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**THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN  
ORGANIZING THE JOINT TASK FORCE**

**BY**

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AWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**The Role of the Commander in Organizing the Joint Task Force**

by

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## Abstract

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ABSTRACT: World wide U.S. interests require the ability to project anywhere on the planet. Power projection is inherently a joint undertaking.. American military power is usually employed in a joint task force (JTF) especially tailored for the mission.

Typically the commander of the JTF (CJTF) is hand picked. The role that the CJTF envisions for himself will be crucial in the determination of the size, capability, and equipment required for the JTF staff, the way the joint forces and the joint battlespace are organized, as well as the command relationships within the JTF. The role that the CJTF plays in the execution of the JTF mission runs the spectrum from merely being a coordinator of the subordinate commands to being an integrator of joint capabilities.

The role that the CJTF chooses should most effectively exploit the flexibility and capability of the JTF concept without compromising the established principles of joint warfare.



## **Table of Contents**

Introduction	1
Forming the JTF	2
The CJTF's Visualization of the Fight	4
Authority for Organizing the JTF	6
Organizing the JTF Staff	8
Organizing the Forces of the JTF	12
Establishing Command Relationships within the JTF	16
Organizing the JTF Battlespace	18
Conclusion	20
Endnotes	23
Bibliography	25



## Introduction

The Armed Forces of the United States face a more challenging environment than at any other time in history. US Allies and interests are world wide and as a result, the potential area of operations (AO) for US forces has become the entire planet. Because of this potential world wide AO and in order to fulfill the requirements of the national military strategy (NMS), the Armed Forces of the United States must be able to project and sustain military power over long distances.

*“The projection of power is inherently a joint undertaking, because of the inter-Service linkages of modern command, control, and communications, the multi-Service structure of the defense transportation system, and the broad range of forces typically involved.”<sup>1</sup>*

The joint forces of the United States are established at either the unified command level, the subordinate unified command level or the joint task force (JTF) level. The establishing authority designates the commander joint task force (CJTF), assigns the mission to the CJTF and allocates the forces available to the CJTF. The CJTF is responsible to the establishing authority for the accomplishment of the mission.

As the individual personally responsible for the accomplishment of the mission the CJTF normally has wide latitude in organizing the JTF. The CJTF is responsible for selecting his JTF staff, establishing command relationships within the JTF, organizing the joint forces assigned or attached to the JTF and organizing the battlespace within the assigned joint operations area (JOA). The CJTF is also responsible for requesting additional forces if required from the establishing authority.

The role that the CJTF personally plays in the execution of the JTF mission lies within a spectrum of options. This spectrum varies from being merely a coordinator of the subordinate commands (an allocator of forces) to being the integrator of the JTF capabilities (what I will call the number one warfighter). This paper will argue that the role the CJTF envisions for himself in the execution of the JTF mission is the most important element in the process of determining how to organize the JTF. Finally I will make a recommendation as to which role the CJTF should choose. This role should be the one that best employs the unique power and flexibility of the JTF concept in the accomplishment of the JTF mission.

For purposes of clarity I will begin by addressing the established doctrinal foundation with a review of the procedures involved in the formation of a JTF, the selection of the CJTF and an explanation of the chain of authority. I will then examine the effects that the role that the CJTF has chosen for himself in the accomplishment of the JTF mission plays in organizing the JTF staff, the JTF forces (to include command relationships) and the JTF battlespace. In the conclusion I will recommend the role that I feel most effectively exploits the flexibility and capability of the JTF concept.

### **Forming the Joint Task Force**

The formation of a JTF for any particular operation remains more of an art than a science. In crisis situations the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) normally follows the formally established six phase crisis action planning (CAP) procedures.

*“CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military courses of action (COAs) for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.”<sup>2</sup>*

Since CAP phases are scenario dependent, actual planning time between phases may vary significantly. Phases may be conducted sequentially, concurrently, compressed, or eliminated altogether. For the purposes of this paper I will assume the CAP phases are conducted sequentially.

