Operational Functions in the Littoral: Command & Control, Movement & Maneuver Protection.
Abstract
On 8 December, 1941, the Japanese initiated operations against the British Crown Colony of Malaya, as a necessary precursor to conquest of the Netherlands East Indies. The British defenders had the advantage of numerically nearly equal land forces, and 1100 kilometers of rugged terrain where they had operated for years. The Japanese had clear superiority in naval and air forces, and ground forces hardened by years of combat in China. This operation had all the trappings of an epic littoral struggle, perhaps on the scale of that ongoing in North Africa. It didn't live up to its billing. In a short ten weeks the Japanese completed conquest of the entire peninsula and the island of Singapore. When Singapore surrendered, the British couldn't find solace in even an isolated tactical victory. The fall of Malaya and Singapore was perhaps inevitable, but the speed with which they collapsed was not. British failures in the operational functions of command and control, movement and maneuver, and protection explain the rapidity with which this operation was completed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 19, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA328237
Entities
People
- Bruce E. Dunscombe
Organizations
- Naval War College