

**STRATEGY
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PROJECT**

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**THE INTEGRATED DIVISION - LEVERAGED DIVERSITY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

BY

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COL Michael R. Gonzales
Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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Component parochialism within America's Army is counter-productive. This adversarial relationship is creating a "lose-lose" situation for our Army as a whole. One of the battles being waged is over the National Guard combat divisions. Some believe they are not relevant and should be eliminated from the Army force structure. Others believe they are more relevant today, as American citizens and their elected congressional representatives look for additional peace dividends, than ever before. An initiative offered by the National Guard's leadership to integrate regular Army commanders into National Guard units is a step in the right direction. However, this is only a small part of what could be done. Cultures within the regular army and the National Guard are different in many ways. These cultural differences have driven a wedge between the components, a wedge not experienced between other services and their reserve component counterparts. Total Army integration would leverage the diversity found in both components. This diversity could be a force multiplier and contribute to higher combat readiness for America's Army. Cultural differences should be recognized as a strength. We need to leverage our diversity in order to build the Army for the 21st century that is able to accomplish the full spectrum of missions: "One Army - One Mission."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.....	3
THE ACTIVE COMPONENT - RESERVE COMPONENT DICHOTOMY.....	4
FORCE GENERATION.....	9
BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS.....	16
THE INTEGRATED DIVISION CONCEPT.....	18
CONCLUSION.....	22
ENDNOTES.....	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	26

INTRODUCTION

All major military conflicts experienced by our country have been followed by deep cuts in defense spending creating severe downsizing of our military services. The basis for these cyclical events is founded in our Constitution. Our founding fathers envisioned a small standing military and a large reserve component, and this concept has always been the desire of the American people during times of reduced threats to our national security.¹

The environment at the end of the cold war and Desert Storm has been no exception. America's army, both active and reserve components, has suffered drastic cuts. This administration and the American people are committed to achieving further peace dividends. The goals of reducing the national debt, fixing social program ills, and other domestic priorities, have taken center stage. This will inevitably require more cuts in defense spending since the Department of Defense (DoD) represents the biggest discretionary spending category in the federal budget.²

Within DoD, the most vulnerable service is the Army. The other services have been more successful at developing and articulating their strategy for the future, thus protecting themselves from the level of cuts being experienced by the Army. This constrained and frequently adversarial environment has caused the Army's senior leadership to aggressively protect its remaining ten regular combat divisions.

Imbedded in this desire is the potential demise of the National Guard combat divisions. This is the latest round of the "two hundred year" debate over the proper balance between the professional Army and the citizen soldier.

The adversarial relationship caused by the perception that the survival of one must be at the demise of the other is the root of our Army's dilemma. Lines drawn in the sand between the components of our Army have created a scenario where "lose-lose" is the most likely outcome. The elimination of our National Guard combat divisions would remove our Army's ability to generate combat forces for extended crisis as our nation's deterrent hedge.³

The National Guard senior leadership, in their desire to create a "win-win" solution for America's Army, has presented the idea of integration of active component and National Guard structure. The benefits of this integration would be improved readiness in National Guard combat units, the addition of more force structure for active component professional development, and the reduction of the cultural gap between the National Guard and the regular Army. This proposal is but a token of what could be done to revolutionize our structure and prepare America's Army for the twenty-first century. Cultural differences should be recognized as a strength. This paper presents a more expanded plan for an integrated army with specific attention to the most controversial aspect of the ongoing debate, the "head of the spear," our combat forces. We need to leverage our diversity by expanding the integrated division concept to preserve as much of our combat arms force structure as possible. In doing so we would be perpetuating the ideal that America's Army should be a reflection of the democracy we have sworn to defend.

BACKGROUND

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

What we are experiencing today in the restructuring of our military is nothing new. Our Constitution addresses our armed forces and provides our civilian leadership with the basis for which to make decisions regarding the size and character of our military components. Since the birth of our country, we have been a militia nation.⁴ This ideal is still very much alive among the citizens of this country, especially those who do not have a direct connection to the military culture. Another factor of no small consequence to our political environment is that fewer and fewer members of Congress have any direct experience in the military.

