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
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND THE U.S. MILITARY

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



Signature: 

13 June 1997

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Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

19970814 123

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Transnational Crime and the U.S. Military (U)			
9. Personal Authors: David A. Hartmann, CIV, NSA			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 13 June 1997	
12. Page Count: 32			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: organized crime, Mafia, Russian Mafia, Trafficking, smuggling, WMD, nuclear, failed states, proliferation, SOF			
15. Abstract: Transnational crime poses a particular threat to the EU in the post-Cold War era. Euro and US Militaries could easily be brought into a joint effort to combat transnational crime.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

ABSTRACT

The collapse of the former Soviet Union and other communist regimes in Eurasia contributed significantly to a dramatic increase in the national security threat, especially to European states, from transnational crime. The worldwide underlying trends supporting the growth in late 20th century transnational crime have been exacerbated in the European context, by the numbers and quality of new post-Soviet criminal recruits. Motivated, intelligent, equipped, possessing national level security and intelligence organization skills and contacts, these individuals and groups propeled the challenge posed by the existing Mafias to new levels.

A political consensus is emerging that Transnational crime now posses a substantial threat to European democratic institutions. The non-implementation of portions of the Maastricht Treaty documents the concern. European national and international institutions are working vigorously to respond to the situation.

The US military has been supporting international anti-crime effort since at least the formation of the anti-drug trafficking Joint Task Forces in the 1980s. The military's participation has produced only a modest increase in the anti-trafficking success rate but they have not been sent back to the barracks. Success or not, politicians obviously believe that participation is just as important as results.

The US experience suggests that European militaries will likely be drawn into anti-transnational crime efforts there. If this occurs, the US military would likely not be able to avoid engagement short of withdrawal. US European Command should begin planning now to assume a key role when so directed by the US NCAs.

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A front page article in the 7 March 1997 New York Times contained the following story elements: Russian, Cuban, Colombian criminals, drug trafficking, a Russian Admiral, a submarine, helicopters, and events in nine nations.

I. TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Background

Since the “beer wars” during the early days of Prohibition in Chicago, most Americans have been aware that organized criminal conspiracies exist and do business within their midst. Sometimes we called “it” the Mafia, the Mob, Murder Inc., or La Cosa Nostra. In the 1950s the Mob moved to Las Vegas, reportedly collaborated with the Kennedy White House on an anti-Castro initiative, and generally kept a low profile seeking anonymity if not respectability. Basically, however, the groups of that period were “small-time...with limited ambitions and constrained horizons,...a local fiefdom.”¹

“The technological transformation of time and space together with the political realities of the Post-Cold War era”² call for a reappraisal of the general threat posed by organized crime. Often referred to as transnational crime, we can define it as any criminal activity conducted in two or more states simultaneously;³ it includes such activities as “terrorism, espionage, drug-trafficking (and) arms-trafficking.”⁴

Characteristics

There are a number of traits indicative of the Post-Cold War transnational criminal organizations, key among them is their drive to exploit the benefits of international borders. They exploit any border to enhance the effects of jurisdictional fragmentation among law-enforcement agencies or for economic gain. This border agility leads to further flexibility in

“new products”⁵ offered and an ability to adapt to new local conditions. Although the ability to circumvent physical borders is key, more and more it is the ability of money and ownership to move across them without hindrance that provides the greatest illicit returns.

These groups, also known as “Criminal Enterprise Armies (CEAs),”⁶ are particularly difficult to deal with on a national level “as there is no single organizational or behavioral paradigm that provides a constant and accessible target.”⁷ Different elements or individuals within various groups “network” with other groups frequently across state borders “relying on a partner’s smuggling or money laundering”⁸ capabilities to complement their own skills. While specific groups dominate particular regions, other groups dominate certain types of crime such as drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and car theft. These alliances “resemble not traditional military alliances so much as strategic alliances among transnational corporations.”⁹ They frequently have “automatic rules of succession to leadership”¹⁰ sometimes off-setting the full value of a hard won arrest.

These groups characteristically enjoy the benefits of a safe home base. The base may be an entire nation (Russia), a region (Sicily, southern Italy), cities (“Cali, Sarajevo, and Kabul”¹¹), ethnic communities (China towns), virtual communities (off-shore banking heavens) or Mafia states (Aruba, St. Martin, Chechenya).¹²

When given the opportunity, the CEAs will seek to align themselves with “collaborative” states or state organs. “In Africa and Post-Soviet EURASIA, it is impossible to construct a firebreak between government and organized crime.”¹³ “Corrupt relations with political leaders,”¹⁴ foreign and domestic, are actively sought. The outward aggressiveness of state/CEA partnerships is another key difference from past criminal regimes (dictatorships).

“Today’s new model of criminal government has regional, even worldwide ambitions.”¹⁵ The CEA no longer seeks just local protection from law enforcement, but an ally and a platform for power projection overseas.

If the leading institutions of the state are above collusion, the CEAs will attempt to corrupt other elements of power. “The only genuinely multi-ethnic organizations now functioning in Bosnia, with their intermingling of ethnic Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (the Mafia)...are positioning themselves to take huge Government contracts and buy-up the state-owned businesses.”¹⁶ “Nigeria, an ambitious heroin broker, doesn’t have an army it has a Mafia in uniform.”¹⁷ Again, the CEA agenda is to co-opt or neutralize “home-base” authorities to support foreign operations.

