STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PEACE OPERATIONS
ARE WE GETTING WARM YET?

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The complexity of peace operations continues to provide significant challenges in terms of planning, commanding and controlling. Although the United Nations and the United States have become more involved and more experienced in these type operations, there continues to be a lack of a coherent, systematic approach at the higher echelons. The varying conditions for introducing military forces, and the increased involvement of non-governmental organizations, compound the problems. Add numerous players at the interagency level, and the desire to wield our instruments of national power, and one quickly sees the "fog of war" appear inside our own planning system. With the significant increase of situations demanding intervention throughout the world, prudent planning and coordination procedures must be devised and standardized to extract the best efforts from all of the players, while limiting the burdens on the participants. Effective interagency coordination may be the most advantageous means of capitalizing on the whole team concept. As the U.S. continues to exercise its world leadership role in peace operations, improvements in several areas may enhance our ability to accomplish the tasks at hand, while also reducing the burdens upon our military forces.

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TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT

Much has changed in this world in just the last decade. The world has transitioned from two competing superpowers into a new environment of increasing instability among some third world countries. International security once held in check by superpower rivalry is now challenged by international politics and multi-national relations.[1] As a result, the United Nations (UN) has emerged as a legitimate mediator of world crises. As a key leader in the United Nations and the world's sole superpower, the United States of America has subsequently been thrust into the forefront in maintaining world order. Since the United States is the only country with the resources necessary to project power throughout the world, the United Nations and regional organizations look to us in supporting legitimate multi-national endeavors. Some situations disrupt world order and provide sparks for increasing world tension. Examples of demands on the United Nations include assisting smaller countries and nations in protecting their borders; preventing ethnic, tribal, and religious violence; protecting civil rights; enforcing international law; and providing humanitarian assistance. The United Nations role has in several instances included supporting the re-establishment of stable governmental infrastructures corrupted by turmoil and political instability, or overwhelmed by terrorism, economic strife, food shortages, insurgency or environmental damages. Increased U.S. participation in these UN sponsored operations has also burdened our own economy during a time of constrained resources and directed military downsizing.

A viable option to resolve some of these conflicts would be for regional organizations to step forward and lead the efforts for stabilization. Some of these

problems are "better faced in the regional context than in the universal one.... The institutions and procedures of the UN, linked as they are to the rigidities of the present international order...incline toward uniformity...rather than discrimination of approach."[2] Regional organizations have a vested interest and understand the culture of the given situation far better than any outside player. Yet, some of these regional organizations are "emerging" themselves and cannot bear the burden of such massive undertakings alone.

Therefore, we should prepare ourselves and our military for increased commitments and demands in the arena of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention. Such action early on may well preclude larger problems or full scale conflict later. Ambassador Rostow aptly stated: "In order to assure its survival, that is, 'to secure the blessings of liberty on ourselves and our posterity,' in the language of the Constitution, America must renew its leadership of the regional coalitions required to achieve and maintain both a stable balance of power—as nearly as may be, a world of independent states living together peacefully, in accordance with the rules of law necessary to their cooperation."[3] In the words of President Clinton, "All of America's strategic interests—from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory—are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations."[4] This is further reinforced in our National Security Strategy where he wrote, "We must exercise global leadership. We are not the world's policeman, but as the world's premier economic and military power, and with the strength of our democratic values, U.S. engagement is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations...."[5]

CURRENT REFORMS

Significant steps have been taken to exert pressure on the United Nations for increased selectivity before committing to additional peacekeeping operations. The United States' recent experience from Somalia led to the development of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which makes a major effort in defining our role in peacekeeping operations. It identifies six major reform issues:

1. Making disciplined and selective decisions on both U.S. and UN involvement in supporting peace operations.
2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations from 31.7% to 25% as of 1 January 1996.
3. Defining command and control structures for U.S. forces involved in UN peace operations. (The greater the U.S. role, the more likely we will provide the command and control structure.)
4. Reforming and improving the UN capability to manage peace operations.
5. Improving management and funding of U.S. involvement in peace operations. (DOD leads on operations involving U.S. forces, and State Department leads on operations not involving U.S. combat units.)
6. Improving cooperation between the Executive Branch, Congress, and the public regarding our participation in UN peace operations.[6]

In addition, U.S. participation is weighed against the following criteria:

1. Participation advances U.S. interests and risks to American personnel are acceptable.
2. Personnel, funds and other resources are available.
3. U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success.
4. Clear objectives exist and an endpoint for U.S. involvement is identified.
5. Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled.
6. Command and control relationships are acceptable, considering U.S. involvement.
7. Sufficient force will be committed to achieve clearly defined objectives.
8. A plan exists to decisively achieve those objectives.
9. A commitment exists to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.[7]

Obviously the administration has learned that it is critical to thoroughly analyze and evaluate our options during our quest for a flexible and selective engagement strategy. This is especially significant as we support a national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. As the world's superpower we have to be selective in our commitment. Reacting to every world crisis is a military and economic burden we can't afford to shoulder alone. Yet, a lack of participation could have a detrimental effect on our global credibility.

As a global leader, our most viable means of influence are our instruments of national power. Of these, military power has increasingly become the instrument of choice for peace operations and humanitarian assistance. Clearly it is the most responsive, most readily employed and, obviously, the most visible element that our national leaders can bring to bear on any problem. Recent successes in Panama, Somalia, Rwanda, Northern Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia provide increased confidence in the use of the military. Yet, our own security strategy states, "The primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened."[8] However, this military option has been utilized heavily since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In fact "we have deployed our forces to assist in security or humanitarian crisis about 40 times - a far greater pace than the preceding 20 years."[9] This represents a 300% increase in the military OPTEMPO over the last several years. This rise in activity further emphasizes the need to improve the process we exercise in executing our national interests.

