STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS IN THE STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

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USAWC CLASS OF 1997
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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Redefining the Role of National Guard Divisions in the Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 25 March 1997

PAGES: 49 CLASSIFICATION: unclassified

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the latest in a series of initiatives designed to capture a post-Cold War "peace dividend" through restructuring and downsizing U.S. military forces. Among the major issues to be resolved is the future role for the National Guard divisions in the force structure mix. This paper applies two conceptual models, one for force structure assessment and another for total mission capabilities, to examine the appropriate role for the National Guard divisions. The thesis developed in the paper is that the eight National Guard divisions are essential to the U.S. military strategy but must be restructured to maximize their utility within the total force.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS..... v

LIST OF EXHIBITS..... vii

INTRODUCTION..... 1

A FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT MODEL..... 1

THREATS AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES..... 3

NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY..... 10

UNRESOURCED FORCE REQUIREMENTS.....11

MISSION CAPABILITIES MODEL..... 14

A CASE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE..... 16

THE CONCEPT OF "STRATEGIC HEDGE"..... 19

REDESIGNING "WAYS".....21

ACCESSING AND MOBILIZING RESERVE FORCES.....27

IMPACT ON STRATEGIC ENDS..... 29

ENHANCED MISSION CAPABILITY..... 31

OTHER BENEFITS..... 32

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.....34

ENDNOTES.....37

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....45

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit 1. Force Structure Assessment Model..... 2

Exhibit 2. Military Resource Use..... 15

Exhibit 3. Total Mission Capabilities..... 15

Exhibit 4. Unresourced CS/CSS Requirements..... 23

Exhibit 5. CS/CSS Support..... 24

Exhibit 6. Multi-Purpose Division Structure..... 26

Exhibit 7. Utility Combat Brigade..... 26

Exhibit 8. Multi-Purpose Artillery Brigade..... 27

Exhibit 9. Impact on Strategic Ends..... 30

Exhibit 10. Enhanced Mission Capabilities..... 32

Redefining the Role of National Guard Divisions in the Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the latest in a series of initiatives designed to capture a post-Cold War "peace dividend"[1] through restructuring and downsizing U.S. military forces. Such a review is essential to the efficient allocation of national resources. However, the pursuit of a peace dividend should unambiguously be approached as a by-product of a more fundamental process for designing a military force of a size and composition consistent with U.S. national security interests. Among the major issues to be resolved is the future role for the National Guard divisions in the force structure mix.[2]

This paper applies two conceptual models, one for force structure assessment and another for total mission capabilities, to examine the appropriate role for the National Guard divisions. The thesis developed in the paper is that the eight National Guard divisions are essential to the U.S. military strategy but must be restructured to maximize their utility within the total force.

A FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT MODEL

A conceptual Force Structure Assessment model (shown in Exhibit 1) provides a point of departure for examining the

appropriate role for the National Guard divisions. As depicted in Exhibit 1, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) are derived from an evaluation of threats and strategic objectives. The NMS, as a subset of NSS, drives the development of military force structure. Because total national resources are limited, other national objectives and constraints indirectly bear on force structure decisions.



Exhibit 1. Force Structure Assessment Model

This section of the paper examines the linkages between threats, NMS, and force structure. A succeeding section of the paper looks inside the "force structure" box (Exhibit 1) in the context of a "Total Mission Capabilities" model to examine the

optimal strategic concept for using the National Guard divisions.[3]

THREATS AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. While strategists agree that assessment of defense requirements and capabilities should be based on existing and impending risk, the defense review process continues to be obfuscated by the lack of a clearly defined threat to U.S. national security. According to Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer:

> Today's global security environment remains complex and full of unknowns. No longer are we confronted with a "clear and present danger." Instead, we find ourselves facing a wide spectrum of unpredictable danger and threats.[4]

Though the specifics of post-Cold War threats remain vague and unpredictable, general consensus about key trends shaping national security requirements is emerging. A nearly universal element in the evolving post-Cold War security paradigm is a military requirement to project warfighting capability while simultaneously supporting a variety of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Although the primary impetus behind force structure decisions will continue to be warfighting requirements, the preponderance of actual military operations will be related to MOOTW.[5] The National Military Strategy, and the force structure that it drives, should reflect both requirements.

The potential for armed conflict that would threaten U.S. national interests is the traditional focus of military forces. In spite of considerable post Cold-War debate about the form that such armed conflict might take, the conventional wisdom (including the premise underpinning the Department of Defense Bottom Up Review conducted in 1992) suggests that two regions, the Korean Peninsula and southwest Asia, constitute the near-term conventional war threat.[6] In recent testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, LTG Patrick Hughes outlined an even more extensive range of potential warfighting threats.[7] Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer have suggested other plausible warfighting scenarios that might confront the U.S. during the next decade.[8]

National interest in MOOTW is a new element in the post Cold War paradigm. Although MOOTW threats and opportunities have always existed, they were not previously evident in national security or military strategies. Prior to World War II, the United States declined to play a super-power role in world affairs. At the conclusion of World War II, U.S. responsibility as a super-power was totally consumed by efforts to contain communism. Even as late as the 1992 Bottom Up Review (BUR),

MOOTW received no consideration in force structure assessment and recommendations.

Among the many plausible MOOTW threats to U.S. security, international terrorism is potentially most ominous.[9] Future terrorist attacks will not only threaten U.S. interests indirectly[10], but may be actually perpetrated on U.S. soil. The possibility of a cataclysmic terrorist incident or series of incidents is second only to nuclear war as an enemy threat with the potential to profoundly alter the structure and functioning of American society.