A focus on “legitimate investments in foreign countries”¹⁸ to augment the safe home base is common. According to testimony before the House International Relations Committee in 1996, this ability to participate “simultaneously in the licit and illicit economies” is central to CEA operations. It is currently estimated that the Cali drug cartel receives more than half its yearly income from legal sources.

Other testimony before this Panel noted the tendency of CEA’s to have a minority ethnic group base and to rely on extreme violence to achieve their ends. In 1994, the murder rate in Russia was “more than twice that of the US.”¹⁹

Supporting Trends

The CEAs are exploiting a series of late 20th Century phenomena, most of which are fortuitous, in their rise to a new level of power.

“Adapting to a world that has turned from public sector dominance towards private enterprise and free markets”²⁰ is the primary nexus. Following the failure of the August 1991 pro-Communist coup, conversion of the centralized economy of the former USSR to private capitalism was begun in earnest with the “shock” policy changes of January 1992. Versions of this scenario occurred across the former socialist world. Old and new criminals took full advantage of the opportunity to increase their power by stealing state resources.²¹

The size and speed of the information revolution and all of its associated capabilities is arguably the key contributor to the most sophisticated big-money crimes. ‘The global money laundering (providing previously undocumented funds with a legitimate point of origin) figure per annum is \$1.3 Trillion”²² and Narco-dollar receipts are estimated from \$180 to \$500 billion with \$350 billion a year more widely touted. The ability to move and “hide” money is the CEA’s Center Of Gravity (COG), both its source of power and its greatest vulnerability.²³

CEA’s because of “their enormous financial resources and diversification (in location) of operations,”²⁴ possess an operational maneuver capability. They can move into totally new theaters of operations and sustain their efforts indefinitely. Established counter-measures can thus be by-passed or, when necessary, strategic withdrawals executed.

Improved telecommunications which are key to the money laundering, also permit the CEAs virtually instantaneous flexibility in the coordination of activities worldwide. States, on the other hand, are organized to deal with other states. They are bound by rules, tend to be open in their dealings, and the legal process can make them slow to respond to all cross-border movements. “The decline of the state (sovereignty)...accelerates under knowledge assault, as new structures of knowing outpace the ability of traditional government to process and respond

to the information.”²⁵ As a result of the speed and diversity of nodes, states are forced to rely on voluntary reporting of transactions that are subject to taxes or other forms of state control.

Just as it is a trait of the CEAs to seek out politicians and institutions to corrupt, failing states may initiate the relationship. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea finances itself with arms sales and criminal activities. In the past North Korean diplomats have been accused of drug and arms trafficking. The recent seizure of \$100 million in drugs by the Japanese from a North Korean ship demonstrates the level at which she now operates.²⁶ The Colombians are taking advantage of the situation in Bosnia to ship “cocaine through Bosnia to Croatia, Austria, and Italy.”²⁷

The rise of “global” cities with their diverse ethnic communities and numbers often in the tens of millions, are a source of new recruits for the CEAs and provide operational “cover and concealment.”²⁸ The CEA’s in return are driving the smuggling of illegal aliens that further feeds these metropolises.

The economics of drug cultivation mitigate against sustained reduction in world supply. “In Kyrgyzstan, per capita GNP was on \$610 in 1994, but a pound of opium (brought) \$400 in local markets.”²⁹ By the time the drug hits the street, “the total cost of cultivating, refining, and smuggling cocaine to the US accounts for less than 12 percent of the retail price.”³⁰ The profits from beginning to the end of the cycle far outweigh potential risks or social inhibitions for people trying to survive on \$610.

This economic incentive translates to the collective level. The wealth of the world tends to concentrate in those nations with technological skills, industrial plants, natural resources and low birth rates. Technically backward, resource poor or over-populated states have little choice

but to ignore criminal activity if the labor of their people has little value in the international market. In another twist, the same information revolution that supports transnational crime activities also provides a television diet which raises the expectations of the international poor.

II GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE

Sovereignty Revisited

Since the rise of the nation-state in the late Middle Ages, sovereignty has resided at the national level and been related to the control of territory. Many today argue that the power of the state is being eclipsed by the interdependence of economies, eco-systems, popular culture, or the reemergence of old ethnic rivalries. Transnational crime decouples “the traditional linkage between territory and security”³¹ by reducing the legitimacy of borders. “Criminals operate in a borderless world, law enforcement still has to operate in a bordered world.”³²

What territory does Moscow control? “In July 1993, ...the Yekaterinburg region declared itself the new “Republic of the Urals.”³³ It can be argued that what is really happening in Albania is not about the political party of the former communists verses the socialists and rightists, but about a criminally tolerant south (smuggling, car theft, drug and weapons trafficking) trying to loosen the control of the central government. According to Robert D. Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy,” few sub-Saharan African states can rightfully claim the mantle of sovereignty. While these may not be “Mafia States,” they are states that have lost control of a portion of their territory to a CEAs.