Our military instrument of power is wielded by the supported Commander in Chief/Joint Task Force (CINC/JTF) Commander. Therefore, it becomes critical that we provide them with clearly articulated objectives, guidelines for coordination, and the envisioned endstate so that they can devise an executable plan. In fact this concept has been clearly communicated by recent Secretary of Defense Perry in his 1996 Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Specifically he stated: "Recent experience also has demonstrated the need to fully integrate - at the national and international levels - political, military, economic and humanitarian actions in peace operations, ensuring that military forces are adequately supported by non-military efforts.[10]

MANAGING COMPLEXITY

"Peacetime engagement missions are marked by unprecedented complexity in planning, command, and control. This complexity results from (1) the nature of the military operation itself, (2) the significant roles played by non-DoD departments and agencies, (3) the significant participation (and sometimes leadership) of non U.S. Government entities, and (4) the dominant role of the Department of State in establishing military objectives as well as orchestrating all of the mechanisms of conflict resolution."[11]

There are many actors attempting to play in this new peacekeeping arena. In fact, we have muddied the water with complex relationships (UN, US); numerous elements of national power (military, political, economic, informational); multiple players or partners (UN, US interagency, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), Private Voluntary Organization (PVO), International Organization (IO), coalition and regional partners);

and we expect success. Along with national recognition that improvements were necessary in evaluating and quantifying U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations, there have been increased efforts in improving interagency coordination. This has included the recent development of an interagency planning Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). (see Appendix A).

But as mentioned earlier, the NGOs and PVOs are also key players. They have realized that coordinated efforts ease the burden and have taken steps to organize their activities. NGOs, PVOs, and the military all have similar objectives when committed to peace operations. The goals include stabilizing the situation (to include deterring war), promoting peace, saving lives, and resolving the problem/conflict or hardship--while supporting civil authorities or the recognized governing body. Yet, there are several subtle differences between these groups. The military focus is limited more to creating a stable environment, enhancing or assuring security and then disengaging from the commitment as soon as practical. This is key to the humanitarian effort because "Without security, there is no stability. Without stability, there is no enduring humanitarian effect."[12]

Yet, how does the JTF Commander harness all of these capabilities? Here lies one of the major disconnects. There are indeed, exceptional interests at all higher levels to participate in these activities. And at the point of action, the players take immense responsibility and commit great effort to accomplish their jobs. Yet, somewhere between the higher level and the on site executor, there is a breakdown in communications despite the best intentions.

The recently developed interagency planning SOP recognizes the difficulties we face. It was designed to effectively integrate the operations of all our governmental players. Up front it articulates, "Although the day-to-day interagency process is generally effective in producing coordinated policy options and decisions, the process has proven unable to cope with the demands of providing coordinated guidance for operations in response to a complex emergency."[13]

This admission of past deficiencies and weaknesses in the interagency coordination process was a positive step forward towards correcting the problem. Previous interagency activities were oriented on providing general guidance to U.S. Government agencies who were conducting actual operations in the area of concern. This general guidance to each agency, who passed it on to their players on site, caused possible misinterpretation of mission and objectives by agencies and players alike. This stove pipe system of isolated individual agency interpretation, self-determined course of action selection, and individualized execution on the ground resulted in awkward, disjointed and rarely coordinated execution in the operational area. The military, noted for its adept skills at detailed mission planning, was equally criticized for "planning in isolation, without allowing other agencies any insight into planned military operations."[14] As one would expect, the consequences were typically a lack of coordination and resources. In some cases the lack of coordination led to the complete neglect of some key elements of the mission. When this glaring deficiency was identified, usually after the fact, it would normally be too late to make the necessary adjustments needed for success.

Consequently, an integrated, interagency, political-military planning process is needed to enhance our ability to successfully execute complex contingency operations. Specifically this process addresses four key elements of planning:

> -the various U.S. agencies involved proceed from the same overall strategy and objectives;
> -all aspects of the operation are coordinated at the policy level;
> -key issues and requirements are identified and addressed early on in the planning process; and
> -the interagency clearly assigns responsibility for distinct elements of an operation to specific program managers.[15]

These points seem obvious enough to the casual observer when taking a common sense approach to mission planning. It levels the playing field and focuses all participants on the same mission from the highest levels down to the executors. Hopefully, it eliminates the hidden agendas, removes the personalities, and concentrates solely on the problem. The overarching goal of this interagency process is to provide the National Security Council (NSC) with sound, logical guidance aimed at "identifying policy issues and questions, formulating options, raising issues to the appropriate level for decision within the NSC structure, making decisions where appropriate, and overseeing the implementation of policy decisions."[16]

THE DOCTRINAL PROCESS FOR INTERAGENCY PLANNING

"The integration of political, military, economic, and humanitarian objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action is essential for success in complex contingency operations."[17] The complexity of such undertakings has been apparent to our national leaders for quite some time. The National Security Act of

1947 was the first official attempt to organize and administer an interagency process in light of national security issues. This act officially established the National Security Council with the following purpose: "The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."[18] Today, President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 2 designates that the senior interagency forum for national security issues is comprised of the Principals Committee (cabinet level representatives). Correspondingly, the Deputies Committee (deputy/undersecretary-level) is responsible for the actual oversight for the interagency process and is tasked to provide input to the Principals Committee on appropriate/relevant issues. This Deputies Committee is the action agent for crisis management. It is further authorized to organize subordinate working groups that provide relevant assessments, issues, recommendations and alternatives. The Deputies Committee also oversees the execution of any guidance or decision.