In CAP phase I the National Command Authorities (NCA) normally require the geographic CINC to submit an assessment of the situation. During CAP phase I, in anticipation of a JCS Warning Order, the geographic CINC will normally form a planning cell (if one has not already been formed). This planning cell will begin contingency planning.<sup>3</sup>

CAP phase II normally begins once the CINC's assessment has been received by the National Command Authority (NCA). The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the joint staff provide advice to the NCA on possible military action. The decision by the NCA to develop military courses of action (COAs) normally signals the end of CAP Phase II.<sup>4</sup>

CAP Phase III normally begins with a CJCS Warning Order to the appropriate geographic CINC. For the purpose of this paper, I will assume that upon receiving the CJCS Warning Order the geographic CINC decides to form a JTF in response to the crisis. The exact timing for the decision to form a JTF, designate a CJTF and assign forces to the JTF vary. Great latitude is given to the geographic CINC in making these decisions. Identifying the JTF commander as soon as possible is highly recommended.<sup>5</sup>

*“The CINC, with the advise of his Deputy and component commanders, selects the JTF commander. This is a key decision and is based on the long term flavor of the operation and special talents of the individual.”<sup>6</sup>*

Once designated, the CJTF starts selecting his key staff (or the source of his joint staff) and begins the process of taking over the contingency planning that was started by the CINC’s planning cell. Once the decision to form a JTF has been made and the CJTF designated, the real “art” of organizing a JTF begins.

### **The CJTF’s Visualization of the Fight**

One of the most important reasons for identifying the CJTF as soon as possible is so that he and his selected core staff can assume the responsibility of contingency planning for the JTF from the CINC’s planning cell. The first step in military planning is usually a detailed and thorough mission analysis. During this mission analysis the specified, implied and derived tasks are determined.

Specified and implied tasks are doctrinal concepts. Derived tasks are a non-doctrinal concept and represent the first opportunity for the injection of the CJTF’s visualization of the fight.

Once the tasks are determined, they are further distilled to produce a mission essential task list (those tasks which when accomplished define mission success). The mission essential task list is extremely important to the CJTF. From the mission essential task list the CJTF deduces or postulates the minimum capabilities required to accomplish the JTF mission. This process is commonly referred to as “troop to tasks”. The CJTF, in consultation with the establishing authority, translates these minimum

required capabilities into a request for the forces (if not already assigned or attached) that possess those capabilities needed to accomplish the JTF mission.

Early identification of required capabilities and the forces that provide those capabilities is especially important for the long lead times normally associated with employing CONUS based power projection.

During mission analysis the CJTF, in addition to identifying tasks and the capabilities to accomplish those tasks, begins the "visualization" of a concept of how to employ the JTF. From this visualization of employment must flow a concept on how to organize, command, and control those forces which provide the capabilities. This "visualization" of the fight must include determining the CJTF's role.

The role that the CJTF can play varies across a wide spectrum of options. At one end of the spectrum is the pre-Desert Storm concept of a CJTF. In this concept the CJTF is a coordinator. He merely allocates resources and provides "broad guidance" or "strategic direction" for the joint force.<sup>7</sup>

In the middle of this spectrum the CJTF is a deconflictor. In this concept, in addition to providing "broad guidance" or "strategic direction", the CJTF sets priorities for scarce resources and is responsible for deconfliction of the subordinate commands COAs.<sup>8</sup>

At the opposite end of the spectrum the CJTF is an integrator. In this concept the CJTF is responsible for total integration of the capabilities of the JTF into a single, coherent, overarching JTF course of action.<sup>9</sup>

Once the CJTF has determined his role he will begin to organize the JTF, within the limits of his authority, to better enable him to fulfill the responsibilities of that role.

### **Authority for Organizing the JTF**

The authority of a CJTF to organize his forces is detailed in US law and joint doctrine. The chain of authority, which is determined by law, ensures unity of command, enhances strategic unity of effort, and guarantees civilian control of the military. The level of authority is described by law and joint doctrine and is used to explain command relationships within the joint forces.