The future military role in countering the terrorist threat is not clear. However, since the keys to combating terrorism include effective intelligence to identify terrorist threats, preparation of forces to preempt potential terrorist acts, and ability to respond to actual terrorist attacks, military forces are well suited to counter terrorist operations.[11] Given the breadth of the potential terrorist threat, and because the response to terrorist activity will typically be asymmetrical, U.S. military strategy must provide a spectrum of responses to possible terrorist incidents.

International drug trafficking, although less frightening than international terrorism, continues to threaten U.S. national

security. Recent evidence released by the federal government suggests that drug use, which appeared to peak in the late 1980s, is once again on the rise.[12] The international balance of payments between the U.S. and primary drug producing nations (Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru) provides additional evidence to support this perception. The "errors and omissions" calculation in the balance of payments provides an approximation of illegal transactions between nations. The errors and omissions account between the U.S. and key Latin American drug-producing nations, believed to be almost entirely due to illegal drug transactions, increased by 320% from 1992 to 1995.[13] The appointment of a cabinet-level official to lead the counter-drug effort demonstrates the level of national policy concern about the drug problem.

The U.S. counter-drug strategic concept has not yet matured, but several areas for expanded military involvement are now under consideration.[14] U.S. counter-drug strategy concentrates on reducing the flow of illegal drug imports and destroying drug production facilities.[15] Because of the magnitude and breadth of the drug trafficking network, military forces are the only instrument of national power capable of mounting effective, large-scale counter-drug operations. The current interdiction

campaign will continue and expand as drug traffickers develop more sophisticated production and transportation methods.[16] In addition, as interdiction becomes more difficult, some form of direct action against drug production sources in cooperation with host governments may be required.[17] Another possibility is that military forces may be deployed to complement counter-drug law enforcement efforts within the United States.[18]

Besides counter-drug operations, other domestic pressures may induce employment of military resources in a variety of domestic law enforcement, civilian emergency management, and domestic infrastructure development activities. Deployment of active and reserve component military personnel in disaster relief and of National Guard forces to augment law enforcement agencies has already proven to be highly effective.[19] Added pressure from multinational and transnational law enforcement requirements, along with over extension of domestic law enforcement and emergency management resources, will intensify pressures to use military forces.

In addition to domestic roles and missions, U.S. military forces will continue to engage in a wide range of non-combatant international peacekeeping, policing, and humanitarian activities. The breakdown of the "superficial equilibrium

imposed by the Cold War" has been replaced with a new threat described by Stephen Sloan as a "new world disorder".[20] Failed states and ungovernable states pose a growing threat to global stability. The recent willingness of the U.S. government to send troops to Zaire underscores the propensity to become involved even when no apparent "vital national interest" is at stake. Transition and post-conflict operations, such as current military action in the Persian Gulf region, have proven to require long term U.S. presence and substantial commitment of resources. Multinational peacekeeping initiatives, as currently underway in Bosnia and the Sinai, also require substantial commitments of forces over extended time periods. The extent of U.S. commitment to international noncombatant activities is reflected by current U.S. military presence in more than sixty nations.

Beyond the threat imposed by global instability, international engagement lies at the heart of the national objectives of promoting democracy and global economic integration. Within such a framework, concern for global political sensitivities sometimes supersedes traditional concepts of vital national interest. Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have become an accepted mechanism for international participation and cooperation. There is a natural convergence of

interests between U.S. focus on international engagement and the United Nations Security Council's desire for a more pro-active role in shaping the global environment. The convergence of these concerns, combined with the paucity of clear criteria to identify vital national interests, creates a strong bias toward more rather than less involvement of U.S. military forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities.

The U.S. military has come to be regarded as a multi-purpose organization with capabilities and responsibilities that go well beyond traditional warfighting requirements. Subtle changes in perceptions about the appropriate role for military forces must be brought into conscious awareness and explicitly taken into account in military strategy and force structure decisions. General Ronald R. Fogelman, Air Force Chief of Staff, has observed that "the use of military forces for peacekeeping and other non-warfighting operations is a reality that should be addressed as part of the congressional mandated Quadrennial Defense Review of force structure and strategy."[21] Failure to adequately consider these MOOTW requirements will create unanticipated deterioration of the ability of U.S. forces to project military power.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY. To provide useful policy guidance, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) must realistically incorporate the ends, ways, and means corresponding to identified national objectives and threats.[22] Consistent with the threats described in the previous section, the NSS and NMS articulate two requirements that should shape force structure and the utilization of the National Guard divisions.[23] First, the Army's primary mission remains fighting and winning the nation's wars.[24] To be successful, U.S. military forces must have the capability to project substantial warfighting force with little or no preparation time. This capacity is the essence of Power Projection. "As the U.S. military nears the completion of a massive downsizing in the aftermath of the Cold War, it is now more dependent than ever on power projection to implement the national military strategy of flexible and selective engagement."[25] The key to Power Projection is not the actual prosecution of war but the credible threat to potential aggressors arising from the ability to do so.[26]

Second, it is probable that U.S. military forces will continue to engage in a wide range of non-combatant activities.[27] The National Security Strategy concept of "engagement"

specifically conveys a commitment to leadership and participation in global community development.

