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NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE CASE OF SLOVAKIA

BY

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**LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAROSLAV KUCA
International Fellow Slovakia**

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USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

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Lt Col Jaroslav Kuca

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Prof R. Craig Nation

Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

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This paper will describe the international and European situation, which occurred after the Cold War, and the Slovak position in the newly created Europe. The political, economic, and military orientation will be discussed concerning this ambitious, youngest and smallest country in Central Europe. Furthermore this paper will have as a central theme why Slovakia needs to becoming a member of the Western Alliance structures such as NATO and the European Union. It will analyze what Slovak is doing to become a member of the Western Alliance structures, and and what will happen if Slovakia is not granted membership into NATO and the European Union.

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Abbreviations

<i>CEFTA</i>	<i>Central European Free Trade Association</i>
<i>BSEC</i>	<i>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</i>
<i>EU</i>	<i>European Union</i>
<i>NACC</i>	<i>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</i>
<i>PfP</i>	<i>Partnership for Peace</i>
<i>NRSR</i>	<i>National Council of the Slovak Republic</i>
<i>MOD</i>	<i>Ministry of Defense</i>
<i>HZDS</i>	<i>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia</i>

1. Introduction

“We need to do for Central and Eastern Europe what was done for Western Europe after the Second World War - that is , try to provide some sense of stability, try to make sure that ethnic conflicts and border disputes don't overwhelm, and that is what NATO expansion is about.”

Secretary of State

Madeline K. Albright

(Her first televised comments as the nation's first female secretary of state)

This paper will describe the international and European situation, which occurred after the Cold War, and the Slovak position in the newly creative Europe. The political, economical, and military orientation will be discussed concerning this ambitious, youngest and smallest country in the Central Europe. Furthermore this paper will have as a central theme why Slovakia needs to becoming a member of the Western Alliance structures such as NATO and the European Union. It will analyze what Slovak is doing to become a member of the Western Alliance structures, and what will happen if Slovakia is not granted membership into NATO and the European Union. Most important this paper is the result of my experiences from studying and living many years in Poland, the Czech Republic, Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, and independent Slovakia. My experience in the United States Army War College has allowed me to apply critical thinking to Slovakia's future in reference to its neighboring countries, NATO membership and the European Union. Finally this paper is limited not only by number of pages, but also by the time required to perform the necessary research and turn in a draft by the end of 1996. The future of Slovakia and Central Europe are being discussed on a daily basis throughout the world so this paper will capture all of the latest information on this important topic.

2. International Environment

The U.S. has recently passed from a long-standing bipolar order to a still unsettled multipolar world. This was a welcome development, bringing promising opportunities to advance the U.S. interests and values but also ushering in new and diverse challenges.

It is also true that the intentions of other nations can change, sometimes very rapidly, and thus the U.S. national military strategy must account for the military capabilities of other nations as well as their current intentions.

The revival of age-old religious, ethnic, and territorial quarrels, in many cases compounded by the more contemporary tensions stemming from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, may present an even wider threat: the risk that they may engulf neighboring states. Among the former Soviet republics, in the Balkans, in the Maghreb, and throughout Africa, dangerous instabilities litter the landscape. Additional challenges are posed by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, each of which is an imminent threat to the security of its neighbors and region.

The community of democratic nations and free-market economies is growing throughout the world - a trend consistent with important U.S. interests. The U.S. is committed to supporting nations transitioning into this community and therefore will assist in efforts to defend against threats to democratic and economic reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe, and elsewhere. However, the transition process in these emerging democracies remains susceptible to setbacks and reversals. The failure of democratic reform in the newly independent states, and particularly in Russia

itself, would not necessarily return the U.S. to the bipolar standoff that characterized the Cold War, but it would in all likelihood adversely affect the U.S. and its interests.

3. The New Environment in Central Europe

Though the collapse of the bipolar bloc structure reduced the risk of global confrontation, it increased the possibility of the emergence of new and unpredictable disputes and conflicts, primarily at the regional level. In building a new security arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe in connection with the European integration process, it is necessary to take into account main elements of instability and risks in the political, military, economic, social and religious areas that endanger the internal and external security of the countries. Several security risks that exist in individual regions of Europe could, if they are disregarded and underrated, break out into open conflicts and influence negatively the security of all Europe. The current developments in Europe point to the need for an effectively functioning European Security System.