The chain of authority begins with the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution sets the requirement for the Federal Government to provide for the common defense. The executive and legislative branches share the responsibility and authority for national security. Exercising this constitutional authority, the President, acting as Commander in Chief, directs the deployment and employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.<sup>10</sup>

This constitutional authority is passed down through the President to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Together the President and the SECDEF make up the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA exercises authority over the Armed Forces of the United States through a single chain of command with two branches.

The first branch runs through the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commanders, runs through

the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs, for those forces not assigned to the combatant commanders.<sup>11</sup>

When authorized, the combatant commanders may establish subordinate unified commands. JTFs may be established by the SECDEF, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command or by an existing CJTF.<sup>12</sup> Thus the constitutional chain of authority extends unbroken from the President to the CJTF.

This chain of authority guarantees unity of command from the President down to the CJTF. The President, advised by the National Security Council, is in turn responsible to the American people for ensuring strategic unity of effort within the executive branch, between the executive branch and the legislative branches, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and among the various nations of an alliance or coalition.<sup>13</sup>

The level of authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. The Armed Forces of the United States use four types of command relationships to describe level of authority. They are: combatant command (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support.

COCOM is the level of command authority vested only in combatant commanders. COCOM is authorized by title 10, US Code, Section 164 or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). COCOM cannot be delegated. COCOM provides full authority to organize, employ, train, and sustain commands and forces as the combatant commander deems necessary.<sup>14</sup>

OPCON is the level of command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below a combatant commander. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander deems necessary to accomplish the mission. Commanders of JTFs will normally be delegated OPCON of assigned or attached forces by the superior commander or establishing authority.<sup>15</sup>

TACON is the command authority that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control necessary to accomplish assigned tasks.<sup>16</sup>

Support is a command authority that is used to convey priorities between commanders and staffs. It is used by the establishing authority to designate when one subordinate command should aid, protect, complement or sustain another subordinate command.

Thus the CJTF is empowered by a chain of authority that is traced all the way back to the NCA. This chain of authority for US forces ensures unity of command and strategic unity of effort. The level of authority given the CJTF is sufficient to enable him to organize and employ the forces as necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of his chosen role.

Once designated as a CJTF and delegated OPCON from the appropriate higher authority, the first task is to select and organize the JTF staff in such a way as to support his chosen role.

### **Organizing the JTF Staff**

*“A [CJTF] is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions.”<sup>17</sup>*

Established joint doctrine provides broad guidance as to the structure and make up of the JTF staff. Normally the JTF staff should reflect the composition of the JTF forces, the character of the contemplated operations, and the CJTF's articulated vision of his role in the accomplishment of the JTF mission. The JTF staff organization should conform to, but is not limited by, the principles outlined in joint doctrine.

The JTF staff requirements vary significantly between a CJTF that acts as a coordinator of subordinate commands and a CJTF that acts as an integrator of capabilities (opposite ends of the spectrum of options). The next portion of this paper will compare the JTF staff requirements between the CJTF that acts as a coordinator and the CJTF that acts as an integrator.

The source of the JTF staff is a continuing challenge to joint operations. The three most common options that I have observed from JTF exercises for sourcing a JTF staff are: forming a standing JTF HQ, forming a JTF HQ "Ad Hoc" for each crisis, and build the JTF HQ on the lead Service component. A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these options is beyond the scope of this paper.

The manpower, planning expertise, and equipment requirements of the JTF staff are based primarily on the JTF mission, the make up of the JTF forces, and the CJTF's role, not on the source of the JTF staff. In accordance with joint doctrine the personnel make up of the JTF staff should reflect the Service or functional component having the majority of forces (or at least significant forces) assigned or attached to the JTF.<sup>18</sup>

The primary responsibilities of a CJTF as a coordinator of subordinate commands would be in the traditional J-1 ( Manpower and Personnel) and J-4 (Logistics) functional areas. These responsibilities would concentrate on deployment, maintenance and sustainment of the JTF. In accordance with joint doctrine, the majority of detailed planning for sustainment and logistics of assigned or attached forces is not handled by the JTF staff. Sustainment and logistics of assigned or attached forces are normally coordinated between the geographic CINC's Service Component and the JTF's Service force commander. Since the majority of force sustainment and logistics planning is handled by the components the manpower requirements of the JTF's J-1 and J-4 functional area staffs would be minimal.