In a crisis situation, this same process is executed under a compressed time frame. The interagency working group provides information to the Deputies Committee, which staffs the initial issues for the Principals Committee. This working group provides appropriate input for Presidential guidance. Upon Presidential approval, the NSC charters the Executive Committee, a subordinate supervisory element for oversight, and the "official" interagency planning begins.[19] Initial guidance from the NSC ensures the political-military implementation plan is adequate, feasible, and acceptable, while

identifying the critical elements of the operation. The emphasis on clearly defined mission objectives and endstate provides all players with a clear understanding of the U.S. position.

As the plan is developed, this Executive Committee is the first step in the reviewing process. The Deputies Committee conducts final oversight before delivery of the plan to the Principals and the final brief to the NSC and the President for approval. This approval initiates the activities for all players involved in mission execution. The Executive Committee continues to monitor the operation, provides appropriate input, and assesses progress or suggested adjustments to the ground situation. This oversight is intended to provide a continual assessment of the operation with relation to mission and objective accomplishment, along with achievement of the pre-determined or adjusted desired endstate. This ongoing assessment is critical for ensuring the effectiveness of each player is being maximized. It also allows the operation to transition to follow-on phases or even revert back to host nation control with adequate assistance.

This same Executive Committee is also tasked to conduct continual monitoring and critical assessment of lessons learned. The capturing of past strengths and weaknesses, includes suggested improvements to the pol-mil planning process. A report of lessons learned provides the NSC with a continuity file as a start point for future contingencies.

THE PLAN IN ACTION

The method which has been designed to coordinate the interagency process for complex contingencies is the Political-Military Implementation Plan (pol-mil plan). This

process was first utilized for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994. Previous efforts at pol-mil planning were ad-hoc at best and failed to successfully establish strategic vision and guidance for the numerous players. As in the past, the military plan was detailed and succinct for military operations. However, the interaction of individual agency plans failed to identify, or possibly ignored, key issues. This nearsightedness and specific focus failed to fully address and support overall U.S. Governmental objectives. The key weakness was the Executive Committee's failure to provide overall coordinated guidance to synchronize the numerous player/agency activities.

THE PROCESS EVOLVES

"The essence of interagency coordination is the interplay of multiple agencies with individual agendas."[20] Focusing on this challenge, the Executive Committee now convenes the initial planning session with all relevant players. The goal of this preliminary session is oriented solely on establishing interagency consensus on the base issues. The focus is the identification of U.S. interests, mission statement, U.S. objectives and desired endstate. This will be further articulated into concept of operation, organization and responsibilities, functional issues, specific issues and actual mission area plans. This emphasis is critical to providing the direction and clear understanding of the purpose for U.S. activities.

The outcome of this meeting may even identify additional players. Most importantly, it clearly articulates the key issues, relevancy and a desired outcome to provide specificity of focus and integration of player effort. With this common view, the individual agencies can plan their own piece of the operation. Continual review by the

Executive Committee program manager provides direction for overall continuity until the pol-mil plan is completed and presented to the Deputies. This planning forum establishes a coherent, coordinated, and standardized process for interagency operations. "Specifically, it ensures that the United States develops coordinated guidance for the operation; significantly improves U.S. Government (USG) policy development and implementation; provides the interagency with an effective management tool to examine policy and resource trade-offs in a more systematic manner; and improves the transparency of interagency planning."[21]

The final review and litmus test for the pol-mil plan is the interagency rehearsal. The Executive Committee briefs the Deputies Committees on the plan. The time proven effectiveness of the standard military operations order format, followed by rehearsals, was adopted as the approved process. The purpose of the interagency rehearsal is two fold: "ensuring that the specific mission area plans support the overall mission and achieve their objectives; and ensuring that the individual plans are synchronized to better support the overall U.S. Government plan."[22] As each program manager presents their specific mission area plan, they elaborate on the following minimum questions:

-What are the specific mission and objectives of the plan?
-What resources are needed to fulfill the mission?
-What are the entry assumptions?
-What are the possible obstacles?
-What are the timelines/milestones to accomplish the mission?
-What is success?[23]

Concurrently, a synchronization matrix is constructed during these briefings, which clearly displays the mission areas, operational phases and events which are planned. This serves to deconflict roles, responsibilities and timing to provide

synchronization. When analyzed critically in terms of desired endstate, deficiencies and necessary modifications may surface. Ideally, another rehearsal will follow any modifications in order to further refine the synchronization matrix and enhance coordination on the ground.

This development of a pol-mil plan for complex contingency operations has served as a major advancement in coordinating an extremely large group of potential players with divergent interests. This success merits recognition and praise in its attempt to organize the agencies of the executive branch. The superhuman effort to force this forum to speak with one clear and understandable voice is monumental. The process itself is still slow and tedious. Each agency/player comes to the table with its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, skills, techniques, bias, and bureaucratic interests. Despite these problems, the effectiveness of slugging through this process with all the players helps clarify the issues at hand and insure appropriate agency responsibility and action. This organizational diversity also provides valuable expertise, skills and abilities.

