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**PREVENTIVE DEFENSE: MILITARY STRATEGY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY**

BY

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**PREVENTIVE DEFENSE: Military Strategy
for the 21st Century**

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PREVENTIVE DEFENSE: Military Strategy for the 21st Century (Abstract)

In March 1996 Secretary Perry outlined a profound change to defense policy called "Prevent, Deter, Defeat". Preventive Defense seeks to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, encourage newly independent nations to emphasize civilian control of their military, and establish defense-to-defense relationships with other nations. This profound change in defense policy recognizes that the military aspect of national power is an integral part of fostering international friendships in non-combat situations as well.

Preventive defense strategy argues that its policies are capable of preventing drastically more expensive conflicts in the future. Preventive defense seeks to promote peace and stability through friendly interaction. Preventive defense shapes the future by building closer ties between the U.S. military and foreign militaries - opening channels of communication that can reduce misunderstanding and misperception.

U.S. forces must be capable of action across the spectrum of peace and conflict. In order to field this kind of force, planners must abandon the methodology of basing force structure decisions on the perceived threat. The American military needs the best weapons and equipment the nation can afford, but the seemingly insatiable appetite for modernization should not consume force structure required to execute the manpower intensive activities that prevent conflict.

*The superior doctor prevents sickness;
The mediocre doctor attends to impending sickness;
The inferior doctor treats actual sickness.*

Chinese Proverb

The New Defense Strategy

In March of 1996 when Secretary of Defense Perry submitted the Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, and in a series of speeches shortly thereafter, he established a profoundly different defense strategy that will guide America in the creation and application of military power well into the 21st Century.

In what has become the classic Perry 'style', this profound change was accompanied by little fanfare and bravura, even the rest of the Department of Defense and the military services haven't fully explored the implications of the new strategy.

Today, our policy for managing post-Cold War dangers to our security rests on three basic lines of defense. The first line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging; the second is to deter threats that do emerge; and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to defeat the threat to our security by using military force. A renewed emphasis on the first line of defense -- preventive defense -- is appropriate in dealing with the post-Cold War Dangers, and is a significant departure from our Cold War defense policies, where the primary emphasis was on deterrence.¹

Most of the efforts at defining U.S. military strategy since the fall of the Soviet Union have been evolutionary attempts to apply cold-war concepts of containment and threat-based planning to the remaining regional military threats.

The Bottom Up Review (BUR) conducted in 1993 (after the dissolution of the Soviet Union) recognized that there were new dangers, and principal among these was the danger of regional conflict. The military strategy advocated in the BUR was essentially 'containment' of regional conflict through the ability of U.S. military forces to defeat aggressors on the battlefield and deter conflicts through overseas presence, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian relief. It prescribed a military force structure capable of 'containing' two regional bad-guys, such as Iraq and North Korea.

The strategy of containment was successful at winning the largely bi-polar Cold War in the 20th century. A strategy that recognizes Preventive defense as a strategic objective will be similarly successful at winning the multi-polar peace in the 21st century. By elevating the "Prevent" objective to the level of "Deter" and "Defeat", Secretary Perry transformed defense strategy from reactive containment to proactive environment shaping - a strategy that utilizes current programs to set the stage for future success.

A NEW ROLE FOR THE MILITARY

The task of preventing conflict and building strategic relationships was previously considered by many to be the exclusive role of the diplomat and military forces were only called in 'as an extension of policy by other means' to use a Clausewitzian phrase. Now that preventive defense is a clearly stated military

objective, it recognizes and legitimizes the post-cold war growth of the use of the military as an extension of policy in non-combat situations as well as an extension of policy in combat situations.

RECOGNITION OF CURRENT REALITY

In many ways, the elevation of preventive defense to a strategic objective is simply a recognition of the shape of the world after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Missions such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Partnership for Peace exercises with former Warsaw Pact nations have become an important part of maintaining the peace. When nations are involved in an armed conflict, such as the Cold War, there is no purpose for prevention. Emphasis is rightly placed on the objectives of deterring attacks and 'winning' the conflict. It is in the absence of major conflict that the concept of preventive defense provides the greatest insights towards an efficient military strategy. Importantly, the post-Cold War recognition of prevention as a strategic objective provides structure and rationale to what may have appeared as disjointed, disparate missions that were leading the military 'off the beaten track' of their primary mission, to defeat enemy forces on the battlefield. Far from detractors, preventive activities to date have significantly reduced numerous future threats. Two well-publicized examples are the elimination of the threat posed by a massive exodus of refugees from Haiti and the prevention of a broader Balkan conflict that could have easily involved Iran,

Russia, France and England. The seeds of future cooperation and mutual understanding have been sewn in numerous exercises around the globe.

Prevent, Deter, Defeat

A military strategy of "Prevent, Deter, Defeat" lends itself quite readily to the classic definition of strategy as an Objective or Ends combined with the Ways or policies to bring it about and the Means or force structure/agencies to achieve the stated ends.² In this case the strategic objectives are the basic functions of Preventing conflict, Deterring aggression, and Defeating hostile forces, placed in priority by Secretary Perry as the first, second and third "lines of defense". A full discussion of the policies and force structure for all three objectives is clearly beyond the scope of this effort, since it encompasses the entire Department of Defense. Specifically, the ends, ways, and means of Preventive Defense will be discussed here, with only passing reference to the objectives of Deterring and Defeating in so far as they relate to the objective of Preventing .

