Army Airborne Reconnaissance Strategy.
Abstract
July 1993: the House Armed Services Committee directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, to provide an airborne reconnaissance strategy for the post-cold war era. The Deputy Secretary of Defense subsequently created the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) to unify existing airborne reconnaissance architectures and enhance the management and acquisition of manned and unmanned airborne assets. This research paper will examine the Army's integration of its airborne reconnaissance requirements into the new Department of Defense airborne reconnaissance strategy. The Army's difficulty in integrating its system recently resulted in the termination of theater level programs such as (Hunter-UAV), leaving critical intelligence collection gaps at corps and echelon-above-corps. This paper argues that Army airborne reconnaissance systems as outlined in the Army Intelligence Master Plan are vital, efficient enablers to both Joint and Army Vision 2010. Problems integrating Army systems into the Department of Defense strategy have arisen because of lack of understanding and support at Army and Joint Staff levels. The paper concludes with the warning that, without increased awareness and emphasis from the Army on Joint Staffs such as the Defense Reconnaissance Office, the Army's airborne reconnaissance programs will continue to erode. This erosion of capabilities will directly impact the ground commanders' ability to shape the battlefield.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA326632
Entities
People
- Ammon A. Sink
Organizations
- United States Army War College