In times of crisis, this lengthy process must be accelerated without the loss of scope and efficiency. Consequently, procedures must be clearly defined and executed on a more timely basis. This may require initial planning and integration with concurrent execution on the ground at the tactical level. Special efforts must be made to contain or minimize the escalation of the crisis while the concept of operation is further refined at the national/strategic level. Additionally, "complex emergencies often involve agencies within the United States Government that are not normally part of the national security policymaking structure. Any crisis procedures must not only include these other

agencies, but also ensure that their perspectives are adequately integrated into the overall USG response."[24]

Other issues which commonly surface include:

-Relations with the host nation government;
-involvement of NGO/IO;
-Relations with the UN;
-Coalition forces arrangements.[25]

This list of issues is not all encompassing. Every situation requires a separate and different response. As a result, each crisis involves different players who come with their own baggage. "Interagency cooperation must begin with a clear understanding of the desired end-state, or the objectives of the mission.... Coordination to reach the desired end-state requires a delicate balance of leadership and followership by all the agencies concerned at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels."[26] This dictates the need for a standardized process to coordinate decision making at the executive branch to focus the numerous governmental agencies.

CRITICAL CONCERNS / RECOMMENDATIONS

PROBLEM #1

Realizing that this process has only recently been developed, it becomes evident why previous operations appeared disjointed and unwieldy. The inherent problem is that this interagency process is not formally institutionalized. It is still "ad-hoc" at best and will likely remain that way for the foreseeable future. The very nature of our political system creates turbulence and discontinuity among the various levels. (i.e. NSC, Principals, Deputies, and Executive Committees). The political appointment process and

internal moves continually create changes among the key interagency players. Compound this rotation of people/players with no existing requirement to conduct internal agency training nor a mandate to specifically adhere to this interagency planning process and we immediately face a challenging scenario.

We can compare this scenario to our military situation over 10 years ago. Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the services operated within their own purview. Following this act, the integration of the services into a joint force became a major focus for the military. This forced culture change served as the impetus to overcome service parochialism and bias, but change was not immediate. This interagency planning process represents an institutional culture change and time is a key player with respect to changing institutional culture. Great strides and inroads have been made by pulling the interagency together and providing the basic requirements of the political - military implementation plan. Still, several key areas of the plan have not yet been implemented and exercised. One of the most significant missing activities is the development of the synchronization matrix which coordinates and rehearses player interaction. This event and the use of a standardized after action review, with emphasis on providing lessons learned, will provide significant benefits for future operations. The pol-mil plan we currently have serves as a starting point for a coordinated effort and process, but still needs to evolve within the doctrinal construct. The identification of key problems, U.S. interests and objectives, coupled with establishment of a succinct overall strategy and clearly articulated end states/exit criteria, focuses the players on unity of effort. PDDs serve as the overall guidance in directing this process as each situation should arise.

Increased use of this process will enhance its effectiveness, and improve institutional learning.

PROBLEM #2

Another significant identifiable problem in the present interagency process is a lack of clearly fixed responsibility for each respective agency and that associated lack of accountability. "There is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments and organizations in interagency operations."[27] The responsibility for the preparation of the pol-mil plan has primarily been jointly chaired and jointly shared by the NSC and Department of State.[28] This responsibility has varied in the past. Recent examples show that State Department took the lead during the Eastern Slovenia crisis, while NSC was the lead during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.[29] The plan calls for the Executive Committee to brief and conduct the rehearsal for the Deputies Committee, while simultaneously constructing the synchronization matrix. Here again, this describes the desired process once the pol-mil plan is formally accepted and adopted. At present, this synchronization matrix has yet to be formally utilized during any situation, although the benefits of such an endeavor would reap untold benefits in coordinating the process. Supposing that the process was formalized and the key players briefed their part of the overall plan, the current system lacks any "teeth" to hold the agencies responsible or accountable for the execution of that briefed plan.

The clear articulation of the U.S. interests, mission statement, objectives and endstate/exit criteria are significant improvements to our complex contingency planning

process. These quantifiable aspects provide a clear focus and understanding for our participation in the mission and defining what constitutes mission success. The process educates all the players and dictates coordinated interactivity for a synergistic effect at the point of employment. The next step,.... assigning responsibility and holding people accountable would appear to be but a "blinding flash of the obvious."

This procedure is quite simple within a structured and institutionalized organization like the military. However, cross the boundary into the interagency world and the structure is less formal and not as clearly defined. Appointment of a head agency may appear to be a step in the right direction. However, looking at span of control and the priority of requirements per the synchronization matrix, then calculate in key player personalities and private agendas, and the outcome may be difficult to anticipate. When all the instruments of national power are applied--military, economic, diplomatic, and informational--the interaction of the multiple agencies and the dimensions of the required efforts increase dramatically. The American political system was designed to prevent any one branch from acquiring overwhelming influence over the political process. Therefore, the tendency of the system is towards diffusion. Consequently, "concentrating the powers of different agencies toward national security objectives is difficult."[30]

Put this complexity in the context of a crisis situation. "Crisis increases uncertainty and the likelihood that compromises will have to be made. With compromise comes the fear that power, security or prestige may be sacrificed."[31] This clearly complicates the decision making process of each agency and its commitment to its respective core values. The unknown wild card which cannot be anticipated and could

continually plague the process is the impact of domestic and international politics. Success rests primarily upon the ability of the players to form consensus, develop a genuine spirit of cooperation, subject their individual agendas for the benefit of the group and to personally work together. Understanding each organization, and the personalities involved in both the formal and informal structure may be relevant during normal business, but are not a priority during a crisis scenario.

