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**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:
IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT**

BY

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USAWC Strategic Research Project

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**North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
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**U . S . Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
April 7, 1997**

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: John Vaagland, Col, Norwegian Army

TITLE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Implications Related to Eastward Enlargement

FORMAT: USAWC Strategic Research Project

DATE: 7 April 1997 Pages: Total 40
Classification: Unclassified

NATO enlargement is a key issue both within NATO and in the context of alternative future security alignments in Europe involving NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU).

This paper examines the most crucial implications of the ongoing enlargement process and what has to be done prior to the very important summer summit in Madrid this year, 50 years after President Truman's Marshall Plan.

The study concludes that the main issue as far as Western security is concerned is not a hasty enlargement of NATO but rather how to guarantee peaceful relations between Russia and NATO. The West must understand that the costs of Russia's being forced to move away from the West could far exceed any advantages gained through NATO enlargement. And finally, US leadership as a super-power within NATO, has never been more important than it is today to avoid polarization of European Security policy. Without broad-based, active US involvement the European security architecture will be less effective and will lose credibility. The US has the unique role as the leading security partner of the world's **principal democracies** and with unparalleled military assets to display influence as an international leader.

***NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO):
IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT***

INTRODUCTION.

Today Europe is characterized by rapid change. As the stable, fairly predictable, though very dangerous Cold War era is replaced by a climate that is less dangerous, Europe remains characterized by instability and unpredictability.

The political, economic and social upheavals in Europe since 1989 have resulted in fundamental changes in the nature of European security policy. This process of change is likely to continue. The challenge of today includes utilizing new opportunities to develop patterns of security and cooperation. We now have a unique opportunity to build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. The aim of an improved security architecture is to provide increased stability and security for all states in the Euro-Atlantic area, without creating new dividing lines.

In this transition process, NATO enlargement is a key issue both within NATO and in the context of alternative future security alignments in Europe involving the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The states in Central and Eastern Europe are seeking membership in NATO, EU and WEU. NATO has responded with outreach programs, most recently the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. NATO leaders affirmed in their 1991 Summit and reaffirmed in their 1994 Summit that

they expect and welcome NATO enlargement as an evolutionary process in which PfP will play an important role. In the ensuing public debate, various officials have made many arguments in favor of enlargement, arguments against it, and arguments to defer it.¹

There appears to be general support in the American and European states, including the United States Congress, and the executive branches in the NATO states for inviting Central and Eastern European states to join NATO. But no decisions have been made nor have dates been established. Russian officials are ambivalent but often object to expansion of NATO. The key challenge now is how to enlarge NATO in a cooperative, non-confrontational way that does not incite new antagonisms and divisions.

This paper is going to address *the most important or crucial implications* of the ongoing process to enlarge NATO eastward. The paper will focus on the issues/implications in the following way:

- **INTRODUCTION**
 - *Describing the Security Environment (Risks and Challenges)*
 - *Recent History of NATO*
 - *Reasons for Enlargement*
- **DISCUSSION OF THE CRUCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENLARGEMENT**
 - *Impact on NATO's Reform Process*
 - *Impact on Russia*
 - *Impact on Central and Eastern Europe*
 - *Impact on Western Europe*
 - *Impact on the United States (US) Interests*

- Regional Confidence and Security-Building - a Norwegian Perspective

- *CONCLUSION*
- *RECOMMENDATIONS.*

The Security Environment.

The world security environment, especially as it applies to the European environment, changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. German unification took place, Czechoslovakia split up, and on the ruins of the two totalitarian federations, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 20 new states were formed. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved, and new institutions, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the PfP, were created within NATO. The fact is, hundreds of millions of Europeans emerged from the shadow of tyranny to the sunlight of democracy and freedom. And, though many perished within the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe in the cause of human rights of free expression, NATO itself has not fired a shot.²

Risk and Challenges.

The old menace of a single, large, aggressive foe is gone, but in its place we face multidirectional and multifaceted risks. Of particular concern, we are faced with an arc of instability from Morocco to the Indian Ocean.³

Since the Cold War, there has been a fundamental change in the character of the threats to peace and stability in Europe. Instead of emanating from conflicts between states, the most serious security risks emerging in post-war Europe stem from conflicts within states. With this change in the substance of security, a broader understanding of the concept of security is needed. The new factors demanding attention include ethnic and religious as well as

environmental degradation, organized crime, terrorism, unresolved territorial borders and large-scale population movements. European leaders are addressing these issues. For example, cooperation in preventing and combating international terrorism and crime has become a priority at the regional and sub-regional level. We may identify four principal categories of risk as follow:

- *The resurfacing of unresolved territorial, ethnic, and religious conflicts accompanied by the absence of democratic and self-governmental institutions capable of accommodating the new problems of ethnic, national, religious and language groups.*
- *Political instabilities associated with the transformation of a totalitarian, one-party system to a pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law. For example, abuses of power by uncontrolled and unconstrained interest groups and lack of civil and democratic control of police powers and the armed forces.*
- *Social tensions stemming from the transformation of a centrally planned economy to a market economy. For example, mass unemployment and erosion of the social safety net.*
- *Environmental hazards posed by poorly designed, unsafe nuclear power facilities and obsolete chemical manufacturing facilities.⁴*

The end of the Cold War has given us a historic opportunity to unite Europe in a new pattern of mutual cooperation and trust. Most likely our greatest single task or challenge for the rest of this century is gradual expansion of the borders of Western Europe to the east of our continent.

