of divergent national security interests, the military relationship will remain sustainable in the future.

An appropriate question, then, would be "at what point will a Japanese state, independent of the alliance, be able to derive benefits from the six functions as described above?" A brief assessment of each function based upon this scenario follows.

Economic national security orientation. Barring some unforeseen circumstances, Japan will continue to place emphasis upon the economic aspect of national security. Questions regarding a Japan independent of the military alliance then become "how much emphasis will be placed upon the military aspect of national security," "will increased military emphasis detract from Japan's economic orientation," and "will such a buildup cause significant alarm throughout East Asia?"

There is little doubt that in such a scenario Japan would feel obligated to increase military expenditures and expand both the number and capabilities of its naval and air forces. Two reasons account for such an expansion: 1) to provide protection of the sea lanes between Japan and the Middle East; and 2) to maintain adequate protection of the home islands upon the withdrawal of American forces. The United States will not be able to maintain its naval and air forces in any significant number without the forward basing provided by Japan through the alliance. For example, the US 7th fleet would have to conduct maintenance repairs at Pearl Harbor if it loses these privileges at its Yokosuka

facility. The US military presence in East Asia would effectively be chained to Guam and Pearl Harbor. Japan would feel obligated to defend the sea lanes either independently, or in conjunction with other naval forces in the region.

Andrew Hanami, Kar-yui Wong, and others have pointed out that Japan could have spent up to three percent of GNP (the average NATO nation level of spending) between 1970 and 1985 with minimal impact upon sustained economic growth.³⁶ This probably does not ring true today when economic growth rates are estimated to remain below three percent. In the short term, the Japanese economy – specifically the defense sector of industry – would benefit greatly from increased defense expenditures on the procurement of indigenous weapons systems. The long-term benefits, as demonstrated by US relative economic decline, are not so certain.

A buildup of Japanese military capabilities would be a very sensitive issue for its neighbors, particularly China and South Korea. The Japanese government would have to display a masterful level of diplomacy in order for such an increase to not be seen as destabilizing. Another issue facing the Japanese government would be the issue of nuclear weapons possession. The combination of a withdrawal of the American nuclear umbrella with an increased perception of military threats would almost inevitably bring Japan into the nuclear club – despite Constitutional and other legal and political prohibitions such as Japan's adherence to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles. This scenario also bodes poorly for continued regional stability.

Another prospect that the Japanese do not want to envision entails a loss of the American economic market in the event that alliance abrogation becomes particularly nasty. The military alliance stabilizes the overall bilateral relationship between Japan and

the US. Japan heavily relies upon export promotion to the American economy for continued economic stability. Closure of the American marketplace would be a nightmare for Japanese policymakers and business alike.

Domestic political system stabilization. Japan's domestic political system would obviously survive an abrogation of the US-American military alliance, but in a potentially different form. As John Dower noted, the US-Japan military alliance serves as an ideological tent from which Japanese political parties and governmental ministries could come in from the heat. One argument asserts that taking the alliance tent away would force elected officials and the electorate to prioritize political issues over pork-barreling. Such an argument, however, forgets the historical dominance of Japan's civil servants in the formulation of national policy. Policy making would still occur at the bureaucratic level, but the degree of cohesion amongst the various ministries as a result of the alliance would breakdown. The JDA would find itself in a position of greater influence. MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might find this prospect as a loss of influence in defense policy issues. Finance would be caught in a real dilemma, as increasing defense expenditures would increase budget deficits, but would also stimulate the Japanese economy in the short-term. Robert Angel demonstrated the inability of Japan's central political leadership to formulate innovative policies when faced with the 1970s international monetary crisis. Angel writes that

Japan has been shielded from military threats of crisis intensity since World War II, so there has been no opportunity to study her postwar response to such a challenge. Although economic rather than diplomatic, the 1969-1971 international monetary crisis was the closest Japan had come to a serious threat to her overall well-being since the end of the war. Since the policy-making system has changed little since the early 1970s, analysis of Japan's response to the 1971 international monetary

crisis provides clues to how the system might respond to similar international crises, including diplo-military challenges, if and when they occur in the future.³⁷

It is fair to speculate that an inability of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to provide leadership during a military crisis resulting in part from the loss of the US-Japan military alliance would occur. The Japanese government wants to avoid such a scenario by maintaining its military relationship with the United States.

Military rearmament legitimization. The military alliance encourages Japan's responsible military growth. An abandonment of the US-Japan military relationship does not mean that Japan would become irresponsible. Rather, the alliance allows for a perception that the Japanese military is responsibly constrained – that it will not run amuck. This perception is important to China, Russia, and South Korea due to their proximity to Japan and also due to the historical legacy of World War II. Once again, Japan's diplomatic skills would be severely tested without the US-Japan military relationship.

Defense-related technology and equipment acquisitions. Japan's military could survive without the US-Japan military alliance, but at a decreased level of capability and at much higher costs. The prospect of acquiring weapons systems from Russia might be tempting, but the Russian leadership might be wary of exporting arms to Japan without commensurate economic developmental assistance. As long as the Kurile islands issue keeps Japan and Russia from establishing full diplomatic relations, Japan will not be able to count upon Russian weaponry as a viable alternative. Additionally, the three other major arms exporting nations – Great Britain, France, and China – do not possess the military technological capabilities that Japan would desire in a scenario that denies access

to US military technology. Once again, how alliance abandonment occurs will dictate US-Japan relations in a post-alliance world.