> (T)he separation between domestic and international issues is evaporating . . . Our efforts to advance the common good at home depend upon our efforts to advance our interests around the world.[28]

This commitment is reprised in the National Military Strategy concept of Overseas Presence.[29]

UNRESOURCED FORCE REQUIREMENTS. Active Component (AC) Army units are not capable of supporting both warfighting and MOOTW requirements simultaneously.[30] "Only the Total Force of America's Army could routinely respond to the massive demands of such difficult and diverse missions."[31] Senior Defense Department analysts have concluded that military commitments outlined in the National Military Strategy are unrealistic because of shortfalls in two areas.[32] First, AC forces augmented by National Guard Enhanced Brigades have adequate maneuver capability but insufficient combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) resources to engage in two major regional conflicts.[33] Second, the continuous involvement of AC forces in non-combatant missions degrades AC warfighting capacity and dilutes Power Projection.[34]

The shortage of combat support and combat service support units for regional conflict deployment is well documented.[35] In 1995, based on current force allocations and Total Army Analysis

requirements, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the Army lacks 238 nondivisional CS/CSS units to support one regional conflict plan. Simultaneous support to a second regional contingency would raise the shortfall to 338 units. The shortage of CS/CSS units is aggravated by dual tasking of units in the force allocation process. Taking into account dual tasking of nondivisional CS/CSS units, the total shortfall of such units to support two simultaneous regional conflicts rises to at least 654 units. The GAO study cited shortages of nondivisional CS/CSS units during the Gulf War as a case in point. During Desert Storm/Desert Shield the Army deployed nearly all of some types of nondivisional support units and ran out of others even though it deployed only a portion of its maneuver forces.[36] The GAO study further concluded that planned Army end strength will not provide sufficient flexibility to provide the required nondivisional support units.[37] This assessment suggests that maximum warfighting capacity falls below the two major regional contingency target due to insufficient CS/CSS resources.

Other studies and actual experience also indicate unresourced force requirements and limitations. Transportation shortages include logistical command and control, movement

control, port opening, and intratheater transportation units.[38] Ballard cites the shortage of Army units to conduct air base ground defense operations as a recurring problem.[39] Target acquisition assets for both warfighting and MOOTW commitments are also inadequate. For example, the first U.S. deployment cycle to the Bosnian peacekeeping effort required virtually all of the Q-36 target acquisition assets available in Europe. Target acquisition units from seven of the eight National Guard divisions have been mobilized to support subsequent rotations of Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard.[40]

The extent of combat capability degradation resulting from MOOTW engagement is just now beginning to emerge as a "lesson learned." The observed reduction in combat capability provides empirical evidence of the opportunity cost of MOOTW engagements. One senior military official has stated that "the military is straining and will continue to do so under the weight of increased military missions."[41] Active component units deployed in MOOTW have found it impossible to maintain C-1 readiness status in terms of either training or equipment. The operational tempo problem sighted by many field commanders is not a result of overly ambitious training requirements or engagement in conflict. It is almost entirely a result of MOOTW deployment.

Inadequate CS/CSS resources and readiness degradation due to MOOTW activity significantly impair the ability of U.S. forces to project the level of combat power consistent with global threats, national objectives, and the NMS. The strategic concept for utilizing National Guard divisions should fill the gap between AC capabilities and strategy requirements in the most efficient possible way.[42]

MISSION CAPABILITIES MODEL

A simple conceptual model illustrates the importance of considering all types of mission requirements in the force structure assessment process. As depicted in Exhibit 2, military forces can be used to produce two types of national defense services, "Warfighting Power Projection Capacity" (WPPC) or "Military Operations Other than War" (MOOTW). Exhibit 3 conceptually depicts the levels of WPPC that can be achieved given each possible level of MOOTW activity.[43] For example, if zero forces are devoted to MOOTW, WPPC is shown by point "A".[44] As increasing levels of military resources are devoted to MOOTW, the capacity to project combat power is reduced. If MOOTW activity is at point "Y", then WPPC is reduced from "A" to "B" (in Exhibit 3).



Figure 2. Military Resource Uses



Exhibit 3. Total Mission Capabilitites

Stated another way, the opportunity cost of committing OY forces to MOOTW is a sacrifice of AB warfighting power projection capability (Exhibit 3). The loss of WPPC is the conceptual counterpart of the empirically documented degradation of warfighting skills, reduction in maintenance levels, and potential inability to disengage forces from MOOTW commitments in the event of a warfighting deployment.

Applying BUR warfighting requirements in the context of Exhibit 3, point "A" represents two major regional conflicts.[45] Past assessments of force structure, most recently the BUR, implicitly assume that MOOTW consumes no resources. This approach is satisfactory only if the level of MOOTW is expected to be zero or if MOOTW activities consume no military resources. Engagement in MOOTW necessarily reduces WPPC below the targeted level. Hence, the assessment of military force structure cannot be made in terms of warfighting capacity alone.

A CASE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE. Although the NSS and NMS are generally consistent with the array of national strategic objectives and threats, the belief that the current military force structure is not adequate to support the NMS reveals a breakdown in the logical progression of the force structuring process. This breakdown has fostered two general, opposing

conclusions: (1) In order to meet the demands of warfighting and MOOTW requirements, resources devoted to military force structure must be expanded,[46] or (2) The strategic threat should be redefined to be consistent with current or down-sized resources. The latter conclusion suggests that the two major regional conflict threat which underpinned BUR assessment should be abandon in favor of a less resource intensive threat specification.