By comparison, the CJTF acting as an integrator of capabilities would be much more involved in the sustainment and logistics arena. "Focused" sustainment and "just in time" logistics are only possible with an integrated, coherent JTF COA. Normally, Directive Authority for Logistics (DAL) is not delegated below the combatant commander level. However, recent JTF exercises and certain CINC level exercises have shown a different approach being explored. In order to better coordinate logistics and sustainment requirements and more effectively utilize scarce resources, CJTFs as well as other major subordinate commands, have asked for and been granted more and more logistics related authority.<sup>19</sup>

In order to plan for and execute greater logistics authority the JTF's J-4 functional area staff will need to be greatly expanded. This expansion would include additional manpower for more detailed planning (for example a J-4 Future Plans

section). This expansion would also include additional manpower and communications equipment required to monitor and analyze logistics execution (for example a Joint Rear Area Operations Center [JRAOC]). Thus, with the CJTF acting as an integrator of capabilities, JTF staff manpower and equipment requirements would be greatly increased in the J-1 and J-4 functional areas.

The most significant differences in JTF staff requirements, between the two CJTF options, will occur in the J-2 (Intelligence), J-3 (Operations), J-5 (Plans and Policy), and J-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems) functional areas.

The CJTF acting as a coordinator provides only "broad guidance" or "strategic direction" to the subordinate commands. By definition "broad guidance" or "strategic direction" require less detailed planning. Less detailed planning requires less manpower, expertise and equipment in the J-2, J-5, and J-6 functional areas. In addition, the CJTF as a coordinator would have significantly reduced execution monitoring and analysis requirements, relying instead on reports, analysis and observations from subordinate commands. This would significantly reduce the manpower and equipment requirements in the J-3 functional area.

By contrast, the CJTF that fully integrates capabilities in a coherent JTF COA requires significantly enhanced planning and execution expertise as well as additional communications equipment. Planning for the employment of JTF capabilities will, more than likely, take place at the JTFHQ. Detailed planning on "how" to accomplish their portion of the JTF COA will occur at the subordinate command level. The additional

planning requirements caused by the CJTF role results in not only additional JTF staff planners but an increase in the augmentation and liaison requirements from the subordinate commands as well.

Even if the J-2 requirements are assumed to be the same, (for the different CJTF roles) it is clearly obvious that the CJTF as an integrator of capabilities requires a much larger planning staff. Additional personnel and equipment would be needed for the enlarged J-3 section. Proper integration of capabilities requires a Current Operations monitoring and analysis section as well. This produces an even larger JTF staff requirement.

Thus it is obvious that as the CJTF moves from one end of the spectrum of options (the coordinator of subordinate commands) to the other end (integrator of capabilities), the JTF staff and equipment requirements increase dramatically.

### **Organizing the Joint Forces of the JTF**

The CJTF is tasked to organize the JTF forces in such a way as to best accomplish the mission. However the CJTF should "allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed."<sup>20</sup> The CJTF must balance the needs of the JTF while maintaining the unique tactical and operational capabilities of the individual Services.

As stated earlier, CAP Phase III normally starts when the geographic CINC receives the CJCS Warning Order. The CJCS Warning Order normally establishes command relationships between the combatant commanders and may identify mission

or planning constraints. The CJCS Warning Order may identify forces and capabilities assigned and tentative timing for execution.