The trend for larger sates to fragment is growing. Czechoslovakia is now two states and Yugoslavia five plus. The former USSR added six plus states to the US European Command (EUCOM) Area Of Responsibility (AOR). States such as the UK, France, Spain and Italy have regional secessionist groups. CEAs promote ethnic divisions as they further fragment the power

of ordered society. The current situation in Albania is being exploited by “drug runners, smugglers and money launderers.”³⁴ As a general rule, the smaller the political entity, the more susceptible it is to subversion.

It is not impossible to believe that collaborative states may lend their international legitimacy to CEA groups or their causes and have CEAs accepted in some quarters, just as Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran were and continue to be willing to support terrorism. Terrorist groups may form alliances with CEAs just as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has “struck a bargain with the cartels.”³⁵ The Central Intelligence Agency believes that the Russian CEAs have connections to worldwide terrorist groups.³⁶ Other politically unsuccessful groups like the Irish Republican Army have to some degree deteriorated into CEAs.³⁷ The divisions between politically motivated terrorists and economically driven CEAs are blurring.

Even when faced with a clear-cut threat, states are sometimes unable to respond effectively because of the complex agendas of democratic nations. If the US were a homogeneous nation we would likely respond to the torrent of drugs much as Chinese Singapore has with severe penalties for users and traffickers and little resultant drug trade. The West in general prefers its broad civil liberties to overly aggressive law enforcement.

Russian Mafia Impact

In 1993 General Shalikashvili noted that the Iron Curtain, while imprisoning those behind it, also “protected the west from hundreds of problems.”⁴⁶ The breakup of the Warsaw Pact did not occur in a vacuum. It occurred in a world already awash in drug money, experiencing the first phase of organized criminal groups attacking a state from with-out, via the free or freer movement of goods, people and information across frontiers. The demise of the communist states

not only contributed to the worldwide trends, but added a new dimension, the old communist nomenkultura, to the criminal conspiracy. The nomenkultura consisted of party leaders, senior bureaucrats and military officers and other elites privileged under the communist system.

The traditional Russian or Soviet Mafia member was not only well schooled in the criminal arts, he was also connected with the bureaucracy. They had the experience and connections to take advantage of the opportunities inherent in the transfer of the former USSR's wealth to the private sector. Reliance on protection, enforcement, and petty crime quickly gave way to opportunities in the movement of goods, services and people across newly established frontiers.

The old nomenkultura who saw their financial positions crumble under the effects of inflation and government down-sizing, joined with the Mafias. Especially for members of the former Soviet security services (KGB, GRU, MVD), the Mafia became the employer of choice.⁴⁷ The nomenkultura provided "intelligence information, legal aid, social prestige, and political cover"⁴⁸ to the regular criminals. In 1991, "the KGB immediately reduced its effectives by about 100,000 agents, most of whom went straight into organized crime syndicates."⁴⁹

Some argue that when the former communist states are able to provide the services which businesses require "the Mafia is likely to fade in importance..(and) the net impact of organized crime on Russia today is probably beneficial."⁵⁰ Others note the long term benefits to the economies of Italy, Germany and Japan born in the immediate post-1945 years, advances based on black-marketing, predatory buying, substandard manufacture, and efficient stealing."⁵¹ Others contend that the Eurasian CEAs are an element of the new regional empire being built "on the cheap"⁵² by the Russian Federation. A former KGB instructor in an interview said, a "true

Mafia would defend Russia against the pollution of foreign money (influence).”⁵³ Today in Russia, attacks on the Mafia tend to have an “extremely narrow focus...(on) Caucasian gangs, non-Russian businessman, and pro-reform ministers.”⁵⁴ “It is against the Chechens that most of the (Russian) Federal Security Service (FSB the old KGB)...operations are directed.”⁵⁵ The Russian Mafias clearly are a power within today’s Russian Federation.⁵⁶

III. NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

How Russia organizes her internal situation, however, is not the issue. The future of Russia as a democratic nation or a Mafia state, while important, is of lesser concern to the nations of the West in the near term than the impact outside her borders of the power of her CEAs and those of other former communist states. It is evident that the transnational crime environment is palpably different in the post-Soviet era. The sheer numbers of the old Soviet Mafiosi and “new” criminals added to the world stage and the special skills and contacts that they possess have dramatically shifted the state-CEA equation.

Peacetime/Crisis

“CEAs may not have the organization and hitting power of CENTCOM (US Central Command), but they are increasingly more than a match for underpaid, under trained, under equipped...cops - or even regional militaries.”⁵⁷ In some instances these groups cross-fertilize, “the police forces and the intelligence agents (were) the natural recruits of the Russian gangs.”⁵⁸

States can easily use these hybrid CEAs with their military or other governmental skills to undermine an adversary. “300 mercenaries from the former Yugoslavia...hired by President Mobutu, (and commanded by) Col. Dominic Yugo (sic)”⁵⁹ recently “ruled” the city of Kisangani, Zaire. Individuals or CEAs will continue to provide services to those that can pay, mercenary

military services often exacerbating already deplorable situations. Some poor states have “financed their intelligence activities with criminal gangs.”⁶⁰

Illegal immigration will continue as long as individuals from poorer nations have the dream and the means of moving north or west. According to a German Naval Officer,⁶¹ European Union (EU) concern over illegal immigration has recently shifted from the former Warsaw Pact states to the Middle East and especially North Africa. The CEAs are key players in the smuggling of humans. The vast majority of the people involved intend becoming productive and responsible citizens of their adopted country; however, their illegal status makes them prime candidates for further exploitation by the CEAs.