In an uncomfortably familiar replay of the interwar period, Central European states find themselves essentially alone in a rapidly changing and potentially dangerous world. Each has new freedom, and few would pine for the return of the tight structures of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, the increase in the degrees of freedom of neighbors' behavior makes designing prudent and effective international policy a much more complex task.¹ The influence of the two superpowers, whose military, political, and economic muscle had divided the continent, has diminished. The Soviet Union has disappeared, and Russia no longer borders any Central European state except Poland

consumed by domestic changes and challenges and is not in a position to reestablish its dominance over the region in the foreseeable future. However, the unforeseeable future can approach quickly, as we learned in 1989. The right mixture of international and domestic circumstances in Russia could produce a renewed drive to reestablish substantial influence in this region.² Russian leaders of all political persuasions have made it clear that the era of obsequiousness to the West is over. For Central Europeans, the memory of forty years of domination has not disappeared, and their leaders are wary of developments in Russia.

On the other hand, the remaining superpower has not demonstrated its constancy. American aid to the region, roughly \$ 400 million per year, is small in relation to the estimated need and compared to the aid extended to western Europe under the Marshall Plan.³

3.1. Are New Alliances the Solution?

After 1989, East European leaders made it clear that they saw their ultimate destiny as residing with Western Europe. Some also began to pursue regional alliances. The best-known, and the most successful, is the Visegrad group of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. But effective cooperation has been limited, concrete achievement few, and even rhetorical commitment short-lived. The major substantive result of the Visegrad process, the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), effects less than 5 percent of its members' trade, has had only marginal effect on increasing that trade, and in any case has a limited though growing membership.⁴ Regional

Regional groups such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Central European Initiative have yet to prove their worth even within narrow functional limits.⁵

3.2. What about Existing Alliances?

After years of rhetoric, bridge-building, and encouraging distance from the Soviet Union, when the break occurred, the newly divorced suitors were offered only a long engagement. Of the three main targets of Central European aspirations-NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Council of Europe-only the last has embraced the region and offered full membership to the Central European states.

Immediately after the changes of 1989, Central European leaders made it clear that only NATO membership would insure their future security. In response, the alliance created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), invited the new democracies into NATO's parliamentary assembly, and in early 1994-four years after the overthrow of the communist regime-offered all the post-communist states' membership in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. A fall 1995 NATO study specified the characteristics needed for future members but still declined to say which partners could expect to become members or when. At its ministerial meeting in December 1995, NATO would say only that 1996 would be a year of "intensive consultations" and warned that "participation in this next phase would not imply that interested partners would automatically be invited to begin accession talks with NATO."⁶

The EU has been similarly cautious. It first offered associate member status to Visegrad states, then Romania and Bulgaria, and over the course of several summits has also specified the conditions for membership.⁷

While international institutions move slowly to mitigate the dangers of a chaotic world (i.e., in former Yugoslavia), Central European states can be expected to follow the self-help guidelines that offer them the best protection.

4. Slovakia and NATO

4.1. Why Slovakia needs NATO

New geopolitical and military-strategic realities in Europe require nonconventional approaches that would guarantee positive solutions for the security questions of the continent. The change in conditions affecting national security requires appropriate reflection concerning the complex security policy of the Slovak Republic. Our security policy follows our national interest, consisting of sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of boundaries, economic prosperity, social stability and international recognition. In realizing this policy, the Slovak Republic follows such principles as sovereignty in safeguarding its own security, observing the norms of international law, indivisibility of security, preventive action, adequacy of the armed forces, democratic administration and supervision of the armed forces, complexity and continuity in safeguarding internal security, juridical continuity, protection of economic interests of individuals, state, and society, and ecological rationality. The Slovak Republic does not consider any other state to be its enemy.

The Slovak Republic emerged as a sovereign democratic nation-state on 1 January 1993. We have assumed independence not for the sake of going into the shell of isolationism, but in order to integrate in the network of European countries and, in our

own name, to enjoy the rights and shoulder the responsibilities that result from being part of the union of European nations.