Four Pillars of Preventive Defense

As described in Secretary Perry's testimony before Congress, that portion of the defense strategy that deals with preventing future threats to U.S. security has four major components:

- Working cooperatively with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus to reduce the nuclear legacy of the former Soviet Union and to improve the safety of residual weapons;

- Establishing programs to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

- Encouraging newly independent and newly democratic nations to restructure their defense establishments to emphasize civilian control of their military, transparency in their defense programs and confidence-building measures with their neighbors; and

- Establishing cooperative defense-to-defense relationships with nations that are neither full-fledged allies nor adversaries, but who are, nonetheless, important to our security.³

The Case for Preventive Defense

Perhaps the strongest support for pursuing a strategy of Preventive defense along with the traditional capabilities to deter and defeat rests upon the self-evident truth found in the oft quoted proverb, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Fortunately, the case for a significant Preventive defense strategy is much stronger than simple proverbial wisdom. The individual elements of support discussed below combine America's fundamental strengths, both moral and

physical, in support of a strategic objective that clearly demonstrates U.S. intention to be a responsible steward of its status as the sole remaining superpower.

Vital National Interest = Affordable Security

If one expects Congress and the American people to expend funds to support the means of conducting preventive defense, then one must demonstrate that the 'prevent' objective clearly supports our vital national interests.

One of America's most basic national interests is the pressing need to secure American interests with the least possible expenditure. It is in this realm that preventive defense provides its most valuable contribution. To the extent that the strategy is consistently resourced and applied, the objective will secure American interests far into the future with minimal current expenditures. The strategy seeks to prevent the vast expenditure of both physical resources and human capital required in the future to defeat the next emerged threat to our interests.

Core Values

According to President Clinton, "*Our national security strategy reflects both America's interest and our values.*" [emphasis added]⁴. And a quick review of American history reveals that our greatest strategic successes have sprung from strategies and concepts deeply rooted in those enduring American values. As a strategy, preventive defense has numerous advantages, foremost among these is

that it is firmly based upon our most fundamental values, namely the concepts of promoting peace, stable institutions and democratic processes. Not through the fear generated by deterrence or the horror of battlefield victory, but through a good natured partnership and cooperative engagement where our interests coincide.

It is possible to believe that such a strategy can be relatively successful without subscribing to a 'Polyanna' view of international interaction. One theory for international relations maintains that since there are no 'enforcing agents' between nations, anarchy is the term that best describes interaction between states. Precisely because each sovereign nation is relatively free to choose their own path between harmony and conflict, preventive defense programs seek to bring the path of other nations closer to harmony and further away from conflict. Since each nation chooses their own policies, preventive defense cannot become America's sole strategic objective, it must always be accompanied by the other strategic objectives of deterring those nations that choose to be hostile and defeating combative nations.

This combination of values-based policy tempered in realism is echoed by Angelo Codevilla, former staffer for the Senate Intelligence Committee who states that "The moral quality of the objectives we seek and the regimes we confront bears on who we really are. But since policy is tested by power and judged by results, the art of American policy making must consist of making good things

happen.”⁵ Clearly the most efficient route to make good things happen is with an ‘ounce of prevention’ rather than waiting until we need a ‘pound of cure’.

Effectively executed, preventive defense offers the possibility of ‘winning’ America’s wars before they have to be fought.

The new defense strategy also rests well on the desire to pursue non-violent outcomes. Whether for moral reasons, or purely based on economics, achieving security while avoiding the costs of violence is clearly preferable. The policy of working with our allies, friends and others implies that many more problems will get solved at an early stage, rather than postponing them until military action appears to be the only solution. In his article America’s Grand Strategy, James Kurth states that a major challenge of U.S. foreign policy is not just to recognize that China is a potential future threat, but to “guide the rise of Chinese power into the path of supporting international order and stability ...”⁶ And this is precisely the conceptual base of preventive defense and a defense strategy which emphasizes preventive measures.

Global Perspective vs. A Collection of Regional Plans

A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL INTERESTS

The policies and forces required by the strategic objectives of defeating enemy forces and deterring hostile nations are inherently based upon a perceived threat, as will be discussed later. By their very nature, these strategic objectives

focus the attention of defense policy makers and other analysts on those regions currently viewed as threatening. Focusing on specific areas, either consciously or unconsciously, creates an environment where emerging threats from other regions are often ignored, misperceived or flat out missed.

The incorporation of preventive defense as a strategic objective, and the accompanying policy of broad based engagement with many nations, not just our friends and allies, makes U.S. defense strategy global once again, rather than a collection of regional operations. It provides a critical link between the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which is clearly global in scope, and the National Military Strategy that previously emphasized containment of two regional threats. The additional strategic objective of preventive defense provides the over-arching military objectives which can then serve to coordinate regional plans.⁷ Since the regional threats do, can, and will vary over time, the combination of strategic objectives (prevent, deter, defeat) returns the initiative to the U.S. rather than forcing the entire defense program to react to changes in one regional power or another.