Drugs will continue to be the key means with which the richer nations are assaulted. Poor third or old second world “mules” will continue to assault international airports as long as the rewards are commensurate with the risks. Alternatively, CEAs awash with narco-dollars can and will develop and deploy “new equipment, like semi-submarines”⁶² as conditions require.

Communications Security (COMSEC) and information security (INFOSEC) are under threat even in peacetime. “Criminal groups have been known to procure and use sophisticated communications intercept equipment”⁶³ and “members of the (old) KGB working for organized crime...include communications specialists.”⁶⁴ The West “should devote as much attention to peacetime protection of communications and information systems as to developing a capability for the wartime disruption of an enemy’s system.”⁶⁵ These assets are apparently working primarily to defend themselves (intelligence gathering) or improve the technology available to support their operations. “It may not be a large step from exploiting technologies for organizational...purposes to efforts to disrupt (Information Warfare (IW)) the technology

dependent communication and information systems of states.” We will only discover the fully successful IW penetrations after the fact.⁶⁶

Wartime

“We must recognize that international criminal and terrorist organizations in ‘peacetime’ must be regarded as combatants during wartime.”⁶⁷ CEAs aligned with rogue states may provide those states with access to capabilities, technology or influence, they’d previously not had. CEA’s have the capability to be the poor man’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) with the additional attribution of deniability on the part of the dispatching state.

In a worst case analysis, CEAs or their allies will use the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to extort a desired goal. World Trade Center like assaults or hostage taking will be the more likely outrages; however, an event out of all proportion in terms of human life to material gain is always possible by intent or error.

“Post-Soviet organized crime represents a new form of authoritarianism, the government because it is complicit, compromised or impotent is unable to protect citizens.”⁶⁸ Numerous states more or less based on “kleptocracy”⁶⁹ may emerge. Coalitions bent on aggression may develop an alliance of CEA controlled and influenced states or the have-not. Should this trend develop “the main fissures in international politics would be that between ‘outlaw’ states and law abiding states.”⁷⁰ Wartime alliances based on an anti-rich common interest are likely (witness Iraq’s DESERT SHIELD supporters).

IV. EU CONCERNS

Due to geography and history, the EU is experiencing the brunt of post-Soviet CEA’s cross border activity. NATO members, other advanced states, transitioning states micro and

developing states are all targets. From the beginning the Eurasian CEAs came to stay, because, as the bank robber Mr. Willie Sutton said, “that’s where the money is.”

As the walls came down, “law enforcement broke down all across Soviet territory and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. Border controls practically ceased to exist.”⁷¹ “The Chechen gangs began their international networking well before the Soviet Union collapsed; their stolen-car operations made them contacts in Turkey and Eastern Europe.”⁷² The Russian Mafiosi got a head start in the West via the Soviet Western Group of Forces (WGF) stationed in the old East Germany.⁷³

The connections established by the KGB in the days of the USSR also serve as an avenue to the West. The Soviets directly or via Warsaw Pact allies, supported political/terrorist groups in 12 EUCOM AOR countries⁷⁴ with the Russia CEAs alone now operating “in up to 50 different countries.”⁷⁵

As the salaries of workers in the old Soviet nuclear industry “declined about 70 percent”⁷⁶ between 1989 and 1994, the fears of proliferation of nuclear materials and/or WMD were raised. The West wasn’t even sure about the size of the potential problem. “A CIA estimate of mid-1992 (re Russian nuclear weapons) had a margin of error of 5,000 warheads.”⁷⁷ Small seizures of nuclear material were made in the mid-90s in Western Europe all “well short of the 8 kilos necessary to make a primitive bomb.”⁷⁸ However, most EU senior officials are less concerned about a bomb and more concerned that a group “smuggling such materials might try to extort money (threaten to release the material) or accidentally pollute the environment with them.”⁷⁹

The transfer of profits gained from money laundering activities and the exploitation of former state properties in the East, to Western banks is another concern. “Capital flight by

individuals and corporations (in the former USSR) runs at between \$10 and \$15 billion a year.”⁸⁰ London, Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg and Germany were early favorite transfer points because of the lack, at the time, of regulation concerning money laundering. Cyprus emerged after 1994 as a favored location, “housing some 2,000 Russian companies,...(and) a dozen banks.”⁸¹ Other still “fiscally tolerant states” in Europe include “Malta, Andorra, Ireland, Belgium (and) the Channel Islands.”⁸² European’s fear that CEA funds will eventually be used to control legitimate businesses the first step to political power.

Drug production in the former USSR is increasing with its largest natural market being the EU. “Opium is an important source of revenue”⁸³ for the economies of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan with “production doubling since 1990.”⁸⁴ Poppies are now raised in the “radioactive terrain around Chernobyl.”⁸⁵ “Russian organized crime groups in search of higher profits are turning increasingly to narcotics trafficking.”⁸⁶ With double-digit unemployment, EU governments are rightly concerned about the potential for further drug penetration of their societies.