Upon creating - relatively quickly - the foundations of its national structure and democratic system, Slovakia sought the recognition of all international organizations and establishments. That endeavor is deemed to have borne fruit. The Slovak Republic today views its full integration in EU as a top strategic priority. Our strategic goal is to join the Euro-Atlantic security system.⁸

The North-Atlantic Alliance is considered to be the most effective existing Pan-European Security Organization and membership is seen as a possibility to obtain adequate security guarantees. This effort bears witness to our return to the values of democracy, human rights and the state of law. The Slovak Republic perceives in NATO membership the political assurance in NATO that it will not be expelled again from the territory to which it feels historical and civilization bonds. Therefore the Slovak Republic has welcomed PfP as a step towards a further strengthening of relations between NATO members and their partners in Central and Eastern Europe.

4.2. What the Slovak Government is doing for integration

As a newly built democratic state, the Slovak Republic is finding its place in the new, emerging European and transatlantic security environment. In these efforts, it fully subscribes to the values and principals on which NATO is based and that represent the foundation of the transatlantic alliance.

The National Council of the Slovak Republic (NRSR), as the supreme representative and legislative body of the Slovak Republic, respects NATO as the most effective organization capable of reacting adequately and promptly to the new security situation in Europe. A historic chance currently exists for the central European region to become an area of long-term development and stability, which is why the attainment of Slovak's NATO membership is an unchanging, permanent, and incontestable priority of Slovak foreign policy, implemented since the founding of the independent Slovak Republic. Our country is one of the most active participants in the PfP program and in the NACC, which it considers to be the basic framework for integration into NATO. It devotes maximum attention to its program and activities. On the practical level of mutual relations and in an active dialogue with the alliance, the necessary political, military, and legislative steps are being taken aimed at acquiring membership. The Slovak Republic, as a part of the emerging new European security architecture, is not only interested in making use of the obtained security guarantees, but wants actively to contribute to shaping a stable Euroatlantic security environment. From this point of view, one of our primary aims is for the Slovak Republic to be among the first countries that will be invited to become full-fledged members of the alliance. The NRSR considers the building of good neighborly relations and the comprehensive development of regional cooperation to be one of the key pillars in the successful implementation of these efforts and expresses its readiness to take an active part in bringing it about.

Slovak foreign policy has aimed to achieve integration with Western organizations, particularly the EU and NATO. The country's association agreement with

the EU took effect in February 1995 (Czechoslovakia had been an associate member since 1991), and the present government submitted a formal application for full EU membership in 1995, the third country in the region to do so. Slovakia was the first associated country to submit its completed EU questionnaire, which it did on 19 July 1996. The Slovak Engineering Battalion has been operating on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the framework of UNPROFOR since 1993 (about 800 soldiers). It has contributed considerably to the creation of a positive image of Slovakia in the world. Slovakia prepared for operational deployment one mechanized rapid deployment battalion, two wings of jet fighters and one field hospital for peacekeeping in joint operations with IFOR, but NATO has been satisfied with the good engineer performances and has offered Slovakia an assignment in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia).

Slovakia has been an active member of NATO's PfP program since February 1994. Since March 1995 it became the first country in the region to submit its complete NATO discussion document. In implementing the objectives of the PfP program, the Slovak Republic will concentrate on:

- democratic and civilian control of armed forces;
- compatibility of defense planning, of the system of defense management in peacetime and in the transition to the state of war, in the building of armed forces and their organizational structures;
- modernization of systems of command and control, communication and of air space;

- exchange of working groups, courses of study and consultations of specialists in the solution of questions related to building the logistics system, interoperability of information systems and compatibility with STANAG standards;
- training of military specialists in the training facilities of NATO countries, participation in the command and staff exercises and exercises of units in the framework of preparation for peace-keeping operations of the UN, the OSCE and WEU;
- building confidence and getting acquainted with all individual aspects of the life of the armed forces and their personal.⁹

General objectives of the PfP are being increasingly incorporated into the strategic concepts for the defense of the Slovak Republic and plans for the reconstruction of its armed forces. They are included in the Individual Partnership Program and the cooperation with NATO and its member countries. All the decisive PARP measures have been included into the main tasks of stage two of building the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, planned for the years 1996-97. To fulfil the planned objectives related to PfP, 540 million Slovak crowns were allocated from the 1996 Ministry of Defense (MOD) budget chapter, i.e. 4.02 percent of the total MOD budget.