International recognition of non-aggression. This function appears analogous to that of military re-armament. In a post-alliance scenario, Japan may feel obligated to revise its Constitution, its ban on arms exports, and its nuclear prohibition policy. Whether or not such a scenario will be destabilizing would depend upon Japanese diplomatic skill and the reactions of neighboring states. The domestic politics of China and South Korea might not allow these two nations to stand by idly while Japan renounces the above mentioned policies.

Long term security guarantee. Japan's reliance upon technology will not supplant the need for quality personnel to man the ships and aircraft that will defend Japanese interests in a post-alliance scenario. Technology is not a panacea. Japan faces a situation in which its male fighting age population is now decreasing, its workforce is slowly declining numerically, its immigration policy makes Japan a veritable "closed society," and an aging population creates increasing demands upon government to provide adequate welfare services. Technology may alleviate problems associated with these factors, but it alone cannot overcome them.

Conclusion

The US-Japan military security alliance was initially designed to defend Japan from external aggression. It also served to militarily enhance Japan's indigenous deterrence capability. Both functions have not changed. The alliance has also historically served a fundamental American national security interest in regional deterrent capability based upon the forward presence of the United States military. The regional deterrent capability of the

American military presence is currently undergoing a transition to include greater rear area support from Japan. Forward military presence has been an American national security concern since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan. The United States equally relies heavily upon Japan to maintain America's position in the continued development of a stable international order. This study will now identify those functions that benefit alliance maintenance on the American side.

¹ What Richard Samuels appropriately terms "technonationalism." See Richard Samuels, *op. cit.*

² Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern Century* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 410. See also Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. Flanagan, *op. cit.*, p. 30; and W.G. Beasley, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-223..

³ Article 41 of Japan's postwar constitution proclaims that governmental decision making authority squarely resides in the elected branch by stating that the national assembly (the Diet) "shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State." Japanese citizens elect representatives into the Diet (Article 43). Article 67 states that Japan's chief executive, known as the prime minister, is then selected by a resolution of both houses of parliament (the decision of the lower house is binding if the lower and upper houses disagree and the upper house fails to pass a resolution within ten days of lower house passage). The prime minister, along with his self-appointed cabinet (Article 68), therefore possess the legal authority to exercise control over the political agenda, policy formulation, and implementation. The postwar Japanese constitution is cited in Hugh Borton, *op. cit.*, appendix iv, pp. 497-500.

⁴ Personal discussion with Dr. Robert Angel. 4 October 1996. For an excellent analysis of the ensuing cold war pressures brought to bear upon both the US and Japanese governments during the occupation, see Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), chapter seven.

⁵ John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1979), p. 369.

⁶ Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan*, p. 26.

⁷ Kosaka Masataka, "The Forces at Work in the Political Shake-up," *Economic Eye*, Spring 1994, p. 22.

⁸ See Haruhiro Fukui and Shigeko N. Fukai, "Pork Barrel Politics, Networks, and Local Economic Development in Contemporary Japan," *Asian Survey*, Volume 36, No. 3, March 1996, pp. 268-286. Fukui and Fukai write "There is solid consensus among students of Japanese politics about the centrality of pork barrel politics in both parliamentary (Diet) and local elections in Japan. An insider [Satsuki Eda, Diet member and vice-president of the Japan New Party], too, noted that Japanese voters are mobilized at election time mainly by the lure of pork barrel, only marginally by policy issues, and even less by ideals and vision. For much of the postwar period, but especially from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s, the role and performance of Diet members in pork barrel politics made or broke their political careers." The Japanese political system remains relatively unchanged in 1997, despite the cold war's demise and a dissolution of LDP dominance

over the elected branch. point in breaking the bureaucracy's control of national policy. See John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1979), p. 369. Political reform in the bureaucracy was seen (and is still seen) as necessary in order to position control of the policy process into the hands of elected politicians. When the LDP lost its majority rule in the 1993 lower house election, hope sprang anew. However, astute political observers noted that the LDP (and thus a continuation of bureaucratic political dominance in national security oriented issues) was not truly defeated by Japan's citizens on election day. Stephen Anderson writes that the 1993 lower house election demonstrates that "the rise of several new parties because of popular movements and LDP defections drained away sufficient votes so that a majority was beyond the reach of any single party." Robert Angel argues more convincingly that the LDP "suffered an organizational rather than an electoral defeat in 1993." In reality, Angel says that the LDP lost its majority status due to internal strife within the Takeshita faction that caused the political party to implode prior to the election. See Stephen J. Anderson, "Japan: The End of One-Party Dominance," *Current History*, December 1993, p. 408. See also Robert C. Angel, "Implications of Japan's July 1993 General Election: The People have Mumbled," paper prepared for presentation at the 26 September 1993 meeting of the Southern Japan Seminar, p. 12. Angel goes on to write that it was "the ambition of the younger politicians and their frustration with the top-heavy faction and party leadership" that caused the LDP's demise. "Public concern with political reform provided the opportunity they sought to improve their position within the political elite." See also Sato Seizaburo, "Japan's Democracy in Crisis: The New Tide in Japanese Politics," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 2, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 1995, pp. 21-28; Uchida Ichiro, "Politics in Japan: Change? Paralysis? The Truth May Be in Between," *Center for Asian Pacific Affairs*, Report No. 20, January 1995, pp. 1-11; and Uchida Kenzo, op. cit. As this study goes to print it appears that Japan's domestic political environment lends more support to the thesis that the US-Japan military alliance supports the domestic political stabilization. The issue regarding the renewal of land leases in Okinawa prefecture to the US military by landowners has placed the LDP and Shinshinto in a cooperative position. Both parties backed revision of the law regarding the leasing of land to the US military. It appears that Ryutaro Hashimoto, Seiroku Kajiyama, Shizuka Kamei, and Ichiro Ozawa are in the formative stages of putting together a "conservative-conservative" alliance. See articles in *Mainichi Shimbun*, *Asahi Shimbun*, *The Daily Yomiuri*, *Asahi Evening News*, and *The Japan Times* spanning from 1 April 1997 to 16 April 1997.