Neither of these views provides an acceptable policy alternative. The first is not economically or politically practical because of pressure from other national objectives and resource constraints.[47] The second abandons a realistic threat-based analysis in favor of a resource-based force structure.[48] The analysis in this paper suggests a third alternative which capitalizes on the economic concept of comparative advantage. Under this view, current (or possibly down-sized) military resources are adequate to support all military requirements specified in the current, threat-based NMS. However, force structure concepts which energize "means" to achieve "ends" must be changed to educe greater efficiency.

The concept of comparative advantage provides insight into an optimal structure and role of U.S. military forces. Because

of training time and resources available, AC maneuver units are likely to have an *absolute* advantage in readiness and deployment for all types of military tasks. However, AC units have a *comparative* advantage in maneuver warfighting capability while Reserve Component (RC) units have a *comparative* advantage in non-combatant, combat support, and combat service support capability.[49] These respective comparative advantages arise from differences in the nature of tasks performed by maneuver, CS, and CSS units. Whereas maneuver units must achieve proficiency in a multitude of large-unit, collective tasks, CS/CSS units rely more on individual and smaller-unit technical skills.

Although these respective comparative advantages cannot be measured directly, post-mobilization training time ratios provide a revealing comparative advantage proxy. During the Gulf War and Bosnian Crisis, RC combat support and combat service support units were able to deploy nearly as rapidly as their AC counterparts.[50] However, RC brigade-level maneuver forces required nearly ten times as long to prepare for deployment as their AC counterparts.[51] These training times are consistent with professional judgments about training requirements for maneuver and non-maneuver activities. For example, a study prepared for General Gordon Sullivan estimated that National

Guard divisional maneuver units would need nearly a year of post-mobilization training prior to combat deployment.[52] In contrast, a GAO study concluded that National Guard divisional CS/CSS units are available for nearly immediate deployment.[53]

The RC comparative advantage in non-maneuver tasks is magnified by duration limitations on RC mobilization since non-maneuver tasks are generally more compatible with short duty tours and frequent troop rotation. By the theory of comparative advantage, the value of military service can be maximized if AC forces devote most of their effort to maneuver warfighting tasks while National Guard divisions specialize in non-maneuver military tasks.

THE CONCEPT OF "STRATEGIC HEDGE". Given the objectives specified in the National Military Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement[54] and the inherent comparative advantages of AC and RC forces, the current concept for utilizing National Guard divisions is sub optimal. Even beyond the current National Military Strategy, the envisioned National Guard division role does not conform to the threats and objectives anticipated in the early twenty-first century.[55]

The current role of the existing eight Army National Guard divisions, based on a concept of "strategic hedge," envisions the

deployment of National Guard divisions as late-entry warfighting entities in a protracted, expanding conventional war.[56] That role is predicated on the assumption of adequate time to mobilize, train, and deploy to relieve or enhance AC units already engaged in conflict.[57] Such a concept makes sense only if the impending threat is a major conventional war expected to extend over a long period of time, a threat not encompassed in the National Military Strategy.

Although the "strategic hedge" concept may have had relevance in the cold war era, it is an anachronism in the post cold war environment.[58] The principal dangers which underpin the National Military Strategy do not include a military scenario requiring "strategic hedge" forces.[59] Warfighting requirements imposed by threat analysis and embodied in the National Military Strategy anticipate rapid force deployment and short conflict duration.[60] Therefore, as they are currently configured, National Guard divisions make little contribution to the production of national security services in consonance with the National Military Strategy.

The contribution of "strategic hedge" to Overseas Presence and Power Projection does not justify significant resource commitment at current levels.[61]

> Although there may be many demands for U.S. involvement, the need to husband limited resources requires that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation in military operations.[62]

Careful use of resources must also extend to optimizing the strategic concepts that impel resource utilization.[63]

REDESIGNING "WAYS". To capitalize on the comparative advantage of RC forces, the strategic concept for National Guard divisions should be changed from that of "strategic hedge" to one that might be labeled "deployment flexibility."[64] "Deployment flexibility" focuses on multi-purpose, modular divisions capable of providing a range of force protection, combat support, and combat service support functions. These multi-purpose divisions should be capable of rapidly deploying a broad spectrum of units and skills tailored to operational and tactical requirements.

National Guard Bureau (NGB) recommendations now under review are a positive step toward redefining the role of National Guard divisions.[65] These recommendations incorporate two significant elements. First, NGB recommendations consciously recognize the need to bring strategic concepts that drive National Guard division structure into greater conformance with the ends and means of National Military Strategy. Second, the recommendations endorse the notion of a non-traditional divisional structure designed to support non-maneuver missions.

These two elements can be extended to produce non-traditional division structures offering even greater utility. The division headquarters provides a command and control headquarters for a diverse, modular set of units capable of deploying to provide CS/CSS support to warfighting deployments or to conduct independent MOOTW missions. Based on this template, each of the eight National Guard divisions should be tailored in consonance with the strategic concepts of Overseas Presence and Power Projection and the expected commitment of military forces.

The GAO has examined unresourced support requirements of potentially high value to support warfighting and MOOTW missions.[66] These are shown in Exhibit 4. The GAO recommended that the Total Army Analysis identify unresourced support requirements and work with the National Guard to develop a plan to exploit these capabilities in the National Guard divisions.[67] The GAO observed that National Guard divisions already posses some assets capable of satisfying unsupported warfighting requirements.