Proactive vs. Reactive

Rather than just reacting to threats as they emerge, preventive defense seeks to proactively engage the militaries of other nations in order to eliminate misunderstandings and head off threats before they emerge. As stated previously,

the new defense strategy moves the U.S. from the position of continually reacting to any other hostile nation's actions and to the extent possible makes us 'masters of our own destiny'. Moving away from the 'Threat-based' strategic objectives of Deterring and Defeating requires a proactive role in shaping the future national security environment. The programs and forces which achieve the objective of preventive defense seek to reduce the conditions of mistrust, fear, and misunderstanding which have led to conflict so often in the past.

Benefits of Environment Shaping

Avoiding Crisis Response

Preventive defense strategy is an effective way to avoid a crisis-driven response to the events of the world around us. Through the portions of the program which develop closer ties with the militaries of other nations, there will always be a broader base of area expertise. The officers and soldiers who participate in such programs will have a better understanding of what motivates and drives the military of other countries, and therefore be better able to advise civilian policy makers about the particular course which other nations' armed forces are more likely to advocate and pursue. In a sense, the exercises and exchanges envisioned as the way to accomplish preventive defense create a cadre

of 'strategic scouts' with an in depth understanding of the issues, personalities and problems of any particular nation.

While such understanding cannot eliminate crises, it can greatly reduce the number of unforeseen 'challenges' to U.S. foreign policy. An historical example is the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Chinese military intervention was generally unexpected across the U.S. foreign policy community and allied military intelligence.⁸ It is not difficult to imagine that, with more 'strategic scouts' - officers, soldiers, and other Defense personnel, who had worked with the communist Chinese and were familiar with their concerns - the U.S. would have been aware of the Chinese sensitivity to UN operations in North Korea. Again, it may not have prevented the crisis of their intervention, but it would at least have eliminated the surprise and the associated military setbacks.

Budget Constraints

BUDGET DRIVES STRATEGY

Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney once said that the budget drives strategy and not vice versa as the theorists would believe. In such an environment, preventive defense is the most reasonable strategic objective because the incremental cost of the programs involved in preventive defense is so small, and the benefit of shaping the future security environment so great.

The basic cost of an exercise is the same whether it is performed in the woods at Ft. Polk, LA or in the woods in Malaysia. The incremental cost of transportation is the major difference. A 10 day exercise uses 10 days worth of fuel, 10 days of food, and 10 days of spare parts at either location. The benefits gained from the incremental cost of transportation extend far beyond the actual unit conducting the exercise. Every level of staff higher up the chain of command gains the experience of planning, coordinating and transporting units to the host nation, as well as the experience of working with the host nation's military hierarchy. The joint nature of such deployments significantly exercise the interaction between the military services required for operational deployments as well. All of these experiences will prove invaluable when the military is called upon to perform similar actions in response to a need to deter or defeat a future threat in that area of the world.

Military-to-Military Contacts

When beginning the engagement process with nations where there is not a long history of civil diplomatic relations, military-to-military contacts are a good place to start. The military in many foreign societies carry a much larger influence into governmental policy than they do in the U.S. As Secretary Perry has said "In many cases it (the military) is the most cohesive institution in the country, containing a large percentage of the educated elite and controlling important

resources. In short, it is an institution that can help support democracy or subvert it."⁹

The 'brotherhood of arms' makes communication between military personnel easier and less threatening. Acknowledging U.S. civilian control of the military, the U.S. military people can communicate openly, emphasizing that while they have input to policy decisions they are not authorized to commit the U.S. to any particular policy. Foreign military personnel may not be familiar with the concept of civilian control, but through universal military tradition they are familiar with the concept of 'following orders'. Such an understanding is a good base upon which to build a more thorough concept of civilian control.

Such military-to-military contacts played a major role in reducing the Cold War tensions in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones;

One of the things I've advocated for many, many years is a dialogue between the senior military people of the two countries [U.S. and Soviet Union]. When I met with Marshal Ogarkov, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, in Vienna in 1979, that meeting was the first time that the two senior military leaders of the two countries had met since Marshal Zhukov and General George Marshall met right after the Second World War. And I found it a very useful meeting; not so much in the plenary sessions, but in the 'one-to-one' discussions that concerned a lot of misunderstandings and suspicions. Much of that could be eliminated if we had a good dialogue between the two. I found that, for example, in the discussion with Marshal Ogarkov, we could get to the specifics without all the dialectical rhetoric that one had in any discussion with Marshal Ustinov, who was Minister of Defence - a 'political' Marshal. With Marshal Ogarkov, who was a strong supporter of the Soviet system, of course, you could have a discussion without all the political terms coming in. The potential was what really impressed me rather

than the specifics of the one meeting. I think, in a military discussion ... 'camarderie' is the wrong word, but there is an understanding among military people; they can 'talk' about these subjects. ¹⁰

In fact, even today the initial advances attempting to establish relations with former enemies are led by military-to-military contacts. As the Los Angeles Times reported, U.S. Department of Defense and Pacific Command officials recently visited Hanoi for talks with the Vietnamese defense ministry, and a visit to Washington by Vietnamese military officials is planned for Spring of 1997.¹¹ This overture follows closely on the heels of the much publicized visit of the Chinese Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian to the United States in the Fall of 1996. These recent events have once again demonstrated the utility of military-to-military contacts with nations that are not military allies but still important to our security and demonstrate the leverage gained from interaction with influential military establishments of other societies.