⁹ See Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), for a scathing critique of Japan's postwar political system. McCormack writes that Japan's economic achievements motivated by growth for growth's sake and a reliance upon technocrats (bureaucratic governance) have brought little joy and much anxiety to the Japanese people. McCormack calls for a reversal of the hundred years of political centralization that started in the Meiji era. He calls for political decentralization of the Japanese government by taking political authority from the national bureaucracies and restoring it to local, autonomous governments. See also Miyamoto Ken'ichi, "Toshi keiei kara toshi seisaku e," *Sekai*, April 1995.

¹⁰ Hayao contends that factional party politics constrains the prime minister's ability to lead in two ways: 1) as party president, the prime minister must face party re-election every two years in a highly factionalized party structure; 2) the high frequency of national elections limits the prime minister's time and energy, often forcing him to perpetually campaign and raise funds, thereby taking away his ability to control policy matters. See Hayao Kenji, *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), chapters five through eight.

¹¹ Robert C. Angel, *Explaining Economic Policy Failure*, p. 288.

¹² Robert C. Angel, *Explaining Economic Policy Failure*, pp. 288-89. See also Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982).

¹³ Regarding this point, see Robert C. Angel, "Prime Ministerial Leadership in Japan: Recent Changes in Personal Style and Administrative Organization," *Pacific Affairs*, Volume 61, No. 4, Winter 1988-89.

¹⁴ Numerous political scandals involving Japanese bureaucrats began surfacing in 1996 with the Health and Welfare Ministry's HIV scandal. The 17 January 1995 Kobe earthquake revealed inadequacies in the central government's crisis management system. The March 1997 accident at the nuclear reprocessing facility in Tokai also demonstrated bureaucratic inadequacies in alerting the local populace concerning radiation exposure.

¹⁵ Personal interview, 14 February 1997.

¹⁶ In 1994, Japan ranked fifth in overall military expenditures behind the United States, Russia, China, and France. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, 1993-94 edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), p. 30.

¹⁷ Robert S. Ross, "Introduction," in Robert S. Ross, ed., *East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. xii. In contrast to this view, Norman D. Levin argues that viewing Japan's Self-Defense Forces as a ranking military power is in reality an illusion, since such estimates overlook the effects of yen appreciation and thereby confuse dollar value for military capability. Levin states that Japan only spends slightly more on defense than Italy, while Japan's actual defense capabilities roughly equal those of a mid-level European power. See Norman D. Levin, "The Strategic Dimensions of Japanese Foreign Policy," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 206.

¹⁸ Personal interview with Pentagon officials and Dr. Michael J. Green, 31 January 1997 and 14 February 1997.

¹⁹ See Norman D. Levin, et. al., op. cit.; Michael H. Armacost, *Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.-Japan Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), chapter three; Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, McNair Paper 31, November 1994; Ted Galen Carpenter, op. cit.; and Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, op. cit.

²⁰ Norman Levin, et. al., pp. 106-107.

²¹ Most Japanese foreign policy elites agree that Japan should not revoke its constitutional prohibition against the use of military force outside of Japan. See Nakasone Yasuhiro, "New Roles in the Japan-US Alliance," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 3, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1996 and Ichiro Ozawa, op. cit. There is not unanimous agreement on this issue, however. Sato Seizaburo argues that Japan would benefit from amending its constitution and declaring the right to exercise collective self-defense. See Sato Seizaburo, "Clarifying the Right of Collective Self-Defense," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 3, No. 2, Fall/Winter 1996, pp. 91-105. *The Yomiuri Shimbun* has also trumpeted constitutional revision of Article ix in its 1995 publication "Yomiuri: Proposals for Constitutional Reform and Comprehensive Security Policy."

²² Shikata Toshiyuki, "Japan's Security Strategy: Meeting the Needs of a New Era," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 3, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1996, pp. 62-63.

²³ The Japan Defense Agency in its 1996 edition of *Defense of Japan*, the JDA notes that Japanese technology transfers to the US include information regarding portable SAMS, the construction and remodeling of US naval vessels, fighter support (F-2), and digital flight control systems (P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft). See *Defense of Japan*, 1996, p. 176.

²⁴ *Defense of Japan*, 1996, pp. 176 and 321. This information was also confirmed through Pentagon sources.

²⁵ See Richard Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army*; Michael Green, *Arming Japan*; and Michael W. Chinworth, *Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics, and Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's (US) Inc., 1992) for three detailed discussions of this evolutionary process.

²⁶ Arthur Alexander, *Of Tanks and Toyotas: An Assessment of Japan's Defense Industry* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1994), p. vi.

²⁷ Arthur Alexander, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

²⁸ Michael J. Green, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

²⁹ Michael J. Green, op. cit., pp. 155-156.

³⁰ See *Defense of Japan*, 1996.

³¹ *Defense of Japan*, 1996, p. 342.

³² Ogura Seiritsu, "Projection of Japanese Public Pension Costs in the First Half of the Twenty-First Century and the Effects of Three Possible Reforms," in Michael D. Hurd and Naohiro Yashiro, ed., *The Economic Effects of Aging in the United States and Japan* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 11-13.