NATO's Recent History.

In recent years, the NATO alliance has undergone a major transformation by successfully adapting to new situations. No organization can survive successfully for almost 50 years without

adjusting to a changing environment. In response to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Alliance began a historic transformation that continues today. New goals were set forth in NATO's London Summit Declaration of July 1990. NATO declared that it no longer considered Russia an adversary and announced a new program for cooperation open to all the former communist states of the East. Just as important, NATO called for a restructuring of its military ties between NATO and the countries of what was then the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

In June 1991, in Copenhagen, NATO continued its evolution by a statement declaring: «We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see new divisions of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free». This objective has guided NATO's policies ever since. It remains the foundation of NATO's current efforts to extend security throughout Europe.⁵

The work begun at the London Summit came to fruition in the NATO Summit in Rome in November 1991, when the Alliance adapted a new Strategic Concept which committed NATO to a broad approach to stability and security. The new Strategic Concept reaffirmed the continuing importance of collective defense. It also clearly identified the changing European security landscape and sought to encourage the changes that were underway in the East. The strategy stressed dialogue and partnership with the emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact. It identified for the first time the importance of addressing *security threats beyond the NATO area*, establishing the basis for peacekeeping and coalition crisis management operations as important NATO missions. In pursuit of these objectives, the forces and missions of NATO's integrated military commands were radically restructured to better deal with the new security environment in Europe.

Another manifestation of NATO's commitment to an inclusive Europe was its creation of the NACC at the same Rome Summit. This established a new institutional framework for consultation and cooperation on political and security issues between NATO and the former communist states of the East. The US played a very important role in this process.

In 1992, NATO took the unprecedented step of declaring its willingness to make its resources and expertise available on a case-by-case basis for peacekeeping activities outside NATO territory under the responsibility of the OSCE and the United Nations (UN).

The next milestone was the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, where the US launched three important initiatives that markedly accelerated NATO's transformation. These were the PfP, the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and the counter-proliferation initiatives. At the same Summit they also addressed expansion of NATO, reaffirming that the Alliance is open to new members. They referred to the provisions of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding accession by additional states.⁶

In Fall 1995, NATO presented the results of its internal study on the political and practical aspects of an enlargement. This study is based on the fundamental principle that enlargement should promote stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, and that it must be compatible with a continued fulfillment of NATO's core functions.

The conclusion so far is that the NATO countries have been relatively successful in adjusting the policies and programs of the Alliance to the new international realities in Europe by creating NACC and PfP program to promote consultations and cooperation between the allies and the former Warsaw Pact states, former Soviet republics and former neutrals.⁷ However, they have been more reluctant to make fundamental structural changes to the Alliance itself and the CJTF

initiative, as a partial consequence, remains to be implemented.⁸ Even though some allies were reluctant to call the IFOR a CJTF, the alliance should nonetheless use the operation as a test case for command and decision-making procedures to be agreed for future CJTF operations.

Reasons for Enlargement.

As mentioned earlier, the end of the Cold War has given us a historic opportunity to unite Europe in a pattern of mutual cooperation and trust. The greatest single task for the rest of this century is to gradually expand the political and economic stability which we take for granted in the West to the eastern portion of the European continent. This will acknowledge that Central and Eastern European countries have important cultural and social contributions to make.

NATO has brought in new members at various times in the past on the basis of the *Washington Treaty of 1949*, raising, over time, the number of allies to 16. The benefits of this earlier enlargement process went far beyond collective defense and security. It helped to develop close political relations among Allies. It also helped to improve their economic conditions, and to strengthen their democratic institutions. This created stability within and among the member countries right up to the present time. The Eastern and Central Europe's democrats well understand that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic, and military community. The Western NATO countries, too, previously understood this link as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. That nation might never have become a stable Western democracy had it not been accepted into NATO's fold. Similarly, NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and even contained the regional chronicle rivalries between Greece and Turkey. Those who insist that democratic credentials must be

presented prior to alliance membership should remember that the need for a stable security framework is greatest when democracy is most fragile and threatened.⁹

In Fall 1995, NATO presented the results of its internal study on the political aspects of an enlargement. This study is based on the previously stated fundamental principle that enlargement should promote stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. This perspective is a logical continuation of NATO's function of ensuring a European security environment that supports the interests of its member states. It also recognizes the need to integrate new democracies within the Western security community to avoid their slipping back toward totalitarian regimes engaging in regional conflicts that could spread beyond their borders.

Bringing in new members would send a signal to any potential aggressor that it would pay a substantial price for any expansionist ambitions against nations which have become a part of the larger Western community of nations. An expanded NATO also would reinforce the post-World War II effort to incorporate Germany in a broader European framework. And, it would make it highly unlikely that the region to NATO's immediate east would emerge as an unstable geopolitical vacuum between Germany and Russia. Finally, enlargement will even enhance NATO's credibility in Central and Eastern Europe.

The July 1997 Madrid Summit will mark the moment when the internal process of NATO enlargement will be finalized. Of the many critical decisions that NATO has made, or will ever make, the enlargement question at the Madrid Summit will be most likely the most crucial one. Prior to this meeting, however, the crucial question for the NATO countries to consider is the implications relating to the «how and when» of NATO enlargement.