The programs which implement preventive defense seek to capitalize on the widely acknowledged American dominance in warfighting skills. This expertise was very costly to develop, and is a widely sought commodity throughout the world. U.S. military expertise is so highly prized that last year 114 nations sent over 2800 military and civilian defense personnel to school in the United States.¹²

The benefit of possessing this sought after skill is that the U.S. can then teach military concepts and doctrine in the proper context. As democratic reforms

percolate through the former Warsaw Pact countries, Hungary is aggressively seeking NATO membership. It is interesting to note that Hungary's top military officer, LTG Ferenc Vegh is a 1993 graduate of the U.S. Army War College, and an "enthusiastic proponent"¹³ of the reforms required by NATO membership such as civilian control of the military. Military schooling in the U.S. has helped to spread democratic principles elsewhere. Despite a long history of coup d'etat and ruling military juntas, today every Latin American military is under civilian control except the one country which has never sent students to be trained in the United States - Cuba. It is clearly in America's best interests to continue this trend wherever possible throughout the world.

1.4 MILLION AMBASSADORS

There is a large synergistic effect to the combination of a preventive defense strategy that is based on America's core values and implementing it with the great young Americans in the military today. Anyone who has seen the wonderful interaction as American soldiers and their foreign counterparts mingle on a personal and professional level will clearly understand the benefits of expanding opportunities for these 1.4 million ambassadors of the American way to associate with foreign soldiers, young officers, and future leaders of other countries. Reporting under the headline "G.I. Charm overcomes Anxieties in Hungary" the New York Times quoted the mayor of Tasar (an American staging

base for Bosnia) as stating "People were afraid of AIDS, prostitutes, and gang violence. But we have learned that the American soldiers are civilized and well-behaved people."¹⁴ Following this and similar examples, it would be very difficult for any would-be trouble makers to convince the people of Tazsar that America is the "great Satan".

Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto- an officer with educational experience in the United States - lobbied against the War Cabinet's plan to attack the U.S. military. It is not difficult to conceive a different result had there been more U.S. schooled Japanese officers with a good understanding of U.S. values, intentions, and attitudes. Unfortunately, the majority of Japanese military officers with foreign education had been schooled in Germany.¹⁵ This trend was a direct result of the tendency to 'seek expertise from the experts' and prior to W.W.I the German military was viewed as the best in the world. This example lends further credence to modernization and resource policies which protect the perception of U.S. military expertise.

Reducing Miscalculations and Misperceptions

Researchers at RAND have conducted an exhaustive survey of what they refer to as "two centuries of mayhem" and produced a list of the most common causes of war.¹⁶ They state unequivocally that "Wars frequently start by accident. Miscalculation is the most common cause of war. While many wars are started

deliberately, few of these turn out as their instigators planned." They go on to state that "Ignorance of "the enemy" is usually a primary basis for a war." And "Major wars often begin because of errors in judgment. And errors occur most often because of inaccurate information."

These are the precise conditions which the strategic objective of prevention seeks to eliminate. The implementing programs seek to build common understanding between the defense establishment in the U.S. and other nations. They seek to increase the open exchange of information in hope of building trust and confidence while reducing miscalculations and misunderstandings.

One must remember, the U.S. is just as susceptible to miscalculation and misunderstanding as any other nation. As will be demonstrated in the next section, the quantity and types of units required to achieve the strategic objective of defeating threatening military forces must be based on the current assessment of future threats, always a risky proposition. Once again, such threat-based assessments are much more accurate and timely if U.S. forces conducting preventive defense exercises around the world act as 'strategic scouts'. The open, informal exchange of ideas and concepts that occurs between individuals provides valuable insight that technical estimates often lack. A satellite is very good at telling you what's on the ground, but it can't provide any information about the intent of those forces.

Naive Belief in Prevention?

EXACTLY THE REASON TO TRY!

Reducing miscalculations and misunderstanding, building trust and confidence are excellent objectives, but they can not prevent conflicting interests in an economically competitive world. Critics have said that it is simply naive to presume that other nations, competing regionally or globally for 'spheres of influence', will acquiesce to U.S. interests just because they participate in military exchanges and exercises. And those critics are correct. It would be naive to presume that preventive defense can eliminate or reduce every instance where U.S. and a foreign nation's interests come into conflict.

In framing the new defense strategy, Secretary Perry realized that for various reasons it is simply not possible to prevent all conflicts and for this reason any military strategy must include the objectives of deterring aggressive nations and defeating hostile forces.¹⁷ What Preventive defense can do is provide for paths of peaceful discussion rather than immediate escalation into military confrontation.

A complete similarity of interests does not even occur between governmental entities within the United States. For instance, the interests of Orange County California may in some areas conflict with the interests of the State of California. But the key to peaceful relations is that we have established paths and procedures for working out those conflicting interests before the situation

comes to blows. Preventive defense can establish similar pathways and procedures on an international scale.