³³ Keizai Koho Center, *Japan 1996*, December 1995, table 1-6, p. 13.

³⁴ *Defense of Japan*, 1996, pp. 219-220. Patrick Cronin and Michael Green also point out that the availability of 18 year old will drop 40% during this time period. See Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, op. cit., p. 46.

³⁵ Rates of increase in Japan's defense expenditures since 1985 are as follows: 1985 - 6.9%; 1986 - 6.58%; 1987 - 5.2%; 1988 - 5.2%; 1989 - 5.9%; 1990 - 6.1%; 1991 - 5.45%; 1992 - 3.8%; 1993 - 1.95%; 1994 - 0.9%; 1995 - 0.86%; 1996 - 2.58%; and 1997 (projected) - 2.77%. See *Defense of Japan* (1996), op. cit., p. 298.

³⁶ Andrew K. Hanami, "The Emerging Military-Industrial Relationship in Japan and the U.S. Connection," *Asian Survey*, Volume 33, No. 6, June 1993, p. 593. See also Kar-yui Wong, "National Defense and Foreign Trade," in John Makin and Donald Hellmann, ed., *Sharing World Leadership?* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989), p. 110.

³⁷ Robert C. Angel, *Explaining Economic Policy Failure*, pp. xvi-xvii.

**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
The US-Japan Military Relationship
Chapter Six
How the military alliance benefits the United States

This chapter identifies and assesses US-Japan military alliance functions that benefit the United States. The alliance serves the American government through six primary functions: global power projection through forward military deployment; regional political influence through the US role as regional power balancer; political and economic leverage vis-a-vis Japan's relatively closed marketplace that otherwise might not be available; acquisition of cost-efficient military weapons subsystems; access to military research and development funds; and a dependable political partner. These functions encourage alliance maintenance from an American governmental perspective in three interconnected ways. First, they enable the United States to pursue its foreign policy objectives during an uneasy transition period from bipolarity to multipolarity. Second, they permit the US government to maintain the alliance at a minimum of economic, political, and military cost. Third, these functions create a condition of interdependence with Japan that would otherwise not occur. An assessment of their effect upon alliance sustainability follows a brief description of each function.

Six Internal Functions

Global power projection. The US-Japan military alliance allows the United States to pursue its national interests in part through the projection of global military power.

America's ability to project global power would not nearly be as legitimate or as effective without the notion of presence. Much like real estate agents who stress three primary factors when selling any property – location, location, location – the US government could not commit itself to a national security policy of engagement and enlargement without presence. In an era where most of the nations in East Asia desire an American military commitment, but refuse to cooperate in the hosting of US forces (the “not in my backyard” principle), Japan furnishes the United States with an essential military hub from which to project military and political power.¹ The “places, not bases” concept of American military presence in East Asia simply would lack operational capability and thus political influence without the regional hub provided by Japan.²

Forward deployed American military personnel in Japan gives the United States government the ability to conduct its global oriented foreign policy in three interrelated ways. First, forward deployment permits the US to influence the policies of other regional actors through preventive defense and deterrence. American military deployment in East Asia reminds regional states that the US maintains a commitment to protecting the territorial status quo, assuring the free flow of international commerce, and encouraging peaceful means of conflict resolution.³ Furthermore, forward deployment of the American military serves the primary national interest of the US government in East Asia. Preventing the rise of a dominant regional power that possesses interests which may or may not coincide with US national interests tops the list of American foreign policy objectives regarding East Asia.⁴ Second, forward presence permits Washington to respond quickly to crises that adversely affect US national interests. In 1996, two such crises occurred surrounding events in the Taiwan Straits and the Middle East.⁵ A rapid response time

would be questionable without US military forces stationed in Japan. Third, forward deployment of American military personnel in Japan is relatively cost effective when compared to the host nation support provided by other allies such as Germany and South Korea. In terms of financial cost, the Japanese government provides over 50 percent of American military costs in Japan.⁶ The US Department of Defense's *East Asian Strategy Report* notes that

Japan supplies by far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies. Japan also provides a stable, secure environment for our military operations and training. Under a January 1991 agreement and other arrangements, the Government of Japan has assumed an increasing share yearly, and will assume virtually all local labor and utility costs of maintaining our forces by this year [1995]. Japan also funds leases for land used by United States forces and incurs indirect costs such as waived land use fees, foregone taxes, tolls, customs, and payments to local communities affected by United States bases. Taken together, these categories represent contributions of a magnitude of more than \$4 billion annually.⁷

The US-Japan military alliance may even allow the United States to maintain its strategic position in East Asia at reduced political and economic costs vis-a-vis any attempt to pull back US naval power to Hawaii and Guam.⁸

Forward deployed military presence remains important to America's post-cold war national security strategy. Access to military bases in Japan provides essential support for such a strategy.