Consequently, the solution to this dilemma is difficult. At the interagency level, a lead agency will be appointed. At the national level, consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff, and often results in a PDD explaining the goals of an operation and establishing interagency responsibilities. This provides guidance and clearly defined lines of responsibility and accountability within DOD. Within DOD, the structure currently exists to develop subordinate plans. With respect to the other players at the interagency level, responsibility and accountability lines may fade into the fog, or be clouded by political pulls and hidden agendas. As the operation unfolds and transcends from strategic level to the operational level (equivalent to the CINC/CJTF) and downward to the tactical level (equivalent to the CJTF and tasked units), further clarification in terms of responsibility and accountability are required. One of the key difficulties in coordinating operations between agencies can be simply determining your counterpart. Organizational structures are different and a counterpart at the operational level may be non-existent for some government agencies.

If the military is involved in the situation, they can provide a structure or nucleus for other elements/agencies. This might suggest that the interagency process may need to

be replicated at the operational and tactical levels in order to identify the players. "During interagency operations, the JTF HQ must provide the basis for unified effort, centralized direction and decentralized execution."[32] "The JTF HQ is the expeditionary focal point for interagency coordination, whereas the Joint Staff serves as the military's national level focal point.... The flexibility associated with JTF organization makes it possible to put some kind of military/political structure or staff into the JTF."[33] Here again, it is imperative that each player understand the goals of the operation and clarify and coordinate their responsibilities.

Steps for combatant commands that support effective interagency coordination and identify mutual objectives include:

1) identify all agencies and organizations which are or should be involved in the operation,
2) establish an authoritative interagency hierarchy,
3) define the objectives of the response effort,
4) define courses of action for both theater military operations and agency activities,
5) solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear understanding of the role that each plays,
6) identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities,
7) identify the resources of each participant to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort,
8) define the desired end state and exit criteria,
9) maximize the mission's assets to support the longer term goals of the enterprise,
10) establish interagency assessment teams.[34]

These objectives account for the USG actors and solidifies their functions while ensuring all have a vested interest and stake in the outcome. Establishing this cooperative environment, combined with an understanding of the functional interdependence of each organization, can develop the mutual reliance and potential for strengthened cohesiveness

to overcome the individuality of each organization. Participating in coordination can lead to full integration when diverse players share norms, values, beliefs and attitudes.

"The connectivity between NGOs and PVOs, and DOD is currently ad-hoc, with no specific statutory linkage."[35] Their linkage may only be tied by a UN umbrella. The UN headquarters could serve as the coordination point for peace operations and humanitarian assistance. However, they don't presently have an adequate command and control structure to execute operations without US assistance. Normally these organizations will not accept taskings or guidance from outside their organization. Since they are not part of the government, they may have conflicting views, goals, and objectives. Compounding this situation at the lowest level is the realization that these actors may not have the authority to alter their current activities without approval from their agency or organization. "Decentralized operations in the field require cogent strategies and plans to inform the operator of agency objectives, concepts for operating, and available resources. Agencies will continue to be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to different priorities, schedules and operating areas. Yet, as long as the CINCs are the only US Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together US Interagency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to provide the leadership even while in a supporting role."[36]

Forging understandings and alliances with the NGO/PVO community is extremely important. A large number of them are normally on location before the military arrives. Their expertise, local contacts and established credibility can provide valuable information about the situation, stability, priorities for action and the attitude of

the local populace. Their skills are critical in relief and refugee assistance, and their success and influence in saving lives makes them extremely credible and influential in the interagency circles. More importantly, their efforts can significantly reduce the civil-military resources required in a given situation. Their capabilities must be leveraged and integrated into the overall course of action. The expectation is that all players on the ground are there to make a difference. "The ranking US military commander may be the only official in the crisis area whose goals and responsibilities include unifying the efforts of all agencies."[37] This unification or cooperation cannot be directed. However, cooperation may be influenced by the capabilities and resources that the JTF brings to the bargaining table. Protection, logistical support, access to information and communication assets are vital to all participants and can lay the foundation for increased cooperation. Responsibility and accountability past this point will likely remain elusive at best. As a result, unity of command will probably remain a moot point for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, unity of effort must remain the focal point and common thread which ties any operation together.

PROBLEM #3

Another dilemma we face is coordination and communication at the execution level. Much like the previous mentioned situation, which lacks structure and organization to influence responsibility and accountability, there is also an absence of integrated communications flow down through the system. The system is either slow and unresponsive, or it can be termed a "stovepipe" communications system. This is a system where information flows directly from the agency/department to the operator on the

ground. Without a forum to share this information, operators can gravitate towards "wearing blinders" and only operate in "their specific lane." This generates an ineffective system of redundancy, wasted effort and a fragmented approach at solving the problem. Again it fails to measure the accomplishment of goals and desired endstate in anything other than a parochial view.

As always, information is power. Ways can be found to leverage this resource for everyone's advantage. As mentioned previously, military capabilities can have a direct influence in shaping a cooperative council and forging new alliances. The linkage of CJTF to CINC through CJCS to DOD and the NCA is a powerful tool. Military communication means and redundancy allow ease of access to information. Additionally, the transfer of information through multiple means (i.e., CJTF to the Ambassador to Department of State in addition to military means) allows duplicity of information and influences the situation.

The most effective means to provide information on site has been the establishment of the Civil Military Operations Cell (CMOC). The CMOC is designed to serve as the focal point for the JTF on all intelligence and operational matters. This includes interaction with the civilian populace, the host nation, foreign government officials, agencies, or other organizations on the scene.[38] This establishes a formal coordination site which is beyond the capability of NGOs and other outside agencies. Specifically, it opens access to key military resources. As such, the CMOC serves as a coordination point for necessary military assets but does not orchestrate all the other agency activities in country. The existence of a CMOC provides the ability to coordinate

efforts but can't command or control coordination. It does provide a critical asset which benefits all participants---information.