If not provided by the CJCS directive, the Warning Order may request that the supported commander develop these requirements and planning factors. In response to the directive the geographic CINC, with the help of subordinate commanders, begins more detailed planning for COA development and analysis. It is at this point that the CJTF's visualization of the fight must be included in the process of organizing the JTF and its forces.

*"The first principle in joint force organization is that [CJTFs] organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the [CJTF's] vision and concept of operations."<sup>21</sup>*

The CJTF's recommendations on what forces/capabilities are needed to accomplish the JTF mission must be included in the CAP process as early as possible. This early identification is especially important if the forces/capabilities are not located within the establishing CINC's geographic area of responsibility (AOR). Due to the longer lead times, planning for the deployment of out of theater forces/capabilities may start with the issuance of the CJCS Warning Order or CJCS Planning Order. Additional planning or execution restraints and constraints could result if the CJTF inputs to the CAP process are not timely.

The CJTF' visualization of the fight and his role in the accomplishment of the JTF mission will drive JTF COA development, the organization of the JTF forces and the command relationships within the JTF. Joint doctrine provides recommended options

on how to organize the JTF, but provides precious little advice in determining which option provides the CJTF optimum flexibility in accomplishing the JTF mission.

According to joint doctrine a JTF may be organized by Service components, by functional components, by a subordinate JTF or by a combination of the three. A fifth and non-doctrinal option is the concept of the "embedded staff". This unique concept was used during Operation United Shield. Because of the unique naval requirements of the operation and in order to reduce the number of staff personnel and flatten the organization, the US Naval Forces (USNAVFOR) staff was imbedded in the combined joint task force staff.

A quick review of the doctrinal foundation for the two most common options for JTF force organization, functional or service componency, follows. The subordinate JTF option will not be discussed because it is merely a reflection, on a smaller scale, of the issues facing the establishing CJTF. Further discussion of the non-doctrinal concept of the imbedded staff is beyond the scope of this paper.

The CJTF may choose to conduct operations through the Service force commanders. Normally, unless designated by other competent authority, the senior officer of each Service assigned to the JTF who is qualified for command, in accordance with the regulations of the parent Service, is designated as the commander of the Service component forces.<sup>22</sup> Two primary advantages of this option include clear and uncomplicated command lines and reduced staff requirements. Organizing along Service components usually requires more thorough integration of capabilities at the JTF level.

The CJTF has the authority to establish functional component commands to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations.<sup>23</sup> A functional component may be appropriate (but not necessary) when forces/capabilities from two or more Services must operate in the same dimension or medium. Although functional components may be composed of forces/capabilities from two or more Services, they are not considered a "joint force".

*"The [CJTF] must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationships the functional component commander will exercise over that military capability."<sup>24</sup>*

A distinct advantage of functional componentency is the ability to plan, allocate, coordinate and task the forces/capabilities made available by the CJTF within a single subordinate headquarters. The two primary disadvantages of functional componentency are potentially confusing command relationships (to be discussed later in this paper) and the additional staff and liaison requirements. Functional component commanders have no inherent or Title 10 command authority. The CJTF must clearly articulate and define the authority of the functional component commander over the forces/capabilities made available by the CJTF. Functional component staffs should be joint in nature and reflect the composition of the forces/capabilities made available by the CJTF.

The primary responsibility of the CJTF as a coordinator would be in providing "broad guidance" or "strategic direction" to the subordinate commands. Due to the typically reduced JTF staff size (as pointed out earlier in this paper), the CJTF would depend on the subordinate commands to develop this guidance or direction into separate COAs. Centralized direction and functional control of operations would almost

be required from the subordinate commands. Typically the CJTF as a coordinator would tend to organize along functional component lines.

As stated earlier in this paper, the CJTF as an integrator of capabilities would normally be armed with a more robust staff. This robust staff would enable a broader spectrum of choices in organizing the JTF forces. A more capable staff would furnish the more detailed level of planning necessary to provide centralized control and specific direction required if the JTF was organized along Service component lines. In addition, if the CJTF chose to pursue the other option, the advantages of functional competency would be realized without burdening the subordinate commands with additional staff requirements.