Even in nations that are not democracies and/or do not espouse our cultural values, while preventive defense may not entirely eliminate conflicting interests, there is no country where the chance for misunderstanding or misperception cannot be reduced by person-to-person contact. The advantages of military-to-military contacts mentioned previously are even greater in situations with a large difference in political and cultural values. The brotherhood of arms, and the relatively universal aspects of military service tend to create a common pathway for communication that may not exist elsewhere when diverse cultures seek to engage each other.

In his theoretical work War and Reason Bruce Bueno de Mesquita proved that it was possible for a war to start, even with complete information by both sides about the other, when the impact of domestic considerations of foreign policy were taken into account.¹⁸ It is sometimes difficult to imagine a nation could become so belligerent as to demand war, knowing the great costs in lives and fortune - even for the victor. but such a possibility is not inconceivable and in fact is well represented in recent history.¹⁹ Therefore, preventive defense can never become the sole strategic objective, it must always be combined with the ability to deter hostile forces and defeat future belligerents.

Building Confidence with Other Nations

The military-to-military contacts gained through the program of combined exercises and other training activities helps to spread confidence in the reliability of the U.S. military and also helps to convince foreign military officers that the U.S. military is capable of being an 'honest broker' in regional conflicts. A relatively small contingent of U.S. military personnel could act as 'go-betweens' in resolving regional military problems where the threat to U.S. interests was apparent, but still somewhat less than 'vital'. In circumstances where a full diplomatic effort is not desirable, a small group of military personnel who have built up the trust of both sides through years of interaction can provide a channel for communication between the belligerents that might not have existed otherwise.

Force Structure for Preventive Defense

Prevention is not a 'Spare time' activity

The Aspen Strategy Group has stated that the U.S. has a tradition of "requirements vs. reality mismatch in military planning; one particular danger in the post-Cold War era is not counting non-combat operations when planning the size and capabilities of U.S. military forces."²⁰

The realization that participation in preventive defense activities could require resources greater than those required under the old threat-based planning considerations has been building for some time. In 1996 the Army successfully

convinced DOD that it could not cut Active Duty forces by 20,000 soldiers and continue the same pace of operations that has been required in the recent past. The elevation of preventive defense to a strategic objective ensures that such resource considerations should, and will, receive a 'seat at the table' in the budget competition. In the past such activities have been seen as essentially lesser included tasks, and the only legitimate concern was adequate forces for the threat-based strategic objectives of deter and defeat.

Abandoning the Threat-Based paradigm

A recent Issue Paper from RAND²¹ continues their argument for switching the very foundation of defense planning. The authors make a compelling case based on the numerous shortcomings of Threat-based planning. Unfortunately they do not point out a very basic problem with the Threat-based planning of the past is that it surrenders the initiative to the 'threat'. Our planning is relegated to a reactive mode, whatever the threat does - we then counter. This would be fine and appropriate if we were better at assessing just what the threat is. Continually over the past 200+ years we have downscaled our military capabilities when we perceived that the previous threat had been vanquished, reflecting the founding fathers distrust of large military forces. In days of slower transportation, an essentially self-contained economy, and with two protecting oceans such a policy was reasonable. Unfortunately, in this century with a more global economy and

much faster transportation means, an inability to correctly identify potential military threats in time to repair our defenses has led to a nearly disastrous entry into war each time. The most recent example was the almost uniform failure to recognize Iraq's ability to threaten U.S. interests prior to their actual invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Former Secretary of Defense George Marshall saw this American trend and in exasperation said,

*We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly, cost us millions of lives and billions of treasure. The reasons are quite understandable. The world does not seriously regard the desires of the weak. Weakness presents too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the bully who schemes for wealth and power.*²²

Understanding the historically demonstrated weakness of threat-based military planning, the RAND study mentioned above makes the case that defense planning should be based on our desired objectives and not on the currently perceived threat. They offer three potential objectives of;

- Capabilities for military contingencies
- Environment shaping activities
- Strategic adaptiveness

The methodology then goes on to lay out how force structure trade-offs can be made by optimizing the effectiveness of the total force across all three objectives. It would be interesting to see the results of this methodology applied to the stated strategic objectives of prevent, deter, and defeat.

Finding the 'Long Pole in the Tent'

Figure 1

depicts conceptual force structure level near the end of the Cold War (1989). The forces required at the time for preventive defense and deterrence




Figure 1

of regional threats are shown as much smaller than the forces needed to defeat the Soviet Union. In the past, threat-based force sizing calculations ensured that the forces required by the defeat objective were clearly large enough to deter and to conduct the relatively few preventive activities that were required.




Figure 2

Figure 2 above depicts overall U.S. force size at the 1996 level, as a result of threat-based planning they are significantly reduced due to the reduction in threat from that of the Soviet Union to the Regional Threats postulated in the 1993 Bottom Up Review.

Now as we look to the future a very different situation could easily arise. If Saddam Hussain is replaced by a less ruthless ruler, and N. Korea collapses of it's own weight, the projected two MRC requirement could very quickly fade into history. The result described below clearly shows why it is important to consider preventive defense as a separate strategic objective rather than a 'lesser included activity'. Figure 3 depicts the situation where the remaining regional threats are so small that a threat-based calculation such as the Bottom Up Review would result in forces too small to deter miscalculating aggressors or conduct those preventive operations that will maintain the peace.