Welfare and subsidy fraud has advanced to new levels in the EU. Bureaucracy “smart” ex-Warsaw Pact elites conspire with locals to defraud EU governments of “export or import subsidies.”⁸⁷ The CEAs move real or fictitious shipments across borders to collect the subsidies. “The incentive for trading across borders because of price differentials and market conditions is as compelling for illicit enterprise as it is for licit.”⁸⁸

V. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES

Civil Liberties

At present the European criminal legal systems are less effective against the CEAs because the EU states “extend citizen-equivalent judicial treatment to foreign criminals.”⁸⁹ Only recently, when Denmark “passed provisions allowing a significant infringement on biker’s freedom”⁹⁰ did they begin to curb their drug trafficking. All states may not have the political consensus to adopt this course nor all CEAs be as weak as the Scandinavian Hell’s Angels.

The legacy of totalitarianism serves the interests of the CEAs. A panel of international military officers at the US Naval War College, except for members from formally communist Poland and Bulgaria, recently agreed that the military must assist the state in addressing CEAs.⁹¹ Formerly NAZI Germany was targeted early by CEAs because, “apart from its wealth and power, Germany has strict bank secrecy laws, no currency controls, unbending rules protecting privacy, (and) a severely hobbled police force.”⁹²

Maastricht Treaty

In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty was to have removed the last impediments to the free movement of goods, services and individuals within the European Union (EU). This 19th century diplomatic step to further EU integration soon ran into the realities of the late 20th century. “People were the EU’s nightmare by 1993--migrants and crooks;”⁹³ as a result the portions of the Maastricht Treaty that permitted free movement (resident status) for individuals were not implemented. Five million guest workers had facilitated the entree into Germany of the Turkish, Italian and eventually the Eurasian Mafias via the old East Germany.

Institutions

Western leadership continues to call for “greater cooperation between police forces, the sharing of criminal intelligence, facilitating extraditions, mutual legal assistance, and increasing flows of technical and financial assistance”⁹⁴ especially to weaker European states. INTERPOL in Lyon functions as a clearing house for shared information and a provision of Maastricht created EUROPOL “which is expected to become the supra-national police agency of Europe.”⁹⁵ “The 1988 UN convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances has been ratified by 80 nations (1995).”⁹⁶ The UN Criminal Justice Information Network (UNCJIN) has been established. The International Law Enforcement Academy is operating in Budapest to train former Eastern Bloc police. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is working with the “the EU and with a number of multi-country task forces targeting organized crime.”⁹⁷

In the final analysis, EU “member countries are still sovereign states moving slowly and laboriously toward a distant goal”⁹⁸ and, as noted, CEAs rely on political fragmentation. Given time, the civilian approach may be effective; however, rising public concern or a single outrage could drastically reduce the time available for those methods to achieve results.

Military Options

NATO

NATO is engaged in the former Yugoslavia in a way it has never been before. This military and political alliance is itself in a broader coalition effort to maintain peace. The NATO alliance concept has come some distance from the strictly Western military defensive concept created in the 1950s. This new NATO deals everyday with the effects of a modern civil war

including the criminal elements aligned with the various political factions. The CEAs provide financial support to their political entity of choice and are tolerated in return. According to a German attached to the EU Mission in Mostar, the entire western part of the city is run by the Croatian Mafia.⁹⁹ NATO soldiers must balance military, diplomatic, and police missions in this new situation.

Key to both the NATO mission and the US National Security Strategy is support for “the growth of democracy.”¹⁰⁰ The EU comes under immediate pressure to respond when political instability manifests itself within the “growing” NATO Area Of Interest (AOI). The EU’s rapid response to the deterioration of conditions in Albania in 1997 was quite different from the agonizing over what to do about the former Yugoslavia in 1991-92. Protecting individuals or minority groups in emerging democratic societies when “flagrant lawlessness and criminal threats to legitimacy...provoke an...authoritarian backlash”¹⁰¹--Chechnya for example--could be a future international mission.

NATO is chartered “to deter and, if necessary, repel all possible forms of aggression.” The alliance further “provides the forum in which (members) consult together on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters affecting their security.”¹⁰² The security of Western Europe today is under greater threat from CEAs than any military threat. NATO should adapt to that reality. “A major police function should be added to NATO. INTERPOL and NATO should be merged.”¹⁰³

US Support

While the US military’s mission is broad and priorities dictate day-to-day actions, conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is a routine affair. EUCOM forces

deployed to Bosnia, Macedonia, and the Adriatic, and those providing air cover of Northern Iraq are engaged in MOOTW. "US armed forces already are involved in struggles against international organized crime... We deploy on missions of disease control, resource protection, security assistance and the protection of US citizens abroad."¹⁰⁴

The scope notwithstanding, militaries have manpower and applicable capabilities which in some areas are beyond the resources of the police. In specific missions such as the interdiction of smugglers' aircraft or vessels, military capabilities have obvious application. Military purists would argue "that if military organization and training are relevant to domestic problems, the preferred solution should be to transplant these characteristics to the civilian agencies."¹⁰⁵ Although the organizationally better answer, dealing with the CEA issue in Europe, if military capabilities are called upon, will require a time-sensitive response.