Thus the biggest difference in organizing the JTF forces would be in the additional options available to the CJTF filling the role as an integrator of capabilities. The additional options would primarily be as a result of the more robust JTF staff that is more commonly associated with the CJTF as an integrator.

### **Establishing Command Relationships within the JTF**

Command relationships continue to be one of the more sensitive issue concerning joint operations. Fully one fifth of the total publication (one entire chapter) in Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) is dedicated to explaining the intricacies of command relationships within the joint forces.

*"Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified."<sup>25</sup>*

The basis for determining command relationships begins with the transfer of forces. Forces permanently transferred (or at least transferred for long or unknown lengths of time) will normally be reassigned. The gaining command is normally delegated OPCON over the reassigned forces.

Forces temporarily transferred will normally be attached. The gaining command is normally delegated OPCON or TACON. TACON is the minimum command authority required to assign missions or tasks.

As previously stated, the CJTF as a coordinator would tend to organize the JTF along functional component lines. The command relationships required to support functional competency vary from OPCON to TACON. The question facing the CJTF in organizing the forces in the JTF along functional component lines deals with responsibility. The greater the responsibility given to the functional component commander the greater the authority required.

The CJTF must clearly articulate his decisions on responsibilities and authority, not only to the designated functional component commander, but to the other subordinate commanders as well. The CJTF must then clearly articulate the forces/capabilities made available to the functional component commander. Just as important is the length of time the forces/capabilities are made available by the other commands. Unless these specific details are clearly articulate by the CJTF and understood by the subordinate commanders, then unity of command and unity of effort within the JTF will be compromised by the ensuing confusion. In addition the CJTF as

a coordinator would probably need to rely on the creation of joint boards for the allocation of scarce resources amongst the subordinate commands.

The CJTF as the integrator of capabilities would probably not need to delegate authority or responsibility to the extent that the CJTF as a coordinator would. The single, coherent, and integrated JTF COA would be planned by the JTF staff, in close consultation and cooperation with the subordinate commands. Priorities for scarce resources and the amount and level of support required between commands would be clearly identified in the integrated planning process. This would eliminate or at least minimize the need for joint boards. If the CJTF as an integrator chose to organize the JTF forces along functional component lines then the minimum authority required to assign missions or tasks (TACON) is all that would need to be delegated.

Thus the CJTF's need as a coordinator to delegate authority to the subordinate commands would by nature tend to produce confusion in the understanding of command relationships within the JTF. The CJTF as an integrator would not need to delegate the same level of authority as the coordinator. Therefore potential confusion in understanding command relationships would be minimized.

### **Organizing the JTF Battlespace**

In addition to assigning the CJTF a mission and then delegating a level of command authority over the allocated forces, the establishing authority (in this case a geographic combatant commander) normally assigns a "working area".

*"A joint operations area (JOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander ... in which... a JTF commander conducts military operations..."<sup>26</sup>*

The decision process on how the CJTF will organize the JOA should begin no later than during mission analysis. The battlespace should be organized to support and enhance the CJTF's visualization of the fight and his role in the fight. The organization of the JOA must be in consonance with the organization of the JTF forces. The AO assigned to a functional component may vary dramatically from the AO assigned to a Service component. These differences will be explained later in this section.

Normally the CJTF is given wide latitude on how he can organize his "working area". Inside his JOA, the CJTF employs various control and coordination measures to enhance joint operations. These measures are necessary to control maneuver and movement as well as facilitate effective joint fires and joint fire support.

The CJTF normally further subdivides his JOA into "working areas" for his subordinate commanders. These areas of operations (AO) must be large enough for the subordinate commanders to accomplish their portion of the JTF mission and protect their forces. Inside these AOs the subordinate commanders normally employ the full range of control measures to deconflict operations.