As already identified, NGOs and PVOs in the area of operation may not have any formal structure, and may already be committed to in-country regulations for operations and activities. It is imperative that the Joint Staff appraise the CINC/CJTF of all known players involved in the mission. With this information, it becomes incumbent upon the JTF to establish appropriate means of coordination and liaison. Past history has led to the establishment of the Humanitarian Assistance Control Cell (HACC). "The HACC assists with interagency coordination and planning, providing the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs and PVOs, and international and regional organizations that may participate in a HA operation at the strategic level."[39] Once the situation stabilizes, this HACC generally transitions to the CMOC or Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). Regardless, the function and purpose remain the same. The CJTF can serve as the driving force to develop a control structure and provide that unity of effort for all activities and organizations in the area of operations. This should not be misconstrued as a mission to take charge and dictate. It must be tempered with the ability to provide necessary resources and a willingness to demonstrate resolve, as well as cooperation, in attaining mutual endstates. Good personal relationships and shared focus must outweigh any semblance of being the taskmaster. General Joulwan summed it up best when he stated:

> We must recognize that the DOD contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our

> success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete.[40]

The establishment of the CMOC, HACC, or HOC may serve as a short-term solution to the communications or coordination problem on the ground. Long-term, the United States will not undertake many missions unilaterally. Therefore, given that most operations will have UN backing and resolution, the long-term solution is the establishment of a fully functional UN task force control element which has standardized communications, a predetermined organization to respond to various disasters or peacekeeping operations, and is fully trained in the coordination of the various players/agencies and assets which may arrive at the crisis. As a UN entity, they would provide the overarching legitimacy for the operation. The UN has recently organized their departments (i.e. Department for Peacekeeping Operations-DPKO, UN High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR, Department for Humanitarian Affairs-DHA, UN Department of Political Affairs-UNDPA, UN Interagency Standing Committee-UNISC, etc.) for responding to various contingencies. This would avoid the perception of the military as being "in charge" and would compliment their function as an "enabler." Contention can quickly arise in a "crisis" when the military arrives on scene quickly and takes charge of the situation--when NGOs/PVOs have been committed on the scene for months or even years. "Soldiers build security; civilians can accomplish the rest. Getting the balance right at different stages in the life of a complex mission is the challenge of interagency cooperation."[41]

Obviously this operation or coordination center must be easily accessible in the area of operation. More importantly it must build its credibility to guarantee its continued role as the true operations center. This is a plausible solution that has already been exercised on one occasion. As the lead UN agency inside Rwanda, the UN Development Program established a multi-agency operations center in Kigali, called the On Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC).[42] Representatives included UN agencies, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the JTF CMOC Cell, the host nation, and international organizations.

The communication and articulation of the status on the ground is key in providing an assessment back to the strategic level. This allows adjustments in courses of action or adaptation in applying the instruments of national power. More importantly, it assesses endstate in terms of mission accomplishment versus time on the ground. Quite clearly this insinuates that exit criteria cannot be time driven but must be based on effectiveness in achieving prescribed objectives.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, there have been vast improvements over recent years in the Clinton Administrations' use of the interagency process for complex contingencies. Current interagency coordination will improve further pending the signing of a PDD which is expected to formalize the pol-mil plan this summer.[43] In addition, the restructuring of the UN HQ to add the DPKO, has been significant. Internal to the USG, the interagency

process and the development of the pol-mil implementation plan and its usage during Haiti are positive steps forward. The development of Joint Publications 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," and its approval are significant leaps forward within DOD. Overcoming the deficiencies sited herein depends on the elevation of awareness, plus an education process to speed cultural acceptance. Significant efforts have been taken at the Army War College also. Our Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) hosted the first annual CJCS Peace Operations Seminar/Game in June 1995. Key recommendations were:

1) the need for increased awareness,
2) development of structure, procedures, and,
3) the need for coordination within the humanitarian community.[44]

This same year the UN dedicated efforts to compiling lessons learned from operations in Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti.[45] The PKI 1996 CJCS Peace Operations Seminar Game focused on:

1) civil military cooperation and coordination,
2) weapons control regimes and policies, and
3) development of exit/transition strategies.[46]

The list of attendees is a clear indication of the interest in improving our abilities in these complex scenarios. They included: UN Representatives, political and military representatives from the United States (Department of Defense, Department of State, Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Army, interagency representatives), and NGO representatives.

Both PACOM and SOUTHCOM have integrated peacekeeping scenarios into their exercise play. General Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, spoke of the

interagency battlefield during an infantry brigade's rotation at the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center:

> The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, media representatives, and others all went to Fort Polk, Louisiana. They were there to work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and to learn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.[47]

This was only four months prior to this brigade's deployment to Haiti.

"The challenge is to blend or synchronize many agencies' activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Synchronization of national instruments of power for national purposes is difficult; synchronization of national, supra-national and non-governmental agencies with sometimes diverse goals, different organizational cultures and diverging assessments of the situation may be impossible. But perhaps if synchronization is beyond our reach, we can work towards cooperation, coordination and consensus."[48]

There is light at the end of the tunnel--if we continue government-wide initiatives to improve our performance in Peace Operations.