Given the example of US military support to counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, if Europeans are not more successful with their civil barriers to the CEAs, it is probable that requests for NATO and/or EUCOM support can be expected in the near-term or not at all. Although this civilian support role need not be permanent, it would increase relevancy for the military in the Post-Cold War European public eye and provide much needed interim punch as civil institutions mature.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Operational Issues

EUCOM should prepare its forces to engage in a counter-CEA role as part of a coalition (NATO) or multi-national European grouping. In accordance with the US National Security Strategy, a Theater Strategic Estimate should be executed, a Theater Strategy devised and a

campaign plan developed. The principles of MOOTW must be observed and where possible, military operational design employed. Specifically, following the Theater Estimate to assess the task, desired end-state, and post-hostilities phase, CINCUSEUCOM should develop a strategy setting forth likely missions and objectives, operational concepts appropriate to the missions, and a listing of resources to be committed and the new commitment's impact on military readiness. EUCOM's resource listing should, in addition to manpower, detail those base facilities, training facilities, communications, operational-level intelligence assets, and transportation resources that can be brought to bear to support major operations or the total campaign. His strategy must look ahead at what resources need to be programmed and budgeted.

Confronting CEAs in the EUCOM AOR is not a unilateral probability. "US military forces will only be used in coordination with host nation or possibly sanctioned by the UN"¹⁰⁶ or other appropriate international organization. When tasked, EUCOM should seek to assume the overall operational planning mission in a combined interagency effort in which CINCEUR will likely be supporting a multi-national authority. Only a multi-service, agency and allied approach will provide the unity of effort required .

Just as in a military campaign, a well orchestrated operational design, whether the military controls all the elements or not, will be key to success. Such a plan would be a roadmap and a bench-mark for the actions and performance of others. Synchronizing the frequently diverse agendas of participating governments, civilian agencies (arrests v. intelligence penetration for example), military and para-military formations to achieve the operational tempo and mass required for the desired end state will be driven by planning.

As the military is naturally reluctant to engage in what would be a broad new set of responsibilities, a sound campaign plan will surface concerns for early resolution. Supporting commanders, CINCs, agencies, allies, and the US national level will see in detail the levels of commitment and synchronization necessary to achieve impact. The military must take ownership of its portion of the mission thus providing the perseverance necessary to success.

Actions

Senior US military leaders must be aware of the threat to current operations and personnel posed by CEAs. Deployed forces must be aware of the potential enemies' Order of Battle to include CEA relationships with other political and military groups. Intelligence on a CEA's COGs, decisive points, lines-of-communications (LOCs), alliances, logistics and doctrine (modus operandi) must be assembled.

US military aircraft have been used to smuggle drugs from Turkey to Italy. Commanders must be as alert to the possibility of being exploited by CEAs as they are to the potential illegal sale of tax exempt goods from the local exchange. In coalition situations, commanders should recognize the possibility that allied "military officers (may) smuggle weapons and narcotics via military transports."¹⁰⁷

It will likely be necessary to apply sophisticated military sensors to the smuggling problems. The New York Times story paraphrased at the beginning of this paper concerned an apparently failed attempt to hire a Russian submarine and crew to smuggle drugs.¹⁰⁸ Given the resources available to the traffickers, it would be surprising if they did not already possess that capability.

US military participation in these operations must be above reproach. In response to efforts at exposing criminal activity, the press is under attack by CEAs and has been intimidated in some areas by CEAs and their collaborationists. Deployed forces must be sensitive to being adversely characterized in the press when dealing with what may appear to be clear-cut issues of right and wrong. They must exhibit restraint in press dealings, understanding the civil-libertarian concerns of the larger communities. SOF Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) capabilities and training will likely be required.

Operations security (OPSEC) and especially communications security (COMSEC) procedures must be maintained in MOOTW situations. The threat is as real as any posed by the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) arms of the former Soviet empire and perhaps more sophisticated.

“We must insure that our aid programs do not inadvertently facilitate organized crime.”¹⁰⁹ Simply delivering the “goods” to areas of need may not be enough. The troops must be aware of the potential for pilferage by “local charitable groups” and do all that they can to insure the final destination of the aid. Attention must be paid to the role of international, national, and private aid groups. Again, unity of effort is required. It is interesting to note that the last cash payment received by CIA turn-coat Aldrich Ames “came from US backed International Monetary Fund loans.”¹¹⁰

If called upon, senior military leaders must first understand their objective and “then sensitize their staffs and subordinate commanders to the non-traditional threat parameters.”¹¹¹ Economy of force may require units completely dedicated to the CEA mission. A Joint Task Force with its own Joint Intelligence Center and Combined Civilian/Military Operations Center would appear desirable.

CONCERNS

“Fighting drug cartels and combating other criminal ‘ghost states’ is the morale officers nightmare, full of impossible restrictions, gray areas, and daily operations (with the potential) to embarrass the flag and demoralize the force.”¹¹² Operational maneuver of forces from outside the theater to include their frequent rotation may be the most efficient method of avoiding subversion of the force. While some might argue that military readiness declines would be the most serious consequences of involvement with a CEA MOOTW mission, security of the force must be the greater concern.