DISCUSSION OF THE CRUCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Impact on NATO's Reform Process.

NATO has been the leading, and most active successful security organization in Europe for nearly a half century, playing a role, if not the key role, in ensuring security in the North Atlantic area. It is the foundation of the Trans-Atlantic link between North America and Europe. Member states devote more attention and resources to NATO than to any other international, security-related institution. Members engage in daily consultations by permanent representatives to NATO institutions, regular meetings of foreign ministers, infrequent summit meeting of heads of government and states, commitment of financial resources to support NATO activities, regular meetings of defense ministers and chiefs of military staffs, commitment of military forces, and participation in the integrated military command structure.

Parallel with NATO's important enlargement discussion and internal Enlargement Study, NATO has been negotiating a new Trans-Atlantic agreement. The negotiations to date have been shaped largely by the problems in Bosnia, NATO's enlargement, and relations with Russia. NATO's future role will depend to a large extent on the result of these negotiations. They will determine how NATO adapts itself to the new security environment.

According to the Communiqué of the NATO Defense Ministers during the December 1996 North Atlantic Council (NAC) session in Brussels, NATO has done much to adapt itself to meet the new security challenges it faces in the changed strategic environment in Europe. At the 1990, 1991, and 1994 Summits, the leaders of the Alliance set out the broad vision of a new NATO and its role in the development of a new European security architecture. They agreed to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness, to strengthen the Trans-Atlantic link, to develop the European

Security Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, to expand effort beyond the core function of collective defense to crisis management; and to foster partnership and cooperation throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.¹⁰ As mentioned earlier, special emphasis was put on the fact that the Alliance is now preparing for the July 1997 summit in Madrid. This summit, 50 years after President Truman's Marshall Plan, will most likely determine the first enlargement phase.

In order to secure NATO for the future, NATO must develop and accommodate the following crucial issues:

- *Reach a consensus on what NATO's future mission should be*
- *Preserve and nurture the Trans-Atlantic link.*
- *Finalize the ongoing adaptation of the future command structure of the Alliance and implement the CJTF concept.*
- *Develop the ESDI relations to NATO in the future command structure to reflect a better way to increase the influence and responsibility of the European countries, including relations with the WEU.*
- *Increase the involvement of France on a regularized basis.*
- *Further develop and strengthen special cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.*
- *Finance an enlarged Alliance, the need for infrastructure investments, and the willingness and ability of new members to adapt to the consensus-based NATO structure.*
- *Create policy for counter-proliferation initiatives.*

Having completed the new security agreement which includes accommodation of most of these issues, the Allies then can prepare to open accession negotiations with any state that has demonstrated the will and ability to meet the requirements of NATO membership. If that can be done in 1998, NATO and EU enlargement negotiations may be put on a parallel track, with the date for accession depending on circumstances of individual candidate nations.

Because of all these issues what is not needed now, from a strictly NATO perspective, is a revived debate on a rapid expansion to the east, or even a specific timetable for admission of particular Central and East European countries.

Impact on Russia.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Russia emerged with about one-half of the population, three-quarters of the territory, and the lion's share of the armed forces and nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. The transition from a totalitarian empire to democracy has just started, and the political situation is far from stable. Because of all that, Russia's position in the world is dramatically weakened. At the same time, Russia with its geostrategic location, its armed forces and nuclear weaponry, its science and technology, its natural resources, and its highly educated labor force is potentially a global power. Nevertheless, Russia in its present state is in possession of an enormous military potential. Both in the nuclear and in the conventional sector it has, as before, and will continue to have, the largest military potential in Europe. Even after the year 2005, Russia will have at its disposal about 3250 strategic nuclear weapons assuming all disarmament agreements will be technically realized. And this contradiction between current weakness and potential greatness has a great impact on, and may determine Russia's position in the post Cold War world.

An acknowledgment of such an interpretation was made by the former Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, when he was asked about NATO expansion in a TV program produced for CNBC Europe last fall. He stated:

It does concern the interests of any European state. I think it was kind of mishandled by the US and Western partners and by NATO itself. It was made in a little bit of a hasty way and in a rough way instead of giving Russia a period to accommodate and discuss those things and be better prepared. I always suggested it to my counterparts in the West so I have a right to say it now. But it was blown out of proportion in Russia and there was an attempt and there is still an attempt to re-create a kind of enemy image, that this monster is coming to us which I challenge also. I think there is total mismanagement of the problem. I lost on that ground when I was in administration. But I am sure that I will win the day in the end and in the end the Russia people just won't buy the re-creation of an enemy image in NATO and thus an arrangement will be found which is not so much an ideological matter; it's just a diplomatic technique - how to be assured that Russia has its place in Europe that it has a stable relationship with NATO, and that expansion when and if it comes does not create new barriers in Europe. If things I can address in professional way and I think the way out is to address those things not in ideological confrontational ways but just business like professional way and there is a way out.¹¹

By saying that, he is saying Russia is anxious about the implications of NATO enlargement for its near term as well as its mid term. And if NATO is taking account of Moscow's legitimate concerns, the Western countries could help Russia to affirm itself as a stable, active, and

influential member of the international community, sharing with the West the basic values of political democracy, market economy and a non-aggressive foreign policy.¹²

President Clinton raised the issue of a new dividing line when he made his presentation at the NATO Summit meeting in January 1994 in support of the program and against immediately admitting the Visegrad (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) states to NATO:¹³

Why should we, now, draw a new line through Europe just a little further east? Why should we, now, do something which could foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the security of all its European neighbors. The best possible future would be a democratic government in every one of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, all committed to market cooperation, to common security, and to democratic ideals. We should not foreclose that possibility.