If forces are sized purely on threat-based considerations that are below the level required to meet the other strategic




Figure 3

objectives of deter and prevent, then you once again enter the historic American cycle of repeated unreadiness and are forced to rapidly develop the large defeating forces at a later date, and at a much greater cost in lives and equipment than if forces had been resourced to accomplish the prevent and deter functions.

Realizing that there are now three objectives for our defense strategy, the 'defeat' objective may or may not be the 'long pole in the tent', driving overall force structure considerations as it has for the past 50 years. It is entirely conceivable that the forces needed to deter will be larger, and one could make the argument that even today more forces are needed to adequately meet the prevent objective.

It is obvious that force structure decisions must always include threat-based planning, but it must be a sub-set to determine the requirement for forces to achieve the 'defeat' objective and definitely not as the sole source of answers to the proverbial question of 'how much is enough'.

In summary, threat-based planning clearly won't provide complete insight on the force structure required for preventive defense. The capability-based planning as suggested by the RAND study cited earlier and others²³ is much more likely to provide the necessary proactive 'vision' for accurate assessments. The net result is that all types of military forces must be sized to meet current and projected strategic commitments, not just current and predicted military threats.

This is a rather drastic change for a defense planning establishment with 50 years experience in sizing forces based solely on threats.

Modernization

Just as threat-based considerations provide only a limited basis for making force structure decisions, they must not drive the modernization function that underpins U.S. forces' ability to accomplish all three strategic objectives.

Modernized equipment, doctrine, and tactics must indeed prevail when subjected to threat-based simulations and exercises, but it is not advisable to 'wait' for an advanced threat to drive modernization programs in a reactive mode. A corollary concept of 'preventive modernization' should ensure that the U.S. military, while always capable of defeating postulated threats, is perceived throughout the world as the superior force. Such 'market dominance' makes U.S. military expertise in high demand throughout the world as was mentioned in the previous section. An efficiently resourced modernization program is critical to ensuring that the U.S. maintains that 'market dominance' in the future. If U.S. warfighting equipment and doctrine are viewed as irrelevant it will be very difficult to muster the prestige that is required to adequately perform preventive defense operations and the deterrent effect of U.S. forces will be jeopardized.

Usability of Forces

In a recent Foreign Affairs article, noted strategist Edward Luttwak advocates more forces with stand-off capability and high-tech, long range destruction capability.²⁴ He argues that manpower intensive forces, such as Army divisions are essentially unusable in the future because of the high risk of casualties due to the high numbers of personnel involved. His arguments are indeed valid, if the only objective of one's strategy is to defeat enemy forces by destroying them. Once one realizes that there are additional strategic objectives such as deterring aggressive nations and preventing future conflict, then the relative merits and the 'usability' of both high-tech standoff weapons and large ground formations comes into clearer focus. Through the thoughtful, judicious use of manpower intensive forces directed towards the strategic objective of prevention the U.S. can reduce the likelihood that we will need to use the outrageously expensive, highly destructive forces suggested in the Luttwak article.

Luttwak is not the first to suggest that American defense strategy can rest solely on the back of superior technology. Immediately after World War II the United States adopted the strategy of Atomic Deterrence²⁵, believing that our superiority in atomic weapons would prevent anyone from threatening our interests. Conventional forces were cut drastically, since it was believed that the technological marvel of the atomic bomb could overcome all threats. The shortfall

of this reliance on the technological 'silver bullet' became readily apparent in the summer of 1950, when (despite the atom bomb) North Korean forces attacked South Korea. The atrophied U.S. Army was rushed in to back up South Korean Forces with nearly disastrous results, suffering defeat after costly defeat as it was backed up to the Pusan Perimeter. Reliance on technology alone can have an overall cost much greater than the price of a weapon system.

Versatility of Forces

Clearly, the United States can not afford three separate forces to be the means by which we pursue the three strategic objectives of Prevent, Deter, and Defeat. Force versatility is an important consideration. Versatile forces are those units which have significant utility across all three objectives. To compete effectively in the budget-driven environment of U.S. strategy development, any additional strategic objective must also leverage the forces developed and fielded under the previous strategy. The specific programs of Secretary Perry's preventive defense utilize current forces and emphasize the 'training' nature of preventive defense activities. The same combat elements that are trained and ready to defeat hostile forces are used in Show of Force exercises for deterrent effect and to work closely with foreign militaries during training exercises for preventive effect. The versatility of well trained combat forces has been more than adequately demonstrated by recent successes in Bosnia, the Partnership for Peace exercises,

Haiti and other preventive defense operations. Such innovative, versatile use of military forces will be absolutely essential in a budget-limited defense strategy for the 21st century.

Can we do both?

Much current debate is centered around the ability of U.S. forces to maintain their combat superiority while engaged in peacekeeping operations and other preventive defense exercises. It is a self-evident fact that units deployed on an operational commitment must focus on accomplishing their current mission and therefore have less time available to devote to training for combat.