As stated earlier, the CJTF as a coordinator will tend to organize the JTF along functional component lines. Functional components, by their nature, are apt to have an AO that very closely (if not completely) approximates the JOA. Functional components, such as the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) and the joint forces land component commander (JFLCC), may have portions of their AO overlap. This overlapping of AOs would require very specific guidance on boundaries and joint fire support coordination measures. Very specific guidance or direction is contrary to the

concept of the CJTF as a coordinator who provides only broad guidance or strategic direction. Very specific guidance and direction may be beyond the capabilities of the limited size of his JTF staff.

The CJTF as an integrator of capabilities has more options in organizing the JOA. The typically more robust JTF staff of the CJTF as an integrator would have the expertise necessary to provide very specific guidance and direction (if needed) no matter how the battlespace was organized.

Typically the CJTF as an integrator may also designate a portion of the JOA as the "JTF deep" or "JTF rear". In these portions of the JOA the JTF staff, under the direct and personal guidance of the CJTF, would be responsible for planning operations and monitoring execution. In some extreme cases, the CJTF may even apportion forces for his direct control in these areas.

### **Conclusion**

American military power is usually employed in a joint task force specifically tailored for the mission. Typically the CJTF is hand picked by the establishing authority. The role that the CJTF visualizes for himself in the accomplishment of his mission dramatically affects how the JTF is organized.

Spanning the spectrum from a coordinator of subordinate commands to an integrator of capabilities, the role of the CJTF will determine the size and capability of the JTF staff required to plan, execute and monitor his visualization of the fight. The organization of the JTF forces, the establishment of command relationships within the

JTF, and the organization of the JOA, must also support the CJTFs visualization of the fight.

The role that the CJTF visualizes for himself should be the one that best employs the unique power and flexibility of the JTF concept in the accomplishment of the JTF mission. The role that the CJTF chooses should keep the chain of command as short and as simple as possible. The principle of unity of command demands that it is always clear exactly who is in charge of what.

Although the pre-Desert Storm concept of the CJTF as a coordinator of subordinate commands may initially be attractive, it does not adequately address the realities of current or future military operations. In response to budget restraints and reductions in size, US forces on land, at sea, and in the air must now reinforce and complement each other more than ever before.

The armed forces of the US must progress beyond mere synergistic joint operations in which joint capabilities are simply deconflicted. The ultimate goal must be coherent joint operations in which the joint capabilities are totally integrated. Total integration of joint capabilities can only occur after the CJTF visualizes his role as an integrator of the capabilities resident within the JTF.

The continuously changing nature of modern warfare is synonymous with joint warfare. Only with the CJTF as an integrator of capabilities will the true power and flexibility of the JTF concept be properly utilized. Only with the CJTF as an integrator of capabilities will the joint forces of the United States be able to meet and surpass the challenges of operating in the twenty first century.



## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1-0 (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 January 1995), vi.

<sup>2</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995), III-9.

<sup>3</sup> Headquarters United States European Command, Joint Task Force Officer's Brain Book (12 March 1993), 5.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Pub 5-0, III-11.

<sup>5</sup> HQUSEUCOM, 5.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> John H. Cushman, Thoughts for Joint Commanders (Annapolis, Maryland, 1993), 3.

<sup>8</sup> Personal notes of the author from a presentation given to U.S. Army War College, Class of 1997, November 15, 1996.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 February 1995), I-3.

<sup>11</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), II-5.

<sup>12</sup> Joint Pub 0-2, IV-9.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., I-3.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, III-5.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., III-8.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., III-9.

<sup>17</sup> Joint Pub 0-2, IV-12.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>19</sup> Personal experience of the author. Based upon participation as an Observer Controller (OC) for numerous CINC, JTF, and Service component level exercises which include (but not limited to) Ulchi-Focus Lens , Internal Look, Purple Star, and Unified Endeavor.

<sup>20</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, II-10.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., II-11.

<sup>22</sup> Joint Pub 0-2, IV-16.

<sup>23</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, II-14.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., IV-15.

<sup>25</sup> Joint Pub 0-2, III-4.

<sup>26</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, II-17.

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