The President went on to say that « *the Pfp enables us to prepare for and work toward enlargement of NATO when other countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO responsibilities*» and «*enables us to do it in a way that gives us time to reach out to Russia and to other nations of the former Soviet Union — in a way that leaves open the possibility of a future for Europe that breaks totally from the destructive past we have known*».

As the US President and the former Russian foreign minister underlined, history has taught us the importance of Central and Eastern Europe to world peace. Two World Wars and the Cold War were fought this century primarily over the territory between Russia and Germany. So, enlargement would be a mistake if it were to result in the development of new dividing lines or the resurrection of old ones.

This implies a role and a place for Russia. As a major power on the European continent, Russia must have a central position in the future security policy architecture in Europe. Russia is in the process of defining its position and role. Many pieces have yet to fall into place. Russia is clearly seeking to reassert its position as a major power on the European continent.¹⁴ This is reflected in its skepticism regarding NATO enlargement.¹⁵ Russian politicians need to formulate and promote their national interests and must be seen in this context. Nationalistic currents in Russia politics reinforce this tendency. Russia is currently in a difficult transitional phase, one in which the development of democracy and a market economy demands enormous effort throughout the country. Therefore, we must continue to support the forces of democracy in the country and help to promote economic and social advances. The development of broad, political, military, and economic cooperation with Russia is one of the most important elements in a new European security structure in order to maintain their focus towards Europe as a Eurasian state. But this cooperation is not open-ended. In order to avoid a return to the old pattern of East-West conflicts, it will require a careful Western strategy of managing the difficult and sometime prickly relationship with Russia. In particular, it is important to take special precautions to avoid a Russian perception of Western encirclement, since it would inevitably weaken democratic forces in Moscow in favor of nationalists around the country. The reform process itself might then be seriously endangered.¹⁶ But we must require that the Russians abide by basic principles and the agreements which they have signed.

Broad Russian participation and input are essential to any new European structure. Without Russian participation and cooperation, we will not achieve the security to which countries in the Euro-Atlantic area are entitled. In the process of enlarging NATO, NATO-Russian relations must

be based on reciprocity, mutual respect, and confidence. We must avoid «surprise» decisions by either side which could affect the interests of the other. Implementation of Russia's Individual Partnership Program under the PfP and our dialogue and cooperation with Russia beyond PfP will be important steps in this direction.

By using all available political, economic, and security organizations, Russia must be drawn fully into the peace efforts of the international community. International mediation efforts in which Russia plays an active part will have a greater impact on the contending parties. Regional cooperation such as the Barents Cooperation, the Council of Baltic Sea States, and the Interim Agreement between EU and Russia is an important element in the confidence-building process. Another example is to meet the desire of Russian leaders to be part of the global decision-making process (G-7). Involving Moscow is also important as a means of giving a democratic Russia a share of the responsibility for and greater participation in the future European security structure. Greater participation will mean more responsibility for Russia itself.

It is necessary to understand that Russia, as one of our allies during World War II, suffered the loss of 1.5 million soldiers liberating European countries from fascism. Further, we must not forget that Russia is still fundamental to the equilibrium in Europe. The main issue as far as European security is concerned is not an enlargement of NATO but relations between Russia and the North Atlantic alliance. A compromise needs to be reached with Russia that will reassure it that its interests are considered and that it remains an important international actor. NATO must take Russia's vital interests into account without giving them a veto over NATO enlargement. This means to enhance the political framework for NATO-Russian relations and institutionalizes security cooperation and establish better mutual political consultations.

Impact on Central and Eastern Europe.

The most imminent risk category in Europe is the political change process in Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the renaissance of nationalism and religious fanaticism. The outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia (FYUG) meant the return of war to Europe. Taking the variety of unresolved territorial and ethnic problems into consideration, the urgent necessity of political solution for that region becomes quite obvious. The common military efforts of the United States, Europe, and countries from Asia and Africa currently protect an unstable and insecure peace in Bosnia Herzegovina. If Europe, in concert with the US, fails to make clear that the law of the strongest has to yield to the strength of the law, the Yugoslavian tragedy will expand. Even this, however, might only be a prelude. The case of Yugoslavia reveals how urgently the definition of common political goals in Europe is required. On the other hand, it also reveals that armed forces will still be necessary in the future to take preventive and containing action. Although this may be heard with reluctance here and there, the past few years in Europe have clearly proven that words of the Prussian King Frederick II unfortunately still characterize the reality of our world: «Diplomacy without weapons is like music without instruments».

The other counties of the Central and Eastern European region are still striving to overcome the huge economic problems left behind as the Communist era ended. To get out of the rubble of 45 years of a centrally planned economy, with a total exploitation of capital investment and unbelievable exploitation of the ecology and total lack of investment in infrastructure will require between 3 to 5 decades. The hidden figure of unemployment in the socialist system was approximately 30%. Therefore Germany with its eastern part and the other European countries,

will have to face many problems in the process of rebuilding Europe in addition to the work all are involved in, in maintaining highly complex societies under rapidly changing conditions.