To date, this loss of training time has had negligible effect in overall combat readiness due to the limited number of units involved in any particular operation and the limited 'time on station' prior to rotation with other units. As mentioned earlier, the number of non-combat deployments has risen sharply since 1989, but the readiness of military forces has been uniformly high over that same period. There has been no marked decline in the combat performance of units rotating through the Army's National Training Center in the desert at Ft. Irwin, CA or through the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, LA ^a. Given a small

^a Some observers report that Armor and Mechanized Infantry units are arriving at the NTC slightly less well trained than in the past. Light units are arriving at the JRTC slightly better trained than in the past. ("Creeping Hollowness". Army Times, 3 February 1997, pp. 14-16.) While more research must be done to determine causal relationships, the difference could be attributable to the relatively recent trend of 'spreading the wealth' of OOTW missions. In the past such missions were viewed as suitable only for light forces. If a redistribution of the work-load is the cause, one would expect to see a slight decrease in proficiency for heavy units and a slight increase in proficiency for light units.

rebuilding/retraining period to refamiliarize with 'combat only' tasks, a combat arms unit regains the standard level of expertise in combat operations within a few months.

What the critics of OOTW missions seem to overlook is the extremely useful experience that all military units gain from these operations. The joint and combined exercises that implement the strategy of preventive defense, along with multi-national humanitarian missions, UN peacekeeping missions, and disaster relief operations provide invaluable experience to the participating military units in working with allies and non-allies alike, about the structure and policies of foreign militaries, and about the training and cultural values of foreign militaries' personnel and the quality of their equipment. Such benefits should not be dismissed lightly.

Those who would condemn preventive defense activities use an argument akin to asking Dr. Walter Reed what he is doing wasting his time spraying mosquitoes when there are so many patients with malaria. Combat units must maintain proficiency in all combat tasks, that is part of what has made the U.S. military so successful at OOTW. The versatile nature of preventive defense activities ensures that military units maintain their combat skills while conducting joint/combined training exercises with other allies, and during dedicated training periods following OOTW missions.

A WARNING

The previous section demonstrated that the U.S. military, as it exists today, can do both missions. But no military force can do both at the same time. Policy makers must realize that units operationally deployed on OOTW missions are in essence 'not available' for use elsewhere in a crisis. Also, if the number of OOTW missions is increased above the current level without a corresponding increase in force structure it will require existing units to spend more time on OOTW missions and less time maintaining readiness for combat missions. The end result of such a downward spiral is a military that can perform neither type of mission well.

Navigating the Speed Bumps

Can we do the right thing?

The wisdom embodied in the often quoted adage is undeniable, "Prevention is better than cure" [Erasmus]. Unfortunately, Erasmus carries little sway in the current Federal budget process.

Preventing future conflict vs. other priorities

In departing comments Secretary Perry stated that the current force structure was just about right. Expressing his belief that a flat Defense budget would be adequate for the next several years, he suggested that some infrastructure cuts could be made to pay for required modernization programs.²⁶ Unfortunately, a

steady Defense budget is far from assured. Hardly a week goes by without another call for decreases in defense spending to pay for vital domestic programs.

The fundamental dilemma is that both sides are right. Further decreases in Defense spending will endanger U.S. ability to maintain it's role as a global power and prevent future threats to national security. There are also numerous domestic programs in drastic need of additional funding if they are to have the intended effect of improving American quality of life. Resolving such dilemmas, weighing the costs and benefits of each argument is one of the true strengths of our deliberative form of government.

The defense vs. domestic debate faces an additional challenge in that the American people and their elected representatives are forced to compare apples and oranges. While the costs are comparable since they are measured in current tax dollars, the benefits accrue in totally different areas, not generally compatible for comparison. Domestic spending generally has immediate, direct benefits that everyone can see. A bridge gets built, a school library expands, more impoverished Americans begin to lead a productive life, more police patrol the streets, etc. On the other side, it is much more difficult to visualize the benefits of a military exchange program with Malaysia designed to help prevent potential conflict in 2010 or beyond. Comparison of these two categories of benefits can easily result in opposite opinions about where to spend the next tax dollar.

There is cause for cautious optimism in this area. The rapidly globalizing economy is making Americans more and more aware of the direct benefits from a relatively tranquil international situation. As more U.S. companies do business abroad, more Americans experience the direct benefits of a stable, secure environment. According to the 1997 Index of Economic Freedom the percentage of U.S. private retirement funds invested abroad is growing rapidly and is expected to reach 14% by the year 2000²⁷. If these trends continue, American voters will increasingly understand and be willing to support defense spending linked directly to preventing international conflict. With such support the U.S. can avoid the cycles of military weakness in the absence of a perceived threat which have precipitated foreign aggression every time in the past.

The counter-argument is of course to scale back the defense budget and constrict U.S. defense strategy to the lone objective of defeating existing threats on the battlefield. For reasons stated very clearly by Marshall above, this method has failed us miserably in the past. It is also highly unlikely and potentially dangerous for the U.S. to relinquish its global leadership role and reduce the corresponding calls on military forces to perform non-combat missions. The empirical evidence so far is overwhelming, such missions have grown dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union and there is no reason on the horizon to believe that they will not continue to grow in the future.

Overcoming the technology bias

Since the dawn of warfare it has been human nature to seek the 'magic weapon' that can vanquish all enemies. In the absence of real magic, technological innovation has served to fulfill our desire for battlefield superiority without significant human cost.