Regional political influence. American military presence as a regional balancer of power furnishes the United States with an increased measure of regional political influence that it would not possess without the ability to forward deploy military forces. The alliance serves to enhance Washington's ability to exert political influence on other East Asian countries. The US government seeks to perform an East Asian "watchdog" function that

discourages the possibility that states may desire to change the status quo through aggressive territorial acquisition in the pursuit of maritime resource claims or threats to close the strategic Southeast Asian sea lanes. The alliance also promotes adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime by dissuading the Korean peninsula and thus Japan itself from going nuclear.⁹ Such influence contributes to potential American political leverage not only in bilateral relations but also in regional fora such as the ARF and APEC. As Donald Emmerson notes, a US military presence in East Asia could theoretically be utilized to gain political leverage vis-a-vis regional states. Emmerson argues that a lack of competition from either China or Japan in the realm of regional military security leads to the ability of the US government to bargain its military security services in exchange for better investment opportunities for American business in Southeast Asia.¹⁰

The United States may influence regional developments to suit its national interests not only bilaterally but also multilaterally through the forward military presence that the Japanese government allows by way of the military alliance. James A. Winnefeld makes this point by asserting that

US forward presence provides indisputable definition of the broader spectrum of America's regional interests. Should this presence diminish to a point where regional states no longer deem American power sufficiently engaged and committed, then the United States would no longer be able to wield influence in the Pacific Rim. Commensurate with the region's strategic importance under such circumstances, regional states would increasingly define their political and strategic goals without equivalent regard for and attention to American interest. In such a scenario, therefore, a lead American role in shaping the Pacific Rim's future could no longer be assured.¹¹

William Pendley draws a similar conclusion by stating that in East Asia

It is America's military power and presence and the importance of the U.S. market which makes her voice heard. If U.S. influence in Asia is to be

maintained in support of its political and economic interests into the next century, then forward military presence and open economic markets must continue as critical elements of U.S. strategy.¹²

Political and economic leverage vis-a-vis Japan. The US-Japan military alliance also presents the opportunity for the United States government to gain influence in relation to Japanese domestic political and economic matters. Admittedly, Japan's overall economy remains relatively closed to US goods when compared to markets in Western Europe. However, the US government has been able to extract some concessions in negotiations with Japan over economic matters that it would not have been able to elicit had both countries entered negotiations absent the military security alliance.

US economic interests in China makes for an interesting comparative analysis. While American firms work through both the Chinese and Japanese governments in order to gain access to their respective domestic economies, US business interests have so far fared considerably better in gaining access to the Japanese domestic market than they have to markets in China.¹³ In 1997, the US and Japan are negotiating over increased American access to numerous Japanese domestic economic sectors, including Japan's port distribution network and its insurance, paper, photographic film, and aviation sectors. US leverage during economic negotiations with Japan would suffer significantly without the overall dampening effect of the military alliance as the military relationship assists the Japanese political leadership in adopting measures that are beneficial to improve the domestic economy while appearing to concede to US demands.¹⁴

Acquisition of cost-efficient military weapon subsystems. As the American economy has declined relatively in particular fields of technology and cost-effectiveness, the United States military has come to rely on foreign suppliers for critical military components. As

noted in Chapter Five, Japan has gradually acquired strong technological-industrial capabilities in specific military weapons subsystems. Japanese companies now dominate several areas in dual-use components and equipment such as semiconductors and flat-panel displays that are utilized in almost every American military weapon system.¹⁵ Other advanced industrial segments in which the US military now relies upon American industrial alliances with foreign firms include computers, machine tools, and robotics.¹⁶ For example, imports account over 90 percent of the semiconductor packages acquired by DoD despite the existence of several domestic suppliers. A single Japanese company, Kyocera, possesses half the world market, while most other significant suppliers are Japanese.¹⁷

The US military has entered a cost-dependent relationship with Japanese industry in that American firms do not produce massive quantities of components such as flat-panel displays in a cost-efficient manner.¹⁸ The US government has established numerous policy measures to alleviate dependence upon foreign suppliers such as the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium (SEMATECH), but the fact remains that such measures have only made a modest impact.

Access to military related research and development funding. Officials associated with the US government stressed in interviews that the United States seeks financial assistance from Japanese business and government to conduct military related research and development. It appears as if the US government is willing to accept its cost-dependency upon Japan for military weapon subsystem components. Thus, technology for technology trades are still important, but have become secondary to the quid pro quo of

American access to Japanese financial assistance in exchange for Japanese access to American military technology.¹⁹

A dependable political partner. The US-Japan military alliance also serves to underpin the notion that Japan remains a strong political ally of the United States when Japan's interests coincide with those of America. The United States and Japan have never maintained total agreement on all political issues. However, the Japanese government often quietly acquiesced to its alliance partner. The political leadership of Japan now publicly acknowledges its political differences with the US, especially concerning the effects of democracy upon the creation of prosperity through the noticeable absence of statements supporting democratic change in Asia.²⁰

Having stated this important caveat, the United States can still depend upon Japan for political support in certain areas known as the common agenda. US-Japan policies regarding Iraq, the Arab-Israeli peace process, the Korean peninsula, China, Russia, economic cooperation in the Pacific, and the environment are often complementary.²¹ For example, the Japanese government is not officially represented during discussions involving the Korean Economic Development Organization (KEDO). Yet, Japan provides significant financial assistance toward construction of "safe" nuclear power production facilities in North Korea.

Assessment

The American military alliance with Japan benefits the United States through six mutually reinforcing functions: global power projection through forward military deployment; regional political influence through the US role as regional power balancer; political and economic leverage vis-a-vis Japan's relatively closed marketplace that

otherwise might not be available; acquisition of cost-efficient military weapons subsystems; access to military research and development funds; and a dependable political partner. These six functions serve to encourage alliance maintenance from the American governmental perspective. In short, the United States relies upon its Japanese ally to maintain the status quo. The cost of alliance abrogation or demise is perceived to be greater than the costs of maintaining the relationship.