For this the Central and Eastern European countries need assistance and help by the rest of the Western countries as well as the reassurance that they will not be pushed back again into suppression or into having their minds made up for them by their powerful neighbor in the east. All of them see membership in the EU as the best solution for their economic problems, while NATO is seen as best suited for the security aspect. Poland and the Czech Republic are driven by another reason. The unification of Germany has awakened their old anxieties from the past, to be threatened and dominated again by the German neighbor. A Germany, however, which is bound and controlled in an enlarged and deepened EU and in an intact NATO, and thereby for the first time in its history West oriented would not be regarded as a risk any longer.

For each of these countries, the main perspective is that to become a member of the EU and NATO will have stabilizing effects, and their efforts are being directed therefore to fulfill the membership prerequisites.¹⁷ It is clearly in Western Europe's interest to include the Central and Eastern European states into the guaranteed zone of EU and NATO jurisdiction, to liberate them from the old « Interim Status» when they fulfill the requirements for joining the respective organizations, and thereby finishing the next step of a history characterized by the rise and fall of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, Hitler's Third Reich, and the Soviet Empire.¹⁸

However, those states which desire to be integrated into this zone most urgently, probably remain to a certain extent excluded. The three Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine have to be seen to be in the most sensitive position, because, over and above NATO relations, they bring into play relations between the US and Russia and the question how large a security organization like

NATO might be. Offers to intensify NATO's PfP were welcomed by head of states of those states but nevertheless judged insufficient to cope with their security requirements. In fact, their common border with Russia and in the case of Estonia and Latvia the presence of large-Russian-speaking communities explain the reluctance of NATO, and especially the US, to provide them with a security guarantee that also might cover nuclear aspects.

There can be no doubt that the current status as associated partners in WEU will not satisfy the security requirements of these states nor the prospect of EU membership unless this coincides with NATO membership. This indicates the immense problems linked to membership in the various organizations such as NATO, EU and WEU. These organizations should theoretically be congruent in the final status, but this status could be achieved in different time phases. However, whether this can be actually realized still needs to be shown as the sensitive example of the Baltic states demonstrates. It brings up the credibility of the EU and WEU as well as NATO but the current situation, especially with regard to Russia, does not allow more than close coordination and cooperation with the Baltic states.¹⁹ Substantive security guarantees will not be possible in the foreseeable future.

However, as NATO proceeds, it risks separating Western and Central Europe from Eastern Europe and creating a strategic vacuum in the East. States in this region are concerned because they will have no firm security framework, and they may have to deal with a Russia which is more aggressive in response to enlargement.

The West must design a better security framework for Eastern Europe before NATO enlarges. This could be a combination of regional security arrangements, a stronger PfP with a

significant political component, bilateral efforts with countries like Ukraine, and finally and most important build a new unique strategic relationship and partnership with Russia.

Impact on Western Europe.

We must never lose sight of the fact that Europe is a patchwork of different nation states, ethnic groups, languages, religions and culture. Throughout history, alliances have shifted following the rivalries between the great European powers. The fundamental achievement of Western Europe and North America after the Second World War was the common experience and understanding that peace and stability on the European continent must be built on integration and cooperation. NATO has successfully protected Western Europe from the threat of war. The European Union has contributed to the integration of the economic and political life of the member states to the degree that war between them is unthinkable.²⁰

We realize today more than ever that the interests that bind us together in Europe have become far greater than the differences that divided us for centuries. European cooperation cannot be built on confrontation. The «balance of power» must be based on solidarity and cooperation between nations and peoples. We have to join forces to prevent ancient competing interests of individual nation states from putting at risk what we so remarkably have achieved in Europe. Real national interests are best served by cooperation and integration to meet challenges which transcend national borders.

While NATO's efforts are primarily related to security and defense policy, the EU has a broader focus in political and economic terms. Strengthening the political and economic ties among European countries is the best way of creating a more stable climate in Europe. In this

process the EU has become the key institution for European cooperation and should play a leading role in the further development of democracy and prosperity on the European continent.

Membership in the EU is of fundamental importance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They demand political attention for their problems, market access for their products, and assistance for their further political and economic reforms. This is an opportunity to tie them firmly into the democratic family of nations.²¹

Support for political and economic reforms and the integration of Central and Eastern European states into European and Euro-Atlantic structures are significant contributions in the enhancement of stability and security throughout Europe. One thing is clear, the EU has become and will remain the main decision-making body for a whole range of issues affecting European interests. Among them are foreign and security policy issues which have a direct bearing on the activities of WEU and NATO. Therefore, the links among the three organizations will have to be further developed and strengthened.

Nevertheless, NATO's reform and enlargement process will need to take into account both the European aspirations to reflect greater European unity in their defense and foreign policies and the US desire that the Europeans share more equitably the burden of defense. It may be difficult to balance these desires with the reality that European cooperation will develop quite slowly. NATO's reform and enlargement cannot be premised on the existence of a single European authority for defense when one is not likely to emerge during the next period of history. NATO will have to be flexible enough to accommodate greater European responsibility and burdens in the relationship with the US. There is no doubt that the EU and WEU have a key role to play in shaping European security and defense.²²

Besides, Western Europe is somewhat divided on the enlargement issue, with Northern Europe generally more interested than Southern Europe. A Western consensus could form around the proposition that NATO enlargement should be tied to EU enlargement. But that may take too long for some in the US and Germany. The reason for that is the spread of instability across the Mediterranean region which includes the Middle East and the Balkans.

