In Search for Leverage: David Versus Goliath in 1967.
Abstract
This paper examines the Israeli Air Force (IAF) operational art employed during the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. Its purpose is to create a blueprint of valuable lessons to guide our nation's future force employment. To set the stage, a short historical compendium of the political environment leading up to the conflict, followed by a summary of the IAF air operation is provided. Given this background, the scope of the operational art analysis is limited to examining the IAF's primary operational objective of establishing air superiority during the first two days of the war. The analytical method to derive major lessons learned will be to sift the elements of operational art employed by the IAF air operation against a screen of the nine enduring principles of war: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Simplicity, Security, and Surprise. This analytical framework revealed a golden trinity of truths' employed by the Israelis that successfully unlocked the effective and efficient application of their limited force: sound planning, quality leadership and expert objective of establishing air superiority during the first two days of the war. The analytical method to derive major lessons learned will be to sift the elements of operational art employed by the IAF air operation against a screen of the nine enduring principles of war: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Simplicity, Security, and Surprise. This analytical framework revealed a golden "trinity of truths" employed by the Israelis that successfully unlocked the effective and efficient application of their limited force: sound planning, quality leadership and expert implementation. p2
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 13, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA328155
Entities
People
- Dennis F. Sager
Organizations
- Naval War College