> An option for augmenting the Army's nondivisional support capability is to use existing support capability--units, personnel, and equipment--in the eight National Guard divisions that DOD did not include in the combat force for executing the two-conflict strategy.[68]

Type of Unit	Number of Units
Aviation	1
Chemical	6
Engineer	54
Medical	31
Ordnance	100
Quartermaster	210
Signal	12
Adjutant General	26
Finance	10
Chaplain	12
Military Police	1
Military Law	32
Psychological Ops	10
Military Intelligence	3
Maintenance	84
Headquarters	16
Transportation	230
Total	**838**

Exhibit 4. Unresourced CS/CSS Requirements

GAO comparisons between unresourced nondivisional support requirements and existing National Guard divisional support units are shown in Exhibit 5.[69] This comparison suggests that the conversion of National Guard divisions from a warfighting structure to a multi-purpose structure would not require total restructuring of the entire National Guard division force. At the same time, the GAO report noted that National Guard divisional CS/CSS units may not be perfectly adaptable in their current configuration to support nondivisional warfighting requirements. By changing the focus of these units away from their current divisional role, these shortcomings could be

ameliorated. The GAO specifically recommended that the Secretary of the Army work with the National Guard to develop a plan for deploying this CS/CSS capability.

> We believe that using Guard divisional support capability will increase the Army's flexibility to provide more nondivisional support in areas of need within the aggregate active and reserve end strength.[70]

Type of Unit	National Guard CS/CSS Unit	Unresourced Requirement
Ordnance	Ammo Transfer Sec	Ammo Acct Tm
Aviation	Attack Helo Bn	Attack Helo Bn
Transportation	Movement Cntr Tm	Movement Cntr Tm
Military Police	MP Company	MP Combat Spt Co
Chemical	Chemical Co	Chem Decon Co
Signal	Signal Bn Signal Spt Co	Signal Bn ADA Spt Co.
Maintenance	Hvy Maint Co EN Spt Tm Army Repair Sec	Equip Repair Tms

Exhibit 5. CS/CSS Support

Exhibit 6 shows two possible configurations for National Guard multi-purpose divisions.[71] Demarest provides more detailed recommendations for structuring Intelligence, Military Police, and combat brigades within non-traditional, multi-purpose divisions.[72] Examples of other selected subordinate unit organizational structures are shown in Exhibits 7 and 8. The key

to tailoring units is to satisfy identified needs rather than to retain traditional organizational structures. The organizational structures shown in Exhibits 6 through 8 specifically focus on enhancement of CS/CSS and MOOTW capabilities of Total Army force. In addition to supporting warfighting requirements, these units are better suited than existing divisions to a broad spectrum of MOOTW requirements. As described by Geoffery Demarest:

> The guiding principle is not that (multi-purpose) divisions could reach an area of operations more quickly than a heavily armed unit; instead, the focus is on long-term potential mission applicability.

Organizing the set of functions around a division headquarters fosters unity of command by integrating functions and capabilities. The division has the capacity to task organize its functional capabilities in accordance with mission and situational requirements. The division also has the rank structure and staff depth needed to understand the mission analysis requirements in the context of the strategic and operational setting.



Exhibit 6. Multi-Purpose Division Structure



Exhibit 7. Utility Combat Brigade



Exhibit 8. Multi-Purpose Artillery Brigade

ACCESSING AND MOBILIZING RC FORCES. Post Gulf War revisions in RC mobilization limitations have enhanced the potential value of RC forces by extending the number of forces that can be called and the duration of active service. Reserve forces can be mobilized by the President of the United States subject to the following conditions:[73] (1) Without Presidential declaration of national emergency or Congressional declaration of war, the President may activate up to 200,000 reservists for a period not to exceed 270 days.[74] (2) With Presidential declaration of emergency, up to 1,000,000 reservists, including IRR members, may be activated. (3) Full mobilization requires Congressional declaration of war.

In addition to involuntary call-up, Title 10 of the United States Code provides for voluntary activation of RC members for duty other than training.[75]

> To provide definite terms of active duty (other than for training) for Reserves with their consent, the Secretary concerned may make a standard written agreement with any member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction requiring the member to serve for a period of active duty (other than for training) of not more than five years. When such an agreement expires, a new one may be made. This subsection does not apply in time of war declared by Congress.

The possibility of voluntary activation of RC members provides a basis for National Guard sponsorship of specific MOOTW operations. Under this "U.S. Volunteers" approach, the concept and force requirements for a MOOTW mission would be established. Through the National Guard Bureau, a particular National Guard division would then be tasked to sponsor an appropriately sized and tailored unit to accomplish the mission under the division flag. The National Guard division would remain responsible for recruiting, training, and mobilizing volunteers for the mission, including required troop rotations. This approach is similar to the "lead division" concept used in Canada for mission-tailoring force structure. In Canada the lead division generates force requirements based on mission parameters, determines force

shortfalls, and identifies supporting organizations to backfill unresourced force structure.

The use of RC forces in a recent Sinai MOOTW rotation serves as a model for a "U.S. Volunteers" approach. The 29th Division (National Guard) sponsored deployment of a composite task force, comprised of volunteer RC soldiers, to execute a rotation of the Sinai peace observation mission. Deborah Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, observed that the success of the operation demonstrated the value of a "U.S. Volunteers" concept. Referring to the 29th Division's Sinai mission, Lee stated:

> I see it as a mission that could be totally handed to the Guard and Reserve in the future. That's how well they did. And if we did, we would reduce the operational tempo on the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions . . . I am hopeful that the mission will stand as the model, and that one success will breed another success. And that confidence in the confidence in the reserves will increase.