Impact on US.

The former American Secretary of State, George Shultz, was asked by CNBC Europe in October of 1996 about NATO enlargement and European relationship, and answered in the following way (the same program in which Andrei Kozyrev participated):

I would expand NATO. I would do it as it seems to at least me, the right thing to do. And obviously, this has to be done as a matter of alliance policy. We have to work with our friends and allies to all come to that point of view and obviously we can talk to the Russians about it. But it really isn't for them to decide. It is for us to decide.

And he continued concerning the Trans-Atlantic relationship:

I think the Trans-Atlantic relationship is a key for the US and we have to keep to reminding ourselves of this. We were sitting here minding our own business and we got drawn into WWI. And we lost a lot of lives and a lot of treasure there. And then we withdrew. And a vindictive peace emerged. And then WW II emerged after 20 years and we got drawn in again. And we got drawn into war in the Pacific and with our allies we won. But after WWII instead of leaving we stayed and we basically led the way to a constructive peace not a vindictive peace. And we opened our markets. And we shared our technology. And we tried to help other people progress and in the process we progressed as well. So I think that's the attitude we want to

take. Our friends in Europe have been a key element in all these developments and we want to stick with them.

US National Security Strategy recognizes both that the world continues to confront the United States with serious threats and that interdependence is inescapable. To protect and advance US interests, American policy must be able to influence the policies and action of others beyond its borders.²³ This mandates that the United States remains engaged abroad, particularly in regions where its most important interests are at stake.²⁴ At the same time, it is essential that US allies and friends share *responsibility* and *the burden* for regional and global security more broadly. The United States and its allies must work together to help build a more peaceful and more prosperous world. This means, among other things, taking pragmatic steps to enlarge the world's community of free-market democracies.

US national security is based on enlarging the community of market-democracies which deter and contain a range of threats to US, her allies and her interests. The three principal components or objectives of this strategy of engagement are *enhancing security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy.*²⁵

These objectives underscore that the only responsible strategy for the United States is one of international engagement. Isolationism in any form would reduce US security by undercutting the United States' ability to influence events abroad that can affect the well-being of Americans in many ways.

In that perspective, NATO has been the leading, most active, and successful security organization in the European area for the nearly half century of its existence, playing a role, if not

the key role, in ensuring security in the North Atlantic area.²⁶ It is the foundation for the Trans-Atlantic link between North America and Europe.

By saying that, the US Administration realizes that active American participation in European security is still essential. A number of initiatives and proposals that are now key elements of the emerging European security architecture were first devised in Washington. These include the NACC and the PfP. The US involvement will be particularly important in the efforts to develop relations with Moscow and to integrate Russia into a political, economic and military cooperation arrangement. It is also important to strengthen democracy and achieve political, economic and social development that will promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia.

Trans-Atlantic solidarity and US participation will also be necessary if we are to have any hope of resolving regional conflicts, intensifying efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and achieve disarmament, thereby reducing the danger of radioactive contamination. Without broad-based, active US involvement, the European security architecture will be less effective and will lose credibility. This would not be in Europe's interest. The European countries, therefore, consider the Trans-Atlantic ties to be of fundamental importance. NATO must continue to play a central role in an effort to promote stability throughout Europe and in the development of relations with Russia as Mr. G. Schultz so precisely underlined.

In the light of change in defense and security issues on the Trans-Atlantic agenda since the end of the Cold War, we must maintain US closer cooperation on a broader agenda. Common interests call for closer cooperation; our many common values and ideals with respect to our views on humanity and society make such cooperation essential.²⁷

In this process American leadership as a superpower within NATO has never been more important than it is today. Maintenance of that leadership position in the Trans-Atlantic Community is critical to the success of the enlargement process. The US's unique role as the leading security partner of the world's *principal democracies* and the US unparalleled military assets give great and important influence as an international leader. Therefore, the US within NATO must lead and strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with the ongoing process and ensure that the timetable is going to be flexibly handled. The collapse of the Soviet Union gives the US new opportunities in concert with other like-minded nations, including Russia, to advance the long-term interests to promote regional stability, enlarge the community of market-democracies, and shape the international environment in favorable ways. This approach would reflect Russia's importance in terms of the size of its territory, population, resources, and defense establishment, including its strategic nuclear capability.

Regional Confidence and Security-Building - a Norwegian Perspective.

For Norway, Trans-Atlantic cooperation and Western European cooperation provide the point of departure. Our contribution to new European security structures is based on these frameworks of cooperation and on our geographical position at the interface between the Atlantic, the European and Russian dimension.

During the Cold War, the situation in the North was characterized by the overall tension between East and West. In addition, the strategic importance of the Kola region was vital for the former Soviet Union. Norwegian security depended heavily on Allied reinforcements in the event of crisis or war.

At the same time, Norwegian security policy included several unilateral restrictions in order to promote stability and the lowest tensions possible in our immediate surroundings. During these years the Norwegian government established certain regulations on Allied military activities in Norway, which are self-imposed peacetime restraints.