Based on its experience to date, the Slovak Republic believes that the significance of the biannual PARP will grow and that it will become an important instrument for the long term development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, aiming at improving conditions for joint activities with Alliance units.

Slovakia's macroeconomics indicators would put it in the top group of countries in the region for EU integration.

In March 1995 the Slovak-Hungarian state treaty was signed, a document that was ratified by Slovakia's parliament one year later. It made clear to applicants that both Slovakia and Hungary have resolved all outstanding conflicts with neighboring countries.

Although legislative squabbles have affected the determination of strategic priorities, tremendous progress has been made in structural terms. Civil-military relations - the formal position of military institutions in the state as well as the military's influence in society at large - have been placed on a new footing. The previously entirely military Defense Ministry has been divided into two separate blocs: a civilian-military one, responsible for the defense and inviolability of the air space of Slovak Republic, and for construction and control of the Army of Slovak Republic; and a General Staff, responsible for the realization of Slovak Army development and for its combat and mobilization readiness. The principles of the country's security and defense policy have been formulated by civilian, accountable bodies. Budgetary allocation lies in the domain of the parliament, and details are worked out by the Defense Ministry in open fashion.

4.3. Slovakia's Defense Doctrine

The Slovak Republic, as a sovereign democratic state, has, since its establishment, viewed guaranteeing national security as a task of primary existential significance. The process of guaranteeing national security has evolved from the Slovak Republic's Constitution; according to it, the acknowledged process for defense policy was reflected in the Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine approved by the NRSR on 30 June 1994. The Defense Doctrine is a long-term security policy document specific to the period of the

Slovak Republic's participation in the PfP program. Within the framework of this program, the main objective of defense and military cooperation is to achieve a level of compatibility and interoperability for the Slovak Army that will guarantee effective and problem-free cooperation with NATO and its member countries and future incorporation into its military structures. At present, the main emphasis is being placed on achieving the stipulated level of standardization given the forces and resources earmarked for the Slovak Army. We anticipate that the extension of the standardization process to other units and regiments in the Slovak Army will commence in the near future.

A document entitled "The Basic Objectives and Principles of Slovak Republic's National Security" was adopted in the NRSR in June 1996 to improve the transparency of policy in the national security sphere. This document deals systematically with the issue of state security and is a suitable means for presenting the Slovak Republic's security interests to the population at home and abroad.

Some of the limiting factors of a state's capability for defense are human resources, the number of personnel, and, especially, the quality of military personnel. This is amplified by the need to fulfill the tasks associated with providing for the peacekeeping missions and for the Slovak Republic's rapprochement with European and Transatlantic structures and also by the complexity of the weapons systems, the operation of which is being insufficiently mastered in the shortened period of basic military service. A way out of this situation lies in regulated professionalization. The experiences of the other transforming states in Central Europe, and also of many advanced Western countries, confirm this trend. We are establishing the rapid deployment brigade as the

first professional unit in the Slovak Army; the level of its professionalization has reached 77.4 percent.

From a long-term point of view, after the year 2000, we envisage the gradual professionalization of the Slovak Army to 50-60 percent, while maintaining general conscription (the current state of professionalization within the Slovak Defense Ministry is 32.3 percent).¹⁰

4.4. What is Slovaks chance for entry into NATO with the first group?

Today Slovakia has a chance for entry into NATO with the first group, but it is very difficult to find official documentation which describe what the probability of entry actually is.

Clinton administration officials refuse to speculate publicly on which former communist countries are leading candidates for NATO membership. But they make no secret of the fact that Slovakia has been slipping in the expansion stakes. Until recently, Slovakia was usually lumped together with the Czech Republic, with whom it once made up Czechoslovakia. But Slovakia's progress toward free market capitalist has been much more tortured than that of its former partner to the West. A few weeks ago, the State Department publicly expressed concern that Slovakia's commitment to democracy may be weakening.¹¹

Not only the Clinton administration is sceptical about Slovakia's entry. The first to seek to eliminate Slovakia from the leading candidates was German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.¹²

The Russia position against NATO enlargement is also of great interest. They propose the establishment of a vacuum of power in Central Europe or a military buffer zone.¹³ I believe, that nobody could be happy with a situation where others decide about his future, especially if he is forced to live in a “military buffer” or “vacuum”. We do not have good experiences from the past. Slovakia is the smallest country in Central Europe and we remember the hardest times which was the period after the Austro-Hungarian Settlement (1868), when strong assimilation of non-Hungarian nations within the Austro-Hungarian Empire began. We also remember the Munich dictate (14 March 1939), and the situation which was created in Europe after Second World War. Many times the strong powers of this world have decided about our future.