The Clinton Administration and our Congressional leadership, both Democrats and Republicans, share the desire to shift our primary focus from defense, which has consumed tremendous resources during the past decade, to the domestic front. Issues such as balancing the budget, reducing the national debt, social security reform, and health care reform are among those issues replacing defense as our nation's top priorities. These programs will require tremendous shifts in resources. Where will the funding come from? It is relatively clear, when one analyzes the categories of discretionary spending, that the Department of Defense has the largest discretionary budget in the federal government, and is, therefore, the focal point for capturing dollars for domestic reform.⁵

The first round of cuts within the Department of Defense during President Clinton's first term were deep. In the context of the combat divisions of America's Army, both our regular force and the National Guard folded divisional flags with rich, honorable histories. This has been a difficult time for our Army. The first round of cuts, however, were in accordance with the Army's off-site agreement between the regular Army and Reserve Component leadership.⁶ Although very difficult, the decisions were endorsed by all components as necessary for America's Army as a whole to meet the mandates of the American people.

THE ACTIVE COMPONENT - RESERVE COMPONENT DICHOTOMY

The dichotomy of the regular Army and its reserve component combat arm, the National Guard, is a people problem. Of all the military components, the Army is centered around people. Some may see the Marine Corps as having a similar characteristic. In many ways that is true, but because of being a small force and due to the fact it has always relied very heavily on their reserve component and has embraced it as its own, it does not share the same adversarial relationship. In fact, the Marine Corps activated their reserve combat units for Desert Storm with great success.⁷

Among the cultural differences is political connection. From the perspective of the regular Army, the National Guard is a political organization. It is seen as using its political influence to benefit the reserve components to the detriment of the regular Army.


Some would draw a correlation between National Guard political influence and a lack of professionalism. It is true that the National Guard is closer to America. Armories are located in twenty-seven hundred communities across this great country.⁸ Guardsmen and women are citizens of those communities, and by virtue of that, are closer to their Congressional leadership. Many Guardsmen and women are neighbors to their Congressional leaders. As an organization, the National Guard has been very successful in telling its story.

Because Guardsmen and women are civilians twenty-eight days of the month and soldiers for two, they are not as proficient at the military art as their active counterparts. From the regular Army viewpoint, they are not as professional for that reason. This hasn't always been true in our history. During the agricultural age, the minutemen possessed the same skills, both as leaders and soldiers, as the professional soldier. The skills required of the pioneer were the same as those required of a soldier.

As we entered the industrial age, the skills of civilians and those of professional soldiers became much different, especially for the combat arms field. Weapons systems became more complicated and the skills required of soldiers and leaders became more specialized. Reserve component soldiers had a more difficult time maintaining those skills, especially in combat arms units where the cross over skills to civilian occupations were much less applicable.

As more and more Army systems and processes become centered around information technology, cross over skills become more and more relevant. The use of sophisticated information tools and technologies are becoming a necessity for both

civilian and military professions. As we approach the twenty-first century and information technology becomes the centerpiece to all of our systems and processes, civilian competencies and military competencies are quickly converging to the point where many of the skills will be the same. See Figure 1 (Converging Skills).⁹



Even considering this trend, the likelihood for additional cuts to the Army's force structure is creating a more adversarial relationship between the components because of the disagreement of how additional cuts should be approached. One of the issues at the heart of the debate between the National Guard and the Regular Army focuses on the National Guard Combat Divisions. The bottom line position of the Army leadership is that the National Guard Divisions are irrelevant to the current national military strategy.