IMPACT ON STRATEGIC ENDS

The redesigned structure for National Guard divisions substantially enhances Overseas Presence and Power Projection. Exhibit 9 provides a direct comparison of "strategic hedge" and "deployment flexibility" concepts in support of the five major tasks described in the NSS.

TASK [76]	Contribution to Accomplishing Task	
	"Strategic Reserve"	"Deployment Flexibility"
Deterring and Defeating Aggression	Plays a role only in the event of major protracted conflict. Not included in current war plans.	**Direct:** Selected elements deploy immediately to provide adequate combat support and combat service support to active component units engaged in conflict. **Indirect:** Produces effective peacekeeping services which reduce the possibility of war. Enhances Power Projection by freeing active component units from non-combatant missions.
Credible Overseas Presence	Ad hoc use of National Guard Division forces in peacekeeping activities.	Provides a large, tailored force for deployment to non-combatant missions abroad. Complements active component forces currently stationed abroad, and relieves those units of non-combatant responsibilities. Provides combat support and combat service support to active component units stationed abroad.
Weapons of Mass Destruction	Minimal.	By complementing a more robust conventional warfighting force, allows civilian policy makers more conventional response options.
Peacekeeping Operations	Can be deployed to take advantage of organizational structure and equipment. However, training is focused on warfighting rather than peacekeeping tasks.	Provides substantial, specifically trained forces to perform non-combatant duties. Provides adequate forces to accommodate adequate rotation of forces involved in peacekeeping operations.
Supporting Other National Security Objectives	Can be deployed to take advantage of organizational structure and equipment. However, training is focused on warfighting rather than peacekeeping tasks.	Provides substantial, specifically trained forces to perform non-combatant duties. Provides adequate forces to accommodate adequate rotation of forces involved in a variety of non--combatant national security operations.

Exhibit 9. Impact on Strategic Ends

ENHANCED MISSION CAPABILITY. A return to the Total Mission Capabilities model (originally shown in Exhibit 3) illustrates the gains in military output to be derived from restructuring the National Guard divisions. Exhibit 10 depicts these gains. First, the capacity to produce national defense services shifts from curve AZ to A'Z', indicating greater total production potential from existing military resources. For each possible level of MOOTW, WPPC has increased. National Guard division resources that were underemployed under the "strategic hedge" concept have been engaged in provision useful CS/CSS and MOOTW services. A second, more subtle effect involves a change in the shape of the production trade-off. The increased specialization of resources (with National Guard divisions specialized in CS/CSS and MOOTW) reduces the opportunity cost of MOOTW engagement.[77] With restructured National Guard divisions, an increase in MOOTW produces a relatively smaller opportunity cost in terms of foregone warfighting capacity. In Exhibit 10, the opportunity cost of engaging in MOOTW at level "Y" is shown as A'B'< AB.

In general, the use of National Guard divisions to conduct non-combatant military functions complements the world-wide stationing of AC units to support Overseas Presence. Such a role also frees AC maneuver forces from non-combatant distractions,

thereby enhancing combat readiness and the credibility Power Projection.



Exhibit 10. Enhanced Mission Capabilitites

OTHER BENEFITS. Besides improving the efficiency of military resource utilization, restructuring the National Guard divisions produces other benefits. The new role and structure of National Guard divisions can improve Trinitarian support for military operations. Harry Summers notes that committing RC forces is "the ideal instrument to revitalize the 'Remarkable Trinity' by stiffening Congressional backbone and encouraging Congress's active support."[78] A corollary to this argument, proposed by General Creighton Abrams, is that the reliance on RC forces acts as a check on military force deployment to those circumstances in

which the civilian leadership can build a base of public support. The use of RC forces mitigates against "half measures and waffling followed by denial of responsibility."[79]

The multi-purpose division concept is consistent with maintaining some "strategic hedge" capacity. Besides supervising the training and mobilization of its subordinate units, each National Guard division headquarters can continue to train as a warfighting entity. In case of national emergency the division headquarters could mobilize to command and control division-size combat units comprised of National Guard Enhanced Brigades or as cadre units to backfill committed AC forces in the United States.

A redefined role and structure for National Guard divisional forces is cost effective. Non-deployed RC forces cost as little as 25% of their AC counterparts.[80] The National Guard divisions require less than .5% of the total Department of Defense budget, about 2.3% of the Army budget allocation.[81] The elimination of the entire National Guard division structure would not provide a substantial bill-payer for other new or existing Army programs.

Finally, redesigned National Guard divisions provide improved resources for the Guard's other mission, state emergency duty. Although the analysis presented in this paper has focused on the National Guard's federal mission, these units also have

the mission to respond to state emergencies. The types of units described in Exhibit 6 are well suited to the natural disaster and law enforcement missions typical of state emergency duty. Equipment and training to support CS/CSS and MOOTW requirements are much more consistent with state duty requirements than are those for combat maneuver units.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The elements of national military strategy are out of balance. While the potential threats to national security are well recognized in the NSS and NMS, current concepts for using military forces are not in harmony with efficient use of available resources and policy objectives. To correct the imbalance, this analysis recommends that policy makers involved in the force structure assessment process do the following: (1) Explicitly include both warfighting and MOOTW requirements in the force structure assessment process. (2) Evaluate force structure deficiencies in terms of specific functional and unit requirements. (3) Apply the multi-purpose division concept to reorganize National Guard divisions in conformance with force structure deficiencies arising from CS/CSS and MOOTW requirements. (4) Utilize National Guard divisions as force

generating headquarters for specific missions under the "U.S. Volunteers" concept.