In contrast to two of our Nordic neighbors, Sweden and Denmark, Norway has not played a major historical role in the Baltic Sea region. In fact, Norway never became a regional power in that part of Northern Europe. The Norwegian orientation towards the Baltic Sea region, which today includes a variety of cooperation measures, is of rather new date. However, our efforts towards increased participation and cooperation in that region is a natural consequence of the historical transformations of the early nineties, which has given the Baltic Sea region a unique opportunity to change from an area of political confrontation into an area of cooperation and political and economic development. With the absence of the dividing line in Europe, Denmark's, Sweden's, and Finland's membership in the EU, and with the Baltic countries and Poland strengthening their ties towards the West, a new and promising field of cooperation is apparent.

Norway's position as Russia's neighbor in the north, gives us an opportunity to act in the forefront of cooperative relations between East and West. In this context, Norway's link with Russia is being seen in a larger multilateral context, including our allies in NATO, other countries and Russia.

One of Norway's most important contributions to the integration of Russia into international cooperation structures followed an initiative taken by the former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, in 1992.²⁸ He proposed a conference on cross-border regional cooperation in the north to include both Russian and Scandinavian territory.

The Barents Region Cooperation was established in January 1993 when foreign ministers and representatives of the Nordic countries, the EU and Russia signed a declaration on expanded cooperation in the Barents Region in the small Norwegian town of Kirkenes, close to the Norwegian-Russian border. The success of this meeting was the development of the two-tier organization of the Barents Region: A Barents Council of Ministers and a Regional Council.

The Barents region itself covers the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, and Finland and Northwestern Russia, including the counties of Murmansk and Archangel as well as the Republic of Karelia. Right from the beginning, the Barents Cooperation has had two main strategic goals, which are closely related. The first is to establish normal neighborly relations across the former East-West divide in the north. This can be done through a network of cooperation which will have a stabilizing effect on the area as a whole. In this way, one will also be involving Russia more closely in European cooperation. The second goal is to promote economic and social development in the Barents Region itself.

The overriding objective of the Norwegian Government's initiative concerning the Barents Region was, and is still related to security policy in the broadest sense of the word. Regional cooperation in the north can contribute to confidence-building, create interdependence and thus enhance security.²⁹

In the field of security and defense our relations with Russia have developed gradually. The PFP engages in multilateral cooperation with Russia. This network covers a variety of activities. Also, trilateral cooperation between Russia, the US and Norway has been established in order to handle problems related to military pollution. Through these initiatives one hope is to contribute in solving the problems of nuclear waste in the Murmansk area.

One of the main aims of Norway's relations with Russia is to integrate our positive, bilateral ties into regional, European and even broader, international cooperation. The Barents and Baltic Cooperation plays an important role in these efforts.

I am convinced that contributing to stable and sustainable economic development and securing democratic reform are the best ways for European countries to achieve stability and mutual trust in post-Cold War Europe. The Barents and Baltic Cooperation and other initiatives for regional cooperation across the former East-West divide should be seen in this perspective. What is often referred to as the new architecture of Europe cannot be constructed in a way that excludes Russia.

The Norwegian and Nordic involvement in the Baltic Sea and Barents region must, however, be seen in a wider European context. Other Western countries are engaged in various forms of support as well. The Scandinavian countries are not alone in having a clear responsibility to assist our Eastern neighbors and friends. A broader European framework is the only realistic approach to this challenge. This kind of cooperation continues to make a valuable contribution to the construction of the new European House.

CONCLUSION

As NATO proceeds toward the earlier mentioned historical 1997 Madrid Summit, it will be necessary to review a number of issues to which the internal study was only able to devote limited attention.³⁰ These issues comprise; the financing of an enlarged Alliance, including the need for infrastructure investment in new member countries; changing military forces and command structures; defining relationships with EU and WEU; and adapting to the consensus-

based cooperation NATO has developed over the past 50 years. NATO must take the time needed to answer these questions. NATO must put the finishing touches on the reformed command structure to improve the capability to carry out NATO's new mission of crisis management, to enable all Allies to participate fully in the structure, and to contribute to the building of the ESDI.³¹

It is essential that enlargement contribute to the development of security policy structures that safeguard the interests of all the parties involved, whether they are included in the first stage of enlargement or not. The objective is greater security, stability, and predictability both in individual countries and in Europe as a whole. Enlargement would be a mistake, if it were to result in the development of new dividing lines or resurrection of old ones.³²

The goal of the enlargement process must be primarily political. Enlargement should not target any particular country and must be carried out in a way and at a rate which reinforces the basic objectives.³³ If we proceed too quickly, or if the process comes to a standstill, we may upset the favorable, stability-promoting trend we have witnessed over the past few years. Enlargement may also function as insurance against the renationalization of security and defense policy and the emergence of new regional alliances.

As NATO proceeds, it may risk separating Central and Eastern Europe and creating a strategic vacuum in the East. States in the region are concerned because they will have no firm security framework, and they may have to handle a Russia which is more aggressive, either in response to enlargement or because of a radical shift in government. Therefore, NATO must design or create a better security framework for Eastern Europe before NATO expands. This

could be a combination of regional security arrangements including Russia (CIS), and a stronger PfP with a significant political component.