They do not appear on any of the current Army war plans and are, therefore, not needed. The Army's ten active combat divisions are sufficient to address the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC's) being projected as the most likely threat to our national security.¹⁰

The Regular Army leadership is reluctant to plan for the use of National Guard Combat Divisions because of the belief that they cannot maintain a high enough level of readiness to be relevant to the war fight. Their predictions of post-mobilization training time have been estimated to be one year in order to be combat ready at division level. This is an area of great contention between the two components.¹¹

The question of using National Guard combat units was perhaps the most contentious issue of Desert Storm. Selected National Guard "enhanced brigades" were scheduled to deploy as round-out brigades with Regular Army divisions as part of the Army's "Total Force Policy." Senior Army leaders decided early on that they would not mobilize the enhanced brigades of the National Guard in favor of rounding out deploying Regular Army divisions with other Active army brigades.¹² Regular Army decisions were based on two factors: One, under a presidential call-up authority, the National Guard brigades could only be used for an initial ninety days with an additional ninety day extension, a total of one hundred and eighty days of availability with about half of that time devoted to required post-mobilization training and deployment to the theater of operations; and, two, senior Army leaders were skeptical that the brigades could be validated for deployment on the time line that was required by the current readiness levels.¹³

Although not documented, it is a natural tendency for commanders to “suit up” their first team for the big game. As General Schwarzkopf put his forces together for the war fight, it was obvious he was suiting up the “first team,” and that we had adequate Regular Army combat forces to do it. It would be hard to criticize this logic. If you’re going to play in the Super Bowl, you’re going to play your first team. To debate the issue in this paper would be counter-productive. There are compelling arguments on both sides of the question.

I would just summarize my view of the salient points in the debate by stating that no amount of resources will make the Reserve Components as combat ready as their Active Component counterparts. In my view, this is an unrealistic expectation. However, the increasing importance of information technology and the potential for converging skill sets between Reserve Component and Active Component counterparts will enable Reserve Component combat units to be relevant.

An example of how effective the application of information technology can be is highlighted by the advanced technology demonstration conducted jointly by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). Their efforts were aimed at fielding a myriad of technology-based training tools to two Enhanced Brigades of the National Guard.

The overall objective of the project was to prove that the introduction and use of these computer-based tools could improve training efficiency of these units by 200 to 300 percent. The measurement of effectiveness was a two-by-two measurement of the training effectiveness of four enhanced Brigades at the National Training Center (NTC).

Two of the four Brigades would have the benefit of training with the computer-based training tools as a critical component of their training program. The other two Brigades would use the traditional training tools available to National Guard units in preparation for their rotation to the NTC. This project, called SIMITAR (Simulation In Training for Advanced Readiness) is ongoing.¹⁴ Preliminary results however, are very positive. The first Brigade recently completed their rotation at the NTC. The 48th Brigade, Georgia National Guard, was one of the two Brigades using the simulation tools. They showed a marked improvement in their training readiness when measured against their own previous performance at the NTC. Although the experiment is not complete, the initial data is compelling in that the application of information technology to the training of National Guard units improves training efficiency. Time is the most constraining resource to Reserve Component units. If the introduction of computer-based simulations and similar information tools can produce order of magnitude improvements, the relevance of Reserve Components would increase dramatically.¹⁵

This being the case with today's budget realities making it realistic to predict that additional cuts be made to our structure, I firmly believe that we need to reassess the Army's position of doing away with significant combat structure in the National Guard.

FORCE GENERATION

The President's National Security Strategy and its derivative, the National Military Strategy, are both so ambiguous about the force generation role of the Reserve

Components that senior Army leaders believe that the National Guard Combat Divisions could be eliminated from the force structure without any negative impact. The argument centers around the time required, after mobilization, to bring them up to combat ready deployable status. Therefore, critics conclude that National Guard combat divisions are irrelevant to the current requirements of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC's), more recently referred to as Major Theaters of War (MTW).

In doing so they fail to consider the significant risk in eliminating National Guard Combat Divisions in the context of the Army's force generation capabilities, based on the following points:

1. The National Security Strategy, with a two nearly simultaneous major regional conflict requirement, will require the National Guard Combat Divisions as the only strategic hedge against a significant unknown threat.
2. The strategy for force generation in the Army relies fundamentally on the National Guard Combat Divisions.
3. The future outlook for additional cuts to the Army will amplify the necessity to retain at least some of the National Guard Combat Divisions. These divisions will provide the force structure to help the Total Army meet strategic mission requirements as well as providing the means to generate follow-on forces.
4. National Guard combat divisions are well suited to meeting requirements to support the spectrum of conflict short of combat operations. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) that are required simultaneously with

major regional contingencies will require National Guard combat structure to perform. Operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement are examples of critical MOOTW missions that the National Guard combat divisions are well suited to perform.¹⁶