The public must be prepared vis-à-vis a military anti-crime mission. Legitimacy and ultimately public support will depend on education.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 84.
- ² McDonald, William F., "The Globalization of Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier", Transnational Organized Crime, Spring 1995, 17.
- ³ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 85.
- ⁴ McDonald, William F., "The Globalization of Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier", Transnational Organized Crime, Spring 1995, 23.
- ⁵ Godson, Roy, William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime", Society Magazine, January/February 1995, 23.
- ⁶ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 11. The term CEA may be over-stating the case, however, it enjoys some recognition and is a convenient acronym.
- ⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 85.
- ⁸ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 201.
- ⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 87.
- ¹⁰ Jondora, John L., "Threat Parameters for Operations Other than War", Parameters, Spring 1995, 60.
- ¹¹ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 9
- ¹² Chechnya has apparently join Aruba as a recognized Mafia state. Author Andrew Meier declared Chechnya "the former Soviet Union's first Mafia-controlled state" along with its leader in 1995, Lt. Gen. Dzhokhar Dudayev, formerly of the Soviet Air Force. In announcing his assault on Chechnya, President Yeltsin gave two reasons for the action. He said that "Chechnya was the focus of an armed rebellion against the Russian Federation and it had become, in effect,...a Mafia controlled state." Author Claire Sterling (11) adds St. Martins to the list.
- ¹³ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 10
- ¹⁴ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 201.
- ¹⁵ Peters, Ralph, "The Culture of Future Conflict", Parameters, Winter 1995-1996, 110.
- ¹⁶ Hedges, Chris, "A War Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia's Peace", New York Times, 1 May 1996, A8.
- ¹⁷ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 12.
- ¹⁸ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 202.
- ¹⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime. Hearings, 6.
- ²⁰ Thornburgh, Dick, "The Internationalization of Business Crime", Transnationalization Organized Crime, Spring 1995, 24.
- ²¹ According to "Inside Russia's True Economy", What quickly resulted was an economy in free-fall with the "Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declining about 60 percent over four years," inflation ran as high as 215 percent in 1994 and the Ruble which had once cost \$1.5 to purchase fell to 5,230 to the dollar by 1996. Thirty percent of the population has gone under the poverty line with

the old, the young and the unskilled suffering the greatest declines. Some former Soviets did better, the successful new entrepreneurial groups, are comprised primarily of the nomenkultura, former communist party leaders, bureaucrats and military officials in alliance with the criminal underworld. Steven Handleman in his book "Comrade Criminal", documents similar illegal acts by the current presidents or vice-presidents of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan.

²² U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 24.

²³ According to Claire Sterling author of "Thieves' World", in 1992 the Colombians were paying up to 25 percent to get their profits laundered. Operating first via the Sicilian Mafia, eventually the Colombians asked the Russian Mafia to help launder their European drug profits. These dollar flows are so substantial that perhaps one-quarter of the transactions in the Russian economy are denominated or paid for in US dollars. The entire ex-Soviet bloc has become an enormous washing machine for dirty money. Suspected drug profits were exchanged for rubles, the rubles used to buy state resources, oil for example, the commodity then shipped to the West and sold for now documentable, dollars.

²⁴ Godson, Roy, William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime", Society Magazine, January/February 1995, 26.

²⁵ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 21

²⁶ Jordan, Mary, Kevin Sullivan, "Japan Seizes Drugs on N. Korean Ship", Washington Post, 19 April 1997, A16.

²⁷ Hedges, Chris, "Gangs Descend To Pick Bosnia's Carcass Clean", New York Times, 7 October 1996, A8.

²⁸ Godson, Roy, William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime", Society Magazine, January/February 1995, 29.

²⁹ Falco, Mathea, "US Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure", Foreign Policy, Spring 1996, 126.

³⁰ Ibid., 127.

³¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 87.

³² Ibid., 28.

³³ Handleman, Stephen, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, 357.

³⁴ Perlez, Jane, "Albania Calls An Emergency as Chaos Rises", New York Times, 3 March 1997, A1.

³⁵ Godson, Roy, William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime", Society Magazine, January/February 1995, 24.

³⁶ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime, Hearings, 52.

³⁷ Anderson, Scott, "The High Cost of Peace In Northern Ireland", Harpers, February 1994, 45.

⁴⁶ Shalikashvili, John, "The End of the Cold War Opens a New Future For NATO", The Officer, August 1993, 50.

⁴⁷ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 205.

⁴⁸ Sterling, Claire, Thieves' World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, 97.

⁴⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 23.