The National Guard has potential to contribute as an active, successful participant in the National Military Strategy. The key is to mesh strategic concepts that capture the comparative advantage of the eight National Guard divisions with the other elements of the military force structure. A redefined structure and role for National Guard divisions, based on "deployment flexibility," can make them relevant partners in promoting stability and thwarting aggression.

ENDNOTES

[1] A "peace dividend" is the concept of increased civilian production and consumption capacity made possible through a reallocation of resources from military to civilian use, usually associated with the termination of conflict.

[2]The issue of the eight National Guard divisions is particularly controversial since these forces are not allocated in current warfighting plans. The National Guard divisions are widely seen as a potential bill-payer in the downsizing process. See General Accounting Office, Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, 14 March 1996), 4.

[3]Military power is an input-output process. The productive potential of the total force is not simply the summation of the capabilities of individual units, but is derived from the synergy gained by integrating the fire power of each service and component.

[4]Dennis J. Reimer, "U.S. Army, Maintaining a Solid Framework While Building for the Future," Army (October 1995): 24.

[5]Eric K. Shinseki, "The Army's Unique Contribution to the Nation and the Joint Team," Army (October 1996): 122. See also, Brian J. Dunn, "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission," Army (November 1996): 9.

[6]Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the Middle East, (Washington: Department of Defense, May 1995). See also John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Army National Guard and the Conservation of Combat Power," Parameters 25 (Autumn 1996): 4.

[7]Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Global Threats and Challenges to the United States and Its Interests Abroad, report prepared by Patrick M. Hughes, 5 February 1997, 8-13.

[8]Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, The Next War (Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 1997), xxiv.

[9]Steven Metz has defined terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant

targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." See Steven Metz, "To Insure Domestic Tranquillity: Terrorism and the Price of Global Engagement," in Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front, ed. Stephen C. Pelletier (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, 1995), 1.

[10]The indirect threat arises from (1) the violence and general instability produced by the emergence of non-state actors with the capacity and will to challenge the primacy of the state, and (2) the ability of terrorists to exacerbate hostilities in regions in which the U.S. has national interests.

[11]Geoffrey B. Demarest, "Beefing Up at the Low End," Military Review (June 1993): 54.

[12]Office of National Drug and Policy Control, Pulse Check in National Trends in Drug Abuse (Washington: Executive Office of the President, 1996), 5,6.

[13]Statistics and Quantitative Analysis, Integration and Regional Programs Department, 1 January 1997, <http://iadb6000.iadb.org/int_data/bop24.html>, 5 March 1997.

[14]Barry R. McCaffrey, Reducing Drug Use and Its Consequences in America (Washington: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1996), 4.

[15]The classified version of the U.S. national drug strategy is contained in Presidential Decision Directive 14. In addition to interdiction and eradication, the counter drug strategy also involves replacing narco-economies with legitimate productive activities. The strategy is summarized in McCaffrey, 4-7.

[16]McCaffrey, 7.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid, 9. Current U.S. federal law prohibits military deployment for domestic law enforcement, with the exception of National Guard forces mobilized under the authority of the state governor.

[19]Phillip A. Behm and Wilbur E. Gray, Alternative Missions for the Army (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 1992), 11.

[20]Stephen Sloan, "Terrorism: How Vulnerable is the United States?," in Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front ed. Stephen C. Pelletier (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, 1995), 2.

[21]Bill Gertz, "General Predicts High Priority for U.S. Peacekeeping," Washington Times (8 January 1997): 4. During the last major strategy assessment, the 1993 Bottom Up Review, MOOTW was not an issue. Fogelman further noted that it is somewhat ironic that warfighting requirements, the lack of a peer military competitor, and speculation about the likelihood of one or more major regional contingencies dominate force structure assessment while MOOTW-related threats dominate actual and expected future operations.

[22]Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. Arthur F. Lykke (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, 1993), 5.

[23]The National Military Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement establishes two objectives: to "promote stability" and to "thwart aggression". These objectives are to be achieved through the strategic concepts of "Overseas Presence" and "Power Projection", and are further defined in terms of three components and five supporting tasks. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), I. See also The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February, 1996), 13.

[24]Shinseki, 119.

[25]Richard F. Ballard, "U.S. Power Projection Capability and Rear Area Security," The Land Warfare Papers 25 (September 1996): 1.

[26]The White House, 14.

[27]These missions may included counterterrorism, non-combatant evacuation, counter-narcotics operations, special assistance to nations, humanitarian relief, and disaster relief. See The White House, 13.

[28]Ibid, 2-3.

[29]Joint Chiefs of Staff, ii.

[30]General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1995), 3. This view is also stated in a variety of other works. For example, see Harry G. Summers, The New World Strategy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 220. See also Brinkerhoff, 5-6.

[31]Shinseki, 120.

[32] Tom Breen, "Two Conflicts Plus Peacekeeping May Be Unrealistic Goal," Defense Daily, (22 October 1996): 119.

[33] Travis L. Hooper, "Future Role and Structure of the Force XXI National Guard," Strategic Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, 1996) 11. See also, William T. Pendley, "Mortgaging the Future to the Present Defense Policy: A Commentary on the Bottom-Up Review," Strategic Review, (Spring 1994): 37.

[34]Summers, 225. See also, Dunn, 2.

[35]General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability, 3.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid, 8.

[38]Gene Piskator, "Force Structure Overview," Transportation Corps (Summer 1996): 2.