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which outlines the President's policies and priorities for national security of the United States, does not specifically address the issue of force generation, and perhaps it shouldn't. However, in light of the President's obvious economic priorities and the American people's desire for a peace dividend, it seems appropriate to establish clear objectives as to the balance between the Active and Reserve Components.¹⁷ The most specific articulation of force structure composition is outlined in the Bottom-Up Review:

*"At the President's direction the Pentagon conducted the bottom-up review ... assessing what defense forces and capabilities our nation needs for this new security era. The administration's defense strategy, which requires U.S. forces to be able to deter and, if necessary defeat aggression in concert with regional allies in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, has proved realistic."*¹⁸

The Bottom-up Review stresses that National Guard combat divisions would be needed for:

"Extended Crisis ...to provide the basis for the rotational forces."

"Peace Operations ...be prepared to share the burden of conducting these operations"

"Deterrent Hedge ...form the basis of an expanded American force structure and serve as a deterrent to future adversarial regimes."

*"Domestic Missions ...In addition to defense missions discussed above... Guard and Reserve force structure provides added capability to respond to external conflicts and to support civil authorities at home."*¹⁹

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces disagreed with the conclusions of the Bottom-Up Review, concluding that eight National Guard Combat Divisions are too large a force for these secondary missions.²⁰ Their conclusion was:

*"These Army National Guard divisions are not used in any major regional conflict currently envisioned in DoD planning scenarios. The conflicts would be finished long before the National Guard Divisions can be ready."*²¹


The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, addresses the issue of force generation in the following manner:

*"Substantial reserve forces will be committed to combat and combat support missions early in any major regional contingency. To backfill active forces elsewhere and to prepare for unseen contingencies. Some reserve component units can expect to be mobilized immediately and to remain on active duty throughout the conflict, even though they are not directly involved in operations."*²²

The lack of clarity in both our National Security Strategy and our National Military Strategy as to the role of the Reserve Component has contributed to the parochialism by both the Active Army and the National Guard. The Army has validated the need for ten active divisions to accomplish the two nearly simultaneous MRC's without reliance on the National Guard Combat Divisions, thus justifying their current force structure. Reality, however, based on our most recent MRC experience, proved that five active divisions were not adequate for even one MRC. In fact, the force requirement for Desert Storm was eight divisions. In addition, the Army found it necessary to cross level significant numbers of personnel and equipment from the V Corps in Europe in order to bring VII Corps to a combat ready status. It is doubtful that this level of re-allocation of uncommitted resources would be available in the active component without significantly impacting on a second MRC capability.²³

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Ret.) sums up the dangers of this course in his book The New World Strategy:

*"By claiming to be able to do what in fact it is unable to do, the United States is not only bluffing - a most dangerous thing to do - but even worse, is kidding itself into a false sense of security."*²⁴



National Guard Combat Divisions are important for another reason. They represent one of the three components of the of the Army's force generation capacity represented in Figure 2, our capacity to generate replacements to the Active Component force structure consists of our Selective Service System, our Army Reserve schools, and National Guard Combat Divisions which provide unit structure and leadership. Our historical capacity to generate forces from our great country for our theaters of operation are based on this effective model. In a speech on May 18, 1994, President Clinton justified retention of the Selective Service System, and our capacity to generate military forces in order to:

*"... provide a hedge against unforeseen threats and a relatively low cost insurance policy against our under-estimating the maximum level of threat we expect our Armed Forces to face. As fewer and fewer members of our society have direct military experience, it is increasingly important to maintain the link between the all-volunteer force and our society at large."*²⁵

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 26, 1992,

General Gordon Sullivan, then Chief of Staff of the Army, addressed the issue of generation of forces:

*"I think in the case of the Army 20 divisions, which is what we have – 12 Active, 6 Reserve, and 2 Cadre divisions should be sufficient. I certainly don't think anybody foresees something of the magnitude of a World War III or a World War II revisited... Of course, we have the capability to go beyond 20 divisions if we have to... Then, we have the capability to in fact expand beyond that. The most difficult thing to come by though is a trained, ready officer and noncommissioned officer. That is the longest lead time. I cannot go out and pick up a trained non-commissioned officer or officer off the street."*²⁶

The Viet Nam conflict is a prime example of the nation's failure to utilize the force generation capacity available. The effects of this failure are summarized by author Lewis Sorley in his book Thunderbolt:

*"Failure to call the reserves at a time when the Army was necessarily expanding.. had a devastating effect on the force. The pool of leaders was depleted over and over again to cadre new units, with officers and noncommissioned officers being spread thinner and thinner. With the trained and experienced leaders in the National Guard and Reserve out of reach, the Army was forced to promote its young officers and sergeants prematurely, and to replace them at lower levels with newly inducted and hastily trained substitutes."*²⁷

An outgrowth of this lesson learned was the Total Force Policy developed by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and implemented by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Creighton Abrams. The program was developed in 1970 and implemented during the next five years. It became known as the Abrams doctrine. The root concept was described by Secretary Laird as follows:

*"A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping, and employing Guard and Reserve forces."*²⁸

Our capacity to generate forces by relying heavily on the capabilities of the reserve components is critical to the Army's sustainability as we approach the 21st Century. It would be a mistake, in my view, if the National Guard Combat Divisions were eliminated from the Army's force structure in order to maintain a larger standing Army. Their role goes beyond the scope of whether they can be ready for the two nearly simultaneous MRC strategy. More importantly, they play a vital part in a very critical way to the force generation capacity of our nation.

It is my view that our force generation capacity must be a fundamental part of our national military strategy. Today, our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy give force generation capabilities a cursory comment. In addition, the recommendations put forward by some that the National Guard Combat Divisions are irrelevant because of their lack of readiness to impact on the two nearly simultaneous MRC strategy are rather short sighted and ignore their role in the force generation triad.

It is my view that we cannot forget the power of mobilizing the Reserve Components as an instrument in our national strategy. We learned the hard lesson in Viet Nam when we did not mobilize the reserves. The importance of using this instrument, or in the case of Viet Nam, not using it, sends a strong message. Colonel Bui Tin, Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam recently stated in an article in the Wall Street Journal:

"[In July 1967] we realized that America had made its maximum contribution to the war. Viet Nam was not sufficiently important for the United States to call up its reserves. We had stretched American power

to its breaking point. When more frustration set in, all the Americans could do would be to withdraw; they had no more troops to send over."²⁹

We must retain the capability to generate forces from our civilian population through the Selective Service System. The other two legs of the force generation triad must also be maintained: the Army Reserve Schools and the National Guard Combat Divisions which provide combat units and leaders to the war fight.

BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS

As we begin the 105th Congressional session, it is becoming more clear that additional cuts are in store for the Department of Defense as the primary bill payer for the domestic program agendas. Both Democrat and Republican leaders promise more than they can pay for without another round of "peace dividend" cuts to our military establishment.³⁰

In the book, Reclaiming Prosperity, the Economic Policy Institute sets forth its ideas in its chapter entitled: "Defense Conversion: Investing the Peace Dividend:"

*"Further military cuts to bring spending into line with realistic security needs is a very attractive source of badly needed public investment for three reasons. First, we do not need current levels to be secure... second, military expenditure is a poor foundation for innovation and technical dynamism for the nation... Finally, public opinion unambiguously favors reducing, not increasing military spending. Americans continue to want a strong defense, but they do not endorse the global lone ranger prerogatives embodied in the Clinton Administration's bottom up review (which recommend a defense plan premised on fighting two wars simultaneously) and the expense entailed."*³¹

This bleak view of the defense budget may not reflect the collective view of our President or Congress, but I believe that it represents a reality that in order to pay for the administration's domestic priorities, more cuts are coming to DoD. There are no

other bill payers. The only discretionary funds in the federal budget to speak of are in two categories: defense spending and welfare programs. Welfare programs may be revised, but the cost projections of future demands on social welfare programs will offset any savings that may be realized from near term revisions.³²

As the Army begins to wrestle with the next round of cuts that are almost sure to come, cost and capability must be objectively evaluated. The adversarial relationship between the Active Army and the Army National Guard must be eliminated if we are to get through this period with what is best for America, given the budget amount that our country is willing to pay for defense.