As these last three chapters have shown, the internal benefits of the alliance to each partner allows the military alliance to be sustainable in an era where no viable military external threat exists. Stated again, this is due in part to the national security orientation of American and Japanese policymakers. Fundamental differences exist between the national security objectives of Japan and the United States. As long as both nations recognize this prioritization of divergent national security interests and are politically willing to tolerate such differences, the military relationship will remain sustainable in the post-cold war period.

This chapter has amply illustrated the importance American policymakers place upon Japan in their geostrategic calculations. However, tensions in the economic dimension of US-Japan bilateral relations necessitate an assessment of these functions that recognizes the potential damage that a major rift in economic relations could inflict upon the military relationship. Thus, a brief assessment of each function follows.

Global power projection. The United States simply will not be able to project legitimate military power in the Pacific without some form of Japanese bases. Naval and air power are vital to the US national security objective of denying emergence of a rival regional actor. Thus, the facilities at Kadena and Yokosuka are vital to American interests.

The return of Futenma MCAS represents a start in the reduction process of the heavily concentrated American base presence in Okinawa prefecture. However, Futenma's closure is contingent upon finding adequate facilities elsewhere throughout Japan. Simply moving bases around in Okinawa will not satisfy the prefectural government and citizens, who rightly desire a reduction in the American military presence. Moving the Marine Corps KC-130 air refueling aircraft to Iwakuni MCAS and rotating live firing drills to five mainland military ranges denotes progress in the reduction of US forces in Okinawa.²² If the United States desires to maintain its global power projection capability through forward deployment, it must continue to strive for measures that gives the military alliance greater political legitimacy.

Regional political influence. The military dimension of regional political influence remains an important factor in East Asian political relations, yet the US government must move beyond mere recognition that the economic dimension of national security has moved alongside the military dimension. Political influence would also be served by US government sponsored programs that bolster the ability of American business and political leaders to speak the languages of East Asia and better understand their cultures. The world is not converging upon an American form of capitalism and culture. Our political leaders should take appropriate measures to enhance American competitiveness through such measures. The United States does not want to be caught up in a situation where its political leverage relies solely upon its forward military presence. Its not too late to stem such a trend.

Political and economic leverage vis-a-vis Japan. The same principles hold true in US-Japan bilateral relations that are true in overall US regional relations. The military

alliance gives the United States political leverage, but only if the government acknowledges its pragmatic use. The United States currently has a virtual monopoly on military security in East Asia and should bargain accordingly on greater access to the Japanese marketplace. The United States should also make this monopoly more widely known in its multilateral relationships such as APEC and ARF to extract further concessions in trade related issues. Two problems emerge from such a policy. First, such a policy would have to anticipate and attempt to preemptively defuse adverse Chinese reactions to a more nuanced US policy regarding its regional military security role. The US government does not want to give the Chinese political leadership an excuse to justify a military buildup that would allow China to project military power in a hostile manner. Second, the US government does not want to "up the ante" at the bargaining table during bilateral US-Japan negotiations. The US government may be becoming financially dependent upon Japanese investments to finance US federal budget deficits. Some reports have indicated that the Bank of Japan, along with individual Japanese business interests, now hold close to 40 percent of America's short term deficit instruments.²³ The US government must be cautious in overstating its military security monopoly in East Asia.

Acquisition of cost efficient military weapons subsystems. Interdependence appears to be an ever greater phenomenon within the military weapons acquisition arena. Thus, the American military will remain cost-dependent upon foreign suppliers of weapons subsystems (specifically Japanese). What the United States must be wary of is long term erosion of its technological and industrial base. The US may be able to alleviate its dependence upon Japanese capabilities by 1) allowing access to the Japanese firms to

construct production facilities in the United States; and 2) reaching out to other foreign firms in Europe and Asia that possess similar technologies.

Access to military related research and development funding. Superficially, trading technology for research and development funding appears short-sighted. Such a quid pro quo will work, however, as long as the technology that is traded does not represent major advancements that Japanese firms could not have developed themselves without significant financial expenditures. The importance of technology for technology transfers should receive greater attention from both sides.

A dependable political partner. As noted earlier, the political leadership in Tokyo will support the United States when Japan's national interests are at stake and will receive potential benefit. Its negative effects upon the bilateral relationship should be thoroughly discussed and understood by both sides. Japanese assertions of its national security interests will gain greater prominence in the future. US toleration of such assertions will depend largely upon its military relationship with Japan.

Conclusion

The Japan-US military alliance has historically served a fundamental American national security interest in a regional deterrent capability based upon forward deployed US military presence. The United States relies heavily upon Japan to maintain the status quo – America's position in the continued development of a stable regional and international order. Yet, the status quo has fomented economic and political tensions between Japan and the United States that at times appear to threaten the military relationship. Some form of alliance modification may begin the process toward alleviating these tensions.

Endnotes

¹ Personnel discussion with Professor Donald Weatherbee, 11 February 1997.

² The "places, not bases" strategy developed out of the events surrounding the American military withdrawal from Subic Bay and Clark AB in the Philippines. This strategy, announced by the Department of Defense's 1992 *Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim* called for "regional access, mutual training arrangements, periodic ship visits, intelligence exchanges, and professional military educational programs rather than permanently stationed forces [in Southeast Asia]. See United States Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, East Asia and Pacific Region, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1992), p. 5. See also Donald K. Emmerson, "US Policy Themes in Southeast Asia in the 1990s," in David Wurfel and Bruce Barton, eds., *Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region* (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), pp. 108-112. I know that the centrality of Japan as a regional hub for the presence of American forward deployed military personnel sounds strikingly similar to the argument for keeping US military bases in the Philippines. However, two big differences in the Philippines/Japan situation exist. First, the Japanese government proclaims its support for the US presence. Second, the United States government has no suitable alternative location within East Asia to fall back upon in the event that the US militarily withdraws from Japan. Australia and Guam are two possible alternatives, but lack the location principle that Japan provides the US military presence.