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- ⁵⁰ Leitzel, Jim, Clifford Gaddy, Micheal Alexeev, "Mafiosi and Matrioshki", The Brookings Review, Winter 1995, 28.
- ⁵¹ Luttwak, Edward, "Has The Mafia Saved Russia", London Review of Books, 2 August 1995, Commentary.
- ⁵² Peters, Ralph, "The Culture of Future Conflict", Parameters, Winter 1995/96, 27.
- ⁵³ Handleman, Stephen, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, 311.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., 310.
- ⁵⁵ Knight, Amy, "Internal Security and the Rule of Law in Russia", Current History, October 1996, 312.
- ⁵⁶ According to testimony before the House International Affairs Committee, the "private sector now constitut(es) more than half of the economy" and "organized crime now control(s) up to half of the privatized capital of Russia" dominating "1,500 state enterprises, 4,000 shareholding societies, 500 joint ventures, and 550 banks," the Mafia is now the most powerful single influence on the Russian economy next to the state itself.
- ⁵⁷ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 11.
- ⁵⁸ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 205.
- ⁵⁹ McKinley, James C. Jr., "Serb Who Went To Defend Zaire Spread Death And Horror Instead", New York Times, 19 March 1997, A1.
- ⁶⁰ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 205.
- ⁶¹ Interview with Commander J. Ehle, German Navy, at the US Naval War College, 16 April 1997.
- ⁶² Sterling, Claire, Thieves' World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, 27.
- ⁶³ Jondora, John L., "Threat Parameters for Operations Other than War", Parameters, Spring 1995, 63.
- ⁶⁴ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime, Hearings, 5.
- ⁶⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 93.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 84.
- ⁶⁷ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 12.
- ⁶⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime, Hearings, 8.
- ⁶⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 30.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., 92.
- ⁷¹ Sterling, Claire, Thieves' World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, 42.
- ⁷² Handleman, Stephen, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, 259.
- ⁷³ According to Claire Sterling author of "Thieves' World", both the Russian state ("60,000 Kalashnikov rifles disappeared from its armories within a few weeks; anti-air missiles were selling for \$450" and the Germans "Russian business Mafia began to collect state tax refunds on non-existent imported goods for the (WGF) troops" were defrauded. According to testimony before the House International Affairs Committee, in 1991 "420 Red Army gangs in Germany were working for Mafia dons in Moscow."
- ⁷⁴ Elad, Shlomi, Ariel Merri, "The Soviet Bloc and World Terrorism", Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 1984.

- ⁷⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime, Hearings, 50.
- ⁷⁶ Gordon, Michael R., Matthew L. Wild, "Russian Controls on Bomb Material Leaky", New York Times, 18 August 1994, A1.
- ⁷⁷ Handleman, Stephen, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, 365.
- ⁷⁸ Binyon, Michael, Richard Beeston, "West Dismisses Russian Denials on Smuggled Plutonium", London Times, 16 August 1994, 13.
- ⁷⁹ McDonald, William F., "The Globalization of Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier", Transnational Organized Crime, Spring 1995, 7.
- ⁸⁰ Rutland, Peter, "Russia's Unsteady Entry into the Global Economy", Current History, October 1996, 324.
- ⁸¹ Theodoulou, Michael, "Russians Expelled From Mafia's Island Playground in the Sun", London Times, 27 August 1994, 13.
- ⁸² Sterling, Claire, Thieves' World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, 233
- ⁸³ Falco, Mathea, "US Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure", Foreign Policy, Spring 1996, 125.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid., 130.
- ⁸⁵ Sterling, Claire, Thieves' World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, 106.
- ⁸⁶ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime, Hearings, 52.
- ⁸⁷ McDonald, William F., "The Globalization of Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier", Transnational Organized Crime, Spring 1995, 12.
- ⁸⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 86.
- ⁸⁹ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 12.
- ⁹⁰ Ibrahim, Youssef, "Sweden's Courteous Police Spoil Hell's Angels Party", New York Times, 3 March 1997, A1.
- ⁹¹ During a seminar discussion on Transnational Crime held at the US Naval War college on 25 April 1997, officers from the Middle East, Latin America and Asia agreed with the need of applying military resources to the CEA problem. Only the officers from the ex-communist states objected in principal to military involvement in police affairs.
- ⁹² Sterling, Claire, Thieves' World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, 52.
- ⁹³ Ibid., 39
- ⁹⁴ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 207.
- ⁹⁵ McDonald, William F., "The Globalization of Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier", Transnational Organized Crime, Spring 1995, 17.
- ⁹⁶ Thornburgh, Dick, "The Internationalization of Business Crime", Transnationalization Organized Crime, Spring 1995, 31.
- ⁹⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 8.
- ⁹⁸ Sterling, Claire, Thieves' World, Simon&Schuster, New York, 1994, 245.
- ⁹⁹ Hedges, Chris, "A War Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia's Peace", New York Times, 1 May 1996, A8.
- ¹⁰⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 12.
- ¹⁰¹ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 204.
- ¹⁰² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 11.
- ¹⁰³ Crozier, Brian, "The New World Disorder", National Review, 19 December 1994, 103.

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- ¹⁰⁴ Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 12.
- ¹⁰⁵ Lamb, Christopher, "Perspectives on Emerging Roles and Missions", Special Warfare, July 1995, 6.
- ¹⁰⁶ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1997, 208.
- ¹⁰⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime, Hearings, 7.
- ¹⁰⁸ Navarro, Mireya, "Russian Submarine Surfaces as Player in the Drug World", New York Times, 7 March 1997, A1.
- ¹⁰⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, The Threat From Russian Organized Crime, Hearings, 13.
- ¹¹⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 19.
- ¹¹¹ Jondora, John L., "Threat Parameters for Operations Other than War", Parameters, Spring 1995, 67.
- ¹¹² Peters, Ralph, "After the Revolution", Parameters, Summer 1995, 13.

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