But we must recognize that Russia is fundamental to equilibrium in Europe. NATO and Russia must build a strategic partnership, founded on substance. This requires a role and a place for Russia. As a major power on the European continent, Russia must have a central position in the security architecture which is currently being designed. Broad Russian participation and Russian input are essential to any new European security structure.

NATO could look at unique forms of formal relationship and special arrangements for consultations, communications, and cooperative programs. A treaty or other formal agreement (collective security) between NATO and Russia (CIS) might be developed. Regular contact between military representatives of NATO and Russia may help to promote a climate of trust and openness and reduce suspicion as regards NATO's ambitions and mode of operation. This may prove to be extremely important in the long term.³⁴

The EU should also contribute to the development of stable relations with Russia, and welcome the signing of the Interim Agreement of the EU Partnership and Cooperation Accord with Russia in 1995.³⁵ Active participation and increased political attention of the EU is of utmost importance to further development of political, economic and practical cooperation with Russia.

Bilateral and regional cooperation such as the Barents and the Baltic Cooperation is one important element of this. As part of a «Europe of Regions», the Barents and the Baltic Cooperation also provides a forum for relations between the EU and Russia and makes a valuable contribution to the construction of the new Europe House.³⁶

Europe has experienced profound change since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The Iron Curtain is being replaced by a new security policy of cooperation encompassing all European countries. The extended security concept implies a common understanding that security is dependent on democracy, welfare, and environmental considerations in each individual country. Today's broad and more diversified range of security challenges calls for a varied set of political and institutional instruments. National, regional, and pan-European cooperation arrangements must be combined in a network of collaboration that will have a mutually reinforcing effect.

To do this, we must make use of every instrument of cooperation at our disposal. This means primarily NATO and the EU, but also the WEU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe. Each of these mutual organizations has its own sphere of responsibility and its own distinct advantages. The various fora must be supplemented by regional arrangements and cooperation measures. At the same time, we must intensify bilateral cooperation in a broad range of fields.

In this process, US leadership as a super-power within NATO has never been more important than it is today to avoid polarization of European Security policy. The conflict in former Yugoslavia underscores the necessity of continued US involvement in Europe. Europe must welcome the active role the US is playing in the current effort to find solutions in Europe. If the US is to succeed in its endeavor, it is important that the majority in the US Congress support a constructive solution based on negotiations. These issues must be addressed in a way that in the long term will serve US and European security interests. Without broad-based, active US involvement, the European security architecture will be less effective and will lose credibility. The US has a unique role as the leading security partner of the world's principal democracies, and with unparalleled military assets, exerts great and important influence as an international leader.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is general support in the US and among the West European states for inviting Central and Eastern European states to join NATO. But the main issue as far as Western security is concerned should not be hasty enlargement of NATO but rather how to guarantee peaceful relations between Russia and NATO. This requires also finalizing the new NATO command structure to carry out NATO's new missions ensuring NATO's future utility is better guaranteed. Relations with NATO are a key question for Russia. Russia has a serious interest in a cooperative relationship with the West because it is in their national interest. Russia has an important contribution to make to European stability and security. Therefore, the long term strategy of enlargement must contribute to keeping Russia in Europe as an active contributor. But we must require the Russians abide by the basic principles and agreements to which they are signatories. Their contribution to the new security architecture must be «no free ride and no free lunch».

On the basis of the analysis/discussion made, the following is recommended for adaptation at the historical 1997 Madrid Summit:

- 1. Decide upon a reformed command structure which improves NATO's capability to carry out its new roles in crisis management and out of area operations, and which enables all allies to participate fully in the structure and thereby contribute to the European Security and Defense Identity (harmonize EU-WEU-NATO relations).*
- 2. Establish a «New Marshall Plan» for post-communist Europe by involving the World Bank and other investment agencies.*

- 3. Institutionaliz security cooperation between NATO and Russia (CIS) requiring the creation of an architecture for permanent coordination of foreign and military policies and establishment of a special seat for them in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This might also include a permanent NATO liaison office in Moscow that reports directly to the Secretary General. Such cooperation might restrain NATO from permanent forward deployment of its troops and nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe in time of peace. The relationship must be built without giving Russia a veto over NATO affairs.³⁷ That means developing a Treaty on Cooperation or a Mutual Security Treaty.*
- 4. Invite Russia to become a member of the G-7 countries.*
- 5. Implement a comprehensive set of security measures for Central and Eastern European states before enlargement which includes Russia as an actor and contributor. This might include the NACC and the PfP by strengthening the political role of PfP. Partners should meet regularly with the North Atlantic Council. The WEU could further strengthen the role of the WEU associate partners.*
- 6. Recommend enlargement on an individual, selective, and country-by-country basis, avoiding moving too fast or stalling. The crucial criteria must be each nation's active participation in NACC and the PfP program, successful performance of their democratic political institutions, the adoption of a free market economy, and a demonstrated respect for human rights. It is also essential that effective civilian*

control of the military be in place. It would be well to ascertain that some minimal degree of military capability and NATO interoperability have been achieved.

7. Consider the regional relationship of the Baltic Republics and Scandinavian countries as the model for gradual NATO expansion.

8. Open the first accession negotiations with two countries Poland and the Czech Republic, the unification of Germany has awakened their old anxieties from the past.

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