Can Peacekeeping and Security Assistance Co-Exist? A Bosnia Case Study.
Abstract
The United States' objectives in Bosnia are to end the fighting, to sustain Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified sovereign state, and to promote stability in the region. Two critical components of the US strategy are the deployment of US troops with a NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia and an effort to rectify the military imbalance in Bosnia through a US-led effort to train and equip the Bosnian Federation's armed forces. This paper examines these two components of the US strategy through the prism of the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) as articulated in joint and service doctrine. This paper argues that the train and equip program: weakens the legitimacy of NATO peacekeepers in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs; increases the potential risks to their security; detracts from the multilateral unity of effort by undermining other aspects of the peace effort and putting the US at odds with its NATO allies; potentially threatens the achievement of US strategic objectives in Bosnia; and suggests a limit to US perseverance by setting unrealistic deadlines for achieving success. In planning future peacekeeping operations, the NCA and regional CINCs should carefully weigh the impact of simultaneously implementing a security assistance program against: the immediate potential for increasing risks to the peacekeeping force; the impact it might have on the unity of effort in a multilateral setting; and any long-term potential for sparking or worsening the effects of future conflict in the country or region in question. The principles of MOOTW can provide an initial 'sanity check' for this calculation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 19, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA328188
Entities
People
- Paul J. Albers
Organizations
- Naval War College