Writing early in this century, Giulio Douhet postulated that the wonderful new invention of the airplane could pummel an enemy into submission without enduring the hardships of putting soldiers through the rigors of ground combat. Ever since, the siren song of the technological 'silver bullet' has permeated a segment of the defense debate. The folly of Atomic Deterrence and its rapid disintegration in the Korean conflict has been discussed previously. Recently, even Secretary of Defense Les Aspin proposed that the force requirements to defeat two MRCs could be greatly reduced due to the U.S. superiority in weapons and detection technology²⁸.

Today there is still a strong desire in the defense industry, their lobbyists, the media, and academia to express a preference for technological solutions. Such ideas are expressed by Edward Luttwak and others who argue, once again, that in the future wars will be fought by smart weapons, cruise missiles, and satellite information - without the need to put soldiers on the ground. The dangers of such

a course of action have been eloquently expressed by former Army Chief of Staff
GEN Gordon R Sullivan who recently wrote:

Today and in the very near future, the national leadership will be more constrained than their predecessors were in 1991 because of the seemingly insatiable desire to narrow our military capabilities and fight by 'remote control.' This desire is fueled by the hope for victory without risking an American life: the ageless quest for bloodless conflict. Whether this goal is viable, those who seek it have pushed the nation toward smaller forces and stockpiles of "silver bullets" such as "smart" cruise missiles which, as we saw last year in Iraq, may not be able to influence events in a meaningful much less decisive way.²⁹

Technological superiority is always desired on the battlefield, and for U.S. forces it is a major source of military superiority. As mentioned previously, technological innovation plays an important role in providing U.S. forces with the prestige and capability to execute all three strategic objectives. The current danger lies in the school of thought that believes technology can substitute for forces on the ground. Such a substitution is relevant, on the margin, when considering the force requirements to achieve the deter and defeat strategic objectives. The very nature of preventive defense on the other hand, requires person-to-person interaction in order to reduce misunderstandings and prevent miscalculation in relations between nations.

A more visionary perspective on the appropriate role of technological advances in current and future warfare is to view technology as a tool. Better tools are more productive than obsolete tools. Without the skilled hand of a craftsman, even the best tools don't produce the intended results.

The entrenched Threat-based perception

The concept that the size of the military establishment of threat nations is the sole legitimate basis for the size of the U.S. military is very deeply entrenched. As the repeated cycle of military dismantlement after conflicts shows, this concept goes back much further than the 40 years of opposing large Soviet forces. Convincing the U.S. public that it must spend money on military forces as the means to accomplish the strategic objective of preventing conflict is indeed a daunting task.

As an example, a recent Chicago Tribune editorial demanded to know "where is the threat" that required an increase of \$11 billion in the FY97 Defense Budget approved by Congress, criticizing such spending as unjustified.³⁰ To the extent that preventive defense is successful, the Tribune's question will remain unanswered. Through the judicious funding of a sufficient force structure to execute preventive defense, a significant military threat, in the hands of a nation hostile to U.S. interests will not arise.

This is precisely the point where force structure decisions have gone wrong in the past. Even as recently as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. took a huge peace dividend in force structure - roughly 35%. Very notable scholars such as Lawrence Korb of the Brookings Institution seem to have a difficult time shaking the threat-based planning assumptions. He argued recently that the U.S.

has an 'overstuffed' military.³¹ His contention was that since no other nation in the world is spending as much on defense as the U.S. that we should therefore cut our defense budget to match the existing threats. But as evidence he only cites his 'revised' force structure requirements to defeat Iraq and N. Korea and totally disregards all the other DOD activities related to prevention of future conflict.

Conclusion

The jury is still out. The trend line for military resources shows a historically familiar decline since the end of the Cold War in 1989. In the absence of a well-defined threat, continued decline is the historical norm and is a likely result of the political process. Countering this downward trend is an increasing awareness of the growing interdependence of the American economy with a stable international marketplace. The confluence of these two powerful trends requires a defense strategy that is capable of securing a stable world marketplace and other national interests at the least cost. That strategy is 'Prevent, Deter, Defeat'.

Iraq and North Korea are the current major regional threats. History reassures us that when they are gone there will be others. A misguided belief that the world economy would not permit major inter-nation wars contributed

significantly to the ease with which the world slipped into World War I.^b And 'the war to end all wars' was followed closely by a more destructive World War II. There will be future wars, despite the relatively stable current situation. And history also shows that the next set of threats will most probably arise from the least probable arena.

That is why a preventive defense strategy is so important. Reducing the potential use of weapons of mass destruction will prevent a disastrous conflict from reaching catastrophic proportions. Also, through broad based military-to-military exchanges, and joint/combined exercises with numerous nations, allies, friends, and even competitors, the U.S. will be more aware of potential conflicts of intentions and interests. Also, when the inevitable conflicts arise, U.S. military forces will be experienced in the type of close cooperation and integration that coalition operations require. The alternative is waiting until a threat emerges, and in reaction, requiring massive expenditures of our national capital, human as well as monetary.

^b In the years just prior to the outbreak of WWI in 1914 it was widely believed that war between nations had become obsolete, based on the relative peace since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The commonly held view was that all future competition between countries would be economic, not military. See Sir Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1910).

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