APPENDIX A

GENERIC POL-MIL PLAN[49]

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENTS

1.1 Introduction

This section is a brief introduction which should discuss:

- why the plan is being written
- what it pertains to
- when it goes into effect
- how the plan is structured
- Office with responsibility for authorship

1.2 Assessment of Situation

This section should briefly describe the interagency's assessment of the situation on the ground--its causes, dynamics, key characteristics and history--and the actors in the area, both friendly and hostile, and their interests in the crisis. Its aim is to provide participating agencies with a clear picture of the context in which they will be operating. Key sub-paragraphs should include, but are not limited to:

- Military situation threat level
- Political situation host nation status, regional actors, international actors
- Economic situation
- Humanitarian and human rights situations
- Security/Law & Order situation
- International Involvement/Presence
- Entry Conditions

1.3 Assessment of US Interests at Stake and Objectives

This section should succinctly state the US interests at stake in the crisis, and how these will be served by the proposed intervention.

2.0 MISSION AND OVERALL USG OBJECTIVES

This section succinctly states the overall US mission and objectives for the operation. As such, it is the centerpiece of the pol-mil plan. All parts of the plan must reflect and support this section, and each should be judged against it. Therefore, the NSC should obtain interagency consensus on the mission statement and USG objectives before tasking out the other parts of the pol-mil plan.

2.1 Mission Statement

In short, this is a clear and concise statement of who, what, when, why and how. The mission statement should include:

- Who is conducting the operation
- What type of operation will be conducted
- Who has authorized the operation (UN, Congress, Presidential order)
- Legal authorities in place (e.g., SOMA/SOFA)
- The operation's primary objectives
- Key elements of the operational strategy
- Endstate/exit criteria

2.2 Objectives

This section lists key US objectives which support the mission statement. These objectives should be both clear and realistic, and their achievement should constitute accomplishment of the mission. Additionally, this section may include a discussion of what we will not do.

2.3 End State/Exit Criteria

This section discusses the conditions that should exist before the operation transitions to another operation (e.g., MNF in Haiti to UNMIH) or ends. This section should also mention the longer term U.S. or international development projects that will continue after the stated end of the operation.

3.0 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3.1 Overall Concept of Operations

This section outlines conceptually how the various elements of US strategy (political, military, humanitarian, etc.) will be integrated to achieve USG objectives. It should include a general discussion of how the operation will unfold by phase. It should outline the primary objectives of each phase and the roles of the major agencies/actors supporting or actively participating in the intervention by phase, to include the designation of a lead agency. It should also outline appropriate end state criteria for each phase, exit criteria for particular agencies, and end state conditions to signal the end of USG involvement. This is not to be confused with the detailed concepts of how individual agencies will perform their roles (see part 6.0). On the contrary, the purpose here is to outline the major tasks each agency is responsible for in concert with other agencies in four key critical task priority areas for each phase.

-Diplomatic/Political Priorities:
-Military/Security Priorities:
-Humanitarian Assistance Priorities:
-Economic Development Priorities:
-Information/Public Affairs Priorities:

Recommended phases for an operation are as follows:

·Phase I: Interagency Assessment
·Phase II: Preparation, Movement, and Force Build-up
·Phase III: Principal Operations
·Phase IV: Security, Stability, and Rehabilitation Activities
·Phase V: Security Transition and Military Drawdown
·Phase VI: Host Nation Redevelopment
·Phase VII: End State Sustainment

3.2 Lead US Agency Responsibilities
This section assigns areas of responsibility to different USG agencies based on the concept of operations. These responsibilities are determined through interagency discussions. In some cases, it may also be helpful to clarify tasks or functions that fall outside an agency's area of responsibility.

3.2.1- State
3.2.2- Defense
3.2.3- AID
3.2.4- USIA
3.2.5- OMB
3.2.6- CIA

3.2 Lead US Agency Responsibilities (Continued)

(include other agencies as appropriate]

3.3 US Government Organization
This section should describe briefly both USG organization for this operation, both in Washington, D.C., and in theater, and the chain of command.

3.3.1 Washington Interagency Elements:

Executive Committee (ExComm)
Planning Group (IWG)

3.3.2 US Organization/Command Relations in Theater:

Senior Steering Group
Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)
Role of US Ambassador
Role of CJTF Commander

3.3.3 UN Organization in Theater (if appropriate)

SRSG
Force Commander
Civil Affairs
CivPol

4.0 FUNCTIONAL ISSUE PAPERS

Papers in this section are designed to lay out USG strategy and agency responsibilities in key functional areas, such as funding for the operation, congressional relations, and public affairs. For each functional area, there may be multiple papers. Each paper should be drafted by one organization and coordinated with all interested agencies.

4.1 Diplomatic Strategy

- Advance diplomatic consultations with UN, US allies, key regional powers, regional organizations and international organizations

4.2 Funding issues and authorities (OMB):

- Relevant funding authorities
- Interagency burdensharing-which agencies will pay for what
- Congressional actions required
- Funding challenges

4.3 Congressional strategy (State H):

- Initial strategy for gaining support for operation
- Plan for ongoing consultation with/reporting to Congress
- Identification of key members of Congress, pro/con
- Strategy for dealing with key members

4.4 Public affairs and PSYOPs strategy (State PA):

- Overall strategy
- Pre-deployment strategy
- PSYOPs plan
- Rules of road for media once operation begins
- Telling the story as operation unfolds
- Key themes
- Identifying key media outlets/people

4.5 Logistics

- Host government support
- Agency needs and responsibilities
- Coalition partner needs and responsibilities
- Use of contractors

4.6 Intelligence

- Agency needs and responsibilities

- Coalition partner needs and responsibilities
- Intelligence sharing

4.X Other functional areas may be added as appropriate

5.0 SITUATION SPECIFIC ISSUE PAPERS

The papers in this section should address the major issues and decision points of the operation. Although the content of this section will vary significantly from operation to operation, there are certain issues that must be either addressed or consciously dismissed as not relevant to a particular operation.