³ Renato de Castro, op. cit., p. 345.

⁴ See *Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and Technology Relations with Japan*, op. cit.; *U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, op. cit., and Norman Levin, op. cit. In the early twentieth century, American strategic thinkers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Homer Lea argued that a US naval presence in the Pacific was critical to countering potential threats to American national interests. See A. James Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia* (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1989).

⁵ One of the two American carrier task forces that conducted operations off Taiwan when China conducted conventional missile testing and military exercises in response to Taiwanese elections was stationed at the US 7th fleet's port of Yokosuka. Air refueling aircraft from Kadena AB, Okinawa and guided missile destroyers from Yokosuka also participated in the September 1996 missile raids on Iraq.

⁶ The Japanese government began sharing the financial cost of the stationing of American military forces in Japan in 1978. This agreement covered the labor costs of Japanese national public service employees at US military facilities in Japan. The US and Japan concluded a Special Measures Agreement in 1987 that included wage adjustment allowances for these employees. In 1991, the two countries concluded a five year Special Measures Agreement that effectively required the Japanese government to bear the base pay and allowances of Japanese employees, along with the utility costs of American forces. This agreement allowed the Japanese government to gradually increase its cost sharing rate over the agreement's duration to 50% by FY1995. In September 1996, both countries concluded a new agreement that extended the existing FY1995 framework through FY2000. Additionally, expenses associated with the transfer of American training sites in Japan will be borne by Japan. See *Defense of Japan*, 1996, pp. 177-179. Although a simple comparison can't be made, Germany provides approximately \$1.4 billion for the stationing of about 80,000 U.S. troops, while Japan provides about \$5 billion in annual funds for the maintenance of 47,000 troops at U.S. bases in Japan. Based upon this simple comparison, Japan provides a ten-fold increase in host nation support of American military personnel than does Germany. See Morihiko Hosokawa, "Rebuilding the U.S.-Japan

Security Structure," address to the annual dinner meeting of the Japan American Society of the State of Washington, 12 March 1996.

⁷ *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, p. 25. Japan also provides an additional billion dollars in improvements to existing facilities for a total host nation support amount of \$5 billion.

⁸ The US government also possesses the option of moving its base of operations to Australia, which reaffirmed its military alliance with the United States in August 1996. However, four operational problems would hamper US efforts at transferring its operations to Australia. First, the US would lose its highly valued maintenance facilities that it possesses in Japan. Second, the Australian government would probably not concede to providing fifty percent of the funding necessary to maintain US military forces. Third, access to potential East Asian trouble spots such as Taiwan and the Korean peninsula would be severely constrained by the waterways surrounding Indonesia's archipelago. Fourth, South East Asian nations ratified the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaty on 31 March 1997. This would potentially hamper US military operations based in Australia.

⁹ Young-Sun Song, "Prospect for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation," *Asian Survey*, Volume 35, No. 12, December 1995, pp. 1089-91.

¹⁰ Emmerson notes that the Clinton administration did not entertain this bargain because its foreign policy apparatus was in disarray and too distracted by domestic and foreign policy crises elsewhere. See Donald Emmerson, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

¹¹ James A. Winnefeld, et. al., *A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension*, cited in Renato de Castro, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

¹² William Pendley, cited in Renato de Castro, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

¹³ Discussion with Dr. Robert Angel, 3 March 1997.

¹⁴ Personal interviews with Dr. Michael Green (14 February 1997) and Professor Stuart Pickens (2 April 1997).

¹⁵ See Report of the Defense Task Force, Committee on Japan, *Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and Technology Relations with Japan*, appendix c, "U.S. National Security and the Risks of Dependence on Foreign Technologies and High-Technology Products."

¹⁶ John Zysman and Michael Borrus, "Lines of Fracture, Webs of Cohesion: Economic Interconnection and Security Politics in Asia," in Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, ed., *Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific*, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁷ *Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and Technology Relations with Japan*, appendix c, p. 4.

¹⁸ Pentagon officials clearly stated that cost is not a dependency, yet the long term effects of industrial base erosion as a result of cost-efficiency makes for a potential total dependence.

¹⁹ Personnel interviews with officials associated with the US government, 14 February 1997.

²⁰ During the early 1990s, the Japanese government claimed to desire linking official developmental assistance to improvements in democratic principles, but this policy claim was never fully implemented.

²¹ See Michael H. Armacost, *op. cit.*, chapter five.

²² Interview with Pentagon officials, 31 January 1997 and 14 February 1997. See also the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) final report, 2 December 1996.

²³ Merrill Lynch financial analyst Ron Bevacqua cited this figure in a discussion on the *Dead Fukuzawa Society* concerning the US federal budget deficit in June 1996. Bevacqua reported the figure from an article published in *Barron's*.

**Explaining Alliance Sustainability:
The US-Japan Military Relationship
Chapter Seven
Conclusion**

This study looked beyond the common threat military argument as primary justification for sustainability of the US-Japan military security alliance in the post-cold war period. The study sought an alternative to the various approaches utilized within the international relations and foreign policy/area studies literature in order to explore the US-Japan military relationship in terms of the functions that it serves – its functional utility.

