Issues on the Center of Gravity in Counterinsurgency Operations.
Abstract
Since World War II, military operations other than war (MOOTW) have been met by an evolution of force structure, technology, and doctrine in the United States. Foremost within our doctrine is the foundation of the Operational Art of Warfare with its concepts and tenets to link strategic objectives or aims with tactical actions. Among the most important of the Operational Art tenets is the concept of the Center of Gravity (COG), which is key within this tactical-strategic linkage to achieving a quick, decisive victory (QDV) by efficient use of forces against the strength of an adversary. Differences arise at the operational level when the COG is studied in the MOOTW environment; particularly in insurgency/counterinsurgency missions. These differences reveal the operational COG in counterinsurgency operations is difficult to find, or likely will never exist due to the insurgent's campaign plan. Consequently, from the counterinsurgent's standpoint the operational level linkage (and associated operations at this level) fail, or at least become very protracted. Do we fully understand the fundamental differences between the conventional forces application of Operational Art and the concept of the COG with that of unconventional forces? Do we have historical examples which depict these differences? This paper examines these questions, offers conclusions and then proposes some considerations for future force employment in the insurgency/counterinsurgency environment based upon the findings presented above.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA328132
Entities
Organizations
- Naval War College