Now, it seems Slovakia’s chances to enter NATO soon are very low, or even non-existent.

4.5. What will happen if the Slovakia will not enter NATO?

“Bringing countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the NATO Alliance before the end of this decade risks making the United States and Europe less secure rather than more so ... NATO expansion would divide rather than unite Europe, creating new security frontiers that would initially exclude some of new Eastern European nations, like the Baltic countries”.¹⁴

Slovakia’s strategic geographical position should encourage accession to membership together with our neighbors (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). In fact, it would be difficult to admit Hungary to NATO without taking Slovakia, since Hungary would then border only non-NATO countries. Slovakia has 1,611.5 km boundaries, but only 95.8 km with Ukraine. This means that without Slovakia NATO will

have 1,515.7 km longer boundaries. Slovenia, the smallest and most prosperous republic of the former Yugoslavia has been, by contrast, coming up fast on the outside as a candidate for NATO membership.

At this time, for internal political reasons, everything seems to indicate that Slovakia is dropping out of the first group of candidates for NATO and probably EU entry. The possibility that Slovakia will not enter NATO in the first wave has consequences for us, due to the fact that not only Hungary, but also the Czech Republic and Poland, will one day be deciding, as regular member of NATO about Slovakia's Euroatlantic future. NATO has a possible solution for this problem. It could declare, that new members will not decide about the next potential members, but that would mean, that new members will have equal obligation but not equal rights.

These countries produce commodities that are similar to ours and will export these commodities to EU markets under preferential customs conditions, compared with the Slovak Republic. Not only would our exports to EU countries be affected, but also foreign capital, which we need badly for the modernization of production, will not be "pushing" to get here if the Slovak Republic does not have a clear prospect of becoming part of the Common Market. There are also other considerations: The young generation's chances, the movement of labor the opportunities to study, and Slovak national pride and self-confidence would all be affected.¹⁵

After Czechoslovakia's split we separated not only property, but also families. During more than fifty years we were a mixed culture, including family, and overall background. In 1993 politicians insisted that separation would not be a problem, because

we could have an open border, not a standard border as exists between others neighbors. How will this look, when the Czech Republic will be in NATO and the EU and Slovakia not?

In the event of its elimination from the first round of admitting candidates for NATO and EU membership, Slovakia will be subject to the curtailment of its exports to EU countries (the destination of 49 percent of Slovak exports in 1995), will be deprived of the benefits of the customs union with the Czech Republic, and will face a reduction of trade volume with CEFTA countries.¹⁶

Prague, for instance, is of the opinion that for the Czech Republic, Slovakia's entrance into the EU is more important than its joining NATO, which even some European countries with democratic traditions, like Austria or Finland, hesitate to enter. I believe, that for Slovakia it is more important with whom we are travelling toward the EU and NATO than which way we are going.

Slovakia can represent a state security risk from the point of view of the perception and implementation of our policy, and thus also a certain type of detonator for crisis and tension. Incidentally, it is enough to contemplate how the almost 600,000 ethnic Hungarian citizens and obviously also many Slovaks, will react if a EU and NATO border really is formed around Slovakia.¹⁷ If NATO enlargement is confined to just two or three countries, there will be good security guarantees for these countries, and a grey zone for everyone else. This is the equivalent of no security at all. The different security policy positions of Central European states and different levels of security would be counterproductive and strategically wrong, bearing potential destabilizing factors.

Hungary's admission at the expense of Romania and Slovakia may increase tension in the region. The integration of Hungary into Western structures may encourage ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania to demand autonomy and eventual union with Hungary. Hungarian minorities living in Slovakia want collective ethnic autonomy, which Slovakia is not ready to grant. This situation clearly has the potential to provoke future conflict.¹⁸

The former Prime Minister of the Hungarian government Jozsef Antall declared in the parliament on June 4, 1990 that after World War I, Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and that "he is spiritually the prime minister of 15 millions Hungarians"- consequently, also of those living in Slovakia.¹⁹ The situation is changed rapidly, and where are guarantees that the next Hungarian government will solve old and new problems as rationally as the present government? Will the solution be worked out between Hungary and Slovakia, or NATO and Slovakia?