The comparative approach to the study of national defense policy provided a useful framework for analyzing the US-Japan military alliance in that the defense policy literature demonstrates that the nature of a military alliance is not simply one dimensional. Military alliances are not maintained solely upon an analysis of a state's external environment. Rather, alliances possess a multidimensional nature that is derived from the complex interplay of numerous functions that help shape national security policy. Such an examination is therefore based upon the national defense policy literature in order to critically evaluate alliance sustainability by identifying, assessing the support for, and analyzing other alliance functions than a common military threat that serve to benefit particular groups in both Japan and the United States.

An integration of the national defense policy literature highlighted four comparative aspects of a state's defense policies that were useful in understanding the environment

surrounding the US-Japan military alliance: 1) perception of the international environment and each state's position within that environment; 2) particular national objectives, strategy, and military force deployment doctrine; 3) the defense policymaking process; and 4) various recurring defense issues. A comparison of these four components when applied to the national security policies of the United States and Japan revealed an interesting paradox. Within this comparison, there exist greater fundamental differences than similarities in the national security policies of Japan and the United States. This phenomenon conflicts with a basic tenet of alliance literature which argues the necessity of similarities for an alliance to function effectively. Yet, fundamental differences between Japan and the United States in their national security orientations (Japan – economic; US – military) lays the foundation for the military alliance and its functions. These differences create and reinforce a condition of mutual dependency that enables the alliance to survive despite the disappearance of a manifest external threat. Thus, there exists a congruence of policies that support and promote divergent – not congruent – national security interests found within the US and Japan. Two main hypotheses have been presented as a result of this analytical framework.

The first argument contended that an analytical framework based upon an integration of the national defense policy literature demonstrates that the functional congruence of policies upholding divergent national security interests provides a solid foundation upon which the US-Japan military relationship may remain viable in the post-cold war world. Such a functional congruence of divergent national security policies has allowed for a slow, yet steady transformation of the military alliance from a situation of total Japanese dependence upon the American military umbrella into a more equitable and balanced

partnership. Over its duration of forty plus years, significant changes have taken place in US-Japan relations. Moreover, the military relationship has changed immensely from its intended direction as stated in the original security treaty's preamble. Deemed a "provisional arrangement" for the defense of Japan, the military security treaty has gradually shifted toward a greater role for Japan to play – not only in its own military security, but additionally in the stability of the East Asian international system.

Yet, the study also highlighted that the United States and Japanese governments still diverge in their respective prioritization of national security interests. These dissimilar interests originated during the postwar period and became endogenous to the military alliance throughout the cold war. The alliance's internal functions continue to support the divergent prioritization of national security interests between Japan and the United States. This divergence furthermore appears politically tolerable to the policymaking elites of both nations. Alliance durability is therefore better understood through a continued toleration of the divergent prioritization of interests than through the common threat thesis.

The second hypothesis asserted that the internal functions which serve to benefit each alliance partner have allowed for a transformation of the US-Japan military relationship beyond the notion of mutual defense against a common military threat. The US-Japan military alliance was found to be both dynamic and bipolar in that it supports the national security interests of the United States and Japan within both the larger global arena and within each nation's domestic arena. In the case of the US-Japan military alliance, political elites utilize the alliance in order to pursue national security within its two contextual subsets – its domestic and international environments. The study found that in the post-cold war period where an absence of a common military threat exists, domestic interests in

maintaining the US-Japan alliance dominate. These interests are served by the alliance's internal functions – the benefits each alliance party receives from the relationship. The alliance's internal and external benefits are shown in figures 7-1 and 7-2.

Figure 7-1: The US-Japan military alliance functions: internal benefits.


Japanese benefits	United States benefits
economic national security orientation	global power projection
domestic political system stabilization	regional political influence
military rearmament legitimization	political/economic leverage vis-a-vis Japan
defense-related technological acquisition	acquisition of cost-efficient military weapon subsystems
international recognition of non-aggression	financial access to military R&D
long-term security guarantee	dependable political partner

Figure 7-2: The US-Japan military alliance functions: external benefits.

establishes foundation for regional peace and stability
promotes potential for increased economic development and prosperity
advances economic, political, and military cooperation through regional integration

Figure 7-3 illustrates the greater influence of internal over external military alliance benefits for Japan and the United States in the post-cold war era. The predominance of internal benefits received by the US and Japan, continued toleration of those benefits by both parties, and the supporting role played by transnational penetration (public diplomacy, lobbying, and foreign pressure) combine to explain sustainability of the US-Japan military security alliance.

Figure 7-3: Explaining US-Japan military alliance sustainability



Conclusion

The United States - Japan security partnership is the most important military security institution for stability in East Asia. This bilateral military relationship has endured historical challenges and is currently involved in the most formidable task ever presented to the people of both Japan and the United States since World War II – maintaining alliance sustainability at a time when economic problems regarding trade issues and technology transfers abound and the collapse of the Soviet military threat strips the alliance of its common military threat cohesion. This study has shown that the military alliance stands upon solid ground within an analytical framework that is based upon the alliance's functions that serve national interests as defined by political elites in both nations.

It must be remembered that the choices made by American and Japanese defense planners will determine the alliance's structure as we approach the 21st century. These choices will also affect the defense policies of every nation in East Asia. Maintaining some

form of the US-Japan military alliance proves to possess widespread benefits that support not only American and Japanese national interests, but also the national interests of countries throughout East Asia. It is possible to modify the military alliance in recognition of economic problems which hamper US relations with most countries in the region. Such a modification could still serve the national interests of all concerned. The US - Japan military alliance thus remains the cornerstone of a regional security framework for East Asian peace, stability, and prosperity.

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