The total cost of our National Guard Combat Divisions is one-half of one percent of the DoD budget. Eliminating all eight of the National Guard Combat Divisions as some have recommended would not save any dollars. In fact, the cost estimates for converting three National Guard Combat Divisions to combat service support divisions are estimated to be approximately \$2.6 billion dollars. No less than fifteen cost studies have been conducted by various agencies, both within the DoD and independent organizations, on the cost of a National Guard Combat Division in comparison to an Active Army Division. The most recent cost estimate conducted by the U.S. Army's Cost and Economic Analysis Center set the cost of a National Guard combat division at 23% of a similar regular Army division.³³ There is little debate that the Reserve Components offer cost effective alternatives to a large standing Army. Historically, the American people have preferred a relatively small standing Army, relying on a larger Reserve Component as the strategic hedge against threats to our national security.

THE INTEGRATED DIVISION CONCEPT - AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

While the debate could go on indefinitely relative to the merits of what the right mix of regular Army and National Guard combat units should be, there is a compromise solution. The integrated division concept, and the related senior officer exchange program, drafted by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), deserve serious consideration.

The integrated division concept, as currently proposed by NGB, involves integrating two regular Army division headquarters and their organic combat support and combat service support units, with six enhanced brigades of the National Guard. There are numerous potential advantages to this proposal however, three address specific issues:

1. The cost of maintaining these integrated divisions would be significantly less than maintaining 100% active divisions. A pure National Guard division can be maintained for approximately 23% the cost of an equivalent regular Army division. The integrated division would be more than this, but would represent a significant cost savings to the Total Army;

2. The complexity of maintaining combat readiness of the division level headquarters and its senior level officers favors the regular Army maintaining these units. The training readiness of the integrated divisions would be enhanced over pure National Guard divisions;

3. Fully integrating regular Army and National Guard personnel and units would facilitate leveraging diversity and enhancing the understanding between National Guard and regular Army soldiers.³⁴

The senior officer exchange program has been designed to assign regular Army officers to National Guard command and staff positions. For example, assigning a regular Army lieutenant colonel for a two year assignment as a battalion commander in a National Guard battalion. This program involves the regular Army officer's accepting a National Guard commission as allowed for in the United States Code.³⁵

These concept plans represent significant paradigm shifts from traditional National Guard policies. To offer regular Army officers command of National Guard combat units is a highly controversial step toward revolutionary change. Traditionally National Guard commands have been reserved for traditional guardsmen (drilling guardsmen). Even full-time National Guard officers have been allowed to command only when a qualified drilling guardsmen was not available. To allow regular Army officers to command, as proposed in the senior officer exchange program, is a true paradigm shift. Even so, I believe that this is only a small step in the right direction, and that we should go further in integrating our combat forces in America's Army.

The concept plans outlined above, represents the kinds of changes that need to be made to revolutionize our Army. However, it is my opinion that it also represents a model from which to expand.

The adversarial relationship between the National Guard and our regular Army must be overcome in order to implement the kinds of revolutionary changes that are

necessary to maximize the full potential of this concept. It could be a critical step in maximizing the Army's limited resources and help prepare our Army for the twenty-first century.³⁶

Going a step further, the alternative model described below attempts to recognize the critical factors that drive force composition as well as those factors that should be considered in revolutionizing our Army. Factors such as the political environment, the dichotomy between the active and reserve components, the impact of the information age on our Army and the necessity for maintaining a force generation capability as a strategic hedge against the unknown as presented in this paper have driven the alternative model presented below.