5. Conclusion

Pavol Minarik wrote for newspaper Pravda: "So, Slovakia's chances of incorporation into the aforementioned first group have not yet been buried definitively. A great deal will depend on what the Slovak government and its diplomacy does in the near future. If they realize the gravity of the situation and start to act rationally at home and abroad, we do not have to end up in the second lane. Anyone well informed about the the situation among our neighbors knows that the Slovaks are not any worse off than the Czechs, Poles, or Hungarians. We have the same blood group as they do, not only theoretically, but actually. At the moment, it is just our bad luck that our politicians have

not understood that the state interest has to be paramount. This applies everywhere in the world. Unfortunately, not in our country. At least at the moment.”²⁰ After 1989 I spent about three years in Poland, I lived in Czechoslovakia for a long time and I can say:”It is a good point of view.” I believe, that our problems started during the last year of the Czechoslovak Federation, when Slovak politicians tried to improve our position in the Federation. That year witnessed painful discussions between the political parties, which were winners in the June 1992 elections. It was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) with chairman Vladimir Meciar and the Civil Democratic Party with Vaclav Klaus who made the breakup of Czechoslovakia inevitable. At a series of meetings quickly following the elections, Meciar and Klaus decided the wishes of their own electorates: the Czechs were fed up with Slovak demands as put forward by Meciar, and the Slovaks were moving inexorably toward self-determination. From my point of view it was Vaclav Klaus who did not wish to improve Slovakia’s position in the federation and tried to divide it, as the solution for the Czech Republic’s international position on the list for quick entry into the EU and NATO. At present this seems to have been a very great historical solution for the Czechs, but Slovakia not only lost “know how” but also received the label “nationalist”. Klaus eliminated many potential problems, which could be reason for Czechoslovakia’s entry into European structures. Which problems? There were not only the dissatisfied Slovaks politics but also problems with the Hungarian minority and Slovakia’s weaker economy compared to the Czech Republic. For a time the world looked on Czechoslovakia as the next case of “Balkanization”. Many Western European countries held Slovakia responsible for the breakup of Czechoslovakia. But our

position in Czechoslovakia is clear today: not only many Americans, but also some Europeans might have difficulty locating Slovakia and Slovenia on a map.

From the military strategic perspective Slovakia has to improve interoperability with NATO forces, organizational structures, and procedures. The most important are considerations such as communications and information systems, NATO doctrine; operational plans and procedures (including NATO's command organization); logistical plans and procedures; infrastructure; civil emergency planning; and intelligence and security. But the most important is to improve our political image.

The dangers to the stability of Central Europe , both political and economic, are dangers for all Europe in two senses. Most obviously, a return to revolution, instability, or the appearance of opportunity for Russian expansion into the region would have an enormous impact on the Central and Eastern European-and American-sense of security, plunging it back to cold war or interwar days. Ending the new links between the different parts of Europe and returning to substantial defense expenditures or, worse, an expansion of the kind of conflict seen in Yugoslavia would create an unavoidable political and economic crisis. This has been recognized most clearly in Bonn, which, until its own recent economic difficulties, had been Central Europe's most vigorous champion in the corridors of the EU. The challenges to the notion of Europe appearing in Central and Eastern are evident in Western Europe as well. The cries of pain at the cost of adapting to new forms of multinational integration come not only from Slovakia but also from France. The suspicion that enough sovereignty has been given away is voiced not only in Romania but in Great Britain. This dimension of the security environment within which

Central and Eastern Europe operates is not so different from that which faces Western Europe and for which effective and sensible responses are needed. It is worth recalling the speed and depth of the changes of 1989. That tidal wave, was for the most part, peaceful.²¹

Unfortunately, we missed the first train to Europe. The tickets are reserved, somebody received a tip (the U.S. House of Representatives last year has passed a law allocating \$60 million to prepare Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for entry into NATO), and Slovakia, probably has to wait for the next departure. When?...we do not know the schedule.

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