[39]Ballard, 2.

[40]National Guard divisional target acquisition units mobilized for recent peacekeeping rotations include those from

the 28th, 34th, 35th, 38th, 42d and 49th divisions. See National Guard Bureau, "National Guard Divisional Units Utilized During Recent Deployments," Information Paper, Washington, 5 March 1997.

[41]Breen, 119.

[42]Melvin R. Laird, "Looking Back to Our Future," National Guard Magazine (December 1995): 20.

[43]Exhibit 3 is a standard Production Possibilities Model depicting production trade-offs between two goods that can be produced with the same resource set. As the production of one good increases (requiring more resources) the production of the other necessarily decreases. The height of curve AZ depends on the quality and quantity of resources devoted to production of military services. The designation discrete categories for WPPC and MOOTW abstracts from concept that military activities lie on a continuum. However, this distinction is widely used and offers useful insights into the examination of mission capability.

[44]Warfighting Power Projection Capacity (WPPC) is typically measured in terms of ability to prosecute some number of major regional conflicts. Because MOOTW force requirements are highly variable, units of measure for MOOTW are less clearly defined.

[45]As noted in a previous section, actual warfighting capability, represented by point "A" in Exhibit 3, is probably less that two major regional conflicts or major theater wars. See Pendley, 38.

[46]Breen, 119.

[47]This view directly contradicts the political forces driving the Quadrenial Defense Review, and is not likely to be adopted at any stage of the review process.

[48]Adoption of a resource-based approach to force structure decisions is viewed by most senior military leaders as the greatest potential pitfall in force structure assessment. See Pendley, 37.

[49]Maneuver, especially at higher unit levels, is heavily dependent on the integration and synchronization of team skills requiring substantial training time. Former Army Chief of Staff

Gordon Sullivan concluded that it would take one year to prepare an Reserve Component maneuver division for combat. CS/CSS requirements, although often demanding sophisticated individual training and skills, requires less integration at higher unit levels. Sun Tzu noted that maneuver is the most difficult military art. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford Press, 1963), 102.

[50]Ninety-seven percent of National Guard CS/CSS units were certified as "deployable" on their mobilization date. See David E. Goff, Mobilization and Unit Readiness Status (Carlisle: United States Army War College, 1993), 10.

[51]General Accounting Office, Combat Brigades' Ability to be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 1995), 40. See also, General Accounting Office, Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1991), 25. See also, Hooper, 13.

[52]Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Bold Shift Task Force, report prepared by Gordon R. Sullivan, 22 February 1992, 347.

[53]David E. Goff, Mobilization and Unit Readiness Status, (Carlisle: United States Army War College, 1993), 7.

[54]Joint Chiefs of Staff, i.

[55]Joint Chiefs of Staff, I. The need to restructure military forces for the next century is described in Joint Chiefs of Staff, ii-2. The analysis in this paper suggests a concept for utilizing National Guard divisions consistent with the existing National Military Strategy. Other authors suggest that the National Military Strategy itself should be revised to reflect the existing warfighting capability of the national Guard divisions. See Brinkerhoff,.

[56]Brinkerhoff, 4. See also, National Guard Bureau, The Future of Guard Divisions: A Context for the Debate (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1996), 6.

[57]National Guard Bureau, 6.

[58]Commission on Roles and Missions, Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 May 1995), 2.24.

[59]General Accounting Office, Army National Guard: Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size of Those Forces, 4.

[60]National Guard Enhanced Brigades are much better suited to providing rapid deployment maneuver capability.

[61]The ambiguity of National Guard division contribution to the ends of National Military Strategy is related to current under-resourcing of National Guard divisions relative to Enhanced Brigades and non-divisional units. See Robert L. Goldich, Army Reserve Component Reforms and the Bottom Up Review, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1994), 11.

[62]The White House, 18.

[63]The Strategic Hedge concept is not inherently flawed. However, maintenance of a strategic reserve may not be a sufficiently high priority given other national objectives and resource constraints.

[64]The rhetoric surrounding the future of National Guard divisions generally focuses on means or ends. Those focusing on "means" typically recommend elimination of National Guard divisions as useless. See Gordon R. Sullivan, 347. Those focusing on "ends" advocate a revision of strategy to embrace a role compatible with current division structure. See Brinkerhoff, 4. Neither of these views reflects understanding the requirements of the National Military Strategy and the potential utility of National Guard divisions.

[65]National Guard Bureau, "Army National Guard Redesign Overview: How We Would Look into the Future," Information Paper, Washington, 1996.

[66]General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability, 4.

[67]Ibid, 7.

[68]Ibid, 2.

[69]Ibid, 6.

[70]Ibid, 8.

[71]These multi-purpose division structure concepts are based on Demarest, 54.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Active Duty, U.S. Code, Title 10, Chapter 1209 (1996).

[74]IRR members cannot be activated without declaration of national emergency or war.

[75]Active Duty, U.S. Code, Title 10, Chapter 1209, Section 12311.(a) (1996).

[76]The White House, 13.

[77]The reduction in opportunity cost holds up to the point where all National Guard division force are committed to MOOTW. After that point, opportunity cost behaves as in the original case.

[78]Harry Summers, On Strategy II, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 22.

[79]Ballard, 18.

[80]"Revamped National Guard: No Cuts but More Support Jobs," Washington Post, 7 November 1996, 3.

[81]Association of the United State Army, Army Budget, (Washington: Institute of Land Warfare, May 1996), 59.

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