It is my belief that the current political environment, and the Constitutional basis for our professional military, remain valid in the minds of the American people for maintaining a small standing Army and a robust reserve component. This being said, America's standing Army should be small, yet lethal, capable of responding to a Major Theater of War (MTW) without reliance on mobilization of Reserve Component combat forces. If a second MTW became a reality it would require extensive mobilization of the National Guard combat divisions. The integrated divisions would be at the highest readiness level and would be prepared to deploy sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

Based on our experience in Desert Storm, I have reservations about a five division active combat force being adequate to meet the combat force requirements for a Major Regional Contingency. During Desert Storm the regular Army deployed eight active

divisions to the fight. In order to deploy units at C1 readiness levels, other combat divisions were tapped to provide fillers within the deployed divisions.³⁷ This integrated division concept provides an alternative to live within a very constrained budget and be able to maintain the 10 active combat divisions in our force structure, five as regular Army divisions, and five as integrated divisions.

As General Sullivan stated in testimony before Congress, it is difficult to impossible to generate senior level combat leaders once they are lost from the force. In order to preserve our force generation capability and retain our senior leaders, we should retain five division currently in our regular Army structure as integrated divisions.

"A Way" to organize the integrated divisional structure would be to expand the structure proposed for the current integrated division concept to five additional combat divisions. The only difference would be that one maneuver brigade would be regular Army and two maneuver brigades would be pulled from the current National Guard divisions and would be reorganized to include divisional slice units as outlined below:



The integrated divisional structure would be significantly less costly to maintain and would provide the following additional advantages:

1. It would enable the Total Army to retain the 10 regular Army combat division flags.

2. The Army National Guard leadership would have both vested interest and ownership in the Integrated Divisions; “One Army - One Mission”. The regular Army could leverage the ARNG’s political influence and the ARNG could leverage the Army’s experience and resources to maintain readiness. Instead of competing for limited resources the AC and RC would be working with our Congressional leadership toward the same goals.

3. It would provide additional command assignments for active component officers in the National Guard brigades and battalions. This would help retain more of our highly qualified regular Army officers, help improve the readiness of National Guard units, and provide more regular Army officers with hands on experience working within the National Guard culture. This diversity would be of benefit to the National Guard and the Army.

4. It would provide a more balanced force for the National Guard in the state to respond to state emergencies with the additional combat support and combat service support elements in the brigade structure. It would also provide the National Guard brigades the ability to conduct combined arms training across all of the battlefield operating systems.

5. Equipment could be cross-leveled from the Regular Army to the National Guard without additional procurement costs.

6. The remaining structure could be leveraged to offset AC and force generation shortfalls.

The five National Guard division headquarters and the 3rd Brigade that would fall out of the integrated division could be reorganized as cadre units to contribute to the force generation capability of the Army. As cadre organizations, they would be less costly to maintain in the force structure, yet provide a way to preserve senior level leaders and serve as a critical component of the force generation capability as a strategic hedge against unknown security threats. This tiered readiness concept would provide America's Army the greatest combat capability. The three remaining National Guard divisions would be converted to Combat Service Support (CSS) units under the current division redesign plan and would fill the current shortfall in combat service support capability in our Army as currently being studied.

CONCLUSION

The dichotomy that has been created over many years between the National Guard and the Regular Army in many ways was created by the differences in the cultures. In the past, these difference have pulled our components apart. Diversity should be recognized as a strength. Combining the technical competencies of our Regular Army with the diverse talents of our National Guard soldiers could have synergistic affects on the Total Force.

The integrated division ideas being offered by the National Guard are on the fringes of real revolutionary change. The time has come for America's Army to stop our adversarial agendas and speak and act with one voice. The combined strength and

influence the Total Army could have with our political leaders would be synergistic, instead of being counterproductive.

As we are propelled toward the information age, the critical skill sets for combat soldiers will converge. The ability of National Guard units and leaders to conduct multiple iterations of live, virtual and constructive simulations on a regular basis will reduce the training readiness differences between the components. The building blocks that will make up our combat fighting force promise to be smaller, e.g. a division will be the size of a brigade, but have even greater lethality. This expanded integrated division concept provides a cost effective means to retain our most difficult resources to produce - our senior combat leaders - while streamlining the force to prepare for the future.

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