Each paper should be tasked to a specific agency for completion in coordination with other interested actors in the USG. **An extended checklist of potential operational tasks is at Annex A.**

Possible topics include:

- Relations of host nation with US, other governments, UN/regional organizations
- Relations with the UN/regional organizations involved and their capabilities
- Military situation in the host nation and military operations required
- Status of police forces and law and order requirements
- Overall political situation in host country
- Humanitarian situation and operations required
- Reconstruction operations required
- Human rights situation and structures in host country
- Involvement of NGO/IOs and relations with them
- Involvement of other non-state actors
- Coalition forces arrangements, recruitment, etc.
- Refugees, IDPs and potential or anticipated movements of populations
- Key events/milestones (e.g. elections, demobilization, police force, etc.)
- Transition planning for follow-on operation or for hand-off to indigenous authorities

The structure of the papers will vary, but they should at least discuss:

- Purpose of the paper
- Current situation
- Objectives and desired endstate
- Concept of operations, including timelines, milestones, and measures of success

- Authorities / mandates that apply
- US agencies involved, their roles/responsibilities and chain of command
- Local institutions involved and the state of play
- Other international actors/organizations involved in area and their influence on the local situation
- Anticipated participation by others and their effectiveness
- Anticipated challenges / difficulties

ANNEX A
SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL TASKS CHECKLIST

5.1 Diplomatic Tasks (State, USUN)

- Collaborate with the UN and regional organizations
- Consult with the host nation and other governments
- Consult with supporting international organizations
- Coordinate with "Friends Groups"
- Mediate and negotiate with the parties of the conflict
- Impose or lift sanctions / arms embargo
- Conduct war crimes investigations, tribunals, etc.
- Maintain compliance with the Peace Accord milestones and conditions
- Appoint a Special Envoy
- Gain diplomatic recognition of a government

5.2 Military Tasks (OSD, Joint Staff, CIA)

- Assess, train and equip coalition forces
- Conduct military operations to accomplish the mandate
- Provide intelligence support to the operation
- Establish a military observer mission
- Implement a weapons control regime
- Demobilize, re-integrate, or reduce military units
- Demilitarize a zone or region
- Conduct constabulary operations
- Establish confidence-building and security measures
- Professionalize / restructure military forces
- Establish mil-to-mil programs
- Coordinate NATO support to the operation
- Provide security assistance to the host nation
- Conduct transition planning, hand-off, and military drawdown

5.3 Internal Political Tasks (State)

- Establish an effective transition government

- Establish a mechanism for constitutional reform
- Staff and fund the transition government
- Conduct nation-wide elections
- Train newly elected political leaders
- Provide advisors to government officials
- Monitor and report on corruption by government officials
- Transfer control of government functions to host nation officials
- Monitor government power-sharing arrangements

5.4 Public Security / Law and Order Tasks (State, Justice)

- Reform or disband existing police forces
- Establish a new police force
- Conduct police training for police forces
- Establish a CIVPOL monitor activity
- Provide advisors to police and criminal justice organizations
- Support the establishment of local police operations
- Assist in establishing humane prison system
- Eradicate police corruption
- Assist in establishing a legitimate legal system
- Support judicial reform and local dispute resolution
- Safeguard government institutions and key leaders

5.5 Humanitarian Assistance Tasks (State)

- Avoid generation of population movements from home towns
- Provide emergency humanitarian relief
- Provide health services, water, food, etc.
- Organize humanitarian assistance zones or relief areas
- Coordinate non-government and private organization activities
- Repatriate or resettle refugees and displaced persons
- Provide housing and public services for returning people
- Assist in capacity-building for humanitarian assistance
- Pre-position humanitarian relief stocks

5.6 Infrastructure and Economic Development Tasks (State, AID)

- Restore basic public services
- Target development assistance such as road building
- Provide job training and employment for discharged military personnel
- Reform government economic policy
- Assist in economic integration and cooperation
- Streamline government licensing / eliminate corruption
- Initiate privatization under market economy
- Manage natural resources
- Seek investment capital

5.7 Human Rights and Social Development Tasks (State)

- Monitor human rights practices
- Promote human rights standards
- Establish civil affairs operations in local areas
- Assist in capacity-building for social institutions

5.8 Public Information and Education Tasks (State, OSD, Joint Staff)

- Conduct public information (e.g. PSYOPS) operations
- Promote civic education
- Provide unbiased historical information on the conflict
- Sponsor journalist training and professionalization

6.0 AGENCY PLANS

Each agency involved should write an agency plan detailing its own mission, objectives and concept of operations in support of the overall pol-mil plan. Format for each of these sections should generally mirror that of the overall pol-mil plan.

Each of these documents should show how a given agency envisions its role, mission, and activities in the overall operation. Interagency review of these plans should highlight areas of interdependence between agencies (e.g., AID cannot do x until DoD does y), areas of disagreement (e.g., two agencies each think the other should pay for x), and the degree of consistency between agency plans and the overall pol-mil plan.

ENDNOTES

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[28] LTC Sam Butler of the Peacekeeping Institute, telephone interview by author, 29 April 1997, Carlisle, PA.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. 1, I-7.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., II-7.

[33] Ibid., II-8.

[34] Ibid., ix.

[35] Ibid., II-21.

[36] Ibid., I-4.

[37] Ibid., III-16.

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[39] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. 1, III-8.

[40] Ibid., II-23.

[41] Last, 1.

[42] Ibid., 11.

[43] LTC Sam Butler of the Peacekeeping Institute, telephone interview by author, 29 April 1997, Carlisle, PA.

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